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Note from the Editors

Ana E. Juncos, University of Bristol;

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The editors would like to welcome Anaïd Flesken from the Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies (EXCEPS) to the editorial team. Anaïd will take the role of editorial assistant for the *CFSP Forum*.

As always we also welcome your contributions and comments on *CFSP Forum* to cfspforum@lists.bath.ac.uk

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Turning Diplomacy Inside-Out

Dr. Mai'a K. Davis Cross, University of Southern California

Despite the unprecedented nature of the European External Action Service (EEAS), policy-makers do not have to look far for lessons on how to make this new venture work. The EU is already built on successful internal diplomacy, and many of its strengths can be applied to this new undertaking. By internal diplomacy, I refer in particular to the diplomacy among EU member states themselves. This diplomacy takes place primarily in Brussels where each member state has a permanent representation, and it occurs under the umbrella of Council of the EU. I argue that these permanent representations provide a rich model for sustainable external diplomacy. In the sections below, I attempt to draw out the qualities that have made internal diplomacy work that may also be applicable to the EU's new external diplomacy program. In particular, I focus on the role of expertise, in-

formal meetings, shared professional norms, and common culture, and offer suggestions for how to maximize these qualities in the EU Foreign Service.[1]

Expertise: From Ambassadors to Neophytes

A major challenge for the new Foreign Service will be to attract the best and brightest diplomats. It has already been agreed that one third of these diplomats will be seconded from the member-states while the rest will come from the Commission and Council.[2] But since the EEAS is un-tested as an EU institution and its future success is unknown, diplomats may hesitate to take the EEAS path in case it proves detrimental to their future career goals. Nonetheless, inducements must be found to ensure that from the start the quality of the diplomats who populate the EU Foreign Service is high.

Internal EU diplomacy has been successful precisely because diplomats have possessed a very high level of expertise on EU issues. This expertise has enabled EU ambassadors, especially those in Coreper II, to negotiate in advance particularly challenging passages of treaties, to find compromise where none was previously forthcoming, and to persuade their capitals of agreements that they were able to forge on their own in Brussels. Diplomats in the permanent representations have actually made remarkable strides in the areas of internal and external security cooperation as a result of their unique understanding of EU policy, and diplomatic skill.

A posting in one's permanent representation to the EU has always been regarded as a high-status position. In particular, a Coreper II appointment is as important, if not more so, than the ambassadorial appointment to the United States. The expertise, status, and prestige of the ambassador sets the stage for the influence of the embassy or permanent representation overall. Thus, the selection of qualified, high-level ambassadors to lead each of the 136 EU embassies will be crucial. It will be on the shoulders of member states to send their most qualified ambassadors to be a part of the new Service. Ashton can then make the crucial decision of how to distribute the posts, with the College of Commissioners holding a right of scrutiny on these selections.

Expertise rests on both the capacity to engage in diplomatic practice – reach compromise, follow diplomatic protocol, balance competing interests, and engage in persuasive dialogue – as well as knowledge of the practical issues that come with a particular posting.[3] For more senior diplomats, especially those at the ambassadorial level, selection should be based on prior experience in serving in multilateral settings and dealing with EU issues. Diplomats who have served in the member-states' permanent representations to the EU are uniquely qualified. Not only have they already internalized the shared professional norms of diplomacy, they have also become experts at the art of multilateral negotiation. They should be targeted for recruitment.

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[1] For a more in-depth analysis of internal diplomacy see Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[2] "Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service," 25 March 2010.

[3] Vincent Pouliot, 'The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities', *International Organization* 62, no. 2, 2008, pp. 257-288.

It is best to establish at the out-set that this is an elite diplomatic service, and to take great care in selecting this first generation of diplomats. There are, of course, a variety of ways to make an EEAS posting enticing. The tasks of EU embassies will naturally be quite interesting in that they will likely deal with more policy areas than national embassies, and they will have the voice of a formidable bloc of countries behind them. Member-states can also encourage the best candidates to apply by promising that years in service in the EEAS will be transferable to the national diplomatic service at any juncture. Similarly, the Commission and Council can emphasize to staff members that experience in the EEAS will be highly valued upon their return to Brussels.

Thus, the primary emphasis must be on populating EU embassies with highly qualified ambassadors. The second priority should be on recruiting new diplomats and training them. It may ultimately be more worthwhile to focus on training diplomats with less experience than those who are already mid-career. This is because of the importance of socialization. As Liesbet Hooghe argues, young people are typically socialized more quickly since they have not been extensively exposed to alternative social contexts (primacy), and newcomers are often more influenced by earlier experiences than later ones (novelty).[4]

In order to ensure that these new candidates are well-qualified for a position in the External Action Service, a common exam system, as an add-on to any national Foreign Service selection process, should be considered.

In light of the need to recruit new diplomats, Ashton has already indicated that a European diplomatic academy will be established. This will be an important part of the new diplomatic machinery, and many resources should be devoted to its successful operation. Internal diplomacy has worked well in large part because of the similarities in the ways member states select and train their diplomats. Diplomats typically come from the same top universities, they tend to share a similar social background, and they undergo the same type of formal and on-the-job training. In an environment that is more challenging and diverse, a common system of training is indispensable. Ideally, EU training would capitalize on the already strong national diplomatic training programs by requiring new diplomats to undergo national training *followed by* European training in the new EU Diplomatic Academy. Diplomats must be given a common language, so to speak, so that they already have a solid basis of understanding within the group, no matter where they are posted.

