

Note from the Editors

Ana E. Juncos, University of Bristol;
Annemarie Rodt, University of Exeter; Richard
G. Whitman, University of Bath.

This issue of *CFSP Forum* goes to press as work continues on the External Action Service and Adebahr considers the role of the EU's Special Representatives within the new service. The second piece in the issue by Agnantopoulos examines the obstacles to Macedonia's accession to the EU. Our final contribution by Simón assesses the EU's current arrangements for military planning and the obstacles that confront their future development.

We welcome Annemarie Rodt from the University of Exeter to the team of co-editor's of *CFSP Forum*.

As always we welcome your contributions and comments on *CFSP Forum* to cfspforum@lists.bath.ac.uk

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Getting real: What instruments for the European External Action Service?

Or how to make use of the EU Special Representatives¹

Cornelius Adebahr, German Council of Foreign Relations

Making the European External Action Service (EAS) a reality is a painful and cumbersome process. Building a foreign policy machinery (nearly) from scratch would already be difficult in itself. Yet, fierce rivalry between – mainly – the Commission and member states persists, with the new High Representative (HR), Baroness Ashton, caught in the middle and the European Parliament half-active on the sidelines.

While it is sometimes not clear whether parties are battling to gain new powers or merely to retain old ones, it is obvious that such institutional infighting risks

¹ This Article is an expanded version of a policy memo sent to PSC ambassadors of member states in February 2010.

losing sight of the actual instruments with which a functioning foreign service should be equipped. Desk allocation or chains of command are only one – though by no means unimportant – thing. Quite another is the question of the actual diplomatic toolbox of which the EU disposes to respond to international crises and other events. Here, the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) have over the years developed into a fully functional instrument that can broadly be employed throughout the EU's area of concern.

Some people on the Brussels corridors have felt that the EAS would herald the end of such envoys. Their job could be taken up, they say, by the new heads of EU delegations who now dispose of a political portfolio in addition to the external relations of the European Community (EC) for which they have been responsible. However, instead of doing away with envoys, the EU should redefine their institutional place within the EAS and, ultimately, upgrade their policy function. In the end, things are simple: If the Union wants to be represented on the world stage as a serious player, it needs to maintain and strengthen its envoys, this oldest instrument of diplomacy.²

EUSRs as instrument of European Foreign Policy

Since 1996, EUSRs have been part of the EU's arsenal of foreign policy

² For an extensive account of the development of EUSRs including references to historical predecessors as well as a detailed comparison with the envoys of the United Nations and the U.S. president, see Cornelius Adebahr, *Learning and Change in European Foreign Policy: The Case of the EU Special Representatives* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009). The following sections are based on this monograph.

instruments. They are the 'face and voice' of the Union in crisis regions from the African Great Lakes to the Middle East and from the Balkans to Central Asia. Today, the EU has deployed 11 EUSRs to nearly two dozens countries that are of great concern to its broader security interests.³ In them, the EU has availed itself of a well-established diplomatic instrument that could be seen as a quasi-precondition for international actorness. This makes the EUSRs a central part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Among the initial reasons for sending an EU Special Representative to a given country or region, the following are most prominent:

- To achieve political representation commensurate with existing economic engagement;⁴
- to gain information about an ongoing conflict;
- to influence international mediation efforts with respect to a crisis;
- and to develop a policy towards a given country or region.

This was the case when the EU deployed its two first envoys ever, in 1996, to the Great Lakes region and to the Middle East Peace Process. It has remained so over the past decade, which saw a

³ For a current overview of EUSR activities, see the Council's website at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=263&lang=EN>.

⁴ It should be recalled that, until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union itself did not have any 'embassies' – other than the EC with its 130 or so delegations to third countries and international organisations. For this reason, the main function and task of the EUSRs was to represent the EU in a given country or region, increasing its visibility and profile especially compared to the rotating Presidency.

relative increase in EUSRs during the first half of the 2000's – with mandates established for Macedonia and Afghanistan (in 2001), Bosnia-Herzegovina, the South Caucasus (both in 2003) as well as Central Asia, Moldova, and Sudan (all in 2005). After that, a period of institutional consolidation set in.

Still in 2005, the existing EUSR mandate for Macedonia was turned into a 'double-hat', i.e. combining the post of head of delegation of the European Commission and that of EUSR in one person. Only two more mandates have followed to date, to the African Union and to Kosovo (at the end of 2007 and in early 2008, respectively). Notably, both are also double-hatted: The mandate for the AU follows the Macedonian model, whereas the one for Kosovo merges the EUSR with the post of internationally mandated overseer.

The practical focus of the EUSRs' work is on security policy and crisis management. They offer advice and support to conflicting parties with the aim of effectively implementing EU policies and terminating the crisis or conflict. To do this, they have a range of – primarily diplomatic – means at their disposal, e.g. proffering good offices, mediation, facilitation, and the like. EUSRs also closely cooperate with third parties, be they states (like Russia or the United States) or International Organisations (like the United Nations, the African Union, or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe).

In addition, the EUSRs have important internal roles, even though these are often not made explicit. Functionally, they can be considered the 'eyes and ears' of the EU. EUSRs provide

information about and analysis of the current situation in their mandate area. Based on their findings, EUSRs can develop policy proposals that they feed into the Brussels policy-making process. Another important role is that of coordination. In its foreign policy, the Union has to rely on the consensus of 27 member states and that the Commission does not have the policy-unifying role it has in the first pillar. Therefore, EUSRs strive to coordinate national policies of member states and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as the activities of the Commission, aiming to achieve the greatest coherence possible.

