

Editorial Team

Ana E. Juncos, University of Bristol;
Anaid Flesken, University of Exeter;
Annemarie Peen Rodt, University of Exeter;
Richard G. Whitman, University of Bath.

As always we welcome contributions and comments on the *CFSP Forum* to cfspforum@lists.bath.ac.uk

Contents

The Role of Local Ownership in ESDP Police Missions in the Western Balkans: Catch-22?	1
The EU and Conflict Resolution in Cyprus: Lessons from Northern Ireland	14
The Coalition Government: A Changing UK Foreign Policy?	23

The Role of Local Ownership in ESDP Police Missions in the Western Balkans: Catch-22?

Elena B. Stavrevska, Central European University

The launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),¹ as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), provided the European Union (EU) with the practical means to become involved in peace support operations. ESDP missions have been both military and civilian. However, with the biggest number of missions to date being civilian, the EU has primarily been engaged in the areas of police reform and rule of law. Seven years after the launch of the first ESDP mission, EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

¹ The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed with the Lisbon Treaty to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Due to the time period covered in this paper, however, I will be using the former.

(EUPM), reflecting on the performance of the missions is crucial.

Both academics and practitioners agree that one key factor that contributes to the success of civilian missions is local ownership. This has been one of the essential elements of most ESDP civilian missions as well. This concept is usually understood to mean local actors taking responsibility of the outcomes of the reforms resulting from the peace settlement. This article, however, looks at the concept as local actors' responsibility, i.e. ownership over the reform process as well. In particular, it focuses on the role of this concept in police missions in the Western Balkans. This region has seen the deployment of the first ever ESDP mission, the first military mission, the development of the integrated civil-military approach, the largest military mission and the largest civilian mission to date. Consequently, the Western Balkan region has not only been the birthplace of ESDP, but also its 'testing ground'. There have been four civilian missions in the Balkans so far: EUPM in Bosnia, EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, EUPAT in Macedonia and EULEX Kosovo. This article analyzes and compares the two police missions in the region, EUPM and EUPOL Proxima. Specifically, it concentrates on the period between 2003 and 2005, which in the case of the mission in Bosnia engages with the EUPM I mandate only.²

² This paper is largely based on confidential interviews conducted by the author in Berlin, Brussels, Sarajevo and Skopje with Bosnian, Macedonian, EUPM, and former Proxima officials, officials from the European Commission and the Council Secretariat, and various experts in the field in 2009 and 2010. The author is truly grateful for the cooperation and assistance provided by the interviewees. While all of the interviewees have given consent to be quoted, for reasons of confidentiality their names and positions are not mentioned here.

Based on the research finding that the sustainability of the reforms whose continuation has been handed over to the local authorities differs between the two cases, it addresses the question of what influences these differences. The paper argues that the greater engagement in the planning and the decision-making during the reform process of the local actors, the more sustainable the reforms. It further develops three chronological stages of involvement: (1) consulting locals in the mission planning and building political consensus for the reforms, (2) involving local expertise in developing key reform documents, and (3) engaging local authorities in the decision-making throughout the reform process. This means that the local authorities are present in the early conceptualization of the reforms, rather than inheriting certain pre-done 'homework'. The research shows that the third stage alone is not sufficient to ensure reform sustainability.

EU Police Mission in Bosnia

When discussing police reforms in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH or Bosnia)³ one ought to keep three critical issues in mind. First, 'security sector [including police] and rule of law reforms were not clearly articulated objectives among policy makers at Dayton, nor during the immediate post-war pe-

³ The long and devastating Bosnian war was finally settled with the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995. The settlement led to the creation of two entities within the state of BiH: the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republika Srpska; and Brcko District, which has special status and is administered by international representation with ambassadorial status. The Federation has ten cantons with separate political and administrative institutions. According to the Constitution, all aspects of policing were left to the responsibility of the two entities (in the Federation further subdivided into ten cantonal police forces, in Republika Srpska, sub-divided into five public security centers) and Brcko District.

riod.⁴ Second, in the case of BiH one needs to distinguish between police reform and restructuring. While implementing police reforms within the old structures at moments looked like a Sisyphean task,⁵ neither the UN-led nor the EU-led police mission was mandated to initiate a political discussion about police restructuring. Over time, on the initiative of the Office of the High Representative (OHR)⁶ and in particular HR Lord Ashdown, the police reform agenda evolved to one focused on police restructuring.⁷ Third and closely related, the overall police reform began without a broader political agreement or complete legal reform, which additionally burdened the activities in the police sector.

The EU deployed its first mission to BiH only in 2003, with the EUPM taking over from UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF). Its goal was 'to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice'.⁸ It had four strategic priorities: (1) development of police independence and accountability under political oversight, (2) fight against organized crime and corruption, (3) financial viability and sustainability, and (4) institution and capac-

ity building at management level.⁹ These four were pursued through programs on seven themes: (1) crime police, (2) criminal justice, (3) internal affairs, (4) police administration, (5) public order and security, (6) State Border Service, and (7) State Information and Protection Agency.¹⁰

The mandate of EUPM has been prolonged and amended several times since. The 2003-2005 mandate came to be known as EUPM I, covering the priority areas listed above. The EUPM II (2006-2007) had different objectives, as well as differently organized portfolios, while picking up on the most important, uncompleted aspects, such as fight against corruption and organized crime, of the EUPM I mandate. The same was the case with EUPM III (2008-2010), with each new mandate having more and more focused approach, leading to the Bosnian police being the most reformed police sector in Europe.¹¹ Overall, the EUPM I was believed to be pursuing a long-term institutional reform strategy with an aim of changing the police structures,¹² which also led to the 'perception of political bias: the police reform was suspected of a hidden agenda, of being used as a means to another end, namely, state centraliza-

⁴ Susan Penksa, 'Lessons Identified from BiH: Strategies for Developing Domestic Reform Agenda' in Andreja Dolnicar Jeraj/Ivana Bostjancic Pulko/Tobias Flessenkemper (eds.) *Seminar on Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Security Sector Reform and the Stabilisation and Association Process*. Sarajevo: Center for European Perspective (2008), p. 28.

⁵ EUPM official, interview with the author, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁶ In the newly created post-Dayton state structures, the OHR had an incredible concentration of power, significantly increased through the so-called Bonn powers, which gave the HR the authority to impose legislation and to counteract 'anti-Dayton behaviour'.

⁷ Penksa, 'Lessons Identified from BiH' (2008), p. 29.

⁸ Council of the European Union, *Council Joint Action*, Brussels (2002).

⁹ EUPM, *European Union Police Mission—the first mission under the European Security and Defence Policy. Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2003-2005*, Sarajevo (2006), p.4

¹⁰ Ana E. Juncos, 'Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina' in Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (eds) *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (2007), pp. 61-62.

¹¹ EUPM official, interview with the author, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹² Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, 'ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges,' *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10:2 (2005), p. 8.

tion.¹³

From an evaluating perspective, the EUPM I mission ought to be credited with at least two achievements. First, it 'has advanced the transformation of the Bosnian police from an instrument of ethnic warfare into a professional service.'¹⁴ Second, it contributed significantly to the change of Bosnian policing mentalities, institutions and practices, as well as bringing them closer to the European norms and standards.¹⁵ At the same time, some issues, such as organized crime and corruption, have remained high on the list of problems the country is faced with, and are therefore the key problems that EUPM III has been focusing on.