Once this first generation of new diplomats are trained and have gained experience in an EU embassy, the focus must then be on retention through career advancement. A fast-track system of promotion based on merit is one way to do this, alongside affirmative action for diplomats from smaller and newer member states. The benefit of successful retention is that the longer an individual is exposed to a particular social setting, the more likely he or she will become

[4] Liesbet Hooghe, 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', *International Organization* 59(1), 2005, p. 866.

socialized into that environment, producing more effective diplomats.[5]

The model I have outlined draws upon what already works in the internal diplomacy realm. The aim is to enable enhanced expertise, status, and collegiality in the external realm. What I suggest involves a first generation European Foreign Service that is top and bottom heavy, and light in the middle. Once the service is up and running, the new diplomats will be promoted, enabling the hierarchy to fill out, without sacrificing the status and prestige of the EU embassies around the world. Of course, mid-career diplomats will be eligible to apply, but recruiting efforts must target very senior and relatively junior diplomats.

First impressions are important and lasting. What happens in the first phase in the establishment of the European Foreign Service sends strong signals to third country governments about what external diplomacy really means to the EU now and in the future. It is critical to the formation of the Service that expertise is the primary consideration, filling in top posts with those who are most qualified and experienced. This will not only make for effective EU embassies, it will also quickly attract other talented diplomats to join in the near future.

Informality & Influence

Once the diplomats are assigned to their posts, what will they do and how will they do it? One of the important lessons of internal diplomacy is that informal meetings are necessary for diplomats to have real and fruitful deliberation. Coreper II ambassadors, for example, often have working dinners up to five times per week, and frequently make it a point to have working coffees and lunches with each other. Although they have regularly-scheduled formal meetings each week, it is during the informal meetings that they really get the work done.

There are several relationships that must be cultivated after EU delegations are given the status of embassies. First, the relationship between EU diplomats and the local government is arguably the most important as it is at the heart of overseas representation in the first place. Second, just as with internal diplomacy, the relationship between diplomats within a single embassy must be considered, especially at the outset, when national differences may be felt more sharply. Third, the relationship between each EU embassy and member states' bilateral embassies will have to be clearly sorted out to enable collaboration rather than competition among European diplomats in the same capital. Fourth, the relationship between each embassy and the rest of the EU diplomatic service, both horizontally (across various embassies) and vertically (between each embassy and Brussels) will be crucial for smooth and effective EU representation overseas.

The EU's internal diplomacy has rested on strong relationship-building, shared professional norms, and common culture. Informal meetings promote and reinforce these qualities. In facing outward, it is important for diplomats in EU embassies to be able to interact with their counterparts in third countries in a similar way. Although somewhat pedestrian, upgrading dining facilities and providing gathering spaces in EU embassies around the world is one strategy that would encourage informal meetings and

[5] Ibid., p. 865.

relationship-building. This would give EU diplomats the ability to invite government officials over to have informal, face-to-face conversations, as well as to encourage meetings among themselves on an ad-hoc basis.

For relationships that lie further afield, having a straightforward system of informal communication such as video-conferencing, setting up a secure intranet, and providing EU cell phones to facilitate quick conversations and texting would help build a strong system of coordination, networking, and sharing of best practices. Over time, horizontal networks across EU embassies will get stronger as diplomats are re-assigned and get to know more and more of their colleagues. An intranet can enable everything from the secure transfer of instructions to blog postings about experiences in the field. Diplomats engaged in internal diplomacy often text message each other during and between meetings, settle issues over the phone, and send emails back and forth to hash out minor points. On occasion, they get in touch with those in bilateral embassies to obtain information or to achieve results in Brussels. EU ambassadors engaged in internal diplomacy are masters at using a variety of contact points to realize their goals. It is important to conceive of the new EU embassies as a global network of EU embassies, rather than separate EU out-postings tied together only by their common interaction with Brussels.

At the same time, interaction with Brussels will naturally be of crucial importance to the success of the future European Foreign Service. One of the main reasons why internal diplomacy works well is that the permanent representations have a constant two-way dialogue with their capitals. Formally, Coreper ambassadors receive instructions from their capitals. In practice, they often write their instructions themselves. Because they are given flexible, negotiable instructions, they are able to achieve substantive outcomes by virtue of their shared expertise and worldviews.[6] Similarly, providing diplomats with room for manoeuvre is crucial for the EU Foreign Service to maximize its diplomatic skill.

Ashton will be responsible for foreign policy strategy at the top of the hierarchy, and there will be much pressure for her to "get it right".[7] The temptation to try to control things from the centre must be resisted. Rather, trust and flexibility are necessary, and this comes back to the selection of the ambassadors. It is important for Ashton to determine the specific posting of each ambassador – just as the Commission President allocates portfolios to each Commissioner – so that she can begin to build those ties. Her travel schedule should also include visits to specific EU embassies to continually renew those relationships. Effectively, she must replicate the successful relationships of member states' foreign ministers and their EU ambassadors in Brussels. This is often an informal dialogue. Red lines and excessively detailed instructions should be avoided unless absolutely indispensable to EU interests.

In sum, a major component of successful internal EU diplomacy has been the informal nature of the transnational dialogue. At the same time, too much in-

[6] I have argued elsewhere that these diplomats actually constitute an epistemic community, a knowledge-based network with shared policy goals.

[7] Andrew Rettman, 'The EU's new top diplomat remains cool under fire', *EUObserver,* 11 January 2010.

formality is not ideal. Diplomatic culture in Brussels benefits from a strong social structure in the form of shared professional norms and a tangible common culture. This provides continuity and predictability to the nature of these diplomatic interactions, which is also an important way to balance out informality.

