THE EU, THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The EU, the US and the International Strategic Dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa: Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa

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PREFACE

This important publication presents the primary results of a one-year research project jointly organized by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS, Brussels), the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI, Rome) with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the contribution of a network of outstanding researchers and institutions.

The research undertaken within the framework of this project focused on the international dimension of security and development policies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region whose strategic importance has increased considerably over the past two decades. Various international actors are now concentrating their activity in the African continent. The main question that our project has tried to address is whether it might be possible to better coordinate these actors' policies in order to ensure a future of sustainable peace, security and development in Africa, and particularly in the Horn of Africa, which was analysed as a separate case study.

Before setting out the content and purpose of this book, it might be of interest to the reader to know how our institutions came together for this research project. FEPS and IAI first joined forces in 2011, based on our common analytical focus on and interest in Africa, and in particular the issue of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Africa. Since then, two main projects have been developed: the first one dealt with the issue of "Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: How to Engage African Regional Organizations and Civil Society"; this was followed by a second project centred on "Promoting Stability and Development in Africa: How to Foster Cooperation between Public and Private Sectors".

Turning to the present research project, it is clear that in today's political landscape, Europe and the US are not the only international actors playing a role in SSA. Therefore we deemed it necessary to analyse how competing interests, both at the level of these external actors and among the African states, can better be addressed and coordinated in order to ensure peace and stability.

We therefore examined policies and mechanisms for cooperation with individual African countries and regional organizations, such as the African Union and Africa's Regional Economic Communities, by the EU, the US and other relevant actors including China, Brazil, the Gulf countries and Turkey. Six contributions by well-known international experts have followed this methodological line, each focusing on one of these countries and showcasing the different political, economic and security roles each has played in the continent.

In terms of geography, the role of the above-mentioned international partners and organizations was examined vis-à-vis the Horn of Africa region, and more specifically Somalia. This is a geographical area where diplomatic exercises, security threats and economic op-

portunities are tightly interlinked and where regional and international actors play a highly influential role.

In view of all this analysis, we have also tried to develop a series of recommendations for the EU and the US on how to engage in SSA and how to better coordinate with other international actors to improve peace, security and development in the continent. To this purpose, an international conference was jointly organized in Nairobi, Kenya on 8 December 2016, aimed at discussing and analysing the conclusions and recommendations of this research project. It was an event of decisive importance for the conclusion of our project, featuring the participation of many policy-makers and policy experts from Africa, Europe and the US.

This book, edited by Nicoletta Pirozzi and Bernardo Venturi, represents an important step towards acquiring a greater understanding of the requirements for security, development and peace in Africa, a continent that has emerged as one of the most promising actors in the global context. It is a continent that is still plagued by many challenges, not least in the security domain, but which is characterized by tremendous opportunity and vast potential.

In closing, we would like to thank our primary supporters over the past year: the European Parliament, Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy) and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which contributed to making this project and this publication possible.

Ernst Stetter,
Secretary General,
Foundation for European Progressive Studies

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INTRODUCTION

Bernardo Venturi and Nicoletta Pirozzi

This publication is the final product of a project devoted to the EU, the US and the international strategic dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) conducted by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome together with the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) of Brussels, with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

This research aims at identifying the role of key external powers in promoting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The strategic significance of SSA has increased considerably in recent decades, with various international actors establishing diversified yet increasingly important levels of engagement in the region. Countries such as Brazil, China, the Gulf states and Turkey have a significant presence in Africa, and some of them have well-established historical ties to the region as well. Against this complex landscape, the analysis here pays attention to how African countries build their own capacities and the new position in which they find them-

selves. The most dynamic among them have increasingly acquired leverage to determine with whom they want to work, and whether or not they need to do what Europeans and Americans say. In addition, a concrete and region-specific analysis is dedicated to the Horn of Africa (HoA) and to Somalia in particular, as a region that has attracted the attention of international actors for political, security, commercial and humanitarian reasons. The publication also provides recommendations for the external powers examined, with specific attention devoted to the EU and the US.

The section devoted to external actors begins with a contribution by Frank Mattheis (Senior Researcher, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, GovInn, University of Pretoria) that describes how Brazil has maintained its historic ties with Africa, originally based on the slave trade; this engagement gradually intensified after the Cold War and came to a head under Lula da Silva's presidency. However, Dilma Rousseff has pursued a less enthusiastic approach towards Africa, which has been accelerated by Brazil's ongoing domestic crises. This has resulted in a new focus on niche strengths, such as the transfer of policies and knowledge to the lusophone world, or on economically viable endeavours, such as exporting specialized defence equipment to Africa.

The role of China in SSA is analysed by Anna Katharina Stahl (Research Affiliate, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe, Bruges). Her chapter outlines the general contours of China's engagement in SSA, and gives particular attention to the two policy areas of development and security. Moreover, it examines how China's leadership change in 2012 has affected the country's policy in SSA and formulates a series of policy recommendations for the EU and the US for how to engage China in the region.

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The chapter on the role of the Gulf states (particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates) by Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw (Independent consultant, Addis Ababa) identifies contemporary factors that drive Gulf peace and security engagement in SSA in general, and the HoA in particular. While it takes into consideration recent global developments (the emergence of China, the Arab Spring, the growing Saudi–Iran rift and concomitant Sunni–Shia sectarianism in the Middle East), it exemplifies Gulf–HoA relations by analysing the reasons for and regional ramifications of the involvement of Horn countries in the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen (2015).

In chapter four, Mehmet Özkan (Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara) explores Turkey's African experience and how it has been transformed in such a way that it now constitutes one of the main focuses of Ankara's foreign policy. Initially begun as a modest humanitarian effort, it now ranges across economic, social, political and security relations. The author argues that Turkey's foreign and development policy towards Africa has changed at ideational, societal and institutional levels. All these levels can be observed in Turkey's approach to Sub-Saharan Africa and indicate that Ankara's policy has reached a level of normalization, in the sense that it is no longer "new" but rather constitutes usual and normal relations.

In his chapter, Bernardo Venturi (IAI Researcher) argues that Africa and Europe are close neighbours and that the EU has a vital interest in strengthening relations with SSA countries and organizations. He discusses the EU's complex and multilayered development cooperation in Africa, including the link between trade liberalization and development, as well as conditionality to incentivize democratic governance. At the same time, addressing the instability of the African continent is a

major concern for EU member states, as they are experiencing its repercussions in terms of irregular immigration, drugs, arms and human trafficking, terrorism and organized crime. The chapter presents and analyses the principal strategic strands and tools available to the EU as a peace and security provider in Africa.

The series of contributions on external powers concludes with Madeleine Goerg's chapter (Former Program Officer, German Marshall Fund of the United States, GMF), which analyses the growing complexity and sophistication of the United States' engagement with Africa and its increased interest in the African continent, although it cannot be said that Africa has risen to the top of the country's foreign policy agenda. Security and development, connected via diplomacy, remain the main pillars of US-SSA relations, with economic transformation rapidly gaining ground. This chapter also brings to light the significant complementarities between US and European approaches and priorities, which the actors on both sides of the Atlantic will need to capitalize on in the coming years.

Finally, the publication includes two chapters focused on peace, security and development trends in Somalia. Rossella Marangio (PhD Candidate, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa) shows how international interventions overall still suffer from shortcomings, especially when considering the broader picture of which the security–governance–development nexus constitutes the backbone. She provides an analysis of the current situation in the country with particular attention paid to the role of international actors and argues that the complexity and interconnectedness of issues in Somalia demand the fine-tuning of development perspectives and grassroots reconciliation, with local ownership guiding both theory and practice.

Cleophus Thomas III (PhD Candidate, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University) assesses the key security and development challenges that Somalia must address in order to sustain the modest gains in stability it has made since 2012. More than two decades of civil conflict in the country have destroyed key infrastructure, fractured social relations and undermined the Somali government's ability to provide security and services, creating space for militant groups such as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) to operate in the region. Nevertheless, the Somali government and its foreign partners have made some progress in fighting terrorism, which has opened the door for political development, entrepreneurship and economic growth.

In the last chapter, we report on the main issues discussed during the final conference of the research project held in Nairobi on 8 December 2016. The conference was a valuable opportunity for discussion among practitioners and scholars from three continents. The chapter provides a summary of the main features, shortfalls and dilemmas of the international powers' approach towards SSA that emerged from the debate.

The editors wish to thank Vassilis Ntousas (FEPS Policy Advisor, International Relations), Rakeb Abate (NDI Senior Program Manager, Southern and East Africa) and Cody Cibart (NDI Program Officer, Southern and East Africa) for their useful insights and valuable support, and Francesca Sparaci (IAI Intern) for her contribution to the editing of this volume.

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BRAZIL AS A SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT PROVIDER IN AFRICA: CONSEQUENCES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Frank Mattheis[*]

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Brazil has succeeded in establishing itself as a crucial regional and global actor. It now belongs to the inner circles of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN), has been selected as a strategic partner by the European Union (EU) and, together with other emerging powers, it forms alliances such as the groupings of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA). Its leadership in South America is largely taken for granted by external actors, although this is not uncontested within the region.[1] In its strategy to become a pivotal actor in global affairs, Brazil has benefited from its ascendance into the top ten economies in the world. In turn, the country commits to the existing global order and while it pushes for international reforms, it does not advocate for overthrowing the entire system.[2] It thus behaves like most other emerging powers and has not been campaigning

for radical change, such as the dismantling of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or the WTO, but rather strives to acquire a central role – that is, a permanent seat at the UNSC or a top diplomatic position.

Brazil's global aspirations have also brought Africa into the limelight. The continent provides a new economic market, a source of political support and credibility, and a validation for its own African identity and a development model.

1.1 Historical context

Despite the central role that Brazil played in the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, political and economic relations with the African continent did not become noteworthy until well after the Second World War. Prior to that, domestic struggles and relations with the US and Europe dominated Brazil's foreign engagements.

The creation of the UN provided Brazil with a framework for a post-imperial structure and an anti-colonial discourse that advocated granting "self-determination to all peoples." In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a vast number of African colonies declared independence. In the following years, coalitions within existing multilateral arenas emerged, most notably the Group of 77 (G-77) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[3] These all adhered to the ideals of anti-imperialism and claimed the need to overcome economic dependency on the West.

Brazil was initially unaffected by the emergence of African nation states. In the 1950s, its economy was domestically oriented through a scheme of industrialization via import substitution. In terms of identity, values and culture, Brazil's elites considered themselves to be Western, yet at the same time a Latin American identi-

ty stemmed from continued lack of emancipation from imperial powers. Only gradually did Africa become part of the construction of identity, crucially in the ideology of *luso-tropicalismo* coined by Gilberto Freyre.[4] This argued for the superiority of Portuguese colonialism due to miscegenation and provided the racial and imperial grounds for portraying commonalities between Brazil and the Portuguese colonies. Political independence in many parts of Africa coincided with a period of progressive left-leaning presidents in the first half of the 1960s in Brazil. Africa emerged on the map of Brazil's foreign policy as the Brazilian government supported claims for independence in Mozambique and Angola. It was during that time that a romanticised idea of belonging to Africa took root as part of the political identity of Brazil. During the subsequent military dictatorship (1964-1985), interest in Africa did not disappear but shifted from anti-imperial solidarity to allegiance with colonial Portugal, and back to support for self-determination after the independence of the Portuguese colonies in the mid-1970s. With the transition towards democracy under way in the 1980s, Brazil took a more decisive position against apartheid. This enabled it to foster ties with African countries, both more generally in multilateral institutions and individually with the Atlantic riparians on maritime issues.

1.2 Relations after the Cold War

During most of the twentieth century, the position Brazil aspired to in the world order continued to oscillate between an orientation towards the West and an assertive commitment to the Global South. Towards the end of the 1990s during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's second presidential mandate, the pendulum swung back to position

Brazil as an active member of the developing world. The narrative of global inequality and Southern solidarity became a central part of Cardoso's foreign policy, and the confrontation with Western countries over the global economic and financial system grew. Strategic links with other emerging countries, including the already revived relations with post-apartheid South Africa, were forged.[5] The special relations with lusophone partners were fortified, notably by actively supporting the creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (*Comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa*, CPLP) in 1996.

