

CFSP Forum

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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

Happy new year!

The focus of this issue of *CFSP Forum* is EU security and defence. One article analyses the new European Defence Agency, another the recently-launched Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two articles examine in more depth the significance and implications of recent developments in EU security policy. And the two final articles take a closer look at developments in two member states, Finland and Germany.

This year Commission funding for the FORNET network will end. We would appreciate hearing your views on FORNET in general, and on how FORNET might continue into the future without Commission funding. Are there other sources of funding for which we should apply? Which FORNET activities should we try to extend beyond the next year? Please contact us with your thoughts, at fornet@fornet.info.

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The European Defence Agency: serious opportunity, daunting challenge

Hugo Brady, Research Associate, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, Ireland

and

Ben Tonra, Jean Monnet Chair of European Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, Institute for the Study of Social Change, University College Dublin, Ireland

The Union's strategic awakening to crisis management has been signalled by a number of recent developments and the arguable lynchpin of that awakening is the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Agency, however, faces a number of challenges that must be surmounted before it can contribute meaningfully to the Union's broader strategic goals.

The drafting of the first ever agreed EU threat analysis and strategy document, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS),¹ is widely acknowledged as being a significant signpost in the development of EU crisis management. Despite shortcomings, it represents a qualitative analytical leap in the Union's understanding of its potential and its strategic mission. It also underscores – for both ambitious and reluctant member states – the scope of the task that we face. In particular, the concept of preventive engagement – which stands in contrast to the US doctrine of pre-emptive action – has the potential to underwrite a more holistic, long term and truly 'strategic' approach to security. However, the ESS also acknowledges *inter alia* that the threats posed by regional conflicts and state failure, and

the need to address these with the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, requires the Union to address definitively the capability/resource deficits identified by military planners and academic analysts alike.

The draft constitutional treaty's provisions to establish the post of Union Foreign Minister, to widen and better define the Petersberg Tasks, to develop permanent structured cooperation, to introduce a solidarity clause, to establish an External Action Service, and to establish the European Defence Agency all promise to boost the Union's security and defence capacity in the short to medium term. Indeed, the EDA's expansive mandate and ambitious development programme agreed at its first Steering Board meetings in September-November 2004 highlight the priority of making the EDA a critical enabling tool of an effective ESDP.² The Agency must now deliver on the reasoning of the ESS that 'a more capable Europe is within our grasp'.

Opportunity and challenge

The opportunity presented is much broader than the four flagship projects rubber-stamped in Brussels in November 2004,³ and is based upon a convergence of three factors:

- 1) recognition of the logical link between a credible ESDP and a more integrated European armaments market;
- 2) the clash between low national military budgets and the need for expensive technologies. This has resulted in a new interest in armaments cooperation, industry consolidation and development of common regulatory and research frameworks; and
- 3) a widening transatlantic gap which has endangered the European Technology and Industrial Base (ETIB).

The latter has been a critical factor for those member states that have traditionally relied upon market forces and preferential bilateral ties with the United States. Such is the technological gap that in recent years they have found themselves – in some circumstances – unable to link operationally with US forces in the field. All of this underscores an urgent need for increased investment in research and technology (R&T) which is beyond the capacity of the market to provide and which demands some form of public-private partnership. That investment, however, must also be directed politically so as to ensure that it delivers the capacity necessary to sustain

the Union's 'Headline 2010' programme while avoiding the pattern of failure that the EDA inherits from the past.

In 2004, the Union – with perhaps more confidence than its track record might have suggested – crossed the rubicon in taking on three peacekeeping missions with strong military dimensions. The third of these, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea; see Hanna Ojanen's article below), is by far and away its most ambitious to date even though it relies heavily in its execution upon NATO assets. That reliance may be problematic if it puts any strain on the Berlin-plus arrangements allowing European forces to have automatic access to NATO (read 'US') assets. Moreover, the Union's requirements in this area will grow further as the addition of the proposed Headline 2010 battle groups to its rapid reaction capacity come on stream. In the meantime, personnel costs and the expense of maintaining out-dated defence equipment continues to chew up the largest proportion of defence budgets. Then, even within the limited proportion of budgets spent on R&T, the opportunity costs of applying the *juste retour* principle undercut both efficiency and value for money in defence procurement. The practical result of this – and it has become something of a cliché to restate it – is that while the US has over 200 long-range transport planes that can carry the heaviest military payloads, EU member states have only four such planes (C17 Globemasters) – all of which the UK is currently leasing from the US. This has serious consequences as when, in Operation ARTEMIS in the Congo, a transport aircraft on short-term lease from the Ukraine malfunctioned resulting in 120 deaths. The second all-too-obvious fact is that no European state can afford to buy or to develop all categories of materiel necessary to the kinds of missions assumed in the ESS.

Governments have accepted the principle that they must combine their resources to acquire necessary capacity, but they balk at many of the political and strategic consequences. The existing record of multinational European defence research and development programmes is poor, frequently dogged by well-publicised delays, budget overruns and political gamesmanship. For example, the first deliveries of the Eurofighter jet – a four-country venture – arrived in 2003, ten years after the original target date, and greatly over-budget. The EDA Director General, Nick Witney, has openly criticised the failings of both the Eurofighter and the A400M aircraft – the proposed solution to Europe's shortfall in strategic lift capacity. He has argued forcefully that European

states must do more to harmonise their military requirements in developing new equipment *ab initio* rather than agreeing on a cut-down base model and then (expensively) modifying it to suit often outdated national strategic requirements.⁴ In addition, it is predicted that critical EU shortfalls in the area of command, control and communications will be more keenly felt in the deployment of the 33-nation EU-led force in Bosnia. The conclusion is clear: EU governments know they need to improve greatly the way in which they co-operate on purchasing and developing weapons systems. The EDA will need to negotiate carefully the traditional bureaucratic pitfalls of armaments procurement to achieve its stated goal of managing European armaments projects at the request of member states. More importantly, it must deliver value for each euro spent to prove the Agency's own added value.

Advances in information technology, precision guided munitions and new operational concepts form the central dynamic in military affairs today and are sometimes called the 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA). Ultimately, another principle ambition of the EDA will be to cajole European defence ministries into transforming their armed forces by endowing EU crisis management capacity with the RMA technologies required to achieve the twin goals of autonomy and interoperability with key partners, particularly the US.

The RMA also implies that the emergence of new threats, many of which cannot be met by conventional means, requires a shift away from hardware development and manufacturing towards a more integrated network of capabilities, stressing the importance of technology and managerial integration.⁵ Transformational technologies have tended to become the chief focus, with platforms (hardware) becoming less significant. For example, Vietnam-era bombs were used in the Iraq invasion when they were updated with transformational electronic (RMA) technology. Therefore, advances in the civilian informational technology sector are now highly significant for their military potential. The internationalisation of the European defence industry in response to declining or static European defence budgets and increasing costs of military equipment during the 1990s, as well as the challenge to respond to RMA-era technology requirements, all underscore the limitations of operating in fragmented national markets. The need for a wide-ranging debate on an EU defence industrial policy has already been recognised by the

European Commission in its August 2004 Green Paper on Defence Procurement.