However, looking at the planning phase of the mission, two factors have affected the way the Planning Team carved out the EUPM I mandate, which ultimately affected its effectiveness. First, the three fact-finding missions in the pre-planning phase were rather brief and only visited the BiH capital, which clearly had an impact on the proposals they prepared.¹⁶ Second, in many instances 'the Planning Team based its planning on the assumptions that the IPTF programs would have reached an advanced stage of development by the end of 2002,' which proved

to be inaccurate.¹⁷

Another problem that the mission was faced with in the implementation of the mandate was, as mentioned before, the legacy of its predecessor, IPTF. With the first Head of Mission of EUPM being the former Commissioner of the IPTF, and many officers transferred from one mission to the other, the line of distinction in the eyes of the public was rather blurred, often leading to confusion where the IPTF's mandate stopped, and EUPM's started. Additionally, many of the IPTF field location officers that remained as part of EUPM, instead of adopting the programmatic way that was foreseen for EUPM, were left to a day-to-day operationally focused path. This was one of the factors that delayed the program and project implementation, and it was only after a rotation of a significant number of EUPM officers, former IPTF, that this was changed.

Moreover, analyzing the initial structure and strategy of EUPM, they appear to be more compatible with an executive mandate than a non-executive one of monitoring, mentoring and inspecting. Similarly, it is important to note that, while the EUPM I had a non-executive mandate and could not initiate disciplinary or criminal investigations against police officers, it could bring problematic cases to the attention of the HR/EUSR, who had the authority to remove the person in question from the function. To that end, the Bonn powers were an assisting mechanism, which could be invoked by the OHR if needed.

In addition, the mandate was broad, aiming at establishing sustainable police in accordance with the best European and international practices, which were

¹³ Judy Batt, 'Seminar Academic Report' in Andreja Dolnicar Jeraj/Ivana Bostjancic Pulko/Tobias Flessenkemper (eds.) *Seminar on Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Security Sector Reform and the Stabilisation and Association Process*, Sarajevo: Center for European Perspective (2008), p. 19.

¹⁴ Michael Merlingen, 'The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM),' in Giovanni Grevi/Damien Helly/Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (2009), p. 162.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ EUPM, *European Union Police Mission* (2006), p. 14.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.15.

nowhere stipulated at the beginning of the mandate. This created confusion among the EUPM personnel, who were unsure of what benchmarks were to be met, and marked the overall mission mandate implementation.

Finally, the reports and benchmarking system from 2003 did not provide reliable indicators that would allow for a comprehensive overview of the project implementation. The system allowed for measuring the progress made, but said little about the actual quality.¹⁸ As a result, mission personnel did not make a secret of their disregard of projects. Consequently, the mission was left to improvise and develop a benchmarking system to meet the existing needs. The 'learning by doing' was confusing not only for the EUPM personnel, but even more so for the local police.

Despite these problems, however, EUPM I 'monitored the implementation of reform projects; mentored street police and mid-level management police in how to improve their work routines; advised senior police managers on how to overcome gaps in police operational capacity and improve police leadership and law enforcement strategies; and provided recommendations to political authorities on how to reform the security sector and the criminal justice system more broadly.'¹⁹ The mission was mandated to develop local capacity and ownership in the police sector, while depoliticizing the police itself.

Overall, the police reforms could be grouped under three categories: (1) those that continued being carried through by a subsequent mission man-

date or another international actor on the ground, (2) those, like establishing the SIPA in the case of Bosnia, that could be seen as one-off activities, and (3) those that were handed over to the local authorities to decide on their continuation.²⁰ Precisely in this third category one can see the concept of local ownership as usually defined, i.e. responsibility of the local authorities over the reform outcomes, applied. Given the complex structure of the Bosnian police, with the decision-making and implementation processes being decentralized not only to the two entities and the Brcko District, but going even further, to the cantonal and the public security centre police forces, the sustainability of the third category of reforms differed across units.²¹ Even though they were expected to cooperate closely with each other, if a reform was kept in place only in one of the units, the overall police cooperation would be made difficult.²² In addition, even though some of the reforms, which were to be decided upon, might have been useful in the long run, the different police authorities at the time hardly had the capacity to decide what was useful and needed at the operational level, without taking into consideration the political implications of the reform.²³

Overall, the implementation of the mandate of EUPM I was problematic, with certain predetermined outcomes given the impossibility of a total success without a meaningful reform of police struc-

¹⁸ Juncos, 'Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,' (2007), p. 71.

¹⁹ Merlingen, 'The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM),' (2009), p. 164.

²⁰ EUPM official, interview with the author, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²¹ Derived from author's interviews with Bosnian officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²² Bosnian Ministry of Security official, interview with the author, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²³ Derived from author's interviews with Bosnian officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

tures, which was not within the EUPM I mandate. Moreover, it was unrealistic to achieve the planned outcomes within a three-year timeframe. With most of the one-off programs that were introduced still in place, some of the other reforms became subject to local authorities and have regressed or been left aside in the reform process in some parts of the country.²⁴

EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia

EUPOL Proxima was deployed to Macedonia in 2003, following the NATO and then ESDP military missions present on the ground after the inter-ethnic conflict in 2001.²⁵ The overall police reform process in Macedonia was closely linked to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) implementation. Reforms in the security sector, including the police, were needed with the very adoption of the Constitution of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia in 1991 and the change of the political system. This also begged change in the role

of the police—from one protecting and preserving the public order and having the interests of the state as the guiding principle, to one protecting the citizens and having the individual and his/her rights and needs at the core of its activities. However, the process was delayed, and consequently, to a certain extent, this contributed to the conflict in 2001 and the inability to prevent the violent outbreak thereof. Among other stumbling blocks, the conflict shed light on the unbalanced minority representation in the police forces, making the police predominantly ethnic Macedonian, which resulted in ethnic biased policing.²⁶ With the signing of the SAA, and later the OFA, the Macedonian Government had taken up the responsibility to reform the security sector, specifically the police sector, and meet certain European standards, as well as address the long-standing issues outlined above. The EU, as one of the main mediators to the OFA and one of the guarantors of its implementation, was invited by the Macedonian Government to provide assistance in the implementation of the reforms in the police sector.

With assistance of European Commission (EC) experts, a Macedonian expert team developed a comprehensive National Police Strategy. The Strategy, as a key document guiding the police reform process, was approved by the Macedonian Government at the beginning of 2004. In this process, Proxima's legal team helped improve the Strategy by commenting on its draft. EU experts also assisted in the development of the Macedonian Integrated Border Manage-

²⁴ Derived from interviews by author with Bosnian officials, October 2010, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁵ The conflict started with sporadic and violent inter-ethnic incidents in March 2001. The clashes, primarily between the Macedonian security forces, composed mainly of ethnic Macedonians, and ethnic Albanian militia, continued until August 2001. The successful negotiations under the EU and NATO auspices provided the basis for preventing further escalation of the conflict and paved the way for a peaceful conflict resolution. This resulted in the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) on 13 August 2001. The Agreement stipulated several amendments to the Constitution and structural and administrative reforms that would ameliorate the inter-ethnic relations and establish solid foundation for multiethnic cohabitation. OFA included provisions about decentralization and delegating more power to local jurisdictions, better minority representation in the public administration, adapting the use of minority languages in public institutions at national and local level, and several other reforms. The provisions on minority representation in the state apparatus also required reforms in the security sector, including the police.

