Ninth National Conference U.S. National Commission for UNESCO

Chicago - 23/26 ottobre 1963

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2 - A report of the ninth national conference

3 - A.Spinelli: The sources of supranational unity

4 - F.Bondy: Cultural diversity - Political unity: a european dilemma?

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6 - C.MacInnes: Reflections of change in literature

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8 - E.Fromm: The psychology of nationalism

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EUROPA

THE NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: NEW DIRECTIONS

1-

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE
U. S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO
CHICAGO—OCTOBER 23-26, 1963

The Cover is taken from a postal stamp which was desig for the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunicati Administrations by Mr. Lex Weyer of Luxembourg. Natio versions of this stamp have been issued by a numbe European countries. The stamp symbolizes the efforts of peoples of Europe, working con-jointly, to achieve pe prosperity, and freedom, and the post-World Wa events which have contributed to the realization of th goals. The stylized white leaves represent the count which have adopted use of the sta



The New Europe and the United States: New Directions

Arranged in cooperation with

THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

October 23-26, 1963

Conrad Hilton Hotel

Chicago, Illinois

Ninth National Conference
THE U. S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

GEORGE V. ALLEN ..... *Chairman*

FREDERICK H. BURKHARDT
MRS. HAROLD C. CASE
ROGER REVELLE } ..... *Vice Chairmen*

L. A. MINNICH ..... *Executive Secretary*

Arranged in Cooperation with
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
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THOMAS L. NICHOLSON ..... *Director of the Conference*

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Steering Committee
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ANN F. JABLONSKI ..... *Administrative Officer*

Cooperating Universities

Chicago Teachers College North
Representative—Dr. Ruth Ellis

DePaul University
Representative—Richard Houk

Illinois Institute of Technology
Representative—Hans Mauksch

Lawrence College
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Representative—Max Mark

University of Chicago
Representatives—C. Arnold Anderson and Sol Tax

University of Illinois at Chicago
Representatives—Milton Rakove and William Grampp

University of Iowa
Representatives—Clyde Kohn and Lawrence Gelfand

University of Michigan
Representative—Howard Ehrmann

University of Minnesota
Representative—William Rogers

University of Notre Dame
Representative—Reverend Mark Fitzgerald

University of Wisconsin
Representative—Leon Lindberg

Endorsed by

The Mayor's Committee for Economic and Cultural Development of Chicago

DAVID M. KENNEDY, *Chairman*

In Appreciation

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO wishes to express its gratitude to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations for arranging the Ninth National Conference. The Commission is especially indebted to Mr. Thomas L. Nicholson, Director of the Conference, who took time from his law practice to plan and organize this significant program. A note of appreciation is due to the Council's Steering Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Robert B. Wilcox for leadership and guidance in planning the many activities; to the Council staff who worked for nearly a year in handling the many details of the Conference; and to the various organizations for their interest and support.

The Commission and Council would like to thank the program participants for giving substance to the Conference; the cooperating midwestern universities; those who organized the special school conference; the volunteers for their services during the meetings; and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Mr. Jean Martinon for the special concert which will close the Conference so appropriately.

It would be impossible to mention by name the many other individuals who contributed of their time and effort. Their help is deeply appreciated.

Finally we would like to thank those whose generous financial support helped make this Conference possible:

George V. Allen
American Association of University Women
American Institute of Biological Sciences
Armour and Company
Bell & Howell
Senator William Benton
Roland S. Bond
K. O. Broady
Kenneth W. Clark
Container Corporation of America
The Denoyer-Geppert Company
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The Northern Trust Company
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The Singer Company Foundation
Mr. and Mrs. L. M. C. Smith
The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
The Spaeth Foundation
Sunbeam Corporation
United Shoe Manufacturing Company
Mrs. Rosalind Wyman
The Xerox Fund

General Information

The United States National Commission for UNESCO is required by Public Law 565 (79th Congress, 2d Session) to "call general conferences for the discussion of matters relating to the activities of the Organization (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to which conferences organized bodies actively interested in such matters shall be invited to send representatives . . ."

Purpose of the Conference

The Conference will investigate the fundamental changes which have been and are taking place in contemporary Europe and the implications of those changes for the United States. It will be primarily devoted to the educational, scientific and cultural problems which the subject suggests, but some consideration of political and economic questions will be necessary to place these problems in context.

The Conference Plan

Delegates will be addressed at Plenary Sessions and Symposia by European and American leaders. The Conference will have seven plenary sessions and will divide from time to time into six symposia sections—A, B, C, D, E, and F. Each section will consist of four symposia, and each symposium will have a principal speaker and a commentator.

On Thursday from 4:15 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. and on Saturday from 2:45 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., each symposia section will break into five seminars. Each seminar will

be led by a discussion leader, and the delegates will participate in the discussions. Admission to the symposia and seminars will be by ticket only.

Press Headquarters

The Press will have its headquarters in Room 500, located on the Fifth Floor of the Conrad Hilton Hotel.

Location of Meeting Rooms

All meetings, including plenary sessions, will be held in the Conrad Hilton Hotel. The exact location of each session is listed in the program.

U. S. National Commission for UNESCO

The twenty-fourth meeting of the U. S. National Commission will be held in the Waldorf Room on October 22 and in the Upper Tower on October 23.

The Honorable George Brown, Deputy Leader of the Labor Party of Great Britain, will address the Commission at a luncheon open to the public at 12:15 p.m. on Wednesday, October 23 in the Waldorf Room of the Conrad Hilton Hotel.

Secretariat officers present with functional responsibilities are Eugene Sochor, Assistant Director (Public Relations); Alice DeKany, Administrative Assistant; and Kathryn H. Langston, Organization Liaison.

Registration

Delegates will be registered in the Writing Room of the Conrad Hilton Hotel as follows:

Wednesday, October 23	**12:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m.**
Thursday, October 24	**9:00 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.**
Friday, October 25	**9:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.**
	7:15 p.m. - 8:00 p.m.
Saturday, October 26	**9:00 a.m. - 2:45 p.m.**

At the time of registration each delegate will be given a Delegate's Kit containing his badge, information materials and tickets to certain conference sessions. Delegates are urged to wear their badges at all times to ensure admittance to the various events.

Information and Message Center

The Conference Information and Message Center, located in the registration area (The Writing Room) of the Conrad Hilton Hotel, will be open continuously throughout the conference. Information on local facilities and arrangements may be obtained here as well as mail and messages for delegates. Delegates expecting messages are urged to check at the Center frequently.

Conference Offices

Conference offices are located on the fifth floor as follows:

Room 532A—George V. Allen, Chairman, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO
L. Arthur Minnich, Executive Secretary of the Commission

Room 512A—Thomas L. Nicholson, Director of the Conference

Room 556A—Administrative Office

Room 557A—Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Room 553A—Volunteers

Room 509A—Program participants

Room 500 —Press

Wednesday, October 23, 1963

REGISTRATION **12:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m.**	The Writing Room, Conrad Hilton Hotel, Second Floor
RECEPTION **4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.**	Grand Assembly, Grand Ballroom, Second Floor, Conrad Hilton
FIRST PLENARY SESSION **8:00 p.m.**	Grand Ballroom, Second Floor
PRESIDING OFFICER	**George V. Allen** *Chairman, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
INVOCATION	**Very Reverend Monsignor George Herdegen** *Chancery Office, Archdiocese of Chicago*
REMARKS	**Lucius D. Battle** *Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State*
	Thomas L. Nicholson *Attorney; Director of the Conference*
INTRODUCTION	**Ambassador William Benton** *U. S. Member of the Executive Board of UNESCO*
TOPIC	*"The Old World and the New Europe"*
SPEAKER	**René Maheu** *Director General of UNESCO*

Thursday, October 24, 1963

SECOND PLENARY SESSION Grand Ballroom
9:15 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.

INTRODUCTION	**Frederick Burkhardt** *President, American Council of Learned Societies* *Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
TOPIC	*"The New Europe and the New World"*
SPEAKER	**Etienne Hirsch** *President, Institut technique de Provision economique et Sociale* *Former President of EURATOM*

SYMPOSIA
11:00 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

A. EUROPEAN SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION

A.1—NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN EDUCATION—Beverly Room

CHAIRMAN	**Henry I. Willett** *Superintendent of Schools, Richmond, Virginia* *Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
SPEAKER	**C. Arnold Anderson** *Professor, University of Chicago*
COMMENTATOR	**Philip J. Foster** *Professor, University of Chicago*

B. EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

B.1—FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION IN EUROPE—Parlors A & B

CHAIRMAN	**John Nuveen** *Investment Banker; Former Chief, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg*
SPEAKER	**Amitai Etzioni** *Professor, Columbia University*
COMMENTATOR	**Ulrich Trumpener** *Professor, State University of Iowa*

C. THE DEVELOPED AND THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

C.1—THE NEW EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMAGES AND REALITIES —Grand Ballroom

CHAIRMAN	**Vernon L. Sorenson** *Professor, Michigan State University*
SPEAKER	**Jacob van der Lee** *Director for Associated Overseas Countries; Commission of the European Economic Community*
COMMENTATOR	**Aristide Zolberg** *Professor, University of Chicago*

SYMPOSIA
11:00 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

D. INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

D.1—THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS—Parlor C

CHAIRMAN	**Richard Houk** *Professor, DePaul University*
SPEAKER	**Otto Kirchheimer** *Professor, Columbia University*
COMMENTATOR	**Jean Blondel** *Professor, University of Essex*

E. NATIONALISM VS. SUPRANATIONALISM

E.1—CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL UNITY—Waldorf Room

CHAIRMAN	**Lucius D. Battle** *Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State*
SPEAKER	**Francois Bondy** *Editor,* PREUVES *Magazine*
COMMENTATOR	**Otto Wirth** *Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Roosevelt University*

F. THE GROWTH OF SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITIES

F.1—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MIGRATION—Private Dining Room 2

CHAIRMAN	**Hartley Clark** *Professor, Carleton College*
SPEAKER	**Lucien Radoux** *Director, European Foundation for International Exchanges, Deputy to Belgian Parliament*
COMMENTATOR	**Sol Tax** *Professor, University of Chicago* *Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*

THIRD PLENARY SESSION — United Nations Day Luncheon—International Ballroom

12:30 p.m. - 2:15 p.m. — *"Europe and the Developing Nations"*

PRESIDING OFFICER	**James K. Hotchkiss** *Chairman, Mayor's Committee for United Nations Week*
INVOCATION	**Rabbi Eric Friedland** *Beth Am, The Peoples Synagogue*
WELCOME	**Richard A. Daley** *Mayor of Chicago*
INTRODUCTION	**George V. Allen** *Chairman, U. S. National Commission, Former Ambassador to India*
SPEAKER	**Her Excellency Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit** *Chairman, Indian Delegation to the United Nations*

SYMPOSIA
2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

A.2—THE NEW EUROPEAN MEN OF BUSINESS—Beverly Room

CHAIRMAN	**Alex Seith** *Lord, Bissell & Brook, Counselors at Law*
SPEAKER	**Wilhelm Paues** *Director and Head, Foreign Affairs Section, Federation of Swedish Industries*
COMMENTATOR	**James Hart** *Dean, College of Commerce, DePaul University*

B.2—THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY—Parlors A & B

CHAIRMAN	**Theodore Achilles** *Vice Chairman, Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United States*
SPEAKER	**Uwe Kitzinger** *Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford*
COMMENTATOR	**Milton Rakove** *Professor, University of Illinois at Chicago*

C.2—THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS—Grand Ballroom

CHAIRMAN	**Howard L. Kany** *Vice President, Columbia Broadcasting System* *Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
SPEAKER	**William Clark** *Director, Overseas Development Institute*
COMMENTATOR	**Robert Clower** *Professor, Northwestern University*

D.2—THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY—Parlor C

CHAIRMAN	**Frank McCallister** *Professor, Roosevelt University*
SPEAKER	**Alexander King** *Director of Scientific Affairs, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*
COMMENTATOR	**Hilliard Roderick** *Deputy Assistant Director, Division of Research, Atomic Energy Commission*

E.2—THE SOURCES OF UNITY—Private Dining Room 2

CHAIRMAN	**Howard Ehrmann** *Professor, University of Michigan*
SPEAKER	**Altiero Spinelli** *Professor, Bologna Center, Johns Hopkins University*
COMMENTATOR	**Leon Epstein** *Professor, University of Wisconsin*

F.2—ADULT EDUCATION IN NORTHERN EUROPE—Waldorf Room

CHAIRMAN	**Clyde F. Kohn** *Professor, State University of Iowa*
SPEAKER	**Mrs. Ingeborg Bertha Lyche** *Undersecretary, Office for Art and Cultural Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Education*
COMMENTATOR	**Cyril O. Houle** *Professor, University of Chicago; Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*

SYMPOSIA A SEMINARS
4:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. European Societies in Transition

Seminar A.1	PARLOR A
Seminar A.2	PARLOR C
Seminar A.3	BELAIRE ROOM
Seminar A.4	WALDORF ROOM
Seminar A.5	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 2

SYMPOSIA B SEMINARS Europe and the United States
4:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Seminar B.1	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 3
Seminar B.2	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 4
Seminar B.3	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 8
Seminar B.4	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 9
Seminar B.5	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 10

SYMPOSIA C SEMINARS — The Developed and the Developing Nations
4:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Seminar C.1	BEVERLY ROOM
Seminar C.2	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 13
Seminar C.3	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 14
Seminar C.4	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 18
Seminar C.5	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 19

SYMPOSIA D SEMINARS — Individual Sovereignty in a Complex Society
4:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Seminar D.1	PARLOR 20
Seminar D.2	PARLOR 21
Seminar D.3	PARLOR 24
Seminar D.4	PARLOR 25
Seminar D.5	PARLOR 26

SYMPOSIA E SEMINARS Nationalism vs. Supranationalism
4:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Seminar E.1	PARLOR 27
Seminar E.2	PARLOR 28
Seminar E.3	PARLOR 29
Seminar E.4	ROOM 515A
Seminar E.5	ROOM 516

SYMPOSIA F SEMINARS The Growth of Supranational Communities
4:15 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.

Seminar F.1	PARLOR B
Seminar F.2	PARLOR 30
Seminar F.3	PARLOR 33
Seminar F.4	PARLOR 34
Seminar F.5	ROOM 553

Friday, October 25, 1963

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION—Grand Ballroom
9:15 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.

INTRODUCTION	**George Beadle** *President, University of Chicago*
TOPIC	*"The Development of European Cooperation in Science"*
SPEAKER	**Sir John Cockcroft** *Master of Churchill College, Cambridge University, Nobel Prize Winner in Physics, 1951*

SYMPOSIA
11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

A.3—REFLECTIONS OF CHANGE IN LITERATURE—Parlor A

CHAIRMAN	**Hans O. Mauksch** *Dean, Division of Liberal Studies, Illinois Institute of Technology*
SPEAKER	**Colin MacInnes** *British essayist and novelist*
COMMENTATOR	**John Howell Daniels** *Professor, University of Wales*

B.3—THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY —Private Dining Room 2

CHAIRMAN	**Robert Farwell** *Associate Dean, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business*
SPEAKER	**Frank Munk** *Professor, Reed College*
COMMENTATOR	**Theodore Achilles** *Vice Chairman, Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United States*

C.3—THE FORCE OF REVOLUTION AND THE IDEA OF FORCE—Beverly Room

CHAIRMAN	**Mojmir Povolny** *Professor, Lawrence College*
SPEAKER	**Louis Gottschalk** *Professor, University of Chicago*
COMMENTATOR	**Hannah Arendt** *Professor, University of Chicago*

D.3—THE RESURGENT INDIVIDUAL: REMARKS ON SOME EUROPEAN NOVELS OF THE SIXTIES—Parlor C

CHAIRMAN	**John H. Daniels** *Professor, University of Wales*
SPEAKER	**Germaine Brée** *Professor, Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Wisconsin*
COMMENTATOR	**Bruce Morrissette** *Professor, University of Chicago*

E.3—THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM—Grand Ballroom

CHAIRMAN	**Lawrence Zelic Freedman** *Professor, University of Chicago*
SPEAKER	**Erich Fromm** *Psychoanalyst*
COMMENTATOR	**Nathan Leites** *Professor, University of Chicago*

F.3—THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT AND THE SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITY
—Belaire Room

CHAIRMAN	**Robert B. Wilcox** *Chairman, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Conference Steering Committee; Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
SPEAKER	**Kurt Feldmann** *Former German and International Civil Servant*
COMMENTATOR	**Lawrence Gelfand** *Professor, State University of Iowa*

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION
8:00 p.m.

Grand Ballroom

INTRODUCTION	**Harvie Branscomb** *Former Chancellor, Vanderbilt University, Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
TOPIC	*"An Experiment in Inter-Cultural Education: The European Schools"*
SPEAKER	**Albert van Houtte** *Greffier of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and President of the Board of the European Schools*

Saturday, October 26, 1963

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION
9:15 a.m. - 10:45 a.m.

Grand Ballroom

INTRODUCTION

Luther H. Evans
Former Director-General of UNESCO; Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO

TOPIC

"Cultural Community and Cultural Diversity of the North Atlantic Nations"

SPEAKER

Geoffrey Gorer
British Anthropologist and Author

SYMPOSIA
11:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.

A.4—THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN THE THEATER—Beverly Room

CHAIRMAN	**Henry Knepler** *Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology*
SPEAKER	**Robert W. Corrigan** *Professor, Carnegie Institute of Technology*
COMMENTATOR	**John Reich** *Director, Goodman Theatre*

B.4—THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND LATIN AMERICA —Parlor A

CHAIRMAN	**Reverend Gerald Grant** *Executive Vice President, United World Federalist—Chicago Branch*
SPEAKER	**George I. Blanksten** *Professor, Northwestern University*
COMMENTATOR	**Herbert S. Klein** *Professor, University of Chicago*

C.4—THE DEVELOPED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS—Parlor C

CHAIRMAN	**Mojmir Povolny** *Professor, Lawrence College*
SPEAKER	**Thomas Hovet** *Professor, New York University*
COMMENTATOR	**Harold Jacobson** *Professor, University of Michigan*

D.4—THE ARTIST, THE ART EXPERT AND THE LAYMAN—Private Dining Room 2

CHAIRMAN	**Henry R. Hope** *Professor, University of Indiana; Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO*
SPEAKER	**G. L. Conran** *Director, Manchester Art Galleries*
COMMENTATOR	**George Cohen** *Artist and Professor of Art, Northwestern University*

E.4—PACEM IN TERRIS—Waldorf Room

CHAIRMAN	**Thomas L. Nicholson** *Attorney; Director of the Conference*
SPEAKER	**Reverend E. A. Conway, S. J.** *Director, Center for Peace Research, Creighton University*
COMMENTATOR	**Francis Schwarzenberg** *Professor, Loyola University*

F.4—THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND THE U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION: JOINT VENTURES IN SCIENCE—Belaire Room

CHAIRMAN	**Hilliard Roderick** *Deputy Assistant Director, Division of Research, Atomic Energy Commission*
SPEAKER	**René Foch** *Director for External Relations, EURATOM*
COMMENTATOR	**Milton Burton** *Professor, University of Notre Dame*

SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION
12:30 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.

Luncheon, Grand Ballroom

INVOCATION

Edgar H. S. Chandler
Executive Director, Church Federation of Greater Chicago

"In Summary—A Panel"

MODERATOR

Thomas L. Nicholson
Attorney; Director of the Conference

PANEL PARTICIPANTS

William Clark
Director, Overseas Development Institute

René Foch
Director for External Relations, EURATOM

Uwe Kitzinger
Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford

Max Lerner
Professor, Brandeis University, Author and Journalist

SYMPOSIA A SEMINARS **2:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.**	European Societies in Transition
Seminar A.6	PARLOR B
Seminar A.7	PARLOR C
Seminar A.8	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 1
Seminar A.9	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 2
Seminar A.10	BELAIRE ROOM
SYMPOSIA B SEMINARS **2:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.**	Europe and the United States
Seminar B.6	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 12
Seminar B.7	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 13
Seminar B.8	ROOM 602
Seminar B.9	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 18
Seminar B.10	PRIVATE DINING ROOM 19

SYMPOSIA C SEMINARS — The Developed and Developing Nations
2:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Seminar C.6	ROOM 657
Seminar C.7	PARLOR 21
Seminar C.8	PARLOR 24
Seminar C.9	PARLOR 25
Seminar C.10	ROOM 610

SYMPOSIA D SEMINARS — Individual Sovereignty in a Complex Society
2:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Seminar D.6	PARLOR 27
Seminar D.7	PARLOR 28
Seminar D.8	PARLOR 29
Seminar D.9	PARLOR 30
Seminar D.10	PARLOR 33

SYMPOSIA E SEMINARS **2:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.**	Nationalism vs. Supranationalism
Seminar E.6	PARLOR 34
Seminar E.7	ROOM 516
Seminar E.8	ROOM 553
Seminar E.9	ROOM 639
Seminar E.10	ROOM 537A
SYMPOSIA F SEMINARS **2:45 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.**	The Growth of Supranational Communities
Seminar F.6	ROOM 515A
Seminar F.7	ROOM 649
Seminar F.8	ROOM 655
Seminar F.9	PARLOR A
Seminar F.10	WALDORF ROOM

THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE WILL BE SEMINAR DISCUSSION LEADERS:

ZALMAN ALPER
Chicago Architect

CHARLES P. BEALL
Professor, Eastern Illinois University

DONALD C. BRYANT
Professor, State University of Iowa

WARREN I. COHEN
Professor, Michigan State University

RAYMOND CORSINI
Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology

MARTIN DUBIN
Professor, Roosevelt University

H. C. HARLAN
Professor, University of Chicago

LEE HERZEL
Chicago Attorney

GEORGE IGGERS
Professor, Roosevelt University

BURTON JOSEPH
Chicago Attorney

JACK JOSEPH
Chicago Attorney

GEORGE KISH
Professor, University of Michigan

T. A. LARSON
Professor, University of Wyoming

RONALD MCCAIG
Professor, University of Chicago

FRITZ C. NEUMANN
Professor, Roosevelt University

DEE W. NORTON
Professor, State University of Iowa

HEW ROBERTS
Professor, University of Western Australia

JACK ROTH
Professor, Roosevelt University

DAVID F. TRASK
Professor, University of Nebraska

SYMPHONY CONCERT
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26
8:30 p.m.

Orchestra Hall
Contemporary European Music
Directed by Jean Martinon

PROGRAM

Sinfonietta, Opus 52—Albert Roussel
Symphony No. 3—Hans Werner Henze (Chicago Première)
Concerto for Orchestra—Bela Bartók

SPECIAL ART SYMPOSIUM
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26
3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

Morton Hall
Art Institute of Chicago

PANEL

Pierre Restany
Art Critic, Paris

Jan van der Marck
Curator, Walker Art Center
Minneapolis

Franz Schulze
Professor, Lake Forest College and
Art Critic, THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

The panel will discuss some of the movements it considers most significant in contemporary European art. A very limited number of tickets will be available at the ticket sales desk in the Writing Room of the Conrad Hilton Hotel.

EXHIBITION:
October 23 to November 12

Gres Gallery
156 East Ontario Street
Chicago, Illinois

"MODERN ART OF WESTERN EUROPE: NEW DIRECTIONS"

The artists whose work will be shown include:

Pierre Alechinsky
Karel Appel
Augustin Fernandez Arman
Francis Bacon
Enrico Baj
Gianni Bertini
Modest Cuixart
Alan Davie
Corneille Guillaume Deverloo
Lucio Fontana
Fritz Hundertwasser
Asger Jorn
Yves Klein
Martial Raysse
Antonio Saura
Joan-Josep Tharrats
Jean Tinguely

The exhibition organized by Mr. Kazimir Karpuszko is being held in connection with the works to be discussed at the Special Art Symposium.

SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR CLUB PRESIDENTS AND PROGRAM CHAIRMEN

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 25
2:00 p.m.

Beverly Room

SPEAKERS

Mrs. Leon K. Richards
Member, U. S. National Commission for UNESCO, representing League of Women Voters of the U. S.

Mrs. Myron Goldsmith
Speakers Bureau
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

L. A. Minnich
Executive Secretary
U. S. National Commission for UNESCO

Edmond I. Eger
Executive Director
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

This meeting is designed for club presidents and program chairmen for the purpose of explaining opportunities for continued study and programming of the Conference topic. A new listing of speakers especially well qualified to discuss European-American affairs will be distributed so that the study of Europe begun at the Conference can be continued by individual groups throughout the year.

HIGH SCHOOL YOUTH CONFERENCE

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 26	International Ballroom Conrad Hilton Hotel
9:15 a.m.	*Welcome*
SPEAKERS	**Alex R. Seith** *Chairman, High School Youth Conference* *Lord, Bissell & Brook, Counselors at Law*
	Clair M. Roddewig *President, Chicago Board of Education*
	The Right Reverend Monsignor William A. McManus *Superintendent of Schools,* *Archdiocese of Chicago*
9:30 a.m.	*"The Future of the Atlantic Community"*
SPEAKER	**Uwe Kitzinger** *Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford*

10:45 a.m. *Panel Discussion*

A. "EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES"

SPEAKER **Peter Lisagor**
Washington Bureau Chief
THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

B. "THE NEW EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES"

SPEAKER **Aristide Zolberg**
Professor, University of Chicago

C. "CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL UNITY"

SPEAKER **Adolph Sturmthal**
Professor, University of Illinois

12:15 p.m. *Luncheon*

2:15 p.m. *Workshop Discussions*

3:15 p.m. *Adjournment*

SPEAKER **Edward D. McDougal, Jr.**
President, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

U. S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

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FREDERICK H. BURKHARDT
MRS. HAROLD C. CASE
ROGER REVELLE } ..... *Vice Chairmen*

L. A. MINNICH ..... *Executive Secretary*

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Organization represented, or the category of membership, is indicated below each individual's name.

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2

The New Europe and the United States: new directions

EUROPA



A REPORT OF THE NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

U.S. National Commission for UNESCO

arranged in cooperation with

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Chicago **October 23-26, 1963**

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE
THE U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

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Arranged in Cooperation With

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The New Europe and the United States: New Directions

A REPORT OF THE NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE
of the
U.S. National Commission for UNESCO

arranged in cooperation with
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Chicago **October 23-26, 1963**

Conference report prepared

by

DAMON B. SMITH

The Cover is taken from a postal stamp which was designed for the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations by Mr. Lex Weyer of Luxembourg. National versions of this stamp have been issued by a number of European countries. The stamp symbolizes the efforts of the peoples of Europe, working con-jointly, to achieve peace, prosperity, and freedom, and the post-World War II events which have contributed to the realization of those goals. The stylized white leaves represent the countries which have adopted use of the stamp.

In Appreciation

The U. S. National Commission for UNESCO wishes to express its gratitude to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations for the invaluable assistance rendered in arranging for the Ninth National Conference. The Commission is especially indebted to Thomas L. Nicholson, Director of the Conference, who took time from his law practice to plan and organize a significant program. A note of appreciation is due to the Council's Steering Committee under the chairmanship of Robert B. Wilcox for leadership and guidance in planning the many activities; to the Council staff who worked for nearly a year in handling the many details of the Conference; and to the various organizations for their interest and support.

The Commission and Council would like to thank each of the program participants for giving substance to the Conference; the cooperating midwestern universities; those who organized the special school conference; the art exhibition and Special Art Symposium; the volunteers for their services during the meetings; and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Jean Martinon for the special concert which closed the Conference so appropriately.

It would be impossible to mention by name the many other individuals who contributed of their time and effort. Their help is deeply appreciated.

Finally, we would like to thank those whose generous financial support helped make this Conference possible:

George V. Allen

American Association of University Women

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The Mayor's Committee for Economic and Cultural Development of Chicago

DAVID M. KENNEDY, *Chairman*

Contents

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO MR. ALLEN

The Honorable
GEORGE V. ALLEN
Chairman, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
Hotel Conrad Hilton, Chicago

I send my warmest greetings to the United States National Commission for UNESCO and my best wishes for your Ninth National Conference on the vital theme of "The New Europe and the United States: New Directions."

We believe that only a united Europe can be a strong Europe and only a strong Europe can be an effective and equal partner in the task of assuring the growth and survival of the free world. We believe also that Atlantic relations are rooted in our common heritage in education, science, and culture and are secured by a common concern for values basic to a democratic society.

It is therefore fitting that your conference should consider how our common heritage can help to develop the necessary means and institutions to deal with our mutual problems and how the evolving partnership affects the United States in a growing and changing world. As we move forward with a unity of purpose, together we will forge an Atlantic partnership which can become a pivotal force in a free and peaceful world.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

OCTOBER 23, 1963

Introduction

Every 2 years the United States National Commission for UNESCO sponsors a national conference. During the past 6 years these conferences have focused on particular geographical areas. In 1957 the national conference was convened in San Francisco with Asia and the United States as its topic. In 1959 Denver was the site for a conference on Latin America. Two years ago Africa was explored in depth at a conference in Boston.

In selecting the theme of Europe for the Ninth Conference, the Commission realized that the concern for the ancient cultures of Asia and the re-emergent cultures of Africa should not overshadow our deep attachment for Europe. Seeing great significance in the trend of recent events from which European life is evolving, the Commission felt a need for Americans to regain closer touch with their European colleagues, particularly in regard to educational, scientific, and cultural developments. It felt a special need to know better the younger generation of European statesmen and intellectuals who have been shaping the concept and the structure of the New Europe. In short, the Commission thought the time was ripe to review and reassess our ties with a Europe which is well known to us in terms of past history, yet not so well known in terms of its present growth.

Most significant about the historical relationship between the United States and Europe is the fact that although America freed itself from Europe and blossomed into a great nation, it retained deep roots in the Old World. For more than 300 years Europe has been the traditional source of ideas and of the men that have contributed most successfully to the coming of age of the United States. Continued mutual involvement between the United States and Europe in the coming years is undeniable. From its inception, the United States has found itself inextricably caught up in the swirl of European affairs. Offspring, partner, leader, whatever any transient arrangement may be, it is clear that in the years ahead the United States will have along side itself not Europe, but rather what the present Conference has chosen to call the New Europe. The ensuing pages of this report are devoted principally to two questions and the light shed on them in the Ninth Conference: What is the New Europe? What is the relationship of the New Europe to the United States?



—Courtesy of Chicago Daily News

The Honorable George Brown, Deputy Leader of the Labor Party of Great Britain (left), discusses a point with George V. Allen (center), Chairman of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO and Thomas L. Nicholson, Director of the Conference, prior to addressing the Commission at a luncheon session.

Starting with a differentiation of the New Europe from the Old Europe, Conference speakers placed the New Europe in a world context that is both new and challenging. They examined the more specific elements of the New Europe from books to business, from playwrights to parliaments, from art galleries to education. Always in mind were the elements of change and innovation that give credence to the concept of the New Europe.

Recurring throughout the Conference was the theme of European unification. The concern for unity has permeated to some degree most every national activity. The goal of a united Europe has dominated the thought and expression of politicians and political scientists alike. The questionable role of nationalism and the nation-state came under close scrutiny, as did the Common Market, the organization in which many believe lies the future of European unity.

The theme of unity within the Conference was not confined to Europe. Education, science, and culture already reflect internationally the new developments within Europe. Specifically, the formation of an Atlantic Community was examined in detail as the focus of future relationships between the New Europe and the United States. Like a united Europe, the Atlantic Community suffers from copious interpretations of the means to achieve its realization. Conference participants endeavored to evaluate such factors and concepts as community feeling, equal partnership, and institutional development as principal elements in the emergence of a flourishing Atlantic Community.

Of profound concern to both the New Europe and the United States is the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. The Conference accomplished examination of this relationship from a variety of viewpoints, and it highlighted the

urgency of eliminating progressively the vast economic inequalities between the two groupings.

On these themes the Ninth Conference participants concentrated their efforts as they investigated fundamental changes in contemporary Europe and implications of those changes for the United States.

The National Commission, which sponsored the Conference in cooperation with The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, is an advisory body established by Congress in 1946 to help the United States Government carry out its responsibilities for membership in UNESCO—the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. As an advisory body to the Government and as a link between UNESCO and the American people, the National Commission is a two-way channel through which the views of the citizens can ultimately find expression in UNESCO policies and programs and through which information about UNESCO is reported back to the American public. The National Commission is composed of 100 prominent citizens appointed by the Secretary of State; a majority of them represent principal national voluntary organizations interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters. One of the activities of the National Commission called for by Public Law 565 is the convening of a national conference every 2 years to study and discuss topics of national interest related to UNESCO affairs.

In this Ninth Conference, the National Commission had the unstinting assistance and cooperation of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, which was responsible for the detailed arrangements and planning of the Conference. Throughout its many distinguished years of service, the Council has fostered broad public understanding of issues critical to the U. S. position in international relationships.

This report is based immediately upon the wealth of commentary presented by some 50 speakers in the course of the Conference. Except for brief introductory and concluding paragraphs, the views presented here are entirely those of the speakers and are appropriately attributed, but no attempt has been made to identify as such any passages or phrases that are quoted verbatim.

René Maheu

The Old Order Changes

GENERAL REMARKS

The frame of discussion for virtually the entire Ninth National Conference was established in two very perceptive opening addresses which tied together the Old World, the New World, and the New Europe. The first was given, fittingly enough for any National Commission event by René Maheu, Director General of UNESCO. To this New Europe Conference, Mr. Maheu brought an important bonus by virtue of his distinguished achievement as both scholar and man of action. Long known as having a European rather than a national outlook, he possessed through his UNESCO service some 15 years of experience in dealing with problems in a worldwide setting.

The second speaker was Etienne Hirsch, President of the Institut Technique de Prevision Economique et Sociale, and former President of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). To the Conference forum he brought the intimate knowledge possessed only by those who helped shape from the beginning the components of the emerging New Europe.

The Old World and the New Europe

Speaking on "The Old World and the New Europe," Mr. Maheu commented that the Old World was synonymous with Europe and that it is quite proper to continue to call Europe the Old World. Nowhere else does the present have deeper roots in the past. In Europe religion is 2,000 years old. A certain rationalist tradition can be traced to the days of ancient Greece. Even the nation-states that have dominated Europe's history have existed continuously for many centuries. Everything in Europe has some historical dimension. Mr. Maheu described European man as essentially a creature of history, a characteristic he did not find in the American man who is noted for *making* history. In this difference Mr. Maheu saw the origin of most of the psychological misunderstandings that have beset even such a self-evident and widely acknowledged community of interests as there is among the Atlantic nations.

This omnipresent European historical tradition not only dis-

tinguishes Europe in cultural terms from other regions of the world, it provides a factor of genuine unity on which the unity of Europe can be built. Mr. Maheu emphasized that the cultural aspect is always of great concern to the European. The great mass media on both sides of the Atlantic pour out information daily concerning strategic, economic, or political matters, but they do not draw enough attention to cultural matters. This is a grave error, he believed, for people are motivated towards ideological allegiances in the final analysis by cultural convictions. Europeans need to realize that U. S. purposes are conceived and justified in terms of culture. In turn, Europeans want to be assured that American cultural values are historically related to their own and measure up to the power and determination of the United States.

Because of the impact of history on European interrelations, Mr. Maheu asserted, Europeans surely have in common certain traditions which transcend current political barriers. Although Europe may be subjected to economic, social, and political upheavals, there are deeply hidden forces which nothing can affect. Within the cultural field, numerous European conferences have attested to the underlying awareness of a definite European heritage deriving from a common history. Even the mechanics of television broadcasting begin to evidence this interrelationship.

Mr. Maheu concluded that the "Old World" title is still pertinent to the Europe of today because it is the part of the world where the present civilization has its deepest roots in the past. It is the part of the world where culture is understood as the awareness of regional values, where common cultural heritage is a unifying force. He again emphasized how important it is for the United States to take these matters into consideration in its relations with Europe.

Turning to the concept of the New Europe, Mr. Maheu stressed three main new features—features so new that they sometimes surprise Europeans themselves: (1) the reconciliation between Europeans and the will to do away with the hatred of the past, (2) the deliberate move towards European unity, and (3) the completely new relationship which has recently developed between Europe and much of the world as a result of the disappearance of the colonial relationship.

Citing Franco-German relations as the most prominent example of European reconciliation, Mr. Maheu noted that everywhere there is a common will to do away with the hatred, the suspicions, and the fears inherited from the past. As Mr. Maheu put it: "How refreshing it is for a European no longer to have any inherited enemy!" This new harmony springs from the recognition in the minds of Europeans that the two World Wars were essentially European wars and in a sense costly civil wars. The movement towards reconciliation has fairly deep roots in a number of joint constructive projects; nevertheless, it is still fragile and must be carefully treated, encouraged, and nurtured.

Noting some of the prime motivations in the move towards organized European unity, Mr. Maheu explained how the first sense of unity had derived from realization of the high price paid in the past for disunity. From the disasters and humiliations of war came the determination to avoid a future similar situation. A second cause of unity results from awareness that the technological civilization which sprang from Europe has made the earlier political structures completely obsolete. They must be amalgamated into bigger ensembles in order to satisfy the economic and military requirements of modern civilization. Parallel with the disappearance of the old nationalism in Europe is the emergence of a new European nationalism vis-a-vis extra-European nations. The actual construction of the New Europe will necessarily entail many problems, such as the nature of the New European institutions and the geographical boundaries. Of one thing Mr. Maheu was certain: Europeans are approaching the problem not from a theoretical viewpoint, but in the light of their history.

In regard to the Europe that has emerged from the process of decolonization, Mr. Maheu asserted that the New Europe

has suffered no loss, not even an economic loss. On the contrary, its gain has been considerable. More important than the prosperity that has occurred, Europe has gained a clear conscience, for a great moral issue was at stake. Europe has regained confidence in her traditions of liberty. Further, the relations between Europe and the developing countries can now be on normal footing. He also foresaw a new role for the New Europe since European civilization is based on the conviction that man is universal. In the colonial era, Europe was prevented from exerting this kind of influence.

Mr. Maheu stressed, finally, the importance of recognizing that the New Europe is a product of the Old World, a product of the vitality of Europe. It is an authentic creation, emerging from within itself, and it is a good thing for the world at large. The need for general balance in the architecture of the world does not permit a vacuum in such a vital area as Europe. He warned that in the many ways in which it is trying to organize and assert itself, this New Europe may seem to hurt and embarrass the United States, but he firmly believed that the New Europe is what the United States wants—namely, a strong and equal partner to cooperate freely in the preservation of a common heritage.

The New Europe and the New World

In his address on "The New Europe and the New World," Mr. Hirsch emphasized the newness of the world in which the New Europe is emerging. It is new in terms of specific factors, both positive and negative. On the positive side, mankind has conquered disease, famine and distance, and has harnessed mechanical energy. Mankind has achieved vast channels of communication among peoples and has produced a potential of progress which is most formidable. On the negative side, Mr. Hirsch cited the growing population of the human race, which is expected to double between now and the year 2000. Further, progress has not equally benefited all mankind, resulting in an ever-widening gulf between the developed and the developing countries. Finally, he asserted that never has mankind lived under such dread of destruction.

It is a new world also, Mr. Hirsch continued, because of historic developments. These include the development of the Communist system, the ascendancy to wealth and power of the United States, the termination of the colonial era, and the birth of the New Europe.

This New Europe, Mr. Hirsch maintained, had as its starting point the historic Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950—the declaration by Robert Schuman, the then French Foreign Minister—announcing the European Coal and Steel Community. Concerned immediately with the need for reconciliation between France and Germany, the Declaration was based on the proposition that an organized Europe is a necessity for peace. It was because Europe did not exist that there was war. Europe must be built step by step by creating solidarity through complete reconstruction. Common institutions should be built as the first step toward a European federation. Finally, the Declaration indicated, reconstructed Europe will have an essential task in the development of the African Continent.

The foresighted Schuman Declaration contained an invitation, Mr. Hirsch continued, to all European countries prepared to discuss and accept these principles. As a result of negotiations begun in 1955, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) came into operation at the beginning of 1958. Both of these Communities possess one very essential common characteristic: they have European institutions in which sovereign powers of the member states are vested.

As a principal component of the New Europe, the EEC is much more than a customs union providing for a free exchange of goods inside the Community. It is an economic union also, bringing about common policies in such matters as transportation and the free movement of workers and capital. And—significantly—the Community is outward looking. There is a continuing de-

velopment of relationships with underdeveloped countries which takes the form of tariff reductions in their favor, but which also has important political, social, and general economic implications.

In tangible results, Mr. Hirsch continued, the Common Market has produced a schedule whereby tariff reductions will be extended over a period of 12 years. Since 1958 trade between member countries has doubled, but not at the expense of outside countries. During the same period the gross national product in the community has increased at the annual rate of more than 5 percent. Great Britain's application for membership in 1961 further attested to the success of the EEC. Mr. Hirsch believed that the unilateral ostracism of Britain at that time and the resulting rupture was not at all permanent. A revolution has been accomplished in the minds of people and they no longer think in terms of national problems. They think in terms of European problems, Mr. Hirsch asserted, so much so that at the present time no political leader can openly oppose an integrated Europe.

Mr. Hirsch stressed the significance of the New Europe as regards U.S. relations. For the traditional relations between the United States and each individual European state, European integration is beginning to substitute relations between the United States and the representative bodies of Europe. The principal objective of the United States and the New Europe ought to be the building of an equal partnership as was proposed by President Kennedy in 1962. Obvious areas of cooperation where this partnership can be stimulated are trade and assistance to the developing countries. Though solutions will not always be found, Mr. Hirsch regarded as most important the spirit in which discussions are undertaken. There is an awareness of the challenge, and the stakes are too high to fail. To prevent failure, Mr. Hirsch called for a strong political will under which the New Europe and the United States could work together to evoke the full significance of an equal partnership.

In his introductory remarks prior to the first plenary session Thomas L. Nicholson, Director of the Conference, expressed the hope that the Conference itself would define the New Europe. To a considerable degree Mr. Maheu and Mr. Hirsch fulfilled this expectation through keen analysis of Europe within the context of the Old and New Worlds.

The Ties That Bind

THREE INSIGHTS

Practically every session of the Conference made reference to the coalescence of national states and the elements that precipitate it. Togetherness, a word that has grown banal in American usage, cannot afford to be scorned in the European or Atlantic vocabulary. The forces of unity embrace numerous levels of individual and organizational endeavor and find expression in various ways. In the course of the Conference, three of these approaches reflecting possible areas of European and Atlantic unification were covered in three plenary sessions. The three subjects are education, science, and culture. Although the methods of action described and the conclusions of the speakers varied, each was concerned with factors that may serve to alleviate the burdens of community building.