The Commission has long argued for a regulatory framework that would provide for a more efficient allocation of resources in this sector. A significant part of this might be achieved by a more strategic interpretation of EU treaty article 296, which allows member states to derogate from free market commitments on the basis of their security interests. In addition, the Commission argues that much can be achieved by 'joined-up' policy making in the civilian sector, where much research and development in technology gives rise to dual-use goods with direct military applicability. It is clear that the Commission sees the EDA as a critical partner in drawing up schemas for civilian R&D that have potential for RMA adaptation. This has obvious attractions too for the Agency since the Union's substantial investment in many relevant civilian projects will give it an entrée to project design otherwise unavailable to it.

However, in the area of markets and regulation, the role of the Commission as a partner of the EDA will have to be tempered by concerns that the Agency should not come to be seen as a creature of the central bureaucracy, an outcome which would be potentially fatal to its success. This is true not just within a European context but also on the transatlantic front. Here it is important to bear in mind that successful European companies need well-funded, dynamic US partners. These might be more difficult to find if potential European partners are enmeshed in a tightly-regulated, oligopolistic European market. The resurgence of transatlantic disputes in the WTO over the subsidising of 'national' aerospace champions could ensure that for the moment the US government prefers to deal with European companies (and countries) on a bilateral level.

In the short to medium term, however, the EDA will strive to catch up with fast moving agendas in research and development. Whilst exhorting European governments to save precious defence euros by spending more efficiently on procurement, it will encourage EU governments to spend considerably more of their defence budgets on research and technology (R&T). It is here perhaps that the Commission will find its firmest foothold since its annual €4.4 billion research budget will inevitably intersect with the development of some dual use technologies. The best example is Commission funding for Galileo, a satellite navigation system due to be launched in 2008. Galileo was originally conceived as a civil project but could have important RMA

implications. The EDA, acknowledging that Europe will not be taking the lead in cutting edge technologies in the short to medium term, must then think ahead to the likely security challenges of 2025. In doing so, it should take a very special interest, for example, in the elaboration of EU space policy. Connected to this is the European Security Research Programme (ESRP) advocated by a Group of Personalities in March 2004.⁶ It would be Community-funded, with a minimum budget of €1 billion per year, additional to existing research funding. Given the growing duality of technology and the increasing overlap between military and non-military systems, the Commission could use the ESRP to finance transformation of technologies and/or co-fund EDA research projects with possible applications in both fields.⁷

Conclusion

The EDA has been established primarily as a policy enabler but also in recognition of the fact that we have moved beyond national defence industries. Nonetheless, boosting capabilities will still require making a convincing case to finance ministries of the need for a more pan-European and long term approach to defence procurement and R&T. Whether or not the EDA will be able to achieve this comes down to a single word: culture. The very great differences between European military cultures (and defence ministries) still pose a serious obstacle. The Agency must face the challenge of being all things to all people. Member states have very different military and security traditions, including non-alignment and anti-militarism as well as great power experience and ambition. In addition, no member state with a significant military industrial base is likely to abandon the principle of *juste retour* overnight. These realities, however, set into even starker relief the aspirations of those who seek either to 'balance' US hegemony or to strengthen and develop the transatlantic partnership. One early test of the Agency's capacity to overcome national differences will be its willingness – or the necessity – to make decisions using qualified majority voting.

While arguments regarding economic competitiveness, industrial consolidation and fiscal efficiency may be compelling, mutual trust and political solidarity engendered by positive experience carry equal, if not greater, weight. Developing the Agency in such a way that it offends the fewest prejudices possible while opening the door to the Commission, broadening

its research base and, ultimately, contributing meaningfully to strengthening Europe's security capacity will be no mean feat. In Nick Witney's own terms, the Agency is unlikely to achieve any of this 'by stealth' but by acting as 'an agent to find the point of balance between Member States, identify the common ground, persuade and cajole people to do things increasingly together'.⁸◊

¹ 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

² See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, <http://ue.eu.int>.

³ These include initiatives in the armoured fighting vehicle sector; command control and communications in conjunction with the EU military staff; preparation for an ad hoc or 'opt-in' project for technology demonstration of long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles ; and working with the Commission to produce initiatives in conjunction with consultation on the Green Paper on Defence Procurement. See 'Council Press Release: Second meeting of the EDA Steering Board', Brussels, 22 November 2004, <http://ue.eu.int>.

⁴ 'Making forces work together', *Financial Times*, 2 December 2004

⁵ See Keith Hayward, 'The Globalisation of Defence Industries', *Survival* 42 (2) 2000.

⁶ For the text of their report, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/security/pdf/gop_en.pdf

⁷ Burkard Schmitt, 'Armaments Cooperation in Europe', Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004, p. 8.

⁸ 'Making forces work together', *Financial Times*, 2 December 2004

From a European security community to a secure European community¹

Magnus Ekengren, Senior Lecturer, National Defence College, Sweden

Karl Deutsch defined 'security community' as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways'.² The European security community has been explained as the result of the EU's desecuritisation of inter-state relations, defined by Buzan and Waever as the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode into the normal political processes.³ Today the EU is securitising European cooperation through the establishment of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and internal emergency and crisis management mechanisms for the handling of new threats such as terrorism. This indicates a possible transformation of the Union's security identity.

This article investigates some significant examples of the securitisation process such as the Union's response to 9-11 and the EU solidarity clause. To what extent will the EU's new security aims and tools deepen the European security community into a secure European community - a homeland defence à la Europe? A secure community is tentatively defined as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a real assurance that the members of that community will assist each other in the protection of the democratic institutions and the civilian population - the basic functions of their societies and governments.

9-11: the EU response as 'functional' security

The EU's security answer to the September 11 terrorist attacks was civilian, with a focus on crisis management capacities located in all three EU pillars. September 11 intensified a process where the EU had begun to rethink its old lines of demarcations between external and internal security, and to consider how trade, aid, diplomacy and the new crisis management capacities under the ESDP can best be combined. Discussions, such as on incorporating the capacities of the justice and home affairs pillar (in the areas of personnel and threat

identification, for example) into the ESDP, have signalled a development towards a broad transboundary security approach. Many have claimed that there is an urgent need for better coordination between civilian ESDP activities, justice and home affairs and the Commission. Security thinking should be 'mainstreamed' into other areas of EU cooperation as well.

Within the *first pillar* the EU elaborated a new 'Rapid Reaction Mechanism' for international civil crisis management and a 'Community Mechanism' for civil protection,⁴ and adopted a whole range of security measures in a wide area of its competences.⁵ Emergency preparedness became one of five areas prioritised by the EU in the fight against terrorism.⁶

Crisis management within the *second pillar* includes military and civilian capacities. Under the ESDP, the EU will be able to deploy up to 5000 police officers in international missions, strengthen civil law systems and administration, and provide for civil protection. The EU's military crisis management capacities build on a close cooperation with Nato. In December 2003, the Union adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS). One of the greatest threats identified is the use of 'Weapons of Mass Disruption' by terrorists, a scenario that would likely result in power outages, water supply problems and a breakdown in basic infrastructure.⁷

Within the *third pillar*, police and judicial cooperation formed another basis for combatting terrorism. The EU adopted a European arrest warrant, common definition of terrorism and common list of terrorist organisations, encouraged the exchange of information between member states and Europol, established an anti-terrorist team within Europol, and created Eurojust (co-ordination of prosecutors and police officers). In October 2004, the Union established a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU Member States.