For this important internal function, it is helpful that the EUSRs are closely linked to all three major players in EU foreign policy – the Council, the Commission, and the member states – in all phases of their work. While EUSRs are appointed by the Council of Ministers, it is the European Commission that legally contracts them as CFSP advisors. Their actual nomination follows a selection procedure that involves the Council Secretariat, the Policy Unit, and the Presidency on behalf of the member states. Due to their status as CFSP Advisors paid from Community funds, they are accountable to the Commission for the budget allocated under the financial statement for their missions.

In practice, their main points of contact are the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the High Representative. EUSRs also report regularly to the Council working groups, thus reaching the staff in member states' permanent missions and the relevant Commission units. However, their relation to the PSC already came under fire in the early post-Lisbon period. Previously, the PSC

provided strategic guidance to the EUSRs (following their work with the help of the Policy Unit and the Council Secretariat), while the HR was put in control of operational direction. Now, the Council and the High Representative together assume greater responsibility of all crisis management operations in general (Article 38 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU). In addition, the new Article 33 TEU (replacing Article 18 V TEU) on the EUSRs explicitly and exclusively grants authority over the EUSRs to the HR, thus diminishing further the role of the PSC. Ultimately, this dispute will only be solved with the final setup of the EAS, although it may serve as an illustration of how much down to detail the struggle over competences has got. Even within the larger camps (the Commission vs. the Council Secretariat vs. member states), smaller groups of people (like the PSC ambassadors) are leading their own battle for influence.

Returning to the broader picture, it is interesting to note that the EUSRs have consistently been ahead of the institutional and political developments in European foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 had created a European ‘foreign policy’ on paper but failed to provide the Union with the instruments to actually pursue strategic aims or even intervene in conflicts that threatened the stability of the continent. This became most obvious in the wars following the break-up of Yugoslavia, where the system of revolving presidencies for external representation had soon shown its limitations. The EU was simply unable to stop the fighting.

In a situation where the EU had failed the foreign policy test on its doorstep, EU envoys emerged in the African Great

Lakes region and for the Middle East Peace Process. They were dispatched before their function was enshrined in the Treaty (in Amsterdam in 1998). More substantially, they represented the EU’s political approach to a region before there was anything like a common policy. And, nearly ten years after their invention, they became a test case for double-hatting long before the Lisbon Treaty would put this feature into practice at the level of the new ‘Foreign Minister’.

It is in this sense that the EUSRs have been breaking new ground for EU foreign policy. Thus, not only do they provide some lessons for the new EAS, but they also deserve to be retained as a useful instrument of the capable international actor that the EU strives to be.

Fitting the EUSRs into the EAS

To a certain extent, the EUSRs have over the years developed a model function for the new foreign service. Be it when establishing internal reporting structures, when resorting to flexibility in responding to crises, or most visibly when introducing double-hatting. On more than one occasion, the EUSR instrument was used as experiment with regard to establishing an EU foreign service.

Now that the EAS is about to be set up, what are the lessons to be drawn from 14 years of EUSRs? And do we actually still need them?

- 1) First of all and most fundamentally, EUSRs should continue to serve in the new EU foreign service besides the heads of EU delegation.
- 2) Secondly, the existing reporting structures to the PSC and the

reasonably successful coordination mechanisms with the Commission should be maintained.

- 3) Thirdly, envoys should be given, as in the past, a broad portfolio of tasks, to be fulfilled in a proactive manner.
- 4) And finally, as boundary spanners to the outside world, the EUSRs should be given a considerable policy input function.

1) The recent rise in envoys to the Afghan-Pakistani region has shown that this diplomatic instrument is commonly applied by foreign services throughout the world. Consequently, the EAS should keep EUSRs at its disposal. While country-specific mandates can in some cases be taken over by the new heads of EU delegation, regional representatives of the double-hatted foreign minister are still highly useful. Whether based in Brussels or in the field, they could tackle crises requiring urgent intervention or help develop the EU's strategic approach to pivotal global regions. When mandates are formally country-confined like for Afghanistan or Moldova but conflict actually straddles all borders, then EUSRs should continue to work with their specific focus, not least because they have the freedom (to travel, to negotiate) that heads of delegation do not.

Moreover, EUSRs could be appointed within the new service to address specific issues of a horizontal or functional nature. Overcoming the present distinction between EUSRs and the Personal Representatives of the HR, one could then conceive of Special Representatives for nuclear non-proliferation, new epidemics, terrorism, human rights, or energy and climate affairs. Given that the EU is now building

a fully-fledged diplomatic service from the start, retaining an established and smoothly working instrument like the EUSRs becomes even more important. The PSC as the responsible body for all crisis management operations provides a linchpin between missions on and information from the ground, and the policy-making and strategising procedures in the Brussels headquarters. It should therefore be tied into the future structures of the EAS, especially with regard to the EUSRs.

2) At the procedural level, the EUSRs' close cooperation, both in the field and in Brussels, with CSDP missions, member states (via the PSC or directly through national capitals), and, increasingly, the Commission has prepared them well for the EAS. Cross-pillar cooperation should, in theory, become less strenuous thanks to the foreign minister's two hats. Nonetheless, as 'old habits die hard' the delicate balancing of institutional interests that EUSRs have learned to perform will also be a central feature of foreign policy-making under the new EAS.