The Social Structure of EU Diplomacy

Common culture encompasses the *esprit de corps* of a group, as well as the identity, heritage, symbolism, and sense of purpose shared by a group. Individuals who share a common culture define their own interests with the interests of the group, and thus have similar substantive norms. The challenge with the EEAS is that it is difficult to cultivate a common culture if it does not arise naturally. To some extent, by virtue of being European, spending lots of time together, and engaging in the invention of a new diplomatic institution, these diplomats will naturally identify with one another, and an *esprit de corps* should be virtually automatic. Nonetheless, there are still certain challenges to this.

As stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty, future EEAS diplomats will be drawn from the Commission, Council Secretariat, and seconded from member states' foreign services. Commission officials have traditionally populated these delegations overseas so it is natural that they would want to continue to play a role in them. In fact, they view this as a great opportunity as their long-standing Commission delegations are effectively being upgraded to a much more prominent political position. Those in the Council Secretariat have been working on EU foreign policy for some time, and are thus highly desirable additions to EU embassies. Member states would like to ensure that the new embassies are populated with their own diplomats so that they can ensure a national presence in these representations. For some smaller and newer member states, the EU embassies offer a unique opportunity for representation in certain countries where they have not been able to establish bilateral embassies. And there is an overarching desire to ensure geographic balance in each of the embassies.

While all of this makes sense, the downside is that if the composition of the corps is too heterogeneous, they risk diluting their ability to cultivate a common culture. They face the possibility of both multi-national and inter-institutional tensions within a single embassy. In particular, the very existence of the Service already poses questions in terms of the balance between the power of the Commission and the Council in overseeing EU foreign policy.[8] To add to this, the two institutions have different professional norms – Commission officials are career civil servants rather than career diplomats.

One strategy that can help mitigate these tensions is to have EEAS diplomats swear an oath of loyalty to the EU, just as Commission officials do. An oath may not be wholly enforceable, but it does instil in its followers a baseline of what is appropriate. The key role of the new EU diplomats is to represent Europe to the outside world, regardless of previous national or institutional affiliations. Thus, they must not betray any biases in this respect, and this norm can be instilled early on with an oath of loyalty. The European Foreign Service ultimately an-

[8] Nicolas Nagle, 'EEAS: The Birth of a European Diplomatic Corps?', *World Politics Review,* 11 November 2009.

swers to the High Representative, not any other individual or body. It is expected to have separate institutional status, and to not be an offshoot of any existing EU institution.[9] Moreover, a similar oath has worked well for the Commission, and its engagement in diplomacy so there is already a good precedent.

Besides the need to inculcate a common culture within the new corps, strong professional norms also help smooth the interactions among diplomats, and their counterparts in foreign capitals. In terms of internal EU diplomacy, these norms include how long each diplomat should speak in a meeting, when it is appropriate to push a point or remain silent, how early they should get involved in shaping an issue before it becomes a formal agenda item, and whether or not to escalate a point for which it is particularly difficult to find compromise. These professional norms do not have to be imposed by European diplomats on others. It is not so important what they are as the fact they exist.

One of the key lessons of the EU's internal diplomacy is the process itself. It goes beyond formal protocol, agendas, and bargaining. The process becomes more than the sum of its parts when there are norms and culture that bring the various players together, whether they are in the same post-national embassy or counterparts from different governments. A conscious recognition and nurturing of these practices will enable external diplomacy to go beyond simple bureaucratic manoeuvring.

The EU is about to embark upon an unprecedented stage in its evolution, the advent of a European Foreign Service. It faces the twin challenges of creating internal coherence alongside external effectiveness. The success of the latter rests to a great extent on the former. The EU is already known for its remarkable ability to engage in effective internal diplomacy. This is why the EU has been able to rise to the world stage as an important and emerging player. It is now time for the EU to turn this experience outward. ◊

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[9] The European Parliament has sought to gain some degree of control over the new Foreign Service, but this was deemed inappropriate. See: 'External Action Service - a new dawn in EU foreign policy?', 27 October 2009. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/.

France and EU Military Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa

Keeping Paris 'on board'[1]

Tobias Koepf, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)

Since 2003, the European Union has developed into a visible military actor in Africa. Within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU has conducted three military operations on the African continent: Operation Artemis to stabilize the situation in Bunia, the capital of the Ituri region in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003); EUFOR RD Congo to help assure that the country's first free presidential and parliamentary elections would be peaceful (2006); and EUFOR Tchad/RCA to protect camps of refugees and displaced persons in Eastern Chad and the Northeastern part of the Central African Republic (March 2008 until March 2009).[2]

France has been the political driving force behind all three operations and has also largely dominated their implementation on the ground. While it played the role of framework nation during Operation Artemis, leaving this task to Germany for EUFOR RD Congo and sharing responsibilities with Ireland in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA,[3] France has provided the force commanders and the greatest number of troops in all three cases. This engagement has been applauded by some, yet others have been more skeptical. Critics have pointed out that in all three targeted African countries, France has a historical record of unilateral military interventionism and is said to support the current political leaders, all of whom have come to power in an undemocratic manner. This has led several member state governments to suspect that Paris wants to instrumentalise the EU in order to maintain a dominant role in its famous 'pré-carré', its African backyard.

This article refutes this realist reading. Drawing upon a constructivist approach, it seeks to demonstrate that the 'European turn' of French military engagement in Africa is indeed much more than a simple modification of means; it constitutes a more fundamental policy change towards a true commitment to multilateralism in crisis management, albeit not with purely altruistic motives. The article concludes with the implications this reading has for future EU crisis management in Africa.

France and EU Military Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa - A Case for Realism?

Some experts have seen the latest French engagement for a stronger European role in the management of African crises through a realist lens.[4] These au-

[1] This article is the revised version of a paper presented at "The European Union in International Affairs 2010" - A GARNET Conference, Brussels, 22-24 April 2010.

