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A New Agenda for Development



by Matteo Bursi, Daniele Fattibene, Francesca Maremonti and Ettore Greco



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A New Agenda for Development: The Role of Development Cooperation in Italy's G7 Presidency

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Introduction

The year 2024 was marked by significant social and economic challenges. The number of military conflicts reached one of its highest levels since the end of World War II, often involving, directly or indirectly, major world powers.¹ Similarly, the increasing fragmentation in international relations, protectionist policies and the persistent disruptions in supply chains contributed to economic slowdowns across several regions, bringing GDP growth in certain European countries to near-zero levels (if not below),² and exacerbating debt issues in developing nations. In this complex context, Italy assumed the rotating presidency of the G7, charged with setting its agenda and coordinating its activities. This responsibility allowed the government to steer discussions on critical aspects of multilateral governance, including development cooperation.

Within its partnership with Focus 2030, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) analysed the actions of Italy's G7 Presidency, focusing particularly on development cooperation and the initiatives aimed at advancing the goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda. By organising meetings and publishing research and analyses, the project team sought to examine the main decisions taken by the Group of Seven in 2024 and the evolution of Italy's development cooperation agenda.

¹ The "Global Peace Index 2024" of the Institute for Economics and Peace (<https://www.economicsandpeace.org/?p=2659>) records as many as 56 conflicts this year, with 92 countries involved in wars that cross national borders.

² This is the case of Germany, whose GDP is expected to fall by 0.1 per cent in 2024. On this point, see the forecast presented by Eurostat: *Economic Forecast for Germany*, 15 November 2024, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/node/289_en.

The main activities conducted under the project “A New Agenda for Development: The Role of Development Cooperation in the Italian G7 Presidency”, carried out by IAI in partnership and with the support of Focus 2030, included:

- In September 2023, in collaboration with the Laboratory of Analysis and Social Policies (LAPS) of the University of Siena, a public opinion survey was conducted on the perceptions of the Italian public regarding various development cooperation issues. The findings were published in December 2023 in the report “Italians and Development Cooperation in 2023”.³
- On 11 December 2023, IAI organised the public event “La cooperazione italiana allo sviluppo alle soglie del 2024: impegni attuali e iniziative future” (Italian Development Cooperation on the Threshold of 2024: Current Commitments and Future Initiatives). The meeting featured participation from the Deputy Minister for Development Cooperation, a representative from Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the Deputy Director of the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, members of civil society and other policymakers. The IAI-LAPS report mentioned above was also presented during the event.⁴
- On 14 and 15 December 2023, two focus groups were conducted, also in collaboration with LAPS, to deepen understanding of Italian perspectives on international cooperation and public development aid. This investigation, carried out online, involved a total of 14 individuals.⁵
- On 19 February 2024, a closed-door roundtable discussion on the Mattei Plan was held at the IAI headquarters. Launched officially during the Italy-Africa summit in January 2024, the event, titled “Il Piano Mattei e la politica italiana di cooperazione allo sviluppo” (The Mattei Plan and Italian Development Cooperation Policy), brought together policymakers and stakeholders to discuss the structure and objectives of the Mattei Plan within the broader scope of Italian development cooperation and the G7 agenda.⁶

³ Publication available on the IAI's website: <https://www.iai.it/en/node/17888>.

⁴ For more details, see the IAI website: <https://www.iai.it/en/node/17823>.

⁵ See: LAPS and IAI, “Gli italiani e la cooperazione allo sviluppo”, in *Documenti IAI*, No. 24|13 (December 2024), <https://www.iai.it/en/node/19310>.

⁶ For more details, see the IAI website: <https://www.iai.it/en/node/18731>.

- On 15 April 2024, the G7 took centre stage with the event “G7 & Development Cooperation: Policy Priorities and Public Attitudes”. This meeting not only addressed the Italian presidency’s development cooperation agenda but also offered a comparative analysis of public opinions on development cooperation in various G7 countries.⁷
- On 31 October 2024, the event “G7/G20 & Development Cooperation Policy Priorities and the Way Ahead” reviewed commitments undertaken by the G7 during the Development Ministerial in Pescara. It explored ways to strengthen synergies between the G7 and G20 on development cooperation, assessing successes, shortcomings and future prospects in light of the upcoming Canadian and South African presidencies.⁸
- Throughout this period, two *IAI Commentaries* were also published: the first Commentary “The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy’s Development Cooperation Policy?” published in March 2024, analysed the potential of the Mattei Plan, highlighting both its strengths and related challenges, drawing on the discussions from the aforementioned February event.⁹ The second Commentary, “Public Opinion and Development Policy: Alignment Needed,” published in April 2024, examined the comparative findings on public opinion regarding development cooperation across various G7 countries.¹⁰

1. Italians and development cooperation

The 2023 edition of the IAI-LAPS survey on Italians’ views regarding development cooperation¹¹ highlighted several noteworthy elements. Firstly, the study revealed that issues closely tied to development cooperation rank among the top concerns expressed by respondents. Social inequality, immigration and

⁷ For more details, see the IAI website: <https://www.iai.it/en/node/18298>.