In addition, the EU should substantiate and broaden the 'lessons-learned' seminars that were introduced in 2005. These could provide a good opportunity for exchanges among EUSRs as well as between them and their colleagues from the EAS. The seminars should be organised by a CFSP lessons-learned unit within the new service that supervises the effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy operations. If such work were done continuously and at the broad operational level, the seminar should help to instil a learning spirit in all personnel involved.

3) With regard to operations, the pragmatic and proactive style of EUSRs, interpreting and developing their mandates with a results-oriented approach, could also serve as an example for the EAS. Pragmatism and political common sense in daily practice will be important, especially when the formal architecture of the new service will not only take time to be built but is also strained by institutional turf wars. The broad portfolio of tasks that EUSRs fulfil should also serve as a model for the new service, as it underscores the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management. Specifically with regard to CSDP missions, the EU should unify both the civilian and military chain of command through the EUSR – in effect copying from the United Nations, where the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) act as sole head of UN mission in a given theatre.

4) Finally, the policy input function of the EAS should be decisively strengthened. The EUSRs have demonstrated the effectiveness of bridging policy areas such as CSDP, the neighbourhood policy, and enlargement policy. They provide valuable information, intelligence, and analysis for the benefit not only of those member states that do not have a diplomatic representation in a given country or region, but also of the EU as an international actor in its own right. This has also helped to combine the economic incentives provided under the Community pillar with the political leverage exercised through CFSP. Most of all, the EUSRs have demonstrated the usefulness of a dynamic learning by doing approach. In this way, their example can help develop the EAS into an effective policy machinery. ♦

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The EU and Macedonia's Accession Process: Derailed or Delayed?

Apostolos Agnantopoulos, Dublin City University

Introduction

In October 2009, the European Commission issued its Annual Progress reports on Macedonia, which recommended a start to accession negotiations with the EU. The announcement was hailed as a 'historic occasion' by the Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski.¹ This had good reasons: nine years ago, the violent clashes between governmental security forces and the National Liberation Army (NLA) had brought the country to the brink of civil war. This prompted the deployment of the first EU-led military operation in 2003.² With formal ESDP involvement terminated in 2006 and EU membership on the way, it appeared that Macedonia was destined to leave behind its troublesome past. Yet, the European Council in December 2009 decided to postpone the discussion on the provision of a date for the start of accession negotiations. The reason was that Greece had threatened to block any such decision because of the unresolved dispute over Macedonia's constitutional name. The Greek veto revived bitter memories from the early 1990s, when Athens used all means at its disposal to

prevent the international recognition of Macedonia. It also generated concerns about the destabilising effects that a stalemate on Macedonia's accession would have – not only for the country, but also for the region as a whole.

The objective of this paper is to assess the severity of the current stalemate. The main argument is that this stalemate is the result of an escalation of the diplomatic dispute between Greece and Macedonia, which was driven mainly by domestic political considerations in the two countries. While the underlying causes of the conflict are deep and a permanent solution may not emerge soon, in the medium term we should expect an unblocking of Macedonia's accession process. The paper is structured as follows: the next section presents an overview of the development of EU relations with Macedonia, with special emphasis on the obstacles observed during the last two years. The subsequent section discusses the main determinants of the conflict and the final section then outlines three potential scenarios for the future.

The path to the current stalemate

The history of the Greek-Macedonian dispute and the repercussions that it had on EU-Macedonian relations are well known and do not need to be repeated at length here.³ Suffice it to say that due to Greece's veto the EU did not establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia until 1995, four years after the initial request for recognition and with the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of

¹Marusic S-J., 'Macedonian PM Visits Brussels' Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/23234/> [Accessed: 18 February 2010].

² Operation Concordia was launched on 31 March 2003 to replace NATO's peace support operation. Operation Concordia was replaced by an EU police mission in December 2003.

³ For an overview see the contributions of Dimitar Mircev and Evangelos Kofos in J. Pettifer (ed.) *The New Macedonian Question* (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1999) pp. 201-262.

Macedonia (FYROM). Since then, however, EU-Macedonian relations have witnessed tremendous progress, starting with the inclusion of Macedonia in the PHARE programme in 1996; the conclusion of a Cooperation Agreement one year later; and, following on from the successful negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2001, culminated in the granting of candidate country status in 2005. Throughout this period Greece not only approved, but actively sponsored, Macedonia's European perspective, despite the fact that bilateral negotiations for a final settlement on the name issue remained pending.

The reversal of Greece's permissive attitude was not unexpected. In fact the first hurdles for Macedonia's membership prospects had appeared in June 2008, when the European Council acknowledged, at Greek insistence, that a 'negotiated and mutually acceptable solution' was an 'essential' element of Macedonia's accession process.⁴ This statement, which effectively meant an additional conditionality requirement, came a few months after Greece had successfully blocked Macedonia's bid to join NATO.