[2] In December 2008, the EU launched a fourth military operation in Africa. EUNAVFOR Somalia, better known under its subtitle Operation Atalanta, is a purely maritime operation designed to fight off piracy off the Somali coast. However, as the operation is still ongoing, it is excluded from this analysis.

[3] France provided its Operational Headquarters (OHQ) in Mont Valérien in the outskirts of Paris. The Operations Commander (OpCdr) was Patrick Nash, an Irish General.

[4] See for example B. Charbonneau, 'Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa', *Modern & Contemporary France* 16. (3), 2008, pp. 279-295; C. Gegout, 'The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Repub-

thors interpret the French push for EU military action in Africa as an attempt to regain influence in a region where France has lost significant leverage since the end of the Cold War. The main reason for this decrease in influence, they argue, is the (re-)emergence of other powerful actors on the African continent that have successfully challenged the French position in its 'pré-carré'.

Two of these actors are considered to be particularly important. The United States have recently shown a strong interest in re-engaging in Africa, the clearest sign being the creation of a US African Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. The primary concerns of American action are the fight against terrorism and the safeguarding of the flow of energy resources from African countries to the US. Energy concerns have also led China to launch an unprecedented offensive on the African continent since the beginning of the 21st century. Trade volume between Beijing and African states has, between 2000 and 2008, skyrocketed from $ 10 billion to over $ 100 billion.

This trend of rising American and Chinese attention is also clearly visible in two of the countries under scrutiny here, as the DRC is rich in a variety of resources and Chad a rising oil producer. France sees spurring a concerted European response to this challenge, realist reasoning concludes, as a strategy to balance the impact of its rising contenders and to become once again a pivotal actor in a region still considered of great importance for French great power projection.

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lic of Congo (1996-2006)', *International Peacekeeping* 16 (2), 2009, pp. 231-244; G. R. Olsen, 'The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?' *International Peacekeeping* 16 (2), 2009, pp. 245-260.

This view is hardly surprising regarding the history of post-colonial Franco-African relations. Contrary to other former colonial powers, who largely withdrew from the African continent after decolonization, Paris upheld its presence in the newly independent countries in Western and Central Africa and the Indian Ocean. Due to its close linguistic links to French-speaking ex-Belgian colonies Zaïre (as the DRC was called between 1971 and 1997), Rwanda and Burundi, Paris included these countries into its 'pré-carré' in the 1970s.

French post-colonial African policy constituted an integrated policy system whose aim was to maintain an exclusive sphere of influence to emphasize France's status as a great power on the international scene. It built on close political, economic and cultural ties and also encompassed an important military component, based on three pillars: permanent military bases, military cooperation, and military interventions designed to keep friendly regimes in power when faced with uprisings from opposition forces. While this engagement certainly had a value in itself, it involved, in accordance with realist assumptions, a strong competitive moment. Paris did not only seek to contain the influence of the Soviet Union on the African continent within the parameters of the Cold War, but also to limit the impact of Great Britain and the US.

However, upon a closer analysis of current French military engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, three factors stand against the realist interpretation as presented above. Firstly, the assumption that the preservation of a central role in its 'pré-carré' is still high on the French foreign policy agenda has to be contested. Since the early 1990s, the

French interest in francophone Africa has steadily been declining. While certain remnants of colonial relations are keeping both sides close together, the significant drop in trade and aid volumes between France and the countries in question as well as the reduction of the number of French military bases and the troops stationed there are a clear proof of this loss of importance.[5]

Secondly, the latest aspirations of the US and China on the African continent have often been exaggerated. Africa is still low on Washington's list of foreign policy priorities, and this holds especially true for francophone African countries. While China's rise in Africa is certainly a remarkable development, it has nevertheless been confined to the economic sphere and largely been focused on a few oil-rich countries outside francophone Africa like Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan. Furthermore, some experts have argued that French policy-makers' perception of the 'Chinese threat' is indeed less striking than realists might expect.[6]

Finally, even in a largely intergovernmental policy field like CSDP, it has become increasingly difficult for governments to push through their own agendas. In a highly complex decision-making process, which continues to be dominated by unanimity rule, today 26 other member states have to be convinced for a policy proposal to be translated into concrete action. Even for a diplomatically well-skilled country like France, which has placed its personnel at key positions in Brussels, this is indeed a challenge that is often underestimated.

A Constructivist Reading of French Engagement within EU Military Crisis Management in Africa

Another explanation is thus needed to shed light on French engagement for EU military crisis management in Chad and the DRC. This article argues that a constructivist approach is better suited to explain French policy. Unlike realist theory, constructivism does not consider the turn from unilateralism to international (in this case European) cooperation in foreign policy matters as just another rational strategy to attain one's static foreign policy goals, but rather as a more fundamental change of foreign policy identity.

For a foreign policy identity to change two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, a trigger to challenge an existing foreign policy identity is needed. This trigger generally consists of a grave crisis situation that leads foreign policy makers to fundamentally reconsider their foreign policy practices. But as the disappearance of an old foreign policy identity is not sufficient for a new one to develop, a second condition is necessary: the emergence of a group of actors on the domestic political scene, playing the role of 'norm entrepreneurs' who feed in new ideas into the foreign policy making process that, in a further step, cluster into a new identity.[7]

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[5] For an overview of recent developments in French African policy, see T. Chafer, 'From Confidence to Confusion: Franco-African Relations in the Era of Globalisation', in Mairi Maclean and Joseph Szarka (eds), *France on the World Stage* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 37-56.

[6] R. Marchal, 'French Perspectives on the New Sino-African Relations', in C. Alden, D. Large and R. Soares de Oliveira (eds), *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 181-196.