Education

With the impassioned enthusiasm inspired by close association with the European Schools, the Honorable Albert van Houtte, Greffier of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and President of the Board of the European Schools, presented a comprehensive report on the successful innovation of official public schools in the European Communities.

The story of the European Schools began in Luxembourg in 1953 when officials of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) pondered what they should do for the education of their children. In September of that year a small primary school with 72 children and 5 teachers opened in Luxembourg with the help of the 6 ECSC members. Success was such that the 6 parliaments ratified a cultural convention in 1957 which gave an official and legal status to the European Schools. As the Common Market and EURATOM took shape in 1958, there were requests for a European School in Brussels. Enthusiasm mounted and in 1962 a new convention was signed and ratified by the 6 countries. At present there are 6 official schools: 1 each in Luxembourg, Italy, France and Germany, and 2 in Belgium. A new school is being organized in Holland. These schools together have close to 5,000 students and 350 teachers. Although designed for the children of civil servants of the European Communi-

ties, foreigners and a number of nationals in the area have been encouraged to attend.

What can be considered as new and important in this project of the European Schools? To Mr. van Houtte they constitute above all a common effort between the governments. Whereas national schools abroad have often tended to emphasize the more nationalistic aspects of education and the international private schools have the problem of recognition of their certificates by universities, the European Schools have avoided such difficulties because of the common effort that established them.

The curriculum has been negotiated among the six governments in a way that meets the most fundamental requirements of education in each country. As a result, certificates awarded by the European Schools are recognized by all member nations. Mr. van Houtte viewed the present curriculum as representing perhaps a synthesis of the educational systems of the six members. Detailed negotiations solved problems of curricula, particularly in the fields of philosophy, history, geography, and language.

Education in the European Schools conforms to certain established principles. Fundamental teaching is given in the mother tongue of the children while some of the subjects are taught in a second language, either French or German. The organization of the European Schools is founded on unified programs and schedules. The overall educational program fully respects religious opinions of the children and their families. Mr. van Houtte noted particularly that the European Schools stress the humanistic tradition in education and aim to develop judgment, wisdom, a sense of responsibility, and a feeling for solidarity among all pupils.

In view of the usefulness and success of these schools, Mr. van Houtte urged that a similar project be undertaken by the United States, either in Washington or New York.

The unity to be accomplished through education of young people, Mr. van Houtte concluded, is aptly expressed in a text sealed in the cornerstone of the first European School, from which he quoted:

> Being brought up in contact with each other and freed at an early age from the prejudices which divide, initiated into the beauties and values of various cultures, they will, as they grow up, become conscious of their solidarity. While retaining love for and pride in their country, they will become world citizens in spirit, well prepared to complete and consolidate the work undertaken by their fathers in establishing a prosperous and united world.

Science

This ardent plea to bring the world closer together through education was reinforced at the Conference by the parallel examination which Sir John Cockcroft, Master of Churchill College at Cambridge University and 1951 Nobel Prize winner in Physics, made of the more specialized realm of science and technology.

The progressive strengthening of science and technology is in Sir John's view one of the most encouraging developments in contemporary Europe. More and more students are studying science in the secondary schools, the universities, and the graduate schools. This factor combined with the high cost of equipment has necessitated greater financial support, which in turn has spurred the European governments to allocate greater sums to research and development.

Recognizing that the international nature of science will always engender interchanges among scientists, Sir John reported a new pattern of cooperation in Europe which enables the participating countries to proceed jointly in efforts far exceeding their individual scientific resources. The first of these developments came in nuclear physics. The European Council for Nuclear Research, known as CERN, was established in 1952, in part through the initiative of UNESCO, and some 12 European countries joined in the construction of two powerful nuclear accelerators in Geneva. Since that time many experiments of fundamental importance have been carried out through effective cooperation and interchange of information, not only among the European participants but between European and American scientists.

Sir John pointed out that CERN has restored high energy nuclear physics in Europe to parity of achievement with the United States, thus enabling effective cooperation between both. CERN and its member countries are now debating whether to participate in a still larger mutual effort of building one of the next generation of accelerators.

Sir John pointed to space research as a second major field for inter-European and Atlantic cooperation. Again the cost factor was an effective spur to collaboration, and action was initiated for the establishment of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO). Eleven nations have signed the convention thus far, and the organization is scheduled to come officially into being in early 1964. To complement ESRO a European Launching Development Organization, known as ELDO, was founded. Its primary purpose is to develop a three-stage rocket launcher for satellites useful to telecommunication and other commercial and scientific purposes. Britain, France, and Germany will spearhead this work.

Under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and EURATOM, Sir John continued, European collaboration in the field of atomic energy is also linked with the United States. OECD has a daughter organization called the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) which presently sponsors, but does not administer, three important joint nuclear projects. It also sponsors study groups on such projects as nuclear ship propulsion, irradiation, digital computers, and health and safety problems.

In contrast with the loosely structured European Nuclear Energy Agency, Sir John described EURATOM as a tightly organized unit having the same six members as the EEC. It, too, cooperates with the United States, particularly the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. A large part of the EURATOM budget is spent in support of projects in the laboratories of the six member nations.

Sir John voiced strong support for the proposed International Institute of Science and Technology designed to serve the Atlantic Community. The institute would be devoted to graduate and postdoctoral studies in science and technology. As yet, however, there is no agreement for going ahead with it.

—Courtesy of Chicago Daily News

Sir John Cockcroft, Master of Churchill College, Cambridge University, Nobel Prize Winner in Physics, addressed the delegate body on "The Development of European Cooperation in Science."

In addition to these many organizations, Sir John cited numerous individual projects on which various European countries are collaborating. The requirements for scientific progress, especially the needs for pooling manpower, funds, and information, have thus constituted a principal element of the distinctive New Europe unity.

Culture

Whereas education and science are relatively concrete subjects, culture is a considerably more amorphous one. The cultural approach to the New Europe, as presented at this conference by Geoffrey Gorer, British anthropologist and author, clearly reflected this difference. There was no trend toward cultural unification identified or highlighted in his remarks, nor any current action program described. On the contrary, Mr. Gorer

identified a plurality of cultural areas within Europe and the North Atlantic world, and he warned against any effort to integrate them.

But, Mr. Gorer asserted, the diversity of cultural groups provides the most solid foundation on which to construct an Atlantic community, a much more practicable foundation than can be provided by nation-states. Ever since its creation, the centralized nation-state has tended to comprise more than one society. In more recent times the boundaries of nation-states have been drawn arbitrarily on political or geographical lines without regard to the social allegiance of the inhabitants. As a consequence, members of a single society may be apportioned to two or more nation-states. Culture is an aspect of society, and therefore the nation-state as such does not have a culture. If nation and society coincide, then the nation-state is one of the institutions of that culture; if the nation-state is composed of more than one society, it will also embody more than one culture.

In applying these factors to the North Atlantic nations, Mr. Gorer emphasized that this grouping does not constitute a single culture area. He pointed out three major culture areas in Europe and North America distinguished by the versions of Christianity which have been dominant in them: the Orthodox societies, the Catholic societies, and the societies influenced by the Protestant Reformation. He described these three societal groups as embodying three different ideals of behavior: the Man in the Truth, the Man in the Right, and the Moral Individual. These three ideals guide the conduct of the faithful, mold the climate of opinion, and indicate the predominant values of lay institutions.

Mr. Gorer detailed his views by asserting the Man in the Truth depends ultimately upon revelation, the Man in the Right upon codified laws, and the Moral Individual upon his own heart or conscience fortified by the scriptures. To Mr. Gorer these three approaches to upright conduct are symptomatic of the type of difficulty and mutual incomprehension which presently prevents a North Atlantic community from being more than a geographical expression. As an example, Mr. Gorer suggested that behind General de Gaulle's veto of Great Britain's adherence to the Common Market lies the distrust of the Man in the Right for the unpredictable Moral Individual.

However, Mr. Gorer continued, local cultures are the bricks with which the North Atlantic community could be built over time. Compared with nation-states, regional societies have a quasi-biological permanence. Further, the great majority of regional societies have the historical experience of restricted sovereignty, whereas the nation-state by self-definition claims absolute sovereignty.

An Atlantic community is essential as a preliminary to the world community which must be devised if the human race is to continue to exist, Mr. Gorer said. Although the nation-state does not seem to provide a basis for it, Mr. Gorer believed it is not beyond human wit, which once devised the nation-state, to devise still another form of organization. A North Atlantic cultural community can be built—indeed, can only be built upon the autonomous regional cultures of the area, he maintained. Cultural diversity is the richest of our inheritances, and the one most fraught with possibilities of human development and invention.

The New Europe at Home

ASSORTED ASPECTS OF TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES

Discussion of the New Europe and its relation to the United States generally centers upon political and economic cooperation or integration. The Ninth National Conference was designed to provide increased attention to other factors in the societal framework of the New Europe. In a sequence of symposia at the Conference, European and American participants highlighted significant developments in education, business, literature, art, and parliamentary institutions.

Education

"New Directions in European Education" was the title of the symposium in which Prof. C. Arnold Anderson of the University of Chicago inquired into three related subjects (1) all-European educational programs since World War II, (2) the distinguishing tendencies between European and American educational systems, and (3) the recent reorientation in European educational systems.

Since World War II, Professor Anderson pointed out, there has been extensive cooperation in educational research programs, marked by the creation of European teams for research and planning purposes. As evidenced by certain Scandinavian programs on the one hand and plans sponsored and administered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the other, such cooperation has been effected both regionally and on a continental level. These efforts represent a sign of the emerging "true European consciousness," which was also evident in a recent attempt to standardize university degrees throughout Europe, in the opening of increased numbers of all-European secondary schools and universities, and in the common European activities for the sake of education in the developing countries. Professor Anderson also emphasized the resurgence of European confidence which has affected European intellectuals and others in many parts of the world. To it are due in part the success of American libraries in Europe, the establishment of chairs of American studies at European universities, and the enthusiasm in some countries for the opportunities provided by UNESCO in the field of education.

In distinguishing European and American educational systems, Professor Anderson noted that education is a matter of national policy in Europe. This is caused partly by the centralized political and administrative structure of the European countries and partly by the ideological orientation of the political parties. European countries make greater use of national commissions on education, which tend to dig deeper than do the reports of the U. S. Government. European countries are more inclined to educational planning, especially as regards the link between educational needs and economic development.

Among the reorientations occurring in European education, Professor Anderson cited particularly the extensive borrowing of other nations' educational practices. He reported that American practices are being copied to a greater degree than ever before. There is also a growing tendency to assess education from the practical side rather than by the intellectual standards that earlier preoccupied European educators. This has led to a growing respectability for such practical kinds of education as the social sciences. Related to this practicality is the fact that education in Europe is no longer seen as a preserve of the elite. There is a burgeoning democratization of education and a growing sensitiveness to the claims of less advantaged groups.

In commenting on Professor Anderson's address, Prof. Philip J. Foster, also of the University of Chicago, pointed out that there is considerable variation in the rate of educational change throughout the European countries. Two important trends he saw throughout Europe were the raising of school-leaving age and the deferment of the selection process that ends general education. He felt that academic education continued to be generally restricted to the higher status social groups, although vocational schools were widespread and well developed. He hoped general academic education could be extended more widely throughout European society.

In the ensuing general discussion from the floor, it was pointed out that standards do vary among European universities, but there is generally a greater homogeneity than among American institutions. Europe provides more financial aid for students than does the United States. Europe has begun to experiment with such new techniques as educational television. Considerable agreement was reached that the economic approach to evaluating educational needs has increased the priority of general education. Many felt that European educational systems are still the best for producing the elite or yeast of society, but they are not appropriate for all those now demanding higher education.

The more specific subject of "Adult Education in Northern Europe" was discussed by Mrs. Ingeborg Bertha Lyche, Undersecretary in the Office for Art and Cultural Af-

—Courtesy of Chicago Sun-Times

Ambassador William Benton, U. S. Member of the Executive Board of UNESCO, emphasizes a point at a Press Conference which was held at Press Headquarters at the Conrad Hilton Hotel.

fairs of the Norwegian Ministry of Education. As an instrument for advancing public understanding of general issues and individual knowledge of specific subjects, adult education in Northern Europe has certain prominent characteristics. A significant role is played by voluntary nongovernmental organizations. Here the population receives firsthand lessons about the democratic process. Small groups are most commonly used. These groups often pursue learning through correspondence, a form of education necessitated by Norway's geography. Mrs. Lyche noted also both the need and the desire for cooperation among the various voluntary organizations and the state. And there is an increasing concern for including the arts in adult education programs.

The general discussion adduced some further factors: Attempts are being made to establish a more satisfactory working relationship between the small groups and radio and television; libraries of various sizes are supported by the government in every town; and Norway is now experimenting with bookmobiles and even with a book-boat that travels in and out of the fiords.

Business

In "The New European Men of Business," Wilhelm Paues, Director of the Department of International Affairs of the Federation of Swedish Industries, highlighted the changing economic scene where the modern European men of business have played their part since World War II. The postwar condition of European business, the Marshall Plan, study opportunities in the United States for European executives and technicians, and most important of all, the growth of European economic cooperation have created new requirements, new practices, and new attitudes. The European businessman, long attuned to governmental wartime regulation, had to be occupationally rehabilitated to survive in a free economy.

The birth of the Common Market, according to Mr. Paues, provided the great new impetus for European businessmen. The expectation of no import duties between 180 million consumers in 1970, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome, encouraged businessmen to plan for this future situation. This led to an almost immediate stimulation in the European economy and in European trade, even under the then prevailing high tariffs. As Mr. Paues demonstrated with a most convincing hypothetical case study of European automobile manufacturers, businessmen aided this impetus by the investment they felt was necessary to prepare themselves in production and marketing for the forthcoming tariff-free situation.

Confronted with the many new factors that had to be considered in forming the policy of a firm, the older European men of business felt uneasy. For small firms it was necessary to specialize production in order to sell a smaller variety of products over an expanded market. For some firms merger was a requirement. Younger businessmen now received more opportunities and were better appreciated by the more conservative older generation. Increased contacts with firms in other Common Market countries led also to closer cooperation among national trade associations.

In the business community, Mr. Paues noted, the motives for European cooperation were mixed. For very many the political consequences of European cooperation were considered desirable at the same time as the economic consequences were regarded with some hesitation and trepidation.

Mr. Paues argued that the division of Europe into two trading blocs is a nuisance from the economic point of view. The added incentives to trade within each bloc disrupt channels of trade that existed earlier. The situation is not serious so long as the general economic situation remains favorable, but it can create great difficulties for outside suppliers once a slump occurs. The awkward thing is that tariff discriminations could be removed easily in good times, but only with great difficulty during a slump when discrimination really hurts. Also, manufacturers are led to set up subsidiary operations in

the other bloc in order to avoid prohibitive tariffs, which may lead to unnecessary investment, surplus capacity, and even greater difficulty in uniting the two blocs at a future time.

Industrial leaders in the three "neutral" countries—Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria—were worried, Mr. Paues reported, over the cool attitude of the American administration which increased their difficulties in contacting the Common Market. Sweden is particularly concerned because about 50 percent of the total exports of dutiable goods go to countries of the hypothetically expanded Common Market (the Six plus Britain, Denmark, and Norway). The situation is also very serious for Austria and to a lesser degree for Switzerland. For Sweden and Switzerland possible economic isolation and risk of poverty instead of progress might necessitate a reduction of defense expenditures, a prospect, according to Mr. Paues, probably not to the liking of the United States. On the other hand, however, Swedish businessmen reflect only positive reactions toward the plan for European integration. Swedish industry has been hardened under a very liberal import regime with low import duties. It wants to have its markets enlarged and to compete with the Common Market without any trade barriers.

In his commentary James Hart, Dean of the College of Commerce at DePaul University, noted that the exuberant self-confidence of the new European man of business is a testimony to the success of United States postwar European policy. He also suggested that American support in recent economic negotiations was concentrated on Britain because of a United States hope that the Common Market would turn into a political third force to which Britain could bring great strength. Heavy American investment in Britain also affected the United States position. Mr. Hart believed that the peace and prosperity of Europe and the world would depend on the merging of the EEC and the EFTA.

Literature

In the symposium entitled "The Resurgent Individual: Remarks on Some European Novels of the Sixties" Prof. Germaine Brée of the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin, expanded her topic to post World War II novels. She noted that since the war there has been considerable experimentation in the novels of Europe which she characterized as "anarchistic diversity." She suggested that in contrast to the tempo of the times European writers have not regarded the alienation of the individual as a major theme. Rather than focusing on society and collective actions of men, contemporary writers see society and its inept rituals as being out of touch with life. The primary trademark of the European novel is a break with tradition.

Novelists in different countries are taking different approaches, Professor Brée said. In Spain the novelist expresses a deep concern for the people and a revolt against the sham bourgeoisie and false facade of society. In Germany a preoccupation with the horror and guilt of the war is coupled with a desire for a continuing German-Jewish dialog. In Britain the writers express petty grievances against the new, less obvious caste barriers of society that have replaced the older, more obvious ones. In the Soviet Union the new novelists are engaged in a reconsideration of recent history through the questioning of official myths. In France there is no underlying unity, but novelists are experimenting with new structures in the design of the fictional narrative.

Professor Brée pointed out two common elements and two widely used themes in modern European novels. In general the novelists express a shared attitude of detachment toward their immediate past that reflects a mood of independence. They also prefer the concrete with a minimum of abstractions. This hostility to verbiage is related to a considerable interest in the form of the short story. One popular theme is the arrangement by which the world is

viewed through the eyes of children. In such novels one finds a rejection of the adult world, an exposé of life's absurdities, and a portrayal of the futility of contemporary society. A second widely used theme is that of the detective story. It is often chosen because it enables the author to bring together a series of otherwise unconnected events.

Professor Brée maintained that the modern European novel is composed of a series of descriptions of encounters between individuals. Most important is what happens to the integrity of the individual in the multiplicity of events. Large movements are not of concern to the novelist. There is usually no collective frame of reference. Detailed descriptions are typical as the neopicaresque has displaced the intellectual hero of former days.

Professor Brée concluded by suggesting that through a humanistic realism the content of individual experience is being expressed in a new, dynamic manner. The structure of the new novel itself tends to convey a message. It is probably correct to say that the contemporary novel is concerned with the reconstruction of the individual in new terms. Professor Brée felt that improvements in communication and a growing mutual awareness among European novelists may result in the emergence of a new European novel.

In the commentary, Prof. Bruce Morrissette of the University of Chicago pointed out that although their novels were not generally concerned with political issues, the authors themselves were often active politically. Modern authors manifest a general refusal to engage in psychological analysis. One additional theme of the modern novel has been the use of a myth enabling the author to establish a tie to the humanistic past.

In response to a question from the floor regarding the implications of a new European literary movement on the new Europe, Professor Brée said that writers have not dealt with this theme to any great extent, but there is beginning to emerge the reappearance of a non-nationalistic literature. She felt, however, that it takes a long time for universal ties to be regrouped.

Although illness prevented his attendance, Colin MacInnes, British essayist and novelist, submitted a paper entitled "Reflections of Change in Literature." Mr. MacInnes believed that British authors could be doing much more than they are to reflect the rapid pace of change in contemporary society. Valued primarily as entertainers, authors are not much encouraged to deal with pressing current issues. Only the theater reflects extensively the vitality of the era. Citing the global nature of the English language, Mr. MacInnes made a strong appeal to all to say farewell to artistic nationalism.

Prof. Robert W. Corrigan of the Carnegie Institute of Technology examined present-day drama in his discussion of "The Search for Identity in the Theater." In his view the main stream of the modern theater

College students interested in the New Europe register for the Conference and check the program for the symposia of their choice.

has not concerned itself with the search for identity. Insofar as it has dealt with this matter, it has done so by noting modern man's failure to search rather than searching itself.

Professor Corrigan pointed out that since the war the theater has been following the lead of such novelists as Proust and Joyce. It has considered concepts of character artificial because they fail to capture the flow and change of being. Thus the modern playwright who sees everything wrecked and confused abolishes the traditional linear plot. He seeks to dramatize a condition. Action he considers contrived, for in life there are no central actions. Nor are there great figures or anyone like a hero in the plays of the recent past and present.

Professor Corrigan emphasized that the new playwrights are interested in the drama each man has within himself rather than in particular men in particular world systems. They search for metaphors of man left face to face with himself, stripped of social, economic, political, and religious baggage. They do not bring us to the theater to show us someone doing something, to show us a crisis resolved in such a way that we can say that life is good or life is bad. They seek to express the fundamental fact that life is, and that it is problematic, discontinuous, and complex. They seek vertical depth rather than horizontal movement, and they have come to be known as authors of the "theater of the absurd."

Using Beckett and Ionesco as his prime examples, Professor Corrigan charged the modern playwrights with abdicating their responsibilities as artists in the theater. In his view the modern theater has not attempted to express the modern situation. It has simply followed directions taken in the other arts. He allowed, however, that the helplessness of the modern theater is probably a reflection of the condition of modern man.

In Professor Corrigan's view the condition of modern man is characterized by the absorption of individualism by the collective society. He saw the root of this problem in the standardization required by industrialization that leads to anonymity for individuals and then to alienation from themselves. The manipulation of people by the bureaucracy is likewise characteristic of the industrial collectivism under which modern man lives. As a result of these two forces, man is divided and transformed from an individual to a social personality. One's function tends increasingly to be the source of one's identity.

Professor Corrigan contended that the result of this condition of our times is that we have a new hero in our age, the hero of surfaces. Role-playing is the new prerequisite for greatness. It is one of the easiest ways to adjust to anything, and it is given new emphasis by the specialization of our age. Like Iago modern man is only the particular reality he is playing at the moment. For Professor Corrigan the theater has lost its subjects. In the face of the modern condition of man the playwright is expressing a sense of helplessness.

Nevertheless, Professor Corrigan concluded, playwrights still find human action significant enough that they engage in the act of writing thus denying to some extent the prevalent pessimism and despair.

In his commentary John Reich, Director of the Goodman Theater, wondered if Professor Corrigan's analysis was not too pessimistic. He suggested that a countermovement was already on the way, and he recalled hopefully that the age of Socrates and Plato followed an Egyptian era where collectivism was more extensive and more severe than it is today.

Art

Speaking on "The Artist, the Art Expert and the Layman," G. L. Conran, Director of the Manchester Art Galleries, concentrated on the exercise of correct judgment in the management of public galleries. In centuries past, he noted, English art galleries depended heavily on wealthy benefactors, and the taste of the benefactor determined the choice of acquisitions. The advent of government support and involvement in the

management of art galleries opens up the possibility of a direct choice of art by politicians. Mr. Conran examined three alternatives, although none of them provides a clearcut solution. There is the possibility of allocating a sum of money and then giving it to an "expert" to use in selecting art. However, this only means that instead of determining excellence in art the government must now determine excellence in experts. Another possibility is the use of an artist as curator. Not being known for a lack of emotionality, artists are likely, however, to acquire whatever art is pleasing to their own prejudices. A third alternative would be to give a *recognized* expert control over the collection. Still, Mr. Conran recalled, even the experts have made blunders in the past.

To improve the system of art acquisition in England, Mr. Conran advocated greater freedom for the director. In his view the gallery director is the one person who should be in a position to reconcile the conflicting claims of the past and present, of dealers and collectors. An autonomous fund is needed. Governmental bodies are inherently slow, and the acquisition of certain finds requires speedy action. Mr. Conran also expressed his admiration for the American tax system regarding art. A wealthy man is able to purchase a costly work of art, promise to will it to a gallery, and then keep that work of art in his own home until his death without paying taxes on it. Mr. Conran noted that it was unlikely that the British tax structure would follow the American system.

George Cohen, artist and Professor of Art at Northwestern University, commented that a major function of an art museum is to educate the experts by providing collections of good art that cannot be seen elsewhere. The art expert must come between the artist and the viewer. The expert must uphold the past, and the artist must uphold the immediate present. Generally both must work together against the taste of the majority. Contrary to the situation in England, Mr. Cohen believed that current taste in American art seems to be influenced more by mass media than by museums.

Mr. Cohen noted that experience in the early part of this century has had a somewhat undesirable influence on current museum acquisition policies. Because the experts failed to secure the contemporary art which was later regarded as outstanding, some present-day curators acquire a little sampling of most contemporary art to avoid repeating the earlier mistakes.

Museums today are taking over a new function, according to Mr. Cohen. They are becoming major customers, and artists are doing work with the express intention of selling it to a museum. The lack of wealthy art patrons has transformed the museum into a kind of contemporary art critic. It is noteworthy that whenever a museum acquires a work done by a contemporary artist, the market value of other works by that artist rises.

Parliaments

In the symposium entitled "The Evolution of European Parliaments," Prof. Otto Kirchheimer of Columbia University pointed initially to a current, well established opinion decrying the declining effectiveness of parliament as a political institution. To Professor Kirchheimer what at first glance looks like deterioration is seen to be simply a consequence of the thoroughgoing process of democratization. The process started during the last third of the 19th century and came to full fruition during the post-World War II period. It is a story of changing historical needs and dimensions.

Democratization swept away electoral restrictions, Professor Kirchheimer said, and removed the barriers between parliamentary job and governmental office. At the same time, commingling representative and governmental function produced something like a new layer between the parliament and the government—the political party. The 20th century European mass party closely correlates subdivisions, organizes elections, recruits members, contacts backers and sympathizers, and does the parliamentary work

to either support or dislodge the government.

What does this mean for the parliament involved? In fulfilling its function of electing a government, the parliament, according to Professor Kirchheimer, must bend to the will of a majority party or a combination of parties which can form and support a workable government. More often than not this entails an act of abnegation. The government needs more consistent support, and both party and government need more steady footing to present their case to the country. Thus comes the necessity for the parliamentary party to curtail its commitment to the principle of parliamentary discourse and to play down the natural antagonism which invariably marks the relations between government and parliament, between actor and overseer.

As one result, Professor Kirchheimer continued, and by necessity rather than by choice, many European parliaments have become populated by second-stringers—party secretaries, journalists, and liaison men to interest groups and professional organizations. These men constitute transmission belts between political leadership and both organized groups and the unorganized masses.

The traditional parliamentary legislative function has also changed in character, Professor Kirchheimer stated. While parliaments retain the prerogative to initiate bills, the great mass of legislative spadework is done in the ministries. Proposals are then coordinated with other interested ministries and, if needed, submitted to cabinet arbitration. Only after these processes are complete is a proposal thrown into the legislative hopper for final clearance. Therefore, as regards the legislative function, Professor Kirchheimer concluded that parliaments frequently put their stamp of approval on work originating, thought through, fought over, and bargained for somewhere else.

Professor Kirchheimer saw a similar change in parliamentary budget control. Today the budget hearings in European parliaments retain only a symbolic meaning. What remains of the budget ritual is the opposition's purely perfunctory picking on items long singled out as political footballs.

Finally, the parliamentary function of supervision and criticism of the administrative apparatus continues to be highly important. In this the opposition must represent the parliament. Professor Kirchheimer noted that many parliaments, conscious of the precariousness of this function, have now emulated the British experience by having a question hour as a control device. Yet spot control rather than systematic item-by-item budget control hearings is a game of skill. There has been little movement among parliamentary assemblies to establish investigating committees. Despite being the most vital function, parliamentary control over the administration represents, in Professor Kirchheimer's view, the weakest spot on the record of the European parliaments. While the area to be supervised has mushroomed, parliaments have generally neither pushed old techniques energetically nor developed new ones to meet the challenge.

Professor Kirchheimer concluded that when all is said and done European parliaments are still fulfilling a number of useful functions, and can become more prominent with some proper reforms. Though parliaments have yielded the leadership to the major political parties and the permanent bureaucracies, they do continue to provide the constitutional framework and the necessary legitimacy for installing cabinets. The test of the feasibility of any governmental combination lies in an open vote by the parliament. If the majority dislocates, it is the parliament as a corporate body which must take care of the new political arrangements to be made. Parliamentary assemblies clearly still have important roles to play in legitimizing cabinets and statutes, guaranteeing freedom of discourse, and possibly overseeing administrative actions as well in a democratically ordered mass society.

Professor Kirchheimer deliberately refrained from analyzing the European Assembly which now sits as parliamentary accompaniment to EURATOM, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Eco-

nomic Commission. The Assembly has yet to acquire the identifying characteristics of an established parliament. For this very reason, Professor Kirchheimer pointed out, the current problems of European parliaments affect in even stronger form whatever might become their legitimate successor.

Although Prof. Jean Blondel, University of Essex, agreed in his commentary on the individual points just made, he took a more optimistic view based on parliament's role in focusing public attention on current issues. He felt that mass media and the political parties had taken over some of the functions of parliamentary debate, but he suggested that where the members of parliament earnestly confronted each other on major questions, the mass media assisted both sides in presenting their arguments. Parliamentary debate in its ideal form results in a clarification and simplification of issues which would not otherwise occur.

The general discussion reopened the question of the European Parliament of the future. Essential to it would be political parties organized on a European level. Presently the European Assembly is preoccupied with national concerns, and the identifiable factions tend to represent national interests. Indeed, the legitimacy of the Assembly comes from individual sovereign states not from the people, and members of the Assembly represent governments rather than popular constituencies. There will eventually be a European Parliament, Professor Kirchheimer believed, which will derive its legitimacy from the European people and will feature political parties formed at a European level. The constituents of the members will have much more diverse interests than do the constituents of any one national parliament, and the Parliament of the future will be the better for that reason.

Two Commission Vice Chairmen discuss a matter during a break in the Conference. At left is Dr. Frederick Burkhardt, President of the American Council of Learned Societies and, right, Dr. Roger Revelle, Dean of Research, University of California.

The Atlantic Community

A CONCEPT WITH IMPLICATIONS

The concept of an Atlantic community has become ingrained in the vernacular of the countless discussions of postwar United States-European relations. As individual words, Atlantic and community provide no particular problem. When placed side by side and given capital letters, they challenge precise definition. The Atlantic is simply the ocean that unites North America with—or separates it from—the European continent. A community by definition is a group having common interests or organizations or living in the same locality under the same laws. Unfortunately the juxtaposition of the two words permits neither so simple nor so acceptable a definition.

Some aspects of the problem were identified by the Honorable George Brown, deputy leader of the British Labor Party, in his address to the National Commission shortly in advance of the Conference. He asserted that there is considerable disarray in the Atlantic alliance, but that there is no substitute for it. A European organization of whatever form could be an effective part of that alliance, yet it must be part of a larger whole. For this reason he clearly rejected General de Gaulle's advocacy of a political force independent of the United States.

Mr. Brown believed it is an urgent matter to create within the Atlantic alliance some form of political consultation or organization which would enable an effective sharing of responsibility for policymaking. Consultation could overcome the unhappy lack of mutual confidence among members of the alliance which has resulted from the existence of nuclear weapons and the fears and strains to which they give rise. All partners need somehow to feel that they have an effective part in those vital decisions involved in what is presently called "trigger fingering,"

Regarding the United Kingdom's status within a strengthened alliance, Mr. Brown first saw a need for a change of climate which would permit the European community to expand withou breaking up. The failure of Britain to gain admission into the Common Market was, he believed, the end of a chapter which could not be pur-

sued. Other nonmember European countries are also concerned with joining the Common Market, hence the problem of climate is not limited to British status alone. Britain is helping to create such a climate by building up the strength of other European countries as well as her own and assuring an overseas competitive position. The Commonwealth commitment of the British is far from being an alibi, he concluded; it is a valuable institution which should be preserved for the sake of all concerned with international cooperation.

The Atlantic "community" or the "Atlantic Community"

In the symposium entitled "The Atlantic Community and the World Community," Prof. Frank Munk of Reed College viewed the Atlantic community as a crucial test for two divergent tendencies. One aims in the direction of community development and the other toward the proliferation of nationalism.

By whatever criteria chosen, Professor Munk contended, the Atlantic community today is the most developed and most advanced of all supranational groupings. It is seminal in ideas, in organization, and in achievement. It has developed modern science, pioneered democracy, proclaimed (if not always practiced) liberty, cradled the nation-state, hatched socialism, and produced at least relative affluence. It has forged the way in the development of regional organizations: OECD, NATO, EEC, ECSC, EFTA and EURATOM are but the initials of Atlantic creativeness.

The scope of the Atlantic community can be affirmed by glancing at such possible variables as the extent of the community, its geographical core or cores, its structure, and the kind and degree of institutionalization. It is possible, according to Professor Munk, to think in terms not of one kind of Atlantic community, but of a number of alternatives. For instance, after World War II an Atlantic community was known of which the United States was undisputed leader, spokesman, defender, and economic supporter. In 1962, President Kennedy launched the concept of an Atlantic partnership based on two pillars, the United States and a united Europe. Clarence Streit has long advocated a Federal Union of the Atlantic nations.[1] Many other concepts will no doubt appear, and some may become reality.

Professor Munk affirmed that as the situation now stands in the West, there is an Atlantic community with a small "c", but if there is to be real Atlantic unity, an Atlantic Community with a capital "C" must be created. Initially much depends on what the institutional form of the community is to be. He believed that President Kennedy's proposal for an Atlantic partnership is very different from a real community. Dual unions do not work, and a community cannot function properly if it is bipolar in nature.

The extent of the Community raises many questions, Professor Munk continued. Does the Atlantic community include only the present North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, and if so, should all of them be counted including Portugal, Greece, and Turkey? What about Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland? Under what circumstances would Spain be included? Should not a place remain open for such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary, which are traditionally oriented toward the West? Are not Australia and New Zealand as close to the way of Western life as Canada? Should Israel be permanently excluded? What kind of ties should bind the North Atlantic community to the South Atlantic communities of Latin America or perhaps South Africa? Should there be agreement with President de Gaulle that there exist two Atlantic communities, one Anglo-Saxon and the other "European"? The one important consideration related to all these questions, Professor Munk stated, is to keep the Atlantic Community open and outwardly directed.

In terms of internal structure, Mr. Munk

[1] Clarence K. Streit, President of Federal Union, Inc., a pioneer of the Atlantic Union concept and author of *Union Now*.

suggested, the Community may conceivably be organized someday as a single political system consisting of subsystems such as North America and Europe. It may be pluralistic with separate organs for military, economic, cultural, and other spheres. It may strive for a political organ which would coordinate all the different aspects of communal concern. Each of these solutions would greatly alter the external as well as internal relationships of the Community.

Most important to Professor Munk was the question of the degree of integration, the relationship between member nations and the central organs, the confederal or federal principles of union—in other words, the extent of supranationality. The organs of decision-making ought to be centralized, he believed, if there is to be a real Atlantic Community, although it can be argued that institutions are not as important as functions, processes, and policies. Functionalism is no panacea for all possible contingencies, as witness the political exclusion of Britain despite Common Market functionalism. Ideologically, Professor Munk sees presently in the Atlantic Community the common denominator of a mild brand of democratic-liberal-welfare state thinking.

Above all, Professor Munk concluded, the progressive development of the Atlantic Community must be characterized by a willingness to be more outward-looking and a determination to be more than an alliance or a confederation.

Although he agreed with Mr. Munk's view of the difficulties currently being experienced by regional organizations, Theodore Achilles, vice chairman of the Executive Committee of The Atlantic Council of the United States, was confident that the forces for unity are stronger than the forces for disintegration. The current disarray seems to be a mere dip in the longer range trend toward unity. Mr. Achilles felt that the Atlantic Community is at this time the only international community both large enough and small enough to make substantial progress. A strengthening of the United Nations, desirable as it may be, seems unlikely at present given its worldwide basis; the notion of a closed European union is too small, especially in terms of resources. He saw six requisites for progress in going from Atlantic community with a small "c" to Community with a capital "C". There must be harmonization of national policies, through real consultation on such areas as economic, military, social and industrial problems. There must be an effective unitary decision-making power on the really vital questions. Machinery for assuring implementation of decisions is needed and might be provided by granting operational power to the central decision-making body. Coordination of military, economic, and political fields does not presently exist in either the Atlantic Alliance or the European Communities; it needs to be done. Democratic control of the decision-making and deliberating body is another requirement. Lastly, safeguards for individual liberties and national rights must be guaranteed.

In terms of immediate concrete steps, Mr. Achilles suggested (1) a more active role for the Atlantic Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference and (2) the appointment of a United States governmental commission to propose reforms and new institutions that may be required.

The Atlantic Community and Current Issues

Speaking on "The Functional Development of the Atlantic Community," Uwe Kitzinger, Fellow of Nuffield College at Oxford University, identified three vital issues facing the world today. One is the problem of population, poverty, and race or in geographical terms the North-South problem. Another is the political East-West problem. The third is that of organizing the Western World in terms of economic and mental growth and political stability. This last problem and its solution greatly affect the approach to the two others.

European unity is not enough to solve these issues, Mr. Kitzinger stressed, nor is Atlantic unity enough. The very notion of

Theodore Achilles, Vice Chairman, Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United States, comments on a speech made by Frank Munk (left), Professor, Reed College. Robert Farwell (right), Associate Dean, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business served as the Chairman of this panel "The Atlantic Community and the World Community."

partnership means two centers of power and decision-making. There is no such power in Europe which could be a truly equal partner with the United States. Further, partnership implies two independent security systems, particularly a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Rather than any of these suggestions, Mr. Kitzinger urged solution of the third problem through creation of an Atlantic Community—a true community in which smaller units must be willing to make sacrifices for the community as a whole. In military terms, Mr. Kitzinger saw a necessity for the United States to give up its finger on the trigger and on the safety catch. In like manner, the Europeans must realize that they cannot and ought not rely on American financing of the Atlantic Community.

Regarding the North-South problem, Mr. Kitzinger believed that free trade is not enough to provide a solution. In world agriculture, the Atlantic Community must extend beyond the Atlantic area and there must be firm commitments to the developing countries.

Mr. Kitzinger saw the Atlantic Community as performing an important role in terms of the East-West problem. Like Professor Munk, Mr. Kitzinger stressed that the Atlantic Community must be outward-looking and extend beyond itself. In this way, the rationale of Atlantic supranationalism may eventually lead to the inclusion of areas beyond the Atlantic and perhaps even to some sort of world community.

Mr. Kitzinger noted various approaches that might be made to these problems of community building. A regional alliance, much as President de Gaulle has outlined, seems to result only in a superstate, not a supranational state, and it is heir to all the difficulties of the nation-state. To organize on any ideological basis such as opposition to the Soviet Union involves self-evident dangers. A third and feasible alternative, Mr. Kitzinger pointed out, is that of functional organization, based on performance of common tasks of limited character. The performance of tasks creates situations which suggest and virtually compel an ever-increasing realm of cooperation. Through such a snowball effect can come the creation of a true Atlantic Community.

A sharp but realistic note of caution was interjected at this point in the Ninth Con-

ference by Dr. Milton Rakove of the University of Illinois. Under a current cold war stalemate between Russia and the United States, the way is open for efforts such as President de Gaulle's to create an independent Europe led by France to hold the balance of power. Enduring serious problems must be faced and overcome before much progress can be made towards a world community.

The Atlantic Community and Latin America

Prof. George Blanksten of Northwestern University, in his address "The Atlantic Community and Latin America," emphasized the ambivalent position of Latin America in relation to the Atlantic community. Latin America is considered a part of the underdeveloped world both by outsiders and by some of the native population as well. At the same time the Latin American countries, unlike many of the underdeveloped nations in Africa or Asia, have drawn their cultures in the main from Europe.

Latin America is torn between these two worlds, Dr. Blanksten stated. Despite their problems of economic and political development, the Latin American nations do not like to be compared with the emergent nations of Asia and Africa on that score. Nor would they consider their cultural positions comparable. Further, in dealing with Western problems, the Latin American nations have been regarded as the "poor relations," and an attitude of condescension has frequently prevailed in consulting Latin America on questions of international organization. At the same time the Latin Americans can point out that their approaches to international organization have frequently been more in accord with realities than many of the plans of the North Atlantic countries. The Organization of American States began in 1902 with only social and cultural functions. Today it has increasing economic functions, and it is on the threshold of expansion of political functions. The problem of ambivalence is not peculiar to Latin America, he added, citing Canada as evidence.

Professor Blanksten concluded that the people in the Western Hemisphere are in a period of transition in international organization—a transition from the regional to some type of universal organization. Latin America has always emphasized the functional framework of regional organization. He predicted a decrease in regional emphasis within the Organization of American States (OAS), resulting in a healthy development of international organization on a much broader base.

Prof. Herbert S. Klein of the University of Chicago, emphasized the intimate economic connections between Latin America and Europe. Latin Americans see in the Common Market what they want to achieve in their own area, and they look upon it as a model. At the same time, the Common Market constitutes a threat to the traditional markets of Latin America. Fortunately, the European members of the Common Market recognize the problem and are trying to cope with it.

On the basis of the strong economic ties along with the cultural ties which both he and Professor Blanksten identified, Professor Klein foresaw great opportunities for vastly increased cooperation between Latin America and an outward-looking New Europe. Indeed, he concluded, Europeans rather than North Americans have the greatest potential for leadership in this aspect of Atlantic Community development.

The Atlantic Community and Functionalism

In a statement substantiated throughout the conference Mr. Kitzinger maintained that one hardly need argue the obsolescence of the nation-state today. A more important question is concern for what is to replace or supplement the nation-state. As the United Nations is capable of little more than handling general problems of peace and economic development, it is not a sufficient substitute or addition to the nation-state. At another level many people have spoken of a united Europe as a more viable political en-

tity. But even more modest are those, Mr. Kitzinger said, who have conceived the problem more pragmatically—the functionalists.

Mr. Kitzinger characterized the functionalist method as the "community method" of creating unity. Functionalists recognize the reality of the nation-state. They do not believe that common institutions set up in a vacuum can somehow create a common interest. It is their firm belief that these institutions must be developed concurrently with common interests. They must interact with them, intensify them and thus make additional institutions both necessary and practicable. As a result, the functionalists use a pragmatic, functional technique that exploits particular tactical situations.

Mr. Kitzinger cited the Rome Treaty as an excellent example of the functional approach. Not only is it irreversible, but it is also progressive in increasing the commitments—agreements to agree in the future—of the member nations. The treaty establishes community institutions independent of the member governments, from which results a gradual relinquishing of sovereignty. Herein is the core of community development. The point of the Common Market is not that it has built a new bloc of its own in the old balance-of-power game, but that it has pioneered a new approach designed to transcend power politics as such. What matters is not so much its regional as its functional character, not the unit it has constructed, but the process it has set rolling.

Speaking on "The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission: Joint Ventures in Science," René Foch, Director of External Relations for EURATOM, presented a specific manifestation of the functional approach. According to Mr. Foch, the two primary objectives of EURATOM are the promotion of European integration and

Delegates and Conference Staff look over pamphlets displayed by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

the fostering of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He viewed EURATOM as an example of the use of science to reach a political objective, in this case, European integration.