²⁶ Tobias Flessenkemper, 'EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia, 2003-05,' in Michael Merlingen/Rasa Ostaukaite (eds.). *The European Security and Defense Policy: Implementation Perspective*, London and New York: Routledge (2008), p. 80.

ment Strategy.²⁷ Proxima's objective was to monitor, mentor and advise senior and mid-level management police officers, and in that sense, help the implementation of the two strategies, the National Police and the Integrated Border Management Strategy. Its activities stretched across five programs: (1) uniformed police, (2) criminal police, (3) Department for State Security and Counter-Intelligence, (4) internal control, and (5) border police.²⁸ Mission teams were deployed to regional and local police headquarters in the former conflict areas in the north and the northwest part of the country, as well as to the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). With a mandate as ambitious as Proxima's, the mission faced challenges in completing all the programs within one year, which led to the mission being extended for another year. The 2004-2005 part of the mission came to be known as Proxima II, with a downsized staff deployed countrywide and a mandate covering three, as opposed to the previous five, programs shaped around: (1) organized crime, (2) public peace and order, and (3) border police.²⁹

The deployment of Proxima, as well as the extension of mandate, was accompanied by a concern of the Macedonian Government that having a peace mission on its soil would undermine its aspirations for becoming a candidate-country

for EU membership.³⁰ This ultimately determined the mission termination on 14 December 2005.

Proxima's biggest contribution is twofold. First, a large portion of the mission staff was deployed in the field, and provided much needed data on how the reforms were accepted and what the actual needs were.³¹ These assessments are perceived across the board as the most valuable legacy of the mission, and are often used even nowadays when it comes to certain investments in the sector, especially by foreign donors, such as the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). Second, Proxima was deployed in an already overcrowded theatre, with international donors often having different visions and different *modi operandi*. On numerous occasions this was confusing and frustrating for the local police.³² Proxima, however, became the dominant player in the sense of coordinating the foreign actors involved in the police sector, which was achieved primarily through regular expert briefings. Namely, in addition to the regular meetings of heads of the key international actors in the country, chaired by the EU Special Representative (EUSR), that ensured political coordination, the coordination in the police sector was ensured through the creation of the so-called 'Police Experts Group' that brought together the Proxima Head of Mission, the Coordinator of the EC Justice and Home Affairs Team (ECJHAT) and EC Police Reform Project (ECPRP), the EUSR Police Advisor, representatives from the EC

²⁷ Isabelle Ioannides, 'EU Police Mission Proxima: testing the 'European' approach to building peace,' in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU way. Chaillot Paper No. 90*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies (2006), p. 72.

²⁸ Isabelle Ioannides, 'The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima) and the European Union Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,' in Giovanni Grevi/Damien Helly/Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (2009), p. 190.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

³⁰ Flessenkemper, 'EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia,' (2008) p. 90.

³¹ Former Proxima official, interview with the author, October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.

³² Derived from author's interviews with former Proxima and Macedonian MoI officials, interview with the author, September-October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.

Delegation, the EAR, EU member states, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and other international actors involved in the reform of the Macedonian police forces.³³

At the same time, aside of the obstacles arising from the local context and the delay in passing the new police law in Macedonia, Proxima was faced with several obstacles in the implementation of its mandate arising from two key issues. First, the planning phase of the mission, which lasted for two months, did not provide a solid basis for a smooth kick-off of the mission. As a consequence, Proxima was to dedicate the first three months of the mandate to undertaking a detailed assessment of the state of the Macedonian police before starting any activities.³⁴ In addition, the mission was not equipped with 'police reform knowledge base and an appropriate toolbox for program management even though [the EU had] an inventory of standardized tools and methodologies,' which was owned by the EC.³⁵ This resulted in the mission personnel having to develop their own program development and management methodologies, and consequently, starting the reform projects only six months within the mandate, which led to many projects being incomplete at the end of the first year.³⁶ Second, the poor coordination among various EU actors on the ground and in Brussels also affected the mandate implementation. The mission, sharing its premises with the Office of the EUSR, had difficulties in preventing the EUSR

Office members interfering in the implementation of its mandate, which was at times very counterproductive. In addition, the relations between Proxima and the EC Delegation were problematic too. According to former Proxima officials, the mission was perceived as a competition to the EC PRP. To top it all, there was a great tension between the EUSR and the Head of EC Delegation, which was not kept secret from the public eye either.

However, beyond these problems, the mission accomplished some tangible results. To name but a few, Proxima's monitoring, mentoring and advising contributed to improved skills of the local police in fighting drug trafficking, strengthened internal control, and increased capacity for cooperation with the judicial branch and the neighbouring countries.³⁷ Additionally, due to the lack of a comprehensive benchmarking system at the EU level, the mission developed its own system by setting specific deadlines for result-oriented activities, which were monitored on a weekly basis. This system, being approved *ex ante* by the MoI, led to successful implementation of the reforms.³⁸

After the completion of the mandate, only few programs were picked up and continued being carried through by the EC Delegation and some of the embassies in the country. Importantly, many of them were completed as one-off, such as, for instance, developing a vision and mission of the Macedonian police. These, and other seemingly small things, are seen to have paved the way for the police reform process to progress and

³³ Ioannides, 'EU Police Mission Proxima,' (2006), p. 79.

³⁴ Flessenkemper, 'EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia,' (2008), p. 82.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Flessenkemper, 'EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia,' (2008), p. 93-94.

³⁸ Ioannides, 'EU Police Mission Proxima,' (2006), p. 76.

the crucial reforms to take place. It is important to note that there has been no regress in any of the aspects covered by the mandate, after its completion.

Finally, there appears to be an agreement on what was essential for the Macedonian police to be able to keep up with the pace of reforms.³⁹ First, during those three years (2003-2005), most of the MoI personnel were trained through various international donors' programs (including Proxima's) in different aspects of policing. This contributed to the overall capacity building, which allowed for the MoI to be at the core of the reforms and lead them further with less international assistance. Moreover, while the changes related to the integration of minority representatives in the structures did slow down the process, as any structural change would, it did not affect the reforms in other negative ways. Consequently, as observed by a former Proxima and later EC Delegation official, who had been present in the country since the planning phase of Proxima, the level of development is tremendous; the discussions one can hear among the MoI officials nowadays are at a completely different, a higher level than those after the conflict, and reflect the state-of-the-art in the police field across Europe.⁴⁰ While it is not easy in such a timeframe to go from disbanding paramilitary bodies to human resource management at the MoI, there has been a total change of horizon; 'there was a lot of effort to

get the ball rolling, but now the ball is rolling down the hill.'⁴¹

Are EUPM I and Proxima Comparable?

In order to be able to compare and contrast any two cases that are not identical, it is imperative to first outline the similarities and what makes the two comparable, as well as the obvious differences and caveats to be kept in mind when analyzing the two countries, Macedonia and Bosnia, and the two missions, EUPOL Proxima and EUPM I respectively.

Looking closely, the two countries have many similarities. Both have a multiethnic character and have gone through an ethnic conflict, even though the scope of the conflicts differed—the one in Bosnia lasted significantly longer, and was much more destructive both materially and in terms of human suffering, not to mention the state apparatus. In addition, the countries have similar histories, both being parts of the former Ottoman Empire, later the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and consequently part of former Yugoslavia, both existing as federal republics. Moreover, they were at a similar level of economic development, significantly lagging behind the other Yugoslav republics. To that end, the economic stagnation is equally an obstacle for development of both. Moreover, the International Crisis Group (ICG) country reports point to the problem of corruption even at the highest level of government, which is another obstacle to reforms in both countries.⁴² Starting from these similar circumstances, the conflicts in the countries differ and hence, so do the post-conflict

³⁹ Derived from author's interviews with former Proxima, EC and Council Secretariat, and Macedonian MoI officials, September 2009—January 2010, Skopje, Macedonia and Brussels, Belgium.

⁴⁰ Former Proxima official, interview by author, October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.

⁴¹ Former Proxima official, interview by author, October 2009, Skopje, Macedonia.