[7] For an introduction to the constructivist school of thinking and its interpretation of foreign policy change see E. Adler, 'Constructivism and International Relations', in W. Carlsnaes, B. A. Simmons

The End of Traditional French Policy – Rwanda as a Turning Point

For over thirty years, France managed successfully to keep its African allies in power. There was not one single change of government that was not, at least covertly, supported by Paris. In the early 1990s this changed, under dramatic circumstances, in Rwanda. Since the 1970s, France had supported the Hutu government under President Habyarimana through military and other forms of cooperation. This support was intensified in 1990, when the oppositionary Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), representing the Tutsi minority and led by today's president Kagamé, multiplied its attacks on the Habyarimana government. When Habyarimana was killed in a rocket attack on the aircraft that brought him back from a regional summit in Tanzania in April 1994, the Rwandan genocide began and brought the RPF to power.

This event deeply shocked French elites in two ways: firstly, Paris failed for the first time in its endeavor to maintain the status quo in a country of its backyard. In the beginning, France thus still tried to shift the power balance in favour of the Hutu government – a strategy that it finally gave up when the RPF took control of the Rwandese capital Kigali; and secondly, French policy-makers and militaries were horrified by the scale of the killings and it was in this light that they decided to launch much debated Operation Turquoise in June 1994. Even though they publicly defended their action in Rwanda, it made them fundamentally rethink their African policy. The question arose as to whether it was still worth maintaining a costly policy if it was not deemed to succeed and might spur such terrible consequences.[8]

A New Generation of Decision-Makers as 'Entrepreneurs' of Policy Change

In the years after Rwanda, France was reluctant to intervene militarily in Africa. This became especially apparent in Zaïre in 1996-1997, when Paris did not react (as it probably would have done earlier) to the overthrow of its long-standing ally President Mobutu by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and in Côte d'Ivoire, when a military coup led by General Robert Gueï swept President Henri Konan Bédié from power on Christmas night of 1999. This new French behaviour led a rising number of observers to even speculate about a complete French retreat from Africa, at least in the military realm. At the same time, however, a new generation of French decision-makers emerged, in the diplomatic service as well as in the military and in party politics.

These new leaders are, it is argued here, typically characterized by the following three features. First of all, they are much less attached to the African continent than were their predecessors. Most of them did not share the experience of colonialism and have less emotional ties to Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, however, they stick to the perception that France has a role to play on the world stage. As experts have shown, being present in political crises of international attention continues to play an important part in this self-understanding of the French global ambition.[9] Finally, they

and T. Risse (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 95-118.

[8] For an account of French action in Rwanda, see D. Kroslak, *The French Betrayal of Rwanda* (London: Hurst and Company, 2007).

[9] M.-C. Kessler and F. Charillon, 'Un 'rang' à réinventer', in F. Charillon (ed.), *Les politiques étran-*

are convinced that while France has to play a leading role in global crisis management, its efforts are most effective if they are carried out in a multilateral framework.[10] This is a lesson that holds especially true for Africa. The highly criticized French action in Rwanda has shown that unilateral French action is likely to fail and that a Franco-African 'tête-à-tête' has to be avoided if ever possible. For this new generation of French leaders, Africa is thus surely far less important than for the likes of François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac. But this does not mean that they exclude it from their agenda. As soon as crises emerge on the continent, they look for what France can do, together with its international partners, to contribute to a settlement.

The Emergence of a New Identity – From Unilateral 'Gendarme' to European 'Firefighter'

Over the last years, the 'European option' has developed into the preferred framework for French policy-makers when translating their self-understanding as a multilateral crisis manager into concrete action. In this vein, France has been, since the Franco-British summit of June 1998 in St. Malo, the main driving force in the development of the military dimension of European foreign and security policy.[11] Today, CSDP provides a kit of military crisis management tools that, while certainly still imperfect, allows for a relatively quick response to international crises. It is against this backdrop, this article argues, that French engagement for European operations in the DRC, as well as in Chad and the CAR should be interpreted, namely as a reaction to two of the most intense and deadliest conflicts the African continent (and indeed the whole world) has seen over the last ten years, the Congo crisis and the Darfur conflict.

Certainly, the French role in the DRC, Chad and in the CAR stays ambiguous. In parallel to its efforts on the European level, Paris continues to pursue a bilateral policy in these three countries. Even though currently under revision, the defence (CAR) and military cooperation (DRC, Chad, CAR) agreements that link the two sides are still in place. On their basis, France maintains, until today, military operations of a permanent character in Chad (Operation Epervier, since 1986) and the CAR (Operation Boali, since 2003) that by their sole presence support the regimes in power. Doubts about a possible hidden agenda thus cannot be entirely ruled out.

But in the forefront of and during the EU operations examined here, there were no clear signs that France initiated them with the aim to additionally support the regimes in place. In the DRC, the effort to stop the killings in Ituri was hardly sufficient to stabilize the Kabila government (2003), and during EUFOR RD Congo, it was under French force command that Spanish special forces together with Uruguayan troops from the UN mission MONUC stopped an attack of President Kabila's militias on the resi-

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gères. Ruptures et continuités (Paris: La Documentation française, 2001), pp. 101-131 (104).

[10] On the role of multilateralism in French foreign policy, see N. Bowen, 'Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foreign Policy Discourse', in *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16 (1), 2005, pp. 94-116.