Mr. Foch cited two joint boards of representatives from EURATOM and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as examples of Atlantic partnership. The work of these boards and the agreements reached have been very successful despite certain problems. One of the joint boards has so far approved 50 European proposals, 40 U.S. proposals, and 9 joint proposals out of some 400 submitted to it.

Mr. Foch drew four conclusions from the almost 6 years of cooperation between EURATOM and the United States. The relationship has revealed that science is one of the forces that can pull together different nations, even "enemy" nations. Results have shown that the more fundamental the field of research, the easier it is to organize and coordinate it. Collaboration to be successful must be a two-way affair in which both partners are contributors. And European institutions find it easier to work well with United States institutions if both are organized on similar patterns.

The inadequacy of the traditional "sealing wax and string" for modern scientific research constitutes a powerful stimulus for integration of effort not only in science but also in other fields of endeavor. Alexander King, Director of Scientific Affairs for the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), told the Ninth Conference participants that there is a growing recognition in European countries of the need for a policy for science and an understanding of its interrelation with other elements of national policy—defense, economic, trade, health, and even foreign. In turn, there is a growing recognition of the importance of international science policy. The OECD is one of numerous organizations pressing scientific development on an international cooperative basis. With its membership drawn from both sides of the Atlantic, and with its outward-looking purpose of assistance to developing areas, the OECD thus constitutes a highly significant mechanism in the functional approach to an Atlantic Community.

Fulfillment of scientific needs, Mr. King emphasized, requires cooperation between politicians, civil servants, scientists, economists, and sociologists. In the formulation of an effective science policy, consideration must be given to the extent of research necessary for national aims, to balance between fundamental and applied research and between defense and civilian requirements, to manpower and educational aspects, to problems of communication and application, et cetera. On both national and international scales the new techniques of scientific inquiry, like the new technology of industrial production, outrun the resources and capacities of nation-states subjected to political fractionalization. Recalling the remarks of Sir John Cockcroft, Mr. King also stressed the high cost of modern scientific research, and he identified various cost-sharing projects being accomplished through OECD, UNESCO, EURATOM, CERN, and related organizations.

Individual scientists working in relative isolation in university laboratories have forever lost their monopoly of research and discovery, and governments have now established their paramount interests. Mr. King assessed this change as something to welcome rather than to fear. The individual scientist now has the prospect of sufficient resources (when adequate policies for science are established) and society as a whole has the boundless promise of eliminating poverty, raising standards of health and welfare, and giving to man an understanding of himself, his society, and his destiny.

Whether the Atlantic area will progress from "community" to "Community" through functionalism such as Mr. Kitzinger urged and Messrs. Foch and King described, or through political will as Mr. Achilles stressed, remains an unanswered question for Conference participants. But they can have no doubts as to the challenge to the peoples whom the Atlantic has historically connected.

Develop, Developing, Developed

FORMS OF AN ACTIVE VERB

The New Europe and the developing nations, the Atlantic Community and the developing nations, the developed nations and the developing ones, Common Market and development, science and development, international organizations and developing nations—the list of relationships as discussed at the Ninth Conference is almost endless. No matter what relationship may eventuate between the United States and the New Europe, the needs and aspirations of developing nations will condition the outcome, and the search for a satisfactory plan for development must be pressed.

The New Europe and the Developing Nations

Concern for the developing nations has been a congenital attribute of the New Europe, for the older nations brought with them historic ties to the others. The progress of relations between the two groups was traced by Jacob van der Lee, Director for Associated Overseas Countries of the Commission of the European Economic Community in the symposium entitled "The New Europe and the Developing Countries: Images and Realities." Although the issues began to take shape at the time of the Schuman Declaration in May 1950, formal discussion of the subject was not undertaken until the EEC negotiations of 1956. At that time the French, because of the distinctive trade arrangements within the French Union, demanded assistance for developing nations dependent on the member states of the EEC. Otherwise the established outlets for their products would be endangered.

The French proposal was particularly unpopular with the Germans and the Dutch because both feared that such a system of association would develop into a system of discrimination towards other developing countries. Through compromise, a system of association was reached for dependent countries which was based on two factors: (1) preferential trade with the EEC, and (2) financial assistance from the EEC for economic and social development.

The year of African independence arrived in 1960, and the new countries (or ex-colonies) demanded continuation of their as-



Left to right: Louis Gottschalk, Hannah Arendt, Professors at the University of Chicago, and Mojmir Povolny, Professor, Lawrence College, participate in the symposium "The Force of Revolution and the Idea of Force."

sociation with the Common Market. The EEC decided that the existing arrangements would continue through 1962, just as provided in the original 5-year agreement.

Mr. van der Lee noted that the 5-year agreement had caused criticism of the EEC. Since the associates were to have free run within the EEC, it was argued that third countries, and particularly Latin America, were being discriminated against. The fact is, Mr. van der Lee emphasized, that trade between nonassociated countries producing tropical products and the EEC has increased more than trade between the EEC and the associates.

The relationship with the new nations was carried further when in 1962 the 6 EEC nations and the 18 associated overseas territories came together in Brussels for a joint examination of the situation. Four provisions emerged from the extended negotiations. The preferential trade system was altered by a reduction of 25 to 40 percent in the external tariff on tropical commodities. The European Investment Fund was increased from $581 to $800 million for the next 5 years and provided more flexible ways for granting loans and technical assistance. With a view to the Commonwealth countries and Latin America, opportunities for association were made available to other countries in similar economic situations. Institutions were established whereby representatives of the EEC and of the associated overseas

countries sit together and administer matters in a parallel system.

Looking to the future, Mr. van der Lee saw need for closer coordination of aid programs to developing countries. If there is to be partnership there must be discussion, and the discussion should take place within institutions of sufficient authority. The EEC and the OECD can serve this purpose well.

It can be noted here, as Prof. C. Arnold Anderson of the University of Chicago pointed out in his address on education, that common European activities in the field of education have also proved beneficial to the underdeveloped countries. Such programs are administered through the United Nations and the EEC in addition to bilateral arrangements. The EEC has made a particular effort to help train specialists from the associated countries by providing scholarships and organizing courses. Significantly enough these programs are by no means limited to former colonial areas of the EEC countries. Furthermore, considerable educational aid is provided by European countries which receive students in their own lands.

Mr. van der Lee believed that Nigerian interest in the EEC might prove to be a test case for the future of relationships with the developing countries. Should the Nigerian negotiations be successful, in contrast with the break with the British, the New Europe would prove itself sufficiently imaginative and vigorous to solve problems inherent in the relationship with the developing nations.

The Atlantic Community and the Developing Nations

In his address on "The Atlantic Community and the World Community"[1] Prof. Frank Munk of Reed College looked toward the developing nations from the viewpoint of the Atlantic Community. In their relations with developing nations, he stated, the Atlantic countries paradoxically have been burdened with problems arising from their wealth, strength, and intellectual vigor; they have been admired, imitated, opposed, showered with requests for aid, and castigated for alleged neocolonialism.

Professor Munk pointed to the association of members in the Union Africaine et Malgache and the successful negotiations of India and Pakistan with the EEC as models or test cases for some future relationship to the Atlantic Community as a whole. The Eurafrican arrangement pioneered by France and similar developments vis-a-vis Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco go beyond granting these countries preferential tariffs or free entry of their products into the Common Market. As already seen, France and the EEC as a whole play a major role in the economic development of these African states. In an even larger framework, an Atlantic Community could furnish aid on a massive scale since its members represent nearly every affluent society in the world and they possess the most efficient industrial and agricultural organization.

Professor Munk contended that benefits other than direct financial aid could be reaped by the less developed countries from a more highly institutionalized Atlantic Community. No infusion of outside capital, private or public, can solve the pressing economic problems of the developing countries unless something is done about the relative terms of trade of what they sell and what they buy. These terms of trade have been moving to the detriment of the producers of raw materials and tropical agricultural products ever since shortly after the Korean war. Unlike their African counterparts the Latin American countries are dependent on selling at world prices. As a result, they have lost more by declining prices received for their exports than they have gained from combined economic assistance from all sources. Since no single country is able to stabilize prices on tropical goods, a coordinated effort of all major free countries is necessary. But this is unlikely as long as each country must regard the others as competitors. Only an Atlantic Community, Professor Munk concluded, properly organized and equipped, would be able to guarantee producers of

[1] See page 23.

tropical products stable markets with stable prices. It would be illusory to expect the same results from a global organization, he added, because the Communist bloc shows no interest in stabilizing conditions in the developing countries.

William Clark, in his plenary address, proposed that we should look to joint ventures in the field of development as the mainspring of the Atlantic alliance just as mutual defense has been its mainspring during the last 15 years. Both concepts have the common factor of attempting to prevent a future that is contrary to all our ideals: a world dominated by a crusading autocracy is no worse than a world where the abyss between rich and poor is permanent and widening. He saw the prevention of such a cheerless world and the creation of a more healthy world community as good and sufficient ideas for grouping nations together.

The Developed and Developing Nations and the United Nations System

The gulf that separates the developed and the developing nations can often be most lucidly discerned in the world arena of the United Nations. Prof. Harold Jacobson of the University of Michigan, in the symposium entitled "The Developed Nations in International Organizations," analyzed pertinent trends in the United Nations and found important implications for the Atlantic nations.

Independence for former colonial areas has brought significant changes to the United Nations, Professor Jacobson said. The accession of Asian and African states has expanded to the stage that non-Western countries now account for approximately 80 percent of U.N. membership. Concurrent with the emergence of the African nations in 1960 was a decline of Western strength in the United Nations.

Proceedings within the U.N. organs have taken on a different tone and temper. General commentary has clearly been much more vociferously anticolonial. Representative of this attitude is General Assembly Resolution 1514, which affirms that colonialism must be ended with all due haste, that independence should not be precluded because of a lack of educational, economic, or social position, that racism must disappear, and that political independence must not be threatened by possible Balkanization or neocolonialism.

The Congo crisis in all its complexities produced another new aspect in the contemporary U.N. pattern, Professor Jacobson continued. The U.N. operation in the Congo has been characterized as the biggest experiment ever in "preventative diplomacy." He stressed three related considerations: (1) the presence of the United Nations in the Congo was tantamount to deep involvement in the politics of the area; (2) the Congo operation demonstrated how dangerously costly such an operation can be for the world body; and (3) the civilian role of the United Nations plunged the Organization into the field of state-building. Clearly evident in the Congo operation were both the potentialities and limitations of the United Nations.

As far as the future is concerned, Professor Jacobson expected that the United Nations and its specialized agencies will continue to be used as a lever to force further decolonization, with continuing difficulties for the West.

How should the West face up to its new status in the United Nations? Professor Jacobson believed it would be a great mistake if the West were to deemphasize international organizations because of the recent trends. Withdrawal would not only slow down the pace of decolonization, but it would serve no real purpose. It is more valuable for the West to continue to participate in a dialog with its critics. The West cannot afford to ignore the issues, and Western concern cannot always be best expressed in Western organizations. Western interest in postcolonial developments within the United Nations is a good basis for furthering such activity.

In summary, Professor Jacobson stated that the changes within the United Nations

do not indicate that the West ought to abandon or deemphasize the organization. On the contrary, he stressed that the U.N. system should be given an increased but not exclusive role.

A number of interesting points were raised in open discussion. The Director of the Conference, Mr. Nicholson, pointed to the critical question involved in a major nation committing its national policy in important areas to an organization that can be dominated by the developing nations. He pointed out that many of the issues that concern the developed nations are not considered important by the developing nations. As an example, he referred to the lack of concern among them regarding the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union.

Karl Feldmann, a former German and international civil servant, expressed concern over the present U.N. voting system. As an alternative to the existing "one nation, one vote" system, he described a scheme that would reapportion voting arrangements according to population. Professor Jacobson, however, thought the present system would not be altered.

Considerable discussion revolved around the multiplicity of approaches to the problems of economic development, and exponents of bilateral and multilateral aid jousted with each other. Professor Jacobson was cautious about multilateral aid for several reasons. He pointed out that where the donors and recipients mutually participate in shaping multilateral action, it is more difficult to project hard advice. Also, the Soviet Union considers development activity as something to further Western aims, hence too much emphasis on the United Nations in these matters will encounter problems. By supporting aid programs in such Western institutions as the OECD, Mr. Jacobson asserted, the benefits of the multilateral approach will be achieved, the difficulties of the bilateral approach will be avoided, and the United Nations will not be overburdened. Finally, Mr. Nicholson believed that the important factor was the experience of Western groupings as compared with that of the United Nations in the intricacies of aid and development programs.

Obligations of the Developing and the Developed Nations

The feature address at the Conference on the subject of development was given by William Clark, Director of England's Overseas Development Institute, before the greatly enlarged audience that attended the special U.N. Day luncheon. Mr. Clark shifted the focus from the donor nations to the receiving nations, emphasizing that they are not merely nonparticipating observers. They too have responsibilities in the dialog of development.

Stressing the fact that one-third of the United Nations Development Decade has gone by, Mr. Clark asserted that progress has not been satisfactory and that the minimum goals of the Decade are not being met. Conversely, the gap between the rich nations and the poor is actually widening. The amount of aid which is being given has doubled over the past 5 years, yet no one can pretend that development is progressing twice as fast as 5 years ago. There is a sense of disappointment, a feeling that extra effort is bringing no extra return, which is causing an unquestionable slackening in enthusiasm for aid and development among the donor countries. This trend towards disengagement from the development battle is one of the most dangerous possible trends in the world today. If it progresses, Mr. Clark warned, more than likely the permanent division of the world into rich and poor would be accepted by the rich countries. As it would never be accepted by the poor nations, the West would be faced by a growing hostility on the part of two-thirds of the world's population. What can be done to prevent this sort of catastrophe? In Mr. Clark's view, the answer lies in a much more effective and efficient partnership between Aid and Development where immediate results will foster its perpetuation. Such a partnership will make considerable demands on both the donors and the recipients.

Mr. Clark noted that the verb "to develop" is a reflexive verb in the current meaning of the word. It is not possible for a country to be developed he said; it can only develop itself. Outside aid may be crucial, but it is always marginal.

The poorer countries, Mr. Clark stated, must put development and the enlargement of their national wealth very high on their list of priorities. This is not an easy thing to ask of any nation, particularly a newly independent, newly developing nation. During this period any nation will want to flex its political muscles, to assert that after years of being governed by others it should now govern its own people with their best interests in mind, and to make the rest of the world realize that the new nation is a nation on its own. Mr. Clark suggested that this realization is most easily and most quickly brought about by development.

To give a really high priority to development means to draw up a sound plan for growth and then to stick to it. The new na-

—Courtesy of Chicago Daily News

Third Plenary Session—A capacity audience attended the U.N. Day Luncheon at which William Clark, Director, Overseas Development Institute, Great Britain, spoke on "The Responsibilities of the Developing Nations." The luncheon was held in conjunction with the Mayor's Committee for United Nations Week, the American Association for United Nations, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

tions will often have to sacrifice glamorous or pet projects that are unassociated with economic growth and development. Hard "political" decision may be necessary, such as concentrating first on intermediate education rather than on the more appealing, democratic, universal primary educations. It is not enough just to put development at the top of a list of priorities. Developing countries also need to have strong governments, just as in wartime democracies need to have governments with extra powers. Mr. Clark counseled restraint in some of the easy criticism directed toward countries which are not necessarily adopting exactly all the democratic forms of checks and balances.

The most difficult of all the tasks for the developing countries, according to Mr. Clark, is the recognition that independence is followed by interdependence. The new countries cannot lift themselves up by their own bootstraps, but will need a helping hand so often from the very people from whom they are still celebrating their independence. Cooperation between the rich countries and the poor is essential. It cannot be one-way cooperation. For worthwhile results, some of the plans of the poorer countries will have to be tailored to the availability of resources instead of to the perfect model for economic growth. And it is also going to be necessary for the developing nations to cooperate with private enterprise. Realistically, this is one of the great sources of investment wealth among the major donor nations, but creating a climate for private investment is difficult in most developing countries. Austerity is the keynote, profits are looked at with anxiety, foreign investment is suspect, socialism is often a slogan, and capitalism a term of abuse.

The developed nations, Mr. Clark emphasized, have responsibilities closely corresponding to those of the developing states. Just as it is imperative for the recipients to give development a high priority in their national programs, so it is for the donor countries. The object of aid programs should be to speed development in the underdeveloped countries, not to promote trade, not to cement alliances, not even to win the cold war. Raising standards in the poorer two-thirds of the world needs to become a joint venture by the richer nations.

In shaping an effective plan for development, economic growth, and social change in the developing countries the developed nations have a duty to provide expertise. In doing so, Western Europe and the United States must recognize that it is hardly relevant to draw on experiences within their own borders. The important thing is the experience the experts have had outside their national boundaries. A practical "science of development" is very much needed.

Concerning the crucial problem of interdependence, Mr. Clark stated that at least half the burden rests with the West. The developed countries must accept the responsibility for seeing the job through. In 1947 the U.S. Congress accepted the broad responsibility of seeing the Marshall Plan through, and its impact was astounding. The same sort of impact could be made today, Mr. Clark asserted, if the Western powers were to accept, for example, the responsibility of providing the necessary external aid for the third Indian Five Year Plan. Private enterprise and investment must be brought into the picture mainly because it is the chosen method of many of the richer countries. If it is to be accepted readily by the poorer countries, many new disciplines will have to be adopted in accordance with the austerity that should characterize a developing country. In the immediate future the poorer two-thirds of the world are not going to provide the most profitable return on capital. However, if capital consequently fails to flow in that direction, the West should not be surprised if the developing nations decide that private enterprise is not relevant to the great problems of their world.

If the necessary actions are taken by both the developed and the developing nations, Mr. Clark concluded, then the end of this colonial century will truly mark the opening of the Development Decade and a long period of prosperous growth. But there is not much time to spare.

E Pluribus Unum

EUROPE APPLIES A MOTTO

As evidenced in the preceding pages, the element of unity in the New Europe—present or future—was put frequently under discussion during the Ninth Conference. The search for European unity encompassed cultures and nations, functions and institutions, trends and events, specifics and generalities. Just as unity implies a multiplicity of components, so the approach to unity in this conference involved a variety of routes.

The Political Source of Unity

Speaking on "The Sources of Unity," Prof. Altiero Spinelli of the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University stated that the need for broader and more integrated political communities has made itself felt in Western Europe, in the Atlantic alliance, in the so-called socialist area, in Africa, and in Latin America. Although the idea that Europeans ought to be united within a single community is not at all new, the fact that such an idea has become a real and popular goal is new. Suddenly after World War II, in several European countries a number of men who were contributing to their countries' policy-making decided to use whatever power and influence they had to promote European unity as today's solution to today's problems.

Mr. Spinelli agreed that such change within some sectors of the European political conscience was an obvious, challenging answer to the depressing and humiliating experiences of the European peoples before, during, and after World War II. Nevertheless, the unity movement flourishes even after the completion of postwar rehabilitation. Europeanism is not an expression of economic interests. It has a life-force of its own and has shown itself adaptable to changing situations.

The real source of the European venture, said Professor Spinelli, has been those men who wanted a European policy and who have discovered the perspective of European construction. These of course include Messrs. Schuman, Monnet, De Gasperi, Adenauer, and Spaak among others. They have dreamt of the fulfillment of European unity, they have seized some favorable opportunities, and they have started translating the vision not only into fleeting political deeds, but into permanent institutions as well. But some of them

have had also the responsibility of leading the rehabilitation of their individual nations, and they have necessarily been limited in pressing their Europeanism.

Professor Spinelli stated that the persevering foe of Europeanism is represented by an omnipresent, powerfully rooted national habit. This is the habit of conceiving laws, solidarities, interests, and policymaking in the traditional, well-known schemes of the nation-state. To act in accordance with such habits creates a sense of fullness with which European activity must compete. European activity does not move among time-honored institutions, but has to build them. It does not enjoy well-outlined political alternatives expressing themselves in definite European political parties, but has to discover them. It does not even have an established political language, but has to invent it. Professor Spinelli emphasized the paradox in European political life. On the one hand, there has been full restoration of the nation-states and of certain national myths and taboos. On the other, there has occurred the establishment of supranational institutions and policies.

Professor Spinelli identified three different trends within the unification movement: federalism, functionalism, and confederalism.

The federalist approach, he explained, is manifested by the concern for building the political institutions of a European democracy. It entails taking away certain deliberation, decision, and execution powers from national governments, parliaments, and judiciaries and entrusting them instead to a European government, parliament, and judiciary. These institutions must draw their autonomous authority from the direct assent of the European citizens and exercise their powers directly on these citizens. The federalist purpose of European union must rest essentially on the creation of a political society committed to building a modern, democratic way of life among peoples not heretofore united.

The functionalist approach involves the building of a European bureaucracy by entrusting the administration of some positive public activities to a European civil service, independent of the national civil services and able to act from directives given by the member states. In functionalism, the forms of political life are a less important superstructure than is generally believed. The functionalist purpose of European union is the slow, progressive coagulation of habits and interests around a European bureaucracy—the Eurocrats—more efficient and farsighted than the national ones.

The primary concern of the confederalist approach is the building of a league of states in order to achieve permanent intergovernmental cooperation. In such an arrangement, each state retains its own sovereignty, but the governments are engaged to take common decisions in some particular matter which have been recognized as being of common interest. The confederalist purpose of European union is to find once more at a European level the glory, the power, and the grandeur which the European national states have enjoyed in the past and which have been lost as a result of two world wars.

In detailing the course of developments since World War II, Professor Spinelli pointed out a sequence of pressures for one or another of these three trends. First came the British effort for establishment of confederate ties under British leadership. It resulted in the Brussels pact, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the European Council. But British leadership was inadequate to further development. Then a functional breakthrough occurred with development of the Coal and Steel Community under a supranational High Authority. Soon a federalist breakthrough appeared, when the several nations entrusted to a European assembly the drawing up of a constitution for a political community. It fell by the wayside, however, when French nationalistic pressures led to the demise of the proposed European Defense Community. A new confederate effort was then pressed again by the British, in the form of the Western European Union, but it failed to develop political substantiality.

Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, addresses the members of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO at a meeting which preceded the Conference. Mr. Battle also participated in the sessions of the Conference.

Functionalism moved forward again, despite opposition of federalists and confederalists, with the formation of EURATOM and the Common Market. At the beginning of 1963, some insuperable limitations of the functional approach began to appear. Important political problems emerged, needing to be faced on a European basis, but requiring decisions which exceed the powers of the functional Eurocrats. Most recently the confederate approach has been resumed, this time by President de Gaulle, with a view to French rather than British leadership.

In the final analysis, Professor Spinelli contended, the essential requirement is political will. Functionalism is a dead end. The choice is between federal and confederal. He urged federal for the reason that confederal inevitably involves undesirable dominance by some one nation.

The Cultural Source of Unity

François Bondy, Editor of *Preuves* Magazine, explored culture as an element of unity in the symposium entitled "Cultural Diversity and Political Unity." Mr. Bondy believed that outlooks and attitudes have altered in Europe at such an amazing speed that change rather than permanence of national characteristics can be considered as the dominant factor. Hereditary enmities supposedly buried in the collective psyche have dissolved overnight. Conceding that contemporary Europe is less divided than was the Europe of the past two generations, he contended that efforts must nevertheless be made to recapture what was valuable in recent historical instances of cultural diversity.

In an eloquent plea for true cultural unity, Mr. Bondy stressed particularly the roles of historiography and the universities. History with a strong national bias is an important source of cultural intolerance and plays a major role in forming a nationalist mentality. Happily, great strides have been made in Western European historiography since the end of World War II.

Erich Fromm, noted psychoanalyst, receives congratulations from a group of enthusiastic delegates after his speech on "The Psychology of Nationalism."

Not so with the universities, Mr. Bondy reported. The European intellectual community of the medieval universities ceased to exist long ago. There is presently a protectionism in European universities against foreigners which narrows considerably the scope of the emergent new European intellectual community. Foreigners are not readily called to university teaching posts as in the United States, and students are not encouraged to spend a year or two studying abroad. As long as this attitude prevails, cultural diversity fails to become an enriching experience for students. This protectionism may maintain some cultural diversity, but at the price of nationalistic conformity within each country and of the lack of varied experiences beneficial to all Europeans.

Mr. Bondy noted among young people particularly a decline of interest in ideologies. There is a "consumer attitude" both to ideas and to political events. The progress of European cooperation is not the result of any fierce ideological movement fighting with equal passion the fanaticism of nationalist and Communist ideology. Cultural diversities as traced in the educational, legal, and administrative systems of European countries seem less responsible for this lack of European militancy than the new psychology which characterizes the outlook of the new generations across frontiers. Nor have the opponents of European unity been able to produce much public echo of their protests.

Mr. Bondy asserted that cultural diversity does not constitute an important obstacle to the formation of a European commonwealth. Such cultural differences between nations as may possibly be identified do not permit any logical deductions as to any national posture toward or against unity. But rather curiously, he pointed out, there is a striking cultural similarity between "protectionists" of different nations; nationalists of different countries may hate each other deeply and yet show a remarkable identity of outlook and even of vocabulary. Contrariwise, both France and Germany, for instance, have given effective leadership to the unification movement despite asserted national cultural differences. Culture is not static; cultural traditions have changed in the past and will change in the future. No part of our cultural heritage is immune to change. What is needed, Mr. Bondy concluded, is further development of cultural diversities—perhaps on a regional basis within present national areas—in ways which can stand the free wind of knowledge, of contact, and of interaction. The goal is a more open European intellectual community in which each can be instructed and enriched

by the diversity of knowledge, of background, of temper of the others.

Nationalism as Social Narcissism

In the symposium entitled "The Psychology of Nationalism," Dr. Erich Fromm, psychoanalyst and author, pointed to the rise of nationalism as the central historical feature of the last 400 years. Based on a sentiment of unity among a people, the sovereignty in which they are united and their collective economy, the national state seems to have been turned into the highest of moral principles.

Psychologically, Dr. Fromm suggested, roots of nationalism lie in the phenomenon of narcissism, which so far has been studied only in individuals. The extreme examples of narcissism are the small infant and the insane person, who have in common the inability to perceive reality outside themselves. To the narcissistic person only the subjective, his feelings and thoughts, are real. Lack of objectivity, a tendency towards fanaticism, irrational sensitivity to criticism, and intense fury—such are the symptoms when the narcissistic image is wounded.

Dr. Fromm stated that the individual narcissistic orientation can be transferred to the group, clan, nation, race, religion, class, political party, and ideology. The madness of self-glorification, the lack of objectivity in value judgment, and the fury which follows the wounding of group narcissism are no less intense than those found in cases of extreme individual narcissism. However, the pathological character of these reactions is often more hidden. Thus it is less subject to correction because that on which millions agree seems reasonable by the very fact of the consensus.

Since the end of the Middle Ages, Dr. Fromm continued, two tendencies have manifested themselves: (1) humanism with its emphasis on the unity of the human race and (2) nationalism with its narcissistic group inflation. In the modern era of nuclear weapons, group narcissism and its inherent pathology endanger the life of the human race. To guard against that eventuality, there is urgent need for a renaissance of the humanist position both intellectually and emotionally. The object of narcissism will have to be enlarged from the group to mankind. Further, social and political changes will also be necessary so that the degree of narcissism within the individual is reduced thus enabling him to experience greater relatedness with and genuine interest in the world outside.

Dr. Fromm concluded with an admonition stemming from the relation of his thesis to the current problems of European unification. He felt that it is quite possible that a new "European bloc" nationalism could emerge and provide its members with a feeling of superiority over the American, the Soviet, and the Latin American blocs. In essence this would be nothing but a new and more modern manifestation of the old-fashioned nationalisms of Europe. The new Europe could, in fact, produce a European nationalism which would be as dangerous as the separate nationalisms of the past.

Additional Sources of Unity

In the symposium entitled "The Significance of Migration," Lucien Radoux, Director of the European Foundation for International Exchanges and Deputy to the Belgian Parliament, brought into focus the value of exchanges of persons among nations. Supplementing the historical work accomplished when treaties and trade agreements are signed, exchanges of persons can provide one of the surest means of combating mistrust, intolerance, or simply antipathy. But a long effort over a whole generation is necessary, making full use of direct contact, bringing people face to face, and establishing spontaneous conversation. Above all, exchanges must be thoroughly prepared and organized to be more than superficial in result. Followup is equally necessary, but is not yet adequately accomplished.

Mr. Radoux emphasized exchanges on

an occupational basis. People will discuss their wages, their standards of living, the comfort of their homes, their social security systems, their trade union memberships, the access of their children to educational facilities, and so on. They soon become aware of the similarities of their destinies. From this there is quickly born an awareness of the community of their destinies.

Mr. Radoux reported encouragingly that hundreds of private and public organizations have undertaken exchange programs in the past 10 years, reacting against the nationalist barriers erected during the 19th century.

In conclusion, Mr. Radoux made a plea for a similar sort of exchange between the United States and Europe—that is, an exchange of persons exercising the same professions. Such a program should be set up for different categories of workers and financed by private initiative and the governments, for this sort of exchange of persons will become increasingly indispensable in the march toward interdependence.

In the symposium entitled "Pacem in Terris," Rev. E. A. Conway, S.J., Director of the Center for Peace Research at Creighton University, analyzed Pope John's historic encyclical so titled. In a detailed comparison of the official Latin text with several translations of it, Father Conway showed how the encyclical was an even stronger force for peace and unity than the first translations revealed it to be. Although the encyclical was to have launched an enormous drive for peace and unity, controversies arising out of the translations considerably diverted attention away from the real intent.

Prof. Francis Schwarzenberg of Loyola University emphasized in his commentary that *Pacem in Terris* was not a rejection of the principles of John's predecessors, but rather the application of permanent principles through new methods. The encyclical was truly universal, addressing itself to all men of good will, not just the faithful. Its validity does not depend on Catholic tenets; rather it appeals to all men who accept that

A group of delegates with smiles and interest as they meet near the Commission exhibit on UNESCO in the registration area.

man is endowed with intellect and free will. Pope John laid stress on freedom both as a goal and as a method reflecting the intellectual freedom within the Church.

In "The International Civil Servant and the Supranational Community," Karl Feldmann, a former German and international civil servant, discussed another factor that has become a source of unity. He noted that within the three European Communities, the EEC, the ECSC, and EURATOM, there are now employed about 7,000 civil servants. The EEC has passed a statute dealing with the European civil service. Members are usually appointed for life, and most of them live and work in Brussels.

In the civil service of the European Communities there are four categories based on the educational level reached by the individual. The highest or "executive" career requires a university degree. The second highest or "administrative" career requires a secondary school education, which is generally equivalent to 2 years of college in the United States. Candidates must write competitive examinations, and a successful candidate must be skilled in one other European language besides his own. There is no discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or race. In actual practice promotion depends primarily on efficiency ratings made by superiors. Recruitment is to be conducted equally among the member countries, even though this practice may affect the quality of the service.

Mr. Feldmann believed that this body of European civil servants will play a significant role in the progressive integration of Europe. As a unit, the civil service has manifested a political as well as technical impact on the movement toward European unity.

In commentary, Lawrence Gelfand of the University of Iowa noted that the existence of an international civil service dated back at least to the early years of the 20th century. He cautioned against the danger of members of such a service losing track of important social and economic developments in their own countries.

Unity Through Federation and the Common Market

In the symposium entitled "Federation or Confederation in Europe," Prof. Amitai Etzioni of Columbia University examined the EEC as a manifestation of the federal approach to European unity. He noted that in the last 100 years the attempt to augment the nation-state through alliances has taken on the somewhat new characteristic of permanence. This has been and still is a slow process of transition in which the international or supranational organization comes to serve the national needs of the various countries involved in the agreements. These new types of permanent agreements are characterized by each nation maintaining most of its autonomy in terms of decision.

The Common Market, he said, is an attempt to supersede this early type of international arrangement by gradually centralizing more and more the process of decision-making for the members as a group. The main question facing the Common Market as an international decision-making body is one of how far can the Common Market go toward centralizing the process of decision-making? Other pertinent questions are: Can anything more than decision-coordinating take place? Will there be one common or six coordinate units of decision-making?

In viewing the situation at present, Professor Etzioni stated that there is not yet a truly central decision-making authority. There exists a Council of Ministers and a Common Market Commission. The members of the Commission are pledged to serve the union, not their respective nations. However, recruitment to the Commission is by national quota rather than by merit alone. Each member nation must also have an equal number of Commission members in each grade of the hierarchy. Additionally, no citizen of one nation may serve as the immediate supervisor of another member from the same nation. All this is a guarantee or safeguard built into the central authority of the union that one would not think to be necessary if the central authority were empowered with a decision-making function.

Above the Commission, and exercising control over it, is the Council of Ministers which makes the ultimate decisions. Made up of the Foreign Ministers of the six member nations, the Council has the power of approval or disapproval of the recommendations of the Commission. In effect, the Commission is supranational, while the Council is international.

The third Common Market body is the European Parliament, consisting of members appointed by the national governments from the national parliaments. It is not a legislative parliament, but rather it passes resolutions and recommendations. In Professor Etzioni's view, the European Parliament has thus far not carried much weight even though it is trying to increase its power in terms of federalization of the Common Market.

Professor Etzioni cited questions of agriculture, monetary fiscal policy, and political interrelationships which create internal difficulties and test the strength of the organization. He was not optimistic regarding the prospect for European political union, for DeGaulle France and post-Adenauer Germany are unsympathetic.

How far can the Common Market go in serving economic, security, and other needs without the creation of a pure supranational element—a federation? As a sociologist, Professor Etzioni suggested that when international cooperation is increased, critical problems are bound to increase. At this point there must exist a sufficient community sentiment that people will make sacrifices. For this sense of community to emerge, the European union must go beyond confederation to federation. Whether success or failure will attend the present effort to build a community of nations in Europe cannot be safely predicted on the basis of existing evidence, Professor Etzioni concluded.

Highlights and Sidelights

National Conferences of the U.S. National Commission have traditionally been of a character considerably different from what has been indicated thus far by this report on the substance of the New Europe discussions. Participants in the previous conferences have frequently associated with those events a spirit transcending the content of the addresses and discussions carried on within the conference rooms. "Extracurricular" attractions, associated events, personal conversations between meetings, and even the general hustle and bustle of a large conference have combined to give a special flavor to the product of the formal meetings.

So was it with the Ninth Conference. Reflecting the thoughtful preparations made especially by The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and by the Conference Director, Thomas Nicholson, there were a variety of events designed to increase the total meaning of the Conference.

One of these, occurring just prior to the Ninth Conference, was the opportunity many of the speakers had for examining the New Europe intensively in a small 3-day seminar at the University of Chicago. The insights gained through that intimate discussion greatly enriched the presentations made at the Ninth Conference.

In a special address before the U.S. National Commission and other guests, also prior to the formal opening of the Conference, the Right Honorable George A. Brown, Deputy Leader of the British Labor Party revealed much of his own thinking and that of the Labor Party on problems affecting relationships among Britain, Europe, and the United States.[1] Although the press of affairs in London precluded further participation in the Conference, his dynamic remarks carried over into subsequent proceedings.

Of a different nature but equally inspiring was the special concert of contemporary European music presented by the Chicago Symphony Orchestra under its new Director, M. Jean Martinon, who had only recently come from Europe to this post. A feature of the concert was the American premiere of Hans Werner Henze's

[1] See page 22.

Symphony No. 3. The Orchestra also played Albert Roussel's Sinfonietta for String Orchestra and Bela Bartok's Concerto for Orchestra. In this demonstration of cultural bonds between the New Europe and the United States, the Orchestra's stirring performance and the audience's unrestrained acclaim gave to the Ninth Conference a highly appropriate "final curtain."

An art exhibition, "Modern Art of Western Europe: New Directions," was organized by Kazimir Karpuszko and presented in Chicago at the Gres Gallery, Inc. Works of the following 17 European artists were shown: Pierre Alechinsky, Karel Appel, Augustin Fernandez Arman, Francis Bacon, Enrico Baj, Gianni Bertini, Modest Cuixart, Alan Davie, Corneille Guillaume Deverloo, Lucio Fontana, Fritz Hundertwasser, Asger Jorn, Yves Klein, Martial Raysse, Antonio Saura, Joan-Josep Tharrats, and Jean Tinguely. Of the 43 works shown, only 7 antedated 1960. Most of them reflected the known international styles of collage and abstract expressionism with surreal and figurative subject matter. In connection with this exhibition a special symposium was held at the Chicago Art Institute to discuss some of the most significant movements of contemporary European art. Panelists included Pierre Restany, Parisian art critic, Jan van der Marck, Curator of the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, and Franz Schulze, Professor of Lake Forest College and art critic of The Chicago Daily News.

The United Nations Day luncheon, arranged in cooperation with the Chicago chapter of the American Association for the United Nations, was an event significant in its own right as well as being the Third Plenary session. Her Excellency Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, India's chief delegate to the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations, made a special trip to Chicago for this luncheon even though the state of her health compelled her to cede to William Clark the assignment of making the principal address.[2] Nearly 2,000 people were on hand to welcome Madame Pandit, to observe United Nations Day 1964, and to participate in this part of the Ninth Conference.

Reaching out in still another direction, the Ninth Conference provided the impetus for convening simultaneously on the final day a high school youth conference attended by hundreds of students from Chicago's public and parochial schools. At a general session Uwe Kitzinger, Fellow of Nuffield College at Oxford University, presented an address on "The Future of the Atlantic Community." Following this, three speakers delivered brief remarks and participated in a panel discussion. The topics were "Europe and the United States," "The New Europe and the Developing Countries," and "Cultural Diversity and Political Unity;" the speakers were, respectively, Peter Lisagor, Washington Bureau Chief of The Chicago Daily News, Prof. Aristide Zolberg of the University of Chicago, and Prof. Adolph Sturmthal of the University of Illinois. In an afternoon session students and teachers assembled in small groups for workshop discussions of the questions raised by the conference. Many of the participants, it was expected, would subsequently provide leadership for parallel discussions in their respective schools.

For some of the Conference participants, the occasion provided something of a Chicago reunion. William Clark, for instance, had served as the United Kingdom Consul General in Chicago two decades ago. For Ambassador William Benton, who introduced Director General Maheu at the opening session, it was an opportunity not only to revisit the city with which he had long been identified, but also to be helpful to an old interest (the Chicago Council) and to a current one (UNESCO). And Mr. Kitzinger at one point found himself on the dais between two speakers with whom he was associated closely in Europe at one time or another.

In addition to the 55 principal speakers and commentators, the Ninth Conference drew upon the experience and interests of countless others. The Department of State

[2] For Mr. Clark's address on the Decade of Development, see page 33.

interest in this examination of European-United States relationships was appropriately expressed by the Honorable Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. President Edward D. McDougal, Jr., of The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations made the Conference participants extremely welcome to the city. The international and academic pivots of the Conference were clearly evident in the cooperative arrangement the Chicago Council developed with 16 academic institutions in the area: Chicago Teachers College North, DePaul University, Illinois Institute of Technology, Lawrence College, Loyola University, Michigan State University, Northwestern University, Roosevelt University, Wayne State University, University of Chicago, University of Illinois at Chicago, University of Iowa, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, University of Notre Dame, and University of Wisconsin. By coincidence, the international-academic alliance was reflected in the persons of the outgoing and incoming Chairman of the U.S. National Commission — former Ambassador George V. Allen and Dr. Harvie Branscomb, Chancellor Emeritus of Vanderbilt University.

One of the last thoughts expressed in the Ninth Conference concerned the importance of what participants might themselves accomplish to effect widespread understanding of the need for cooperation between the New Europe and the United States. Even during the Conference this effort was begun as members of the working press interviewed speakers and reported conference developments in their newspapers. TV, too, was engaged in the effort as three of Chicago's major discussion-type programs featured panels of Conference speakers.

All of these items and others—some tangible, some intangible—thus helped to form the total Conference atmosphere. Each of the participants could look to one event or another, or perhaps to some particular comment as most worth remembering.

Summary

For an interpretation of the meaning of the Ninth Conference as a whole, Director Nicholson brought together in the Seventh (final) Plenary Session a distinguished panel of four: René Foch, Director for External Affairs at EURATOM, Max Lerner, author, journalist, and professor at Brandeis University, William Clark, Director of the Overseas Development Institute, and Uwe Kitzinger, Fellow of Nuffield College at Oxford University.

Mr. Foch drew the conclusion that the Atlantic partnership of Europe and the United States cannot be just the harnessing of European efforts to existing policies. Instead, it must be a continuing dialog between equal partners who share the same ideals, who must together shape common policies, and who certainly possess the means necessary to fulfill them if they stand together.

Development of the relationship can best come in a pragmatic manner, through solution of existing problems such as those connected with tariff negotiations and monetary policy.

The present status of the relationship, Mr. Foch said, is one where the postwar honeymoon is over, yet the more mature relationship remains to be built. Building it depends on good will and perhaps enthusiasm, but mostly on a more realistic knowledge of each partner and of common problems. The United States must recognize the achievement of what has been termed the European comeback. Europe, for its part, must recognize its own responsibilities, some of them arising from the very success of its comeback. It must find the constitutional means of carrying out these responsibilities. Further, the New Europe has responsibilities toward the United States in such matters as the monetary and tariff policies just mentioned. It also has a responsibility towards the rest of Europe. This will require consultation between the partners for policies looking to the relaxation of international tensions and the encouragement of any trends towards a liberalization of the political regimes in Eastern Europe. Finally, both partners have a responsibility towards the newly developing countries, and there should be closer cooperation between them. Just as the New Europe is playing a vital part, side by side with America, in assisting the Indian plan for development, so might American capital join with European in African development, and European capital with American in the Alliance for Progress.

Focusing attention on the movement toward unity within Europe, Max Lerner cited the need for an impetus—an elan—as the critical element for any further leap forward. There exists a real need for a forward leap, but Europeans do not seem to feel the need. Historically, great nations have come together not because of idealism but because of common danger and under stress. After World War II, Europeans had a great sense of guilt which resulted in the measures already taken towards unity. No longer do they have that sense of guilt, nor do they feel themselves under stress or in grave danger as Americans do in regard to the risks of nuclear war or the possibility of totalitarian triumph.

Mr. Lerner believed that any future development of European unity would come through the creation of a transnational set of relationships. These would cut across national boundaries without being hardened or rigidified into definite supranational structures. Although the elan for such a development is not presently at hand, it might appear either from the aspirations of Jean Monnet and his associates or from President de Gaulle's efforts. There is a "mystique" in the work of both of these men which could produce the necessary impetus. Unfortunately, the DeGaulle mystique has a negative element as well as a positive one. While his talk of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is positive, Mr. Lerner said, he is endeavoring to reach Europeans with the negative mystique that freedom for Europe means freedom from America. Hence his efforts hold little promise for an Atlantic Community.