In the great variety of EU instruments and practices we can discern an emerging new security task of the Union. The goal crystallising is not mainly the securing of the external borders of the EU. Instead, it is the common safeguarding and support of the *functions* of governmental and societal institutions through emergency modes of communication and decision making and rapid-reaction networks. To secure these functions is increasingly seen as a pre-requisite for up-holding the values embodied by today's Union. This is not only a matter of 'infrastructure' but also the very

function of national government and EU governance; the ability to lead society and articulate political goals.⁸ 'Functions' in contrast to 'territories' are not delimited by spatial boundaries, but rather defined over time.⁹ The goal of the Union might in the future be functional rather than territorial integrity.¹⁰

The solidarity clause¹¹

The solidarity clause is included in the draft constitutional treaty, but the European Council adopted it as a political declaration in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The clause states that the Union should make the most of its multi-sectorial character and 'shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources, to:

- prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack.
- assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster.'

The clause codifies the new object of EU security: the functions of the democratic institutions are to be safeguarded, together with the protection of people. The formulation '*in the territory of the Member States*' points to a new kind of international security and defence cooperation. *In the territory of the Union* gets a more far-reaching meaning than normally thought of when considering that the Union will comprise more than 30 member states in a not-too-distant future. The EU goal is not the defence *of* the territory. It is the defence of an unspecified 'population' (of the states or the Union?) and an undefined institutional capacity for democracy. And that in a territory that in practice stretches beyond the borders of the EU member states in the perspective of the need to prevent terrorist threats internationally, as envisaged by the ESS.

The member states are supposed to prevent *before* an attack, *constantly* protect each other and assist *after* a member state has been attacked. The EU is trying to redefine the basis for defence from a question of where to an issue of when. This involves a shift of focus from space to pace. The Union and its member states, according to the clause, 'shall act jointly

in the spirit of solidarity if a Member State is a victim'. The wording evokes the image of an emerging common society and democratic system to protect and feel responsible for. However, the question still remains: what kind of threat or crisis would be European and activate the clause?

With the solidarity clause, the Union might be able to take a step towards a new type of transnational functional or 'societal defence'¹² in contrast to state defence. Sundelius concludes that the clause attempts to combine state security and human safety in the 'intermestic sphere' (international-domestic), as he defines the security domain for the Union.¹³ If successful the clause will probably have a strong positive impact on the long-term formation of a Union identity. It could be a step that with time might be a model also for other parts of the world. Perhaps it could be linked together with similar regional systems for a global defence network for the combatting of today's network based global terrorism. In this way, the Union could be a defence union rather than a defence alliance. This defence union would be in harmony with the Union's transnational character.

An EU defence in the Union's territory is more easily reconciled with its traditional role of creating long term peace structure than a defence *of* territory. The latter associates more with traditional military instruments of power, which could be detrimental for relations with certain third countries and for the image of the Union as a security model. The Union could be a defence power while at the same time avoiding a new and potentially destabilising balance of power with neighbouring regions. The EU candidate states could at an early stage of the accession process be involved. Also neighbouring and third states should be able to participate as far as possible. The former chairman of the EU's military committee Gustav Hägglund has proposed the development of an EU homeland defence, involving also military means.

Towards a new security identity

Traditional integration theory has understood CFSP and ESDP merely as an 'external consequence', a spill-over effect from internal EU integration. Today, these policies must be viewed as a possible driving force since they securitise central aims and issues of the Union and thus could be assumed to change its very security identity. They constitute an external source of change - a 'second image reversed'¹⁴ - for the Union. As in the case of the security community, the emerging new identity does not imply the transformation of Europe into a state. Nor does it depend on a military defence alliance. Instead, the new EU aims and tools point

to a new type of regional security identity. There is now a need for theories able to explain how and why a European security community develops into a secure European community.

Historical approaches are one way forward: After the end of the cold war, the Union has come to suffer the same weakness as nation-states when forming its security and defence policy. It has reacted to the latest events and created tools for fighting 'the last war'. The EU reacted to the Balkan wars by creating the ESDP for strictly 'external' use and to 9-11 by strengthening its 'internal' security and adopting a security strategy modelled on the US national security strategy. One of the reasons for the growing expectation-capability gap in today's ESDP could be due to the fact that the Union has lost its lead in developing international relations for the creation of security. This is for example one reason why the EU today is being compared with traditional international actors and the US, where it always will come out badly with a great image problem. Historically this was not the approach that made the Union successful. The Union was originally very strongly developed on its own unique transboundary merits and comparative advantages. The challenge today is again to try to make the most of its ability to think innovatively on conflict prevention, crisis management, peace and stability.

In the 1950s the Union was able to transcend the division between external and domestic member state security by generating cooperation and community through transnational transactions. Fifty years later it has begun to dissolve the boundary between external and internal EU security by expanding its internal safety, police and defence cooperation to neighbouring areas and linking it to the Union's contribution to international security. The transgovernmental security and safety cooperation that has evolved since 9-11 and been codified by the solidarity clause might give the Union an opportunity to take the lead again towards post-national security systems and communities. ♦

Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 4.

⁴ EU Council of Ministers, Decision of 23 October 2001/792/EC, Euratom: Art. 1.1. The mechanism has been used seven times, including to coordinate aid to the Czech Republic after floods in summer 2002, and deliver pumps to France after floods in December 2003, and help Morocco after an earthquake in February 2004. Several capacities have been tested in these first EU interventions. The added value by the mechanism over the system of bilateral requests for assistance is that it allowed for a more consolidated and theoretically quicker and more precise response. European Commission, 'Reinforcing the Civil Protection Capacity of the European Union', Brussels, 25 March 2004, COM (2004) 200 final, p. 10.

⁵ These include economic security; the protection of technical infrastructure; the combatting of terrorist funding; programmes of aviation-transport security; a Rapid Reaction Network in the field of 'health security'; programmes for the control of communicable diseases; preparedness and response to biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear terrorist attacks; general vulnerability reduction; security of energy supply; diplomacy (e.g. in the UN); a Joint Research Centre (including a new security programme); and policies of common risk analysis and intelligence. H. Jarlsvik. and K. Castenfors., *Säkerhet och beredskap i Europeiska Unionen*, Användarrapport, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2004.

⁶ The other four comprise police and judicial cooperation, global fight against terrorism, air transport security and economic and financial measures.

⁷ 'Note pour le Haut Représentant, Stratégie de sécurité de l'Union européenne. Compte rendu du séminaire sur les menaces – Identifying and understanding threats, Rome 19 septembre 2003', EU Institute for Security Studies, 23 September 2003.

⁸ B. Sundelius, 'The Seeds of a Functional Security Paradigm for the European Union', paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics of the ECPR Standing Group on European Union Politics, 24-26 June 2004, Bologna, Italy.

⁹ M. Ekengren, ed., *Functional Security - A Forward Looking Approach to European and Nordic Security and Defence Policy*, Proceedings of the Conference held at National Defence College, Stockholm, December 5 – 6, 2003.

¹⁰ I thank Carl-Einar Stålvant for this observation.