[11] For French engagement in favour of CSDP, see C. Major and C. Mölling, *'Show us the Way Forward, Astérix': Europe Needs the French Involvement in ESDP* (Paris: CERI-Sciences Po, March 2007).

dence of his main opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba in August 2006.[12]

In Chad and the CAR, the French engagement for a European involvement seemed from the beginning primarily directed towards moderating the consequences of the Darfur crisis. France, and in particular its newly appointed foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, was originally pushing for a European operation to establish a humanitarian corridor to provide food and assistance to the population in Darfur – an approach that was not only heavily opposed by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and NGOs working in the conflict area, but also by Chadian leader Idriss Déby. EUFOR Tchad/RCA thus constituted a 'second-best' (or only 'third-best', if the failed establishment of a robust UN mission in Sudan is also taken into account) reaction to the Darfur crisis and should not be seen in a purely Chadian and CAR context.

Additionally, France was pushing strongly for a more balanced composition of the troops to rule out accusations of partiality. It was only after Germany and Great Britain decided not to provide soldiers for EUFOR Tchad/RCA that Paris took a central role in the operation to assure its survival. French officials have pointed out that Paris for a moment even considered abandoning its efforts to launch the operation due to the weak response of its partners. And officials from other EU member states have confirmed that Paris, even though the EUFOR operation depended on the French Epervier forces in logistical terms, made a big effort to keep the two operations apart from each other.[13]

Conclusion: Implications for Future EU Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa

Interpreting the French push for a European involvement in military crisis management in Africa in a realist fashion, i.e. as an attempt to instrumentalise the EU for purely French interests on the continent, thus points into the wrong direction. Applying a constructivist approach, this article has demonstrated that, even in Africa, France is much more committed to a multilateral involvement in crisis response than is often believed. This is a result of the experience of French involvement in Rwanda in the early 1990s and the rise of a new generation of political and military leaders sharing a different perspective with regard to the management of African crises.

But what does this mean for France's European partners and for future EU crisis management policy on the African continent? France is committed to acting within a European framework and is highly likely to present any future initiatives to tackle African conflicts first in this forum. Instead of suspecting France of pursuing a hidden agenda and rejecting its efforts outright (as seemed to have been the case for some in Darfur/Chad/CAR), other EU member states should take French initiatives seriously and realistically weigh the possible pros and cons of military action.

French approaches are often focused on short-term military solutions and do not include a long-term political vision. It is

[12] H. Fritsch, *EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?* (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 2008), pp. 59-60.

[13] Author's interviews in Paris and Brussels, January-March 2010.

thus up to other EU member state governments to make sure that military means are, if considered as being useful, integrated in a comprehensive conflict management approach containing civil instruments of CSDP as well as diplomatic means and thus canalize the French will to become active into a broader strategy.

Otherwise it might well be possible that at one point France will aim its efforts into another direction. In Lebanon, for example, France took the lead in propping up the UN mission UNIFIL to stop the delivery of arms to Hezbollah after the 2006 Summer War. While this does not mean that Paris has completely given up its skepticism towards UN peacekeeping, which was spurred by the events in Former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, the UN option might gain further popularity with regard to Africa – in spite of its huge operational shortcomings.[14] It is still hard to believe that Paris and Washington might team up for a military NATO response to an African conflict, but recent reintegration of France into the Atlantic Alliance has made the option of NATO involvement in Africa at least theoretically possible. Considering the essentially military character of the Alliance, one has to doubt whether this is helpful with regard to long-term conflict solutions.

Given the lessons from Rwanda, a 'renationalization'[15] of French policy in Africa is rather unlikely. But as France's decision to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire to stop a rebel attack on the government of President Gbagbo in September 2002 demonstrated, it cannot be completely ruled out. This option should, however, be avoided by all means. The Côte d'Ivoire case has shown that against the backdrop of its colonial legacy, France can easily be instrumentalized by local leaders. EU member states should thus decide whether it would not be a better option to keep France on board and support it in finding comprehensive solutions to Africa's complex conflicts. ◊

[14] A. Mattelaer, *Europe Rediscovers Peacekeeping? Political and Military Logics in the 2006 UNIFIL Enhancement* (Brussels: Egmont, October 2009).
[15] B. Irondelle, 'European Foreign Policy: the End of French Europe?', *Journal of European Integration* 30 (1), 2008, p. 158.

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Innovative action towards the challenges?[1]

Dr. Ludovica Marchi, University of Cambridge

In this increasingly globalised and multipolar world, a grand strategy for the European Union (EU)[2] should be based on the idea that the EU's relationship with the emerging powers like China (and also with the resurgent Russia) needs a paradigm[3] underpinned by what can be shared in terms of interests linked to global governance tasks (e.g. collective security, state failure, climate change, environmental degradation as well as a fair bargain over trade). These rising and re-emerging powers should be regarded as capable of promoting political processes in which they play a part together with the Europeans. A grand strategy for the EU needs the Europeans' full support. This article argues that the Europeans should try to look at their own foreign policy in an innovative way. It brings forward and discusses four groups of considerations. China should be regarded as a new power rejoining the world, and as becoming more expert at how to contribute to global governance. Iran should be approached bearing in mind that prolonged and delicate negotiations are meaningful and necessary, and would offer results on several fronts. The EU's global governance action, in particular in military operations, should respond to the fundamental need for agreeing on a concept of European common security interest. The way the EU relates to the US should be repositioned in full respect of the Europeans' own common strategic objectives. These different aspects of European foreign policy can all become vehicles for robust and even original choices, fundamental to helping Europe to contribute, proactively, to a more harmonious world order.

Relationship with a China which is rejoining the world

Europeans have often thought that the conduct of diplomacy with great powers implies convincing them of the error of their ways, and tended to have accepted and put into practice the liberalising and democratising principles of the European global engagement. In its relationship with China, the EU should begin to move towards a policy of reciprocal engagement, appropriate to the superpower China has become.[4] This would entail the EU member states identifying those areas in which they undercut one another's national interests. They would then use incentives and leverage to tune Chinese behaviour (i.e. making it more conforming to that of the Europeans) in a limited number of policies most relevant to the EU, and where opportunities for common action arise.