Brazil experienced a period of relatively strong economic growth in the 2000s. Domestically, this enabled some reduction in poverty and inequality, while externally it emboldened the country's foreign policy, which began attributing unprecedented importance to relations with other developing countries. Economic ties with Africa steadily improved as Brazil cancelled a series of debts and Nigeria became its most important oil supplier. From the early 2000s onwards, Brazil also emerged as a development partner. It provided technical assistance and project funding to reproduce Brazilian domestic policies, in particular social programmes, such as the *bolsa familia* education grant and health technologies related to tropical diseases. Political ties also became more stable as the number of state visits from African presidents steadily increased around the turn of the century.[6]

During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidency (2003-2010), South-South relations, including with Africa, were further upgraded to one of the top priorities of Brazilian foreign policy. This development benefited from steps taken by Lula's predecessor and from the vastly improved economic situation in the country. The new president from the Workers' Party (*Partido dos trabalhadores*, PT) thus did not represent a paradigmatic rupture but instead

ushered in a period of unprecedented rise in diplomatic presence and intensification of high-level interactions with developing countries.[7] As a result, the scope of positioning the country within the global order gained a new strategic quality. Expanding relations with other developing countries was part of a broader effort to increase Brazil's autonomy in the international arena. Even though Brazil-US ties were not primarily characterized by confrontation during Lula's presidency,[8] a clear diversification of Brazil's partnerships took place by steadily building new links. It is less a zero-sum game between North and South and rather an act of rebalancing through intensification with the South.[9] With respect to Africa, the Lula government intensified and diversified Brazil's ties across the continent, initially bilaterally with the established lusophone countries as well as South Africa, and gradually through rising power coalitions such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the BRICS coalition.[10] The underlying narrative of South-South cooperation entailed an explicit distancing from the Western powers. Through new informal platforms, Brazil has called for a more representative global governance architecture – that is, one in which it has more room to manoeuvre.[11] However, the degree to which these emerging institutions have been able to institutionalise themselves has varied widely: IBSA has suffered from wavering political commitment and scarce financial resources, while the BRICS grouping has sought to create a longer-term role by launching new structures with specific mandates, such as the New Development Bank.[12] Since 2011, Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, though from the PT as well, has shown less enthusiasm for foreign policy and in particular has been less dedicated to Africa. While much of Lula's Africa policy has been continued, the political clout on that continent has started to fade and no major new initiatives have been launched.

1.3 The role of Brazil in peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa

Until Lula's presidency, Brazil's engagement with security issues had seldom ventured outside its region, understood as both Latin America and the lusophone world.[13] Conversely, it took a leadership role in peacekeeping missions in Angola and Mozambique in the 1990s by sending military and civilian personnel (in some cases even the force commander) to both the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM).

In 2004, Brazil's role as a security provider changed fundamentally as it ventured outside its traditional area by becoming the biggest military provider to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and holding the position of force commander throughout most of the mission. Although not located in Africa, Haiti constitutes a very important reference point for Africans owing to its history of a republic proclaimed by African slaves in the aftermath of the French Revolution. The radiance of Brazil's engagement thus crucially reinforced its African identity and its standing within Africa.[14] The engagement in MINUSTAH paved the way for further peacekeeping contributions, notably to the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), where the Brazilian former commander of MINUSTAH, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, took over command from 2013 to 2015, though the overall personnel contribution remained minimal. Brazil also contributes to another five out of ten current UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, namely the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African

Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). However, all these engagements entail only a modest number of peacekeepers, seldom beyond two-digit figures.[15]

Brazil is traditionally committed to multilateralism and non-intervention in domestic affairs of other countries, so it is reluctant to intervene outside the UN or the CPLP framework. It has been an observer to several regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and it has actively fostered political relations, but these engagements were not followed by financial or personnel support for their peacekeeping operations.

In the Portuguese-speaking African countries (*Países africanos de língua oficial portuguesa*, PALOP), Brazil plays a dominant role among external actors and conceives itself as a natural main actor. At the bilateral level, the historically engrained relations with the lusophone countries in Africa remain dominant. Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Cape Verde figure prominently among those countries that receive military training by Brazil, serve as destinations for patrolling Brazilian vessels or are invited on joint exercises. Namibia also has an important position in Brazil's military outreach. Brazil played a crucial role in setting up a navy in the country after its independence and it has been a vital partner over the last 20 years, providing both extensive training in Brazil and naval hardware.[16]

In addition to these traditional partners, defence cooperation has also been extended along the Atlantic shore, the area considered to be of greatest strategic

importance to Brazil. This particularly covers defence agreements to facilitate mutual visits and exchange programmes with the regional powers of Senegal (2010), Nigeria (2010) and South Africa (2003), as well as 1.5 billion dollars spent by Brazil on military training programmes in Africa between 2009 and 2013.[17] In most of the countries of Africa, however, Brazil is mainly subordinate in terms of security provision, either to major powers such as France or to the UN.

From a topographical point of view, the maritime space between Africa and Brazil constitutes the most evident security link between the two.[18] The South Atlantic has long been considered a vital dimension to Brazil's concept of security. It has, for instance, been reflected in Brazil championing the Zone for Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), which was approved by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1986. ZOPACAS incorporated an anti-imperial notion of solidarity between South American and African riparian countries of the South Atlantic, with the explicit exclusion of apartheid South Africa and occupied Namibia. Though ZOPACAS has promoted joint projects in various fields, including the environment and the navy, the underlying narrative encompasses a division between the North and South Atlantic as the main commonality between its Western and Eastern shores.[19] In particular, since the early 2000s, Brazil has become more assertive towards a potential expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its members into Southern waters.[20] To this end, Brazil has tried to persuade African states to make the South Atlantic an area of predominantly South-South cooperation. Western powers, in particular those with overseas territories (e.g. the UK and France), or those with a notable military presence (e.g. the US), ought to play a secondary role. However, the willingness of African states to

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accept or even support Brazil's covert hegemonic ambitions has been minimal.

Given that most African members of ZOPACAS have only a limited capacity to engage in maritime security operations, concrete collaboration has focused on South Africa. The South Atlantic Naval Exercise (ATLASUR) has been a regular event where the navies of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and South Africa can undertake joint naval exercises. Since 1993, ATLASUR has occurred on a biennial basis so it is one of the most regular exercise venues for its partners. Brazil and South Africa, which have by far the most capable navies in the region, have also been conducting joint exercises together with India under the India, Brazil, South Africa Naval Exercise (IBSAMAR). Since 2008, IBSAMAR has also been conducted on a biennial basis and thus reinforces the military cooperation in the South Atlantic.

During the last ten years, the Brazilian defence industry also significantly expanded its operations into Africa, by selling equipment to African countries. Since 2011, the state-owned aviation company Embraer has sold dozens of Super Tucano aircraft across the continent, including in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Ghana and Angola.[21] The Super Tucano offers a product that is not only relatively affordable but also adapted to tropical conditions and relevant missions in Africa, such as combating insurgencies, terrorism and the drug trade. Another state-owned company, Emgepron, has equipped various African navies with small vessels, again benefiting from offering tailored and lower-cost solutions. However, the fall in the oil price in 2015 forced various potential resource-dependent buyers, such as Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, to cancel their orders.

1.4 The role of Brazil in development in Sub-Saharan Africa

Brazil's ascendance as a provider of development assistance started while it was still itself a recipient of official development aid (ODA), and it gained particular momentum under Lula. The institutionalization of development assistance occurred with the shift of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (*Agência brasileira de cooperação*, ABC) from a donor management body to a provider of aid. This transformation also paved the way for an engagement in Africa, though many other emerging powers had already established their presence in the meantime.[22]

The weight of Brazil's development assistance is difficult to assess by ODA terms and thus also difficult to compare with that of other actors.[23] The official figures seem very small, totalling 20 million dollars in 2010, but they do not include important items such as debt relief. More important than the budget figures has been the scope of expansion beyond its immediate neighbourhood and the traditional links with PALOP to include most African countries in various cooperation schemes. Notably, Brazil's own region – South America – eventually enjoyed only second priority with regard to the country's incipient development aid.[24]

Owing to the limited budget, development was conceived less in terms of infrastructure but focused on capacity-building. Technical cooperation has figured prominently on the agenda,[25] in particular in the fields of social policy, health and agriculture, where Brazil is considered to be a model, thanks to its successful poverty reduction, fight against the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and emergence as a leading food producer. Apart from ABC, crucial actors in carrying out projects have thus come from other ministries and public institutes, such as

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the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (*Empresa brasileira de pesquisa agropecuária*, EMBRAPA), which set up an office for Africa in Ghana to coordinate training and technical cooperation in the field of agriculture. The understanding of development promoted by these actors was largely positivistic in terms of their technological emphasis, as well as self-centred, because it focused on the unidirectional transfer of Brazilian knowledge to Africa.[26]

The dominant narrative of African expansion was embedded in the leitmotif of South-South cooperation to promote cohesion between countries of the Global South on the basis of colonial history, position in the global order, socioeconomic standing and cultural affinities.[27] Owing to Brazil's domestic achievements, development in Africa was also considered to be a special responsibility in terms of paying back the historic debt of the slave trade; development thus embodied a paternalistic approach.

Brazil's relations with other development actors are ambiguous. The country openly contested the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the development cooperation of its member states. At the same time, it has been subservient to Western agencies through trilateral cooperation, carrying out work on the ground – e.g. the British-funded Africa-Brazil Partnership on Climate-Smart Agriculture and Food Security, and the Japanese-funded ProSavana (Programme of Triangular Co-operation for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannahs of Mozambique). There is an important element of competition with other emerging donors as Brazil struggles to match the weight of Chinese loans and infrastructure. Gradually, Brazil has abandoned its prioritization of knowledge transfer, an area where Turkey has started to follow suit, and appropriated some of China's instruments, such as financial lending, albeit with significantly smaller resources.

1.5 Priorities and challenges of Brazil's engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Brazil is in a phase of transition. Many of the elements that have characterized its engagement in Africa over the last ten years are changing rapidly.[28] Brazil has been losing momentum on its way to becoming a global power. Since 2015 the country has been suffering from a contraction of the economy, severe budgetary cuts and a political institutional crisis involving most of the country's leading political figures. Budgetary cuts mean that Brazil can afford fewer engagements in Africa. The subsequent dominant focus on domestic issues translates into more modest global aspirations. This foreign policy shift conversely reduces the relevance of Africa, as Brazil requires less support from the continent in international organizations. The South American country thus needs to revisit its commitment to existing alliances and partnerships. ZOPACAS, for instance, has come to a standstill since Brazil backed out of the leadership role that it had fulfilled during the previous decade.

In turn, the economic interest is gaining more importance. Engagements in Africa are now expected to yield material benefits to help overcome the domestic economic crisis, rather than mainly aiming for political gain, such as votes at the UNGA.[29] This shift is affecting the strategic relevance of development and security initiatives, as markets and profits for Brazilian companies become a key priority, especially in sectors that have already invested heavily in Africa – that is, mining, oil and construction.[30]

In general terms, the expansion phase that has characterized Brazil's presence in Africa under the PT, chiefly under Lula, has come to an end. Since Brazil also perceived Africa as a trial ground for a projection of its lead-

ership outside South America, it can now take lessons from the knowledge gained and start to consolidate. The priority is shifting away from covering the whole African continent with diplomatic representations, high-level summits and agreements. Embassies are at risk of closing or, if they are not entirely shut down, they could enter a phase of hibernation where their activities are drastically reduced until more favourable conditions return. In some cases, as in South Africa, the post of head of mission has been vacant for an extended period of time. Such stagnation has happened before and might enable Brazil to resume operations when the situation in the country has improved. The Brazilian embassy in Ghana, which remained but was dormant from the 1970s to the 1990s, is indicative of such an oscillation.[31] As Brazil's engagements in Africa enter a phase of contraction, a stronger focus could return to the PALOP, where structural relationships are more likely to survive changes in political and economic prioritization.

The self-perception of Brazil's political elite is shifting. Under the next government, a Western and South American joint mindset prioritising traditional partners in Europe, the US and MERCOSUR (the common market of the South) is likely to prevail. The narrative of Brazil being an African country could fade from the foreign policy agenda, not least because trade agreements and memoranda of understanding, such as with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have yielded very modest results beyond acquaintance with regionalisms in Africa.[32] The position that Brazil aspires to reach in the global order may shift accordingly. Even though its identification with the Global South is unlikely to disappear altogether, coalition-building will probably move away from idealistic and historical justifications. The same is

true for the external relations of MERCOSUR, which are more likely to be refocused from the Global South towards the traditional EU partner.