Edward D. McDougal, Jr., President of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (left), and Max Lerner, noted journalist and author, seated at the final plenary session in which Mr. Lerner participated in a panel discussion.

With the departure of many great European leaders—Schumann, Adenauer, De Gasperi, Churchill — from the European stage, there remains something of a vacuum in political leadership. Mr. Lerner believed the vacuum would have to be filled by scholars. If they can overcome the protectionism noted by Mr. Bondy, they might well provide a genuine leadership towards what is possible in the European dream.

Despite Mr. Lerner's distrust of idealism as an animus, William Clark in his summation reasserted the possibility that altruism could provide a sufficient animus. As Gen. George C. Marshall stated in his historic address at Harvard, the objective of the Marshall Plan was not to defeat any nation or group of nations but had as its common enemy only hunger, poverty, disease, and ignorance. This common enemy, Mr. Clark believed, will provide a unity to the community of nations. The essential challenge to Europe and the United States, to the present European Economic Community and the possible future Atlantic Community, is to make the right decision in facing the revolution of our times. The fact that two-thirds of the world's population is in nations now emerging onto the world's stage constitutes the revolution of our times. Two-thirds of the world's population is now determined to be heard and to play their part in the world, making demands that are not easily met, making suggestions that cannot readily be agreed upon. This revolution, Mr. Clark asserted, is in fact the focal point of the Ninth Conference. The required decision for the

Participating in the final plenary session (left to right): Dr. Harvie Branscomb, newly elected Chairman of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO; Thomas L. Nicholson, Director of the Conference; René Foch, Director for External Relations, EURATOM; Uwe Kitzinger, Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford; Robert Wilcox, Chairman of the Council's Steering Committee.

developed countries is to resolve to try to cooperate with the emerging nations, to find some way of regarding these people as new potential partners. In doing this, it will not be sufficient merely to make the sacrifice of putting to use the wealth at hand. For sacrifice we are prepared, Mr. Clark asserted, but sacrifice is not enough. Like patriotism, what is wanted is sacrifice with good sense. There needs to be a careful study of how, in fact, economic growth and social change *together* can speedily be brought into being in two-thirds of the world's population. In effect, there is need for a science of development which UNESCO and National Commissions for UNESCO can help to shape. With sense and science, and with political will, the great revolution of our times can be achieved.

In his brief final summation, Uwe Kitzinger stressed the role of the Conference and its participants. By the very evident civic responsibility shown by the participants themselves, he was encouraged to believe that there are forces at work—ferments of change, as Monnet called them—at work in American society which may yet allow us to overcome the existing immense difficulties. Within the Conference discussions he saw a convergence of viewpoint carrying promise of earlier cooperation across the Atlantic than might otherwise be hoped.

Man's history is coming to a crucial breakthrough, Mr. Kitzinger predicted. We are at a moment when not just the degree but the kind of world relations is changing. He was confident in the achievement of both the political audacity and the intellectual receptivity to deal with the deep problems that presently divide the world. With success in meeting the problems there can be a transmutation of the structure of world politics and even a transmutation of the very quality of power and responsibility in a world in which we may not have much time to lose.

Summary Program of the Ninth National Conference

Wednesday, October 23, 1963

FIRST PLENARY SESSION

PRESIDING OFFICER	GEORGE V. ALLEN, Chairman, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
INVOCATION	VERY REVEREND MONSIGNOR GEORGE HERDEGEN Chancery Office, Archdiocese of Chicago
REMARKS	LUCIUS D. BATTLE Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
	THOMAS L. NICHOLSON Attorney; Director of the Conference
INTRODUCTION	AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BENTON U.S. Member of the Executive Board of UNESCO
TOPIC	**"The Old World and the New Europe"**
SPEAKER	RENE MAHEU Director General of UNESCO

Thursday, October 24, 1963

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

INTRODUCTION	FREDERICK BURKHARDT President, American Council of Learned Societies; Member U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
TOPIC	**"The New Europe and the New World"**
SPEAKER	ETIENNE HIRSCH President, Institut technique de Provision economique et Sociale; Former President of EURATOM

SYMPOSIA

A.1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN EDUCATION

CHAIRMAN	HENRY I. WILLETT Superintendent of Schools, Richmond, Va.; Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
SPEAKER	C. ARNOLD ANDERSON Professor, University of Chicago
COMMENTATOR	PHILIP J. FOSTER Professor, University of Chicago

B.1 FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION IN EUROPE

CHAIRMAN	JOHN NUVEEN Investment Banker; Former Chief, Economic Cooperation Administration, Mission to Greece, Belgium, and Luxembourg
SPEAKER	AMITAI ETZIONI Professor, Columbia University
COMMENTATOR	ULRICH TRUMPENER Professor, University of Iowa

C.1 THE NEW EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: IMAGES AND REALITIES

CHAIRMAN	VERNON L. SORENSON Professor, Michigan State University
SPEAKER	JACOB VAN DER LEE Director for Associated Overseas Countries; Commission of the European Economic Community
COMMENTATOR	ARISTIDE ZOLBERG Professor, University of Chicago

D.1 THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS

CHAIRMAN	RICHARD HOUK Professor, DePaul University
SPEAKER	OTTO KIRCHHEIMER Professor, Columbia University
COMMENTATOR	JEAN BLONDEL Professor, University of Essex

E.1 CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL UNITY

CHAIRMAN	LUCIUS D. BATTLE Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
SPEAKER	FRANCOIS BONDY Editor, *Preuves* Magazine

E.1 CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL UNITY—*Continued*

COMMENTATOR	OTTO WIRTH Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Roosevelt University

F.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MIGRATION

CHAIRMAN	HARTLEY CLARK Professor, Carleton College
SPEAKER	LUCIEN RADOUX Director, European Foundation for International Exchanges, Deputy to Belgian Parliament
COMMENTATOR	SOL TAX Professor, University of Chicago Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO

THIRD PLENARY SESSION

PRESIDING OFFICER	JAMES K. HOTCHKISS Chairman, Mayor's Committee for United Nations Week
INVOCATION	RABBI ERIC FRIEDLAND Beth Am, The Peoples Synagogue
INTRODUCTION	GEORGE V. ALLEN, Chairman, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Former Ambassador to India
REMARKS	HER EXCELLENCY MADAME VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT, Chairman, Indian Delegation to the United Nations
TOPIC	**"The Responsibility of the Developing Nations"**
SPEAKER	WILLIAM CLARK Director, Overseas Development Institute

A.2 THE NEW EUROPEAN MEN OF BUSINESS

CHAIRMAN	ALEX SEITH Lord, Bissell & Brook, Counselors at Law
SPEAKER	WILHELM PAUES Director and Head, Foreign Affairs Section, Federation of Swedish Industries
COMMENTATOR	JAMES HART Dean, College of Commerce, DePaul University

B.2 THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

CHAIRMAN	THEODORE ACHILLES Vice Chairman, Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United States

SPEAKER	UWE KITZINGER Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford
COMMENTATOR	MILTON RAKOVE Professor, University of Illinois at Chicago

D.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY

CHAIRMAN	FRANK MCCALLISTER Professor, Roosevelt University
SPEAKER	ALEXANDER KING Director of Scientific Affairs, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
COMMENTATOR	HILLIARD RODERICK Deputy Assistant Director, Division of Research, Atomic Energy Commission

E.2 THE SOURCES OF UNITY

CHAIRMAN	HOWARD EHRMANN Professor, University of Michigan
SPEAKER	ALTIERO SPINELLI Professor, Bologna Center, Johns Hopkins University
COMMENTATOR	LEON EPSTEIN Professor, University of Wisconsin

F.2 ADULT EDUCATION IN NORTHERN EUROPE

CHAIRMAN	CLYDE F. KOHN Professor, University of Iowa
SPEAKER	MRS. INGEBORG BERTHA LYCHE Undersecretary, Office for Art and Cultural Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Education
COMMENTATOR	CYRIL O. HOULE Professor, University of Chicago; Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO

Friday, October 25, 1963

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

INTRODUCTION	GEORGE BEADLE President, University of Chicago
TOPIC	**"The Development of European Cooperation in Science"**
SPEAKER	SIR JOHN COCKCROFT Master of Churchill College, Cambridge University, Nobel Prize Winner in Physics, 1951

B.3 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY

CHAIRMAN	ROBERT FARWELL Associate Dean, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business
SPEAKER	FRANK MUNK Professor, Reed College
COMMENTATOR	THEODORE ACHILLES Vice Chairman, Executive Committee, The Atlantic Council of the United States

C.3 THE FORCE OF REVOLUTION AND THE IDEA OF FORCE

CHAIRMAN	MOJMIR POVOLNY Professor, Lawrence College
SPEAKER	LOUIS GOTTSCHALK Professor, University of Chicago
COMMENTATOR	HANNAH ARENDT Professor, University of Chicago

D.3 THE RESURGENT INDIVIDUAL: REMARKS ON SOME EUROPEAN NOVELS OF THE SIXTIES

CHAIRMAN	JOHN H. DANIELS Professor, University of Wales
SPEAKER	GERMAINE BREE Professor, Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Wisconsin
COMMENTATOR	BRUCE MORRISSETTE Professor, University of Chicago

E.3 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM

CHAIRMAN	LAWRENCE ZELIC FREEDMAN Professor, University of Chicago
SPEAKER	ERICH FROMM Psychoanalyst
COMMENTATOR	NATHAN LEITES Professor, University of Chicago

F.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT AND THE SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITY

CHAIRMAN	ROBERT B. WILCOX Chairman, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Steering Committee; Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
SPEAKER	KURT FELDMANN Former German and International Civil Servant
COMMENTATOR	LAWRENCE GELFAND Professor, University of Iowa

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION

INTRODUCTION	HARVIE BRANSCOMB Former Chancellor, Vanderbilt University, Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
TOPIC	**"An Experiment in Inter-Cultural Education: The European Schools"**
SPEAKER	ALBERT VAN HOUTTE Greffier of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and President of the Board of the European Schools

Saturday, October 25, 1963

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION

INTRODUCTION	LUTHER H. EVANS Former Director General of UNESCO; Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
TOPIC	**"Cultural Community and Cultural Diversity of the North Atlantic Nations"**
SPEAKER	GEOFFREY GORER British Anthropologist and Author

A.4 THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN THE THEATER

CHAIRMAN	HENRY KNEPLER Professor, Illinois Institute of Technology
SPEAKER	ROBERT W. CORRIGAN Professor, Carnegie Institute of Technology
COMMENTATOR	JOHN REICH Director, Goodman Theatre

B.4 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND LATIN AMERICA

CHAIRMAN	REV. GERALD GRANT Executive Vice President, United World Federalist—Chicago Branch
SPEAKER	GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN Professor, Northwestern University
COMMENTATOR	HERBERT S. KLEIN Professor, University of Chicago

C.4 THE DEVELOPED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHAIRMAN	MOJMIR POVOLNY Professor, Lawrence College
SPEAKER	THOMAS HOVET Professor, New York University
COMMENTATOR	HAROLD JACOBSON Professor, University of Michigan

D.4 THE ARTIST, THE ART EXPERT AND THE LAYMAN

CHAIRMAN	HENRY R. HOPE Professor, University of Indiana; Member, U.S. National Commission for UNESCO
SPEAKER	G. L. CONRAN Director, Manchester Art Galleries
COMMENTATOR	GEORGE COHEN Artist and Professor of Art, Northwestern University

E.4 PACEM IN TERRIS

CHAIRMAN	THOMAS L. NICHOLSON Attorney; Director of the Conference
SPEAKER	REV. E. A. CONWAY, S.J. Director, Center for Peace Research, Creighton University
COMMENTATOR	FRANCIS SCHWARZENBERG Professor, Loyola University

F.4 THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND THE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION: JOINT VENTURES IN SCIENCE

CHAIRMAN	HILLIARD RODERICK Deputy Assistant Director, Division of Research, Atomic Energy Commission
SPEAKER	RENE FOCH Director for External Relations, EURATOM
COMMENTATOR	MILTON BURTON Professor, University of Notre Dame

SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION

INVOCATION	EDGAR H. S. CHANDLER Executive Director, Church Federation of Greater Chicago
TOPIC	**"In Summary—A Panel"**
MODERATOR	THOMAS L. NICHOLSON Attorney; Director of the Conference
PANEL PARTICIPANTS	WILLIAM CLARK Director, Overseas Development Institute
	RENE FOCH Director for External Relations, EURATOM
	UWE KITZINGER Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford
	MAX LERNER Professor, Brandeis University, Author and Journalist

THE SOURCES OF (supranational) UNITY

by ALTIERO SPINELLI

INTRODUCTION

The ~~use~~ need for broader and more integrated political communities than the ones existing at present has made itself felt not only in Western Europe, but also within the Atlantic Alliance, in the so-called Socialist area, in Africa and in Latin America as well. But, whereas elsewhere and up to now, all that has been done ~~is to~~ remains at the ~~all but~~ stage of preliminary discussions and ~~almost entirely~~ formal gestures ~~stage~~, the unification experience in Western Europe, and more precisely among the six countries of the European Economic Communities, has been carried forward with continuity ~~for~~ some fifteen years ~~ago to date~~.

It would (be hardly) exact ~~or would it be~~ fair to consider the Economic Communities as a true fulfilment of European unity, but the Communities, through their institutions, through their supranational action programs, through their daily activities have represented, beyond any doubt, a noteworthy (forward step) towards unification. Not only have they had deep effects on the economic and political lives of their member countries, but they have also set a strong impact ~~to work~~ on the political imagination of the countries lying outside the Communities themselves.

It is ~~but a~~ only natural ~~thing for~~ that an industrial and commercial center as large as the Common Market ~~to~~ forces the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the Commonwealth countries, the African and South American Countries ~~to deep, and~~ into deep and sometimes agonizing,

reappraisals of their individual trade policies. ~~It~~ But here it is more important for us to ~~stress here~~ emphasise another aspect of the influence which stems from ~~borne by~~ the European experience: ~~as a matter of fact,~~ indeed, in effect the Communities have also been felt as a stimulating model for other ~~potential cases of integration~~ groups of nations aspiring to more integrated political communities.

~~This is true, first of all, for the~~ The Atlantic Alliance ~~which,~~ for example ~~although several years have passed by, finds itself~~ has found itself for several years in a situation of permanent crisis, and ~~which~~ is getting ~~ever~~ close to the moment ~~in which~~ when the treaty which ~~has~~ created it is ~~slated~~ due to expire. On both shores of the Atlantic Ocean an "Atlantic Community" is often spoken of, which should somehow avail itself of some institutional experiences of the European Communities. The ~~continental~~ projects of a Latin-American and African political union ~~and~~/or economic union draw as well, ~~without doubt,~~ their inspiration from the European experience. The Soviet Union ~~themselves~~ too, would like to transform the hardly workable and not so profitable Comecon into a true supra-national instrument, making out of it a Socialist version of the Western Common Market.

If we wish therefore, to study the sources of supra-national unity, it is perhaps useful abstractly analysing instead of ~~studying in abstract~~ the interplay between Nationalism and Supranationalism, ~~it is preferable perhaps to~~ to attempt a case-study of the ideal and political sources which have fed in the past, and are now feeding ~~at this time,~~ the European endeavour ~~at~~ to overcoming the old ~~states-nations~~ nation-states. An ~~analysis~~ assessment of the European forces ~~or~~ and institutions should be helpful in understanding the

chances of success ~~existing~~ for such an experiment as well as in establishing to ~~which~~ what extent it is possible or convenient to be inspired ~~oneself~~ by it, ~~in order~~ to promote ~~broader~~ other integrations ~~than the European integration or the non-European ones.~~

II

The European mutation

~~Changes~~ in the ~~European~~ political conscience.

The idea that Europeans, although divided into several nations and many states, ought to be united within a single community is not at all new. It has been roving as a ghost in the history of Europe for the past fifteen hundred years, ~~i.e.~~ in ~~practice~~ fact ever since the fall of the Western Roman Empire.

What is new, ~~at~~ since the end of World War II, ~~has been instead~~ is the fact that such an idea has become a real purpose. ~~All of a sudden~~, suddenly, a number of men ~~have therefore~~ appeared in several European countries who, each to a greater or lesser degree, directly or indirectly, were contributing to their respective countries' policy-making, ~~and who~~ decided to use whatever ~~large or small~~ power and influence they had, not just to ~~forebode~~ predict European unity within a far and ~~indefinable~~ undistinct future, but to promote its ~~fulfilment, if only partial,~~ implementation now, as today's solution to today's problems. New also is ~~was~~ the fact that, after a century or longer of systematic and increasing nationalistic brain-washing inflicted upon the various peoples, the idea of European unity has become very popular within a very short period of time. It is true that no elementary popular ~~thrusts have taken~~ or economic pressures for supranational unification have so far taken ~~place up to now, true enough,~~ nor ~~strong and active~~ pressures on

~~on the part of economic interests have been exerted toward supra-national unification~~, nor could such ~~a~~ thing happen ~~because~~ because of a total lacking ~~of~~ traditions, institutions and political language ~~itself were lacking which are~~ necessary for the public feelings and interests to crystallize themselves and to become a political force. The popular favor enjoyed by the ~~European~~ idea of a united Europe has been, up to now, ~~a~~ relatively passive ~~one~~ and inert, ~~one,~~ but still spread broadly enough to give constantly to the ~~politicians favorable to~~ statesmen who favored the European unity, the feeling that, while many and powerful obstacles against the fulfilment of their purpose are ranged ~~both~~ in front of them and even within them~~selves~~, there is no outright hostility or even lack of understanding on the part of the ~~masses.~~ populace of Europe. On the contrary, they have known at all times, ~~on the contrary,~~ that the idea of Europe is highly popular. ~~among the Europeans.~~

Such ~~definite change~~ mutation which has taken place within some sectors of the European political conscience was an obvious challenging answer to some depressing and humiliating experiences of the European peoples before, during, and after the war.

Nationalism had destroyed, in its fury, ~~the~~ democratic institutions one after another and given rise to tryannies; the proud ~~states-~~nation~~s~~-states, after having ~~pretended~~ demanded and obtained the most complete loyalty from their citizens, had ~~crumbled~~ failed ignominiously and, in the case of Germany, even cover~~ed~~ing itself with horrible crimes ~~of enormous magnitude~~. Lastly, even after their liberation, the~~se~~ nation-states were in such a condition of economic, social, political and military break-up that they were able to stand on their feet thanks only to outside U.S.

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aid in the West and to the ouside Soviet terror in the East. All the circumstances ~~mentioned above~~ had reduced, to very little indeed, the customary respect toward one's own state-nation and opened ~~the way within~~ the ~~spirits~~ minds to change in favor of the European unity.

It is ~~meaningful~~ significant that the ~~Britishers~~, English, the Swedes and the Swiss, who have overcome the trial of World War II without having lost their respect for their respective states, are also the countries in which the European ~~change has not~~ mutation did not take place at the end of the war, either ~~with~~ in the political class of ~~with~~ in the people.

It is very probable that a similar change would have manifested itself within the Eastern European countries as well. But, ~~having~~ the ~~latter~~ countries having been absorbed in the very different Communist experiment under Moscow's imperial leadership, ~~they have been~~ were unable to participate in any manner in the movement aimed at the unification of Europe. It should be mentioned here, if only for the sake of the record, that, notwithstanding their declared internationalism, up to now the Communists have not been able to find any form of supranational union for the countries they rule ~~outside~~ except the imperial ~~one~~ form of direct dependency of the single states on the Soviet state.

It is easy to understand how, such being the case, the field of action of Europe~~ism~~ism has been initially the continental part of democratic ~~solo portion of Europe which has remained democratic, and more precisely, first of all, those made up of the six continental Western European countries.~~ Europe, namely the "Six," ~~The~~ Only the success achieved by the Six has exerted, later on, a strong attraction on Greece and Turkey, ~~and~~ on England as well as on the other EFTA

countries and Spain.

This renovating ~~change acting~~ mutation in the political conscience of many Europeans has demonstrated itself not to be a short-lived phenomenon. Had Europeism been only a ~~fad~~ fashion, or a tentative emergency answer given to an emergency situation, it would have dissolved itself ~~long~~, long ago, because the internal and external conditions of Europe are far different today from those which were prevailing at the end of World War II. Europeism has shown itself, on the contrary, to be a political and doctrinal behavior capable of adapting itself to different situations and determined to supplying with European answers ~~the~~ a poor ~~Europe~~ as well as an affluent Europe, ~~enjoying well being~~, a politically powerless Europe as well as a Europe which has become an important factor of world politics, a cold war Europe, as well as the Europe of ~~dictension~~ "détente".

Contrary to the affirmations by the doctrines, which consider as prime sources of the political ventures of the peoples the great ~~nameless~~ anonimous forces of popular feelings or of economic interests, the European venture has had its start before any ~~popular~~ pressure ~~of the peoples or of any pressure brought to bear by the~~ popular (or pressure brought to bear by) economic forces. Its real source ~~because some~~ has been some men who were counting on European policy and who have discovered the perspective of European construction, have dreamed its fulfilment, have been capable of ~~grabbing~~ seizing, if not all, at least some favorable opportunities, and who have started translating this vision not only into fleeting ~~European~~ political deeds, but into permanent institutions as well.

The very fact of having been able to create some institutions, although incomplete and inadequate, has been basic for the European construction because, as Jean Monnet recalled when inaugurating the first one of them, it is only through the institutions that experiences are gathered and transmitted throughout the times from one generation to the next.

Since the E.C.S.C. institutions, and even more (since) the institution of the Common Market ones, have been in existence, the policy of European CONSTRUCTION is no longer dependent (only) on the rhapsodical initiatives of Europeist politicians, but also on the daily activity of the communitarian bureaucracy and on the stable existence of economic forces which have now found, in the Common Market, their normal field of action as well.

Europeism has had in the past, just as it has now, both allies and foes, sometimes very important but (in general) contingent U.S. support, Soviet aversion, understanding on the part of the Catholic political forces, Socialist lukewarm attitudes and Communist opposition have contributed to a remarkable extent to determining Europe's course over the last twenty years, but all of these forces may change and some have actually changed their position.

Europeism has not had as its true and permanent foe in the past, nor has it at this time, nationalism, genuine, determined to establish once again, for its country, the apartheid of the twenties and thirties. That sort of nationalism died with the war and is now cultivated only by some few nostalgic remnants of that era. The permanent, persevering, proteiform foe is repre-

sented, in fact, by the powerful rooted ~~customs~~ (national habit) ~~which~~ existing in every country and present in every political current and in every man; ~~identify~~ laws, ~~habits~~ solidarities, interests, ~~and~~ and policy-making ~~with~~ in the traditional and well known ~~categories of~~ mental and action schemes of the state-nation. ~~To act~~ ~~industry~~ in accordance with such habits creates ~~gives~~ a feeling of fullness, against which European ~~industry~~ activity, although supported by a very stimulating political vision, appears to be, and is in fact for the time being, necessarily full of gaps, obscure, uncertain~~ties~~ as to what is to be done, lacking the support of all those traditional rules and references which normally give self-confidence ~~serenity~~ to him who acts. European ~~industry~~ activity does not move amongst time-established institutions, but ~~must rather~~ has to build them; it does not enjoy well outlined political alternatives expressing themselves in definite European political parties, but ~~must rather~~ has to discover them; it does not even have an already formed political language, but ~~must rather~~ has to invent it. The political forces which ~~have taken~~ took over the leadership of the Western European countries after World War II have been very sensitive toward the Europeist ~~change~~ (mutation.) Some of ~~among~~ their leaders, ~~as a matter of fact, such as~~ like Schuman, De Gasperi, Adenauer, Beyen and Spaak have been among the ~~first rank~~ foremost leaders, ~~of the if not as far as thought is concerned, at least as regards European~~ European action. This notwithstanding, to rebuild the state-nation meant for them all to move within what was well known, whereas to build Europe meant sailing into unknown, ~~or at least dark,~~ waters. This explains

not only why they have carried out, or at least tried to carry out, European activities under exceptional circumstances, but also why the fullness of their daily political labors ~~have~~ has been devoted not so much to the construction of Europe, but rather to restoration of the former states-nations.

National reconstruction and European construction however, were complementary only to the point ~~in~~ at which some problems or bundles ~~multitude~~ of problems were reached for which ~~a decision was required to establish~~ it was yet to be decided whether they were to be confronted on either a national or (a) European ~~plane.~~ level. Beyond such a point the two activities became ~~alternative ones:~~ conflicting; the one smothered, or at least, ~~is~~ was an obstacle to the other. Nevertheless, European political life has had as its prominent feature this very paradoxical and contradictory motion: on one hand full restoration of the states-nations, and therefore of ~~the various~~ several national myths and taboos, ~~connected thereto,~~ ~~and~~ on the other hand, establishment of supranational institutions and policies. ~~Up to date,~~ So far, the new European construction has not yet occupied all the field that it should reasonably occupy, nor has it been able to establish an effective supremacy ~~of~~ the Community over the single states, not even in those fields in which the pre-eminence of the European ~~point of view~~ over the national viewpoint is formally acknowledged and accepted by the states. This crucial problem remains still open.

pause

In order to evaluate, with some exactness, ~~which is the~~ what has gathered ~~up to date~~ to now political momentum ~~of~~ the European construction we shall now ~~take into con~~ analyse the political directives which have been followed so far in this

construction, as well as the directives which might, or should, be followed in the nearest future.

III - Alternatives offered to Europeism.

Throughout the last twenty years the European unification process has drawn, and keeps on drawing, its inspiration from three different trends: Federalism, Functionalism and Confederalism. Such trends seem to be clearly at times and then become confused, now antagonistic and then allied; but differ widely as to their individual institutional approach to European construction, as to the ideal purpose which they assign to Europe, as well as to the sociological positions of those promoting them.

The three diverse approaches may be defined as follows: for the Federalists it is a matter, above all, to erect the political institutions of a European democracy, taking any certain deliberation, decision and execution powers from national governments, parliaments and judiciaries, and intrusting them instead to a European government, parliament and judiciary drawing their respective authority from the direct assent of the European citizens and such to exercise directly their powers on Europe's citizens.

For the Functionalists it is a case, first of all, of building a European bureaucracy, entrusting the administration of some positive public activities to a European civil service, autonomous opposite the national civil services and which may act according to common directives indicated by the nation states, by means of special treaties and further intergovernmental decisions.

For the Confederalists it is a matter, ~~first of all~~ primarely, of building a ~~European intergovernmental co operation, forming a permanent league of States,~~ League of States in order to have a permanent intergovernmental co-operation. Each of them ~~each~~ retains its own sovereignty, but ~~this but also committed to acting in such a way that their individual~~ the governments (are engaged to) take common decisions in ~~these~~ some particular matters which have been recognised as being of common interest.

A ~~widely~~ different conception of the common purpose that the new European community ~~might~~ (ought to have) corresponds to ~~such diverse~~ each one of these different approaches. It may even be affirmed, as a matter of fact, that it is the very vision of the purpose which leads some to choose ~~an~~ one approach and ~~someone else~~ others to ~~picking up~~ choose another one.

The purpose of European union must, for the Federalists, rest essentially on the creation of a political society committed to building a modern democratic way of life among ~~using~~ peoples who ~~which, at the supranational level,~~ have so far been able only to live, ~~either in~~ at the supranational level either in a regime of actual apartheid or of war.

~~As far as the~~ For the Functionalists, ~~are concerned,~~ the forms of political life are a less important superstructure than is generally believed, and the purpose of the European union shall, for a long time to come, be the slow, progressive ~~clotting~~ coagulation of habits and interests around a European bureaucracy, more efficient and far-sighted than the national ones.

The purpose of the European union is, for the Confederalists, that of finding once more, and at European level, the glory, the power and the grandeur that the European national states have en-

joyed in the past and which ~~and~~ as a result of ~~events which have taken place during the last half century,~~ the World Wars have been lost. As the old states-nations have been the natural trustees of that glory they cannot forget the basic mark of their rank: sovereignty. As we are living, however, in an era in which the political scene is ruled by colossi such as the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the european states are forced to associate themselves in ~~a~~ League or Confederation in order to be able to make headway against the latter ones. And lastly, since no League made up of states completely equal among themselves has ever been able to function, ~~in the past,~~ it is necessary ~~for those~~ that in the European confederation ~~that~~ there be one state ~~among them~~ having a ~~national leadership~~ natural hegemony over all the others. (Guaranteeing).

Either a Europe committed to building up the liberties of the multinational European people; or a Europe committed to living quiet and prosperous under the silent but efficient leadership of those modern mandarins, the Eurocrats; or, lastly, a Europe calling for a revival of old nationalism around a new European nationalism. These are the three purposes ~~backing up~~ which support the three institutional approaches.

This link between approach and purpose in the three trends appears more ~~evident~~ clearly if the sociological and political position of the supporters of each of them is taken into consideration.

The Federalist trend appears simultaneeously during the war in all the countries within the ~~resistance~~ democratic left wing of the Resistance movements, and organizes itself, immediatly after the end of the war, as a

"grass roots" movement.

In given circumstances it has exerted a considerable influence on European action. Its supporters, as a rule, have not occupied positions from which decisions were taken but only positions from which suggestions could be made. The European federation is for them an important aspect, even a decisive one, but still always an aspect of the vision of a new democratic society to be established in Europe and not of old societies to be restored. It is not difficult to recognise the well known mental attitude of radicalism, which is usually to be found as the creative thinking, at the origin of all democratic revivals and progresses.

The Functionalist trend has had its most original and strongest expression in the personality of Jean Monnet, a high French official, with a long experience in international offices both in peace and war, and it has found its natural field of expansion among some modern high officials of the national administrations who, having been able to overcome their narrow national horizons, envision the European problem with the technocratic contempt for the political institutions and the extreme technocratic confidence in the administrative institutions. Monnet has found himself in a position, in certain decisive moments of the recent European history, to avail himself of a very strong position within the French administration and of a very large influence on some political men. The crucial proposals of the Schuman plan, of the Pleven plan, of Euratom, all bear the

seal of his mentality: to create solidarities of concrete interest in given sectors around European administrations; Europe would have been ~~made~~ created by the bureaus almost without anyone being aware of it, even if then the credit should have been abusively stolen by some political man or party. Monnet did find at first some intelligent and willing partners in the diplomatic delegations of all the countries who were elaborating the treaties of the Communities and then in the officials of the Communities in whose hands that much of Europe which has been created so far is to be found and who, not wrongly, have been called ~~with~~ by the meaningful neologism Eurocrats.

It has happened, as a rule up to know, that the proposals advanced by ~~either~~ Functionalists of Federalists either have failed completely ~~have fragmented themselves~~ or, at least, have been ~~wholly~~ totally or partially blunted ~~in front of~~ by the active or passive resistance of the states-nations, ~~and that~~ the actual ~~realisations~~ implementations have ~~always~~ given ~~attributed~~ the supreme decision-making power ~~relative to decisions~~ to a Council ~~made up~~ of national ministers. ~~The~~ Therefore the Confederal solution appears, at first sight, ~~only~~, as the limit ~~of some partial~~ Federalists or Functionalists success, the point where compromise has taken place; where the states have accepted that common decisions be taken but have ~~not attributed~~ refused the power to decide ~~in~~ on a supra-national body, ~~they~~ and have retained it for themselves. But this is ~~an illegi-~~ in a certain ~~timate~~ sense a spurious Confederalism, ~~corresponding only to~~ generated unwillingly by some impasse in the construction of Europe. The true Confederal thought is the one expressed by this or that statesman who believes and hopes in the

possibility of an association of states under the leadership of ~~its~~ his own. The two statesmen who have had the vision of a Europe ~~made up of~~ Confederate (of) sovereign states under the leadership of their respective countries have been Churchill, and De Gaulle. The first one has ~~formulated~~ coated the idea with ~~the empiricism and~~ the rhetoric peculiar to the British, the latter with ~~rationalism and~~ the rhetoric peculiar to the French, but in reality the two versions differ only ~~above all~~ in the fact that while one entrusts to London the leadership of the Confederation, the latter ~~does the same with~~ entrusts it to Paris. Since ~~As~~ the objective of such ~~products~~ projects is ~~a will to power~~ the desire for power, they arose sympathies and ~~gather consents~~ gain followers, above all, among those political currents which, ~~more than others, have~~ are more dedicated to the cult of power.

IV.

An Outline of the Development

Such are the leading ideas and men that most contributed to determine the course of the European construction.

Their influence can be summarized in the following way:

From 1947 until 1950 the political scene is dominated by Churchill's propaganda and Bevin's initiative. English statesmen aim decisively at the creation of European ties of the confederate type under British leadership. The Brussels pact, the O.E.E.C., and the European Council are the results of this policy. Since, however, English leadership is more of a long an illusion of the ruling class in the United Kingdom than a reality, all these organizations turn out to be rather ineffective. They produce excellent studies and debates; at times they even reach common decisions, but these decisions lack consistency and fail to generate any sense of community. Europe continues to be devided. During this period the supporters of the federal and of the functional approaches give point to their ideas, but they remain obscured by the shadow of the confederalism of Churchill and Bevin.

In 1950 and 1951, ~~above everything else~~, the break-through of the functional approach takes place. Under the influence of Monnet, Schuman proposes the creation of a Common Market for steel and coal under the supervision of a supranational High Authority, and after a few months Pleven proposes the creation of a common European army to be organized and armed by a supranational commission. Great Britain refuses to accept either proposal, but they are endorsed by six states. Long and complicated diplomatic negotiations begin in order to translate those projects into international treaties.

The Schuman Plan becomes a reality in the fall of 1952. In 1952 and 1953 the breakthrough of federalism takes place. The difficulty inherent in creating a common army, without a common political power to which that army may be attached, constrains the governments to accept the federalist request. They entrust to a European assembly the drawing up of a constitution for a political community, without even awaiting the ratification of the treaty of the E. D. C.

In 1954 the resistance of French nationalistic traditions leads to the fall of the E.D.C. and with it to the downfall of the political community. But Europeanism is by now ineradicable from the political life of western Europe, and phoenix-like it rises again from its own ashes.

Once more the new cycle is initiated by an English confederate plan. In 1954 and 1955, the Eden government succeeds in creating the W.E. U. in place of the E.D.C. Since, however, the English government is again not capable of exercising any true European leadership, the W.E.U. also demonstrates the same political unsubstantiality as the other confederate attempts of five or six years earlier.

With the Messina conference in 1955, a new functionalist impulse is born. Between 1955 and 1958 the six governments slowly and overcautiously elaborate the mechanism of Euratom and that of the Common Market.

All the English manoevres, directed towards opposing to the functional scheme of the Common Market a confederate scheme for an area of free exchange, fail. Even more unsuccessful are the federalist criticisms directed to constructing not only a European bureaucracy but also, and above all, a European political power. The six governments write into the treaty a precise program for a graduated customs union; in the same treaty, they exchange formal promises of gradual economic unification, and they entrust to a commission, supranational but appointed by themselves, the task of overseeing the implementation of what is already agreed upon in the treaties and of what is to be decided later by the Council of National Ministers.

Between 1958 and the end of 1962, while the E. C. S. C. and Euratom demonstrate very strong limitations in their capacity for expansion, the E.E.C., usually called the Common Market, enjoys an enormous success. The power to decide, that is, the real political power, rests in the hands of the Council of National Ministers, but during this period the Council accepts the fact that initiative for proposals must come from the European Commission. This method of working-- European proposals, national decisions, European implementation, or at least

implementation controlled by a European organization-- is called the method of "supra national dialogue," and it seems it should become the chief way to the construction of Europe. Politics seems, in effect, to be reduced to something of secondary importance in respect to the continued work of European Civil service.

At the beginning of 1963, the insuperable limitations of the functional approach suddenly appear in various ways. The success of a Common Market has created a very strong interdependency among several Eupopean countries, and thereby reinforces the tendency to see a whole series of important political problems as problems to be faced on a European basis. But the decisions to be taken exceed the powers of the Eurocrats.

Some of these problems, such as the agricultural policy and the Kennedy round, are consequences of the internal development of economic communities, but for each of these problems the solutions, in one way or another, depend not on preferring this or that technique of integration but on the political will to assign this or that general goal to the community. It is to be decided whether European economic must have a high degree of self-sufficiency in agriculture or a high degree of interdependence. In this matter the European Civil Service has no authority to speak. It must stand by, cap in hand, and accept the choice made by those who have the power to make political choices.

Other problems are completely external to the development of economic integration. The entrance of Great Britain into the Common Market, the reform of the Atlantic Alliance along the lines of Euro-American partnership, the question of the the nuclear deterfent--national, European, or Atlantic-- are all problems which show even more clearly that the political goals of European's deciding powers determines the answers to be given. The Common Market as a whole, with its Eurocrats and its complex of interdependencies, can be embedded in and employed by one or another of these goals.

The entire functional edifice was founded on the hypothesis of the efficacy of the "supranational dialogue," that is, on the hypothesis that the power to decide would certainly remain in the hands of the governments, but that in the meantime, the European Civil Service would have created a concrete solidarity of interests and would, therefore, in increasing measure, condition the decisions of the governments.

When, however, Europe arrived to the point where it became a matter of new political choices, and when administrative difficulties raised by choices made much earlier, the "international dialogue" no longer worked, and the governments stopped paying attention to the proposals of the Commission and began making decisions by themselves. The French government began its dissent over the question of British entry into the Common Market because that entry did not coincide with its conception of the new Europe. The German government followed suit on the question of farm prices becauses they were not compatible with its national agricultural policy. Other analogous instances may yet occur.

In order to get out of this inevitable dead end of the functional approach, two alternative policies are taking shape in Europe today.

On the one hand, DeGaulle has resumed the confederate approach with tenacity. He hopes to unite the other countries of the community in a confederate association under French guidance, and this with the aim of reaching the "rank" of a great world power. Nationalistic resentment, autarchic dreams, authoritarianism, contempt for democracy, and nuclear militarism are the inevitable ingredients of such a policy.

On the other hand, although in a less obvious way, we observe within the parties of the European democratic left, a revival of the federal approach; one hears of a Europe of the people to oppose to the Europe of states and nations, of aversion to the Europe of DeGaulle, of European elections, of supranational political power.

Both these approaches have by now put aside their old quarrel with the functional approach. Both accept the Eurocrats and their European Civil Service. But both propose to subordinate it to a political power—in one case to a federal government, in the other to a council of states ruled by hegemonic power.

In what way this dispute for domination of the Common Market and its institutions will end is still quite uncertain. It is certain, however, that the victory of either approach will result in two ~~Europes—one~~ very different ~~from the other.~~ Europes.

Conclusion

This ~~brief~~ examination of the European experience demonstrates at least, that the process of supranational unification may take on many forms and many meanings. It is complex; it is slow; and it is likely to establish itself only if there is behind it a permanent tendency toward the creation of political ~~good-will.~~ common purposes

If this tendency is lacking, the most interesting plans have no chance of being realized because there will be no one to support them.

If, for example, we examine the problems of the so-called Atlantic Community, it is not difficult to see similarities and dissimilarities between it and the European Community.

The organization of the Atlantic Alliance is of the confederate rather than of the functional type. It was effective only so long as there was strong American leadership of it. It entered a crisis when this leadership was no longer uncontested and uncontestable.

The common interests of the United States and Western Europe push toward the discovery of new forms of cooperation. But in the American political world there is no tendency to limit American sovereignty either by adopting the functional or the federal approach. As long as this attitude remains unchanged in America, it is useless to propose to the Atlantic Alliance, as a goal, its transformation into a community similar to the European community.

The most sensible proposal today is that which suggests the transformation of ~~a kind of~~ the present military confederation ruled by American hegemony, increasingly difficult to maintain, into a partnership between the United States and an authentic European supranational community.

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National Conference 9/2

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

United States National Commission for UNESCO

CULTURAL DIVERSITY - POLITICAL UNITY

A EUROPEAN DILEMMA?

Address by

Francois Bondy
Editor, Preuves Magazine

Chicago, Illinois

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I have been asked to contribute to this debate some remarks on the theme "cultural diversity - political unity in Europe". I will not venture to enter the field of national psychology and national cultures not only because I have no special competence in this domaine, but also because I am ever less assured whether these differences are relevant to the problem of political unification. Outlooks and attitudes have changed in Europe - especially in Germany, France and Italy - at such an amazing speed, if not quite as rapidly as the economic and social structure of these nations, that we may consider change rather than permanence of national characteristics as the dominant factor. This prevalence of change over continuity is itself no complete novelty. Throughout the whole 18th century and part of the 19th century we find the image of the German as a timid and peaceful "Bürger" who prefers his "Zipfelmütze" to a helmet, while at the same time the Frenchman is usually considered as martial and reckless. This changed only during the Bismarck era. During this century again, the attitudes of German youth, between 1914 and 1963, have so much changed that we can hardly speak of an identity of national character. Hereditary enmities, supposedly embedded in the collective psyche, have dissolved over night, less perhaps through better understanding of the neighbour than through a shift of interest and emphasis.

Opinion polls show that a majority of Frenchmen believe that they can cooperate better with the Germans than with the British.[1]

National traits have to do with a sense of tradition, with a feeling of the unity and the meaning of a national History. In his report on an international discussion "Europe and the Europeans" Max Beloff writes (page 74):

"In the 18th century and after the French revolution, historians seemed to regard the nation as the essential historical reality treating its past as though it were a form of biography in which the living being could be seen to pass through several stages, from infancy to maturity, with its essence unaltered."

A perfect example of this type of 19th century historiography is constituted by H. T. Buckle's famous "History of Civilisation in England" which has appeared a little over a century ago and from which I quote the following characteristic passage:

"In the character of a nation, inconsistency is impossible. Such, however, is still the backward condition of the human mind and with so evil and jaundiced an eye do we approach the greatest problems that not only common writers, but even men from whom better things might be hoped, are on this point involved in constant confusion, perplexing themselves and their readers by speaking of inconsistency as if it were a quality belonging to the subject which they investigate instead of being, as it really is, a measure of their own ignorance. It is the business of the historian to remove this ignorance by showing that the movements of the nations are perfectly regular and that like all other movements they are solely determined by their antecedents. If he cannot do this, he is no historian."

One may contrast with this the following remarks, written one century later by the German historian Michael Freund:[2]

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[1] Opinion poll by the "Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique", end of september 1962, on the question whether France's future relations should be closer either with Great Britain or with Germany, 40% have answered: with Germany; 25% with Great Britain; 35% had no opinion.

[2] "Historische Restbestände in der europäischen Politik" in "Studium Generale", March 1953.