In order to avoid a stalemate, the UN special representative Mathew Nimetz undertook a new mediation attempt and in October 2008 he unveiled a plan, which included potential alternative names for international use.⁵ By this

time, the position of the two sides regarding the content and scope of the compromise solution had crystallised: The Greek government requested a synthetic name with a geographical qualifier (i.e. North or Upper Macedonia) to be used throughout the entire scope and process of Macedonia's international relations (*erga omnes*), while the government of Macedonia argued that the commonly agreed name should be used only in bilateral relations between the two countries and the constitutional name retained for all other purposes (a dual name formula). Disagreement also ensued over Skopje's request that the final settlement should also acknowledge the Macedonian nationality and language. The Greek government refused to discuss these issues, arguing that they were not part of Nimetz's mandate.⁶

When Nimetz's plan leaked to the press, the negotiation process stalled and a new cycle of bilateral tensions was ignited. The Macedonian government accused Athens of violating the Interim Accord, by which the two countries had agreed to establish diplomatic relations in 1995, and filed a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice.⁷ Athens reiterated its determination to block Macedonia's membership bid, arguing that the lawsuit proved the governments 'lack of interest for a swift settlement'.⁸

⁴ European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 19-20 June 2008. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/101346.pdf [Accessed: 5 February 2010].

⁵ Nimetz Proposals Concerning the Name Issue Available at: <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/OfficialDocuments/Nimetz.html> [Accessed: 11 February 2010].

⁶ International Crisis Group, Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock. *Policy Briefing*, No 52, 2009, p. 9

⁷ Article 11 of the Interim Accord prevents Greece from blocking Macedonia's accession to regional international organisations, inasmuch as the latter was referred to as FYROM. For the full text see http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/6/3/0004456.pdf [Accessed: 3 March 2005].

⁸ *Balkan Insight* '18/11/2008 Greece Bans Macedonia over World Court Bid' Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/14871> [Accessed: 18 February 2010].

In parallel with the sharp deterioration in the bilateral relationship between Athens and Skopje, Macedonia's hopes to start accession negotiations were also hampered by the delays observed in the implementation of the Accession Partnership, which had been approved by the Council in February 2008. Criticisms levelled against Skopje centred mainly on the political criteria and in particular the conduct of the June parliamentary elections, which were marred by several incidents of ethnic violence, especially in the predominantly ethnic Albanian areas. These shortcomings were highlighted in the 2008 Progress Report, and prevented the Commission from recommending the start of accession talks with Macedonia.⁹ However, during 2009 the Macedonian government achieved significant progress in satisfying the benchmarks specified by the Commission, and in October it was rewarded with a more positive assessment.¹⁰ This ignited a new cycle of fruitless diplomatic activity, which eventually led to the Greek veto in December.

The determinants of the conflict

The Greek-Macedonian dispute can often seem incomprehensible and ludicrous to outsiders. However, a closer look reveals that it involves the main features of an

intractable conflict – most notably a clash of nationalisms and historical narratives. From the Greek perspective, the problem resides in the appropriation of a name which is part of Greece's cultural and historical heritage in order to construct an 'artificial nation'; and its subsequent use as part of a well-orchestrated irredentist project, which ultimately aims at the acquisition of Greek territory. In fact, most Greek policy-makers acknowledge that Macedonia, as a geographic entity, extends beyond the Greek realm and that therefore a compound denomination might be deemed necessary in order to distinguish the Republic from the Greek province bearing the same name. However, the prospect of the term 'Macedonian' being employed to identify non-Greeks is seen as a threat to the very essence of the Greek nation, because it casts doubts on its historical continuity.¹¹ For Macedonians, on the other hand, the use of the term Macedonia for their state, nationality and language is essential in order to demarcate their existence vis-à-vis the other Slavic nations of the region.¹² Thus, despite occasional disagreements regarding the desirability of a compromise solution on the state's name, the recognition of Macedonian name, nationality and language is generally considered as non-negotiable.

These concerns about identity are also linked with more practical considerations, regarding the alleged existence of a 'Macedonian minority' in Greece. Although Greece accepts that, in

⁹ European Commission, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 2008 Progress Report, Brussels, 2008. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia_progress_report_en.pdf [Accessed: 5 February 2010].

¹⁰ European Commission, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: 2009 Progress Report, Brussels, 2009, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/mk_rapport_2009_en.pdf [Accessed: 5 February 2010].

¹¹ A. Triandafyllidou, 'National Identity and the Other', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21(4), 1998, p. 606.

¹² K. Drezov, 'Macedonian Identity: an Overview of the Major Claims', in J. Pettifer (ed.) *The New Macedonian Question*, op. cit., pp. 47-59.

the past, the northern parts of the country were inhabited by Slavic-speaking populations, the prevailing view is that these had been fully 'Hellenised' and that the few remaining Slavophones are merely 'bilinguals' bearing 'Greek national conscience'. The Macedonian authorities cite the number of active or potential Slavic-speakers as attaining to an elevation of several thousand, and vigorously criticise Greece's refusal to acknowledge their ethnic identity.¹³ Although the minority issue is not formally part of the ongoing negotiation, it impinges upon the process, by generating mutual suspicion and wariness.