In addition to the domestic constraints, Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa, whether under a PT government or led by a different party, will face numerous challenges on the continent. The introduction of the South-South narrative in Brazil's engagement in Africa has largely failed because the ground proved less fertile than expected. Flagship projects such as support of the Namibian navy and the region-wide transfer of agricultural production technologies have been challenged because local partners did not reciprocate the commitment that Brazil expected. It has been very difficult for Brazilian security and development actors to position the country as a new key partner among the established Western presence and the competition with other emerging powers for influence, especially in the wake of China's ubiquitous engagement. Financial expectations on the African side and competition from established and new donors constitute a difficult environment for Brazil to operate in. The outlook for instruments such as development loans are currently grim, but this could open a window of opportunity to refocus on the transfer of successful policies, in particular in the areas of health and socioeconomic structures.

However, despite the economic crisis, the asymmetry between Brazil and African states in terms of development, political influence, size and security capacity prevails and continues to hamper an idealised "partnership between equals." This asymmetry has been further consolidated by unrealistic expectations of support on the African side and a paternalistic approach on the Brazilian side.

Concerning the key security priority for Africa – that

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is, the South Atlantic – there is simply a lack of interest, capacity and even awareness on the African side. Yet this space represents a crucial area for development and security for the Brazilian side, and the lack of African naval power will require a stronger collaboration with South American or even external actors.

1.6 Recommendations for the EU and the US in the context of Brazil's presence in Africa

The EU and the US have a lot to gain from pulling Brazil – a country that has often been sitting midway between the West and the Global South – into their sphere. They should accommodate the torn identity of Brazil by offering privileged partnerships in the OECD, which is often perceived as a Western club. Special membership status would allow for an alignment of norms and rules, while leaving Brazil enough space to credibly refer to its autonomy and its South American belonging. For instance, the country could be given space to design its own foreign development tools and priorities but it should be bound to ODA transparency and accounting rules. The EU and the US should also directly include Brazil in setting up UN-backed interventions in Africa and demand further personnel contributions. Joint operations could mitigate the limitation of Brazil's capacities in the security domain and would play to its historical preference for multilateral solutions. It could also be beneficial to support the leadership role of Brazil in South America by providing recognition of its initiatives, such as the Union of South American Nations (*Unión de naciones suramericanas*, UNASUR), in particular if concurrently exploiting existing differences with other BRICS countries with respect to global governance matters. The consolidation

of regional leadership in combination with a fragmentation of coalitions that are challenging Western norms and institutions would embed Brazil's engagement in Africa into a South American rather than a Global South context. This would, in turn, facilitate collaboration between the EU, the US and Brazil in Africa because a rationale of commonality and multilateralism within existing security and development initiatives would be more approachable.

Regarding security provision, the EU and the US should be mindful of their role in Africa and in the South Atlantic. An expansion of NATO, even if rhetorical, carries the risk of providing a common interest in resistance for the otherwise fragmented alliance between Africa and Brazil. Increased NATO military presence in places such as the Gulf of Guinea or in defence of UK and French overseas territories provides grounds for a resurgence of anti-imperialism, unless firmly anchored in regional institutions such as the AU and the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Brazil has played an important role as a defender of the Global South and will continue to confront Western powers in solidarity with Africa. The EU and the US should steal Brazil's thunder by ensuring that their security presence is not perceived as a Western action but rather as multilateral, with the inclusion of African institutions such as the AU or the SADC. In addition, it should seek long-term solutions for their overseas territories that are considered to be the last colonies and provide a raison d'être to alliances entrenching the North-South divide. Concerning existing alliances with a strong exclusionary focus, such as ZOPACAS, the EU and the US would be advised to wait for them to lose steam. The general lack of commitment on the African side and the absence of jointly securitized threats mean that such initiatives run idle in the absence of a committed leader.

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By contrast, engaging in confrontation carries the risk of reinforcing their antagonism with NATO.

Regarding development aid, the EU and the US should engage in more triangular cooperation with Brazil on the African continent. Brazil's expertise in development policies and technologies make it a capable partner. This is particularly valid in the PALOP, where Brazil has a strong presence and working knowledge, both of which offer manifold complementarities. At least in the short term, the EU and the US can take advantage of the dire situation of Brazil's public budget, which requires institutions such as ABC and EMBRAPA to rely more on external funding in order to maintain their operations. Triangular cooperation, where Brazil is contracted to implement EU and US development programmes on the ground with African beneficiaries, can also be an incentive for Brazil to adopt the OECD's rules for development aid. This would conversely reduce the likelihood of Brazil operating outside the OECD framework and facilitate common standards and aims with the EU and the US. In addition, it would offer the EU and US an opportunity to circumvent their own restrictions concerning a direct aid presence in Africa, particularly in countries that no longer qualify for ODA due to their income level or their political regime. Triangular cooperation thus helps to ensure a broad presence in Africa and to establish more coherent development norms both globally and specifically in Africa.

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2
CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Anna Katharina Stahl

2.1 Introduction: China's renewed diplomatic interest in Africa

Owing to the rise of new international players or emerging countries, the dominance of the European Union (EU) and US in the world is increasingly being challenged. Among these rising powers, China merits particular attention. Because of its size – in terms of geography, population and gross domestic product – it is considerably different from other rising powers.[1] In recent decades, China has witnessed a rapid economic expansion, making the transition from a low-income economy to a middle-income country (MIC). As a consequence of its rapid economic growth it is starting to adopt a more active global posture. In the context of its ambitions to play a more prominent international role, China's increasing engagement in Africa has attracted particular attention.

Although China's presence in Africa has increased considerably in the 21st century, it would be wrong to

consider it as a completely "new player" there. In fact, modern Sino-African relations developed shortly after the foundation of the People's Republic of China in the 1950s.[2] During this period, China's foreign policy in Africa was influenced by the Cold War environment and mostly driven by ideological motives. Following the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955 (the so-called Bandung Conference), the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, actively supported national independent movements in Africa.[3] The Tanzania-Zambia Railway, constructed in the 1970s, is considered to be an important symbol of China's support of African governments emerging from national liberation movements. It connected Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, thereby eliminating Zambia's economic dependence on the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Notwithstanding the importance of the history of Sino-African relations, China's current engagement in Africa has to be situated in the context of its own economic development at the beginning of the 1970s. Under the leadership of Deng Xioaping, China started shifting away from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-oriented system (the so-called "open door policy"). In the context of China's open door policy, the Chinese leadership also increased the scale of the country's economic activities abroad, particularly in Africa. As China started opening up to the world, it was primarily interested in Africa's economic prospects in terms of natural resources, trade and investments. Despite the initial focus on economic opportunities, its engagement in Africa has broadened over the past years to include diplomatic, cultural and security cooperation.

China's foreign policy currently covers almost the whole of the African continent and does not make any distinction between particular regions. With the excep-

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tion of three states, it maintains diplomatic relations with all 54 recognized states on the African continent. In fact, on the basis of its so-called "One-China policy," China does not engage in diplomatic relations with countries that have recognized Taiwan. In Africa, only Burkina Faso, São Tomé Príncipe and Swaziland maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In March 2016, Gambia decided to resume diplomatic relations with China at the expense of Taiwan.[4] China's bilateral cooperation with the other 51 African states is coordinated through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC was established in 2000 to provide an institutional framework for promoting both political dialogue and economic cooperation between China and Africa. It is primarily based on the mechanism of ministerial conferences that bring together Chinese and African foreign affairs and finance ministers every three years.[5] In addition to these ministerial conferences, FOCAC summits with African heads of state and government are held on a regular basis, alternating between China and Africa. The most recent summit took place in December 2015 in South Africa.

In addition to establishing structured diplomatic relations with Africa, the Chinese government has formulated a specific African policy agenda, laid down in several policy documents. Following the initial FOCAC summit held in Beijing in 2006, the Chinese government issued its first white paper on China's Africa Policy.[6] This introduces the general principles and objectives guiding Chinese foreign policy towards Africa. At the occasion of the second FOCAC summit in South Africa in 2015, Beijing released a second Africa policy paper that confirms the overall policy framework outlined by the 2006 policy document.[7]

Overall, the formulation of China's Africa policy falls under the leadership of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council. However, China's for-

eign policy in Africa is not as monolithic as it might seem. With the growing involvement of different actors, China's engagement in Africa has witnessed a pluralization in recent years. Under the leadership of the State Council, different ministries are involved in the implementation of China's Africa policy. Owing to the fact that the FOCAC secretariat is located in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the MFA has a coordination role. The leading role of the MFA in China's Africa policy is also mirrored in the creation of the position of Chinese Special Envoy for Africa in 2007, who is a senior Chinese diplomat from the MFA exclusively dedicated to African affairs.[8] In addition to the MFA, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages China's foreign trade, investment and aid relations with Africa. MOFCOM was established in 2003 as the result of a reorganization of the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation.

Apart from China's ministries, policy banks constitute key players in China's involvement in Africa. The two most important Chinese policy banks are the China Export-Import (Exim) Bank and the China Development Bank (CDB).[9] Whereas the CDB plays an important role in funding large infrastructure projects in China and abroad, it is China's Exim Bank that plays a predominant role in supporting China's foreign trade and economic co-operation with Africa. It administers concessional loans according to diplomatic and business objectives, and it plays a "policy-oriented 'development financing' role" in Africa.[10] In this context, China's policy banks support the activities of Chinese companies in Africa. Similar to other rising powers, the private sector plays a key role in China's engagement with Africa. Most of the Chinese firms operating in Africa are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than private-sector firms. Since SOEs do not have to face pressures from stockholders as private compa-

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nies do, they are better suited specifically to advancing the government's broader geopolitical objectives.[11]

Alongside the national institutions, Chinese subnational governments are also key actors in Africa. Over the years, Chinese provincial and municipal governments have set up extensive overseas programmes and have thereby become important players in international development cooperation with Africa.

In sum, over recent years, China's relations with Africa have become ever more complex, involving a variety of different actors and covering a growing range of issues. This chapter focuses primarily on China's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). As an analysis of China's overall engagement in SSA would go beyond the scope of this chapter, the following sections concentrate on two specific policy areas – namely, development, and peace and security. On the basis of the analysis provided by sections 2 and 3, Section 4 draws conclusions about the main opportunities and challenges of China's engagement in SSA, and it formulates a list of policy recommendation for the EU and the US.

2.2 China's role as a development actor in SSA

China's growing engagement in Africa has been most visible in the economic area, including development cooperation. In fact, unlike the US and the EU, China does not make a clear distinction between development aid and economic/commercial arrangements.[12] Figure 1 shows that China has become Africa's second largest trading partner, having surpassed the US in 2009. In parallel with growing Sino-African trade relations, there has been an important increase in Chinese aid to Africa over the last 10 years, as indicated by Figure 2.

Figure 1 | Sub-Saharan Africa's trading partners, 2000-2013

Source: Brookings 2014.[13]

Figure 2 | Chinese aid to Africa, 2001-2009

Source: Author's compilation based on Bräutigam 2011, Appendix 6.[14]

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As a consequence of China's own economic progress and its status as a MIC, it has become one of the world's largest suppliers of finance to developing countries, progressing from a net recipient to a net donor.[15] According to the most recent estimates by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), China's total concessional finance for development amounted to 3 billion dollars in 2013 and 3.4 billion dollars in 2014.[16] Among the group of emerging donors, China is therefore one of the most important providers of development assistance. Yet Figure 3 shows that in comparison to traditional donors – members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), i.e. the EU and the US – Chinese aid to Africa is still rather marginal.

Figure 3 | ODA of major donors to Africa, 2000-2011

Source: Author's compilation based on Bräutigam 2011[17] and OECD statistics.

China's role as an emerging donor has also been reflected in the publication of specific policy papers. In April 2011, China published its first white paper on its foreign aid.[18] The document was published by the State Council in order to respond to the criticism of the international community regarding Chinese development assistance to Africa

and to send a signal of increased transparency of Chinese aid to Africa.[19] Unlike China's white paper on Africa from 2006, which was primarily drafted by the MFA, the 2011 white paper on China's foreign aid was prepared by MOF-COM and refers to China's foreign aid policy more broadly.