⁴² International Crisis Group country reports, see www.crisisgroup.org

settlements and the ESDP missions there.

First, while the peace settlement for Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement, aimed to re-establish the state institutions from scratch, post-conflict Macedonia remained a functional state, with many reforms to be undertaken. At the same time, the level of centralization of the two countries is significantly different, and has critically affected the outcome of the reform implementation. Namely, while Macedonia has been, until recently, a fairly centralized country, with the decentralization process happening parallel to the OFA implementation, in the case of Bosnia, the state structure is so complex that it has allowed for a lot more 'spoilers' and profiteers from a dysfunctional state to exist, and for the level of capacity to undertake reforms to be significantly lower.

Second, the two countries were at different stages in their relations with the EU at the time of the missions. Macedonia was struggling to get a candidate status, hence it was important to demonstrate its ability to govern its territory by itself. Bosnia, on the other hand, had only signed the SAA in 2008, and has only recently started to work towards harmonizing its legislation with the *acquis communautaire*.

Third, in both countries the EU has been present through various institutions and projects. However, one important difference can be found in the EU presence in Bosnia being somewhat streamlined and hierarchical, as it has been led by the OHR. The OHR has the highest concentration of power among the various EU actors on the ground and has at times played a role of one of the most important political actors in the country. Such

hierarchy did not exist in the case of Macedonia.

Fourth, focusing on the police missions only, the mandate of Proxima was limited to monitoring, mentoring and advising, while EUPM's objective was to monitor, mentor and inspect. The qualitative difference is in the possibility for the EUPM 'to inspect', i.e. the option to initiate removal from office of a non-compliant police officer. While this has, in general, been done by the Head of Mission communicating the non-compliance to the local authority in charge (usually the Interior Minister), there have also been instances when the issues have been taken further. Namely, with the Bonn powers at hand, the OHR can remove people from office. Different HR's have used this power to a different extent. However, the very possibility of being able to use this mechanism equips the EUPM with an 'executive extended hand' gives the non-executive mandate a different twist.

Fifth, each of the two missions, EUPM I and Proxima, developed its own benchmarking system for assessing the implementation of their mandate activities. Nevertheless, the EUPM benchmarking system was considered 'complicated and unable to identify the objectives of activities'.⁴³ The one in Macedonia, on the other hand, is seen as one of the tools that ensured the implementation of reforms.⁴⁴

Sixth, while the EUPM was deployed to Bosnia based on a UN mandate, derived from the Dayton Agreement, Proxima was deployed to Macedonia based on an

⁴³ Ioannides, 'The EU Police Mission (EUPOL Proxima)', (2009), p. 192.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

invitation by the Macedonian Government.

Seventh and foremost, while in the case of Macedonia the National Police Strategy and the Integrated Border Management Strategy, the main documents that led the reforms, were primarily prepared by national actors, in the case of Bosnia, the reforms were rather introduced from the outside based on the assessment of primarily external actors. In addition, 'Proxima's interventions in the local policing field [...] were programmed together with senior local officials of the [MoI].'⁴⁵ Moreover, the benchmarking system of Proxima was endorsed by the MoI which ensured smoother implementation of the reforms and willingness to adapt to the changes at lower levels in the hierarchy of the Macedonian police.

Additionally, it is also worth noting that those segments of the police structure that are affected by the current mandate of EUPM, which are in fact the core areas of the police reforms, can only be assessed, in a similar manner as in the case of Proxima, once the mission personnel has been withdrawn from the country.

Sustainability of Police Reforms and Local Ownership: A Love-Hate Relationship

Evaluating the present post-conflict situation, it is clear that in both cases there has been no return to violence, and peace has been preserved, but at the same time, definite conflict resolution has not been achieved by either one of the two. Instead, the two cases can be analyzed in terms of the progress made, and in the context of this paper,

the progress in reforming the police forces.

In both cases, most of the reforms that have been introduced and meant to remain (i.e. were not merely a temporary measure) are still in place. These are considered to be the critical aspects for the overall reform. Apart from them, the effects of most of the one-off programs of the missions – the ones, which did not continue to be carried through by another donor or within the subsequent mission mandate, are still present. Finally, the two cases differ in terms of the programs that were neither one-off, nor continued to be carried out by another donor/subsequent mission mandate, and were handed over to the local authorities to decide on their continuation. In Macedonia, most of these reforms are still in place. In BiH, on the other hand, it differs across entities, and even across smaller administrative units (cantons, public security centers and Brcko District).⁴⁶

This difference can be seen as a result of the origin of many of the reforms—as explained above, in the case of Macedonia, the strategic documents for the police reform process were developed by national experts, while in the case of Bosnia, the reforms were not genuinely conceived by Bosnian authorities. This is, clearly, not to deny the existence of the National Strategy on Community-Based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was developed by Bosnian police experts in 2006 and endorsed by the Police Steering Board, composed of the Federation Director of Police, Republika Srpska Director of Police, the Police Chief of Brcko District, the Director and

⁴⁵ Flessenkemper, 'EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia,' (2008), p. 86.

⁴⁶ Derived from author's interviews with Bosnian officials, October 2009, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Chief of Service of the State Border Service, the Director of the State Investigation and Protection Agency and the EUPM Head of Mission,⁴⁷ in 2007. Nevertheless, while this Strategy being of great importance, it only came into being in 2006/2007.

To that end, what made a difference was the autonomy of the institutional decision-making and the level of local involvement, and consequently local ownership, in the actual shaping of the reforms. While, as noted earlier, the concept of local ownership is usually understood as the locals taking responsibility of the outcomes of the peace process, in this context I use the concept to refer to the 'ownership' of the locals over the actual reform process. This could mean local experts' engagement in preparing the documents guiding the reforms and/or locals' involvement in the decision-making process regarding the reforms throughout the implementation. The greater the participation is, the greater the local ownership.

Out of the three different types of reforms mentioned—one-off activities, those that continued being carried through by other donors or subsequent mission mandates, and those whose continuation was left to the discretion of local authorities—given that the first two are still in place/undergoing in both Bosnia and in Macedonia, it is only the last category that differs. It is this difference, with the sustainability of those reforms in Bosnia varying across the different units, and the ones in Macedonia being preserved, that this paper sought to explain. Accordingly, the core of the proposed argument is the hypothesis that the higher the degree of local involve-

ment in shaping the reforms from an early stage, the longer lasting the reforms will be.

The argument can be seen as a three-stage development, with the stages being numbered in relation to the time of them taking place, rather than the degree of their importance. First, a higher autonomy or involvement of the local actors in the decision-making regarding the shaping of the reforms from the beginning can also lead to an early detection of the areas that need to be addressed. In most cases the state institutions do not have the capacity to do so immediately after the conflict, as it is already very difficult to bring the former conflicting parties to the same table in order to decide on sensitive issues in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Importantly, this would provide an opportunity for a political consensus to be built and set the basis for the reforms to take place. Resistance to change is expected, but the intensity of resistance is lesser when the decision has the backing of the leader of those subject to the changes. Moreover, even if a political consensus is not reached, bringing the different parties to discussing these issues allows for detecting the most sensitive areas and find feasible alternatives.

The second stage is linked to developing the key documents guiding the reforms. In most cases the reforms are based on the peace settlement, but the specifics thereof are defined in detail in various other documents. Bigger involvement, if not autonomy, of local experts in the field in preparing such documents affects the local police not perceiving the reforms as something alien and consequently, taking a greater responsibility over their implementation. Finally, the third stage relates to the local police au-

⁴⁷ EUPM, *European Union Police Mission* (2006), p. 49.

thorities' involvement in the decision-making during the actual reform process.