The conflict is further complicated by domestic politics in the two countries. It is now well documented that Constantinos Mitsotakis, Greek Prime Minister from 1990-1993, was eager to compromise on a synthetic name, but was unable to do so because of his slim parliamentary majority and the maverick opposition from within his own party.¹⁴ The recent hardening of Greece's stance has also, at least partly, been driven by domestic political pressure. The then Greek PM Constantinos Karamanlis first announced the intention of his government to make Macedonia's integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions conditional upon a resolution of the name dispute during a high profile televised public debate in the run up the

2007 national elections.¹⁵ Although one cannot exclude the possibility that Karamanlis acted in this way in order to strengthen the credibility of Greece's veto, it is clear that he also intended to respond to the electoral challenge presented by George Karatzaferis, a populist politician who had emerged from the rank and file of the conservative party and had managed to lure many disillusioned voters by campaigning on a nationalistic agenda. It is revealing that during the first years of his premiership, when he enjoyed an uncontested political hegemony in the centre-right of the political spectrum, Karamanlis persistently resisted calls to adopt a more assertive stance on Macedonia's accession.¹⁶

The influence of domestic politics in Macedonia is even more pronounced. The violence during the 2008 election was not an isolated event. In fact, it reflects more general difficulties in implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which terminated the internal armed hostilities between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians by providing special status and rights to the Albanian minority.¹⁷ Resentment is particularly evident among the

¹³ T. Kostopoulos, *Η Απαγορευμένη Γλώσσα: Κρατική Καταστολή των Σλαβικών Διαλέκτων στην Ελληνική Μακεδονία* [*The Forbidden Language: State Suppression of Slavic Dialects in Greek Macedonia*] (Athens: Mavri Lista, 2000).

¹⁴ A. Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Co-operation and the Macedonian Issue* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).

¹⁵ The transcript of the debate can be found at <http://www.forthnet.gr/templates/newsPosting.aspx?p=209090> [Accessed: 19 February 2010].

¹⁶ For instance, Greece conceded to Macedonia's candidacy status only a few months after the US had decided to adopt Macedonia's constitutional name instead of the provisional UN denomination and despite the fact that several MPs urged Karamanlis to respond in a dynamic manner in order to regain the lost ground. Athens News Agency, Press Review, 8 November 2004, Available at:

<http://www.hri.org/news/grpapers/typos/2004/04-11-08.typos> [Accessed: 18 February 2010].

¹⁷ For the full text see http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp [Accessed: 26 February 2010].

Macedonian majority, which considers Ohrid as an unfair and externally imposed plan. This instils the perception of an overall attack on Macedonian independence and generates negative predisposition towards a compromise on the name.¹⁸ At the same time, the decision of the Albanian minority to abandon armed struggle has been conditional on the prospect of rapid integration in the Euro-Atlantic framework. The stalemate in the accession process over the name dispute, which most Albanians consider of secondary importance, is therefore jeopardising their loyalty to the Ohrid Framework.¹⁹

Three scenarios for the future

At present a new cycle of negotiations is under way, intending to find a solution during the term of the Spanish Presidency. On the basis of the preceding analysis it is possible to speculate on an outline for three possible scenarios.

No solution and stalemate of accession process. Arguably a perpetuation of the current situation would strengthen those who would like to see a revision of the Ohrid Agreement. Even if this does not lead to a new cycle of violence, the ensuing political instability and the perception that EU principles are being misused will decrease the pace of domestic reform. Macedonia's hurdles

could also unleash centrifugal forces in other countries in the region.

Whereas Greece is, in principle, able to veto Macedonia's accession for as long as it desires, the substantial costs associated with a permanent stalemate, and the lukewarm support that the Greek position generates within the EU, render such a scenario unlikely in the medium to long term. France is the only big EU country who has openly vowed its support for Greece, citing 'community solidarity' as a reason for doing so.²⁰ The other potential Greek ally is Bulgaria, who also refutes the existence of a Macedonian nation, despite the fact that it has officially recognised Macedonia as a country since 1992. The EU's supranational institutions have also attempted to disassociate themselves from Greece's demands. The case of the European Commission, which has acknowledged the 'essential' character of a mutually acceptable solution but has nevertheless recommended the start of accession negotiations – on the basis of the technical assessment provided in the Progress Report – can be considered characteristic. In the same vein, the European Parliament passed a resolution, in January 2010, which requested that the European Council take into account the Commission's proposal and start accession negotiations immediately.²¹ More generally, past experience suggests that Greece is rarely able to maintain a veto

¹⁸ International Crisis Group, Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and how to Resolve it', *ICG Balkans Report*, No 122, 2001.

¹⁹ A. Matovski, 'Macedonia after Bucharest: Avoiding another European Failure in the Balkans, (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2008). Available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/browse/14/article/fyr-of-macedonia-after-bucharestbravoiding-another-european-failure-in-the-balkans/> [Accessed: 5 February 2010].

²⁰ *Balkan Insight* 14/3/2008 'France Backs Greece in Macedonian Row', available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8630/> [Accessed: 18 February 2010].

²¹ *SETimes* 28/1/2010 'EU Urged to Set Date for Macedonia Accession Talks', available at: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/01/28/feature-01 [Accessed: 11 February 2010].

against mounting opposition within the EU.

Rapid settlement and start of accession negotiations. This is arguably the most desirable scenario for the EU. It would strengthen Macedonia's political stability and accelerate the process of domestic reforms. It would also send a positive message to the other aspiring members in the region that the EU continues to take the enlargement process seriously. It is however unclear whether the two conflicting parties have the political will to exploit the window of opportunity offered by the pending decision over the start of accession negotiations.