Three years later, in April 2014, MOFCOM drafted another important policy document related to China's development assistance, the so-called draft "Measures for the Administration of Foreign Aid."[20] These measures are the first comprehensive legal document with the character of a law to regulate the Chinese government's foreign aid.[21] The policy document provides a list of 51 articles highlighting the principles guiding Chinese development cooperation. On the basis of MOFCOM's draft measures, the State Council released a second white paper on foreign aid in July 2014, which provides an update on Chinese development assistance for the period 2010-2012.[22]

Although the two white papers provide important information on Chinese development assistance, controversy over the lack of transparency of Chinese aid and doubts regarding the reliability of the data remain. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the instruments, geographic distribution, sectors and development principles of China's development assistance to SSA, it is therefore important to cross-check the Chinese data with other sources. The research by Deborah Bräutigam[23] and the China Aid Dataset constitute two important sources regarding the figures of Chinese development assistance.[24]

2.2.1 Instruments and geographical coverage

China's aid system is in flux, and in recent years new instruments have emerged. According to the white paper on foreign aid, China offers the following three types of

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financial support to developing countries: grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans.[25] Other sources confirm that Chinese foreign assistance to SSA also takes the form of debt relief, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as in-kind aid.[26]

According to official Chinese sources, in the period 2010-2012, China provided assistance to 121 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Oceania and Europe.[27] As Figure 4 shows, in the period 2010-2012, aid to Africa accounted for over half of Chinese aid, while Asia accounted for nearly one-third of the total. Chinese aid to Africa mostly concentrates on countries in SSA. According to the 2014 white paper on Chinese foreign aid, nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Togo, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia) have been the primary beneficiaries of China's debt relief.[28]

Figure 4 | China's foreign aid by region, 2010-2012

Source: Chinese State Council, *China's Foreign Aid*, July 2014, cit.

The importance attributed by China to Africa is also reflected in the establishment of an instrument specifically targeted at the continent's development. Under former President

Hu Jintao, a specific China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) was established.[29] The objective of this is to promote Chinese business activities in Africa by providing equity funds that assist Chinese companies investing there. The fund was established in June 2007 with 1 billion dollars of initial funding by the CDB, which was later increased to 5 billion dollars.[30] Experts have noted a lack of transparency of the CADF since no list of the projects that it funds is available.[31]

2.2.2 Sectoral priorities

China's intervention as a development actor in SSA is reflected in a variety of areas. Different sources confirm that Chinese finance to Africa covers the areas of infrastructure, natural resources, industry, health and agricultural sectors.[32] As outlined in Figure 5, China's 2014 white paper on foreign aid lists the following five main sectors of Chinese intervention: (1) infrastructure; (2) goods and material; (3) human resources development (education); (4) industry; (5) agriculture.

Figure 5 | China's foreign aid by sector, 2010-2012

Source: Chinese State Council, *China's Foreign Aid*, July 2014, cit.

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
Figure 5 shows that Chinese support for infrastructure development accounts for the bulk of Chinese aid in volume. This explains why China is emerging as a major funder of infrastructure projects in Africa. According to a study by the World Bank, China has signed infrastructure finance agreements with more than 30 African countries, some of those in SSA, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan, being the biggest recipients.[33] Moreover, the study highlights that "most Chinese government-funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at securing a flow of Sub-Saharan Africa's natural resources for export to China."[34] Experts have referred to this Chinese practice as so-called "infrastructure-for-resources deals."[35]

In addition to infrastructure, another important share of China's aid projects concerns the sectors of human resources development, agriculture and industry. In the 2014 white paper on China's foreign aid, the term "human resources development cooperation" refers to capacity-building measures, education and vocational training projects. Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has offered scholarships for students from SSA to study in China. Moreover, China is holding training sessions for public officials and technical personnel from African countries with close political relations to the Chinese Communist Party (e.g. Ethiopia). China's contribution to human resources development in Africa is particularly visible in the area of agriculture. On the basis of its own experience, China is active in the area of agricultural development with the aim of enhancing recipient countries' productive capacities. Since 2006, the Chinese government has established more than ten Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) in SSA, including in Mozambique, the Republic of Congo

and Rwanda.[36] Building on China's history of promoting agricultural development in Africa in the 1970s, the AT-DCs are a new tool of Chinese agricultural aid to Africa to foster technology transfer.[37]

Alongside infrastructure and agriculture, Chinese finance also contributes to the development of the industrial sector of countries in SSA. China is playing a key role in Africa's industrialization by establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These are based on China's own development model. To attract foreign direct investment in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese leadership set up industrial and technological development zones for a specific industry in different Chinese coastal cities. Following this model, China's overseas SEZs in SSA are intended to create economies of scale for Chinese overseas investment, and to assist less experienced small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises to venture overseas "in groups."[38] So far, Chinese SEZs have been established in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia.

2.2.3 Guiding principles

China's recent policy documents provide an overview of the core principles guiding its development engagement in SSA. Considering China's history as an aid donor, its current role as a development actor in Africa is based on principles that were formulated during the 1950s. Overall, two sets of principles can be distinguished: the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence from 1954 and the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid from 1963. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formulated by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in light of the Bandung Conference.[39] They present guiding principles for China's relations with other countries and are enshrined in the

constitution of the People's Republic of China. Among these five, Chinese leaders have put particular emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and of non-interference.

Box 1 | Guiding principles of China's foreign policy

China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1954)
1. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. mutual non-aggression;
3. mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. equality and cooperation for mutual benefit;
5. peaceful co-existence.

China's Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance (1963)
1. respect the principle of equality and mutual benefits;
2. respect the sovereignty of recipient countries and never attach any conditions or ask for any privileges;
3. provide economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extend the time limit for the repayment when necessary;
4. help recipient countries embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development;
5. help recipient countries to complete projects which require less investment but yield quick results;
6. provide the best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China at international market prices;
7. ensure that the personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology being transferred;
8. ensure that Chinese experts have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country.

Whereas the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence guide China's foreign relations with all countries, the Chinese leadership also formulated a set of specific guidelines to govern its assistance to developing countries, known as the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance. These were put forward by then Premier Zhou Enlai during his visit to several Asian and African countries in 1964.

The two sets of principles have important implications for China's policy regarding SSA. They serve as a justification for the Chinese leadership to oppose the common practice aid conditionality.[40] China defends the lack of conditionality in its development cooperation with Africa by invoking the principle of non-interference, claiming that interference in domestic affairs is illegitimate, and that Chinese aid should instead focus on the real needs of the recipient countries.

2.2.4 China's South-South cooperation with Africa

China's role as a development actor in SSA differs significantly from that of the EU and the US. Most importantly, China refers to its development relations with African countries as "South-South Cooperation" (SSC) between two developing countries. The notion of SSC stands in opposition to the traditional North-South Cooperation between the EU/US and developing countries. Unlike traditional development cooperation, China's SSC with Africa is not based on the notion of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as defined by the OECD's DAC.[41] In contrast to the DAC definition of ODA, which excludes commercial arrangements by private actors, the Chinese approach to development is characterized by a mutually beneficial business-oriented cooperation.[42] Hence, unlike the traditional development approach of the EU

and the US, which is aimed at poverty reduction through the disbursement of grants, grant-based aid represents only a small part of China's foreign aid to SSA.[43] Because China's SSC with Africa is driven by the idea of a win-win partnership, Chinese leaders argue that the Chinese development approach is less paternalistic than that of the EU and the US.[44]

2.3 China's growing contribution to African peace and security

Besides development, China's growing presence in Africa is also reflected in the area of security. This comes as no surprise considering that Africa represents the region with the greatest number of armed conflicts in the world.[45] Although China's engagement in Africa is driven by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, "Beijing has become increasingly entangled in African domestic affairs and conflicts as its economic involvement deepens."[46] In recent years there has been a growing number of examples of China's exposure to security challenges in Africa. In Nigeria and Sudan, Chinese oil facilities are regularly attacked, and Chinese workers kidnapped by rebels and militia groups.[47] Chinese SOEs have also been exposed to security risks in other parts of Africa, such as Angola and Eastern Congo.

As a consequence of its growing presence in Africa, China has also been increasingly involved in African conflicts. Concerns have been raised that China's presence in Africa exacerbates the proliferation of arms.[48] Because the Chinese arms industry is expanding, the Chinese government has made deals with African states, such as Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Namibia and Sierra Leone, to supply military equipment, often in exchange for nat-

ural resources.[49] These Chinese arms trades tend to be characterized by poor transparency and they frequently bypass United Nations (UN) arms embargos.[50] Some experts have argued that China is explicitly supporting so-called pariah states that are boycotted by the West on human rights grounds, such as Sudan or Zimbabwe.[51]

Initially being rather unprepared, the Chinese leadership has started to realise that in order to have the capacity to develop a long-term relationship with Africa and protect China's economic interests, it needs to deal with Africa's precarious security situation. It has started to go through a learning process, acknowledging that Africa's intrastate and regional armed conflicts have produced wider security threats, such as terrorism, piracy and international organized crime. As part of its learning process, China has gradually shifted from a policy of non-interference to selective engagement or so-called "constructive involvement" in African security.[52] Three important developments can serve as an indication of China's changing security approach in Africa.

First, China increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and has become the largest contributor to these of all permanent members of the UN Security Council. It currently has around 1,500 peacekeepers participating in UN PKOs, which is more than 15 times as many as about 10 years ago.[53] Typically, China has limited its contribution to non-combat forces. However, there are a few examples where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was deployed on African soil. As part of China's involvement in the peacekeeping mission of the UN in Mali,[54] it sent an infantry unit in 2013.[55] According to official Chinese sources, the Chinese troops in Mali are a "guard team that will mainly be responsible for the security of the MINUSMA headquarters and the living areas of peacekeeping forces."[56]

Second, China is starting to join multilateral security initiatives and to formulate a more outward-looking military strategy. In particular, it wants to increase its global maritime presence. China's contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia is considered to be a landmark in this process.[57] In 2009, China started to deploy a counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, which was the first expeditionary deployment of the PLA's navy.[58] China's anti-piracy efforts there suggest that the Chinese leadership is more open to a deployment of the PLA in other parts of the world.

Finally, China is supporting African security initiatives. In particular, the Chinese leadership is collaborating with the African Union (AU) to foster the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). China's growing support for the AU has been symbolised by the building of the new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in December 2011, representing the largest Chinese foreign aid project in Africa. Furthermore, the Chinese government decided in October 2011 to give to the AU Commission the status of full member of the FOCAC. During the FOCAC meeting in 2012, President Hu Jintao officially launched the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security.[59] As part of this new policy initiative, the Chinese government has started providing financial and technical support to the AU's activities in the field of peace and security, as well as to institutionalize a strategic dialogue with the AU on peace and security matters. Last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly that China would provide 100 million dollars in military assistance to the AU in the next five years to support the establishment of an African standby force and to boost its capacity for crisis response.[60]

2.4 Conclusion: The broader context of China's engagement in SSA

In sum, this chapter has highlighted that China's relations with SSA have expanded substantially over the past decade. China's engagement in Africa reflects the broader trend of the rise of MICs and therefore needs to be analysed against the background of China's own economic development and its domestic policies. At the same time, the expansion of Sino-Africa relations shows that emerging countries increasingly challenge the dominance of Western powers. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, a continent regarded as the so-called "backyard" of the EU and the US. Thus this last section will situate China's engagement in SSA in a more general context, focusing specifically on China's domestic policy priorities and the implications of China's rise in SSA for the EU and the US.

2.4.1 China's domestic priorities

China's engagement in SSA is largely influenced by the country's specific political structures. It is commonly described as a "one-party system", centred on the CCP. In 2012, on the occasion of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, China witnessed a change in leadership.