In Macedonia, the locals were involved in all three stages of the process. In Bosnia, they only became significantly involved in the third stage, i.e. after the reforms were already defined externally. This alone is not sufficient for local ownership over the reform process, and consequently the reform outcomes, to develop. At least one more of the former two stages is necessary for such a development to unfold.

In conclusion, acknowledging both the differences and the similarities in the contexts of the two countries, but also in the mission mandates and the actual implementation of the reforms, the paper outlines three different kinds of reforms: (1) those that are seen as one-off activities; (2) those programs picked up by other international actors or subsequent mission mandates; (3) those aspects that were left to the decision of the local authorities as to whether they should be continued or not. The research shows that the first two groups of reforms have remained in place, or have continued to be implemented in both cases. The third group, however, has proven to vary in terms of implementation in Bosnia, while it has been kept in place in Macedonia.

Analyzing these differences, the general argument the paper makes is that a greater engagement of the local actors in the planning and the decision-making during the reform process contributes to more sustainable reforms. The chronological three stages of developing that form of local ownership include: (1) consultations with the locals during the planning of the mission, which would al-

so provide the basis for building political consensus for the reforms, (2) involvement of local experts in the preparation of crucial documents guiding the reforms, and (3) engagement of local authorities in deciding about the reform throughout the process. This implies a modification of the concept of local ownership, when it does not refer to locals' responsibility over the reform outcomes only, but the reform process itself as well. This can be a result from local actors being involved in the process from an early stage in the three-stage development described above. ♦

The *CFSP Forum* welcomes contributions

CFSP Forum welcomes submissions for future publication. Articles should be 2,000-3,000 words in length with footnotes. This is an opportunity for young researchers, established scholars and practitioners to publish topical articles on all aspects of the CFSP/ESDP. For previous issues see:

www.fornet.info/CFSPforum.html.

Please note that we cannot guarantee publication of every article submitted.

Please email your article to:
cfspforum@lists.bath.ac.uk.

The EU and Conflict Resolution in Cyprus: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Etain Tannam, Trinity College Dublin

In many accounts, it is argued that EU membership helped resolve conflict in Northern Ireland, particularly in its effect on British-Irish relations since the 1970s.⁴⁸ The aim of this article is to determine the conditions conducive to successful international intervention in the Northern Ireland case and to apply these to the Cypriot case. The argument in this article is that the EU's influence on its members and on non-members (through aid provision to Northern Cyprus and Turkey and the carrot of eventual EU membership) is determined by domestic bureaucratic capacity, the existence of agency slack in the EU and the ability of kinship states to control their ethnic groups. In the first part of this article, the Northern Ireland case is examined. In part two, international intervention in Cyprus is examined.

Northern Ireland

Various conditions underlying the peace process in Northern Ireland were apparent by the 1990s: membership of the European Union (EU), institutionalisation of the British-Irish relationship and co-operation and skilled bureaucracy.

⁴⁸ For example, Meehan Elizabeth, 'Britain's Irish Question: Britain's European Question? British-Irish Relations in the Context of European Union and the Belfast Agreement', *Review of International Studies*, 26, (2000) pp. 83-97.

EU Membership

Institutional changes in Britain and Ireland coincided nearly perfectly with preparation to join the EU and eventual membership in 1973. While from a political science perspective, this coincidence makes it difficult to show that EU membership resulted in the institutionalisation of British-Irish cooperation, many authors have emphasised the role of EU membership in changing the British-Irish relationship. The process was multi-faceted. At a basic level, EU membership meant that British and Irish politicians and bureaucrats met more frequently and discussed issues, unrelated to their joint history. Indeed, by 2004, a former Irish Prime Minister, Garrett Fitzgerald warned that Irish governments too readily supported British bargaining positions in the EU, for example in security arrangements and taxation, and that both were to be found in the same camp on most functional issues.

Secondly, EU membership altered the status of Irish governments vis-à-vis the UK in bargaining with respect to Northern Ireland. EU Membership created a greater equality in the British-Irish relationship. Whereas before, Ireland and the UK were perceived to be 'un-equal sovereigns',⁴⁹ for one British Commission official, there was a gradual change in how British officials viewed their Irish counterparts, after EU membership.⁵⁰ Thirdly, the EU provided a consensual model of decision-making that lent ideas to both governments about their own relationship, but also about methods of

⁴⁹ Patrick Keatinge, 'Un-Equal Sovereigns: the Diplomatic Dimension of Anglo-Irish Relations' in Patrick J. Drudy (ed.), *Ireland and Britain Since 1922* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 139-161.

⁵⁰ European Commission, DG Enlargement, interview with the author, 11 May 2007.

resolving the Northern Ireland dispute. Fourthly, the EU provided incentives for cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and intervened in the conflict economically.

The EU became more active in Northern Ireland from the late 1980s. One of the key ways in which an EU role sponsored by the Commission was hoped to help conflict resolution was by encouraging Irish/Northern Irish cross-border cooperation through EU regional aid. Cross-border cooperation was heavily politicised in Northern Ireland: moderate nationalists and by 1988 extreme nationalists supported it, as it was connected to the erosion of the meaning of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Unionists opposed cross-border cooperation as they viewed it as a ploy to achieve a united Ireland.⁵¹ In the late 1980s the key principle that emerged in Commission policy to Northern Ireland was that of conditionality to attempt to advance cooperation between nationalists and unionists within Northern Ireland and cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Economic aid packages through EU Structural Funds became the pillar of EU policy towards Northern Ireland and towards achieving peace and reconciliation. If both communities failed to cooperate then money would not be granted – a carrot-and-stick approach to achieving co-operation. This economic aid model dominated Commission policy to Northern Ireland from 1988. For the period 1988-1994, although the Commission provided economic incentives through regional policy, it did not other-

wise play a pro-active role in encouraging the conflicting groups to cooperate.

Not only did the peace packages signify a greater EU financially targeted commitment to conflict resolution, it also precipitated a greater awareness among Commission officials of the significance of the Northern Ireland case and its possible lessons for other cases of conflict. Moreover, the new institutions established under the 1998 Belfast Agreement bore similarities to the EU's institutional framework. For example, the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) set up to govern areas of cross-border cooperation operated like the European Council. In addition, the conditionality principle used by the EU was based on a similar logic to British-Irish strategy – unless specific actions occur, incentives would be withdrawn. Thus, the EU and British-Irish intervention worked neatly together, using a similar logic, but with different specific aims. It is clear that British-Irish intervention was necessary for successful EU intervention.⁵² EU policy to Northern Ireland reflected joint British-Irish policy preferences, rather than being dominated by partisan preferences, or being unable to intervene at all, because of conflicting preferences among EU member states. Thus, EU member state preference convergence around EU support for Northern Ireland was essential for EU intervention in Northern Ireland.

While it is difficult to dispute that EU membership affected the British-Irish relationship, it is also clear that violence in Northern Ireland and domestic institutional changes, either closely pre-dated,

⁵¹ Paul Hainsworth and Gerard McCann, 'Change at Last: the 2004 European Election in Northern Ireland', *Irish Political Studies*, 19: 2 (1994), pp. 97.

⁵² Katy Hayward, 'Mediating the European Ideal: Cross-Border Programmes and Conflict Resolution on the Island of Ireland', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45: 3 (2007), pp. 675-693.

or coincided with EU membership. In the absence of these specific bureaucratic and domestic factors, EU membership alone may not have facilitated successful British-Irish intervention.