¹¹ This section is largely based on M. Ekengren, and S. Larsson, *Säkerhet och försvar i framtidens EU – en analys av försvarsfrågorna i det europeiska konventet*, Report 2003:10, Stockholm: Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies, 2003, www.sieps.su.se.

¹² B. Sundelius, 'Totalförsvaret är överspelat – vi behöver ett samhällsförsvär!' (The End of Total State Defence – We Need a Societal Defence), Försvarsberedningen, Stockholm: Ministry of Defence, 2001.

¹³ B. Sundelius, 'The Seeds', p. 8.

¹⁴ P. Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic Politics', *International Organization* 32 (4) 1978.

¹ This contribution builds on a forthcoming chapter, 'The Interface of External and Internal EU Security – Implications for the Nordic Countries', in A. Bailes, ed, *ESDP and the Nordic States*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. It also draws on M/ Ekengren, 'From a European Security Community to a Secure European Community – Analysing EU 'Functional' Security - The Case of EU Civil Protection', paper presented at the SGIR Conference, Fifth Pan-European Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, 11 Sept. 2004, www.eucom.leidenuniv.nl.

² K. Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1957, p. 6.

³ B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. de Wilde, *Security – A New*

Europe has a strategy, but is the EU a strategic actor?

Catherine Gegout, Marie Cure Fellow, London School of Economics, UK

More than a year after the US National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in September 2002, the EU presented its own European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003.¹ The ESS is a limited document which aims mainly to protect European security, rather than focus on European *and* global security. The ESS also illustrates that the EU is a strategic actor focused on short-term European security.

A limited European security strategy

ESS echoes US concerns

Strategy is the art of using all the economic, diplomatic, and military resources and policies of an organisation to execute approved plans as effectively as possible. For maximum credibility, the ESS should have defined the EU's foreign policy aims; the values and interests it wishes to defend and promote when making its foreign policy; and the economic, diplomatic, and military resources it intends to deploy. It should then have listed the conditions under which its various instruments could be used. But the ESS does none of this; instead it lists in detail the challenges and threats faced by Europe, only gives a plan to respond to threats, and fails to address the challenges directly.

It would seem that the EU wants to be in harmony with US concerns. The challenges and threats faced by Europe and the US are the same. Although the ESS alludes to security issues such as regional conflicts and state failure, it puts a clear emphasis on threats. In fact, the ESS is 'one of first EU texts to be threat-driven',² and it echoes NSS concerns.

The ESS was created to prove to the US that the EU could be a united – following the disagreements on the war on Iraq – and credible actor, capable of using military power, yet which also believes a mixture of instruments are necessary to address threats and challenges. Hill believes that the ESS was produced 'to convince the USA that Europe was not totally mired in delusional 'soft power' thinking'.³ At a meeting in Paris, Javier Solana explained that the reason why Europeans must 'act together' is so 'the US will take heed and

listen'.⁴ The ESS was thus not aimed at creating a European security identity which would have put an emphasis on EU policy actions and on the way national defence structures could be integrated into the EU.

Vague and insufficient description of European capabilities and utopian aims

The instruments mentioned in the ESS are very general. For instance, dealing with terrorism 'may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means'. Also, instead of preemptive action, the ESS stresses 'preventive engagement': the EU does not wish to commit itself to tackling hostile states before they can strike, which is what the preemption doctrine favours. The member states agreed that a common culture was necessary, but they did not state how they intended to foster this culture.

In terms of EU action against threats, the ESS focuses mainly on past instruments used to combat terrorism, the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and wars. In terms of EU action to address international challenges, the ESS does not focus on the importance of the EU's external assistance, nor does it detail how aid and conflict prevention measures should be reinforced.

The ESS has very utopian aims. It states that Europeans should aim at 'an effective and balanced partnership with the USA'. This seems very ambitious. In order to have a balanced partnership, the EU should have the same military capabilities as the US.

The general message to third countries which violate international norms is that they 'should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union'. Here too the type of sanctions, and the conditions under which the EU should use its economic and military capabilities to punish these states, are not clearly stated. The ESS advocates multilateralism, but it does not clearly state that the EU will *systematically* act under the UN framework. It is also very general as regards the partners with which the EU should develop links.

The ESS has very broad aims with a narrow focus on terrorism and WMDs. But the EU's aim to enhance European and international security must not only be judged according to the ESS: one must study the EU's foreign policies.

A strategic actor focused on short term European security

To be a strategic actor, Europe needs aims, capabilities and policies with results. Security is a state of being secure, or feeling free from danger and destitution. For Europe to be secure, it must address the threats of terrorism and WMD. It could then promote a 'European security strategy'. All the other challenges such as making the world a better place are not directly aimed at enhancing European security. Answering these other challenges would mean that Europe has both a 'European *and* international security strategy', or a global strategy, as it would focus both on its own security and on the security of other countries in the world.

EU foreign policy is made up of the EU's trade, development, CFSP and ESDP policies. In the following sections, I will look at what action the EU is taking in these four policy fields to answer first, global challenges, and second, threats.

No coherent global strategy

When establishing trade relations with third parties, the EU adopts the strategy of exporting its values, as it tries to include a political conditionality clause, namely the respect of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance (corruption must be eradicated). However, this is not systematic. For instance, 'China, South Korea, Laos, the Philippines, and Malaysia refused to have political conditionality included in their sectoral trade agreements with the EU.'⁵ This leads to a European foreign policy which applies different conditions to different countries, which shows the limits of its export strategy.

The EU's development policy also exports EU values through the use of political conditionality. This policy is different from that of the US. In effect, Europe spends more on the developing world than the US does. Table 1 (p. 10) shows the differences between aid given by European states, the European Union, the US and the rest of the world.

The way the EU carries out its development policy is different from that of the US. The EU aims to transpose its own model of regional integration; it is willing to give more aid to countries which create regional blocs among themselves. However, despite the apparent effectiveness of the EU's development policy, one must keep in mind that the EU spends more

on neighbourhood countries than on its development policy. The EU's strategy is more focused on close problems than on global issues.

Within the CFSP framework, limited action is taken in failed states. The ESS mentions the regional conflicts in North Korea and Kashmir, but there is little EU action towards these countries.

Within the ESDP framework, the EU does not have the full range of military capabilities it needs to effectively stop conflicts. In June 2004, the 2010 headline goal was defined with the creation of battle groups and the establishment of a civil-military cell. On 12 July 2004, a European Defence Agency was created. However, this might not be enough to address the 'new wars' with paramilitary groups, warlords, terrorists, criminal groups, mercenaries and private military companies as their main actors.⁶ The failure of the EU to act cohesively in Darfur shows the limitation of the ESDP.

Although Europe's rhetoric aims at making other countries secure, it does not avail itself with all the instruments that would make the world a better place: it does not effectively have a comprehensive notion of European and international security.

Europe's 'excès de zèle' towards terrorism and WMDs

Europe focuses mainly on its own security by acting internally and externally against the threats of terrorism and WMDs. In terms of *internal* security, Europe has been acting effectively since 9/11 to combat terrorism and WMDs. In terms of *external* security, Europe has also been using the whole range of its foreign policies to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

As regards the EU's trade policy, the EU promotes dialogue and cooperation with countries which have to deal with potential sources of terrorism. The EU signed a 3rd Generation Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan in 2001. It included a preferential trade package, as well as additional development aid. The EU can thus 'reward' states that do not follow human rights and rule of law principles. This type of policy goes against the one of exporting its values and imposing political conditionality.