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[1] This article has its origin in the debate held on 24th October 2009 at the workshop on 'The European Union Facing External Challenges', Pembroke College, Cambridge.

[2] 'Grand strategy' and 'grand bargain' are used here to imply a strategy for the EU aimed at achieving a more consensual global order and governance. For the argument sustaining the need for the EU to engage in a grand strategy see: Jolyon Howorth, 'CSDP after Lisbon: forging a global grand bargain?', *International Relations*, December 2009; Jolyon Howorth, 'The Case for an EU Grand Strategy', in Sven Biscop, Jolyon Howorth and Bastian Giegerich, 'Europe: A time for Strategy', *Egmont Paper*, No. 27, 2009, pp. 15-24. Sven Biscop, 'The value of power, the power of values: A call for an EU grand strategy', *Egmont Paper,* 2009 No. 33.

[3] See Timothy Garton Ash, 'Overcoming Europe's 20-year crisis', *Discussion Paper presented at the 6th Meeting of the ECFR Council*, *'Building a new Europe for a multi-polar world'*, Madrid, 6-7 November 2009.

[4] Ibid., 5.

With its participation in the EU operation Atalanta, China is coming into close contact with European institutions and the EU's mode of conceiving security concepts. This is true with regard to the European maritime legal framework governing the military ships anti-piracy operation. The framework includes contribution also from Kenya in employing its judiciary system to the task of pursuing those allegedly identified as responsible for piracy activity. The EU–Kenya legal system is a sign of the EU implementing a holistic approach to wider security, to the extent that it creates continuity with the maritime prime initiative, taking charge of some of the consequences of the impact of the operation. China is under the influence of the EU. It has also exchanges with officers of the EU military operation unit who work closely with the Political Security Committee in their duty to coordinate the naval mission.[5] These officers are consistent outlets of information on the EU strategic concept. The more the EU, its instruments and its institutions are able to create the conditions for common undertakings with China in global governance, and associate it with EU operations, the more China is encouraged to come closer to the EU and the member states in its own understanding and promotion of global security.

At the same time, as the world's largest carbon emitter, China is also provoking the EU, the US and the industrialised world with its declared commitment to lower CO_2 release per unit of production, to the point that Europe is taking a long time to acknowledge its position as a true global engagement. Its agreement with India aligned their efforts to tackle climate change for five years, and established the common task of seeking financial sources and technology to assist developing economies to control their carbon generation as they industrialise. China's goal is to create, by 2050, a low-carbon society that is 'equitable, environmentally sustainable, prosperous and resilient'.[6] The EU, the US and the developed economies had the challenging option of generating more substance in the European, and their own, foreign policy at Copenhagen, in December 2009, and being a driver of environmental change in a multilateral and consensual bargain with China, making the greatest possible effort to cut their own emissions. China's embarking on this new road needs to be seen as a manifestation of the way in which it is rejoining the world, gradually adapting to global norms, and becoming more skilled at how to make a positive contribution to global order.[7]

Prolonged and delicate negotiations with Iran

The EU should be able to pursue a deliberately step-by-step conciliatory approach to Iran. A grand strategy expects that the EU builds channels to bring forward the conviction that the 'change to a multi-polar world is very important to the majority of countries in Europe and the entire world' and that 'confrontation belongs in the past'.[8] On a number of global matters, including the non-proliferation regime and Iran's nuclear programme, the EU will advance its poli-

[5] Author's interview with a European Council official, November 2009.

[6] *Financial Times*, 'Gordon Conway, co-chair of the China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development'. 12 November 2009, p. 15.

[7] See Mark Leonard, 'What next for China?', *Renewal*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2009.

[8] *Financial Times*, 'Russia's president Medvedev'. 10 November 2009, p. 6.

cy only if facilitated by China[9] and Russia, and of course in collaboration with Washington. It will need to consider whether to reverse the role it held in 2006 in gaining their support for UNSC sanctions it promoted against Iran which led to the stalemate in negotiations, and mediate now between China, Russia and the US, this time to create interest and engagement in regional cooperation.

What seems to be lacking, in general, in the political discourse of the EU (and the US) is the ability to look beyond the nuclear issue.[10] The EU's hesitation, after the Iranian election, on how to behave with regard to the public demonstrations, their suppression and the court cases, was a sign of the lack of a European unified approach to building a relationship with Iran. Iranian elites are first and foremost concerned with the continuation of their existence and power, and believe that developing into a threshold nuclear state offers a security guarantee and leverage in regional affairs. Iran is concerned about any negotiating programme set up by the EU and the US for the political demands that come attached to it: 'the recognition of Israel and the suspension of support for Hamas and Hezbollah' are strong claims, and are not bound to shaping more consistent political relations.[11] A staged approach by the EU to Iran that did not focus on areas of hard security would leave Iran with diminished hard bargaining influence, and would open better chances for normalising relations.

Though the nuclear question remains dominant for the West, it can, to a certain extent, be compartmentalised from other matters, regional and domestic. Chinese and Russian stakes in the Islamic Republic are higher than those of the European countries.[12] This truth reinforces the logic of an EU strategy which includes the powers of the region in a discourse of common cooperation. Yet Iran's biggest trading partner remains the EU, and Iran recognises its interest in bilateral contracts for oil, gas, infrastructure and trade with the EU states. From Iran's viewpoint, normalisation of relations can only be achieved with deadlines which are acceptable as meaningful markers: diplomatic representation, political influence, trade in general and accession to the WTO membership in particular. These are the areas that the member states of the EU retain, and should use for the next stage of effective mediation.[13] The EU's grand bargain needs to expand its role and contribution with confidence-building measures. A conciliatory attitude seeking to restore diplomacy, as a form of communication, should persuade the actors of the Middle Eastern region (Israel included), China, Russia and the US, and their domestic audiences that 'prolonged and delicate negotiations' are possible, meaningful and necessary,[14] and will ultimately produce outcomes on several fronts. The key goal of the EU's long-term thinking would centre on integrating Iran into the widened Middle East scenario and the world community.