As mentioned above, the decision by Greece to adopt a more hard-line position on the name issue seems to have been driven by domestic political considerations. Even though the personality and record of the newly elected PM, George Papandreou, suggests that there may exist a desire to 'move forward', Greek public opinion seems ill-prepared to accept a compromise on the name, let alone the thorny issues of nationality and language. Pessimism is also being generated by the rise to the leadership of the main opposition party of Antonios Samaras, who has forged a reputation as a hardliner on the Macedonian issue. On the Macedonian side, the relatively unproblematic path of integration during the first half of the decade and the fact that the country has already achieved international recognition by more than 120 states (including the US, Russia and China), seem to have established a consensus among a significant part of the political elite that 'time works in the

favour of Macedonia'.²² Although the recent disagreement between Nikola Gruevski and the former President of Macedonia Branko Cervenkovski over the desirability of a compromise reveal that this consensus is not solid, the significant electoral gains that Gruevski's party, VMRO achieved in the last elections suggest that the hard-line position is popular and pays political dividends. Indeed, some analysts in Skopje have argued that Gruevski is purposefully pursuing delaying tactics in an attempt to strengthen his grip in Macedonia's domestic political scene.²³

*Accession process continuation without permanent solution.*²⁴ In this scenario Macedonia would be allowed to start accession negotiations with the provisional name used in the UN (FYROM), and in exchange it would drop the ICJ procedure and refrain from using 'controversial' names and symbols. Greece would also retain the possibility of blocking particular chapters should Macedonia undertake 'provocative' moves.

There is little doubt that Macedonia and the EU would immediately opt for such a

²² H.-J. Axt, A. Milososki, and O. Schwarz, 'The Greek-Macedonian Name Dispute: Reconciliation through Europeanisation?', 2006. Available at: www.europeanization.de/downloads/europeanization_dispute.pdf [Accessed: 12 October 2007].

²³ V. Tcherneva, (2008) 'An Overly Comfortable Limbo', *European Voice*, 2008. Available at: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/10/an-overly-comfortable-limbo-/62830.aspx> [Accessed: 11 February 2010].

²⁴ This scenario builds on a solution, which has been proposed by Aristotle Tziampiris, assistant professor at the University of Piraeus. Available at: http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_09/09/2009_110537 [Accessed: 5 February 2010]. The proposal currently circulated proposes that the two countries agree on the name and leave discussions concerning its use, nationality and language for a later stage is also consistent with this solution.

solution if given the opportunity. It is also likely that Athens would be willing to set aside the name issue, if it sees that the veto is unsuccessful and has negative repercussions on other policy priorities. This was apparent in the run up to the December European Council, when Greece focused on defending its position on Macedonia and was therefore unable to back Cyprus' efforts to achieve a stronger statement on the separate issue of Turkey's refusal to open its ports.²⁵ Even if Macedonia is not provided with a date during the term of the Spanish Presidency, it is almost certain that the issue of EU-Macedonian relations will resurface on several occasions, and with the country engaged in rallying support to overcome its financial difficulties, the Greek government may soon be tempted to use its veto as a bargaining chip.

In short, the current stalemate in Macedonia's accession process is likely to be overcome. Whether this will involve a temporary compromise or a permanent solution is a subject for debate. It can however be argued, with some certainty, that the fears that the Greek veto might bring significant regional instability are exaggerated. In fact, if signs of destabilisation occur, this will only strengthen the determination of the EU and other actors with a stake in the region to find a rapid solution. A more active policy on their part will then accelerate the pace by which Greece's veto becomes untenable.◊

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²⁵ S. Lygeros, 'The Backstage before the EU's December Summit' (in Greek) Available at: http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcqi/_w_articles_politics_1_29/11/2009_381349 [Accessed: 30 November 2009].

The politics of EU military planning and conduct

Luis Simón, Royal Holloway, University of London

This contribution provides an overview of the capability for the planning, command and control (C2) for EU military operations.¹ It argues that the 'awkward alignment' between the UK and Germany is particularly responsible for the lack of a permanent operational planning capability in Brussels. The first part describes the process for the planning, command and control of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operations. The second part looks at the relationship between politics and planning.

The Union's Military Planning, Command and Control Capability

According to the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level, 'Military Planning is an iterative process which needs to analyse all relevant factors to determine the military mission'.² At the political and strategic level, this would include, according to this document, the 'analysis of the implication of political objectives, desired end state, restraints and constraints as well as an analysis of the capabilities needed, in order to develop potential military options balanced

against those capabilities offered or potentially available'.³

Military planning is conducted at four levels:

- The political and strategic level (EU institutional level).
- The military strategic level (Operation Headquarters –OHQ– level).
- The operational level (Force Headquarters –FHQ– level).
- The tactical level (Component Headquarters level and below).

It is also important to distinguish advance planning from crisis response planning. Advance planning is conducted to allow the EU to deal with potential crises. It is sub-divided into two categories:

- Generic planning is the production of basic planning documents for potential operations where some planning factors have not yet been fully identified or have not been assumed. It identifies the general capabilities required.
- Contingency planning is the production of detailed planning documents for potential operations where the planning factors have been identified or have been assumed. They include an indication of resources needed and the deployment options available. They may form the basis for subsequent planning.

Crisis response planning is conducted to enable the EU to deal with real crises. It builds on advance planning products, whenever available.⁴

¹ This contribution builds on the argument developed in Luis Simon, 'Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations', *Occasional Paper* 81 (Paris: EU ISS, 2010).