In the development field, the EU has also included a clause on the necessity to combat terrorism. The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, decided on 25 March 2004, sets the framework for the relationship between the fight against terrorism and the EU's development policy. The EU Plan of

Action on Combating Terrorism (11 June 2004) details this link: the Council and the Commission must 'include effective counter-terrorism clauses in all agreements with third countries' (point 1.4). The EU requires third countries to reaffirm the importance of the fight against terrorism and to co-operate in the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism. Some NGOs have expressed their concern about this paragraph. The counter-terrorism clause mentioned in agreements with third countries goes against the concept of development aid, which traditionally focuses on third states' concerns, namely the fight against poverty. The EU does not specify the consequences (for instance sanctions) for third countries that do not comply with this clause.⁷

In the CFSP field, EU action seems to have had a very limited impact. In terms of institutions to address the problems of WMD, the EU wants to strengthen the controls and relevance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to proliferation. It adopted the Declaration on the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the U.S.-EU Summit in June 2003. It has a Personal Representative appointed to deal with WMD matters since October 2003. In terms of CFSP policies, as regards proliferation, the ESS is concerned that 'distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand'. It states that there are possible 'nuclear risks' in North Korea, South Asia and the Middle East. But effectively, very few programmes to help these states have been set up. The Big Three within the EU have given special attention to Iran. However, the main sponsors of terrorism are Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Chechnya. The EU does not seem to be acting vis-à-vis these states.

In the ESDP field, the EU does not have the capacity to fight terrorism and countries with WMDs.

The EU is a strategic actor focused on short term European security. When European states have an aim, namely combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they act in a unified way and with the whole range of capabilities available to them. In order to ensure both long term European security and global security, it would have to aim at materialising the rhetoric of promoting international security as stated in the ESS. ♦

Table 1⁸
Overseas Development Aid in 2003

Country	% GNI	\$ million	% total aid by donors
Italy	0.17	2,433	
Greece	0.21	362	
Austria	0.20	505	
Spain	0.23	1,961	
Germany	0.28	6,784	
Portugal	0.22	320	
United Kingdom		6,282	
Finland	0.34		
France	0.35	558	
Ireland	0.41	7,253	
Belgium	0.39	504	
Luxemb.	0.60	1,853	
Netherlands	0.81	194	
Sweden	0.80	3,981	
Denmark	0.79	2,400	
	0.84	1,748	
EU States			
Total	0.35	37,139	54
Of which EC		7,173	10.5
United States	0.15	16,254	24
Japan	0.20	8,880	13
New Zealand	0.23	165	
Australia	0.25	1,219	
Canada	0.24	2,031	
Switzerland	0.39	1,299	
Norway	0.92	2,042	
Total other		6,756	9
TOTAL		69,029	100

¹ 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 December 2003;

² 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

³ François Heisbourg, ed., 'European Security Strategy: Is it for real?', European Security Forum (ESF) Working Paper No. 14, October 2003, p. 1.

⁴ Christopher Hill, 'Britain and the European Security Strategy', FORNET Working Paper no. 6, 2004, p. 2.

⁵ Javier Solana, 'Annual Conference of the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union', Document S0232/04, Paris, 9-10 September 2004, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/fr/discours/81889.pdf.

⁶ Thomas Risse and Tania Borzel, 'One Size Fits All! EU

Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law', paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 4-5 October 2004, p. 18.

⁶ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 1999.

⁷ For further information on the link between the EU plan to combat terrorism and its development policy, see: the 'EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism', Council of the European Union, Brussels, 11 June 2004, Doc 10010/3/04 REV 3 LIMITE; the 'EU Presidency Statement - Counter-Terrorism - Resolution 1373', Speaking points for the presentation by the European Union in the meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with the EU (New York), 23 April 2002, http://europa.eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1323_en.htm; 'The Irish Association of Non Governmental Development Organisations', 2004, http://www.dochas.ie/Working_Groups/Presidency/speeches/examiner_article.htm; and 'Letter to the Troika, EU should fulfil its part in the UN Millennium Summit, Les ONG dans la Coopération', 21 April 2004, http://www.onqd.lu/article.php3?id_article=495.

⁸ Table based on information from 'DAC Members' Net Official Development Assistance in 2003', <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/9/1893143.xls>, Website consulted on 10 January 2005.

Operation Althea: healing, testing, or testing the healing?

Hanna Ojanen, Senior researcher, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland

On 2 December 2004, the European Union embarked on a new military operation, once again the first of its kind. Indeed, once again: as the Union's crisis management activities have so far been few, they have all been launched as 'firsts ever': the first ever civilian crisis management operation (Bosnia), the first ever military crisis management operation (Macedonia), the first ever autonomous military operation (Congo), first ever rule of law mission (Georgia) ... Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 'first' not only in the sense of being considerably larger than the previous ones (some 7200 troops, which however should subsequently diminish) but also as an operation of a new, *comprehensive* kind, linked to the two civilian crisis management operations in place, the Police Mission (EUPM) and the Monitoring Mission (EUMM). It is also one in which several non-EU countries participate: in addition to 22 EU members, 11 other countries have contributed troops to the operation.¹

The EU has chosen to name its operations quite differently from what its colleague in crisis management, NATO, does. Instead of brisk 'Desert Storms', the EU approaches the crisis regions with hushed 'Concordia'. The name of the new operation in Bosnia, 'Althea', then, brings into mind the herb *Althaea*, named after ancient Greek *(h)althaia* or *(h)althein*, to cure, to heal. *Althaea Officinalis*, marshmallow, was used in medicine already two thousand years ago and has been said to cure all kinds of different ills.²

What could the EU aim at healing or curing through this operation? The tasks of the operation seem numerous. The main mission is to uphold security and stability to ensure compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord. At the same time, the operation should support the work of the local EU Special Representative, the core tasks of the Office of the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan, the goals of the Stabilisation and Association process, and, all in all, what was adopted as the comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina by the European Council in June 2004.³

In fact, Operation Althea makes up only one part of the Union's presence in the country. But through this operation, the EU can be expected to play many different roles at the same time, and lots of attention is drawn towards the operation from both outside and inside the Union. To start with three most obvious roles, the EU now performs as a vice-NATO of some kind, while it also is a regional organisation at the service of the UN, and an enlarging organisation drawing neighbouring regions closer to itself.

First, the EU takes over from NATO and will accordingly have to be able to manage at least the same tasks as NATO did if not even some more. The antecedents, NATO's IFOR operation from 1995 and SFOR from 1996, were originally much larger but were reduced over time in size, while Europeans gradually also took over from the Americans. In Althea, there are no US troops, but 150 American personnel assist the former SFOR commander who will command a small NATO headquarters in Sarajevo.⁴

This takeover can be seen as a part of a more general devolution of NATO's tasks to the EU: while NATO leaves operations in Europe for operations in other parts of the world, the EU itself has during the past years put much effort in building up crisis management capacities of its own for different situations (battle groups, talk about establishing a crisis management corps for disaster relief and emergency reconstruction, proposal for a Human Security Response Force⁵). Putting these to use in crisis regions in Europe appears natural. Moreover, the EU is increasingly conscious about its neighbourhood, and building security in the neighbourhood is one of the major strategic objectives in the European Security Strategy of 2003. Thus, addressing the anticipated regional security threats such as weapons smuggling, extremist religious groups or issues of border security is in the interests of the Union also as a neighbour, not only as an organisation in charge of a crisis management operation.