Under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, China's 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP) was adopted. The 13th FYP presents the roadmap for the new Chinese leadership for the period 2016-2020. As China's FYPs constitute blueprints for China's domestic socioeconomic development, they generally do not explicitly refer to issues of Chinese foreign policy. Yet several elements of the 13th FYP indicate that China's new leadership remains committed to supporting the coun-

try's diplomatic relations with Africa. This has also been symbolised by the fact that the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi, decided to pay his first official visit in 2016 to four African countries.[61]

Several reforms outlined in the 13th FYP implicitly relate to China's engagement in Africa. China's 13th FYP foresees an organizational reform of the PLA and reflects efforts of the current Chinese leadership to modernize its military and play a more important role in African security. This trend has been confirmed by the recent establishment of a Chinese diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa.[62] China has thereby followed the example of the EU and the US. While the US opened the United States Mission to the African Union in 2006,[63] the EU established an EU delegation to the AU in 2008.[64] Moreover, the Chinese government signed a 10-year leasing agreement with Djibouti to set up its first military base in Africa. This shows that the current Chinese leadership is ready to protect its economic interests in the Horn of Africa by fostering its security engagement on the continent.

Alongside the security reforms, the 13th FYP shows that the new Chinese leadership has recognized that, in order to maintain a rapidly growing economy, it needs to change in China's current economic model. In this context, the government has attempted to adapt the Chinese economy to a so-called "New Normal"[65] of slower, but more stable and sustainable, economic growth. According to the 13th FYP, China will have an annual growth rate of 6.5-7 per cent until 2020. China's slower growth will have repercussions on its relations with Africa. There are initial signs showing that China's trade and investments in Africa are declining as a consequence of its economic slowdown. Moreover, as China needs fewer natural resources, the price of commodities is declining, which negatively impacts on natural resources exporting states in Africa.

Yet, in order to proactively respond to China's "New Normal," the 13th FYP puts forward a series of measures to implement China's new One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR). This new development strategy, also known as the New Silk Road Initiative, was announced by President Jinping in September 2013 and consists of two main components: the Economic Land Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. OBOR aims to redirect China's domestic overcapacity and capital for infrastructure development to improve China's connectivity with countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. In order to foster investments in countries along China's New Silk Road, a specific Silk Road Fund of 40 billion dollars was established by the Chinese government. Through the Silk Road Fund, African countries belonging to the Maritime Silk Road could benefit from Chinese financing for major infrastructure projects.[66]

In addition to the formulation of new development strategies, the current Chinese leadership is supporting the creation of new financial institutions. The most notable example is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which could rival the World Bank in providing infrastructure finance to Asian developing countries. In terms of China's development relations with Africa, the New Development Bank – also known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) Development Bank – is likely to play an important role. As the headquarters of the New Development Bank are in Shanghai, and it will also open a regional office in South Africa, an important instrument to foster Sino-African development relations is presented.

2.4.2 Implications for the EU and the US

To respond to China's growing international role, both the US and the EU have institutionalized their diplomatic

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relations with China. The US established a "Strategic and Economic Dialogue" with China, which contributes to the wider objective of building a cooperative and comprehensive relationship with the country.[67] Along the same lines, the EU decided in 2003 that China would be the first among the emerging countries – the BRICS – to be lifted to the status of a bilateral strategic partner. In the same year, the Chinese government issued a specific EU policy paper, thereby formalising for the first time its diplomatic relations with an international partner.[68] On this basis, European and Chinese policy-makers adopted the Strategic Agenda 2020 to foster their collaboration.[69] While China adopted a second policy paper on the EU in 2014,[70] the EU recently released a new strategy to guide its relations with China for the next five years.[71]

China's growing presence in SSA represents a major challenge for the EU and the US. Thus EU and US policy-makers have started to address Africa within the framework of their bilateral relations with China.[72] Whereas as EU-China and US-China exchanges on Africa are still at an early stage, several areas for potential cooperation have been identified.

Against the background, the following policy recommendations can be put forward:

- **The EU and the US should collaborate with China to foster the AU and the APSA**. The recent establishment of China's diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa represents an opportunity for collaboration between China, the EU and the US to support the AU and its role in fostering African peace and security. Moreover, China's first overseas deployment of combat forces in Mali reaffirms China's growing involvement in PKOs in Africa and could open the door for collaboration with the EU and the US to support

the APSA. While China is a newcomer in the field, it could learn from the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which has seen its most important missions deployed in Africa. In recent years, the EU has started welcoming the contribution of partner countries in CSDP missions. The EU and the US signed a Framework Participation Agreement in March 2011 to provide a legal framework for US contributions of civilian personnel to CSDP missions.[73] A similar type of collaboration could be envisaged with China. This could provide a starting point for overall China-EU-US security cooperation in Africa.

- **The EU and the US should specifically reach out to China in the area of maritime security in the Horn of Africa**. China, the EU and the US are major trading partners. As most of their trade is transported by sea, they share a common interest in secure maritime routes. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has undermined the safety of one of the most important maritime routes. Both the EU and the US have engaged in efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, namely through the US-led Combined Task Force 151 of the Combined Maritime Force and the EU Naval Force Atalanta. Moreover, China launched a counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden in 2009, which has been its first long-distance naval deployment. In this context, initial collaboration in terms of information-sharing and the coordination of navies took place between China, the EU and the US. For instance, the PLA navy has responded to the distress calls of non-Chinese vessels under pirate attack in the Gulf of Aden, and has also provided an escort for several non-Chinese ships. This initial collaboration should be further expanded. For instance, China should increase its participation in the Shared

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Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism, which is a monthly planning conference that allows for the coordination of all counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

- **The EU and the US should specifically reach out to China in the area of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa**. China's new military facility in Djibouti will have major implications for the EU and the US. Following the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US has been increasingly involved in counterterrorism in Africa. Through its Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, the US has been involved in fighting terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.[74] At the same time, Djibouti hosts a military camp for France that has been pushing for a more proactive European response to counterterrorism in the Sahel region. While EU-US cooperation on counterterrorism has expanded significantly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and more recent attacks in Europe,[75] counterterrorism also officially features on the agenda of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership.[76] Thus, although there have been some concerns about China establishing a land facility in Djibouti close to that of the US and France, it could represent an opportunity for joint efforts between China, the EU and the US to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

- **The EU and the US should enhance China's contribution to global governance, namely through the Group of 20 (G-20) and the AIIB**. China currently holds the presidency of the G-20 and will be followed by Germany in 2017. This presents an opportunity for collaboration between the EU and China to foster the role of the G-20 in global economic governance. In particular, the EU could support China's efforts in

opening the G-20 to African developing countries. Together they could support South Africa's leadership of the G-20 Development Working Group. At the same time, the EU and the US should engage in a coordinated approach regarding China's efforts to play a more prominent role in global governance through institutions such as the New Development Bank and the AIIB. The case of the AIIB shows the risks of a divided transatlantic partnership. While the US opposed the creation of the AIIB, several EU member states have followed the Chinese lead and become founding members of the New Development Bank.

- **The EU, the US and China should contribute to Africa's development and support African countries in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**. As members of the UN, all three partners have contributed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs. Through triangular development cooperation the EU, the US and China could support the implementation of the SDGs in SSA.[77] Although only a few examples of triangular cooperation have emerged so far, this new type of development cooperation could present several advantages. First, triangular development cooperation would allow the combination of the comparative advantages of China's model of SSC with the traditional donor-recipient relationship between the EU/US and SSA. While as China's SSC encompasses mostly infrastructure projects, traditional development cooperation of the EU/US puts particular emphasis on aspects of sustainable development and good governance. Second, triangular development cooperation might be better suited to tackle regional and global challenges, as compared with traditional bilateral frameworks.

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3

THE ROLE OF GULF STATES IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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The "Gulf states" are the seven countries bordering the Persian Gulf in the Arabian Peninsula: Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They are characterized by their abundant hydrocarbon reserves, high per capita income, high expat-to-national ratio,[1] and religious homogeneity (Islam). In the political sphere, all but Iraq are headed by emirs and monarchs with varying levels of governing authority.

The political and economic role of the Gulf states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has long been evident. However, the Gulf states are lately widening their sphere of influence and assuming a proactive role in other regions of the African continent and the rest of the world. Although it should not be considered only a contemporary development, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), particularly the Horn of Africa (HoA), is a region in which the Gulf states are investing politically and economically.

The Arabian Peninsula and continental Africa have

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a long history of interaction that has resulted in shared cultures and identities that have transcended the trials of time to show their legacy in modern day SSA. From the highlands and lowlands of Eritrea and Ethiopia, to the coastlines of Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya and the islands of Tanzania, to the interiors of Sudan and Mali, the influence of Arabic culture and Islamic faith are evident in the language, traditions, architecture and religious practices of millions of people in SSA.

Although Gulf countries consist of the seven mentioned above, this chapter looks at the six states (sans Iraq) which make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It particularly focuses on Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar, the economic and political heavyweights among the Gulf countries and the ones having a more proactive engagement in SSA. Similarly, even though the chapter makes reference to SSA as a unit, the author will focus primarily on the HoA and provide a more nuanced analysis of Gulf-HoA relations, given the relevant historical as well as contemporary relations and dynamics between these two sub-regions.

3.1 The role of the Gulf states in peace and security in SSA

3.1.1 The rise of the Gulf states as influential international and regional actors in SSA

The economic and political influence of Gulf states has expanded beyond the MENA region. From increasing their footprint in global humanitarian funding,[2] to establishing Dubai as a global investment and financial hub, Qatar bidding to host the 2022 International Federation of Association Football (Fédération Internationale de

Football Association, FIFA) World Cup and Saudi Arabia leading the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (2014-2016), Gulf states – particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE – are on the rise. This Gulf revival has its roots in changing global and regional dynamics (especially in the case of MENA). One significant global factor in this regard is the tilting of global power eastwards with the emergence of China and India. For GCC countries that have relied heavily on the United States' strategic interest in MENA and its military support, the shift in power signalled the need to diversify their political and economic partners. Furthermore, the "Arab Spring" and subsequent fall of authoritarian regimes in North Africa was not only worrying to Gulf monarchies but also a reminder that the US military presence in the region, or even in their territory (in the case of Bahrain), would not insulate them from internal resistance. In fact, when the US gave its support to popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and also welcomed the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in both countries,[3] Gulf monarchies, some of which also have (Shia- or Sunni-based) Islamist movements (UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), understood that their national interests and that of their major ally – the United States – might not be perfectly aligned. Similarly, US energy self-sufficiency, its rapprochement with Iran and its reluctance to engage in military intervention to get rid of Assad in Syria signalled to GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the waning of US interest in the Middle East.[4] It is in the light of these developments, therefore, that the Gulf states feel compelled to assume a more proactive role in regional affairs and improve their international standing. Given the geographical and cultural proximities, the MENA region and SSA, particularly the Horn of Africa, are prime sites to form strategic alliances and pursue Gulf interests.

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3.1.2 The role of the Gulf states in peace and security in SSA

The Gulf states are engaging in SSA's peace and security in various ways. From institutional interaction between the GCC and African Union (AU) to individual Gulf states influencing peace and security in SSA countries, Gulf countries have overtly and covertly contributed to peace and security (or the lack thereof) in SSA in general, and in the HoA in particular.