⁸ For more details, see the IAI website: <https://www.iai.it/en/node/19004>.

⁹ Daniele Fattibene and Stefano Manservigi, “The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy’s Development Cooperation Policy?”, in *IAI Commentaries*, No. 24|10 (March 2024), <https://www.iai.it/en/node/18219>.


¹⁰ Irene Paviotti, “Public Opinion and Development Policy: Alignment Needed”, in *IAI Commentaries*, No. 24|18 (April 2024), <https://www.iai.it/en/node/18385>.

¹¹ LAPS and IAI, *Italians and Development Cooperation in 2023*, Rome, IAI, December 2023, <https://www.iai.it/en/node/17888>.

the overall conditions of less economically developed countries emerged as some of the most pressing issues for Italian citizens. A striking 80 per cent of respondents expressed genuine concern about poverty levels in developing nations.¹² Consequently, it is not surprising that 56 per cent agreed on the necessity for countries like Italy to allocate a greater share of resources to official development assistance (ODA). Similarly, 68 per cent stated they would feel significant guilt if the needs of impoverished people in economically disadvantaged countries were ignored.

However, these levels of concern are juxtaposed with somewhat contrasting views regarding the government's financial commitments.

Figure 1 | Should resources for ODA be increased or decreased?



Question: *In 2022, of its gross national income (GNI) of around 1,9 trillion euros, the Italian government spent 0.32 per cent (approximately 6.2 billion euros) on official development assistance. Do you think that the government should increase or decrease the amount of money that it spends on aid to lower-income countries?* Source: IAI-LAPS survey 2023.

When asked, “Do you think the government should increase or decrease the amount of resources allocated to economic aid for developing countries?” the responses showed divided opinions among the interviewees: 41 per cent supported an increase in ODA as a share of gross national income (GNI), 42 per

¹² Ibid., p. 4. The controversial term “developing nations” was used in the survey in order to make the questions easier for respondents to understand.

cent believed the current level of spending should remain unchanged and 17 per cent were in favour of a reduction of ODA (Figure 1).


These conflicting attitudes can partly be attributed to an “acquiescence bias”¹³ but also reflect deeper concerns. For instance, some respondents expressed doubts about Italy’s economic capacity to sustain higher aid contributions, particularly in light of fears about potential domestic crises affecting employment and citizens’ purchasing power. Moreover, over half of respondents voiced scepticism about the efficient allocation of ODA funds in recipient countries. This scepticism was further reinforced by the perception, shared by 66 per cent of respondents, that the majority of ODA funds fail to reach their intended beneficiaries. Additionally, 59 per cent believed that a significant portion of ODA funds might end up enriching corrupt politicians in developing countries. The perceived inefficiencies extend to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and associations involved in development cooperation, with 84 per cent of respondents criticising the lack of transparency regarding the use of funds by these entities. Furthermore, 72 per cent stated that the impact of NGO activities was either low or unclear.

Another topic of considerable interest concerns the role of ODA in reducing migration flows. A majority (59 per cent) of respondents agreed that development aid positively contributes to mitigating migration pressures – a finding that aligns with the broader public preference for addressing migration challenges through developmental approaches (Figure 2).

Despite the public’s entrenched opinions on issues related to development assistance, awareness of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) remains disappointingly low. Only 16 per cent of respondents declared to know what the SDGs are, while the remaining 84 per cent were equally divided between those who had never heard of them and those who had heard of them but were unsure of their meaning (Figure 3).


¹³ Acquiescence bias describes the tendency of individuals to agree with statements brought to their attention. See, among others, Andreas Hinz et al., “The Acquiescence Effect in Responding to a Questionnaire”, in *GMS Psycho-Social Medicine*, vol. 4 (2007), Doc07, <https://www.egms.de/static/en/journals/psm/2007-4/psm000039.shtml>.

Figure 2 | ODA to decrease migration flows



Question: *To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Providing overseas aid to developing countries is an effective way to address migration".* Source: IAI-LAPS survey 2023.

Figure 3 | Knowledge of SDGs



Question: *Have you ever heard or read about the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?*
Source: IAI-LAPS 2023 survey.