"Our time seems to be predominantly a-historical. It has jumped out of his historical rails and people have lost the historical ground under their feet. A-historical epoche are epochain which a great lot of History does happen, although this may sound paradoxical. The history in being is yet unformed, in ferment, in flux. It does not give people a yardstick for their behaviour. In such times man does not find his path from past through the present toward the future. Historical "ratio" fails. The territory inhabited by Germans is now roughly what it was in the years 900 to 1000 A.D. A millenary of History has been wiped out. A millenary of destruction has been wrought by the Reich which indeed called itself "tausendjährig". Traditional, historical categories are insufficient for the description of such events."

Michael Freund then shows that in such an epoch we find simultaneously a complete flux and the petrifaction of some unrelated fixations from the past, both factors together - the flux and the petrifaction - creating a sense of discontinuity. In the work of other formally tradition-bound Germany historians and scholars after 1945, such as Friedrich Meinecke, Alfred Weber, Ludwig Dehio, we find this same awareness of a profound change and even of a complete break with the past.

Until the thirties, a national state meant to its citizens the prevalence of law over crime, of order over disorder, of security against invasion, rape, looting and foreign rule. But States could become, like the Third Reich, criminal agents outdoing everything which mere private initiative has ever achieved in the spheres of murder and robbery and national States have broken down under invasion as their cities crumbled under bombs, leaving whole populations expelled from their territory, stripped of their belongings and totally unprotected by any government of their own.

Even today we can easily trace the differences in approach and collective feeling between nations who have lived through this frightful experience - like the Germans, French, Italians, Dutch - and people who have not undergone this experience and were able to go on trusting their own government to secure internal order and external security, such as Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland.

If we move from collective psychological reactions to the psychology of leading individuals, we are struck by the fact, which has been often noted, that the three political leaders who have been hailed, or abused, as architects of European unity - Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer - were all three born and brought up in frontier-regions: Lotaringia, Trient, Rhenania, with a quite special experience of what either war or cooperation across frontiers has meant. De Gasperi has been a deputy in the Habsburg empire; Robert Schuman has studied in German universities. During the debate starting from the Schuman plan, German nationalists from right and left have attacked Adenauer as a Rhenanian separatist, unaware of national interest and always ready to submit to French desires, while in France Robert Schuman was pilloried from extreme right to extreme left, as a traitor to French interests, as an agent of Germany. The strict parallel of the hostile arguments on both sides of the frontier, reveal one important fact: the dangers to European unity came less from cultural and psychological differences between the spirit or "Volksgeist" of the European nations concerned, than from similar yet mutually hostile traditions of nationalism.

Nationalism itself has not been a specifically "national" trend, but a European movement crossing all boundaries, like romanticism. Nationalists of different countries may hate each other deeply and yet show a remarkable identity of outlook and even of vocabulary. The rhetorique with which Italian, French and German nationalist professors have insisted on the absolute superiority of their own culture, in contrast to other "inferior" cultures, is as similar as the language in which inmates of various lunatic asylums will tell you, each of them, that he is Napoleon. While cultural diversity has often made for interest, attraction and cooperation, this identical aberration among intellectual leaders of various nations has been an element of European disruption. The cosmopolitical character of nationalism is aptly symbolized by the

trinity: Count Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Richard Wagner, in their influence on extreme German nationalism.

However, the remarkable aspect in the crucial year 1950 and after, has been the weakness, the lack of echo of the combined assault led against the beginning of European Community by the coalition of "vested interests" and the two ideologies of chauvinism and of Moscow-led communism. Neither the fears nor the ideological passions nor the prejudices have been able then to prevail against the new European cooperation. If we take into account how little education in the new European spirit had been attempted, in the schools as well as in the press, and how much education and information had been directed in the opposite sense, we may admit that national feelings have profoundly changed under the impact of great historical upheavals.

Has this change been conditioned, at least partly, by the pressure toward greater uniformity, toward the leveling of cultural and national differences in the modern industrial mass society? T. S. Eliot, in his essay from 1944, "The man of letters and the future of Europe" [1] has, quite on the reverse, attributed the extreme fanatical movements of this century to the pressures of industrial society:

"The cultural health of Europe, including the cultural health of its component parts, is incompatible with extreme forms of both nationalism and internationalism. But the cause of that disease which destroys the very soil in which culture has its roots, is not so much extreme ideas and the fanaticism which they stimulate as the relentless pressure of modern industrialism setting the problems which the extreme ideas attempt to solve."

Against some trends of historiography, in which the search of totalitarian ideology is traced to the millenarists, to Rousseau, to Marx, to religious and intellectual traditions of some kind, we do well to bear in mind this realistic consideration, that the upsurge of extreme fanatical ideology has been, to a considerable extent, the reaction to breakdowns in the fabric of society.

Now, however, this same - or rather not quite anymore the same - industrial society seems to press in Europe in the sense of a decline of ideologies, of a "consumer attitude" to ideas as well as to political events. Thus, the consent to European collaboration, has not been carried by a fierce ideological movement, fighting with equal passion the fanaticism of nationalist and communist ideology. Some Europeans, who had a sense of urgency, of an opportunity which might be lost, have suffered from this gentle, but rather passive consent to their ideas, from this lack of European militancy and of "passionate intensity" among the best. However, the withdrawal from attitudes of fanatical political faith has been a major factor in our new European welfare societies and it has helped the overcoming of nationalism.

In an opinion poll of 1962, whose results have been presented by the French publication "Sondages" (N° 1, 1963), one may note the readiness for European unity, combined with the lack of passion for the European cause. Persons from Western Europe who have answered to the question, whether they think about Europe "very often or rather often" in the following way:

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[1] Reprinted in "The Intellectuals", a controversial portrait, G. de Huszar, Free Press in Glencoe, Ill.

	Among persons aged between			
	20 to 34	35 to 49	50 to 64	65 and over
	%	%	%	%
Federal Republic.....	40	43	46	41
Belgium.....	25	31	35	28
France.....	28	37	35	36
Italy.....	29	34	24	22
Netherlands.....	37	46	51	55

Another poll shows, however, that persons who travelled abroad are, on the whole, more in favour of European unity than persons who have not left their country and youth furnishes the largest contingent among the first group, the "travellers". This is an obvious contradiction. The answer seems to be that the young are less nationalist, more positive toward European unity. At the same time they are not much concerned with it as a problem calling for thought and action. Taking Europe for granted, they are more aware of its reality than of its yet unsolved difficulties. With full employment at home and the abolition of travel restrictions on monetary and other grounds, they live inside a "holiday Europe", while manual workers from less developed regions, like Southern Italy and Spain, live in a Europe of nearly free movement and establishment.

Once many European federalists used the argument that the single European countries would live for a long time in a wrecked economy, with little hope of progress, except through the creation of a political European community. This argument has become obsolete. At the same time, fears about security have diminished since the death of Stalin and the changes which have occurred since then on the international scene. Youth, by and large, takes prosperity, open frontiers, security for granted and enjoys Europe rather than participating toward its further progress. Only a small minority realizes the necessity for a "leap forward", for new political institutions, for a difficult fight against the still strongly entrenched national sovereignties. The majority which does not feel this need may be wrong, since we cannot even be sure any more that the Common Market is an irreversible step, as so many of its leading Administrators have stated. But this feeling is an important psychological factor.

It may be worthwhile to add here, that we do not quote the results of opinion polls as if they constituted an imperative indication of "popular will", which governments must obey. In a French opinion poll of December 1957 to the question, to which "camp" France should belong, the answers have been respectively: 21% - France should belong to the Western camp; 3% - France should belong to the Eastern group; 31% - France should belong to neither, while 25% had no opinion on this matter. No French government could feel obliged by this poll to choose neutrality. However, there is a relevance in the opinion polls: they show, for instance, the falsity of the claim, made by nationalists and communists, that public opinion would never accept a German-French alliance and other steps which mean a break with the past. These polls indicate that in their relation to national opinion, governments may have a much wider room for action than they think and that timidity of governmental action cannot be all the time excused by the pretense that the majority is not yet emotionally ready for a new situation. The "negative"value of opinion polls is therefore of great importance.

For this lack of European militancy, cultural diversities as we can trace them in the educational, legal and administrative systems of European countries, seem again less responsible than the new psychology which characterizes across frontiers the outlook of the new generation. It is not active defense of cultural and political

singularities, but a widespread lack of awareness that Europe will be what we Europeans make of it. That it is not a thing which "exists" as the national States exist, in which we have been brought up.

If, however, we approach now - with great hesitation - the field of cultural diversity taken in this narrower sense of educational, legal, administrative traditions, we find that these differences do not lend themselves easily to any clearcut deduction concerning the attitude of nations toward the concept of a European Commonwealth or Federation. We may, for instance, take for granted, that the Germans are used to an "Obrigkeitsetaat", an Administration which is invested with some feeling by mystical superiority toward the simple individual citizens. Even now, one may hear in a German discussion, that a "Beamter" should remain a "Mensch", which implies that normally a Beamter is something higher or, at any rate, different. We also find in Germany the tradition of idealistic philosophy, alien to an empirical and moralistic approach, which we think "anglosaxon", and leading to the sense of a "totality" in which the destiny of the single human component becomes rather negligible.

However, we find that the German Federal Republic has been all the time disposed to concede parts of its sovereignty to some superior body, to prolong the historical division of sovereignty between Länder and Federal Republic one stage further to a Federal Europe. It is, of course, a historical experience of this division of sovereignty rather than any cultural tradition which has predisposed Germans to this new step. To this we may add their lack of confidence toward the new State. The lack of prestige of a State, which even recently a leading politician in Berlin could call with contempt a "Rheinbund", a mere Rhenanian League.

Looking to France, we note that most initiatives toward European unity have come from here, that names like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Pierre Uri have become symbols of a new European political approach, while the greatest resistance in the name of a traditional outlook and the dogma of untouchable national sovereignty has equally come from France.

These two opposite attitudes have both deep roots in French history and political thought. The belief in untouchable national sovereignty has to do with the way in which France has gradually grown, in which the Crown with its legal advisers has created an administrative linguistic unity, perfected by the Revolution as the "one an undivisible Republik" and which appears as a pure crystal rather than some common ore to be thrown in the European melting pot. But from Sully, the minister of Henry IV, onward through the centuries we find French political and legal thought which conduces to European Commonwealth. According to which trends out of many we care to isolate, we could show that the French people is especially incapable or, on the contrary, remarkably well prepared, for entering into a larger European Community. There is no possibility for unequivocal deductions from cultural collective traditions. General statements about which European nations are gifted for a new form of European community, are very much like arguments about which European people are gifted for democracy. All such arguments, based on an allegedly unchangeable mentality, too often reflect merely prejudices, the conditioning of the mentality of those who propound them. I may quote as a very recent instance from a review on a book about the Germans, written by that most stimulating and cosmopolitan British intellectual, the Labour M.P. R.H.S. Crossman:

"... In other countries the minority of conscientious objectors, eccentrics and other opposition-minded groups is the salt which gives democracy its savour. But in Germany, since the time of Heine, the good Germans have been rejected as traitors by the rest of the community, and as a result the salt has lost its savour....

It is only when we study the plight of the good German that we realise why Germany can never become a true democracy." (The Observer, August 18th, 1963)

In the following issue of The Observer, a rebuttal appeared, written by another M.P., Mr. R.W. Sorensen, from which I quote:

"... If this is his belief, then I can emulate him by adopting a similar process to demonstrate how incapable of true democracy are France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, Turkey, China, Pakistan, Burma, Ghana, some Latin-American States and other dubious areas, for all these have badly treated their "good" nationals and have had, or now have, lamentable lapses from true democracy - quite a large proportion of the earth's population...

How strange it is that from the same primal common human stock have arisen its branches, some endowed with the capacity for true democracy and others foredoomed to wretched alternatives! It would seem there is something to be said for apartheid after all. Or are we simply suffering from subjective myopia?"

It may be possible to show that all such definite generalisations about the incapacity of collective groups to learn or to change do not reveal a knowledge but an intention, and should be examined as such.

If, nevertheless, the relation between cultural diversity and political unity should be pursued, it might be of special interest to study the types of education represented by the schools and universities in Europe - and not only their teaching, but their specific atmosphere. One might examine their spirit and their functioning under one special aspect: In what way can a European intellectual community be promoted now? Such a community has existed, without the benefit of any special new "European University", through the Middle ages, but it does not exist now. We should enquire which elements of education can be put in common, through the stressing of common traditions which reach beyond the new national States as Mr. Eliot wants, and simultaneously through an awareness of common new problems and perspectives. We find valuable indications for the study of this problem in the Colloquium "L'Université Européenne", held in March 1962 and published by the Institute of Sociology of the Brussel's University. Georges Goriely, a sociologist, has spoken in this Colloquium on Universities as breeding grounds of nationalism and fascism. But one should also consider the rebuttal by Mr. Cereti from the University of Genova. We might examine why German University students had been more nazi than the average German population, while the French University has served in the main the cause of tolerance and humanism. But we shall not forget that after the War, the University of Göttingen - teachers and students united - has forced the resignation of a neo-nazi education minister of Lower Saxony [1] and in the protests against arbitrary government proceedings against the news magazine "Spiegel", again University teachers and students have played a prominent role.

But quite apart from the "spirit of the universities, which may have been in some countries more disposed toward nationalism and fascism than in others, there is the factor of protectionism nowhere stronger than among liberal professions and the schools which lead to them. Swiss Universities, for instance, who have hardly been noted for politically dangerous trends, have been much more protectionist in the last thirty years than a century ago and have missed, in contrast to the United States, the opportunity of attracting some of the best German non-nazi teachers after 1933. The readiness to call foreigners to University teaching posts as it exists in the USA, is not to be found anywhere in Europe, just as little as the readiness to draw into the academic world writers, artists and other "non-academic" intellectuals.

This protectionism against outsiders and foreigners has considerably narrowed the scope of the emergent new European intellectual community. European intellectuals do

[1] Compare Science and Freedom, N° 3, August 1955: "Göttingen versus Schlüter".

not seem sufficiently aware of this inferiority of their present academic systems, compared to the American tradition. It is true, we have moved since the War to a somewhat closer European community of minds, [1] but just as the centers of learning remain national strongholds, the equivalence of diplomas and the right of exerting liberal professions in the Common Market-countries has not progressed in a way which could be compared with the growing freedom of movement for manual workers. Traditions of protectionism, centering on professions of the highest prestige and influence, remain considerable and are, of course, quite understandable. Many Europeans, who speak with eloquence on the need of European spiritual unity, may react differently when this deep-rooted protectionism seems threatened. But, is it national cultural tradition in its diversity which is thus protected?

As long as Universities in Europe remain strongly protectionistic our cultural diversity fails to become an enriching experience for students who are not generally encouraged, to spend at least one or two years of their studies abroad. This protectionism may maintain some cultural diversity, but at the price of nationalistic conformity inside each country and of the lack of experience of this diversity itself for all Europeans who might benefit by it.

We try in this gathering to form for a few days a kind of intellectual community, in which each of us hopes to be instructed and enriched by the diversity of knowledge, of background, of temper of the other participants. Europe, today, lacks the presence of a real cultural community which could embody this kind of experience continuously. At a time, when in the political domaine not much immediate progress toward unity seems likely, it is worthwhile to consider what we could do in our various fields to promote a more open European intellectual community. Should not today every student in Europe be obliged to spend at least one year abroad and to master at least one more language, an achievement which is already natural to the citizems of our smaller countries? Should we not promote an intellectual climate in which other steps leading beyond nationalism will appear at once more necessary and more feasible? This could be the way of making of our diversity a living part of our culture. But is it not legitimate to consider cultural diversity as a fragile and unique achievement which has to be protected by the States in its specific character? I would not deny that there is something valid in such preoccupations. There is a specific flavour, a unique quality linked to each single language and each national tradition. The great Dutch scholar J. Huyzinga has stressed more than once the different nuances of even the most general concepts according to each language. [2]

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[1] Compare Minerva, Vol. I, N° 4, Summer 1963; Pierre Auger: "Scientific Cooperation in Western Europe".

[2] J. Huyzinga: "Schriften zur Zeitkritik", Zurich-Brussels 1948, p. 300: "Die Sprache setzt dem richtigen Verständnis des Fremden und Abweichenden immer wieder gewisse Grenzen. Unser Ausdrucksvermögen ist in zahlreichen Hinsichten national begrenzt. Stets gibt es Abweichungen in der Aequivalenz der verschiedenen Sprachen, sodass es unmoglich ist, jeden Begriff und jedes Wort einer Sprache mit vollkommener Genauigkeit in eine anderen Sprache wiederzugeben. Merkwürdigerweise tauchen die unaufhebbaren **Divergenzen gerade bei den fundamentalsten und offenbar universal notwendigen Begriffen** auf. Beispielsweise entspricht in der Wortreihe 'raison', 'reason', 'Vernunft' und 'rede' kein Wort gänzlich dem anderen. Ebenso ist der Begriff des englischen 'evil' im Niederländischen auf die Begriffe 'kvaad' und 'boos' verteilt, und ähnliche, unüberbrückbare Divergenzen trennen das französische Wort 'salut' vom niederländischen 'heil' oder die englische Bezeichnung 'salvation' von dem deutschen Ausdruck 'Erlösung'."

Huyzinga, however, was no nationalist. His works on the culture of Burgundy or on Erasmus indicate how he traced European culture yet unbounded by latter political and cultural units. It is true that words do never have quite the same "atmosphere" in different languages. This appears even for some words between Germany and German speaking Switzerland. To be aware of such infinite "nuances" can lead, in the extreme, to the belief that no language is really translatable - and all poetry shows the truth of this. However, communication of thought through translation has always been possible and if the poetric truth would be pushed into its extreme consequences, from a partial truth it would turn into a total madness.

Some cultural diversities between nations can be matched by cultural diversities between regions inside the present national States.

Already now we can see how bilingual frontier-regions - Alsatia, Catalogna - acquire a different significance through the movement toward European unity than they had in the epoch of the fight between national States for hegemony. The real opposition to European Community springs, it seems to me, from cultural narrowness, provincialism, ignorance. Just as the Communist Parties have opposed for several years every step toward Europe with arguments appealing to the different chauvinistic rhetoriques of each country, even the non-political traditionist opposition, claiming to safeguard precious differences, appears remarkably similar everywhere in its language and its motivation. Those cultural diversities which can stand the free wind of knowledge, of contact and interaction, will benefit by the change which the limitation of national sovereignty must bring. It is obviously true that many aspects of European traditional culture will change with the diminution of the role and importance of the national States. But many aspects have already changed through fascism, national-socialism, chauvinism - in Eastern Europe through Communism - and often with the result of awful mutilation, impoverishment and degradation. Culture will also change spontaneously through the pressures of mass society which in Europe we call often "americanisation" and it will change regardless of the politics which we adopt.[1] There is therefore no part of our cultural heritage immune to change. We cannot guarantee that a European Federal Community will mean no significant change for the diverses national cultural traditions. These traditions are themselves the product of many worldwide influences and cross developments and they will have to change even more if they shall not become some pieces of petrified folklore. Let us be aware that a culture which through jealous overprotection of its specific tradition turns into folklore, becomes an exhibit in a show case, a tourist attraction, since this is not a way for a singular culture to live, but to die.

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[1] An example for a positive appraisal of this change may be found in the special issue of "Chronique Sociale": "L'Europe des personnes et des peuples", the protocoll of a Colloquium in Strasburg 1962, for instance in the lecture of Prof. Jean Rivero: "L'Europe et les Nations" from which I quote: "..L'uniformisation doit aller plus avant dans le concret; et il nous faut dénoncer ici la tentation de ce que j'appellerais l'Europe folklorique; il est des formes de particularisme, - les plus voyantes peut-être -, qui ne sont en définitive que le résultat de l'inégalité des niveaux de vie; le pittoresque sicilien peut charmer le touriste plus que le confort banal de l'Europe nordique: si l'élévation des niveaux de vie tend a remplacer les haillons du lazzarone par le complet veston standard, tant pis pour le pittoresque! Aligner les sous-alimentés sur les peuples riches en calories, les îlots insalubres sur les cités modernes, les villages où l'isolement perpétue les formes de vie médiévale, sur les villages intégrés au présent, c'est uniformiser l'Europe; mais cette uniformisation-là, qui fait reculer la misère et l'analphabétisme, qui sert la personne, qui donc oserait la déplorer? La diversité des génies européens serait una bien pauvre chose si elle ne pouvait survivre au relèvement des niveaux de vie et si elle résidait seoulement dans les coiffes, les cornemuses, les mantilles."

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THE EUROPEAN AND THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE FUTURE

Address by

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October 23-26, 1963

The breakdown of the Brussels talks and above all the manner in which they have broken down - not because technical solutions could not be found to economic problems, but because a political veto was interposed by the President of France - these events have perhaps more than anything else highlighted the ambivalence, indeed the diverging ultimate objectives of the move towards European unity since the second world war. The different strands which have run through this European Movement, which have together contributed to its - let us admit it - astonishing success, and which, having reached a parting of the ways, are now opposed in deadlock. Three strands above all must be distinguished: Firstly the conception of a world system of order, or world government; secondly the notion of an Atlantic partnership, between America and Europe; and thirdly the concept of Europe as a new independent third force in the world.

Let us begin with the first of these strands of thought. At the end of the second world war progressive opinion all over the world looked for a new world order, for the abolition of force as a method of diplomacy, the abatement of national sovereignty and for international law worthy of the name 'law' pronounced and sanctioned by a world authority. Measured by these hopes the United Nations, for all its value, proved a sad disappointment, and by 1947 it was clear that more intensive co-operation would be possible only on a less extensive front: a tighter bond could be forced only between a smaller number of nations. Failing progress on a world scale, the federalists in Europe in particular felt that it was their responsibility to set an example, to embark on a pilot project for wider institutions.

Some of them began this task with the same misconceptions, the same false hopes with which the world federalists had been cursed: the illusion that by creating common institutions you could somehow permanently paper over real clashes of interest and real divergences of outlook. Calling as they did for a United States of Europe to be set up more or less at one stroke, they, just like the world federalists, were in for speedy disillusion. Federalism had its virtues in the eighteenth century and there may be parts of the world for which it's eminently suitable even today. But the people who have built the new Europe - even though some of them have called themselves federalists - have in fact tackled the problem in a totally different way.

These new 'Europeans' are being far more practical, far more empirical, far more gradualist in their approach. They recognize the reality of the nation state and they don't believe that common institutions set up in a vacuum could somehow create a common interest: they believe that common institutions must be developed concurrently with common interests and must interact with them, intensify them and thereby make further common institutions both necessary and practicable. So they used a pragmatic functional technique, exploiting particular tactical situations in order to set up new institutions which have helped solve other problems but have also in their turn themselves raised new problems which could be resolved only by further snowball progress along this same road.

The process of European integration has in fact taken the form of a dialectic, of thesis and antithesis that could only be reconciled by a new imaginative step forward onto a higher level of integration each time. It started from the bottom upwards with the problem of the Ruhr. The Allies after the second world war were determined that Germany must never regain control of her coal and steel resources. But one could not discriminate against any one country forever; any attempt to do that would breed precisely the sort of resentment, precisely the sort of new explosion which it was designed to prevent. And to this antithesis was only one synthesis: that other nations should abdicate the same measure of control over their coal and steel resources which they intended the Germans never to regain. This precisely was the achievement of the Schuman Plan.

The institution of the Coal and Steel Community really had two main effects. The only territorial dispute between France and Germany at the conclusion of the second world war was over the Saar - a territory that only mattered because of the coal and steel it produces. Once coal and steel were pooled anyway between France, Germany and other Community partners, this bitter dispute suddenly became not so much solved as dissolved: the shift in the whole context of Franco-German relations made the quarrel over coal and steel meaningless, and so the path lay open for further agreement between these two historical enemies.

The other effect of the Coal and Steel Community consisted not in the problems which the Community solved, but in the new problems which it raised--consisted in fact in the planned anomaly of this partial economic integration itself. How could there be a common policy for coal when there wasn't one for oil or for natural gas, or for atomic energy, when there was no harmonisation of transport and no harmonisation of labour policy? And if transport rates and labour policy are harmonised for coal and for steel, how can the rest of transport and labour policy continue to diverge? Again it was progress by a dialectical process; and from partial integration the Six went forward to their general Economic Community.

At this point one must look for a moment at the institutional technique of this Community method integration. It has, I think, three outstanding features.

Firstly, each Treaty setting up one of the three existing communities - Coal and Steel, Euratom and the EEC - each Treaty contains a rigid backbone of precise commitments - in the case of EEC a detailed twelve year plan agreed in advance, signed, sealed and delivered come what may. (It's laid down for example that the common external tariff for dead poultry and edible offals thereof (except liver) fresh, chilled, or frozen, will, as from the 1st January 1970, be 18 per cent.)

But then, joined to this rigid backbone of precise commitments there are what I'd like to call the muscles: agreements, not matters of substance, but simply agreements - to-agree, agreements - to-agree on common policies hereafter by certain procedures and by certain deadlines. If all the problems that might be encountered in circumstances as yet unforeseen had been debated in the detailed way attempted in the recent Brussels negotiations, - if they had been debated before the Rome Treaty was signed, the drafting for it would still be going on today. As it is the agreed backbone of precise obligations does two things. On the one side it forces the pace for further mutual commitments as time goes on, it steps up the need to agree on joint policies. On the other hand it also facilitates such further agreements through the sheer passage of time, through consolidating mutual confidence between the countries working together within the Community, and through increasing the congruence of their substantial interests.

Then, thirdly, the Treaty sets up Community institutions independent of the member governments. It's they who propose the policies, it's they who act, if I may continue the metaphor, as the brain which directs the muscles within the limits set by the skeleton Treaty. Such Community policies can and must be framed, not to reconcile the different national policies (which are designed to solve partial problems or even to deflect them on to the next country) but to deal with the problem itself as it presents itself at Community level and deal with it from a Community point of view, in the interests of all the Community's citizens regardless of their nationality. But the final decisions on these major policies are not taken by the Commission of the Community itself, but by the national governments in the Council of Ministers.

In this Council, at the beginning, any one Government could veto the Commission's proposals. But as time goes on votes on a vast range of subjects need not be taken unanimously any more: a qualified majority is sufficient, so that it takes at least two governments (not counting Luxembourg) to veto a proposal, and even all three Benelux states can be over-ruled. The date from which a qualified majority of Governments is sufficient to decide on the Commission's proposals varies with the field of action concerned: on cartels it was January 1961, on foreign trade it will be 1966, on a whole range of other matters, 1970. The Treaty thus commits the Governments not simply to a scale, but to an escalator of supranationality. Here again this is not a federal structure but a Community system sui generis, in which the Community organs propose but the national governments dispose according to voting rules drawn up with a time dimension, rules that progressively limit the veto power of any one State alone.

So far then, I've tried to make two main points on the Community technique. First that the Community method of integration with its permanent dialogue between national governments and Community organs is quite different in its constitutional ideas and objective from the notion of federation; and secondly, that, in its method, so far from setting up once and for all a definitive constitution of any kind, the Community technique has shown and is still showing a continuing dynamic of its own, and has advanced in intensity over the past and for that matter - in spite of any temporary lull before us - looks like advancing further in the future by a dialectical process. Now thirdly, let us ask how far this Community technique differs from federalism not only in tending to increase in intensity with time, but also in its capacity - or even its tendency - to expand in extension in space.

As we have said there were even in the forties important divergences on this question of extension within the European movement, and indeed it is to a dramatic resurgence of them that we owe the present crisis. The United States of America was welcomed as an ally by most of those who sought to unite Europe; but they were far from united on the policy which Europe should pursue toward America once it was united. Some advocated political unity as a means toward a more equal partnership with America in a strong Atlantic alliance; others wanted a United Europe to play a more independent part in the world as a kind of "third force".

There was a similar ambiguity in the economic aims. Economic unity was advocated as a means of redressing the balance of dollar payments. But for some the first objective was to form a regional block embracing only Europe and the colonies or former colonies associated with it overseas; while others saw the discriminatory removal of tariff barriers as a purely temporary move, to strengthen the economies of Europe and to pave the way for full convertibility of currencies and to free trade for the whole world.

The Rome Treaty, setting up the European Economic Community, is itself an economic document and is understandably enough silent on these questions of ultimate purpose; though the common external tariff which the Community is now proposing to apply does represent a certain lowering of Europe's trade barriers towards the world at large. Now as it happens, the Community dialectic looks as if it is already beginning to operate outwards from Europe, involving wider circles of the rest of the world in the process of recognizing common responsibilities that can be met only by joint action. Britain's application - and it's noteworthy that one can say this regardless of its present failure - Britain's application seems already to have triggered off irreversable political processes. The Brussels negotiation began as an attempt to fit Britain into the European Community, but thanks to our overseas connections it very quickly turned into a consideration of how to fit the European Community into the structure of the world economy.

In discussing Commonwealth food exports, in discussing the import of Asian manufactures, in discussing the position of sterling, Britain and the Community had their noses rubbed in far more general problems: dilemmas which, though they may present themselves in bilateral guise can be dissolved only if they are treated in global terms; difficulties which, though they may have been posed today in static terms, are capable of solution only if they are extrapolated into a rapidly evolving dynamic world framework. And from this antithesis between intra-Commonwealth preferential arrangements and extra-Community non-discrimination there could be only one logical way out: to submerge Britain's preferential demands for trade and commodity guarantees into world-wide solutions to world-wide trade and commodity problems.

Now one might say - all the agreements that were reached in Brussels are provisional, or rather they are conditional on Britain's entering the European Community. So, formally, they are. And now that that old opponent of the European Community, President de Gaulle, is attempting to usurp it and bend it to his own purposes, to make it a 'massede manoeuvre' untrammelled by links with what he calls the Anglo-Saxons and a third force in the world, now that he is claiming that same right to a foreign policy independent of the Community which we always claimed and is using the national veto still allowed in the Rome Treaty on the admission of new members--surely, one might say, the whole exercise of applying to join has been in vain. Aren't we right back where we started from?

Certainly not. And that not simply because, in this country, after a decade of never having had it so good we've suddenly acquired a new super-ego, an image of ourselves as "outward-looking" which might help us shortly to become that; but also because, on the continent too, there is no turning the clock back. The British application has served as a catalyst - and five of the Six are now coming to realize that you cannot apply the Community spirit inside one half of Western Europe and still continue to bargain in the old balance of power terms with the rest of the Western world. We must hope that the divergence of attitude between France and the rest uncovered by the British application, will not impede the economic progress of the Six; for we need a strong and united Europe to stand alongside the Anglo-Saxons in the world tasks to which we are beginning to turn. That means I am sure that we are right, for example, not to try to build a London - Rome entente to counter the Paris-Bonn axis.

But what we can do is this: President de Gaulle says we are not mature enough for the Community. Surely we can show ourselves far more ready to adopt a Community approach than he. The Political Union planned by the Six cannot be realized while President de Gaulle maintains his present stand. But is it too fanciful to suggest that we should propose a similar or even more far-reaching consultation on foreign affairs and co-operation in culture and education with any European countries willing to take part? Can we not, after our expiatory experience of knocking at the door and being turned away, can we not take up the Community method ourselves and see for example if it can be applied in Europe also to conventional defence. Could we not also think through the implications of the Community approach to the control of a Western deterrent? And even if we don't join EEC, why not proceed with the world commodity agreements, with industrial free trade, with the re-organization of world payments arrangements and with a real world plan for economic development, along Community lines?

There is no space here to elaborate such notions in detail, and in a sense it would be self-contradictory when advocating a Community approach also to define the exact stages to be gone through or the precise shape of the final solution--indeed perhaps even to believe that there could be anything like a "final solution" in our lifetime. The whole point of the Community approach is its flexible step-by-step character; and as Dag Hammarskjold once said, "Working at the edge of the

development of human society is to work on the brink of the unknown". But what is clear is that the functional attack on all these problems--just like the Economic Community in Europe - will have political implications, this time on a far wider scale. Commodity arrangements and world development plans will require institutions to group together the interested industrial and developing countries on a basis of equality: and the more such important problems are dealt with by Community-type institutions, the more urgent will their democratic supervision become. We can thus see the existing Community institutions with their links to associated Africa, can see Commonwealth institutions and other existing regional bodies re-constituted along Community lines, and see even revamped organs of the United Nations all form a network of overlapping circles, untidy perhaps, but with an untidiness that reflects the functional character of each body, tailored in composition and structure precisely to fulfill a particular concrete task.

Here it seems to me lies the answer to President de Gaulle's trend of thinking, which tries to pervert the functional Economic Community and solidify a continental regional bloc. Of course he may well (as some people think) have a far-sighted political strategy in mind: the conception of a Europe some day stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, in which Soviet Russia would take her place in meeting the threat from Red China that de Gaulle - and perhaps now Khruschev - see as a threat to Eastern and Western Europe alike. Such a conception of Europe as a Third Force between the United States and Communist China may well pre-suppose the exclusion of the Anglo-Saxons from the continental unit. But the real problem isn't even whether, in the short run, one-half of Western Europe has the resources to pass through the intermediate phase of only loose links to the Anglo-Saxon world; the real problem is what sort of a partnership it could be, between Russia on the one hand, and France, Germany and their allies on the other; and even thereafter in the long run, whether the ultimate problem of Communist China can really be best approached through building a third larger European bloc. Surely, if we want to speculate that far ahead, the Soviet Union will find it far easier to work with non-Communist countries gradually on a functional basis in different wider organizations in which common interests are involved than in joining a European regional unit? And in the last resort surely it will be easier to work with Communist China on a similar functional basis organized on a world scale? Not the least object of this whole construction of interlocking frameworks is, after all, precisely to soften the crystallization of the world into sharply defined power blocs.

Perhaps we don't quite yet have to look that far ahead--though it is always worth leaving open the way for one's next move but one. But what is immediately relevant to our situation is this: we may not be able to join the Common Market, but that doesn't exhaust its challenge to our political creativity. The point of the Community is not that it's built a new block of its own in the old balance-of-power game (and that we're now excluded), but that it pioneered a new approach designed to transcend power politics as such. What matters is not so much its regional, as its functional character, not the unit it's built, but the process it has set rolling. This process must not be hemmed in and confined to one half of Western Europe, nor must it exhaust itself in a purely Atlantic framework.

The Community dialectic has never worked by historic inevitability but has at each stage required hard effort of intellectual planning and of political will. It could be our greatest task today to work with all those--and there are thousands of them wielding government responsibility in Western Europe today - who reject the formation of a new larger sovereign continental-unit, and who work on the contrary - and far more corrosively-- for the dissolution of uniquely independent sovereign units to supplant them by functionally orientated, democratically controlled and geographically interlocking institutions as the basis - indeed in large measure also the form -- of a higher, more civilized, more humanely responsible world order.

National Conference 9/6

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REFLECTIONS OF CHANGE IN LITERATURE

Address by

Colin MacInnes
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Chicago, Illinois

October 23-26, 1963

This year, ladies and gentlemen, a sinister event occurred to me: I became 49 years old. Now, to be fifty is really rather splendid: dignified, one may hope, assured - a junior elder statesman of the literary scene. Or to be 48 has also a kind of decaying glamour: one may no longer be young, but at least one is not half a century old. But 49...well, 49 is a kind of limbo in which one must both look back upon a vanished youth, and forward to approaching maturity (or maybe senility), without being able to feel that one really belongs to either of these two human conditions.

Yet perhaps an advantage of this peculiar age, for a writer, is that at it one may survey in retrospect the literary scene that one remembers, and speculate on that which is to be. And this, ladies and gentlemen, is what I shall try to do this morning: to tell you, that is, of the changes I have witnessed in English literary life, and to try to define the future courses it may take. I hope you will excuse me if I deal almost exclusively with England for, despite my intense admiration for many Continental European and American writers (and indeed those of Africa and Asia too), this is the world of writing I know best.

Now, from one point of view the status of the writer in my country is a favoured one - or may seem to be so. Publishers are eager to enlist new authors and will consider seriously almost any typescript about almost any theme whatever. Magazines and newspapers press you to write for them, and radio and television producers frequently call you on the telephone. It is by no means impossible for many an English writer to live exclusively by his pen by writing simply what he wants to, and this even applies to not a few writers who are very young indeed. In our country, for example, Miss Shelagh Delaney has seen her first play, written when she was 19, produced in London, on Broadway and elsewhere, and a film made out of it by John Osborne's company. Two of Mr. Allan Sillitoe's novels - which did well in themselves - have reached the cinema. Miss Muriel Spark has risen like a rocket, in but a few years, as she thoroughly deserves to by the macabrely scintillating quality of her novels. Even writers from our former colonies and dominions, as Mordecai Richler from Canada, or Dan Jacobson from the Union of South Africa, or Vidia Naipaul from Trinidad, or Chinua Achebe from Nigeria, have won recognition, and relative affluence, with considerable rapidity.

Also, by the community, our writers have been much honoured. Neither Bernard Shaw, nor Wells, nor Rudyard Kipling received official honours from the State - not, perhaps, because these were not offered, but because they felt, in those days, that to be Mr. Shaw or Mr. Wells or Mr. Rudyard Kipling was an honour to which little could be added. But today, a majority of our more established writers are publicly garlanded. Mr. T. S. Eliot holds the Order of Merit, one of our highest distinctions, Mr. E. M. Forster is a Companion of Honour, Dr. Edith Sitwell is a Dame and C B Es and O B Es (please, ladies and gentlemen, excuse me from explaining these esoteric English honorific abbreviations) - these abound among literary figures. Even our Queen, as you may have heard, holds informal luncheons to which are invited not just the high officials of State, but artists also. And thanks to television, figures like Mr. Somerset Maugham, or Mr. John Betjeman, or Dame Edith Sitwell herself, would be recognized in any English pub or bus (supposing, that is, that they ventured into such places).

Then what is missing? Why, in conditions so advantageous, do writers feel a certain malaise about their situation, their relevance, even their use? Chiefly, I believe, because writers are regarded as entertainers, as 'personalities', more than as disturbing, original creators. Now in one sense it is true that writers are entertainers: both in the immediate sense that Shakespeare was, when he was an actor-manager, or Dickens when he gave his public readings, and also in the deeper sense that a book, however serious in intent, must grip the reader's erring interest and thus, to this extent, 'entertain'. Yet surely, ladies and gentlemen, the chief purpose of a writer is, or ought to be, to bear witness to his times, to reveal the inner nature of their society to his fellow creatures and then, in however

modest a way, try to alter and improve what he may find defective in this situation. In this task, at present, I cannot say I feel we writers in England are very successful.

Before I try to explain what I believe to be the social and political and artistic reasons for this relative failure, may I first refer to material changes which, in the past two decades, have greatly altered the writer's activity and even his very nature. For the kind of work a writer does, ladies and gentlemen, is determined as much by the material conditions in which he operates, as by his inner thought and deeper artistic purpose. Shakespeare, for instance, apart from his sonnets and long poems, created in function of the theatre as he knew it - in function, I mean, of an actual building, the Globe Theatre. Ballad singers stopped writing ballads (or wrote far less of them) when printing and literacy made direct speech less indispensable. The art of Charles Dickens was greatly influenced by the necessity of his stories' appearing, serialized, in current periodicals.

Now, if I look at the first contract I signed for the first book I wrote - back in the 1940's - I am astonished, today, by its simplicity. What my publishers were trying to put on the market - and what I myself was trying to write - was a novel to be published between hard covers and sold in the bookstores directly to the public. But by 1963, the scene has altered. The original hard-cover book has become, so to speak, the raw material out of which dozens of other 'rights' may very well emerge. A current contract, for example, envisages the rights that may derive from radio, television, theatre, films, and overseas and paperback editions, to name but these. And as any publisher will tell you, unless he had some hope of some, at least, of these rights being taken up, he could never afford to produce the hard-cover novel in the first place.

Well - splendid! Why shouldn't the writer - and the publisher - who have taken the risks together, have hopes of these additional benefits arising from their joint endeavour? No reason at all...except that there will be a severe temptation to the writer to produce not the book he really should - I mean some true expression of his vision of society - as a volume that can most easily be transformed into one or another of the subsidiary media I have mentioned. And what is insidious is that this process may become almost unconscious. That is to say that even an honest artist may, without willing it, write the 'book of the film' before the film is made, rather than write, as he should, the book itself. And this is the more so when one reflects that in England - and I have no doubt here in the U.S. as well - the film rights of a book may easily be ten or twenty times in value what the writer may hope to earn from a simple hard-cover publication.

Of course, temptations are made to be resisted, and the devil has always found ways of deceiving writers - as all human creatures - long before films or television were invented. It is also true that some of these subsidiary media can be immensely beneficial, artistically, to the writer - for example the paperback re-edition enables him to reach a wider public that would never buy the original hard-cover edition at all. All the same, there does remain a danger. For there cannot be many writers who, today, in the silence of their work-room, have not suddenly had visions of film cameras and stage musicals for which their supposedly autonomous work of art would be no more than the convenient raw material.

To digress a moment (since all English writers love talking about money, rather than about writing - thereby differing, I am quite sure, from writers in the U.S. and elsewhere) - to digress, I do think, so far as money goes, that the best condition for a writer is not to have too little or too much. Too little means worry and wasting mental energy that ought to go into the work. Too much leads to vanity, and often ends by divorcing the artist from worlds of experience that provided, when he was poorer, his best raw material. The trouble, today, I think, is that writing is either too little rewarded or too well. I, for example (you will excuse my speaking of myself, since mine is the case, after all, I know best - and which certainly

This year, ladies and gentlemen, a sinister event occurred to me: I became 49 years old. Now, to be fifty is really rather splendid: dignified, one may hope, assured - a junior elder statesman of the literary scene. Or to be 48 has also a kind of decaying glamour: one may no longer be young, but at least one is not half a century old. But 49...well, 49 is a kind of limbo in which one must both look back upon a vanished youth, and forward to approaching maturity (or maybe senility), without being able to feel that one really belongs to either of these two human conditions.

Yet perhaps an advantage of this peculiar age, for a writer, is that at it one may survey in retrospect the literary scene that one remembers, and speculate on that which is to be. And this, ladies and gentlemen, is what I shall try to do this morning: to tell you, that is, of the changes I have witnessed in English literary life, and to try to define the future courses it may take. I hope you will excuse me if I deal almost exclusively with England for, despite my intense admiration for many Continental European and American writers (and indeed those of Africa and Asia too), this is the world of writing I know best.

Now, from one point of view the status of the writer in my country is a favoured one - or may seem to be so. Publishers are eager to enlist new authors and will consider seriously almost any typescript about almost any theme whatever. Magazines and newspapers press you to write for them, and radio and television producers frequently call you on the telephone. It is by no means impossible for many an English writer to live exclusively by his pen by writing simply what he wants to, and this even applies to not a few writers who are very young indeed. In our country, for example, Miss Shelagh Delaney has seen her first play, written when she was 19, produced in London, on Broadway and elsewhere, and a film made out of it by John Osborne's company. Two of Mr. Allan Sillitoe's novels - which did well in themselves - have reached the cinema. Miss Muriel Spark has risen like a rocket, in but a few years, as she thoroughly deserves to by the macabrely scintillating quality of her novels. Even writers from our former colonies and dominions, as Mordecai Richler from Canada, or Dan Jacobson from the Union of South Africa, or Vidia Naipaul from Trinidad, or Chinua Achebe from Nigeria, have won recognition, and relative affluence, with considerable rapidity.