Institutionalized regional and continental relationships between SSA and the Gulf are still nascent but growing. At the third Arab-Africa Summit in November 2013 in Kuwait City, and in its ensuing Kuwait Declaration, the leaders of these two regions asserted their commitment to formalized collaboration and partnership in the areas of peace and security, development, and investment between the two regions.[5] In a sign of growing interest in collaboration, an AU high-level delegation led by Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui paid a visit to Kuwait, Qatar and UAE in 2015. The high-level African delegation met with ministers and high-level state officials in the respective countries to discuss peace and security developments in Africa and to seek collaboration to address ongoing conflicts (Somalia, Libya, Mali) and emerging challenges (terrorism, violent extremism). The AU and the respective Gulf countries expressed their mutual commitments to support the AU's continental conflict prevention and management mechanisms by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to facilitate formal partnerships.[6]

Qatar is emerging as a notable peace and security actor in the greater Middle East and HoA regions. It is particularly carving out a portfolio as a mediator, and has engaged in several peace processes (namely those

in Yemen, Lebanon and Sudan).[7] In the Horn, its most recent effort was to mediate a truce between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2010 in the wake of the border dispute between these two countries in 2008.[8] In the framework of what has been called "economic diplomacy,"[9] Qatar not only facilitates and sponsors mediation processes, but also puts financial incentives on the table to encourage conflicting parties to come to terms. For example, when Qatar took over the Darfur peace process and mediated the Doha Agreement between the government of Sudan and the Equality Movement (JEM, the major armed opposition group in Darfur) in 2010, Qatar pledged 2 billion dollars for development plans in Darfur and brokered agro investment deals worth 1 billion dollars in Sudan.[10]

In the light of growing Islamic radicalization in the HoA and MENA, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been accused of backing insurgents and Islamists abroad. Though Qatar and Saudi Arabia dismiss these accusations as baseless, they are said to turn a blind eye to financial support from their capitals to radical Islamic movements abroad, albeit not supporting these movements directly.[11] In SSA, Qatar's support has been linked to al-Shabaab in Somalia,[12] while Saudi Arabia has been accused of promoting and supporting Wahhabi/Salafi movements in the continent. While much of the Wahhabi/Salafi proselytization is done through non-state actors (individuals, humanitarian organizations, religious institutes, etc.), Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been repeatedly named and shamed for failing to conduct due diligence.[13] Further, in the African context, the promotion of more rigid Wahhabi and Salafi interpretations of Islam is seen as a weakening of the Sufi-based African Islamic culture that has flourished in East and West Africa for centuries.[14] Moreover, in the light of growing violent extremism in SSA, this development is a source of concern for countries with predominant or

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significant Muslim communities, lest such fundamentalist Wahhabi interpretations provide fertile ground for violent extremism to take root domestically. In Mali, for example, Wahhabi followers are suspected of supporting Al-Qaeda affiliated groups operating in the region.[15] In Ethiopia, the government has been in a row with the Muslim community since 2011 when, in an effort to counter what it said was an infiltration of foreign-sponsored, Wahhabi-based extremist cells, it attempted to introduce "a more moderate" Al-Habashi teaching.[16] Calling this undue interference in religious affairs by a secular state, the Ethiopian Muslim community held protests in 2011 and 2012.[17] The government rejected this allegation and sentenced 17 Muslim activists, declaring that they were engaged in terrorism and plotting to create an Islamic state in Ethiopia.[18]

An important agenda that drives Saudi Arabia's involvement in SSA is its need to deprive the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran of any support in SSA. In view of Saudi Arabia's competition with these two actors for greater influence in MENA, a larger Iranian or Brotherhood footprint in the HoA would not only undermine Saudi Arabia's geopolitical currency in the region but could also affect its access to the Suez Canal, on which it relies for trade.[19] Sudan has been a particular concern for Saudi Arabia in this regard due to its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and amicable relationship with Iran.[20]

An interesting encapsulation of Gulf interests in the HoA emerged as Yemen – the bridge between the Horn and the Gulf – descended into crisis in March 2015. As Saudi Arabia asserted its regional hegemony and announced military action against the (predominantly Shia) Yemeni Houthis, three Horn countries, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti, cut their diplomatic ties with Iran and voiced their support for the Saudi-led coalition. Eritrea too is said to

be renting out its ports and airspace and even sending ground troops.[21] All four of the Horn countries (including Eritrea) have their own reasons for joining or supporting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Sudan and Eritrea are two "pariahs" in the Horn whose national economies, and regional and global diplomatic influence, have been debilitated by international economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. They are therefore keen to form new alliances that would allow them to put their geopolitical leverage to use and unchain them from their economic shackles. Djibouti for its part is a country that is heavily reliant on rent derived from military bases on its territory and would rather diversify its clients rather than its economy, as the potential for the latter is limited. In Somalia, a state that is emerging after more than two decades of turmoil, the federal government is under pressure from internal actors (members of parliament) and donors to tackle its pervasive massive corruption issues.[22] It therefore needs to find alternative sources of finance and also bolster its regional and global diplomatic currency.

While the discussion above describes the context in which several Horn countries are supporting the Saudi coalition in Yemen, more important is the implication of their involvement in existing regional dynamics in the HoA, especially how it will affect the "no war, no peace" Ethio-Eritrean relations. As reports have surfaced that Eritrea is renting out its ports and airspace and contributing 400 troops to the Saudi coalition, observers have pointed out that this would be a "get-out-of-jail-free card"[23] for the severely isolated "North Korea of Africa." While Eritrea's exact returns for its contributions to the coalition remain opaque, a UN Monitoring Group report implied that Eritrea might have received financial assistance, investment and fuel for its services.[24] What is more predictable is its diplomatic returns: support from

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the Yemini government and Saudi Arabia, and potentially improved relations with post-Mubarak and post-Morsi Egypt, which is rising to assume its (contemporary) historical role as an influencer of MENA affairs. This development is particularly worrying for Ethiopia, which has been pressing for the isolation of Eritrea after the devastating war between the two countries in 1998-2000. As the biggest economy in the region with a relatively stable political scene, Ethiopia is watching Eritrea closely and, to create tensions with this country, the Ethiopian government may use its newly acquired Gulf partnerships and resources to destabilize it by supporting internal and external opposition groups.[25] Ethiopia is also concerned that a revival of Egyptian power and the support Al-Sisi's government has garnered from GCC countries could turn Egypt against Ethiopia's controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project to control the Nile waters. While Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a historic deal for cooperation on the Nile water in March 2015,[26] the millennia-long suspicion and tension between Egypt and Ethiopia are too deep to be settled with a single agreement. As a result, the two countries still keep a close eye on each other's actions. It is for this reason that Ethiopia is wary of a potential Egypt-Eritrea coalition, for fear the latter could capitalize on internal opposition or use external actors, such as al-Shabaab, to shake up the security apparatus of the country.[27] For a country that is preaching a narrative of "Ethiopian renaissance," malice from either or both of these actors would not only undermine Ethiopia's 4 billion dollar GERD project, but it could also challenge its strategic importance as a (self-portrayed) island of stability in a largely destabilized HoA region.

In addition to the Ethio-Eritrean tie, Sudan's participation in the Saudi-led coalition, including the contribu-

tion of approximately 350-700 ground troops to the fight against the Houthis in Yemen,[28] is a concern for regional peace, security and human rights in Sudan. Sudan's 2.2 billion dollar deposit from Riyadh and Doha,[29] and additional deals it has signed with these countries,[30] could mean a further deterioration of the situation in a country that is heavily militarized, has engaged in violent conflict on different fronts (the most publicized and horrific of which was in Darfur), and has a disappointing human rights record and a head of state who is accused of genocide.

The war in Yemen is a symptom of the growing Saudi-Iran rift, or the Sunni-Shia tension (the Sunni Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia against the Shia Houthis supported by Iran) in MENA, exhibiting its ripple effect in SSA in general, and the HoA in particular. In addition to its political consequences for countries in the Horn, the Saudi-Iran tension also has economic repercussions for others. Oil-based African economies, for example Nigeria, are feeling the brunt of falling oil prices caused by the Gulf states' refusal to reduce oil production to offset overproduction as a result of Iran joining the market.[31]

3.2 The role of the Gulf states in the economic development of SSA

3.2.1 GCC economic cooperation with SSA

The Gulf states are emerging as generous development partners in the world. As records of global humanitarian assistance show, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE accounted for 35 per cent of the total global humanitarian funding from non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) states from 2009-2013.[32] Gulf overseas develop-

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ment assistance (ODA), however, is not a recent phenomenon. Kuwait, UAE and Saudi Arabia established national development funds, and led in the establishment of other multilateral Arab institutions such as the Arab Fund, in the 1960s and 1970s to assist mostly Arab communities abroad.[33] Expanding their assistance, they established the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa in Khartoum in 1974, providing funds for SSA countries that were not part of the Arab League (and hence could not get funding from the Arab Development Bank or similar multilateral agencies).[34]

While SSA countries are becoming notable recipients of Gulf aid (receiving 12 per cent of Gulf multilateral aid), disaggregated data on exact figures and the distribution of GCC ODA to SSA is hard to come by.[35] Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some of the objectives and strategies for Gulf development assistance to SSA.

Gulf aid is founded on Islamic teachings of giving and humanitarianism. One trend in Gulf funding is to channel it to predominantly Muslim countries and to use it to promote Islam through charitable organizations.[36] By 2005 around 42 countries had received Gulf aid; however, only three SSA countries – Senegal (1.6 per cent, 1.2 billion dollars), Mali (1.1 per cent, 0.8 billion dollars) and Guinea (1.1 per cent, 0.8 billion dollars), all of which are predominantly Muslim – had received more than 1 per cent of total Arab finance each.[37]

One interesting distinguishing character of the Gulf states (in this case Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE) is that their development assistance is allocated bilaterally (rather than through multilateral institutions) and is given in the form of loans (rather than grants).[38] Further, unlike funds from Western donors, Gulf financial assistance is not conditional on economic or political reforms, making it attractive for African states that cannot meet donor

standards (including those set by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).[39] As a result, several SSA countries have been looking to Gulf finance (in terms of funds) to finance national programmes. Ethiopia and Kenya, for example, have taken loans from Kuwait and UAE respectively to finance infrastructure projects at home.[40]

As a lack of transparency characterizes Gulf funds, there is a conflation of public and private funds – both in terms of the sources of the funds (private and public sources for development) and where the funds are going (public and private investments abroad).[41] While state officials campaign for and donate to humanitarian causes abroad, and raise funds for aid,[42] public agencies in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar also seek investment opportunities abroad and set aside funds for overseas private investment in sectors such as agriculture.[43] Several private Saudi agro investments in Sudan and Ethiopia, for example, are supported by the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad – an 800 million dollar fund, set aside "to support investment by private sector Saudi Arabian companies in agricultural projects abroad."[44]

Given the new face of development cooperation that Gulf states are pursuing (one based on trade and investment abroad), the next section highlights GCC trade and investment interests and engagement in SSA.

3.2.2 GCC trade and investment in SSA

According to a comprehensive report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, GCC exports to SSA were valued at 19.2 billion dollars, representing only 2 per cent of GCC total exports in 2014, while GCC imports from SSA for the same year were worth 5.5 billion dollars, although much of this was destined for the UAE for re-export.[45]

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While precise data on Gulf investment portfolios is hard to come by, the main areas of GCC economic engagement in the region include extractive industries, real estate, private investment and banking, retail, tourism and even education.[46]

Although equity markets (stock exchanges) in the continent are rather limited with the exception of South Africa, private equity and direct investment in private companies are still possible. Qatar National Bank, for example, has purchased a 23 per cent stake in Ecobank of Togo, while the Investment Corporation of Dubai has invested 300 million dollars in the Dangote Cement factory in Nigeria.[47] Islamic finance is another area where the Gulf states have a comparative advantage over other actors in SSA. In 2014, for example, Kuwait Finance House arranged South Africa's first sovereign Islamic law-compliant bond of 500 million dollars. Following in South Africa's and Senegal's footsteps, Nigeria and Kenya are also considering issuing Islamic law-compliant bonds to sovereign bodies in order to access finances from Gulf Islamic banks.[48] Given the significant Muslim population in SSA (29 per cent),[49] including in large economies such as Nigeria and Ethiopia, Islamic finance is a much needed product with potential for growth.

Africa's population is growing, its middle class is expanding, it is experiencing high rates of urbanization, and its retail and consumer goods markets have skyrocketed and are projected to expand further.[50] Seizing this opportunity, Gulf companies are penetrating the retail market in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia.[51]

The tourism sector is an important source of income for many African economies. While the sector also has significant potential, it is rarely fully capitalized on. Understanding its embedded potential, Gulf investors are expanding their footprints in the African tourism sector

in Zanzibar, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mozambique and elsewhere in the continent.[52]

The Gulf states are also eyeing the health and education sectors in SSA after their relative success in delivering such services in North Africa. While West Africa, particularly Nigeria and Ghana, are popular Gulf destinations for investment in health services, East Africa, particularly Kenya and Uganda, have attracted the attention of Gulf countries for investment in education (especially private schools).[53]

3.2.3 Main fields of impact and future prospects

In view of the above-mentioned areas of Gulf economic engagement in SSA, what makes GCC countries noticeably different from more traditional actors such as the US and European countries is the unconditionality of their terms and their practice of giving loans rather than grants. GCC countries are also different from actors such as China in that their economic interests are not tied to extractives or infrastructure development but rather to the service sector.

