### The future Developments in Libya – A mid-term Forecast

Col. (GS) Wolfgang PUSZTAI

#### Content


- 1. Definition & Methods
- 2. Key Indicators
  - a) Security
  - b) Governance
  - c) Economy
  - d) Social Standards
  - e) Summary of Indicators
- 3. Possibilities for influencing the Key Indicators
- 4. Conclusions

## 1) Definition & Methods

#### **Definition:**

- Mid-term forecast: 6 months about 3 years
   <u>Methods:</u>
- Identification of indicators for the stability of Libya
- Analysis of the past and of the current situation of these indicators
- Forecast for the specific indicators
- Possibilities for influencing the key indicators in a positive way

#### Method



#### 2) Key Indicators

- a) Security
- b) Governance
- c) Economy
- d) Social Standards
- e) Summary of Indicators

## 2a) Security (I/IV)

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
build-up of the security forces		A significant progress in the short to mid-term is unlikely. "Militias" will have the real power.	⇒₹
Police		very slow progress – will still need to rely on the SSC for quite some time	⇒₹
National Army		slow progress – will still need LS support	
Border Security		very slow progress – will need militia support	
reintegration of the militias		striking success cannot be expected soon – depends on the overall development	
targeted assassinations & abductions of Libyans		lack of the rule of law!!! Increase is likely, in particular if Salafi violence cannot be stopped	<b>1</b>
targeted bomb attacks on Libyan targets (i.e. buildings & people)		lack of the rule of law!!! Increase is likely, in particular on buildings – no mass casualties	
violence against black Africans		situation won't get better until the rule of law exists and can be enforced	⇒
xenophobia against Western foreigners		will grow slowly, in particular if Islamists get more influential	-
violence against western foreigners	Colonel Wolfga	a deterioration can be expected, if the Salafists cannot be brought under control ng Pusztai	6

## Security (II/IV)

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
local / tribal conflicts			
<ul> <li>Mashashiya – Jabal Nafusa tribes</li> </ul>		no solution in sight - some kind of ethnic cleansing around the mountains not unlikely	
<ul> <li>Wrishifana - Zawiya</li> </ul>		no lasting solution in sight	$\Rightarrow$
<ul> <li>Sia´an/Mahamid – Berber/Zawia</li> </ul>		no solution in sight – lasting ceasefire realistic	
<ul> <li>Tawurgha - Misratah</li> </ul>		no lasting solution in sight	⇒
Warfallah - Misratah		no lasting solution in sight	⇒
Tarhouna - Misrata		no solution in sight – lasting ceasefire possible	
• Warfallah – Souk al Jouma etc.		no lasting solution in sight	$\Rightarrow$
<ul> <li>Toubou – Arab tribes (Al Zuwayya!)</li> </ul>		no solution in sight – ethnic cleansing likely	Ļ
<ul> <li>Touareg – Arab-/Berber tribes</li> </ul>		no solution in sight – some kind of ethnic cleansing could take place in some areas	
<ul> <li>other Sebha conflicts</li> </ul>		very complicated – civil war cannot ruled out	
•			$\Rightarrow$
	Colonel Wolfga	ng Pusztai	7

# Security (III/IV)

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
influence of radical Islamists			
Tripolitania		due to a lack of will to directly confront the Islamists their influence will increase slowly	
Cyrenaica		will increase further on	
• Fezzan		conservative Islam remains part of normal life	
religious violence (incl. AQ/AQIM)			
Tripolitania		further increase likely	
Cyrenaica		further increase likely (incl. AQ involvement)	
• Fezzan		AQIM will get actively engaged in Fezzan	
polarization of the population		as the development of the regions will differ and due to increasing radical Islamist influence, an increase can be expected	
rifts between the three regions		depends in particular on the way of the development of the constitution and its subsequent implementation	
disintegration of the country		full disintegration unlikely, strong regions likely – maybe even semi-independence/CYR	???
	Colonel Wolfga	ng Pusztai	8

# Security (IV/IV)

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
establishment of organized crime		main reasons will remain: lack of perspectives, no sufficient law enforcement	
Tripolitania		further increase can be expected	
Cyrenaica		will remain at a high level	
• Fezzan		will remain about the same (smuggling as a "normal business"	⇒
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the revolution		some dissatisfaction will remain, in particular with small tribes, that contributed a lot	⇒
single, uncoordinated attacks by Gaddafi-loyalists		will remain about the same – mostly with the character of individual revenge	⇒
coordinated attacks by Gaddafi- loyalists		a major coordinated loyalist campaign will become increasingly unlikely	1

# 2b) Governance (I/II)

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
legitimacy of the governing authorities		more and more governing authorities will be legitimated by elections	
authority of the President and the GNC		will improve over time	
stability of the GNC		will remain more stable than the GNC, although individual members could be sacked	1
stability of the interim government		will become more stable over time, an (unlikely) collapse would be a temporary setback, but no real disaster as long as the GNC remains intact	
assertive interim government		a powerful government will remain unlikely, but there will be improvements over time	⇒∢
efficiency of the interim government and the administration		only a very slow progress can be expected over time	⇒₹