2. The Mattei Plan and financing of ODA

In 2024, Italian political and public attention on development cooperation significantly converged around the Mattei Plan. The parliamentary approval of Decree-Law No. 161 of 15 November 2023,¹⁴ converted into Law No. 2/2024, officially launched a project that the current government considers pivotal in redefining Italy's medium- to long-term relationship with the African continent. The broad participation of African state representatives and regional and multilateral institutions at the Italy-Africa Summit, held in Rome on 28-29 January 2024, suggests that this initiative is viewed as noteworthy by African nations.¹⁵

The initial budget allocated to the Mattei Plan totals 5.5 billion euros, with 3 billion sourced from the Italian Climate Fund and the remaining funds drawn from development cooperation budgets. A steering committee and a dedicated mission unit housed within the Prime Minister's Office oversee the plan, positioning Palazzo Chigi as the central governance hub. The Mattei Plan identifies pilot projects in nine countries¹⁶ and is structured around six thematic "pillars" guiding interventions in recipient nations: education and training, agriculture, health, energy, water and infrastructure.¹⁷

In its implementation report submitted to Parliament on 11 November 2024, the government outlined 21 projects that had either commenced or were imminent. Of these, 17 pertained to the nine pilot countries, while the remaining four involved regional or transnational initiatives affecting a broader group of nations. Notably, one of the most prominent projects – the Lobito Corridor¹⁸ – was among these transnational initiatives and aligns closely with

¹⁴ Decree-law No. 161 of 15 November 2023: *Disposizioni urgenti per il «Piano Mattei» per lo sviluppo in Stati del Continente africano*, <https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2023-11-15;161>.

¹⁵ The summit was attended by 21 African heads of state and government, together with representatives of the European Union and various international organisations.


¹⁶ Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and the Republic of Congo.

¹⁷ Italian Government, *The Six Pillars of the 'Mattei Plan'*, 15 March 2024, https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Italia-Africa_MatteiPlan_6pillars.pdf.

¹⁸ Regarding the relevance of the Lobito Corridor, see: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, *Democratic Republic of Congo, the Lobito Corridor Becomes a Bridge between*

the European Union's Global Gateway strategy.¹⁹

Figure 4 | Mattei Plan's pilot projects



Source: Research Services of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, "Schema di DPCM di adozione del Piano strategico Italia-Africa: Piano Mattei (Atto del Governo n. 179)", in *Dossier di documentazione*, 23 July 2024, <https://documenti.camera.it/leg19/dossier/Testi/ES0217.htm>.

The Mattei Plan offers a significant opportunity to reshape Italy's development cooperation model, emphasising inclusivity and a model of partnership with African partners based on local ownership. In the coming years, it will be


Continents, 17 September 2024, <https://www.esteri.it/en/?p=123444>.

¹⁹ As known, the Global Gateway is the EU's instrument aimed at financing investments in third countries in the coming years in order to foster sustainable growth in each area of the world and strengthen European relevance on a global scale. On this topic, please refer to the website of the European Commission: *Global Gateway*, https://commission.europa.eu/node/5445_en.

crucial to analyse the actual implementation of these initiatives to identify best practices and areas for improvement. Monitoring the volume of funds allocated to the plan will be also crucial, as the project's overall success is inherently tied to these financial commitments.²⁰

However, preliminary data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on ODA in 2023 highlight a critical issue. Italy's ODA investments amounted to 0.27 per cent of GNI, down from 0.33 per cent in 2022 and far below the 0.7 per cent target established in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.²¹ This decline marked a reversal from the growth observed between 2020 and 2022.

Figure 5 | ODA/Gross national income



Source: IAI elaboration on the basis of OECD data.

²⁰ Criticism has already been expressed regarding the economic resources allocated by the government for the Plan. See, for example, the AOI position paper: *Nuovo Partenariato con l'Africa e Piano Mattei per l'Africa*, October 2024, p. 8 ss., https://www.info-cooperazione.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/AOI_NPA_PianoMattei-3ott24_finale.pdf.

²¹ OECD, "Italy", in *Development Co-operation Profiles*, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2023/06/development-co-operation-profiles_17afa013/full-report/component-27.html#chapter-d1e20868-169e3f801b.