Institutionalised British-Irish Relationship

The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was an international treaty that could only be revoked by mutual consent. It obliged British and Irish representatives to meet at least twice a year in the formal inter-governmental conference. Apart from the regime created by an international treaty, the AIA and subsequent agreements created layers of institutional engagement between both governments, further embedding their cooperation and altering their decision-making processes. Participants have observed that after the AIA, British-Irish policy became more consensual, less adversarial and more based on a problem solving approach, whereby problems were solved jointly.⁵³

In contrast to confrontational politics, whereby 'the nature of the negotiations allows policymakers to emphasise confrontational framing in order to increase their negotiation leverage',⁵⁴ the British-Irish bargaining process became consensual and non-zero-sum. Formal ministerial meetings increased and also, over time, the number of informal *ad hoc* meetings at short notice also increased. For one civil servant, the greatest change in the conduct of relations since 1985 was their increased informality.⁵⁵ Issues that before led to 'megaphone

diplomacy' were now dealt with through the AIA's framework and rhetoric became more conciliatory. In tandem with institutionalisation, senior bureaucrats in the UK and Ireland played a dominant strategic role in policy to Northern Ireland. Key British and Irish civil servants in both administrations enjoyed close collegial relations that deepened over time. British and Irish civil services shared similar operating procedures and structures, having once been one civil service before the foundation of the Irish state. Both civil services are highly meritocratic in recruitment and promotion procedures and the aim is to achieve a degree of policy-making stability over time, regardless of government turnover.

Within the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Anglo-Irish Division, responsible for Northern Ireland affairs and relations with the UK, became respected for its policy analysis and the calibre of its staff. Similarly, the team of British civil servants involved from the Prime Minister's office and from the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) adopted a strategic and analytical approach to conflict resolution. The existence of a well-trained, elite group of civil servants seems to be essential to allow successful bilateral intervention and explains why a relatively clear British-Irish policy emerged over time, regardless of governmental turnover. Similarly, accounts of why Margaret Thatcher negotiated the AIA in 1984-1985 often emphasise the role of her cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, in influencing her position and altering her bargaining approach.⁵⁶

⁵³ Ted Barrington, Irish Ambassador to UK, 1995-2001, Lecture to Department of Politics, University College Dublin, 10 October 2002.

⁵⁴ Neophytos Loizides, 'Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in Turkey' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 62: 2 (2009), p. 281.

⁵⁵ Interview with the author, Anglo-Irish Division, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs 17 May 2007.

⁵⁶ Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, *Northern Ireland 1921/2001: political forces and social classes*, (Serif Books, London, 2002), p. 203

The above paragraphs have shown that while EU membership was a factor in the success of the British-Irish relationship and the peace process in Northern Ireland, other necessary domestic conditions preceded EU membership. These factors, conducive to cooperation and 'Europeanisation' are not present to the same degree in the Cypriot case.

Cyprus

Until recently the Greek-Turkish relationship has been less than cordial. In 1990, Greece opposed Turkish membership of the EU. However, in 1999, both states committed themselves not to use violence and to refrain from unilateral actions. The Greek government became committed to Turkish membership⁵⁷ and did not want the Cyprus issue to muddy the negotiating waters. Greek-Turkish rapprochement in itself reflected domestic state interests. For example, in 1999, the then Turkish and Greek foreign ministers:

acted as if it would be in the interests of both Greece and Turkey if the nationalist and fundamentalist wings of Turkish politics were subordinated to a pro-European stable government.⁵⁸

A key incentive for Greek cooperation was a fear of growing a Turkish-Israeli military cooperation.⁵⁹ Generally, while

there are still deep-seated perceptual and historical obstacles to Greek-Turkish cooperation,⁶⁰ 'particularly with regards to Turkey, the EU has helped in containing excessive nationalistic elements in Greek foreign policy'.⁶¹ In addition, there is a perception among Turkish elites that cooperation would 'reap mutual benefits' to Greece and Turkey.⁶² In this context of historical antagonism and recent signs of rapprochement, to what extent are the conditions for successful cooperation that were identified in the Northern Irish case present in the case of the Cyprus conflict?

EU Membership

The effects of EU membership are not likely to exist in the Greek-Turkish case. However, accession negotiations to join the EU can cause changes in applicant states' policy approaches. Until 2004, optimism that such change would occur was widespread. Moreover, while Turkey and Turkish Cyprus are not EU members, they do receive EU aid. Indeed the Turkish Cypriot community is the largest non-EU recipient of EU aid, receiving approximately 200 million euro for 2007-2013.⁶³ The EU dimension to the Cypriot conflict altered between 1990 and 1999 and hence two key periods can be identified: 1990-1999 and 1999-2010. In 1990, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus voted by referendum to become a mem-

⁵⁷ Bashar Rumelili, (2003), 'Liminality and the Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of the Community-Building by the EU', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9: 2 (June 2003), p. 239.

⁵⁸ Christopher Brewin, *The European Union and Cyprus*, (Cambridge: Eothen 2000), p. 171.

⁵⁹ Yannis Stivachtis, 'Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean region: security considerations, the Cyprus imperative and the EU option', in Diez Thomas (ed.) *The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: modern conflict, postmodern union*, (Man-

chester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 37.

⁶⁰ Mustafa Aydin, 'Crypto-optimism in Turkish-Greek relations. What is next?' *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 5: 2, (2003), p. 225.

⁶¹ (Kavakas, D. (2000), 'Greece', in Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (eds), *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p.147).

⁶² Rumelili, 'Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders', op. cit., p. 210.

¹⁶ Conversation with author, Commission Office, Turkish Community, February 6 2009.

ber in 2004.⁶⁴ As in Northern Ireland, conditionality formed a major part of Commission policy towards Cyprus and towards Turkey and, arguably, the EU dimension at this stage was potentially far stronger than in the Northern Ireland case. It was also hoped that the provision of economic incentives would precipitate increased Greek-Turkish cooperation and improved Greek-Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot relations. To bolster the incentives, as in Northern Ireland, various aid packages were provided by the EU for Cyprus and also for Turkey. However, in 1999, the carrot-and-stick approach altered with the decision that resolving the Cyprus conflict should be separated from Cypriot and Turkish accession negotiations.

This policy reversal rested on a Commission assumption that if the Cyprus issue continued to be a part of accession negotiations, Turkish membership in particular would not be agreed. Turkish-Greek cooperation was assumed to be vital to resolving the Cypriot issue and more generally Turkish 'Europeanisation' and democratisation could be solidified by joining the EU. In addition to this assumption, a key reason for the 1999 change was Greek policy preferences with respect to Turkish membership.⁶⁵ In line with conditionality principles, the Commission pledged €259 million to Northern Cyprus if a solution was reached. However, when the referendum to establish a federal bi-communal Cyprus was rejected in 2004 by Greek-Cypriots, the money was made available anyway,⁶⁶ weakening the conditionality

rule. Thus, various aid packages were agreed for both parts of Cyprus. For the period 2007-2013, €492 million in Structural Funds were granted to Cyprus.⁶⁷

Overall, as in Northern Ireland until the 1990s, Commission rhetoric and approaches could not be pro-active in convincing Cypriot actors of the incentives to cooperate. Thus, while the Cypriot issue is not ignored in various documents on enlargement, references to it are rhetorical:

The Commission welcomes the steps taken in 2006 by the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities towards re-launching a process leading to a comprehensive settlement under UN auspices. These efforts need to be substantially stepped up in 2007.⁶⁸

While emphasis on the EU provision of financial packages is similar to the Northern Ireland case, the pro-active approach adopted by the Commission under Peace in the 1990s is not evident in the case of Cyprus. Greece's use of veto influenced key EU decisions with respect to Cyprus and Greek Cypriot membership of the EU since 2004 poses an even greater challenge. Cyprus has threatened to block Turkish accession unless the Cypriot issue is resolved.⁶⁹ Similarly, the Greek Cypriot government stated that it 'would continue its efforts to freeze EU-Turkey energy talks as a

⁶⁴ Olga Demetriou, 'The EU and the Cyprus Conflict: the view of political actors in Cyprus', *EUBorderConf*, no. 9, July (2004), p. 4.