## **Governance (II/II)**

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
rule of law - level of legal certainty	•	a very slow, but steady progress can be expected; the implementation of the Sharia in a more moderate form is not unlikely	
level of corruption		even worse than before - a very slow progress can be expected (if any!)	⇒
freedom of expression and media		will remain about the same; the many private enterprises and the social media will act as "watchdogs"	⇒
human rights		a quick progress can not be expected; numerous problems will remain	⇒
widely accepted constitution		The process is already well behind the very unrealistic timeline fixed by the Constitutional Declaration. Further delays can be expected. It will be very difficult to get a broad acceptance in all regions.	<b>*</b>
judicial system		needs to be build-up almost from the scratch; at the best a slow progress can be expected	⇒₹

#### 2c) Economy

Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
proper legal framework for foreign companies & investments	•	slow improvements can be expected over time (problem: review of old contracts!)	⇒₹
return of foreign companies		Will remain about the same until the new government is firmly in place, a decision to conclude old contracts and to settle claims is taken and a basic level of security in the areas of relevance for the companies is guaranteed.	⇒₹
financial management		A real efficient financial management is years away.	⇒
sustained high oil-/gas production	-	will remain about the same, but there are major question marks over maintenance and security (in some areas)	<b>\$</b> ??
diversification of the economy		did not even really start, no significant progress expected; heavily dependent on foreign involvement	⇒

#### 2d) Social Standards


Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
living standards of the population			
Tripoli		will increase relatively quick	
Tripolitania		will increase in due time	$\Rightarrow$
Cyrenaica		will probably remain about the same	
• Fezzan		will remain about the same	
public supply (water, fuel, electricity etc.)		coverage and reliability will improve in due time, in particular around the larger cities; a major maintenance problem will remain	⇒₹
health care		will increase slowly, in particular around the larger cities; depends heavily on foreign support and on investments by the governm.	⇒₹
unemployment		no quick significant progress expected	
general infrastructure		improvement will take place over time, but depends heavily on the return of foreign companies	⇒₹

#### 2e) Summary of Indicators


Indicator	Assessment	Short to mid-term Forecast	Trend
Security			
Security forces		slow progress expected	$\Rightarrow$
local conflicts		no lasting solutions	⇒
<ul> <li>threat by radical Islamists</li> </ul>		situation will get more difficult	
<ul> <li>polarization, federalism</li> </ul>		tensions will increase	
<ul> <li>other &amp; general security situation</li> </ul>		at the best the situation will remain the same	⇒/>
Governance		will mostly improve over time	
Economy		will improve slowly over time	
Social Standards		will increase slowly over time	$\Rightarrow$


# 3) Possibilities for influencing the key indicators in a positive way

- The future is not a "given" it can be influenced!
- The earlier and more focused measures are undertaken, the easier the "ship" can be pushed into the right directions!
- Just before a catastrophic failure it is very difficult to change the path!
- There is an interaction of most of the indicators.
- A coordinated manipulation of the whole environment is necessary!









### 4) Conclusions

- In the mid-term Libya will be a highly unstable state with a weak central government, highly autonomous or even semi-independent cities/regions and a kind of civil war in some areas.
- Several positive elements are there (resources!).
- There is a chance for a more positive development!
- More support in state-building is urgently necessary!
- Later on eventually nation-building could take place.

#### To this end a proper strategy is necessary! ends – ways – means

#### Use of all available Instruments of State Power (I/II)

#### **Diplomatic Instrument**, e.g.

- bilateral and regional diplomatic contacts
- bi- and multilateral treaties
- EU (in order to pursue common objectives and/or to receive EU support for the own objectives)
- UN (see above)
- international law (e.g. to "framework" the Libyan state)

#### Informational Instrument, e.g.

- public diplomacy (focused communication with the population, the emerging civil society and the leaders of Libya (to include informal leaders) in order to influence the mindset as well as the decision making processes and through this the policy of the country)
- media communication (focused communication with national, Libyan and international media based on a sound strategy)
- training and education as part of state building (later on maybe also nation building)
- focused intelligence gathering about the developments in Libya

# Use of all available Instruments of State Power (II/II)

#### **Economic Instrument**, e.g.

- focused economic and finance policy
- humanitarian assistance (there are still plenty of IDPs!)
- development assistance (in particular for remote areas, as these are also places where extremism finds a fertile ground)

#### Military Instrument, e.g.

- military diplomacy
- support within the framework of state building (e.g. training of all kinds of security forces and doctrinal work)
- common exercises
- patrolling the Mediterranean (direct support to the Libyans and by own nation assets)
- hand-over of military equipment as stop gap measures