While the Gulf states' interest in the service sector is booming, their involvement in manufacturing industries lags behind, mostly due to inadequate infrastructure, bureaucracy and high risk linked to political instability in much of SSA. Nonetheless, Gulf states are engaged in manufacturing in South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire and, increasingly, Ethiopia.[54]

Similarly, infrastructure investment is an area with great potential that has received only limited contributions from GCC countries. According to a report compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2014, "Gulf-based entities, both public and private, are currently contributing around 10% of infrastructure investment in Africa," mostly in the telecom and power spheres.[55]

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3.2.4 Gulf investment controversies

In contrast to the areas of Gulf engagement in SSA discussed above, a more controversial investment sector is agriculture. In the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis and subsequent spikes in food prices, the Gulf states have taken to heart the importance of ensuring their food security and self-sufficiency. Given their lack of arable land and adequate fresh water resources for agriculture, Gulf countries have encouraged public and private companies to invest in agriculture abroad, mostly in Africa and Asia.[56]

Although detailed data on land deals is hard to come by, Saudi Arabia is the prime GCC investor in agriculture abroad, with 70 per cent of its deals in SSA, mostly in Sudan and Ethiopia.[57] According to regional observers and international watch groups,

> in the past five years Saudi Arabia has invested more in Ethiopia than any other country, with Saudi Star Agricultural Development being the leading investor in the country, having committed to invest US$2.5 billion in Ethiopia by 2020. The firm plans to develop a rice-farming project on 10,000 hectares of land leased for 60 years and rent an additional 290,000 hectares.[58]

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been the largest investor in Sudan, accounting for half of all the foreign investment.[59] But Saudi Arabia is not the only GCC country investing heavily in agriculture in SSA: UAE and Qatar are also notable investors. UAE, for example, is preparing to develop more than 28,000 hectares of land in Sudan.[60] In 2008, Qatar was in negotiations with the Kenyan government to develop 40,000 hectares in the Tana Delta part of the country as part of the deal to construct the Lamu port.[61]

Interest in agricultural investment in Africa is not unique to GCC countries. Emerging economies such as China and India are also involved in the African agro market in an effort to guarantee their food security. Given the fact that most of the SSA countries where these deals are being negotiated suffer from food insecurity themselves, the value added of these export-led agricultural foreign investments for local economies is questionable.

Further, Gulf investments in agriculture have been dubbed "land grabbing" and criticized by many analysts, human rights activists and environmentalists, who point out the negative consequences of these massive land deals: from alterations to the lifestyles of communities (affecting their access to water and grazing land or their cultural attachment to the land), to the displacement of communities without appropriate compensation,[62] to environmental degradation of natural resources such as land, water and biodiversity,[63] activists highlight the human and environmental rights dimensions of agro investment in Africa.

Overall, and as mentioned above, how these deals are handled lacks transparency and hence getting up-to-date information on agro projects is a challenge. However, some observers note that most of these deals, though large in scale, are lagging behind in terms of implementation.[64]

3.3 Assessing main priorities and main challenges of the Gulf states

The main priorities for the Gulf states in SSA revolve around their evolving identity as influential global actors as well as the regional dynamics in MENA, particularly in view of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, grow-

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ing Sunni violent extremism, and Iran (both in terms of its internal developments and its emergence as an important international actor post-sanctions). But these three variables work together and drive one another, as was clearly revealed by analysis of Gulf involvement in the Yemeni crisis.

As GCC countries still rely on US military and diplomatic alliances and backing, they are likely to continue to engage in and support the counterterrorism and anti-piracy programmes of the US in MENA and SSA. They will do so not only to prevent the negative ramifications of terrorism and piracy in their own political economies, but also to demonstrate their own strategic importance in securing Washington's security agenda in MENA and the HoA.

Keeping the Muslim Brotherhood weak in SSA is also among the priorities of the GCC countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain. Given that, the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood was a threat primarily in Sudan and Egypt (which is not in SSA but is strongly relevant for HoA dynamics), GCC countries are likely to maintain strong economic and diplomatic ties with both countries in order to influence their internal politics and prevent the reinforcement of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ridding Iran of any base in SSA in general and in the HoA in particular will be another Gulf priority. Money and diplomatic backing will be provided in exchange for SSA allegiance to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries, who will strengthen their relationships with Eritrea for this reason.

Gulf states will seek to take part in the "Africa Rising" rhetoric by lending a hand to AU peace and security endeavours and expanding their trade and investment with the region. They will hope to capitalise on the growing African consumerist middle class, the booming service

sector and growing (public and private) financial demand to sustain the economic growth and infrastructure development projects of many SSA countries.

Gulf states have faced resistance to the extensive land deals they have negotiated with food insecure SSA countries. However, given the abundant land, water and labour resources in the continent and also the high demand from African countries for foreign direct investment, it is likely that GCC investment in agriculture in SSA will continue.

While these are the main areas that will anchor GCC engagement in SSA, it should not be forgotten that they will be competing with emerging actors such as China and Turkey for political influence and economic opportunities in SSA (particularly in the HoA). The implications of this for African countries is rather positive as they will now have multiple political and economic partners to choose from.

Recommendations

While GCC investments in SSA are largely welcome, investments in the agricultural sector are more controversial. In order to ensure win-win results for GCC investors and their agro investment host communities, Gulf investors both public and private should put more energy and resources into community "buy-in" of their projects through consultations with affected communities and provide appropriate compensation. They should encourage private and public investors to integrate corporate social responsibility into their plans, so that they can launch need-based, long-term development programmes that can benefit communities affected by these agricultural projects.

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Further, in order to build trust and settle these investment controversies, the Gulf states should ensure more transparency on the scope, ownership and purpose of any agro investment deals.

The EU and US should also reconsider their agricultural trade agreements with SSA to present SSA countries with alternative opportunities to develop their small-holder agriculture and enter the global market competitively, without being forced to prematurely adopt large-scale and commercial farming. In view of the growing market for organic agricultural products, if adequately supported, small-holder SSA farmers could indeed maximize their comparative advantage in the global market.

Moreover, given the role and growing importance of emerging actors in SSA, the EU and US should re-evaluate their development cooperation models, especially the conditionality around economic reform, to ensure that they remain important economic partners for Africa.

In order to avoid being complicit in supporting radical movements and violent extremists in SSA directly or indirectly (through money channelled through non-state actors), the Gulf states should strengthen their mechanisms for due diligence.

Given the United States' role as a forerunner in the fight against terrorism, and the EU's role in its joint mission with the AU in Somalia against al-Shabaab forces, the US and EU – together with SSA countries – should demand more transparency by the Gulf states in the distribution of their ODA.

In a region where histories, identities and also conflicts are interrelated (as is the case in the HoA), all three actors (GCC, US, EU) should ensure that they understand the regional dynamics before undertaking political or military intervention in, or in support of, countries in the Horn.

One persisting security challenge in the HoA region is the unsettled Ethio-Eritrea relations. The tit for tat and proxy wars these two countries engage in to undermine and delegitimize each other could have a destabilising effect on the region. Therefore, the US and EU should make more concerted diplomatic efforts towards resolution of the Ethio-Eritrea tension.

Among the Gulf states, Qatar in particular is strengthening its relationships with both countries, and given its already notable portfolio in mediation in the HoA (between Sudan and Darfur rebels, and between Eritrea and Djibouti), Qatar could be a suitable mediator to continue the diplomatic effort to reconcile the two countries.

In the same vein, the effectiveness of international sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Sudan and Eritrea should be reviewed, as further economic crises and diplomatic desperation could make them vulnerable to becoming proxies in a regional tug-of-war in the HoA or MENA.

NOTES

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10   Sultan Barakat, "Qatari Mediation: Between Ambition and Achievement", cit., p. 19.

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4

TURKEY'S AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: FROM VENTURE TO NORMALIZATION

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Turkey's Africa initiative has produced dividends in less than a decade. In the early 2000s, Africa was not a serious consideration in Turkish foreign policy. When people talked about Africa, it was mostly limited to the North of Africa, where Turkey has considerable relations as a result of a shared religious and Ottoman background. In this context Turkey has pursued an aggressive, yet increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) policy since 2002. In retrospect, Ankara's Africa policy and the positive response it received from African countries went beyond the imagination of many. Indeed, the Justice and Development Party's Africa policy represents, hands down, the most successful aspect of Turkish foreign policy over the past decade. The Africa initiative, whose origins date back to 1998 and which was implemented beginning in 2002, promises to become a lasting element of the nation's foreign policy thanks to its content and potential repercussions.[1] In recent years,

the Turkish government's interest in the African continent has expanded geographically into Sub-Saharan Africa and thematically into the domains of security, humanitarian assistance and economic relations. The nation's active involvement at all levels in Somalia, in particular, has received much attention from across the continent and contributed to the consolidation of Turkey's position in Africa. Thus far, closer economic cooperation, coupled with more than half a million US dollars in development aid and humanitarian assistance, has formed the basis of this new approach. Various government agencies (e.g. AFAD, TIKA, YTB) and non-governmental organizations (IHH, Cansuyu, Hasene, etc.) have actively contributed to furthering the nation's relations with the African continent.[2] Meanwhile, the Turkish authorities' take on Somalia and other nations indicates that Ankara is interested in becoming not only an economic power in the continent but also a political ally. This brief intends to give a comprehensive perspective on the state of Turkey-Africa relations and the implications for the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and other actors at the international level.

4.1 Defining Turkey as an actor in Africa

The comprehensiveness and complexity of Turkey-Africa relations is already known. However, in order to contextualize contemporary relations very broadly, Turkey's Africa experience since the early 2000s can be explained as having occurred in five stages,[3] each having laid the groundwork for the next.

The period between the Justice and Development Party's rise to power in 2002 and the designation of 2005 as the Year of Africa represented a preliminary stage

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of Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa. It was during these years that initial assessments of Africa's potential were made and lower-level meetings were held between Turkish officials and their African counterparts. When, as a sign of the success of this process of deliberation, Turkey designated the year 2005 as the Year of Africa, African governments were not taken by surprise. Announcing 2005 as the Year of Africa in practice generated a debate about Africa in Turkey and was followed by concrete actions in subsequent years. At the same time, the move represented an unmistakable sign of Turkey's commitment to building stronger relations with Africa.

The second period, which started in 2005 and ended with the first Turkey-Africa Summit three years later, marked a period of more diverse relations in a range of areas, including politics and the economy. During this period, Turkish-African relations made more progress than the Turkish authorities had initially predicted, while both sides became more familiar with their counterparts. The main purpose of the 2008 Turkey-Africa Summit was to develop a mutual perspective on cooperation, and this has been mostly achieved.

The third period began with the 2008 summit and continued until then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's August 2011 visit to the Somali capital. This was when Turkish-African relations assumed a multi-dimensional nature. While the Turkish government opened embassies in various African countries in almost every region of Africa, the nation's trade volume with Africa tripled from 6 billion dollars to approximately 18 billion dollars.[4] As such, the years between 2005 and 2008 represent a key period of growing complexity in Turkey's Africa policy.

It was during the fourth period, which began with Erdoğan's official visit to Somalia, that Turkish-African

relations assumed a different nature – a political one. In 2011, the Turkish government's Somalia Initiative represented the nation's added focus on high politics, i.e. political matters and security issues, in addition to mere economic ties and humanitarian or development aid. As a matter of fact, Turkey's involvement in Somalia constitutes a second experience of state-building for Ankara, after the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, although they differ both in scope and in nature. The restoration of relative public order in Somalia, and the world's renewed interest in the conflict, rendered Turkey a prominent stakeholder whose opinions were widely appreciated. As a result, Turkish authorities met with representatives from the European Union, Great Britain, Spain, Norway and the United States, among others, on African issues, mostly in bilateral formats. Most of these meetings took place within a framework of exchanging ideas and understanding Turkey's position and policy toward Africa. This was the first time that the international community started to see Turkey as a potential partner on Africa.

The end of 2014 marked the beginning of the fifth chapter in Turkish-African relations. The coming years will be particularly important, as they will present opportunities to consolidate existing achievements and develop a more systematic approach. At an institutional level, for example, the 2014 Malabo Summit paved the way for the full normalization of the Turkish government's relations with countries in Africa, as most African leaders attending the 2008 Turkey-Africa Summit retained some doubts about the sincerity of Turkey's interest in the continent. However, such sentiments were absent at the Malabo Summit; on the contrary, the summit advanced relations still further, as stated in the 2015-2019 Joint Implementation Plan.[5] However, the Malabo Summit agenda focused on the possibility of more compre-

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hensive cooperation and maximising mutual benefits for the future. In the 2015-2019 Joint Implementation Plan, Turkey and the African Union (AU) agreed on the development of political, social and economic relations, with a special focus on health, communication, tourism, peace and security, and mediation.