Also, by the community, our writers have been much honoured. Neither Bernard Shaw, nor Wells, nor Rudyard Kipling received official honours from the State - not, perhaps, because these were not offered, but because they felt, in those days, that to be Mr. Shaw or Mr. Wells or Mr. Rudyard Kipling was an honour to which little could be added. But today, a majority of our more established writers are publicly garlanded. Mr. T. S. Eliot holds the Order of Merit, one of our highest distinctions, Mr. E. M. Forster is a Companion of Honour, Dr. Edith Sitwell is a Dame and C B Es and O B Es (please, ladies and gentlemen, excuse me from explaining these esoteric English honorific abbreviations) - these abound among literary figures. Even our Queen, as you may have heard, holds informal luncheons to which are invited not just the high officials of State, but artists also. And thanks to television, figures like Mr. Somerset Maugham, or Mr. John Betjeman, or Dame Edith Sitwell herself, would be recognized in any English pub or bus (supposing, that is, that they ventured into such places).

Then what is missing? Why, in conditions so advantageous, do writers feel a certain malaise about their situation, their relevance, even their use? Chiefly, I believe, because writers are regarded as entertainers, as 'personalities', more than as disturbing, original creators. Now in one sense it is true that writers are entertainers: both in the immediate sense that Shakespeare was, when he was an actor-manager, or Dickens when he gave his public readings, and also in the deeper sense that a book, however serious in intent, must grip the reader's erring interest and thus, to this extent, 'entertain'. Yet surely, ladies and gentlemen, the chief purpose of a writer is, or ought to be, to bear witness to his times, to reveal the inner nature of their society to his fellow creatures and then, in however

modest a way, try to alter and improve what he may find defective in this situation. In this task, at present, I cannot say I feel we writers in England are very successful.

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interests me the most)...I then, for what I consider to be my best novel, had, in 1952, a global sale of 1,200 copies and only two reviews in the entire world press. On my fourth, which I am far from considering the best, I did very well - in fact I think too well, far better than it deserved.

It is because of this - and because a writer's early good work is often neglected in favour of later work that is less good - that I greatly envy the conditions in the U.S. whereby writers are awarded grants and scholarships by universities or foundations. It is true that in England there are a few literary prizes - but very few, and amounting in value only to a few hundred pounds. (There is also a mysterious fund called the Queen's Purse - doubtless founded in the days of William the Conqueror - which I once managed to raid on behalf of an indigent poet of my acquaintance. But that is about all. Now, whenever I meet an American colleague touring in Europe - for that matter in America - it always seems to be at the expense of some splendid Foundation or other; or else he is spending a few months of the year at some university, teaching Creative Writing (whatever that may mean). But in England, they do us the honour of making us earn every penny of our livings. Well, that is flattering in a way, since we are clearly treated as professionals who can look after themselves; but all the same, when I see the vast sums lavished by our State on English ballet, or theatre, or music, or on painting, I do feel a little jealous of these fellow-artists. For though, as I have said, it is possible to earn a living as a writer, one may often find that the reputation a particular writer enjoys is by no means reflected in his standard of living - and in those, even more, of his poor wife and children.

But to search for the profounder causes of the changes in our literary scene, one must look deeper than mere matters of money: for artists, who are tough because they have to be, have a way of surviving against the worst adversities. Now in England, in the past 20 years, it is not only the literary scene that has altered profoundly, but the whole of English life itself. I suppose one could fairly say that the chief problem of America during the same period has been the assumption of world power within a single generation, whereas the rise of England a century ago took almost as long as that to be completed. Well, in the same brief period we, in England, have seen an equivalent contraction of our global influence. Even in my own lifetime, the change has been prodigious. When I was born, England, though already in decline, ruled a fifth of the globe and, despite atrocious living conditions for a majority of the population - both at home and in colonial territories - we were still a major economic power. But since World War II, the shrinkage, both economic and political, has been as rapid as decisive.

But at the same time, in a quite different sense, there has been an increase of actual well-being. It is true that we, like you and everybody on this earth - even the Chinese, though they do not seem to realize it yet - are all menaced by the Bomb. But apart from this (if one can ever say 'apart from this' when thinking of this constant danger) the conditions of life in England have certainly improved so far as the comfort and happiness of its people are concerned. I can well remember the 1930s when we had 3-1/2 million unemployed (about a sixth of the total labor force) and the London streets, at night, were scenes of Dickensian misery and despair. I can remember when hospitals were places of fear and not, as they are now, of reassurance. I can recall when, for the working-classes, who are still the immense majority of our population, the achievement of material prosperity was no more than a dream. All this has altered for the better. And although class divisions in my country are still powerful - largely, I believe, because we have a monarchy, which sets the tone of social stratification - among younger generations these are rapidly breaking down. Educational opportunity, though still inadequate, is far greater. Health is better. Sexual life is less guilt-ridden and more healthily adjusted.

Thus it is that one can, of the past two decades in my country, speak of the Decline and Rise of the English people. But these two tendencies have involved

enormous psychological readjustment in the nation. On the one hand, there is certainly an immense nostalgia - and I think a rather sterile one - for past imperial greatness; and as the wide support the government had at the time of Suez demonstrated, this hankering for old glories was general to all classes: I mean, it is not, as is often supposed, merely the former governing classes who lament their empire. Then, on the other hand, there is the decline of the influence and relative affluence of the literate middle classes, and the rise to economic - if not yet political - power of the working-class majority. All, these have meant that Englishmen and women, in the past twenty years, have never quite been sure what, so to speak, they actually are. We all know we are changing, but find it hard to assess the true nature of the change.

Now, it is true that societies are always in a state of flux - that beneath apparently immobile stablity, alterations in the social pattern are constantly occurring. The 18th century, for instance, which to all of us both in the Americas and England may now, in retrospect, seem a period of calm, was in fact one of profoundest social and political upheaval. There was the American Revolution, to begin with, not to mention the French, and the beginnings, in England, of that Industrial Revolution that was to spread over the entire globe. Yet even so, I do think the speed of social change in the past two decades had accelerated enormously. And from the point of view of writing, this is a situation which suits some writers, and inhibits others.

For if we think of great writers of the past, I think we are bound to see that conditions of relative social stability - or, at any rate, the appearance of it - did help their art. One can hardly, for instance, imagine Janes Austen writing her rural moral idylls in the conditions of 1963. Dickens, though he was writing of a society that was in a state of violent motion, could at all events treat of a social order that was gathering momentum rather than, as at present, contracting in it. Proust analysed a decadent society also in a state of flux, but it was a flux from an earlier position of 19th century bourgeois stability. As recently as this century we can see Kipling, for example, preaching his gospel on the assumption, shared with all his readers, that despite change, certain moral and social values were immutable. But in conditions like the present, the kind of writer whose temperment best leads him to analyse a more or less identifiable social order - I mean identifiable to his readers as much as to the writer - is at a considerable disadvantage: which has the consequence that writers of this kind - as in England Mr. Anthony Powell or Miss Ivy Compton-Burnett - tend to describe a social order which has largely ceased to exist or, at any rate, ceased to be relevant and meaningful to what is happening outside small, closed areas of social life that have been left behind, so to speak, by the tide of general change.

But of course, there also always have existed writers who delighted in describing social change; and writers, too, of an imaginative stamp whose artistic preoccupations were not chiefly with the momentary social order, but with mankind seen in his relation to eternity. In the latter group I think of Melville, who could perhaps have written in any epoch - he would surely, for instance, been quite at home among the ancient Greeks; and in the former category - of those who delight in social flux - I think of D. H. Lawrence who not only approved of change, but sought by his writings to accelerate its motion. And for such recorders of chaotic change, or for such imaginative visionaries, one would have expected the past twenty years to be a very fruitful period indeed.

Well, all I can say is that these opportunities, in our country, have not been seized by very many writers. Of imaginative seers, I think of Mr. William Golding, yet do not believe that he, or any other visionary English writer, can be compared in quality to Nathaniel West. Of the chroniclers of social change - poetic chroniclers, I mean, and not merely documentary - I think, say, of Miss Muriel Spark...yet cannot find that in this sphere of writing we have any voices as powerful as those of James Baldwin or of Norman Mailer. So that if we are to imagine someone a century

from now wishing to discover what English life was in the forties, fifties and sixties, I don't think this hypothetical enquirer would get much help from the current English novel.

Why is this so? I really do not know the answer, and it may perhaps, ladies and gentlemen, be one of the purposes of a Conference like this one, for us all to try to discover in what ways current writing has, or has not, revealed our times to us, and in what ways it still could. And at this point, I might venture to suggest that part of the failure lies not just with writers, but with their multitudinous readers. Readers today, I think, are lazier than they used to be: anxious for the latest volume that will 'give all the answers', but not so ready to tackle the harder kind of book that asks some of the right questions. I regard, for example, Nathaniel West as one of the most visionary American writers of our century; yet it has indeed taken very long for his work to be appreciated, and even now one could scarcely speak of him as a much-loved writer in your country. Or if, in England, I think of my own contemporaries, I remember how the most penetrating analysis of colonial decay I know of - surely a topic very relevant to English thinking - which appeared in the novels of V S Naipaul from Trinidad, did not become acceptable until after the achievement of Trinidadian independence. Writing, ladies and gentlemen, is a two-way performance: we may sing and dance as best we can, and even try to make our song authentic and revealing. But if you will not hearken - or if you prefer singers and dancers whose only intention is to flatter you - then there has been a failure of communication and a mutual loss.

You will perhaps have heard that our theatre is far more vital than it used to be twenty years ago, and in England I would say that more light has been thrown on our society by the dramatists than by the novelists - perhaps for this very reason that the theatre, even today, is a demanding place - or can be - so that a message of some significance may be delivered in it which the larger public for novels will no longer accept in the fictional medium. Thus, if one is thinking in terms of poetic social realism, I do not think many novelists can equal in quality the dramatic portrait that the playwright Bernard Kops has painted of the relation between Jew and Gentile in the changing London scene. Or if it is intuitive, imaginative apprehension of our spiritual dilemmas we are seeking for, I can think of few books to equal in poetic intensity the plays of Mr. Harold Pinter. And myself, although a novelist, I rejoice in this shift of emphasis from the bookstall to the theatre. For though English literature is often thought as being chiefly glorified by its great novelists, we may remember that its true origins were in the drama, from the religious moralities of the middle ages to the great Elizabethan and Jacobean periods and their aftermath.

Perhaps, at this point, our two themes - that is, the material and the spiritual factors that encourage, or inhibit, the best kinds of writing, may be seen now to coalesce. We have technical innovations that endanger the seriousness - if I may use so old-fashioned a term - both of writer and of reader. We have a swift change in social scene that both bewilders reader and writer, and engenders in both a reluctance to study, or to create, works of art that truthfully reflect this social confusion. Much, then, is against good art being created in our day. But as soon as I say this, I reflect that much has always been against great art in any era. Socrates died by hemlock in the world's most illustrious democracy; Voltaire was banished by its greatest modern artistocracy; the prophetic tones of Rimbaud were not heard in the rich capitalist bourgeoisie than later ensued. In Europe today, and I believe also in America, it is still not easy for a lone, penetrating voice to make itself heard, and this despite the apparent growth of interest in the arts, and the vast proliferation of new artistic media. Perhaps the struggle to tell the truth - the writer's task - and to see this truth, if it be true - the reader's - in an eternal struggle.

So if I may venture, ladies and gentlemen, to leave a final thought with this Conference, it would above all consist in an appeal to every reader to be as individual, and as personal, and even as bold, as I think the writer also ought to be. The world is full of pundits, and we would do better to hearken our own inner judgment, and form

our own opinions. A mass readership may often be wrong, but a mass of thinking individuals will more usually be right. This leads me to my second thought, which is to beg readers to be patient of new writers who may seem to them, initially, 'difficult': either hard to assimilate by the strangeness of their theme, or by the style in which it is expressed. All creation, so Picasso has said, is ugly - and there is much truth in the idea that birth is accompanied by pain and, with its glory, ugliness. My last thought of all - and one I believe to be appropriate to an international gathering of this kind - is that we should say goodbye forever to artistic nationalism. I myself, for instance, have been as much influenced by French and American writers (and even by African) as I have by English, and I see nothing astonishing in this since art, though rooted initially in time and place, is also timeless and universal. And this is especially so when one thinks of American and of English writing: for out of the very differences in our shared language, I think we can both learn something. Language, in one country alone, has always a tendency to ossify, to become conventional and thus less expressive. But today one may say that there are at least six 'English' languages - English English, American English, Caribbean English, African English, Indian English and what I might call International English used for politics, commerce and social intercourse all over the globe. And with the possible exception of the last, all the five others are true languages, not dialects, that borrow from one another and cross-fertilise each other. And speaking now as a Briton, I would say I believe that the unique fact for which my people will be remembered by forgetful time, is not for our past commercial or imperial glory, but for this magical invention, by only a few million people, some five hundred years ago, of a flexible, poetic, vivid speech which seems to have the inner gift - the same gift that writing also ought to have - of constant and effective self-renewal.

7

National Conference 9/7

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

United States National Commission for UNESCO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY

Address by

Alexander King
Director for Scientific Affairs
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development

Chicago, Illinois

October 23-26, 1963

The concept of science policy is relatively new for the simple reason that until quite recently there was no need for it. Scientific discovery was a matter for the few research scientists, mainly working within the universities, who, possessing a strong sense of vocation, were free to follow the line of their own genius. Such a situation made no great demands on society or the economy. Research scientists, like other academic people, were supported from the normal endowments and grants of the university augmented to some extent by foundations or the cultural funds of Governments. Their discoveries, interesting and exciting in the extension of knowledge, had no apparent or major importance in the daily life of people generally. Industry indeed began to find the work of research chemists, metallurgists, and finally physicists of some value and although classical economists paid little attention to science, or indeed to technological innovation which was usually regarded as springing from the interaction of economic forces, nevertheless by the outbreak of the second World War great industries had arisen on the basis of new scientific knowledge and the whole pattern of industry and trade was changing rapidly.

At this stage, application of research to the economy was mainly due to the engineer and to the vision of the entrepreneur; the scientist himself (with exceptions of course) was aloof from the exploitation of his results, although rather proud of it nevertheless. By 1939, however, the practical uses of the natural sciences were becoming more clearly obvious to industrialists (although not yet to politicians or civil servants) and a change in the nature and conditions of scientific work had set in.

Since the second World War, this change has become massive and indeed explosive, yet it is only now that the institutions of science are being seriously reshaped to the needs of a new, frightening, technological world of boundless promise and challenge to the human spirit which has already profoundly changed our whole way of life. There is, then, general recognition of the importance of science to our society, both as a threat of universal doom and as a means to eliminate poverty, to raise standards of health and welfare, not only in the industrialised countries but throughout the world, to give to man an understanding of himself, his society, and his destiny. The absolute importance of science to defence, even more than to the economy, has been followed by an appreciation not only of its direct political significance but also of its world prestige value to the nation which cultivates and exploits it. Governments everywhere have become interested, although they have not always encouraged a wise and balanced approach to scientific effort and its application. Nor have they yet fostered it in the best interest of their peoples. Research scientists themselves have often had a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the application of their discoveries and hence have been greatly swayed by fashion in the direction of their work.

There are other major changes in the nature of scientific work in addition to this recognition of its importance on the part of government and industry. Firstly, there has been a very great expansion in the total amount of research undertaken and hence in the number of scientists involved and in the cost of their work. Science is no longer, alas, the strongly individualistic and vocational business of the past - it has become professionalised - and while the genius of the few remains dominantly significant, there is now a professional array of scientific workers with attendant assistants, engineers, maintenance auxiliaries, and information men, while team work has become normal. In many fields also, greatly increased research costs are due not so much to expansion in activity as to greatly increased unit costs, especially in subjects of research and development such as high energy particle physics, radio astronomy, and space. With the replacement of the proverbial "ceiling wax and string" by synchrotons, radio telescopes, and space satellites, the scientist can in the long run look for support only to governments and, taking the taxpayers money, accept the responsibilities which accompany his expensive privileges.

The need for a national science policy

The consequence of all this at national level is that research and development

now represent a significant part of the budgets of industrialised and scientifically advanced countries, and, furthermore, the promise of research both fundamental and applied for long term and immediate influence on security and welfare is such that this expense, desirable in the national interest, is becoming progressively greater than resources available or which might become available. Such a state of affairs, which is most noticeable at present in the smaller scientifically advanced countries, is fast becoming general and requires a policy approach involving priorities in the allocation of resources to science.

This situation is particularly clearly observed in Europe, where high levels of social, economic, and scientific development combined with political fractionation into smaller sovereign states, necessitates a careful use and management of scientific resources and manpower. Recent moves towards economic integration are by no means unconnected with technological development. The complex business of modern industry with its large minimum unit plant size for economic production and heavy research and development intensity, requires large markets and hence calls for economic integration. Equally such integration, once achieved, will greatly favour technological development and the science pure and applied on which it is based.

There is, therefore, a growing recognition in European countries of the need for a policy for science and an understanding of its inter-relation with other elements of national policy - defence, economic, trade, health, social, and even foreign. Existing scientific institutions are largely inadequate and have no means for the development of a scientific strategy. The average national research council, for instance, is merely a means of persuading governments to provide money for more research, an objective certainly desirable in itself but not necessarily compatible with new tasks of allocation of resources in a broad sense in relation to scientific promise on the one hand, and national, economic, and social needs on the other. There has of recent years, however, been a political recognition in some countries of this problem and hence a consideration as to how science policy might be developed in the national interest. There are now Ministers of Science in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; in Belgium and Sweden science policy councils report directly to the Prime Minister, while in most other countries other approaches have been taken to problems of science co-ordination and development through Ministers of Education. In no instance, however, is there as yet a deliberate, coherent, and comprehensive policy and strategy for science fully related to the balance of national needs.

A national science policy would, of course, have many facets; it would have to consider not only the extent of research necessary for national aims and the desirable balance of effort, but also manpower and educational aspects. It would have to encourage the provision of accurate and comparable research and development expenditure statistics, to consider the balance between fundamental and applied research, and between defence and civilian requirements, how to revivify neglected fields of research, how to attack problems of communication and application, to regard expenditure in international schemes as a complement to that of national programmes, to relate natural sciences, technology, and the social sciences, to determine optimum conditions for scientific creativity - to mention only some of the most obvious.

Such an approach requires co-operation between politicians, civil servants, scientists, economists, and sociologists; in most cases existing scientific organisations are able to encompass only a fraction of what is necessary, but recently there has been the beginning of a strong move towards the evolution of an unambiguous science policy in a few countries.

International science policy

Even in the absence of a comprehensive science policy, it is already evident that for all but the very largest countries, resources cannot meet national needs for research, and it is especially difficult for small advanced nations to enter the new,

expensive, fashionable, scientific fields in any significant sense. One possibility is, of course, to concentrate research facilities on a more limited range of experiment, but this can at best be a half answer since the advanced (and often expensive) fundamental research of today often becomes the key to new development within a decade, and it is only by actual participation in new lines of advance that the scientist of a country can have a sufficiently intimate knowledge of new techniques and discoveries which may have eventual significance for application far indeed from their point of origin. Without this detailed knowledge of the whole texture of scientific discovery, industry can be ill advised and capitalised for obsolescence.

An increasingly utilised solution is to share costs through international co-operative research and this has been developed as a major activity in Europe this last decade. Some sciences of a world scope (the environmental sciences) which cannot respect political frontiers have always suggested international co-operation; for example, oceanography, meteorology, and astronomy, while the United Nations special agencies with their comprehensive membership, and especially **UNESCO**, have usefully developed such co-operation and extended it to fields of wide environmental common interest, e.g. through the arid zones and wet tropics research programmes. In Europe, regional organizations play a considerable role in science, so that **NATO** with its fellowship, summer institute and research support schemes, encourages general and not merely defence sciences. O.E.C.D. is properly concerned with science and education as a dynamo for economic growth and development, while the Council of Europe deals with the health of university and other research, mainly in a framework of cultural policy. Specialised organisations have been created for co-operative work in different fields and especially those which are expensive. The European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN), which was created by **UNESCO**, gives access to high energy particle physics to countries which would not be able alone to provide the basic equipment. While the economic arguments for co-operation here are very great, the success of CERN through intellectural cross-fertilisation has been exciting. In the nuclear energy field too, both the European Nuclear Energy Agency of O.E.C.D. (E.N.E.A.) and **EURATOM**, whose members are countries of the Common Market, have important programmes of research for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The individual projects of E.N.E.A. such as the Dragon and Halden reactors have as participants those O.E.C.D. countries willing and anxious to contribute; their scientific programmes are independently supervised, but for financial negotiation as well as political and legal questions, attachment to O.E.C.D. is maintain somewhat analogous to CERN are the new European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the launching body (ELDO). For inherently less expensive topics, the co-operative research scheme of the O.E.C.D. provides a forum on which experts can meet to discuss the desirability of common activity on specialist topics, mainly applied, proposed officially by their countries. The result is a group of projects in which a common programme is established by the experts in each subject, and each participant laboratory takes responsibility for a particular element of the programme. This functional approach, to which O.E.C.D. contributes only promotional and co-ordinating expenses, aims at providing a very greatly increased yield from existing resources and at a modest cost with international overheads at less than 1%. It also constitutes a network of research, some 300 institutions co-operating, involving the work of about 1500 scientists.

These and many other experiments in practical scientific co-operation, which have developed since the War, now offer to their countries various practical means for keeping abreast of new discovery and of extending the effectiveness of their limited scientific resources. To the smaller countries, they already represent a major and no longer a marginal proportion of the total scientific effort, and with the tendency of these organisations to grow, they present bigger bills every year. Control of the programmes and, hence, of the finances is difficult, and in some instances the results are of limited value in the absence of complementary work at home. It is to be admitted, however, that in the balance-of-payment situation which results, some countries attract considerable amounts of international money. The somewhat random proliferation of these bodies is another difficulty, especially as each has its

representation and policy shaping from different departments of government of a particular country, often decided in the absence of a national science policy and without a common framework and balance.

O.E.C.D. and science policy

Appreciation of these problems encouraged O.E.C.D. to undertake a detailed study of the nature of national science policy and of the need for it as well as its international counterpart. The Secretary General therefore set up a group of experts to advise him on the subject, consisting of eminent scientists and economists, who had been associated with national policy consideration, but who were advising O.E.C.D. as individuals. Their report, which has recently appeared, discusses science and policy from two angles - the influence of science on other elements of national policy and the need for a policy for science itself. One conclusion of the report is that national science offices or other mechanisms should be set up in each country, supported by a staff able to undertake studies and enquiries on the basic problems. An immediate result of this meeting has been the convening by the O.E.C.D. Ministerial Council of a meeting of Ministers of or for Science, which will take place at the beginning of October, and the results of which will be available therefrom for report by the time this paper is presented. The agenda of the Ministers of Science meeting, the first of the kind to be held ever, is restricted to three items - the nature of and need for a science policy in each country, international science policy and the proliferation of international scientific organisations, and finally science in relation to economic policy. In each case a number of issues are clearly stated, debate on which should encourage national developments on the basis of exchange of experience and of clear formulation of necessary studies and information for decision.

Science and planning

A recent feature of European change has been a greater and growing recognition of the need for coherent economic planning and admission of planning methods as techniques, not necessarily incompatible with a free society. In particular, work of the French Commissariat General au Plan in its economic planning by consent, and of the Swedish integrated labour market policy, are indications of a growing concern on the part of Governments with the need for rational consideration at a single place of the economic and social complex, with its direct reprecussions on living standards, wages, employment, export pattern, expansion rates, and inflation control.

Acceptance of education and science as influential contributions to growth, and their consideration in terms of investment means inclusion of such investment in the overall national planning as an item which, if out of balance, could prejudice the attainment of national objectives as a whole.

Equally, on the international level much progress has been made in improving methods of assessment of educational needs in the attainment of high growth rates, of national economic targets, and social objectives. The O.E.C.D. Mediterranean Regional Programme, by a partnership between the Organisation and six individual countries of the European Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia), is making available to decision makers in each government assessments of the investments in education which will be necessary up to 1970 and 1975 if economic expansion targets and social goals are to be achieved. This new approach was unanimously endorsed by the European Ministers of Education meeting in Rome in October 1962, while an educational investment programme launched by O.E.C.D. for countries outside the Mediterranean scheme has now found participation by the great majority of Member countries, and experiments in the new educational planning are under way.

Investments in technology and research, necessary for the success of economic planning targets, are a much more complex affair and as yet only a start has been made. Teams of scientists, economists, and engineers have, however, been created in some

O.E.C.D. countries with a view to establishing methods of assessing such needs.

Where national economic plans exist, either in a detailed classical sense or in a more flexible and advisory context, it is evident that science policy considerations will have to be related. This is already the case in France, where excellent collaboration and reciprocity exists between the "Plan" and the "Délégation Générale à la Recherche Scientifique."

Scientists and policy

At first sight, the planning of education, the establishment of national policies and especially the unpalatable introduction of concepts of priority seem to run contrary to the methods of scientific endeavour, and to tenaciously held ideals of academic and research freedom.

Scarcity of resources in relation to proposals for research, as well as the very high cost of contemporary scientific work makes some such approach, however, inevitable in the long run. The real problem is how this can be done with the co-operation of the scientists themselves, and in such a way as to preserve and, indeed, to enhance the creative satisfaction, status and value of their work. Any wise science policy will recognise the need to preserve freedom of choice in fundamental research and will resist any attempts to impose a rigid direction. National priorities for science, on which allocation of scarce resources are made, will be restricted to broad attempts to achieve a balance of effort and will not be applied within such allocations where research programmes and their management must remain under the choice and control of the professional scientist. It is a paradox that fundamental research is probably the greatest national investment of all, but that its dividends do not necessarily accrue in the place where the investment is made. Without freedom of choice of topic and method by the individual scientist, such research becomes quickly sterile. Since the exploitation of the results of fundamental research often appears in technological fields and industrial sectors far removed from the original discovery on which they are based, Governments and industry must indeed, as a matter of policy, "throw their bread upon the waters" if the high yield is eventually to appear. Even on economic grounds, therefore, no Government would attempt to regiment or coerce such an activity. The presence of leading scientists together with economists and policy makers on national science councils should make such matters evident to those who decide and execute policy and allocate funds.

The scientist himself has little to fear from a clear integration of his activities within the fabric of national policy. The situation here is very similar to that on educational investment planning, which appeared initially to many educators as a somewhat repulsive and materialist approach to an essentially cultural problem. Already they have found, however, that on the contrary this approach gives them better arguments than they have ever possessed to obtain adequate funds from Ministers of Finance to enable them to carry out without restriction activities which are properly under their control. The same will certainly be true when adequate policies for science are established.

8

National Conference 9/8

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

United States National Commission for UNESCO

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM

Address by

Erich Fromm
Psychoanalyst and Author

Chicago, Illinois

October 23-26, 1963

The psychological roots of nationalism lie in a phenomenon which so far has been studied only in individuals, and which has been called narcissism. The extreme examples of narcissism are that of the small infant, and that of the insane person. They have in common the inability to perceive reality outside of themselves - intellectually and emotionally. To the narcissistic person only the subjective, his feelings and thoughts are real. In the extreme cases mentioned above, the inability to perceive outside reality is almost complete; there are many less drastic examples of narcissism in which this inability is marked, yet not complete. In the more marked cases of narcissism we find the following pathology: lack of objectivity; a tendency toward fanaticism; irrational sensitivity to criticism and intense fury when the narcissistic image is wounded.

While the clinical data of individual narcissism have been thoroughly studied, what has not been studied is the transformation from individual to social narcissism. The narcissistic orientation does not occur only in the individual. It becomes transfered from the individual to the group, to the clan, nation, race, religion, class, political party and ideology. Not the individual but the group becomes the object of narcissistic inflation. This transference of narcissism, however, does not change its dynamics. The madness of self-glorification, of lack of objectivity in value judgment, the fury which follows the wounding of group narcissism, are not less intense than those found in cases of extreme individual narcissism. On the contrary, the pathological character of these reactions is often more hidden (and hence, less subject to correction) because that on which millions agree seems reasonable by the very fact of the consensus.

Since the end of the Middle Ages two tendencies have manifested themselves: 1) humanism, with its emphasis on the unity of the human race, and 2) nationalism, with its narcissistic group inflation. In the last decades political parties and ideologies have often replaced the older forms of religious and nationalist narcissism.

In the period of nuclear weapons, group narcissism and its inherent pathology endanger the life of the human race. The way out is seen in a renaissance of the humanist position, intellectually as well as emotionally. If the individual can feel a narcissistic pride in the human race as such, and in his being part of it, the dangers of narcissistic pathology will be smaller than if different nations, races, religions and political ideologies offer themselves as idols and objects for individual narcissism. This, however, will not be enough. It will be necessary that the degree of narcissism within the individual is reduced, and that he is able to experience greater relatedness with and genuine interest in the world outside. This requires social and political changes which permit an ever-increasing number of individuals to give up their narcissistic solipsism by becoming genuinely engaged and interested in the world outside.

One word with regard to the problem of European unification. It is, of course, desirable that old nationalistic antagonisms like that between France and Germany disappear. But one must not lose sight of the fact that nationalistic narcissism does not primarily depend on the size of the group, but on the narcissistic attitude of each person. It is quite possible that a new "European Bloc" nationalism could emerge which gives its members a feeling of superiority over the America, the Soviet, the Latin American blocs, and which would be nothing but a new and more modern manifestation of the old-fashioned nationalisms of Europe. The New Europe, in fact, could produce a "European" nationalism which is as dangerous as the French and the German nationalisms of the past were.

The lecture will develop in detail the dynamics of individual and group narcissism, its biological, sociological function, and the conflict between narcissism and the spiritual values of humanist, religious and philosophical thought.

9

National Conference 9/9

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

United States National Commission for UNESCO

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS

Address by

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October 23-26, 1963

When I think of European Parliaments today, some odd images come to my mind. The hordes of school children who regularly invade, almost as if on a conveyor belt system, the sprawling buildings of the Bundeshaus in response to an earnest, if somewhat superficial, effort of the German authorities to implant the importance of the parliamentary institution in the still unformed mind of the young. Or, the deserted halls of the Palais Bourbon where so many fruitless schemes were hatched during recent years to domesticate the monster of Colombey Les Deux Eglises. Or, the small trickle of members sent off by their respective houses to the European Parliamentary Assembly where they work earnestly and laboriously to reserve a place for themselves in competition with the bustling Eurocrats. What does it all add up to?

There seems to be by now a well established opinion decrying the declining effectiveness of parliament as a political institution. Let me give you the bill of particulars which has recently been collected by the London Times (August 1, 1963, p.11, col. 2). Though culled from British experience, it might have been said anywhere else in Europe. "...that it has sunk in public esteem, that it retains only vestigal control over the administration, that the populace knows less and cares less about what is going on there, that its procedures are time-wasting and obsolete, that it is out of touch, that it is hag-ridden by the Whips, that it is unsuited to grapple with, or even identify the real problems confronting society, that it is almost wholly deficient in scientific understanding, that the quality of its members has declined, and that they lead a dog's life anyway."[1]

This is quite an indictment. In order to examine it I will first tell you how and why European parliaments have changed on the long journey from our grandfathers' time to ours. I will then tell you what has happened to the main job of parliaments in contemporary Europe. How do they now relate to the rest of government? What has happened to their legislative powers? How do they fill the job of overseeing the current administrative work? If they have failed in some respects where lies the remedy? What at first glance looks like deterioration is seen to be simply a consequence of the thorough-going process of democratization. This process started during the last third of the nineteenth century and has come to full fruition during the post-World War II period. It is a story of changing historical needs and dimensions rather than one of personal failure. How could it be different, as identical observations have the same pertinence for one country after another. During the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century most of the Western parliaments had a representative but not yet a governmental function. They received grievances from the ranks of the population. They debated, assented, bargained for, and modified legislative proposals. They voted annually for the budget. In some advanced countries such as England, they selected the gentlemen to be entrusted by the Queen with the affairs of state, while farther East in Prussia or Austria parliaments had to accept whoever the Emperor or King saw fit to impose as Chancellor or Minister. But, whatever the local situation, England apart, parliament was not an integral part of the governmental structure. Government meant the officers, the bureaucrats, the monarch. The state power might be protective or oppressive or alternatively either, but neither the people at large nor

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[1] For the corresponding Italian criticism, see a report on an Italian TV series featuring an inquiry in the shortcomings of the Italian Parliament, "Proposte di specialistici per migliorare l'efficienza del sistema parlamentare," Il Messagero, August 4, 1963, page 11, col. 3. See also the thorough study on the Italian Parliament edited by Giovanni Sartori, Il Parlamento Italiano, 1946-1963, Napoli (1963), 386 pp.

the assembly members, selected by a severely restricted electorate, formed part of the official state apparatus.[1]

Democratication swept away electoral restrictions and removed the visible and invisible barriers between parliamentary job and governmental office, between the apparatus of the state and society. Yet, while making parliamentary and governmental office freely exchangeable, commingling representative and governmental function, at the same time it produced something like a new layer between the parliament and government: the party. Of course, the political party was not altogether a new organization. But there is a world of difference between today's permanent organization and an ad hoc electioneering organization put up to support a single candidate or even a club of elected politicians, drawn towards each other by mutual political sympathy. The twentieth century European mass party closely correlates subdivisions, organizes elections, recruits members, contacts backers and sympathizers, and at the same time, does the parliamentary work to either support or dislodge the government. Especially if a party obtains a majority, as now frequently happens in many European countries (England, Scandinavia, sometimes Germany and Italy, and now even France) the party leadership cadres will be catapulted into governmental office.

What does this mean for the parliament involved? One hundred years ago Walter Bagehot referring to Parliament's job characterized it "to elect well a government." To do so in our days, it must bend to the will of a majority party or a combination of parties which not only can form a workable government but are able to support this government in its major pursuits. More often than not this entails an act of abnegation. The more sprawling the affairs of state, the more all-embracing the commitment which the party has made to its voters and backers, the more necessary it is that the parliamentary party curtails its commitment to the principle of parliamentary discourse and plays down the natural antagonism which invariably marks the relations between government and parliament, between actor and overseer. In order to be effective a parliamentary majority must -- all talk about the separation of executive and legislature notwithstanding -- invest the state, but, at the same time it will inevitably be captured by its necessities. A parliamentary assembly may be sluggish and hesitant; its majority members may well perceive the shortcomings, dangers, and inconsistencies inherent in a policy decided on by the government; they may, in the privacy of the caucus room, besiege the party's government members with their doubts or they may communicate their hesitations to their favorite journalist, off the record; but, when the vote is called, they will in most cases support the government. Does this mean, as the English critic says, to be hag-ridden by the Whip and does it imply the much lamented depersonalization of politics, sounding the death-knell of the independence of the member? If so, it is only part of the story.

The French experience of the Third and the Fourth Republic has shown that the local member owing his election to purely local combinations and factors, who, in Paris, joins a loose political grouping does not form a strong enough parliamentary backbone for the operation of a modern government. The government needs more consistent support and both party and government need more steady footwork to present their case to the country. By necessity rather than by choice, many European parliaments therefore become populated by second-stringers -- party secretaries, journalists, liaison men to interest groups and professional organizations -- who constitute transmission belts

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[1] As to the question or how far Parliament was representative of the people at large, the Burkean turned neo-liveral in our times will wistfully adduce the theory of virtual representation, an idealization of a state of affairs which is supposed to have provided our forefathers with quality parliamentary gentlemen rather than with professional politicians. The historian will remember more accurately, however, the nineteenth century liberal alternating between fear of the mob and fear of the ruling class, between a romantic and somewhat theoretical love for the people and an ambiguous attitude towards the authorities which kept him in check, but also protected his property against the all too ardent embrace of the man in the street.

between political leadership and both organized groups and the unorganized masses. It is difficult to know exactly whether the stream of communication flows more frequently downward to the clientele or up to the political leadership. But, anyway, a new job has been born: the professional politician.

While he takes his natural place in parliament as homme de liege of the political leader, his operations must necessarily extend beyond its precincts. Does that mean that the quality of the membership needs necessarily to go down? Or, that parliament has no longer room for, or could not attract the intellectual, the scientist, or the businessman? Evidence in this respect is neither clear-cut nor very meaningful. Members of parliament have at all times been selected for a number of qualities. Depending on the time and on the society, steadfastness, loyalty, personal reliability, and sociability have played as decisive a role as intellectual acumen for those making the selection.

Before entering judgment on such points, it is important to look at the jobs incumbent on parliament in addition to the one already discussed: electing a government well -- and, as we may add, sustaining it in the eyes of the opposition opposing it. These further traditional jobs of parliament concern legislation and supervision and control of the administration.

As to legislation, constitutional powers and political practice are two quite different matters. France offers the greatest novelty: it has rearranged legislative powers so as to take a goodly part of them out of the hands of parliament by handing them over to the executive. The division is both by subject matter and level of detail. There are fields where only the principles are left to the French parliament, with the filling-in explicitly reserved to the government. Moreover, when bills reach parliament the government has acquired a set of new powerful procedural weapons to force undiluted passage on parliament. In spite of the continuing theoretical omnipotence of the British Parliament, there too the cabinet calls the tune, carrying its legislative program to victory via its secure parliamentary majority. For quite different reasons, parliament does not fare much better in a country such as Austria, where for all practical purposes a steering committee of the two major parties determines the legislative program, allowing legislation to be introduced by one of the two major parties only in the rare cases when the parties have agreed to disagree. Of course, if the majority party is of a divided mind, split as the Italians call it in different correnti, and willing to coalesce with parties outside the government, the picture may look different. In such a case the final shape of a bill might eventually be determined by parliamentary bargaining tactics. This may even happen in a country where the government musters a secure majority but where, in order to smooth popular and administrative acceptance of legislation, it lays stress on securing maximum participation of the social groups mostly represented in the minority party.

But whatever the amount of legislative power effectively retained by parliament, its exercise brings up the question of the relations between the bureaucracy and parliament. While parliaments retain the prerogative to initiate bills in their own midst, the great mass of legislative spade work is done in the individual ministries. Proposals are then coordinated with other interested ministries and, if needed, submitted to cabinet arbitration. The function of cabinet arbitration is often the most vital part of the legislative business because various ministries, more than political parties, mirror the different needs and priorities of the various sectors of the community. Only after these processes are complete is a proposal thrown into the legislative hopper for final clearance.

The type of projects that are fed into the hopper varies from country to country. The bureaucracy may retain large ordinance-making powers, because a working parliamentary system such as the English one does not want to be bothered with detail but rather retains the right to strike down bureaucratic enactments laid on the table of the House within a stated time limit. Another approach, used in the past in Germany and France,

is that parliament may endow the bureaucracy with vast decree-making powers for a limited time for just the opposite reason: because it is unable to reach an agreement in its own midst. Or a parliament may, to its own detriment as in contemporary Italy, wade through a mass of the most detailed legislation, either in full assembly or in committees endowed with legislative power. The formulas vary greatly but the embarrassment remains the same whether it does too much or too little: no parliament is able -- and I would even venture to say no parliament should try -- to match the bureaucracy in specialized competence. Theirs should be the job of making political decisions, not the perfecting of technical arrangements. The dividing line is often misjudged and as a reaction may then lead to the drastic French solution.

But of course even political decisions presuppose some knowledge of the impact and consequences that alternative technical proposals will have. Therefore, the parliament which contains a mixture of professional politicians with what we might call experts (even if the experts sometimes turn out to be interest group politicians) is clearly better equipped to handle legislation than a parliament of the famous 19th century type of independent minds, who upon closer inspection turn out to have been bureaucrats, intellectuals, and property owners.

Even if it is not formally made into a rubber stamp by a government backed by a cohesive majority and exercising full control over both the legislative time table and the content of the bills, the European parliament's legislative position is insecure. Much of the substance of the job has gone to the bureaucracy dealing directly with the various interests concerned. A great part of the bargaining involved in securing final acceptance has become the job of the minister or the cabinet or the chancellor. Where they fail or where parties are not cohesive or where a majority is unstable, the European parliament still fills a traditional role. But frequently they put their stamp of approval on work originating, thought through, fought over, and bargained for somewhere else.

Between legislation and supervision of the administration lies the parliamentary budget control. Today, the budget hearings, which were 19th century liberalism's proudest device for enforcing parliamentary control over taxation and expenditure, retain in European parliaments only a symbolic meaning. Even if the overwhelming majority of individual budget positions had not long since become fixtures, how can an outsider form a meaningful opinion about bureaucratic efficiency and needs unless someone gives him inside information? What remains then of the budget ritual is the opposition's purely symbolic picking on items long singled out as political footballs, such as "special funds of the Prime Minister's Office," etc.

If the budget debate remains little but a faint echo of parliament's 19th century preoccupation, supervision and criticism of the administrative apparatus remains one of the most vital functions of a parliament. The more clearcut the division of parliament into a big government block and an opposition smaller in numbers though not necessarily in wisdom, the more conspicuous becomes the opposition's role not only as critic of policies but also as a watchdog over sprawling administrative empires. Countries like England, Germany, Italy, and possibly France in recent years, come to one's mind rather than those with more or less all-embracing coalition governments such as Austria or Belgium. If the majority stands for the parliament as a whole in the business of electing and upholding a government, the opposition represents the parliament in its critical and supervisory capacity. Plainly, parliamentary control and check by the opposition will take on different forms according to the degree of material well-being of a country. How do the various oppositions measure up to the role? Right at the outset we encounter a happy paradox. The more satisfactory the state of affairs of a country in general, the more prosperous its citizenry, and the more undisturbed its social peace, the less the degree of corresponding class, religious, and ideological discord and the greater the national unity and resolve in face of possible external threats, the smaller becomes the differential between parties in regard to essentials. The present state of affairs in Great Britain, the Federal

Republic of Germany, or the northern European countries come easily to mind. Here major social organizations will work out their problems sometimes with the help or under the prodding of the government in a peaceful and amicable manner. Domestic prosperity apparently increases the propensity for bargaining and understanding rather than for internecine fight, thus materially limiting the occasions for parliamentary conflict. An additional factor works in the same direction. Not only have the dimensions of foreign military policy drastically changed, frequently overshadowing and at the same time determining domestic social and economic lines of action; but many phases of these policies, as for instance the entire intelligence field, do not lend themselves to parliamentary treatment. Whether a security matter becomes known to a member of parliament via unidentifiable contacts or whether he hears of them as a trusted member of the establishment via semi-official channels, the end result is the same from the viewpoint of parliamentary treatment: since these matters form part of a whole complex of subject matter excluded from parliamentary discussion by explicit or implicit agreement, remedies for shortcomings must be sought via other devices.