² 'European Union Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level', Council Doc. 10687/08, Brussels, 16 June 2008.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

The first element of the Union's crisis response planning process relates to the identification of the crisis, which falls to the EU Situation Centre (SITCEN), placed within the General Council Secretariat.⁵ Once the Council has agreed to prepare a military response to a given crisis, the Secretary General/High Representative can send an information gathering or fact-finding mission integrated by military and civilian experts. This exploration phase is followed by the definition of the political, strategic and political-military objectives of the operation, the end state and exit strategy, the constraints and limitations, risks, timeline considerations, tasks and chain of command, through the so-called Crisis Management Concept (CMC). The Crisis Management Concept offers the basis for the Joint Action that will provide the legal framework for the operation. DGE 8 within the General Council Secretariat is responsible for crafting the Crisis Management Concept for CSDP military operations.⁶

Building on the Crisis Management Concept, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) will produce the Military Strategic Options, which describe 'a military action designed to achieve the EU objectives as defined in the CMC. A Military Strategic Option will outline the military course of action and the required resources and the constraints'.⁷ Once the Military

Strategic Options have been produced, the EU Military Committee prioritises them and the Political and Security Committee decides on the preferred course of action.

Once a Military Strategic Option has been chosen, the EUMS produces the Initiating Military Directive, which 'should provide a clear description of the EU political/military objectives and the envisaged military mission to achieve these objectives'.⁸ The Initiating Military Directive defines the military strategic level of command; once it is issued, the Operation Commander and the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) kick into the planning process. This provides the Operation Commander with political advice that should be taken into account when producing the Concept of Operations, the Provisional Statement of Requirements, the Operation Plan, the Rules of Engagement Request and the achievement of the End State and Exit Strategy.⁹

The Initiating Military Directive is the core of a broader transition package that the EUMS sends to the OHQ, including personnel. Through the Initiating Military Directive and the emissaries it sends to the OHQ, the EUMS provides input into the Operation Plan. However, it is the military strategic level of command or OHQ and, more specifically, the Operation Commander that is responsible for the development of both the Concept of Operations and the Operation Plan. Under the authority of the Operation Commander, the OHQ also exerts command and control over the operation, to actually ensure that its

⁵ At the time of writing (March 2010), the High Representative has proposed the integration of the SitCen within the structure of the new European External Action Service. This change, however, has not been officially confirmed as of yet, let alone implemented.

⁶ Since February 2010, DGE 8 has been integrated within the new Crisis Management Planning Directorate, which is now responsible for the crafting of the Crisis Management Concept for both civilian and military operations.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

development matches the Operation Plan. Only an OHQ can, given its specific expertise, engage in operational planning. The Union does not have a permanent military strategic level of command or OHQ. Instead, it disposes of three different ways of acquiring that capability in an *ad hoc* manner, the first one relying on NATO and the other two doing so 'autonomously':

- The Berlin Plus agreements offer the EU the presumption of availability of NATO's assets and capabilities for ESDP operations, most notably in the realm of planning and C2. Final confirmation of the lease of such assets and capabilities lies with the North Atlantic Council, which decides on a case-by-case basis.
- Through the framework nation system, the UK (Northwood), France (Mont Valérien), Germany (Potsdam), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Rome), offer their national OHQs for CSDP military operations. The framework nation must ensure that it is equipped to accommodate augmentees from other EU Member States.
- An Operations Centre, placed within the Civ/Mil cell of the EUMS in Brussels can be activated for the planning and C2 of a CSDP military operation 'should the Council decide so'.

The lack of a permanent capability for the operational planning and conduct of CSDP military operations poses important problems. For one, it hampers flexibility in the Union's planning process, as politico-strategic deliberations over potential CSDP missions lack the crucial operational expertise necessary to address crucial political questions, such as how many troops are needed and for how long or how much the mission will cost.

Secondly, the lack of an operational planning capability denies the Union the capacity to develop the (advance) contingency planning products that are so crucial in situations where rapid reaction is required. Finally, the lack of a permanent command and control infrastructure has a negative impact upon the quality and security of the Union's military Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and hampers the kind of overall situational awareness offered by a central command, so vital for a Union that aims to think more strategically (as it argued in the 2008 revision of the European Security Strategy).

The preferences of the 'Big Three' (Britain, France and Germany) are largely responsible for the shape of the Union's military planning and conduct capability.

The politics of military planning and conduct: it takes three to tango

The 'awkward alignment' between the UK and Germany is particularly responsible for the rather modest evolution of the Union's planning and C2 capability. Although using different means (opposition by the former, ambiguity and inaction by the latter) and driven by different motives ('Atlanticism' in the case of the former, 'Civilian Power Europe' in the case of the latter), the behaviour of these two countries has been key in confounding the creation of the permanent military strategic level of command that Paris has pursued so eagerly.

As the institutional setting of the ESDP was being discussed in the interval between the June 1999 Cologne EU Council and the December 2000 Nice one, discussions on the nature of the EUMS constituted the first debate on the nature of the Union's planning and C2

capability. According to an insider to the discussions, 'there was an absolute consensus that something like the EUMS was needed to assist the political institutions with strategic planning'.¹⁰ It was, however, the very nature of that 'something' that sparked the argument. Paris wanted a fully-fledged OHQ capable of doing advance planning and with a permanent C2 structure, as it considered it inseparable from the autonomous European Crisis Management Capability to which the 1999 Cologne EU Council had committed. London, for its part, was more in favour of a small international secretariat that would assist the EUMS with strategic planning but would have no operational punch, in order to avoid the duplication of a capability already existing within NATO. The Germans stood close to the British position: they wanted to avoid duplication with NATO and supported the British vision of a political structure with some military expertise rather than the French vision of an operational structure.¹¹ A compromise was reached along the lines of the British-German position. The EUMS would stay away from the business of advance planning, restricting its activities to the realms of early warning, situation assessment and assisting with the politico-strategic phase of crisis response planning. It would have no capacity for operational planning or C2.