At the same time, apprehending indicted war criminals also figures among the concrete tasks. Interestingly, there seemed first to be a clearer partition of tasks between the EU and NATO whereby the EU's role was to focus on organised crime in terms of monitoring Bosnian troops carrying out the necessary work, while NATO would use its remaining presence for, notably, the pursuit of war criminals. Subsequently, however, the EU's mission has been broadened

to cover most of the authority and responsibility of SFOR.⁶ Whether this is an indication of implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO, of devolution, or of competition, is a matter of interpretation. In any case, NATO and the EU seem to differ in their emphases. For NATO and the US, linking the mission to war against terrorism is not far-fetched, while for the EU, the context is rather that of improving civilian-military cooperation and of defining and finding the proper forms of its presence in the region, its overall relationship with the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular.

The Stabilisation and Association Process that is the framework for the EU's relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina also includes the aim of including the country one day as a member of the Union. The main objectives of EU assistance towards that goal are to help consolidate the peace process and foster inter-entity co-operation, to help ethnic reconciliation and the return of refugees and displaced persons, to help establish functioning institutions and a viable democracy, to lay the foundations for sustainable economic development and growth, and to bring the country closer to EU standards and principles. What is found particularly problematic is the state itself, its delimited powers: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a weak state that should be strengthened. Quoting Christopher Patten, 'We cannot allow BiH to fail, because to do so would open up ethnic fault lines and expose the whole region to destabilisation.'⁷ Reluctance in the country to take ownership of reform has been criticised,⁸ and the lack of progress has been disappointing. Thus, the EU is not only engaged in securing the implementation of a peace agreement, but also in the process of state building.

As if testing the functioning of the Berlin Plus agreement and testing the EU's capacity to assist state reform and to carry forward the process of enlargement to Western Balkans were not enough, Operation Althea also tests the EU's capacity to implement the delineations of the European Security Strategy as regards multilateralism and cooperation with the UN. The operation is based on a 12-month mandate by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1572, 22 November 2004) and might give good possibilities for cooperation also on the ground.⁹ The EU and the UN seem to recognise that they increasingly need one another: the EU needs the UN for legitimacy and the credibility of its proclaimed multilateralism; the UN needs the EU for capacities and thus credibility.

Finally, Operation Althea can also be seen as an occasion for a *retouche* on the roles of the different EU organs and on the balance of power between them. The European Parliament has shown an interest in an increased say in the military side of the EU's new crisis management activities to complement what it now has, oversight over the civilian aspects of the mission.¹⁰

Hopefully the name of the operation is a good omen. At least there is no shortage of different pains and problems that Althea might help to cure and heal. A source of frustration for the locals might be, however, that these are not limited to *their* problems – be they administrative and security sector reform, infrastructure or ethnic reconciliation – but also include a wealth of small ailments of the operator itself. Some healing is needed in the field of fast developing inter-organisational relations whereby the EU is sharpening its place among the others, as well as in the internal working and coherence of the Union's external activities. Quite often, indeed, explicit references to testing of some kind are used when characterising the EU's operations: the EU tests its new capacities, its new concepts, or its old recipes of enlargement for new cases. Testing can be a comfortable way of flinching from one's duties – if something is only a test, even poor results or no results at all may be accepted. The risk is, however, that the EU can be perceived to conduct operations in the end primarily for its own sake, to improve its own functioning, or to polish its image. The Union cannot remain an entity engaged in endless testing. At some point, it needs the courage not to test, but simply to make the most of the capacities it has. ♦

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech04_209.htm.

⁸ 'The EU's relations with Bosnia & Herzegovina', updated November 2004;

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/bosnie_herze/index.htm; 'Bosnia & Herzegovina: Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006', http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/bosnie_herze/csp/index.com.

⁹ Martin Ortega, 'The EU and the UN: Strengthening Global Security', in Espen Barth Eide, ed., *'Effective Multilateralism': Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalised UN*. Global Europe, Report 1. The Foreign Policy Centre, British Council and the European Commission, in association with Wilton Park, 2004 (<http://fpc.org.uk>), p. 11.

¹⁰ European Parliament, 'Motion for a resolution on the European Union military operation 'ALTHEA' in Bosnia and Herzegovina', 24 August 2004. RE\539526EN.doc.

¹ Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, Norway, New Zealand, Romania, Switzerland and Turkey.

² Moreover, a predecessor of gelatine has been produced from its root (thus giving the name to marshmallows).

³ Gerrard Quille, 'ESDP takes over from NATO: Operation ALTHEA, coherent, effective and democratically accountable?' *European Security Review*, ISIS Europe, n. 24, October 2004. www.isis-europe.org.

⁴ 'EU Force (EUFOR) – Operation Althea' in *European Defence Indepth*, www.european-defence.co.uk.

⁵ *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, Barcelona, 15 September 2004. (Convenor: Mary Kaldor).

www.lse.ac.uk/depts/global/studygroup/studygroup.htm

⁶ 'EUFOR: Changing Bosnia's Security Arrangements'.

EUROPE Briefing, Sarajevo/Brussels 29 June 2004.

International Crisis Group (ICG). www.icg.org. P. 4.

⁷ 'The Western Balkans: The Road to Europe', Speech by Christopher Patten to German Bundestag, European Affairs Committee, Berlin 28 April 2004 at

Finland: still in search of a mission statement

Henrikki Heikka, Senior Research Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland

It is difficult to think these days of any entity without some sort of a mission statement. As traditional organizations and hierarchies have given way to networks, everyone from individuals through NGO's and corporations to great powers has been encouraged to state their mission in simple and understandable words. Contemporary mission statements in international politics, such as the US National Security Strategy or the European Security Strategy, are brief documents that paint a picture of the values that the actors hold dear and the goals they seek to promote.¹ Networks of policy-makers, think-tankers, diplomats, officers and consultants are then tasked to rethink creatively every day how the mission statement can be turned into reality.

The keys to successful implementation of a mission statement in international politics these days are similar to the secrets of managing a large corporation: the winner is the culture that breeds innovativeness, rewards achievement, allows people to learn from mistakes and is in real-time touch with the rest of the world. Losers in contemporary international politics are made from the same mould as failed businesses: rigid hierarchies and standard operating procedures, and organisational cultures that stifle discussion and reward subservience.

In search of that vision thing

In Finland, the latter half of 2004 saw a period of unprecedented debate over a mission statement for the country's foreign and security policy. The debate crossed the usual political divisions, with the government coalition's credibility stretched to its limits as the main politicians seemed to disagree with each other on fundamental issues.² In the debate, the prime minister, for example, took a positive approach to globalisation as well as the development of the European Union's military capabilities, whereas the president aligned herself with anti-globalisation forces and was reserved about the idea of the EU's battle groups acting without a UN Security Council mandate. In addition, the governing parties were internally divided on issues such as whether or not to call Finland a militarily non-aligned country.