[9] Timothy Garton Ash, 'Overcoming Europe's 20-year crisis', op. cit., p. 5.
[10] Rouzbeh Parsi, 'The EU and Iran', in Alvaro Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski (eds), *The Obama Moment: European and American perspectives*, EUISS, 2009, pp. 162-167.
[11] Roxane Farmanfarmaian, 'Iran and the EU: Reassessing the European role as the US extends its hand and Iran unclenches its fist'. *Paper presented at the workshop 'The European Union Facing External Challenges'*, 24th October 2009, Pembroke College, Cambridge.
[12] Rouzbeh Parsi, 'The EU and Iran', op. cit.
[13] Roxane Farmanfarmaian, op. cit.
[14] Rouzbeh Parsi, 'Iran and the EU', op. cit.

The EU global governance action in military operations

To move further towards a grand strategy belief, the EU should control the rationality of its own actions in the military and governance sphere. It has been active concerning failed states, crisis management and linked operations, police training, border control, infrastructure reconstruction and the like, but five out of the twenty EU missions to mid 2008 have taken place in the Congo. These operations are: the military intervention Artemis in 2003 with 1,800 troops; EUFOR RD in 2006 with 2,000 personnel; the limited police training effort EUPOL, in Kinshasa, in 2005, with 30 people, substituted by a new mission to the country as a whole in 2007; and a continuing security sector reform operation, EUSEC RD, in 2005 with 40 officers. The emphasis on the Congo as a focus of EU operations[15] is a signal of the need to choose the EU's priorities and link them to the capabilities, both existing and projected, and to when (i.e. in what typical crisis occasions) these should be reasonably applied. Prior to this planning, the EU should respond to the fundamental need for agreeing on the concept of European common interest with regard to security. Within the grand strategy objective, the EU is required to define how this common interest is best translated into specific and clear targets, and in conjunction with these it is also expected to specify the timing for their attainment. Once agreed, these primary decisions would give the first indication that the idea of the grand bargain is starting to develop into a more consistent reality, but this will become true only when the Europeans increase their efforts to envisage, more clearly, the need for a European foreign and security policy which takes full account of the interests of all the EU states.

The way the EU relates to the US

Last but not least, for a correct use of the EU–US strategic dialogue, central to addressing the problems ahead (the continuing political and cultural challenges, together with global defence), the EU needs to question how it relates to Washington. This entails that the Europeans should agree on the big strategic issues on which the EU will need to be able to engage the US. The Europeans seem dissatisfied at having delegated the strategy of the Afghan campaign to American leadership (with more than 30,000 European troops engaged in a difficult operation). Also, on Russia and the Middle East, they should define the European position with responsibility, 'not in the spirit of second guessing where the US wants to go'.[16] Ultimately, the EU has sufficiently strong ties with the US to bear disagreement, and possesses adequate flexibility to manage their differences. Thus the Europeans should confidently be assertive in their foreign policy, and defend their own robust common positions. The more the Europeans express themselves with one voice, the more powerful and effective their collective influence will be in Washington and on world affairs. An acquiescent EU compliant with US initiatives, an EU internally divided on how to deal with Washington, or one that is split by the initiatives of individual free-rider member states,[17] are all situations that are not beneficial to a credible and influenti-

[15] Nick Witney, 'Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy', *ECFR Policy Paper*, July 2008, pp. 40-42.

[16] *Financial Times*, 'How Europe can be heard in Washington', 16 November 2009, p. 15.

[17] Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, 'Towards a Post-American Europe: a power audit of EU-US Relations', *ECFR Report*, October 2009, pp. 62-6.

al European foreign policy. If they didn't succeed in acting together on the major issues of global relevance, the Europeans would eventually fail to reposition the EU–US discourse within their own common strategic objectives, interests and logic.

Responding to the call for a grand bargain in global governance action, the EU should above all opt for fresh and innovative choices: although Beijing states that it is reluctant to play a larger leadership role on the world stage, and Moscow (despite the problems of its reckless behaviour with Georgia, the gas question, and the way it deals with issues in its general neighbourhood) declares its intention to concentrate on modernising its state, economy and technology, the EU should engage in activating partnerships of effective multilateralism.[18] Connecting with Beijing as a global partner, in tackling the cumbersome problems facing the world, would mean enhancing China's prosperity as a source of strength for the whole community.[19] Tying in with Beijing would necessitate some concessions by the EU, such as compromising on the demand that its own model needs to be replicated by its partners. A grand strategy should allow the other partners the choice of learning by doing, though it uses leverage to make this happen. Joint undertakings, peacekeeping efforts and military actions are characterised by common rules, and tend to shape a common understanding of law, freedom and global rights, and how they are applied to civil society. In an interconnected world, cultivating spheres of positive influence to advance possible solutions to the dilemmas of today, in a spirit of partnership rather than conflict, is the big test that the grand strategy faces. ◊

[18] Giovanni Grevi and Alvaro Vasconcelos (eds) 'Partnership for effective multilateralism', *Chaillot Paper* No. 109, June 2008.
[19] Edward Luce and Geoff Dyer, 'Beijing talks unlikely to pay dividends immediately', *Financial Times*, 16 November 2009, p. 6.

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