As a way of compensating for the lack of an operational planning and C2 capability, the framework nation and Berlin Plus tracks were agreed under the provisions of the Helsinki Force Catalogue. For the French, the framework nation scheme was a transitional solution only justified by the need to maintain the capacity to act of the European military instrument. The UK, on its part, was most instrumental in

bringing about the so-called Berlin Plus agreements through which the Union would gain access to the Alliance's planning and conduct capability at SHAPE.

The first attempt to restructure the Union's planning and C2 capability was aimed at mainstreaming the objectives contained in the 2010 Headline Goal (notably the need for rapid reaction and greater civ/mil interaction) into the Union's planning and conduct capability. In this context, the Council decided to create a Civ/Mil cell within the EU Military Staff that would 'reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation, assist in coordinating civilian operations and have the responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation, once a decision on such operation had been taken'.¹² Attached to it would be the new Operations Centre, a sort of embryo of an OHQ that could be activated at the request of the Council on a case-by-case basis.

This first planning and C2 reshuffle is an eloquent example of the extent to which politics delimit the scope of evolution in the Union's planning and C2 capability. The need to downplay the strong sense of intra-European bitterness caused by Iraq underpinned a mood for movement on the planning and C2 front. Most interestingly perhaps, Germany's oscillation towards the French position at the April 2003 Tervuren Summit was instrumental in advocating for the need to reform the Union's planning and C2 capability. Months later, a tripartite compromise between France, the UK and Germany in December 2003 in Berlin gave way to the Civ/Mil cell-Ops Centre package. In the words of a French official:

we convinced the German Chancellor on the necessity of

¹⁰ Author's interview with EUMC representative in Brussels, May 2008.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² 'European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations', Council Doc.13990/1/04.

a Permanent Joint OHQ, but we did not convince the German military. For the British that was a red line. We had a very long trilateral discussion, and the result was a bad compromise.¹³

Concerns over the planning delays in the 2006 EUFOR operation in DRC acted as the trigger to the post-Wiesbaden process in mid-2007, which resulted in a second reorganisation of the Union's planning and C2 capability. A brand new division fully devoted to advance planning, the Military Assessment on Planning (MAP) branch, was created within the EUMS. The German EU Presidency agreed with the French that the EUFOR DRC operation had called into question the efficiency of the Union's planning and C2 capability. For the French the lessons to be learned from the DRC mission was that the EU needed a permanent operational planning capability that would help avoid the kind of delays in the politico-strategic planning process experienced in the run up to the Congo mission. However, the German Presidency agreed with the British that the lessons from DRC should concentrate on improving the Union's strategic planning structures, not the operational ones.¹⁴ Even if modest, the post-Wiesbaden process resulted in an improvement in the Union's PC2 capability: with the creation of the MAP, the path towards a European advance planning capability was, in principle, open.

In late 2008, NATO-friendly France's hold of the EU Presidency and US support for an autonomous CSDP raised expectations over a more fundamental reshuffle of the Union's planning and C2 capability, and potentially the creation of a fully-fledged OHQ. While the financial

crunch, the Georgian crisis and the Irish 'No' vote in the first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 certainly drained the energies of the French EU Presidency, Britain's ongoing uneasiness towards the concept of a permanent OHQ remained the biggest obstacle to France's then-ESDP agenda. Towards the end of the French Presidency, in November 2008, a proposal was put forward for the creation of a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Although many of the details concerning its organisation still remain unclear, the new CMPD will gather into a single body all the strategic planning capabilities until now spread out across the Council's structure (DGE 8, DGE 9 and parts of the Civ/Mil cell). The CMPD will offer comprehensive strategic planning, including advance planning, and will have responsibility for the Crisis Management Concept. It will have 'a military angle, a police angle, a rule of law angle, a development angle, etc'.¹⁵ A Detached Augmentee Cadre (DAC) integrated within the CMPD will be deployed into the Union's various Operational Headquarters, both military (framework nation, SHAPE, Ops Centre) and civilian (CPCC).

Conclusions

The question of the nature of the Union's capability for the planning and C2 of CSDP military operations has been one of the most controversial issues throughout the CSDP process. In the context of this debate the Union's most influential member states have projected their views over the heart and soul of ESDP, namely its degree of autonomy from NATO and the appropriate balance between civilian and the military instruments. The awkward alignment between the UK and Germany largely explains the rather modest development of the Union's planning and C2 capability and, most particularly, the lack of a

¹³ Author's interview at the French Ministry of Defence in Paris, June 2009.

¹⁴ Author's interview at the General Council Secretariat of the EU in Brussels, May 2009.

¹⁵ Author's interview with General Council Secretariat official in Brussels, May 2009.

permanent military strategic level of command or OHQ. On three occasions (in late 2003, mid-2007 and late 2008), the French have explored windows of opportunity to bump up the Union's planning and C2 capability. On three occasions they have met with Britain's explicit opposition and Germany's 'destructive ambiguity'. Compromises between the Big Three have led to some improvement in the Union's planning and C2 capability. Yet the fact of the matter remains that the lack of a permanent military-strategic level of command continues to considerably cripple the performance of the Union's planning and C2 capability. ♦