While other European countries also reduced their aid budgets, the overall ODA of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)²² remained stable at 0.37 per cent. Italy's bilateral aid allocated domestically – largely tied to migration management – continued to grow, reaching 1.5 billion US dollars in 2023 (41 per cent of gross bilateral ODA), raising concerns about the country's genuine commitment to external development cooperation.²³

The Budget Law for 2024 has established an increase in nominal value of investments in development cooperation by nearly 100 million euros, reaching an amount close to 6 billion and 300 million; a growth is also foreseen for 2025, when, according to the draft Budget Law, it should reach around 6 billion and 700 million euros in total.²⁴ However, starting with 2026, a decrease in the sum is projected, which, again in nominal terms, should bring Italian ODA back to around 6.1 billion euros in the year 2027. For this reason, many NGOs and civil society organisations have voiced critical opinions, both with regard to the cuts planned for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, and with regard to the concentration of expenses on multilateral initiatives as well as on programmes which arguably are not directly related to development cooperation (such as reception of migrants).²⁵

²² DAC has 32 members – including the European Union – and brings together the major Western economies (which are the largest contributors globally in terms of ODA).

²³ See, for example, Luca Liverani, "Meno aiuti. Cooperazione allo sviluppo, l'Italia in un anno ha tagliato 631 milioni", in *Avvenire*, 12 April 2024, <https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/rapporto-ocse-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo-l-italia-in-un-anno-taglia-631-milioni>; and "Torna a ridursi il contributo italiano alla cooperazione allo sviluppo", in *Openpolis*, 3 May 2024, <https://www.openpolis.it/torna-a-ridursi-il-contributo-italiano-alla-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo>.

²⁴ Data from the annex No. 28, "Aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo", of the Budget Law for 2024. See the State General Accounting Department website: *Aggiornamento a legge di bilancio degli interventi a sostegno delle politiche di cooperazione internazionale per lo sviluppo Art.14 L. 125/2014*, https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/_Documenti/VERSIONE-I/attivita_istituzionali/formazione_e_gestione_del_bilancio/bilancio_di_previsione/bilancio_finanziario/2024-2026/APS_2024_LB.pdf.

²⁵ On this topic, see "Poca cooperazione nella legge di bilancio", in *Openpolis*, 13 December 2024, <https://www.openpolis.it/poca-cooperazione-nella-legge-di-bilancio>.

3. The G7 initiatives

Development cooperation topics were extensively discussed during various G7 meetings, with two specific events having the greatest impact on the development cooperation agenda: the summit of heads of state and government held on 13-15 June at Borgo Egnazia and the Development Ministerial Meeting in Pescara on 22-24 October. The Italian presidency concentrated its efforts on three primary directions within this area: 1) food security, nutrition and sustainable food systems; 2) sustainable investments and infrastructure; 3) global health.

The commitments made by the Group of Seven on these themes align with the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda and, at least partially, with various initiatives undertaken in previous years by multilateral institutions and a few Western states. Moreover, the G7's deliberations were in line with some G20 initiatives, such as the support for the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty approved at the Rio de Janeiro summit on 18 November 2024.²⁶

3.1 Food security, nutrition and sustainable food systems

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As president of the G7, the Italian government prioritised combating hunger and supporting sustainable food systems. The launch of the Apulia Food Systems Initiative (AFSI) represents a noteworthy outcome, demonstrating the G7's commitment to eradicating global hunger and enhancing food production systems.²⁷ AFSI builds upon previous Italian-led initiatives, such as the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (G8, 2009) and the Matera Declaration (G20, 2021),²⁸

²⁶ Regarding the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty refer to the website dedicated to this initiative: <https://globalallianceagainsthungerandpoverty.org/about>.

²⁷ G7, *Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué*, 14 June 2024, <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf>.

²⁸ The continuity between AFSI and the two initiatives mentioned in the text was correctly noted by Cecilia D'Alessandro: "The Italian G7 Presidency: Spearheading Progress on Food Systems in Africa", in *IAI*

reiterating the G7's pledge to increase investments in regions still afflicted by hunger.

The commitments also extend to specific sectors, such as coffee production, which is particularly vulnerable to climate change. In fact, the G7 established a Coffee Sustainability and Resilience Fund to mobilise public and private resources aimed at bolstering the sustainability and resilience of this critical market, which involves numerous countries and countless small-scale farmers.²⁹

The Italian presidency also promoted programmes supporting health diverse and climate-resilient crops, as exemplified by the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS) initiative.³⁰ This programme, focused particularly on Africa, aims to strengthen sustainable agricultural production across the continent. Additionally, the G7 emphasised water-related challenges. Recognising the persistent difficulties in accessing this vital resource in many regions, the G7 reaffirmed its support for the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) framework.³¹

The Group also endorsed various supranational initiatives, such as the recent appointment of a United Nations Special Envoy for Water. Financial resources for these efforts were also addressed. The G7 discussed the costs and benefits of debt-for-development swaps, although without reaching binding commitments, and proposed strengthening the role of public development banks (PDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs). A notable example is the creation of the G7 PDBs & DFIs Collaborative on Sustainable Food Systems, designed to enhance food security and sustainability in less developed countries.³²

Commentaries, n. 24|27 (June 2024), <https://www.iai.it/en/node/18608>.