The debate had its origins in the government's much-awaited Security and Defence Policy Report, which was published in September 2004.³ For several years, the political elite had toned down its discussion about Finnish grand strategy by referring to the forthcoming report, which was supposed to lay out a vision of the country's place in the world.

After the report came out, the years of silence ended and the debate soon boiled over. At one point, the government coalition's backers became so worried about the public criticism of the government, that their party newspapers, *Demari* and *Suomenmaa*, published a rare common editorial on 3 December 2004 pounding home the virtues of a national consensus in foreign policy. As one would expect, such a move simply fanned the flames of the debate, and the opposition as well as other commentators, spared no ammunition in criticizing the government for a return to the past.

As the year 2004 draw towards its conclusion, it seemed that the debate had proven right what Liisa Jaakonsaari, Chairman of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and a prominent Social Democrat, had said in October: 'the Government lacks one thing, and with it, everything: a vision'.

Shortcomings of the report

Why did the report cause such an outpouring of criticism? The simple answer is that it left a lot to be desired. Public debate and parliamentary criticism focused in particular on three shortcomings in the text. Almost everyone in the debate shared the view that the report ignored the importance of transatlantic relations and the United States in particular. It is easy to share this criticism: the US currently has 752 foreign military bases, spanning the whole world, and a military budget that exceeds all other major powers combined. Pax Americana is, in good and bad, the defining feature of contemporary international security, and the transatlantic relationship is Finland's link to Pax Americana. With only 2 pages out of the total 167 in the report devoted to the topic – a section far shorter than the one dealing with the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security, Cooperation in Europe and 'means of disarmament' – critics had no difficulty in blasting the government for promoting a rather distorted view the world.

A second major shortcoming, pointed out by critics, was the rather thin analysis of the political developments in Russia. The very real setbacks in Russia's democratisation during the recent years

were not analysed, hardly even noted, in the report. As Putin's roll-back of liberal democracy in Russia accelerated throughout the latter half of 2004, critics were able to point to concrete evidence suggesting that the government's report was either out of date or from the same mould as Finnish cold war communiqués.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, criticism of the government's vision – or, rather, the lack of it – focused on the question of whether the concept of non-alignment has any relevance in today's world. The parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, along with many influential commentators, pointed out that Finland's active role in building the EU's external action capabilities, the close link between NATO and European defence, and the globalised nature of today's threat perceptions, were beginning to make the idea of military non-alignment increasingly outdated and unfit for describing Finland's policies.

Reasons for failure

What can observers of Finnish foreign policy learn from the debate? Is it realistic to expect the government to come up with a more up-to-date mission statement in the coming years? The most obvious conclusion would be to blame the authors and reshuffle the people involved. However, blaming the authors of the report for failure to come up with a mission statement for the country would not be fair.

The main authors of the report, the 'gang of four', as they were known, may not have been the dream team of Finnish grand strategy, but they were definitely not short of intellectual firepower or expertise. The defence establishment was represented by Pauli Järvenpää, an Ivy-League educated expert on security policy and one of the most articulate Atlanticists in the Finnish foreign policy elite. Jaakko Laajava, the Foreign Ministry's representative, is also an Atlanticist with a proven ability to think big about international relations. Risto Volanen, who served as the Prime Minister's Office's representative in the group, is a graduate of the Ecole nationale d'administration and a well-known geopolitical realist. Jaakko Kalela from the President's office is a historian by training with decades of experience on the intricacies of Finnish-Russian relations. The fact that such a group managed to produce a report so out of touch with reality is a small miracle in itself.

As time has gone by, public knowledge of what

happened during the process of drafting the report has mounted. While it will be up to journalists and historians to carve up the details of the process, it is likely that the picture to emerge will be one of an exercise in innovative strategic thinking turning into a highly politicised struggle over whose patron gets to keep what of their shrinking bureaucratic empires. Frustrated people involved in the process have made it clear that in so far as the realities of globalisation, American hegemony and European security integration stood in the way of bureaucratic cultures in the process of writing the report, reality had to give way to bureaucratic interests.

The way forward

What can we expect from Finnish foreign and security policy in the coming years? Predicting is a dangerous business, but since organizations do emulate the successful administrative techniques of other organizations, some comments on how the making of Finnish grand strategy is likely to evolve can safely be made.

As suggested in beginning, networking and real-time situation awareness are the prerequisite for success in today's world. Finland's response to the recent tsunami disaster shows that work remains to be done in this respect. Network-centricness in foreign policy implies not only adequate communications – and here Finland is, for the most part, in tune with the times – but the ability to tie the whole government and its partners in civil society and the business community into one web able to respond rapidly to the challenges of the day.

In terms of strategic thinking the role of think-tanks will probably expand, since the growing need to think about Finland's policy in every part of the globe cannot be met by expensive in-house expertise within government. The extent of transparency in international affairs these days means that the government no longer has a monopoly on the facts needed for an informed opinion.

It is also likely that the requirements put on Finland by the fast pace of events in the world will outdate the current process of drafting security policy reports every four years. While the quadrennial rhythm might stay, the reports are likely to become shorter and more abstract mission statements, and the government will be expected to provide the Parliament and the public detailed briefings on Finnish security at a much higher tempo. ♦

¹ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels: December 2003; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington: September 2002.

² The main parties in the government currently are the Center Party, torn between its more liberal wing and the less liberal rural-agricultural lobby; and the Social Democrat Party, in which business-friendly federalists and more traditional socialists struggle for power. In the making of foreign policy, the Centre Party's key posts are the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, while the SDP's key posts are the President and the Foreign Minister.

³ The report is available at http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/2160_English_White_paper_2004.pdf

Germany: the new deployment law and the problem of integrated military structures

Wolfgang Wagner, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany

Germany's new deployment law

On 3 December 2004, the German Parliament passed a new law defining the Bundestag's participation in decision-making on the deployment of troops out of area. Such a 'Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz' had been on the agenda since the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 ruled that the Basic Law allows sending the Bundeswehr out of area, that the Bundestag has to approve of each deployment and that new legislation should define further details.

Since the Court's ruling (and without further legislation), Germany has become a major contributor of troops with almost 10.000 soldiers participating in IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, ISAF and a number of smaller missions. In order to fulfil its constitutional role, the Bundestag convened more than forty times to discuss and finally endorse deployments. Whereas most decisions received broad support and passed without much ado, participation in ISAF nearly toppled the Schröder government because parts of the smaller coalition partner, the Green Party, opposed it.

The troops themselves, many of them conscripts who volunteered for longer service and deployments abroad, have appreciated an explicit parliamentary approval because this conferred legitimacy on the Bundeswehr's new role out of area. During the first years after the end of the Cold War, German governments had faced fierce resistance to deployments out of area as significant parts of the public and the then red-green opposition regarded them as a troubling break with the antimilitarism of the Bonn republic. Although the Constitutional Court declared that out of area missions do not violate the Basic Law, it made equally clear that the Bundeswehr was no instrument at the government's disposal but a 'parliamentary army'. Even though the Berlin republic has become a 'normal' power as regards out of area missions, the Constitutional Court helped to

preserve a distinct feature of German postwar constitutionalism by giving the parliament a powerful role in defence politics.