⁶⁵ Brewin, *The European Union and Cyprus*, op. cit.; Rumeilli, 'Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders', op. cit.

⁶⁶ Demetriou, 'EU and Cyprus', op. cit., p. 25.

⁶⁷ Commission of the European Community, Inforegio Factsheet, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/compar/comp_cy.pdf, (2006), p. 2.

⁶⁸ Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, COM (2006) 649, October 2006, p. 52.

⁶⁹ *Irish Times*, November 8, (2008), p. 8.

result of a Turkish naval ship's interference with a Cypriot off-shore fuel survey' being conducted by two Norwegian vessels.⁷⁰

The issue salience of Turkish membership and opposition to that membership from some member states, most notably France and Germany, implies that 'agency slack' does not exist. Cyprus' use of a veto to block Turkish accession could be very welcome to those EU governments opposed to membership.⁷¹ Thus, a key internal EU condition for successful intervention-preference convergence is absent in the Greek-Turkish case. The possibility of Greek-Cypriot and Greek-EU membership causing increased preference convergence over time is not likely in the medium-term, as the domestic conditions necessary for such Europeanisation are also absent.

Institutionalised Greek-Turkish Cooperation

The Greek-Turkish relationship has become more institutionalised since the 1990s and is governed by various sets of legal regimes. However, the degree of institutionalisation is far lower than in the British-Irish case. Following agreement to cooperate in dealing with terrorism, Greek-Turkish joint committees were established to initiate a process of consultation and joint work on bilateral issues in wider areas – tourism, environment, culture, trade and regional development.⁷² Similarly, when both states were faced with the devastating conse-

quences of earthquakes in 1999, both governments at the UN co-sponsored a joint UN resolution to establish a Joint Standby Disaster Response Unit.⁷³ According to the Turkish Embassy, high-level contacts between Greek and Turkish leaders have helped maintain momentum in the rapprochement process.⁷⁴ In 2007, both governments agreed to cooperate in energy by inaugurating a gas pipeline.⁷⁵ By 2008, 24 confidence-building measures had been adopted by both governments with respect to those issues covered by the 1999 working groups, including the Aegean issue, and 31 agreements had been signed.⁷⁶

However, unlike the British-Irish relationship, the various regimes that have been established do not emphasise Cyprus or the conflict there. Most of the agreements have related to functional practical matters. Indicative of the weakness of Greek-Turkish cooperation with respect to Cyprus is that in 2006, despite the positive developments that had occurred, Greek-Turkish ministers met only twice and informally to discuss confidence-building measures.⁷⁷ In January 2008, the Greek Prime Minister made the first official visit to Turkey in 49 years.⁷⁸ In contrast, on average British-Irish officials dealing with Northern Ireland had six formal meetings a year,

⁷⁰Stefanos Steafanou, cited in Euractiv, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/cyprus-turkey-clash-oil>, 11 June, (2009), p. 2.

⁷¹ David Hannay, 'Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: time for a sense of proportion and compromise', *Policy Brief*, Centre for European Reform, July 2006, p. 2. Available at www.cer.org.uk.

⁷² Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-greek-relations.en.mfa>, 19 August 2009.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Commission of the European Communities, Turkey Progress Report: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: enlargement strategy and the main challenges 2007-2008, COM (2008), p. 29.

⁷⁷ European Commission, Turkey Progress Report, COM (2006), op. cit., p. 649.

⁷⁸ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: enlargement strategy and the main challenges 2007-2008, p. 28.

rising to 15 at times of crises and, in addition, informal meetings occurred.⁷⁹ Moreover, 'good relations are a matter of style, while the unresolved issues and latent tensions surrounding them still persist in substance'.⁸⁰ Similarly, when asked about delays in the Cypriot negotiations in 2009, the Greek Deputy Foreign Minister blamed Turkey for 'bringing forward positions on the table of negotiations that go against UN resolutions, EU principles and the community acquis'.⁸¹

The Greek Deputy Minister blamed the slow EU accession process on Turkey not fulfilling its obligations and also blamed Turkey for its adversarial behaviour with respect to the Aegean issue.⁸² Moreover, Greece has formally complained about alleged Turkish airspace violations.⁸³ Again, while Greek-Turkish relations have improved, the carefully coordinated and orchestrated British-Irish governmental response to tensions and crises is absent in the above Greek-Turkish examples. Most recently, following the election of hard-liner Eroglu, as President of Northern Cyprus, in April 2010, Greek and Turkish governments issued separate statements.⁸⁴ While relatively low-key, each statement placed the onus on their rival kinship groups to produce a settlement. Moreover, in contrast to

the British-Irish relationship's characteristics, no joint statement was issued.

Similarly, while in the British-Irish case, senior civil servants played a strategic and transformative role, in the Greek-Turkish case, there are bilateral sections in both bureaucracies dealing with Cyprus, but they are less prominent than in the British-Irish case. Senior civil servants are not as involved in providing continuity and inventiveness that characterised the British-Irish policy-making environment. Greek and Turkish bureaucracies are significantly different from their British and Irish counterparts. In Turkey, strong military influence and conservative tendencies in the Turkish Foreign Ministry imply that the bureaucratic environment is quite distinctive. For example, the Foreign Ministry was opposed to Turkey forming a Customs Union with the EU, because the EU has allowed a divided Cyprus to join the EU, in the absence of Turkey. The Turkish government ignored its ministry's concerns and sealed the customs union deal with the EU:

It is indicated in journalistic accounts that the government, resolute in initiating the Customs Union, bypassed the foreign ministry through various bureaucratic manoeuvres.⁸⁵

While this governmental control may indicate that civil service is not necessary in explaining successful bilateral governmental intervention in conflict, the perceived need to bypass the foreign ministry would not constitute a stable

⁷⁹ Etain Tannam, 'Explaining British-Irish Cooperation', *Review of International Studies*, 2010 forthcoming, not known yet, due to backlog in RIS

⁸⁰ Gulnar Aybet, 'Turkey and the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges', in *Security Dialogue* December 2006 37: p. 535.

⁸¹ Giannis Valinakis (2009), p. 1.

⁸² Ibid., p. 2.

⁸³ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, op. cit., p. 29.

⁸⁴ Available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-84_-18-april-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-presidential-elections-in-the-trnc.en.mfa and http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/19042010_ALK1434.htm.

⁸⁵ Bahar Rumelilli, 'The Microprocesses of Hegemonic Influence: the case of EU and Greece/Turkey', (2004), *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada*, Mar 10, 2004 p. 10.

policy-making environment necessary for long-term strategic planning. Periodically, the Foreign Ministry and military in Turkey share a conservative consensus and their influence has held sway over potential modernisers among the political elites.⁸⁶ This influence has been blamed for causing a foreign policy vacuum in Turkey and an absence of strategic planning.⁸⁷

However, while this situation is markedly different from the case of British-Irish policy-making, there is also evidence of change. In particular business opinion and some sections of society are modernising and in favour of EU membership.⁸⁸ In tandem with this, it was observed that the military had lost some influence on the National Security Council (NSC). In 2001, the number of civilian members increased and in 2003 a civilian was appointed as Secretary General of the NSC for the first time.⁸⁹ Moreover, despite the military's attempt to prevent the then Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, from becoming President in 2007, on the basis that he was a Muslim and therefore allegedly undermined the Turkish secular state, it failed to do so.⁹⁰ Whereas in the past Turkish governments have resigned in the face of military warnings, in 2007, the government spokesperson reacted strongly against the military's 'inappropriate' behaviour and Gul eventually was elected president.⁹¹ Thus, while the military's

influence on bureaucracy and government is stronger than in the British-Irish case, this influence has waned.