But if the exclusion of entire blocs of subject matter from parliamentary supervision has become unavoidable, this only serves to highlight the fundamental problem: what does parliamentary control of the administration mean in an age where a medium-sized state of 45 to 50 million population employs from a million to a million and a half civil servants and state employees? How can the parliament, twice removed from the actual scene, exercise meaningful control? The cabinet minister and his personal staff, if they do not shun the trouble, the waste of energies, and the enmities in the administrative ranks, may call for the files, summon the professional administrative echelons and, as a last resort, transfer or discipline recalcitrant personnel. The members of parliament may make a critical speech, discuss departmental problems on the days set aside for the discussion of the budget of that department he may elicit specific information during the questioning hour or -- when a pattern of misconduct or gross inefficiency in public institutions is suspected -- may band together with other members to introduce either a formal interpellation of the government or suggest a form of public inquiry. But the member of parliament always remains an outsider to the precincts which he may want to police. Even if he should be an unusually intelligent man with good technical or bureaucratic background, where will he find the information to exercise his office as supreme controller? Many parliaments, conscious of the precariousness of their supervisory function have now emulated the British experience and have now a question hour as a control device. Yet, spot control rather than a systematic item by item control provided in the theory of budget hearings is a game of skill. The questioner more often than not has little to go on: pieces of minor complaints furnished by an aggrieved or disgruntled voter or party friend -- the phone not yet installed after a year of waiting, a military transfer under conditions causing special hardship, a new piece of road not yet available in spite of much prompting, or a person having been given a job in spite of a dubious record. The member might try to enlarge on the particular incident and unearth a faulty policy, negligence, or a case of corruption. The minister's or the under-secretary's brief will try its best to keep to the minute detail and not offer an entering wedge for further inquisition. Or it might try the opposite way and overwhelm the questioner with a lot of technical detail which the member will rarely be in a position to dispute. While such tactics are deemed perfectly legitimate there is one boundary line: no minister may lie with a straight face in specific statements to parliament. The case of Profumo who lost job and seat and that of Franz Josef Strauss, eased out of his job, though by no means of parliamentary politics, have brought that fact to mind in recent days.

If it is hard to establish meaningful administrative supervision via the pecking process during question hour, one might think it would pay greater dividends for parliamentary assemblies to establish investigating committees. Discussions of entire problem sectors (employment, social security, monopolies) would not only open new vistas for the future but would unearth many anxiously secreted administrative practices. Yet, the field of nationalized industries apart, where some rather modest beginnings

have been made with such inquiries both in Great Britain and also in France before the days of the Fifth Republic, there has been little movement in this direction. In England, the field is covered outside the parliamentary precinct via royal commissions or in case of malfeasance by tribunals of inquiry. I confess I do not know how far the Italians were able to get with their plans for a searching parliamentary investigation of the Sicilian Mafia. But I do know that in the German Federal Republic committees of inquiry have quickly degenerated into a device for mutual mud-slinging over various incidents of corruption with an inquiry on economic concentration shunned off to a completely stymied commission of experts and the various projects for a thorough-going reform of social insurance never even being exposed to the procedure of a thorough public parliamentary inquiry. Parliamentary control over the administration, I would therefore say, represents the weakest spot on the record of the European parliaments. While the area to be supervised and examined has mushroomed, parliaments, with exception of the institution of a special commissioner called Ombudsman still to be discussed, have neither pushed old techniques energetically nor developed new ones to meet the job at hand.

What then can we, in conclusion, say about the present position and the future prospects of the European parliaments? When all is said and done the European parliaments are still fulfilling a number of useful functions and with some proper reforms could take a more definite though probably not a pre-eminent place on the European political scene. This primary place they have clearly had to yield to the leadership of the major political parties and the permanent bureaucracies. Yet, parliaments do continue to provide the constitutional framework and the necessary legitimacy for the installing of the cabinets. The voice of the voter may have spoken unmistakably designating the new incumbents, leaving parliament only a confirming role. But the outcome of the elections may have been less than conclusive. Bargains, whether between organizations or between politicians may have to be made in order to procure a necessary majority or to tolerate a minority government. The test of the feasibility of the combination as well as the legal sanction is again provided by an open vote in the parliament. During the lifetime of the parliament the majority may dislocate, the artful combination may break; again, it is the parliament as a corporate body, assuming ever so much more public importance when cabinets weaken and loose their grip, which must take care of the new political arrangements to be made.

Parliaments on their own do not produce a functioning political opposition; their existence and degree of efficiency depends on the particular social and political conditions prevailing in a given society. There also may show up some more persistent critics, inveterate foes of the establishment, forcing the majority or those who carry officially the title of opposition to strain their wits and think harder and faster. Some countries such as the Federal Republic have no such critics at all and clearly its parliament is none the better for it. Others, such as Italy, might have too many for comfort. But once these often uncomfortable guests do show up, the machinery of the parliamentary organization protects their freedom of expression and, at least in the precinct of the parliament their freedom of banding together. Whether they get into parliament as a group of their own by courtesy of the electorate and the electoral laws or whether, more likely, they act as a dissenting voice from within an old established group, parliament will honor their claim to represent a fraction of the electorate as much as that of their less obstreperous colleague.

As to the control of the administration, the concern over having to fight a losing, if vital, battle is nearly universally recognized. At least this is how I interpret the nearly universal enthusiasm for the gift of the Scandinavian countries, the OMBUDSman as a kind of watchdog for the public with the right to receive complaints, inspect files, and make recommendations. The OMBUDSman may work as a sort of patron saint for the pensioneer who gets nowhere with his somewhat complicated and forlorn social security claims. He takes the quarrels of the small fry from the hands of the busy politician and hands them over to somebody willing and able to follow them up more effectively. While this is a clear gain for the small man it may not necessarily be a

major profit for the parliamentary politician. While he economizes on time and energy, his direct contact with unaffiliated constituents is further reduced to the handshaking level. Moreover, having handed over the small fries administrative troubles to a special agent hardly increases parliamentary insight and control over administrative procedures; nor does the installation of the OMBUDSman help to tackle the more vital job of how to associate parliament with the solution of the long term problems of society. Granted this may be difficult in fields such as international and foreign affairs, the occasions for such participation remain open in the economic and social policy fields, and here the degree of public interest is fully commensurate with parliamentary means of action. Today, more often than not, parliament receives economic and social policy proposals for legislative action in the last or near to the last stage, with the solutions worked out elsewhere, with timetables for action laid down both by the pressing need of the moment and the prestige of the cabinet which has underwritten specific solutions. Why not then use the medium of the parliamentary inquiry, let us say on the problem of social insurance reform or redundant coal mines, problems which have to be solved in the next few years, to allow parliament to share more intimately in those chores of government which matter to large sections of the population. They would thus not only gain in public esteem but they might be able to hold their own when meeting bureaucracy and interest groups in the formulation of the public interest, thus making them again effective rather than haphazard partners in the legislative and administrative process.

I have not yet touched on the beginnings of a European Assembly now sitting as parliamentary accompaniment to three still separate European agencies: Euratom, the Coal and Steel Community, and the Hallstein European Economic Commission. With all their shortcomings, European parliaments are creatures of the direct democratic voting process. They do choose governments and in some fashion influence their course. None of these conditions apply at the moment to the European Assembly; it would therefore make little sense to reiterate that probably for this very reason the problems of European parliaments affect in even stronger form what ten years from now might or might not become their legitimate successor.

What lesson do European parliaments hold for the legislative branch of the U. S. government? On the face of it, the situation of the European parliaments which have to fight to find a continued useful place in the scheme of contemporary democratic government and that of the omnipotent American Congress with its electoral position entirely independent of the executive and with its mastery over legislative, budgetary, and investigatory machinery seems quite different. Yet, below the facile powerlessness-omnipotence antithesis there are some basic similarities rooted in the social structure of industrial mass society. First and foremost the capacity of the Congress to pierce through the armor of the bureaucratic and military establishment, if it ever thinks of doing so in a sustained rather than a haphazard fashion, seems as questionable as that of its European colleagues. On the surface the staying power of the Congress in face of the Presidency seems never to have been more significant and appears quite remote from the slow and steady erosion of European parliamentary power. But, would an emergency show that industrial mass society and its equivalent -- the administrative state -- assigns a secondary place to all parliamentary assemblies by sheer necessity? However that may be, political assemblies, as I have tried to show, still have important roles to play in legitimizing cabinets and statutes, guaranteeing freedom of discourse, and possibly overseeing administrative actions as well, in a democratically ordered mass society. Recognizing both their usefulness and their inherent limitations will help them to keep their appropriate place in the political scheme of our society.

10

National Conference 9/10

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

United States National Commission for UNESCO

THE NEW EUROPEAN MEN OF BUSINESS

Address by

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Chicago, Illinois

October 23-26, 1963

Let me start this short introductory talk with some remarks on the setting of that European stage on which the new European men of business play their part.

There are about 20 national states, the smallest counting 130,000 inhabitants, the biggest slightly over 50 million. The geographical area is one third of that of the United States, which makes it exceedingly handy transport-wise. The sea shores are long, the canals numerous and the rivers often navigable. The long inland transports in America can easily be avoided in Europe.

In the first act of our play you see the aftermath of the Second World War. Executives had learnt how to produce under the worst possible conditions except for one - too much money had been chasing too few goods and the sales department had only had to ration products to old customers. Production and productivity were down to unbelievably low levels.

Enter the good samaritan from the West Wing. Marshall aid for reconstruction was supplemented with another measure which would become the first stimulus to the creation of a new kind of European businessman. Executives and technicians from most European countries were invited to study the United States. Numerous productivity working parties crossed the Atlantic and came into contact with the explosive possibilities of a non-regulated and competitive economy. These visitors found that most firms - even in the United States - were too small to exist without free interchange of ideas and information and that there was no premium on secrecy. The confrontation of different nationals in the Working parties introduced a new technique of confidence and co-operation which was new for most Europeans.

Act two. The European Coal and Steel Community starts working in 1952. It is an experiment in International and supranational control of the sector in the economies of the war-ridden countries on the European continent which was the basis for a war potential. The playwright had, however, been a little too ambitious and his plans did not become quite real. Private businessmen had to play extras in a puppet show where the High Authority pulled the strings. You might consider if not the dirigisme of the CECA was the last part of a hangover from the controlled war economy.

Act three. Paris in July 1957, the hemicycle of the French national Assembly, rather late at night. The counting of the votes shows that France has approved the Treaty setting up the European Economic Community. The other members of the Community pass the same ratification documents. Some parliaments in the Common Market countries even set up as a firm wish or even as a condition that the negotiations for an all-European free trade area should be brought to a successful conclusion.

Act four, first scene. The free trade area negotiations break down at the end of 1958. EFTA is set up uniting seven European countries and associates Finland through a special treaty.

Second scene. New negotiations for a unification of Europe start in the fall of 1961 and break down in January 1963.

Let me first say that the first act hardly created a new European businessman. The work which had to be done can be described rather as occupational rehabilitation. Manufacturers had to remember again - if they were of pre-war vintage - how to calculate costs and prices - and the neophytes had to learn it for the first time. Price control and all kinds of government regulations had corrupted free enterprise and not all of the corrupted liked the harsh winds of competition.

Import liberalization was created through OEEC and gradually European trade began to flow more freely. GATT brought forth a certain reduction of outrageously high tariffs.

The most progressive businessmen in Europe began to discover that a market of 10 million people, or even of 50 million, was too small - considering the purchasing power - for the rational production, of some goods. Efforts to export were partly successful, but high tariffs cut down on the economic incentive. Many European countries did not have a higher export share than 15% of Gross national product. Producers for the national home market could feel fairly safe in their own tariff fortress. There was really very little need for a new kind of businessmen. The "silver beards", as the grandfather entrepreneurs were called, could still run their firms as patriarchs. The young men who came out of the new business schools, set up in about the same way as your American business schools, did not climb as fast as they hoped, or as they deserved, to responsible positions. Many of them were frustrated in inferior jobs. Some of them had received a very good but also very theoretical training on mathematically computed demand curves etc. and had become what we Europeans now call technocrats. They had learnt by learning and not by doing - they despised the administrative methods of the silver beards and these, in their turn distrusted the intellectual technicians of business.

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The signature and coming into force of the Treaty of Rome gave businessmen not only in the Common Market and the rest of Europe but also in other parts of the World a new impetus. Let me try to describe how the thinking went.

In normal cases a businessman knows very little about the future. He might be able to see one year ahead with a certain clearsightedness. But the prospects and possibilities five years ahead are already rather dark. If you try to estimate the economic situation - with all possible changes in technology, currency policies etc. 13 years ahead (the period between 1957 and 1970) - everything looks dark and impenetrable. If you in this darkness of uncertainty light up a sign saying: no import duties between 180 million consumers and six countries in 1970, businessmen can start planning.

There might be earthquakes or wars to come, but they are incalculable anyhow. The firm time-schedule of the tariff dismantling in the Rome Treaty gave businessmen - I admit only one factor out of many that are of importance - but that factor was a firm commitment on the part of the six governments. The natural and inevitable consequence was that those businessmen who wanted to plan for the future set their rudder on this light. Many might have given it too much weight in their calculations, but they found - for the first time in many years - it possible to plan with some certain facts.

The second outcome of this firm time-table was that many people started to discount the final stage in the transitional period of the Common Market. May I take an imaginary case and be excused if I use real names to make the example easier to follow.

In summer 1957 the director general of the Volkswagenwerke in Germany sits and takes a look at the Treaty of Rome. He thinks that he would like to go into the French market with his cars. But the import duty in France on motorcars is 30 percent ad valorem and he doubts that even a Volkswagen could climb such a tariff wall and still be competitively priced against the French cars. He can be imagined to look at a diagram of this kind.



He considers that he would like to wait with going into the French market until Year 6 when the French duty has been halved according to plan. At a talk his production manager points out that the sales to France might demand the building of a new plant which will take two years. In order to be ready he has to start building in year + 4. The export and marketing manager points out that the signing up of new distributors and repair shops etc. may take four years. The director general asks the marketing department to sign up these new agents already in year + 2. But protests come; it would be ridiculous to sign up distributors in year + 2 if they would not get any cars until year 6. So the conclusion is that a few cars will have to trickle over the frontier already in year + 2 to give the new distributors some chance of survival.

But now the director general has all the facts for a static analysis, he has worked only within a laid-down time schedule. He starts pondering and sees the looming competitor of Fiat. The Fiat people have the same facts and might analyse the tariff situation the same way as Volkswagen. But imagine - the Volkswagen boss ruminates - that the Fiat people do not wait until year + 2 with the acquisition of new distributors and repair shops. If they start already in year + 1 they and not we might sign up the best people in each town or village and they will get the edge on us in introducing their cars. They may even get the last available display window in Champs Elysées and that is a social "must" for a car manufacturer. So the Volkswagen head considers that other people's reaction to the expectations may be more rapid than his own - to his disadvantage. He concludes that he dares not wait until year + 2. He has to get in first. So he started his first measures already in year - 1.

But if many manufacturers in the Common Market had to sell to other countries in order to get a foothold before their competitors did, they had to pay the high duties that still remained in 1958, when no tariff cuts had been made. So it was only reasonable that they should want to cut these invasion costs as much as possible. The natural conclusion was that the transitional period ought to be cut so that the tariff costs of going into the other EEC countries would be reduced.

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Some of the silver beards found that the shape of things to come appeared rather complicated and hazardous. So many new factors had to be brought into the equations for formulating the policy of a firm that they felt rather uneasy. It became evident that even a small firm had to specialize its production and that was a hard decision to make if some of the lines to cut had been taken up by the founder of the firm who was also the great-grandfather of the present president. It would be necessary to sell fewer products over an increased market where people used other and strange languages. Sometimes the firm was so small - and that is quite often the case in Europe - that it would have to merge with another firm or be taken over itself to be viable under the new conditions.

There is no doubt that the fearful and unusual aspects of the new development frightened many older or not so well trained company presidents in the Common Market and made them undertake what John Foster Dulles called an agonizing reappraisal of their own and their firm's future. The younger men were received with more understanding. If they were sons and if they were good they were appointed president even before their fathers died. If the son did not look too promising someone from outside was taken into the family firm. You must realize that such a change was a revolution in the attitude of the older generation of businessman in several European countries.

Another consequence of the Common Market was that firms got a new relative size. If one firm in Belgium had been able to supply 40 % of the needs of a certain product in Belgium it would only be responsible for 2 % of the probable needs of the Common Market. A firm which had been dominating and a price-setter in a small country would find itself in a drastically different and weaker position in the Common Market.

The need for contacts within the own country and with similar firms in other countries of the Common Market increased. The isolationist attitude had to change into something which might be called togetherness. The activity of the Common Market Commission instituted measures which would be applied simultaneously as Community law in all the countries. National trade associations felt a need to establish contacts with their opposite numbers in the other member countries to check on attitudes and clear policies in the new situation. Very early the industrial federations of the six Common Market countries formed their international EEC federation. National trade associations followed suit and today there are about 800 different trade associations on Common Market level. The activity is remarkable. Some of them can have subcommittees and working parties and the central council of such an EEC association may meet as often as once a month.

Let me remark here that the atmosphere in Common Market business circles is not entirely dominated by business considerations. Behind the idea of forming this Community were deeply felt needs for a conciliation between peoples who had been regularly at war for a thousand years. It was a feeling which prevailed not only among politicians but also by a great number of citizens in all walks of life. In the business community the motives for European co-operation were mixed - for very many the political consequences of a European co-operation were considered desirable at the same time as the economic consequences were regarded with some hesitation and trepidation.

The political aspects were, however, sold in a very soft way when the Treaty of Rome was written, as its authors remembered the refusal of France to ratify the European Defense Community a few years earlier. The European Economic Community was presented as an economic measure in many of the six parliaments when it came up for ratification. Only when it had been passed its originators dared to emphasize its political character.

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The formation of EEC had called forth the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1956 which broke down at the end of 1958 and which were followed by the formation of EFTA. In 1961 there were started new negotiations for a unification of Europe. The US administration was very much in favor of the Common Market and actively supported the adhesion of Britain at the same time as it looked only disinterestedly at the application of Denmark and Norway who were only smaller Nato powers. In Sweden we received at least the feeling that the State Department almost frowned on the applications of the three neutral EFTA members, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden, for association to the Common Market.

Whatever the position was on the future membership of the Common Market, the problem became of only academic character in the beginning of 1963 when France told the other negotiating parties that she could see no useful purpose in continuing the talks.

From the American point of view the break-up of these negotiations brought into the open the many different cross-currents and animosities that had existed for hundreds of years between the Anglo-Saxons and the continental Europeans. The effort to circumvent these political differences by economic arrangements had failed when polities surfaced.

Let us face the fact that the division of Europe in two different trading blocs is a definite nuisance from the economic point of view. It is not that the Common Market on the whole introduces higher tariffs than before - the Common external tariff lies about the former average of the national tariffs. It is not that EFTA does not change its external tariffs at all. The nuisance stems from the added incentive to trade within the own bloc and so to disruption of the channels of trade that existed earlier. As long as we are riding high on a good economic activity there are few reasons to be really worried. We can see that the internal trade of both EEC and EFTA increases very rapidly and more than imports from outside countries into each of the blocs. But imports from outside countries have not gone down but also increased at a much slower rate. What we have to fear are the consequences of a slump when the differences in tariff treatment probably will hit outside suppliers severely. The awkward thing is that it would be fairly easy to remove discrimination during good times when it is not felt very mucht but that it will be extremely difficult to do it when a slump comes and discrimination really hurts.

More far-reaching and long range consequences can be expected from this division of Europe. Manufacturers in one of the areas will sometimes need to set up subsidiary operations in the other in order to escape the prohibitive effects of import duties. There is a certain risk that this may lead to unnecessary investments and to the raise of surplus capacity which might make a future joining up of them more difficult.

I have been asked to say something about the reactions in those three EFTA countries which are neutral, that is Austria, Switzerland and Sweden. I can of course only express what I know of the attitude of private industry.

Let me tell you quite frankly that we were rather worried by the cool attitude of the American administration which increased our difficulties in contacting the Common Market. There was a risk that for instance Sweden would not have been accepted as an associate of the Common Market. Not less than about 50 % of our total exports of dutiable goods today go to the Common Market, Britain, Denmark and Norway. If we would have been excluded from this enlarged Common Market our economic situation would have been very serious indeed. The situation is already very serious for Austria who has its greatest trade with the Common Market. For Switzerland it is already troubling even if the specialized export products of that country are able to climb considerable tariff walls.

For Sweden and Switzerland such a development of economic isolation and risk of poverty instead of progress would be extremely serious. Even if these two countries are neutral their defense expenditure is considerable and very high per head of population in comparison with some of the European Nato members. Would these two neutrals be able to continue paying for their own armed forces and their weapons? We do not know exactly but it ought to be stated that there is a definite risk that a harmful economic arrangement of Europe may hamper the

defense effort and weaken the defense ability of these two countries who are good friends of the United States, who pay for their own defense without any outside grants and for a thousand years have defended their own freedom.

None of these countries wants to play the game of combined brinkmanship and blackmail of the United States which has become so popular among some countries in the World.

From the point of view of the business community in Sweden I have experienced only positive reactions towards the plan for European integration. Our relations with the industries in the Common Market are very good and friendly and we co-operate closely in all matters of common interest and are engaged in positive efforts to bring the two blocs together. Swedish industry has been hardened under a very liberal import regime with low import duties and wants to have its markets enlarged and compete also with the Common Market without any trade barriers.

11

National Conference 9/12

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

CULTURAL COMMUNITY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIONS

Address by

Geoffrey Gorer
British Anthropologist

Chicago, Illinois

October 23-26, 1963

I approach the subject of your deliberations as a social anthropologist who has specialized in what has confusingly come to be called National Character. What my colleagues and I study and attempt to make coherent are the motives, the predispositions, the articulate and inarticulate values that the majority of a society manifest or assent to at a defined period of history; for as anthropologists our unit of study is the society, and not the nation-state. In our traditional field of study, the technologically primitive societies without literacy and without any sources of power except human and animal muscle, wind and water, the distinction between society and nation-state rarely arises. The very simplest societies have developed no state apparatus; in the somewhat more complex ones the geographical boundaries of state and society coincide. But ever since the invention of the centralized nation-state in neolithic times at either end of the Asiatic land-mass, the nation-state has tended to comprise more than one society - a dominant society and subjugated or conquered societies. In the more recent history of the last century or so the political frontiers of nation-states have been drawn arbitrarily on political or geographical lines, without regard to the social allegiance of the people inhabiting the land through which the frontier is drawn. As a consequence members of a single society may be apportioned to two or more nation-states - recent examples which have been discussed are the Somalis and the Armenians; but their case is by no means unique.

This distinction between society and nation-state is basic to my argument. To the extent that we are using "culture" in its anthropological significance as the learned and shared institutions and techniques of a people, culture itself is an aspect of society, and what has been called national character is an aspect of culture. I think I can speak for all anthropologists in stating that the nation-state, as such, does not have a culture. If nation and society coincide, then the nation-state is one of the institutions of that culture; if the nation-state is composed of more than one society, it will also embody more than one culture, and manifest more than one type of national character. A simple example is my own country of Great Britain, or the United Kingdom; we are one nation-state but we embody at least four cultures - the English, the Scots, the Welsh and the Northern Irish; and nobody with any experience of these peoples would question, I fancy, the fact that they manifest four differing and, in some points, strongly contrasting national characters. To discuss so complex a concept as the Cultural Community of the North Atlantic Nations we must get our definitions straight; and I intend to restrict my use of the terms "culture" or "cultural" to the technical anthropological meaning. Culture, as I shall use the term, is an aspect of society; and a cultural community must imply a community of societies, and not - at least in the first instance - of nation-states.

I should confess that I only reached this position gradually. The arliest work on the national character of complex societies was undertaken during the last war to be of use in various aspects of psychological warfare; and the studies of the Japanese national character were studies of a nation. So too were most of the other studies of Asian societies with which I was then associated. In my book The American People the title is too inclusive even though in the preface and (in the English edition) in appendices I excluded the Southern States, and, to a lesser degree, Texas, rural New England and California.

When I came to write, with the late John Rickman, The People of Great Russia, I emphasized even in the title that I was dealing with only one of the societies in the U.S.S.R.; and similarly with the title of Exploring English Character. These are the only North Atlantic societies on which I have published. I took part in a study of French culture, meaning the dominant culture of central France; and during the war I participated in some fairly superficial studies of German societies which attempted to emphasize the differences between Prussian, Bavarian and Austrian. For the other members of the North Atlantic Community my information is confined to that derivable from a fairly wide reading and such observations as an alert tourist (in many of the countries) can make. I think I am aware of the gamut

of the traits exhibited by the national characters of the numerous societies which make up the North Atlantic Community; but there are several societies within this community about which I have no specialized knowledge at all.

In all the studies in which I have been involved the emphasis has been placed on the uniqueness of each culture, and of the national character which is its psychological expression. Although there are few, if any, traits customs beliefs or values which are unique, confined to a single society, the combination and pattern of the totality of traits, customs beliefs and values of any society is always, as far as we know, unique. I have conceived as an important task the pointing out of the differences which so frequently underlie superficial similarities. If I may quote from my study "The American People", the chief difficulties in Anglo-American relations arise "because English and Americans share varients of the same language, the same religions, the same political ideas, the same laws and the same physical types /and therefore/ each group expects the other to be a near replica of itself, and is continually being disillusioned and distressed when this expectation is proved to be unjustified".

This type of contrast is a constant feature of societies with a shared historical origin; for example between the Spaniards and the Portuguese, or between the Norwegians and Swedes. Indeed it could be said that for members of many societies their sense of their own identity depends essentially on a negative or a complementary definition. You know you are a Norwegian because you are not a Swede or a Dane, and conversely; and this sense of identity, of defining oneself as a member of a given society, would seem to be a basic necessity for the psychological well-being of peoples in advanced, technically complex societies. As far as the records can guide us, this sense of self-identity through membership of a nation-state defined geographically and politically is, comparatively speaking, very recent; earlier self-identity was defined in terms of kinship, wherever one's kin might happen to live by religion, or, at least in the case of the Greeks of the classical period, by language. In much of Africa today the problem of identity is the cause of very much political disturbance and distress in the contest between identity as a member of a tribe, and therefore ultimately through kinship, or identity as an adherent to a supra-cultural religion, and identity as a member of a geographically defined nation-state. The opposition to the merging of nation-states into a larger community, such as the North Atlantic Communtiy, would seem to stem in large part from a fear of the loss of identity, one of the basic fears induced by large-scale urban civilization; I would hazard that this fear of the loss of identity is a greater obstacle to the forming of a larger community for most people than are any of the overtly political complications.

The unique characteristics of each society with its culture and the resultant national character is, as far as is known, universal, an aspect of the social life of homo sapiens; but the discernment of the differences of culture and national character is, to a great extent, a question of perspective, of observational viewpoint. Anthropologists are professionally trained to look at every society as closely as possible, irrespective of its size and political importance and to analyze its unique variants of the universal institutions which every society manifests; and nearly all human beings have a quasi-anthropological attitude to the customs, speech and values of those societies which are nearest to them, either physically, as neighbours, or culturally through the sharing of common history, traditions or institutions; nearly every adult can be articulate about the differences between "us" and "them" in the next region, canton, tribe, on the other side of the river or the frontier, and so on. But habitually this ability to discriminate only applies to the nearest neighbours; the Scots or the Welsh, for example can be most articulate about the differences between themselves and the English and will lump all Continental Europeans together. And I wonder how many of the people here, who could tell me with great precision the differences between the citizens of the United States on one side of the lake and the citizens of Canada on the other, nevertheless consider that the whole of America south of the Rio Grande is inhabited by one amorphous society of "Latins"?

This question of perspective is an important one. Anthropologists group the unique cultures which are their primary object of study into "culture areas". To date, this concept has been most clearly elaborated in the sphere of material culture; the types of objects which are made or traded do tend to group discrete cultures into larger wholes. Since material objects are easier to study with precision than are institutions, customs and values, the most precise delineation of culture areas has been in terms of concrete traits; but underlying such expressions of aspiration as "United Africa" or the "North Atlantic Community" is the hope that these geographical descriptions are already, or are capable of becoming, single culture areas with sufficient shared values, customs and institutions to maintain coherence.

I myself do not believe that the North Atlantic Nations constitute a single culture-area. As far as my knowledge goes, I would assume that there are three major culture areas in Europe and Northern America; and that these three culture areas may be conveniently, though probably not quite precisely, distinguished by the versions of Christianity which have been dominant in them in recent centuries; the Orthodox societies, the Catholic societies, and the societies influenced by the Protestant Reformation.

It is a question of the greatest complexity, which I am not competent to answer, whether the differing versions of Christianity were adopted, or prevailed, because they were congruent with the predispositions, values and character of the peoples assenting to them, or whether the preponderating influence of the churches in government and education, until very recent times, transformed the character of the peoples into congruence with the values of the dominant sect. The only clue I possess is a slight knowledge of pre-Reformation English literature; and this does tentatively suggest to me that the English had Protestant characters before they had Protestant dogma.

These three confessions emphasize three different means by which the faithful may be apprised of God's will and guide their conduct, which in turn represent three different types of character. For the Orthodox, a Pentecostal illumination will show the Truth to the group, or, exceptionally, the individual earnestly seeking it. The pious Roman Catholic will keep in the right by scrupulously following the rules laid down by his spiritual superiors who, in their turn, are bound by obedience to their superiors, and to the minutely codified laws which bind the conduct of layman and priest alike. The Protestant prayerfully searches his own heart and studies the scriptures to ascertain whether he is following the Lord's will, whether his conduct is moral.

These three approaches embody three different ideals of behaviour: the Man in the Truth, the Man in the Right, and the Moral Individual. And these three ideals not only guide the conduct of the faithful and identify the characteristics they try to elicit in their children; they also inform the climate of opinion, indicate the predominant values of lay institutions, from government to education, for the societies in which these creeds have been dominant, whether or not the majority of their members consciously subscribe to the creeds in which these values were embodied. And in many ways these three attitudes to human nature have, till now, been mutually incompatible, each convinced that they alone are correct and that the other approaches are mistaken or sinful. This mutual intolerance still persists, though the chief cause for disdain has shifted from religious to political ideology. We all claim to be democrats and to live in a democratic society, as earlier we all claimed to be Christians and to live in a Christian society; but our version of democracy, as formerly our version of Christianity is, we maintain, the only one which really deserves that honoured name.

Because they are inarticulately held, these three different ideals of upright behaviour, and the type of society and institutions which will advance them, would seem to be a major cause for the mutual incomprehension and intolerance within the

geographical area which might constitute a North Atlantic community. The Man in the Truth depends ultimately upon revelation. The Truth exists, for him, in perpetuity; it can be discovered by exceptional holiness or by exceptional historical insight, by the study of the Gospel according to St. John or of dialectical materialism according to Marx, Engels and Lenin. When the Truth has been revealed, the duty of man is to live in the Truth as completely as possible; even the slightest deviation runs the cataclysmic risk of the descent into the abyss of total Untruth, of Sin. Societies based on the revelation of Truth inevitably tend to rigidity; although different aspects of the Truth are revealed over time, at any one moment there is only one Truth and an infinity of perilous errors. Compromise on any serious point is, inevitably, a dereliction from the Truth.

The Man in the Right depends ultimately upon codified laws. Knowledge, precedent, foresight, reason, precise definitions employed with the greatest clarity and intelligence available will produce the code of laws under which the upright man should live. He may interpret the letter of the law with all the ingenuity of which he is capable; but the body of law and precedent, whether of church or state, is superior to all those who live under the law. The law will contain provisions as to how it may be modified or added to in detail; but the law, as a whole, can only be overturned by violent revolution, by temporary anarchy from which a more perfect law will subsequently be evolved. Revolution may occasionally be necessary, but it is deplorable in itself, a last resort; and, except in times of revolution, the man in the Right should live under the law, should submit himself and his interests to the regulations and interpretations made by the specialists who are by definition his intellectual or spiritual superiors.

The man in the Right has contempt for those who do not acknowledge the rule of law; they are, in the precise sense of the term, uncivilized and therefore unreliable. One can, indeed one must, negotiate with people who are not in the Right, who do not demonstrate their allegiance to the letter of the law; but one cannot rely on them and so should not get involved too deeply. They may suddenly appeal against the letter of the law in the light of a new revelation of the Truth or, what is even more unpredicatable, by an appeal to natural justice against the letter of the law.

The Moral Individual, and the societies he composes, places comparatively little reliance on revealed truth or on codified law. The source from which the Moral Individual derives the knowledge of upright conduct is from his own heart of conscience fortified by the scriptures; he believes deeply that every human being has natural capacities for discerning true justice and the proper way to forward this obviously desirable goal; if he communes with himself with sufficient earnestness and sincerity he will learn the Will of the Lord or the moral course of action more accurately than by reliance on any other source. Moral Individuals, and societies composed of moral individuals believe that every individual has both the capacity and the duty to "make up his mind for himself" on all questions of moral importance. He should take into account revealed truths, or truths held to be self-evident; he should not unwittingly flout the law, for ignorance of the law is no excuse; but the ultimate fount of authority and the individual's true guide to upright conduct is the innate sense of justice, fairness, equity which each individual possesses and can gain access to. For moral individuals compromise is desirable, if no principles are betrayed, if it is in accord with both parties' sense of natural justice; to refuse to compromise is to be rigid, or legalistic, both terms of opprobrium for the moral individual, each a term of commendation for the man in the Truth and the man in the Right respectively.

I have dwelt at some length on these three approaches to upright conduct which I think characterize the three culture-areas of the North Atlantic Community because I believe that these are symptomatic of the type of difficulty and mutual incomprehension which prevent the North Atlantic Community being more than a

geographical expression. While the people who practice one approach to upright conduct consider that any other approach is not merely misguided but wrong and dangerous there can never be that delegation of authority, of sovereignty which must precede the transformation of the North Atlantic Community into a cultural as well as a geographical expression. I believe, as I have written before, that behind de Gaulle's veto of Great Britain's adherence to the European Economic Community lies the distrust of the Man in the Right for the unpredicatable Moral Individual.

Together with the differing approaches to upright conduct go differing definitions of the high abstractions which men value and wish to achieve. You will forgive me for recalling that in the second world war President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill launched a slogan to subsume our war-aims: The Four Freedoms - Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear. Once this neat slogan was launched it was found that it could not be neatly translated into any other language; in no other language that I know of does a single word carry the two connotations of not-being-prevented-from and being-protected-from. All agree that Freedom is good; but there are many differences as to how this good is rightly defined. And so with all the other goods men value.

I stress the understanding of the goods, the goals men strive for in the differing cultures and culture-areas which comprise the North Atlantic Nations; for a viable North Atlantic Community can only be built on the best aspirations, not the fears, of the peoples who will compose it. Fears can make, do make, a temporary alliance; but when the fears diminish the alliance disintegrates if there are not also shared aspirations. A detailed and objective study of the implications of the high value abstractions in every language would be a most useful preparatory work for all multi-cultural associations.

I have been discussing cultures and culture-areas, rather than nation-states in the last few minutes for a number of reasons. The first is my conviction, to which I shall shortly return, that a North Atlantic Community can only be built by a coalescence of societies and their cultures, not by an alliance of nation-states. The second is that, owing to relatively recent historical events, some nation-states contain within their boundaries more than one culture and, on occasion, representatives of more than one culture area - I will witness the U.S.S.R. and Belgium, among many others; and in a few cases in Europe, and many more in other parts of the world, members of one culture are divided by a national frontier.

To the best of my knowledge, there does not exist a comprehensive map of the cultures of the North Atlantic Nations. There are linguistic maps; and where there is a difference in language, there is prima facie evidence for difference in culture. But the converse does not hold true. The same language may be shared by people of strongly contrasting cultures: the English-speaking peoples are a striking example of markedly differing cultures sharing the same language. The same would appear to be true of the German-speaking people, the Italian, Spanish and French speakers. Accent and minor turns of phrase or vocabulary will distinguish Prussians, Bavarians and Austrians, Milanese, Romans and Sicilians, North country, Midlands and Southern English, Middle West Americans, Middle West Canadians and so on; but with varying degrees of intensity these speakers of variants of the same language will identify themselves with their local culture and its geographical area rather than with the nation-state in which this culture is enclosed. Most members of regional societies have also loyalty to and a strong sense of identification with the nation-state to which they belong and, in confrontation with other nation-states will sink their regional loyalties in patriotism. When there is no such confrontation, they tend to consider themselves Bavarians or Sicilians or Southerners, and so on, in the first place; only secondarily, most of the time, will they consider themselves Germans, or Italians, or citizens of the United States.

I should like to suggest to you that these local cultures are the bricks with which a North Atlantic Community could be built, over time. The society with its distinctive culture is, as far as the records go, the natural, the universal unit in which homo sapiens has always lived his life; and for the majority of mankind over recent millenia societies have nearly all had a specific geographical location. By contrast the nation-state is a relatively recent invention in the history of the human species.

The first nation-states seem to have arisen around the great rivers of Asia and North Africa and may, as Dr. Wittfogel has suggested, have developed this form because of the need for large-scale organizations to deal with problems of flooding and irrigation; and this form of social organisation extended comparatively slowly to the rest of the world. Even two centuries ago, large areas of the inhabited world were not organized into nation-states; this was true of all the sparsely inhabited portions of the globe - Australia and much of the Americas - and large sections of the more densely populated areas; over much of the world the local or tribal society was paramount. We can imagine human beings living full and adequate lives without the existence of nation-states, for we have many simple examples; we cannot imagine human beings living full lives without a local or tribal society, even though it be politically submerged within a nation-state.

The accretion and expansion of local societies has been a very gradual process, perhaps taking nearly as long a time as the history of homo sapiens. The very earliest men may have been organized into societies little larger than a single family and very gradually amalgamated into larger units; but in the time-scale of recent history local societies and their cultures appear much more persistent than nation-states. Examples can be found from many frequently fought-over areas of Europe or Asia; Alsation culture, for example, or Sicilian, or Greek have persisted over centuries though the peoples have been included under a variety of national suzerainties. Nation-states change their frontiers, expand the contract, even disappear from the political scene; but, as far as the records go, the local societies and their cultures continue with a very slow natural rate of change, even though their political life be modified according to which nation-state is paramount over them at a given period.

The painful history of this century has shown that local societies and their cultures can be physically destroyed by extermination or forcible dispersal; but there are also many examples of the resilience and vitality of local cultures preserved for generations, despite the tyranny of dominant nation-states.

The resilience, vitality and persistence of local cultures are an asset which we would be unwise to neglect. As I have said, there is no cultural map of the North Atlantic area; but, did one exist, I do not think there would be very much difference between a cultural map of this area in 1800, and one made today (with the partial exception of those areas which were then very sparsely inhabited). But if one looks at a political map of 1800, showing the territories of nation-states, there are few portions of the map which are the same as those of today, apart from geographical areas with "natural" boundaries such as sea or mountains which are also nation-states. Nation-states are unstable entities though this fact is disguised because political history is typically written from the view-point of the dominant culture. We in England think that the history of Britain extends over millenia - the late Hugh Gaitskell claimed that Britain's entry into the Common Market would terminate "a thousand years of history"; but over many centuries of this millenium England was not paramount over Wales or Scotland, and, for quite a few, was paramount over much of the territory which is now France.

The major reason for the instability of nation-states is that the self-definition of all nation-states includes the claim to absolute sovereignty. In the

whole history of this institution there are no examples known to me of nation-states willingly abrogating their sovereignty over any considerable period. There are temporary alliances and treaties in plenty, but to date these have always been ad hoc arrangements, either a military alliance with a specific goal, or treaties with escape clauses or terminal dates.

This seems to me inevitable; nation-states are designed as autonomous monads. Indeed, in the early history of this invention, nation-states seem to have conceived of themselves as unique; the earliest states, China, Mohenjo-Daro, even Egypt did not (it would appear) need to acknowledge the existence of a rival or rivals; they were complete and absolute by themselves.

Today, a nation-state which does not retain the autonomous right to make or abstain from war and to regulate its own economic and fiscal policies is a contradiction in terms. The fact that the dominant societies of nation-states do or do not belong to the same culture-area, have similar or contrasting definitions of upright behaviour and the other differences which I referred to earlier is on the whole irrelevant. If they do not share the same predispositions and values, and ignore the differences hidden under similar words and actions this may exacerbate relations and lead to unnecessary misunderstandings; but however close the values of the dominant societies of nation-states may be - and it would seem as though, during much of Europe's monarchical history, the values of the dominant groups were very close - their relationship has always been at best an unstable equilibrium.

It follows that I agree with what I understand to be the position of General de Gaulle that one cannot build a North Atlantic Community on an aggregation of nation-states. L'Europe des patries - a Europe of sovereign states - would seem to be one more ad hoc alliance. But I do not for that reason think that a North Atlantic Community is impossible to achieve; I think it is essential as a preliminary to that world community which we must devise if the human race is to continue to exist. Human beings invented the nation-state; it should not be beyond human wit to devise another form of organization now that the nation-state has become too dangerous.

Although nation-states as we have known them have necessarily been incapable of long-term mutual accommodation, the submerged regional societies and their cultures have had long experience of this. In Europe I believe, though I could not demonstrate this, the regional cultures comprise a larger proportion of the population than do the dominant cultures. This would appear not to be the case on this side of the Atlantic; but even here they are no insignificant proportion of the total population.

I should like to suggest to you that a North Atlantic Community might be able to be constructed if the units were regional societies, rather than nation states. Regional societies have a quasi-biological permanence, compared with nation-states; the great majority have the historical experience of restricted sovereignty, of living peaceably enough under the domination of some superordinate national culture. True, a certain number of regional cultures in the past have revolted against the superordinate society which was felt as oppressive, as enjoying a national sovereignty to which the regional society felt it had an equal right; as a result we have had an ever-increasing proliferation of nation-states. Such regions had never submitted willingly to subordination by the dominant culture; typically they were dominated by conquest.