The problem of integrated military structures

The 'Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz' was brought back on the agenda as concerns mounted that a strong parliament might conflict with renewed efforts to establish integrated military structures. Germany has been a staunch supporter of integrated military structures as they were regarded as welcome safeguards against a re-nationalisation of defence policies after the cold war. Together with France, Germany was instrumental in establishing the Eurocorps in 1991. More recently, the German government welcomed the establishment of a NATO Response Force as well as of EU battle groups. Both are highly qualified forces designed for the most demanding tasks out of area. Most importantly, both the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups are designed to be deployable on very short notice. At the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004, the defence ministers announced their ambition 'to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council.'¹ No later than ten days after such a decision, the forces should start implementing their mission on the ground. NATO has similar ambitions regarding the deployability of its Response Force.

From a military point of view, rapid deployability is essential for addressing certain types of crises. The requirement of rapid deployment, however, may come into conflict with the necessity of parliamentary approval. This became obvious when NATO organized a simulation of deploying its Response Force in Colorado Springs in October 2003. It soon became clear that a rapid deployment could be endangered by the required advance approval of the German Parliament. As with AWACS, German troops would play an essential role for the NRF. In contrast to AWACS, however, even a belated 'green light' could possibly cause problems. As a consequence, German Defence Minister Struck immediately launched a debate about a reform of Germany's parliamentary proviso. Struck's suggestion was supported by his American colleague, Donald Rumsfeld, who urged NATO members 'to bring NATO's decision-making structures up to date so that NATO military commanders can take decisive action against fast-moving threats in the 21st

century.'²

The problématique of integrated military structures resurfaced in the Bundestag's debate on the Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz. The major opposition party, the Christian democrats, voted against the law because they regarded the parliamentary proviso as incommensurate with the functioning of integrated military units. In his statement on the Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz, Christian Schmidt (CSU) argued that the deployment of integrated units should not require parliamentary approval. Lest Germany's reliability as a an ally and contributor of troops be endangered, the Bundestag should only give a general approval of deployments when endorsing the establishment of integrated units in the first place. In a similar vein, Eckart von Klaeden (CDU) argued that the aim of strengthening EU and NATO is incompatible with the requirement of having every single deployment approved by parliament. The Free Democratic Party suggested establishing a special committee that could assemble quickly and decide on Bundeswehr deployments on behalf of the whole parliament.

Notwithstanding the opposition's concerns, the Bundestag decided not to exempt integrated military units from parliamentary approval and not to delegate deployment decisions to a special committee. Speakers from the ruling coalition of Social Democrats and Greens instead hailed the parliamentary proviso as a cornerstone of Germany's 'culture of restraint'. As a consequence, the whole house should assume responsibility for sending troops out of area. However, the new deployment law does provide for one major exemption from the general rule of parliamentary approval: 'missions of minor intensity and importance' are subject to a 'simplified procedure' according to which a mission is approved unless 5% of all members of parliament insist on the regular procedure within seven days of having been informed by the government. Missions 'of minor intensity and importance' include exploratory missions and missions concerning only single soldiers who do service in allied militaries or international organizations.

One size does not fit all: the broad spectrum of deployment laws in EU member states

To be sure, the conflict between alliance politics, on the one hand, and the democratic control of the armed forces, on the other, is nowhere likely to be as intense as in Germany where both demanding standards of parliamentary control and multinational integration were designed to prevent a resurgence of militarism. Indeed, the role of

parliaments in security and defence politics varies widely across EU member states.³ In addition to Germany, the consent of parliament prior to a deployment of troops has been required in Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. In Italy and the Netherlands, governments have regarded parliamentary approval as indispensable although there has been no constitutional requirement to do so. However, in some of these countries, the deployment law provides for exceptions from and modifications of the general rule of parliamentary approval. In Austria, parliament has delegated its right to approve or disapprove of military deployments to a standing committee which has participated in the exercise of various executive tasks. Moreover, the government may deploy troops without parliamentary approval if urgency does not allow for prior consultation. In this case, a debate must be held within 15 days. In case parliament does not endorse the deployment, the respective troops have to be ordered back. Yet another exemption from general parliamentary approval can be found in Sweden: the government may deploy troops without consulting parliament if the deployment takes place within the framework of multilateral security institutions. Particularly deployments based on a 'standby-agreement' as provided by art. 43 of the UN Charter, do not require the consent of the Riksdag. Similarly, deployments based on international agreements that have been endorsed by parliament are exempted from further approval. In Ireland, there has been still another exemption from general parliamentary approval for deployments consisting of less than twelve armed soldiers.

In contrast, in former colonial powers, governments are usually allowed to deploy troops without the consent of parliament. For example, the governments in France and the United Kingdom decided to participate in NATO air strikes against Serbian targets in 1999 without having consulted their parliaments. In a similar vein, no parliamentary approval is required in Spain and Belgium.

Across the members of the European Union, there have been huge differences regarding parliaments' participation in deployment decisions. It is important to note that these differences do not reflect different *levels* of democratic achievement but rather different traditions of democratic thought and historical experiences. This renders any attempt to standardise procedures of parliamentary participation inappropriate. As a consequence,

defence ministers and militaries across the EU should take the differences in parliamentary involvement more seriously. For example, differences in parliamentary involvement should play a more important role in setting up integrated military structures such as battle groups.⁴ In order to make a valuable contribution to the EU's military capacities, battle groups should combine member states' individual capabilities and comparative advantages in effective ways. In order to be deployable without undermining some national parliaments' control of the military, however, the EU should hesitate to compose battle groups of militaries that are subject to different strategic and democratic cultures.◊

¹ Military Capability Commitment Conference, Brussels, 22 November 2004.

² United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, Press Conference with Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and NATO Secretary -General Lord Robertson; Wednesday, 8 October 2003; <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20031008-secdef0746.html>.

³ An overview has been given in Assembly of the Western European Union/The Interim European Security and Defence Assembly, National Parliamentary Scrutiny of Intervention Abroad by Armed Forces Engaged in International Missions: The Current Position in Law (Doc. A/1762), Paris, 2001. This report treats all then EU-members except for Ireland and Austria. Parliamentary competencies in Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Poland are further treated in Jürgen Mittag. *The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP. Options for the European Convention* (Brussels/Cologne, 2003); Alexander Siedschlag. 'Nationale Entscheidungsprozesse bei Streitkräfteeinsätzen im Rahmen der Petersberg-Aufgaben der EU – Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien, Schweden', in Erich Reiter, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.). *Europas ferne Streitmacht. Chancen und Schwierigkeiten der Europäischen Union beim Aufbau der ESVP* (Forschungen zur Sicherheitspolitik 6) (Hamburg et al.: Mittler, 2002), pp. 222-232; Hans Born and Marlene Urscheler, 'Parliamentary Accountability of Multinational Peace Support Operations: A Comparative Perspective', in Hans Born, Hans and Heiner Hänggi, eds, *The Double Democratic Deficit*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 53-72.

⁴ For a similar argument, see Marc Houben and Dirk Peters, 'The Deployment of Multinational Military Formations: Taking Political Institutions Into Account', CEPS Policy Brief No. 36, Brussels, 2003.

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