²⁹ G7 Development Ministers' Meeting, *Communiqué*, Pescara, 22-24 October 2024, point 23, <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Communique.pdf>.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, points 19-20.

³¹ *Ibid.*, points 27-28.

³² *Ibid.*, point 37.

3.2 Sustainable investments and infrastructure



Italy's G7 presidency provided an opportunity to present the objectives of the Mattei Plan in greater depth to its partners. The Group of Seven expressed support for the Italian initiative, linking it to other programmes previously developed by member states.

Throughout 2024, discussions within the G7 focused heavily on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).³³ Representing the G7's response to infrastructure programmes led by other nations, such as China, the PGII aims to mobilise 600 billion US dollars in public and private funding to promote sustainable infrastructure development in recipient countries. The initiative primarily targets Africa and the Indo-Pacific region, emphasising the creation and strengthening of economic corridors to improve the socio-economic conditions of the numerous states involved.³⁴

3.3 Global health



In 2024, global health emerged as a central theme in G7 discussions. Member states committed to intensifying efforts to achieve SDG 3 ("Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages"). To strengthen global health systems and prevent future crises akin to COVID-19, the G7 supported the negotiations to reach a Pandemic Agreement on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and

³³ Ibid., point 44.

³⁴ Under Italian leadership, the G7 also considered the role of sports in development. The Development Ministerial Meeting culminated in the adoption of the Pescara Declaration on Sustainable Investment in the Sport Ecosystem, recognising the positive role of sports in achieving the SDGs.

Response³⁵ and reiterated the need for adequate funding of the World Health Organisation (WHO).

The G7 also advocated for a replenishment of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.³⁶ Additionally, the group reiterated its support for a broad adoption of the One Health Approach and endorsed the African Union's goal to produce locally 60 per cent of vaccines used on the continent. To this end, the G7 emphasised the role of PDBs and DFIs in bolstering pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in Africa.

3.4 Conclusions

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Italy's G7 presidency provided a platform to bring global attention to topics of national interest or deemed significant by the government. Discussions within the Group of Seven showcased, in particular, the Mattei Plan, which has been presented by the Italian government as a cornerstone of Italian development cooperation policy. While the overall assessment of Italy's twelve-month presidency appears positive, the true impact of initiatives undertaken in development cooperation will only become evident in the coming years, depending on their actual contribution to the 2030 Agenda goals.

The success of the Mattei Plan, in particular, hinges on engaging African partners in defining and implementing projects and aligning its execution with other European initiatives, such as the Global Gateway, which will remain a focus for the European Commission.

Dialogue among G7 members in 2024, though marked by differences on specific points, reflected a shared commitment to multilateral and cooperative approaches. Achieving meaningful, globally impactful results requires coordinated action among states from all regions. It will be crucial to establish close synergies between upcoming G7 (Canada) and G20 (South Africa)

³⁵ Concerning the Pandemic Treaty, the role played by the European Union on this dossier and the difficulties that have become apparent in recent months in its adoption, see Emanuela Bozzini and Daniela Sicurelli, "The EU and the Pandemic Treaty: From Agenda-Setter to Troubled Deal-Maker", in *IAI Commentaries*, No. 24|36 (July 2024), <https://www.iai.it/en/node/18692>.

³⁶ G7 Development Ministers' Meeting, *Communiqué*, cit., point 55.

presidencies, maintaining continuity with the commitments made during 2024. However, the US presidency of the G7 in 2026 could introduce changes, potentially favouring nationalistic and bilateral dynamics, as suggested by President-elect Donald Trump's statements. This could significantly complicate the efforts to advance the 2030 Agenda's SDGs. Whether other Western nations and the European Union can maintain their commitments and multilateral approaches remains to be seen. In this context, it will be of paramount importance that Italy keeps firm its commitment to its traditional multilateralist approach in line with its national interest in expanding cooperation and partnerships with African countries as the most promising avenue to navigate effectively the challenges ahead.

A New Agenda for Development: The Role of Development Cooperation in Italy's G7 Presidency

The aim of this paper is to analyse the action implemented by Italy in its role as G7 Presidency in the field of development cooperation, describing the agenda set by the government to pursue the sustainable development goals set by the United Nations for 2030. This report represents a summary of the various activities carried out by the Istituto Affari Internazionali in collaboration with Focus 2030 within the project "A New Agenda for Development: The Role of Development Cooperation in the Italian G7 Presidency".



The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas.

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