With the changed technologies of communications, production of power, and weaponry the role of nation-states could easily be diminished; and the role of regions comparably enhanced. Regional areas would need to be sociologically demarcated, for in nearly every modern nation-state the regions have been quite arbitrarily broken down into administrative units - counties, departments, states, provinces and so on - which are only casually related to the local culture of the inhabitants. It is my

belief however that, with the partial exception of the metropolitan conurbations, the adult inhabitants of the countries of the North Atlantic nations are quite clear (in the vast majority of cases) about their identification with a specific regional culture; and that consequently it would not need much more work than is entailed in a national census or referendum to produce a map of the local societies and their cultures in any technologically advanced area.

Once the areas of the local societies have been determined, they should be granted the greatest amount of autonomy possible. They will not be military units, for in most cases they will not have the necessary economic base; but I presume that a North Atlantic community would aim at the disappearance of national armed forces in favour of a supra-national or multi-national force. They will not be economically self-sufficient; but here again modern technology is already evolving multi-national and supra-national industrial and power complexes. There would be a need for a common currency throughout the area, and for a minimum legal basis, for entrenched clauses which could not be repealed by a single local society. But these provisos apart, each region would be independent and encouraged to develop its own distinctive culture and view of the world and of upright conduct.

Among the rights which I should like to see assigned to every region is that of determining its adherence or relationship to a metropolis; and this right would include double adherence, of which we have a prototype in the constitution of the state of Andorra. If double adherence of a region were allowed, it would clear away most of the major causes of dispute and discontent which perpetually vex the old world. There is a very considerable number of regional cultures over which two or more nation-states claim paramountcy: I will give as examples the Tyrolese, the Saarlanders, the Transylvanians, the Kurds, the Armenians, the Somali. If regional cultures were autonomous, within the limits I have outlined, one of the major causes for dispute and war would be eliminated.

I had better state that, in this context, I am not advocating the enhancement of States Rights, as this is understood in the U.S.A. The boundaries of the several states are political and are often as arbitrary, from the cultural point of view, as most of the frontiers of the ex-colonies of Africa. I would think however that there are distinctive cultural areas within the United States that would properly qualify as autonomous regional societies.

The autonomous regional societies of the North Atlantic area would constitute the units who would determine the shape and actions of the North Atlantic Community. If I am right in discerning three major culture-areas in the North Atlantic area, there might well be three subordinate groupings for government and religion between which the autonomous societies could choose their adherence. But I am deeply convinced that a North Atlantic cultural community can only be solidly built by allowing for, and emphasizing, the cultural diversity which distinguishes mankind and not by wishing it away and seeking to impose a single cultural pattern. Cultural diversity is the richest of our inheritances, and the one most fraught with possibilities of human development and invention; we must preserve this with all our best efforts as earnestly as we strive to preserve the human race from annihilation.

National Conference 9/13

NINTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

of the

UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

NOTE ON CREATION OF A PRIMARY AND SECONDARY INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The creation of a great international school in the capital of the United States, the center of attraction of the free world, would answer a real necessity.

To be sure, the United States can put American schools at the disposal of its guests, but these schools are unable to meet a number of noteworthy situations.

Diplomats from every country in the world, of all races and colors, foreign journalists and businessmen and so many others very often come to Washington for a limited time, but take up residence there with their families.

The problem of educating their children is all the more pressing as the standards of local schools vary considerably and private schools involve tuition fees too high for the average budget to bear.

The crux of the problem, moreover, is that families arriving in Washington with school-age children have the greatest difficulty in integrating them into the American cycle of studies and encounter the same difficulty on returning to their home countries. The problem of the equivalence of a diploma received in the United States arises, in particular, with regard to admission to universities in most countries.

It is noted that a private French school and a German school have been opened recently in Washington. It appears, however, that they are unable to solve the problems confronting them, because of their operating costs, the quality of the teaching or for other reasons.

A solution could certainly be found if all those interested - for various reasons - joined forces to open a great international school in Washington.

In addition to these reasons of opportuneness, there are others which are no doubt of overriding importance to the United States, whose world-wide responsibilities are gradually extending to every field of human activity.

The problem of teaching and education is becoming increasingly a problem of prime importance for all countries in the world. The developed countries seek to adapt teaching to the new requirements of the modern world: development of technical, scientific and mathematical knowledge, the learning of languages and, above all, the maintenance of a vast pool of knowledge and of a vast general culture. The developing countries seek to create an educational system and network in which the example and experience of the West play a leading part.

Everywhere the problem of educational reform is posed, in the U. S. as elsewhere.

It would, then, be extremely desirable for the United States to seize the present opportunity of meeting a local need in Washington to initiate an educational experiment based on a combination of various systems and capable of serving as a "pilot school" or, one might say, "pedagogical laboratory" from which both national and foreign educators could draw inspiration.

For that purpose, it would be absolutely necessary to associate with it other countries, particularly those whose cultural contribution to the world has been and is essential and whose way of life derives from a common inspiration and origin.

Such an experiment, to have a chance of success, must be based on a definite concept and must not aim at solving all problems at once. The experiment, therefore, must be bold, but prudent, so that all chances of success will be on its side.

In reality, one cannot forget that what is at stake is an experiment in education in which the responsibility of those who undertake it is so great that they are obliged to succeed. Otherwise, the education of a generation of young people would be compromised.

The author of this note admires the financial effort being made by the United States to develop throughout the world a system of scholarships and he is familiar with the generous welcome extended to scholarship holders who have the good fortune to complete their education in that great country. But this effort is concentrated essentially at the university level.

The Washington International School would constitute an example at the primary and secondary school levels.

It appears, by the way, that the United States intends to create a network of American schools abroad, following the example of other countries, such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, etc.

In view of these projects, it would seem desirable first to create a prototype, which could then serve as a model for other schools to be created, or at least as a guide and example for them.

II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL

It is proposed that the International School be established on the following bases:

a) Taking advantage of an international environment to concentrate teaching on the study of modern languages and enriching the curriculum with the culture of the countries where these languages are spoken.

b) Elaborating a curriculum constituting a broad compromise among the curricula of the countries having an educational system of international renown and, perhaps, constituting a synthesis of these. The high level of this instruction will thus be assured and the recognition of diplomas will be facilitated.

c) Dispensing instruction in deference to individual conscience and faith: neutral instruction respectful of religions and permitting them to be taught to the pupils.

d) Educating students towards mutual understanding, opening their minds widely to world problems and preparing them to be good world citizens, while retaining their pride in their fatherlands.

III. THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM

A distinction should be made between the languages of instruction and the languages taught.

Languages of Instruction

To give the International School a truly international character, it would be essential for the basic instruction to be given in several languages, permitting most students to get this instruction in their mother tongue or in a closely related language.

But, in order to succeed in the experiment and to assure the unity of the School, it is essential to limit the number of languages so that the preparation of a uniform curriculum for all linguistic sections is possible and class scheduling problems are still soluble.

It is proposed, therefore, that 3 or, at the most, 4 language sections be opened from the start, viz. those which make it possible to meet the most evident local needs while remaining within the framework of the same cultural inspiration, to wit:

- An English language section
- A French language section
- A Spanish language section
- and, perhaps also, a German language section - in order to include the existing German school in the common effort.

The basic instruction would be given in these languages and students would enroll in the section of their choice.

Second Language

From their youngest age, the students would be trained by the most active methods in the fluent and thorough practice of a second language, so that they could use this as a language of instruction from the secondary level on. This would be the "vehicular language".

Certain branches would be taught compulsorily in this language, e.g. from the 7th grade on. The branches which seem to lend themselves best to this are history, geography, history of art, geology, etc. But, even before the 7th grade, this language would have been currently used in singing lessons, manual training, physical culture, drawing, etc.

Thus, the branches taught in the vehicular language would be given either in French or in Spanish to students choosing English as their first language and in English or Spanish to students whose first language was French, etc.

Third Language

All students would be required to learn a "third language", e.g. from the 8th grade on.

This third language would have "to be learned so as to be used fluently at the end of the secondary studies". The most active methods should be employed to this end, but the students should also have acquired by then a literary culture in that language.

Thus, students who chose the "English" or "French" section would take Spanish as the third language. Those who chose the "English" or "Spanish" section, would take French, and those in the French and Spanish sections, English.

Other Languages

Within the framework of the American political perspective, one would be tempted to consider the foregoing insufficient.

Why not teach Russian, Chinese, Arabic, Italian, Portuguese or Dutch, not to mention African and Asian languages.

Great caution is imperative. The opening of linguistic sections in those languages is certainly not to be excluded. Still, it would be necessary for the number of students to justify them and for those countries to be prepared to cooperate in the experiment.

A solution can be sought in two directions:

a) Students whose mother tongue was not English, French or Spanish could receive instruction in their mother tongue if their country supplied the required teacher to the school.

b) Students who chose a course of studies without Latin could be required to choose the study of a 4th language, e.g. from the 9th grade on. This language could be one of those mentioned above, subject to the availability of a teacher and the possibility of solving the problem of scheduling classes.

N.B. To conclude this point, it is essential to note that the teaching of languages, however desirable, is limited both by the student's capacity of absorption and by the necessity of establishing a balanced curriculum covering a whole group of subjects.

IV. CURRICULUM

Within the framework of an international school such as the one envisaged, it can be considered that the objective is preparation for university studies. The curriculum, therefore, must be conceived accordingly.

Now, every country has developed a curriculum in keeping with its own traditions in the field of education, taking national contingencies into account.

A simple comparison among the curricula of countries with great traditions in the field of education shows, however, that these curricula are everywhere identical or comparable for at least 70 percent of their content: Teaching everywhere includes the mother tongue, arithmetic and, later, mathematics and science, history, geography, literature, classical and modern languages, manual

training, physical culture, sports, music and the arts; in some countries, philosophy in secondary school.

It is all a question of intensity or orientation toward an extended general culture or more or less early specialization.

This concrete problem of a compromise among the curricula of different countries arose in the European Schools created by the European Communities at the seat of their institutions. There are at the moment 5 such schools - 6 soon - with 4,000 students.

The solution was found on the basis of mutual concessions made by each of the countries. They reached unanimous agreement, preserving what each of them considered indispensable to permit the recognition of the school diploma for all civil purposes and for admission to the universities of the six countries.

The diploma issued by the Schools has since been recognized by Austria and by the Swiss and English universities, and this recognition has, in addition, been inserted into the Agreement on Equivalence of Diplomas that has just been negotiated by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

It is obviously not indispensable for the Washington International School to adopt the same curriculum. But it can be recommended as a basis for negotiation on the curriculum to be established, since it already constitutes a compromise in the sense of what has been said above.

The above proposal in regard to languages is, moreover, inspired by the practice and experience of the European Schools, which use the 4 official languages of the Community (French, German, Italian, Dutch) and English.

V. ORGANIZATION OF STUDIES

On the basis of the same experience of the European Schools, it is proposed that the Washington International School adopt a primary and secondary study cycle covering 12 years, viz.:

a) a kindergarten for children from 4 to 6 (outside the cycle).

b) Five years of primary studies (minimum age for admission, between 5 1/2 and 6 years).

c) Seven years of secondary studies validated by a high-level final examination.

During the 5 years of primary school, a sufficient knowledge of the second language should be acquired.

The secondary cycle should assure a balanced preparation, in particular:

- A broad general and humanistic culture;

- A thorough knowledge of languages;

- A reasonable knowledge of mathematics and science;

- A course of college preparatory studies;

- A civic education receptive to world problems;

- A physical and athletic education assuring a balance between spiritual and physical development.

These problems were solved as follows in the European Schools:

The secondary cycle is divided into a 3-year "common trunk" followed by 4 years of specialization.

a) The same instruction is given to all students during the 3-year "common trunk".

The first year centers on an intensive study of the second (vehicular) language: 7 hours a week.

The second and third years are still characterized by the fact that all students learn Latin, even those who drop this language during the last 4 years.

The third year is characterized by the introduction of a third language (English), in which classes are held 4 and, later, 3 hours a week until the end of the studies.

b) The last 4 years allow several choices:

- A classical section, based on Latin and Greek, with more limited mathematics and science program than in the other sections;

- A Latin section (without Greek), with a highly developed mathematics and science program;

- A "modern-language" section with a highly developed mathematics and science program. In this section, a fourth modern language is mandatory.

Experience shows, however, that it would be desirable to have also a modern language section with the mathematics and science program of the classical section and in which part of the program would be devoted to human sciences (economy, sociology, statistics, etc.).

It is proposed that consideration be given to this organization of studies, which has proved its worth, as a basis for discussion on the creation of the Washington International School.

VI. PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL

It is possible to admit foreigners to national schools. It is also possible to allow other countries to open national schools abroad. But an international school presupposes a joint effort by several countries.

Regardless of the juridical statute of the School (considered below), it is proposed that other countries be associated with its operation.

On the basis of the linguistic sections proposed, it is suggested that a request be made from the start for the cooperation of Great Britain, France and organizations of Latin American countries, which could not fail to appreciate the possibility of cultural diffusion which such a School would offer.

The cooperation of these countries could be exercised in the following areas:

Pedagogical management of the School: These countries could be invited to sit on the "Pedagogical Council" of the School charged with:

- Curriculum planning;

- Organizing the supervision of the level of studies;

- Assisting the director and teaching corps;

- Organizing the final examination.

Pedagogical supervision of the School: These countries could be invited to designate a school inspector entitled to visit all the classes, who would then sit in the "Council of Inspectors" with his colleagues from the other countries.

Providing the teaching staff: These countries could be invited to designate professors and school masters from among their national teaching corps to assure the teaching of subjects to be given in their language and to teach languages.

In the same connection, other governments showing an interest in having their national language taught could also provide teachers for the School.

In this way, the experiment would be truly international and would constitute a major contribution to the study of pedagogical problems in various fields:

- Direct cultural cooperation among countries;

- Joint solutions prepared by renowned international pedagogues with responsibilities in their home countries within the framework of the Pedagogical Council and the Council of Inspectors;

- Cooperation among teachers of various nationalities and backgrounds;

- Students from every corner of the world living together.

It would be a truly exciting experiment, enriching and profitable to all.

VII. ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS

Juridical Statute of the School

Several opinions may be envisaged:

a) Creation of an international school based on an international agreement negotiated by a number of countries and ratified by the parliaments.

This formula appears needlessly complicated and could have political inconveniences. It could, in particular, give rise to reactions of wounded pride on the part of countries not invited to negotiate.

b) Direct creation by American authorities of a school having, accordingly, an "official" inspector.

The initiative could be taken by the State Department or the Department of Health, Education and Welfare or again by the District of Columbia or the State of Virginia (depending on location of the school buildings).

This "official" formula would undoubtedly be the best, since it would give the pedagogical experiment undertaken its full value and the character of a governmental commitment.

c) Creation of a "private" school having the status of a private law cultural association, but sponsored by the American authorities.

Organs of the International School

The International School should be endowed with the following organs:

a) A Pedagogical Council, referred to under VI, responsible for all fundamental decisions, including approval of the budget.

It could consist:

- Of representatives of the American authorities (State Department, Department of Health, Education and Welfare and others);
- Of a pedagogue designated by each of the countries participating in a major way in the school's life;
- Of pedagogues selected especially for their well-known competence either in the United States or abroad.

The Council should never exceed 9 or 12 members. It would meet once a year.

b) A Council of Inspectors consisting of the inspectors referred to under VI and charged with preparing pedagogical decisions to be taken by the Pedagogical Council, e.g. adaptation of curricula, need for professors and school masters, etc.

This Council should consist of no more than 5 members and would meet twice a year, or possibly three times in the beginning, on the occasion of their inspections.

c) A Board of Directors responsible for preparing and administering the budget, and in addition, for all aspects of school life.

It could consist of:

- A member representing the American authorities, as chairman;

- The school principal;

- Two representatives of the teaching staff;

- Two representatives of the Association of Pupils' Parents.

Special emphasis is laid on the importance of the cooperation of teachers and parents on this Board. This cooperation contributes greatly to the creation of a favorable atmosphere and harmonious cooperation, which is always harder to achieve in an international environment.

The Board could be completed, in case of need, by a member (or observer) from the Embassies of the contributing countries.

d) It goes without saying that the School would need a principal whose pedagogical standing was up to the difficult and delicate task that awaits him.

He could be of American nationality and assisted by a "deputy" from each linguistic section.

School Buildings

The school buildings should be placed at the disposal of the School gratuitously by the American authorities, and would remain Government property.

Being a "pilot school", it would be desirable for it to have enough land to develop the desired athletic activities. A 25-acre area is offered as a suggestion.

It will no doubt be hard to find this land in Washington itself. A corrolary of building the School at a distance from the city would be the necessity of organizing a pupil transportation system.

Financial Means

It would be highly desirable for students to be admitted free of tuition or upon payment of a very moderate fee.

By way of example, European School students whose parents are officials of the Communities or of a Member State enjoy tuition-free instruction. Others pay a registration fee of $15 to $60 a year, from which the Board of Directors may, moreover, exempt needy families.

This aspect of the problem is particularly important in order to prevent a school already so privileged from becoming a "caste school" to boot.

The consequence is, however, that the budgetary expenses would have to be borne by the public authorities.

Teaching Staff

If other countries consented to assign professors and school masters, it could be proposed that these countries pay their salaries and allowances.

It would be highly desirable, at any rate, to establish a statute for the teaching staff assuring all teachers equal living conditions (with foreign teachers possibly enjoying a special allowance and the right to an annual trip to their home country).

It should be fully realized that the work of the teachers in such a new type of school will be particularly arduous. They should be selected with utmost care. They would deserve the best living conditions, for the success of the School would ultimately depend on them.

Admission of Students

It would be of prime importance that the International School not constitute an "exclusive circle".

It is essential that, in addition to the foreigners applying for enrollment, there be a proportion of American students (e.g. 25 to 35 percent).

While it is to the interest of foreign students to have their own school for the reasons stated above, it is just as much to their interest to live an American life and to adapt themselves to it. Contacts with American comrades are very important in this respect, just as it is for the parents to know and associate with each other. Here, the Association of Pupils' Parents can play a very useful part.

It is also to the interest of young Americans to associate with and know foreigners.

This note is nothing more than a "working paper" and the proposals made should be considered only as bases for discussion.

The main thing is that an international - truly international - school be created in Washington and that it serve the great objectives which the United States pursues for the diffusion of its culture, understanding among men and peace in the world.

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U. S. National Commission for UNESCO

THE EXCHANGE OF PERSONS IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD

Prepared by:

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Chicago, Illinois

October 23-26, 1963

I readily accepted the invitation of the United States National Commission for UNESCO, requesting me, as the director of a private exchange organization, to say something of the reasons why these exchanges had increased so considerably in the last years.

It was my first reason for accepting, for it gave me the opportunity to explain how the exchange of persons supplements, in a way, the historical work accomplished when they sign treaties, come to trade agreements or alter the economic course of things.

But my second reason for satisfaction was even greater: I was asked if such exchanges could contribute to better understanding between Americans and Europeans.

Naturally, my reply is affirmative. But it will not be limited to a simple affirmation. I want to say right away that in my opinion these exchanges are not only desirable but are necessary.

I believe profoundly in the value of exchanges of persons. In a Continent where national egoism has done so much harm--I refer to Europe--I believe exchanges of persons to be one of the surest means of combatting mistrust, intolerance or simple antipathy.

Ignorance of the life of others is one of the fundamental elements of a reserved or hostile attitude. Knowledge of the conditions of their life, in particular of their working and family life, is, to my mind, essential.

In view of the special ties, both political and economic, linking Europeans and Americans, and taking into account that in the natural order of things, in the interests of those on both sides of the Atlantic, such ties will continue to increase, it is not enough, in order to be able to say that Americans and Europeans know each other well, for a number of tourists, however considerable, to cross the ocean.

We will come back to this problem later, after we have examined certain aspects of the present situation in international exchanges.

The exchange of persons is a topic of the day

For years the big international organizations, both intergovernmental and voluntary, have been attempting to lay the basis of a technique, pedagogy and even sociology, of exchanges.

In this field we owe several specific achievements to UNESCO. In 1954 UNESCO called a number of specialists together in order to study the techniques of training those responsible for journeys and exchanges. In 1956 they examined the techniques of receiving young foreigners. In 1959 the pedagogical institute in Hamburg studied the pedagogical problems of the program of international exchanges for young people and adults. Finally, in May 1960, the UNESCO Institute for the Young at Gauting-Munich brought together travel technicians and sociologists to analyse the influence of international exchange programs and travel.

During the same period, the countries of the Western Europe Union officially set up a study group for the coordination of the exchange of young people, and the Council of Europe, which soon took the matter up within its cultural and social sector, was to render extremely important services.

Finally, it is very symptomatic to notice that at the official opening of the Experimental European Center for the Training of Young Executives it was the problem of international exchanges that formed the subject of the inaugural session.

All that proves that we are right to re-examine these problems together.

Touring

Within Europe the possibility of organizing charter plane flights has entirely changed the way of relationships.

Together with this, more spare time is available. The 5-day week has been generalized; countries where the workers have only two weeks'holiday are behind the times; many have 3 weeks and a very large number of big French firms have just started giving 4 weeks'holiday.

Radio and T.V. networks systematically exchanging programs and relays on an international scale, commercial disk distribution and, of recent years, the multiplication of transistors, have all enabled the masses to make themselves acquainted with programs of international activities.

A veritable leisure and travel industry has sprung up. But one may wonder whether these millions of men, women and children who travel about in other countries go back home with any more understanding of the people and the problems of the countries visited. One may even imagine that some of them even return to their own countries with their former prejudices strengthened.

Let us, then, pose the problem.

Exchanges in Europe

Those reponsible for international exchanges must be abreast of the times, i.e. they must lead those under their administration to a natural conscience of the shrinking of the world and the widening of the common destiny. The young people of today, whether manual workers or intellectuals, will carry the responsibilities of a world linked together in economic and cultural communities much more closely than it is today. The world of the next thirty years will have nothing in common with ours. But that world must remain man-size. I mean by that that it must retain structures finalizing in the development of everyone.

The object of any cultural effort, of any "exchange" policy, indeed of any policy whatsoever, is mankind--what has been called its "eminent dignity". This pre-supposes respect for the individual, a respect which is in a certain amount of danger from mass civilizations.

Well, the European problem is that of this personal development parallel with the achievement of a community Europe necessitated by world evolution.

After the war, the mass of individuals had to understand, follow, accept and recognize the necessities of European reconstruction. An immense task was undertaken. It still exists.

I would ask my American friends to understand our difficulties in Europe, multiplied by 100 in relation to theirs.

We do not have the equivalent of their federal government. We have an historical afterbirth: my young compatriots are taught from the cradle that Caesar said the Belgians were the most gallant of all the peoples of Gaul; the little Germans take their bottle to the sound of a famous national Anthem; the French youngsters are dazzled by the meteors that made France, from Richelieu to Napoleon.

Add to that the fact that these people speak innumerable languages, that they keep up former antagonisms and tensions which have never been given the direct lie since the Treaty of Verdun and the dividing up of Charlemagne's Empire.

The Different populations do not have the common instrument of speech constituted by having one sole language, as is the case in the United States for English, which brings together all the citizens of the country, whether their families be Italian, French or Scandinavian.

Finally, our old religious differences, though much less spoken of today, nevertheless remain present in many minds. And the great difference in the level of existence between the peasants of Calabria, Greece or Turkey and the English or Dutch working class means that it is difficult to find a common denominator.

All that had, and has, to be overcome. Apart from treaties, which are the affair of the clinicians of political life, we can only do this on an individual basis, by a long effort over a whole generation; by the application of a new, active and non-scholastic pedagogy, essentially based on direct contact, on bringing people face to face and on the establishment of spontaneous conversation.

Without preparation, too many young people set off on their travels in a permanent state of nationalist comparison. Actually, most of them set off with the idea of looking for what they have left behind them, instead of seeking something new. When they don't find it, they become irritated and return further from understanding others than they were when they left. Travel is an article of everyday consumption and must be made to yield its maximum for the comprehension. Yet the technique of modern communications, which would seem to be our principal ally, often rounds on us and our effort.

It is, in fact, a serious and troublesome paradox that the speed and ease of modern means of communication prevent the traveller from getting to know people and things, replace, to the detriment of men's knowledge, human

contacts by a quick glance at masterpieces, bring about a superficial attitude, skin-deep knowledge. The need to feel secure when travelling, means that the traveller does not realize the extraordinary isolation in which he is made to move.

Yet we have traditions in Europe with which we can link up, although these traditions left their mark only on minorities. From the times of Athens and Rome we have had international universities. We have seen Romans learn Greek to go and study at Athens university. We have seen North Africans speaking Latin and Greek, learned at the great universities of their time.

Since the Middle Ages, and more previsely since 12th century, great European universities have been set up. From Salamanca to Louvain, from Paris to Heidelberg or Oxford, ploughing their track over the roads of Europe came these bands of "errant scholars" hurrying to take their degrees with the most famous masters of the day.

Then came the glorious blossoming-out of the Renaissance. Latin again became the current language. Erasmus was a man from everywhere, knowing everything, his influence was enormous and thousands of intellectuals did not know whether they were Dutch, French, Belgian, or German: they were of Europe.

The great nationalist crises of the 19th century and the atrocious wars of the 20th were to break all that.

It is against that history, those prejudices, frontiers and language barriers that we have for 10 years already, undertaken--that hundreds of private and public organizations have undertaken--to react by means of exchanges and especially by human contact with the native. But by what method?

Exchanges on an occupational basis

All technicians find that most of these prejudices melt away when the journey is not merely a passive one, when the individual has a role to play, his own job and responsibilities in the group travelling. Success is even more likely to be ensured by directing centers of interest, during the journey, towards the only stable elements of present day special life, namely salaries and success in one's occupation. There is no doubt at all that exchanges based on the desire to learn foreign languages or on the exercise of a profession do away not only with the isolation and insecurity of the contacts but give rise to conversation on a lasting basis.

It is even noticed that this beneficial influence is exerted not only on the traveller but also on his host, on his family circle when he gets back, and often on his office or factory friends, who attach far more importance to what he tells them than to any talk given by an employer, teacher, or foreign technician. That is where we see a real change in the attitude towards the "host" country; we also find that the individual revises his opinion and attitude in regard to his own country.

The method which therefore seems to us to be most beneficial is to bring together, under the most favorable conditions, men having basic, common occupational interests. They compare their salaries, their standard of living, the comfort of their homes, their social security system, their trade union membership, the access of their children to educational facilities, and so on, and this apprenticeship by reciprocal comparison can be founded only on what can be seen to be the truth in everyday life. These workers will become aware of the similarity of their destinies and will soon be wondering how it was possible, for instance, that the Lorraine steelworker and the Dusseldorf steelworker could have been set one against the other till the end of their days. They have the same difficulties in their work, the same bosses, the same houses, the same anxiety for their children's future. From an awareness of the similarity in their destinies is quickly born an awareness of the community of their destinies. But for that a certain number of technical and pedagogical conditions are indispensable.

First of all, the exchanges must be prepared. The motives and expectations of the participants must correspond to the realities of the program. Interest must be oriented beforehand towards a small number of essential points that will be gone into more thoroughly. The faculties of working as a team and the sense of responsibility must be developed. Some small knowledge of geography and languages must be given and existing stereotyped attitudes and prejudices must be skillfully prised off.

This is the price that must be paid if the worker is to leave with a relative feeling of security and the commencement of an attitude that will give him quicker identification and consequently quicker liking for the new surroundings or partner.

This implies a sort of travel philosophy and also the training of technicians responsible for the exchange groups. All cultural and travel organizations are unanimous that the capacity of the person responsible for the groups constitute the essential element for the success of the operation. The responsible person is the key person. Therefore he must always be well trained. The importance of this is such that it must be given priority over obstacles. All educators agree that it is better to have a good responsible person than a good program. And that a group is as good as the person responsible for it.

Finally, and it is on this note that I shall end this chapter, the follow-up of the expedition must be organized. This is where the big cultural organizations still have the most progress to make. I mean that technical means must be found of keeping in contact with the worker AFTER his return to his country, in order to keep up and prolong the beneficial effects of his journey for as long as possible.

In this respect, the exchanges we organize between boroughs of different countries, in the form of "borough twinning," have, by periodically renewing contacts with certain elements of the groups exchanged, certainly contributed to maintaining an excellent spirit of friendship which has been added to an interest which might have lost its keenness. The habit of enjoying joint activities at regular intervals is an essential element of rapprochement.

I must say that, except under exceptional circumstances, this kind of activity can only be conceived between towns and boroughs that are not too far from each other. Official association between towns and boroughs in Europe have been created and are flourishing. Exceptions apart, however, they are never more than 100 to 250 miles from each other. An experiment it would be difficult to apply to exchanges between Europeans and Americans.

The Necessity for Exchanges Between the United States and Europe

In conclusion, I wish to speak of relations between the United States and Europe.

As the French say, "There is no point in breaking down a door if it is open". Let us recognize at once that exchanges exist and are numerous.

For example I shall only mention the immense effort undertaken in the granting of Fulbright Scholarships in order to pay tribute to it as one of the most useful and most generous of initiatives.

Nor shall I enlarge on the numerous foundations existing in the United States and those set up in Europe, which enable quite a number of people to cross the Atlantic each year.

My plea is for a particular sort of exchange--that of persons exercising the same profession and not having the financial possibility to visit the other side of the Atlantic.

I have already said why exchanges of persons having the same occupation had made their appearance in Europe. It appears to me that they are today necessary between the United States and Europe.

Why? Because that seems to me to be one of the best ways for impressions and influences that have to contribute to a better understanding of each other to be reflected back into family and occupational surroundings. These family and occupational circles must be reached if we, who live on either side of the Atlantic, wish to fight the ignorance and prejudices liable to cause faltering in a quick march towards our interdependence.

We must realize one thing: it is that in the years to come, Europeans and Americans are going to have to live together more and more. We have tasks to accomplish in common. The institutions that may be created will be but instruments. The commercial, economic, financial and even political agreements will be the superstructure. Intendance will follow with understanding, with interest, with the desire to cooperate, only if it is made clear why one way has been chosen rather than another and why one must contribute towards attaining the objective proposed.

I am not going to make a speech on the misunderstandings that exist between us. It is not only the military that have had to learn that the word CONTROL has a different meaning. There are our girls and boys who must learn that vicar and curate mean the opposite according to whether you pronounce these words in French or in English. And semantic misunderstandings are the least serious.

Need I recall that it was the Americans who in 1948 encouraged the Europeans to create mass movements to sustain the European idea?

It is not quite the same thing that has to be done. But how useful it would be if American subway workers came to live in European families where they would meet men doing the same job as themselves. And why could they not do the same as the employees of the Berlin subway whom we sent to punch tickets in the Paris subway, and vice-versa? Why should not some American civil servants--those who fill out forms every day, or make others fill them out--come to Europe on an exchange basis, as we have done in Europe, so that they would understand that both their jobs are the same and that national regulations would have to be changed? And that they can help to see that those changes take place harmoniously in the interests of everyone?

A multitude of examples could be given.

We should set up a vast, precise program of exchanges between the U.S.A. and Europe, in favour of the different categories of worker. The program would be financed by private initiative and the governments.

It should not be developed behind closed doors.

On the contrary, it should be made public, be surrounded by the publicity necessary to make it appear as the indispensable complement decisions of policy made by the governments.

What I propose is that a new mission--the consequence of a situation that is going to develop rapidly--should be fulfilled. In a word, let us help ourselves to learn to live together.

That, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, is the concrete proposal I submit for your deliberation, in concluding my address. It is for a complementary nature to what is already being done, particularly in favour of students. My proposal is, of course, only a basis for discussion. The aim to be reached is to set up and guide between our two Continents a cultural current that will be the support and tomorrow the driving force of our Atlantic Community. My proposal may not, of course, prejudice exchanges between our two Continents and the rest of the world.

The truth is that exchanges of persons are becoming increasingly indispensable, for we must and will tend towards universalism. It is for the educators to canalize and master the enormous means that technique has placed at their disposal, so that this current shall prevail over all others.'

NC 9/15

9TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE

OF THE U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

Held in cooperation with

the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Conrad Hilton Hotel

October 23-26, 1963

REVISED PRESS SUMMARY

Uwe Kitzinger

The European and the Atlantic Community;
Regional and Functional developments
for the Future

Mr. Kitzinger, Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, said that the pace of technology had made the nation state as obsolete as the Dodo. The question was what best to put in its place.

The dangers of regional groupings lie in their potentially racist overtones; the dangers of ideological groupings lie in their potentially fanatical exclusiveness; but that functional groupings relatively free from the mystical encrustations of nation states, continents and ideologies show a much more promising path to world survival.

There are two and only two main problems in the world today: the population, poverty and race issue raised by the terrible economic and social inequalities in the world today, and the ideological issue posed by the opposition of Marxist and liberal philosophies now entrenched in power-political blocs. Of these the North-South issue would soon be more important than the East-West issue, but both demand a mature and sophisticated response. It is against these problems that the new Europe and the organization of Atlantic defense and economics have to be judged.

His conclusions were not just to make Japan an integral member of the Atlantic Alliance, but to go beyond the Alliance, beyond even an ill-defined "partnership", to the partial surrender not just of European but also United States sovereignty in clearly defined domains: to deal by the "Community Method" with defense and space research of course, but also with the demands of science and education, with freer trade in industrial products, with world agriculture, the world monetary system, and aid to the developing countries. But instead of creating new European or Atlantic superstates, and giving them all but unlimited powers over a limited area, we should corrode the whole concept of nation states and power blocs by subtracting from the state

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AFTER SIX MONTHS: A TRUSTWORTHY TRANSLATION OF POPE JOHN'S ENCYCLICAL, PACEM IN TERRIS

Prepared by:

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A major project of our Center for Peace Research at Creighton University in Omaha has been a rigorous historical review of the so-called "traditional just war doctrine." We undertook this project two years ago in the hope of offering some guidance to Catholic and non-Catholic scholars who are attempting, with scant success up to date, to relate that doctrine to the problem of nuclear warfare.

We have concentrated largely on the writings of Vitoria (1487(?)-1546) and Suarez (1548-1617) on "peace," "war," "unjust warfare," types of "war," the "human community," and "jus gentium" (law of nations). In neither Vitoria and Suarez have we found that "war" is used as the name of any particular historical event e.g. Roman wars, feudal wars, Spanish wars. War is almost exclusively discussed within the general framework set by Thomas Aquinas. War can be the name of a deliberate hostile act or sequence of acts which infringe upon "external peace;" it can also be the name for acts which result in destruction and death but which "defend" the peace. The first meaning of peace refers to the condition of a human person who is joined to God by Divine Charity. In principle, this internal peace finds outward expression in one's ordinary acts and in the behavior of persons and groups of persons toward each other.

Hostile actions, disruptive of external peace, are divided by Vitoria and Suarez into two kinds: either armed attack upon a peaceful people, or "injurious actions" of some other kind, generally an infringement of rights, customs or laws. An injured people could morally "defend the peace;" that is, they might respond in an appropriate manner. Such response could take the form of armed resistance to armed attack. The name of this response (for both Vitoria and Suarez) was "defensive war" (bellum defensivum). It is important to note that they conceived this "defensive war" as being different in type from hostile armed response to all other kinds of injurious action.

I suppose you have all heard of the celebrated conditions of a "just war" which make up the so-called traditional just war doctrine. Very briefly, they are: 1) the war must be declared by a legitimate authority; 2) for a just cause; 3) fought with a right intention, and 4) "debito modo," that is, principly, the innocent should not be attacked. Many barnacles have attached themselves to this doctrine through the centuries. For example, one modern Catholic writer lists no fewer than nine conditions, one being that you must be certain that your opponent is in the state of mortal sin. Now, Vitoria and Suarez did not apply these famous conditions to "defensive war." Neither believed that "defensive war" required special moral justification since they believed that such action was consistent with a human being's love of God and his personal condition of "internal peace." As I have described it, "defensive war" was "forced" upon an innocent Community. Fighting such an engagement, therefore, was considered to be "an involuntary act."

On the other hand, Vitoria and Suarez taught that procuring destruction and death in response to "injurious action" of other kinds was a totally different undertaking. They called war of this kind "offensive" or "aggressive" war. It was this type of war which, it appeared to them, required special moral justification. Offensive or aggressive war was the

"just" or "unjust" war; as a matter of fact, only this type could properly be called "war". And it was in connection with this war that the "conditions" were conceived and stated.

As Vitoria and Suarez saw the problem, it was concerned with discovering just how the human will could be said to love peace while voluntarily procuring destruction and death. Since the injurious action to which offensive war was the response would not involve destruction and death, how might the Christian will voluntarily embrace "war" as a means of redressing, preventing and punishing injurious action?

The conditions of "just warfare" were intended to describe ranges of hostile human action in such a way as to leave intact the Christian's constant adherence to God and his unbroken dedication to peace. The conditions, therefore, are "outer limits" of human behavior and choice.

Both Vitoria and Suarez regarded offensive war as an "institution" as having been brought in by the "jus gentium" as a means to protect the peace. Hence it was a product of human ingenuity, not a "built-in" device of the natural law. Should human ingenuity ever find a successful device in its stead, the institution of offensive war would (and should) pass away.

If we apply this teaching to the passage in question, it seems perfectly clear that Pope John was referring only to the bellum offensivum or aggressivum. It seems likewise clear that he left intact the whole problem, and a sticky one it is, of the morality of a defensive nuclear resistance.

Comparative Texts for
"After Six Months --A Trustworthy Translation of The Encyclical Pacem in Terris"

America Press Translation
("(This English version) has been reviewed and collated with the official Latin text...Careful review of various modern-language versions reveals that they are free from any gross defects. Early criticisms of the Vatican-released translation seem to have rested principally on differences of literary judgment." Editor's note.)

Official Latin Text
(Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. LV, 20 April, 1963)

"The Pope Speaks" Translation
("...a translation prepared directly from the official text. To our knowledge, all other translations circulating in this country are based on the Italian version of the Encyclical, though in manycases the official Latin was taken into account to a greater or lesser degree." Editor's note.)

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44. On the contrary, the conviction that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity has been generally accepted. Hence, racial discrimination can in no way be justified, at least doctrinally or in theory.

Latissime e contrario ea opinio pervasit et obtinuit, omnes homines esse naturae dignitate inter se aequales. Quam ob rem, saltem in ratione disciplinaque, nullo modo probatur hominum discrimen, causa;

Today, on the contrary, the convicti is widespread that all men are equal in natural dignity; and so, on the doctrinal and theoretical level, at least, no form of approval is being given to racial discrimination.

111. And one must bear in mind that, even though the monstrous power of modern weapons acts as a deterrent, it is to be feared that the mere continuance of nuclear tests, undertaken with war in mind, will have fatal consequences for life on earth.

Ac praeterea, quamvis immanis militaris apparatus potentia hodie homines a bello suscipiendo deterreat, nihilominus tamen est cur timeatur, ne ipsa atomicorum instrumentorum experimenta belli causa suscepta, nisi cessent, varia vitae genera in terris grave in discrimen possint adducere.

Moreover, even though the monstrous power of modern weapons does indeed act as a deterrent, there is reason to fear that the very testing of nuclear device for war purposes can, if continued, lea to serious danger for various forms of life on earth.

113. All must realize that there is no hope of putting an end to the building up of armaments, nor of reducing the present stocks, nor still less of abolishing them altogether, unless the process is complete and thorough and unless it proceeds from inner conviction; unless, that is, everyone sincerely co-operates to banish the fear and anxious expectation of war with which men are oppressed.

Omnibus tamen persuasum esse debet, non posse neque rei militaris augendae intermitti studia, neque arma imminui, neque -- quod caput est -- usquequaque armamenta de medio tolli, nisi huiusmodi ab armis discessus plenus expletusque sit atque ipsos attingat animos; nisi scilicet omnes concordem sinceramque operam dent ut ex animis metus atque anxia belli expectatio pellantur.

Everyone, however, must realize that unless this process of disarmament be thoroughgoing and complete, and reach men's very souls, it is impossible to stop the arms race, or to reduce armaments or--and this is the main thing--ultimately to abolish them entirely. Everyone must sincerely co-operate in the effort to banish fear and the anxiety expectation of war.

America Press Translation

127 And for this reason it is hardly possible to imagine that in the atomic era war could be used as an instrument of justice.

137. Today the universal common good poses problems of world-wide dimensions which cannot be adequately tackled or solved except by the efforts of public authorities endowed with a breadth of powers, structure and means of the same proportions; that is, of public authorities which are in a position to act in an effective manner on a world-wide basis The moral order itself, therefore, demands that such a form of public authority be established

138. A public authority, having world-wide power and endowed with the propoer means for the efficacious pursuit of its objective, which is the universal common good in concrete form, must be set up by common accord and not imposed by force.

Official Latin Text

Quare aetate haec nostra, quae vi atomica gloriatur, alienum est a ratione, bellum iam aptum esse ad violata iura sarcienda.

Cum autem hodie commune omnium gentium bonum quaestiones proponat, omnes contingentes populos, cumque huiusmodi quaestiones nonnisi publica quaedam auctoritas explicare possit, cuius et potestas, et forma, et instrumenta qequa sint amplitudine, cuiusque actio tam late pateat quantum terrarum orbis; tum exinde sequitur, ut ipso morali ordine cogente, publica quaedam generalis auctoritas constituenda sit.

Haec autem generalis auctoritas, cuius imperium ubique terrarum vim habeat, idoneisque instrumentis ad commune bonum universale conducat, omnium utique populorum consansione condenda est, non vero vi imponenda.

"The Pope Speaks" Translation

Thus, in this age which boasts of its atomic power, it no longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice.

Today the universal common good presents us with problems which are world-wide in their dimensions; problems, therefore, which cannot be solved except by a public authority with power, organization and means co-extensive with these problems, and with a world-wide sphere of activity. Consequently, the moral order itself demands the establishment of some such general form of public authority.

But this general authority equipped with world-wide power and adequate means for achieving the universal common good cannot be imposed by force.

N.B. Extract from America editorial, 25 May, 1963, p. 732: "Some widely publicized criticisms of the English translation issued by the Vatican had caused many to ask whether the English-speaking world had been misled as to the the Pope's real thought. The Cardinal's (Suenen of Belgium at the United Nations) words should settle all such doubts. Reading from an English text that was obviously the product of painstaking preparation, he quoted at length one of the very passages quoted by critics. Since he cited without change the Vatican's English version, it is clear that Cardinal Suerens, for one, is satisfied that the disputed translation (of paragraph 111) accurately conveys Pope Johns thought." Cardinal Suenens departed from the America translation of paragraph 137: " In our time (the Pope writes), the universal common good poses problems of worldwide scope. They can only be resolved by a public authority whose power, organization, and means of action also have worldwide scope and which can take action throughout the whole world. It is thus the moral order itself which requires the organization of a public authority of universal jurisdiction. This organization of a general character, whose quthority extends throughout the world, and which possesses effective means for the promotion of the universal good, must be established by unanimous agreement and not imposed by force."