The Greek higher civil service has an abundance of political appointees, normally holding authority for policy formulation.⁹² The Greek Prime Minister generally takes decisions without consulting with the civil service. In other words, Greek civil servants were observed 'to play a minor role compared to their counterparts in other European countries'.⁹³ However, in assessing whether Greece has become 'Europeanised' by EU membership, it is observed that 'change is evident [...] in the domestic policy process. Use of policy expertise and rationalisation in policy-making in specific policy areas has occurred'.⁹⁴ In the Foreign Affairs Ministry, it was observed that a 'wholesale pragmatic reassessment of the style and strategic goals of Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey and the Balkans' occurred from 1995 onwards.⁹⁵ The head of the Foreign Ministry from this period onwards had more liberal leanings.⁹⁶ While, this may well reflect party influence as before, it is noteworthy that this shift is argued to reflect the EU's normative pressure, particularly creating 'the belief that deepening democracy, by protecting human

⁸⁶ Aybet, 'Turkey and the First Year of Negotiations', op. cit.; Rumeilli, 'Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders', op. cit.

⁸⁷ Aybet, 'Turkey and the First Year of Negotiations', op. cit., p. 540.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 544.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 543.

⁹⁰ Carol Migdalovitz, 'Turkey's 2007 Elections: crisis of identity and power', Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, fas.org/srgp/crs/mideast/RL34039.pdf, 92007), p. 3.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Dimitri Sotiropoulos, 'A Description of the Greek Higher Civil Service', in E. Page and V. Wright (eds.), *Bureaucratic Elites in West European States*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 14.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Kevin Featherstone, 'Introduction: "Modernisation" and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics', in Kevin Featherstone (ed.) *Politics and Policy in Greece* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 120.

⁹⁵ Dia Anagnostou, 'Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship', in Kevin Featherstone (ed.), *Politics and Policy in Greece*, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 132.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

rights and minorities enhanced rather than undermined security'.⁹⁷

Despite change, clientelism continues to undermine efficiency.⁹⁸ For example, in international comparisons of government effectiveness, Greece scores relatively low, limiting its ability to 'adapt and enact reform consistent with the EU pressure'.⁹⁹ While policy experts have a higher profile, there is little evidence of policy learning and 'the dominance of party over process has not been removed'.¹⁰⁰ Overall, while change has occurred in both Greek and Turkish bureaucracies since the 1990s, the role and approach of senior civil servants involved in bilateral a policy to Cyprus is less conducive to the joint learning and problem-solving processes that occurred in the British-Irish case.

Conclusion

Therefore, the question of whether the EU can bring about Greek-Turkish and Cypriot rapprochement so as to end the conflict in Cyprus is complicated, not simply because of Turkish exclusion from the EU, but because domestic conditions conducive to EU influence are absent in the Greek-Turkish and Cypriot cases. While it may be countered that EU membership could create domestic institutional change gradually, the case of Greece, a member since 1981, indicates that such a process would be very lengthy, if it emerged at all. The case of Northern Ireland and the British-Irish

relationship provides a template for how peace can occur. The EU and its foreign policy are not a panacea for conflict resolution and its critics neglect the role of domestic institutional constraints on EU foreign policy capacity. ♦

Recent monographs and edited books on European Foreign Policy

We welcome details of recently published books on aspects of European foreign policy. Please provide publication details to the editors (including details of contents and an abstract of 500 words detailing the contents of the volume) at:

cfspforum@lists.bath.ac.uk.

⁹⁷ Aganostou, 'Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation?', op. cit., p. 133.

⁹⁸ Kevin Featherstone and Papadimitriou, *The Limits of Europeanization: reform capacity and policy conflict in Greece* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), p. 41.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁰⁰ Kevin Featherstone, 'Conclusion' in Kevin Featherstone (ed.), *Politics and Policy in Greece* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 120.

The Coalition Government: A Changing UK Foreign Policy?

Richard G. Whitman, University of Bath.

The change in the governing party in the UK, from New Labour to a two party Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, begs the question as to the impact on the UK's European and wider-foreign policy. Although the coalition has been in power for under six months it is possible to offer an assessment of its foreign policy stance – and consequently consider any impact on EU foreign policy-making processes.

Foreign and security policy has been a surprising success for the coalition. There have been some minor stumbles in the presentation of policy that might be reasonably expected in a new and untested administration. However, in broad terms the government has been remarkably untroubled by foreign policy challenges to-date.

Foreign Policy and the General Election

The General Election campaign was marked by the low-key nature of the debate on foreign, security and defence policy and so major differences between the coalition parties did not need to be bridged during the early stages of the coalition. During the election there were minor skirmishing with the then Labour Government, the target for the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, on the resourcing of Britain's military involvement in Afghanistan rather than the substantive question of whether an ongoing military commitment is in the country's best interests. The only

marked disparity between the two coalition parties was on the issue of the replacement of the Trident missile system and on which the Liberal Democrats did not place much emphasis in their election campaign. The other area of substantive foreign policy difference between the parties was on the relationship with the European Union, but none of the parties sought to devote substantial attention to contrasting their differences on Europe. The coalition government's European policy is marked by being low-key. Bilateral diplomacy with other European governments has been cordial and with no major disagreements with major European states. The coalition has also been fortunate in that the European Union's agenda has not included any substantive issues that have seen the UK forced into a minority on policy proposals or been the cause of policy differences between ministers from the two coalition parties. Overall there has been a remarkable degree of continuity in foreign and security policy between the new government and its predecessor. Albeit with a new tone and tenor to the government's public diplomacy.

New Prime Minister, New Language

David Cameron's 'straight talk' diplomacy demonstrated on his overseas tours of Turkey and India are attempts to override the diminished resources available to UK foreign policy by rhetorically making the continued case for a significant role for the UK in international relations. Furthermore, stressing that the UK is in-tune with a rapidly changing global context, which has significant implications for the UK's future security and prosperity, by claiming to be reappraising priorities was effective in generating attention for the new Prime

Minister as an international statesman. However, the stress on using Britain's diplomatic infrastructure to boost commerce is more of a restatement of the existing realities of the contemporary role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office than a new departure.

Resources Constraining Action

This autumn will see issues of foreign and security policy much more prominent in the government's agenda. At present, as with government policy more generally, the impact of constrained public expenditure on foreign and security policy is more anticipated than actual. Operating under constrained resources a challenge for the coalition will be to establish a clear narrative for UK

foreign policy domestically and overseas outsiders that counters any impression that the UK's capacity for diplomacy and appetite for international engagement is diminished. The medium and long terms objectives and ambitions for the UK's security and defence policy will be set when the Security and Defence Review reports in the autumn. The Review will set a large part of the broader context – and future limits – of the UK's foreign and security policy. Consequently the coalition greatest legacy will be in setting a direction that will guide its successor governments over the next couple of decades. ♦

Calls for Papers

We welcome details of call for papers for conferences themed on aspects of European foreign policy. Please confine details of the calls for papers to 250 words.

Please send details of calls for papers to cfspforum@lists.bath.ac.uk