4.2 The role of Turkey in peace and security in SSA

Since 2011, Turkey has become more involved in peace and security throughout Africa. The security elements in Turkey-Africa relations essentially have three dimensions. Firstly, Turkey has contributed to international efforts to ensure peace and stability in Africa. Ankara contributes to the United Nations (UN) missions deployed in the continent. As of August 2015, Turkey was taking part in seven of the nine existing UN missions in Africa, albeit providing only a small number of police and military officers. In addition, by the end of 2014, military training was provided in Turkey for 2,200 military personnel from over 20 African countries. This training was implemented through a joint project between the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Turkish National Police Academy in Ankara. For the period 2015-2016 it expected to receive more than 1,200 African military personnel for training.[6]

Secondly, Turkey has contributed to the security of international trade through its efforts in the Horn of Africa. Since 2009, Turkey has taken an active role in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden[7] and has provided military support to fight against this scourge in cooperation with the EU and the UN. The Turkish G-class frigate Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Giresun (TCG Giresun) joined the Combined Task Force 151, which was formed by the United Nations

Security Council.[8] The Giresun frigate was sent on a four-month mission, starting 25 February 2009, within the framework of the Turkish Armed Forces' authorization to serve in the sea off of Somalia. According to the mandate, Turkish Armed Forces personnel would not engage in ground operations against piracy and armed robbery; instead they would provide protection to Turkish merchant and military ships within their task areas. Upon the expiry of its mandate, the Giresun frigate returned to Turkey on 25 June 2009. However, on 19 June 2009 another frigate, the Gediz frigate, was sent to the Gulf of Aden with 28 commissioned officers, 156 non-commissioned officers, ten specialized sergeants and 72 rank-and-file personnel on board.[9] Subsequently, the TCG Gokova frigate was dispatched to combat piracy after the return of the Gediz frigate due to the expiration of its mandate in September 2009. A total of 267 staff, including 30 commissioned officers, 158 non-commissioned officers and 79 soldiers, served on the frigate for five and a half months in the Gulf of Aden.[10] On 20 February 2010, SAT (Underwater Offence Group) commandos neutralized seven sea pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The TCG Gemlik frigate (F-492) indicated that SAT commandos had impeded pirates from attacking a Japanese ship in the Gulf of Aden.[11]

On 1 April 2010 a Taiwanese-flagged ship was hijacked, and on 7 April 2010 a Turkish bulk carrier named Yasin-C was hijacked 270 nautical miles from its destination at Kenya's port of Mombasa. According to a statement delivered by the Turkish General Staff on 1 April,[12] the Gallipoli frigate had interfered with a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden, which was preparing to attack other ships, and captured nine pirates. According to another statement made by the Turkish General Staff on 18 April,[13] the Gallipoli frigate had organized an operation

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with two speedboats near the north-east of the Seychelles against a pirate ship, which was close to the route of the Turkish-flagged ship Servet-Y. Following this operation, 13 pirates were neutralized and the materials used were captured.

Thirdly, Ankara continues to contribute to the state-building process in Somalia, increasingly with a security component.[14] Turkey mostly provides support to the Somali central government in the area of training for security services. Since 2011, Turkey has dedicated a budget of 20 million Turkish lira for the restructuring of the Somali army and its police forces. One of its projects is to build a non-commissioned officer school in Mogadishu with a capacity of 100 student-officers in the first phase, followed by plans to start building the foundations for professional military ground, air and naval schools. Turkey's General Directorate of Security, the Turkish General Staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have conducted various studies on how best to restructure the Somali army and police forces. Turkey has pledged to contribute to building infrastructure and to configuring and training the Somali police in order to ensure stability. To this end, 60 Somali police officers were brought to Turkey through the General Directorate of Security, then sent back to Somalia after receiving training at the Police Academy. Subsequently, more than 500 police officers have travelled to Turkey for training in the last three years.[15] Currently Turkey has expanded its military activities, with the Turkish Armed Forces involved in training the Somali army, as requested by the Somali government, and opened a military base in Somalia.[16]

However, Turkey's engagement in Somalia has not been without its detractors. On 27 July 2013, the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu was attacked, leaving one dead and three wounded from among the Turkish secu-

rity forces.[17] Shortly before President Erdoğan's January 2015 visit, militants attacked the hotel where the Turkish forward-planning team was based. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin ("al-Shabaab") claimed responsibility for both attacks.[18]

Ankara's involvement in restoring peace and security in Somalia has been focused especially on three approaches.[19] Humanitarianism has been the main theme and one of the most pronounced official discourses since the start of bilateral relations. Humanitarianism relates not only to emergency aid, but also to development aid. With a mixture of both aid policies, Turkey has become a leading and visible actor in Somalia.[20]

The second aspect of Turkey's Somalia policy relates to implementation of its development policies. There has been a convergence of activities by the state apparatus and civil society organizations such as IHH Humanitarian Relief Organization and others on the ground.[21] This unofficial coalition – most often lacking perfect coordination – has boosted Turkey's overall visibility in Somalia. Most importantly, based on the author's observation and conversations in Mogadishu, whatever has been done in Somalia, irrespective of whether it has been done by state institutions or civil society, all the credit has gone to Turkey, making it appear as if Ankara were the initiator of everything.

The third aspect of Ankara's involvement is its regional approach. Turkey has realized that the "Somalia problem," with all its complexities, goes beyond the nation-state and includes regional and global dimensions.[22] This approach has mostly stemmed from a geopolitical understanding that without solving the regional balance, any peace in Somalia is likely to be temporary. At the Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference in Ankara, on 2 January 2013, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu

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demonstrated Turkey's recognition of the issue at hand when he announced Turkey's integrated strategy to address the issues in Eastern Africa as a whole. Davutoğlu discussed Ankara's diplomatic commitment to ease tensions between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia.[23] When Turkey opened an embassy in Eritrea in 2013, it became the only country to have embassies in all countries in the region.

Less than four years after his first visit on 19 August 2011, President Erdoğan again visited Mogadishu in January 2015 to survey the ongoing development projects. His visit signalled Turkey's strong intention to continue to focus on Somalia's state-building and development. Similarly, in March 2016, Turkey organized an international Somalia conference in Istanbul to focus attention on the situation in Somalia, again at the international level. During the meeting, Erdoğan tweeted that

> Somalia has become a symbol of how we view Africa and of the brotherly relations we wish to establish with the African people. Turkey, through its all state bodies and NGOs as well as official and voluntary personnel, supports the rebuilding of Somalia. The international community should assume a more active role in Somalia. We, in cooperation with the international community, will continue to work until Somalia becomes a country of peace and stability.[24]

Somalia is still considered something of a domestic issue in Turkey. There is perhaps no single state that has contributed more to the betterment of Somalia in the last five years.[25] Many Turkish civil society organizations, large and small, have also provided support to rebuild Somalia.

4.3 The role of Turkey in development in SSA

Between 2005 and 2015, aid has been one of Turkey's strongest foreign policy elements in general and in its Africa policy in particular. The official Turkish aid agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, currently has operations in over 40 countries in Africa. TIKA was initially established to help in the post-cold war transition of the states in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. However, after 2003 it was transformed into a more global aid agency and its areas of operation were expanded, including to Africa.[26] Through TIKA offices, Turkey has shown a strong will to widen cooperation with Africa. Turkey has also executed projects by which it provides technical assistance to African countries through TIKA. Turkey's former President Abdullah Gül explained that Turkey is attempting to build relations with Africa by engaging in "health, education, agriculture, environment, infrastructure, and capacity-building" as strategic areas of action,[27] which basically constitute the essence of Turkey's humanitarian aid to Africa. In that sense, Turkey has built hospitals in Somalia and Sudan and has implemented many health projects, including for cataract surgery, in central African countries. Many micro-level educational and infrastructural projects, along with capacity-building in many areas, have been carried out through TIKA.

Besides the activities of TIKA, Turkey has also utilised international organizations to provide aid to Africa.[28] For example, through the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Red Crescent Society, Turkey has donated 7.5 million dollars to various African countries to help them cope with the negative effects of drought and other natural disasters.[29] In 2008, Turkey allocated 3.5 million dollars to humanitarian aid through the WFP,[30] while in 2009 it made a modest do-

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nation of 0.5 million dollars to the general African Union budget as part of its commitment to institutional development in Africa. In a similar vein, in 2007, Turkey for the first time hosted a summit of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) in Istanbul, of which 33 out of 49 were from Africa. During the summit, Turkey committed 20 million dollars in development aid for African countries. To show Turkey's seriousness and commitment to development of the LDC, Ankara also hosted the fourth conference of Least Developed Countries in the first half of 2011.[31]

Turkish authorities are also aware of the importance of human development in the country's relations with the African continent. In line with this policy, the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), a prime ministerial office responsible for Turkish scholarships, has covered, and continues to cover, the costs of education for more than a thousand African students in Turkish universities. Similarly, there are Turkish vocational schools in Africa run by several Turkish non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Hudayi Foundation from Turkey. Turkey's contribution to education in Africa feed up to perception in the continent that Turkey constitutes an important player and also creates an important link between Ankara and the continent.

In addition to these developments, nothing illustrates the remarkable change in Turkey-Africa relations better than the increasing trade and institutional cooperation between the two regions.[32] As mentioned above, 2005 was a turning point in Turkey's relations with Africa. Turkey obtained observer status in the African Union in 2005, which declared it a strategic partner in January 2008. In May 2008, Turkey joined the African Development Bank and strengthened its relations with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa and the Economic Community of West Afri-

can States (ECOWAS).[33] The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) has established eight Business Councils as part of Ankara's attempts to expand business activity with Africa.

While these developments at the political and institutional level are important, the Turkish opening up to Africa is underwritten by soaring bilateral trade. Turkey's trade volume with African countries, only 5.4 billion dollars in 2003, increased nearly threefold by 2008, when it exceeded 14 billion dollars. Despite the economic crisis, trade continued to expand and reached around 17 billion dollars in 2015. Yet, considering Turkey's total trade volume with the world, its current trade volume with African countries is not significant.[34]

Table 1 | Turkey's trade with Africa, 2006-2015 (million dollars)

Export	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
North Africa	3,096	4,029	5,850	7,415	7,025	6,700	9,443	10,041	9,757	8,527
Other Africa	1,469	1,946	3,212	2,738	2,257	3,633	3,913	4,103	3,996	3,921
Total	4,565	5,975	9,062	10,153	9,282	10,333	13,356	14,144	13,753	12,448
Import	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**
North Africa	1,676	2,285	3,535	2,237	3,098	3,342	3,308	3,508	3,435	3,006
Other Africa	2,233	2,821	2,060	1,700	1,725	3,424	2,613	2,522	2,502	2,092
Total	3,909	5,106	5,595	3,937	4,823	6,766	5,921	6,030	5,937	5,098

Source: TurkStat, *Foreign Trade Statistics*, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046.

4.4 Priorities and challenges

Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, which started out with a strong focus on the dimensions of aid and hu-

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manitarian efforts, have since expanded and accelerated with an increase in trade, and deepened by addressing state-building and security. However, despite this positive trajectory Turkey-Africa relations are not without risk.

One can argue that there are two fundamental risks associated with the future direction of Turkey's relations with the African continent. The first risk relates to a certain tiredness of "opening" to Africa, which can be called African fatigue. The opening period that began in 2002 is now over, requiring a much larger vision, planning and a new discourse.

Another key risk relates to the potential influence of domestic developments on Turkey's Africa policy. Since the 17-25 December 2013 graft operations, and more precisely the failed military coup, led by Gulenists in Turkey, of 15 July 2016, the Gulenists have sought to compensate for their losses at home by discrediting the Turkish government inside African countries. Considering that the power struggle in Turkey is unlikely to end in the immediate future, these developments could possibly contribute to closer cooperation between Ankara and African capitals, since the Turkish authorities are increasingly likely to develop a more direct and comprehensive policy toward the continent to counter the negative campaign conducted by the Gulenists. In this sense, various aspects of Turkish-African relations will continue to remain at the forefront of public attention in the foreseeable future.

However, at present there are no serious problems facing Turkish-African relations. The Turkish government's efforts are greatly appreciated across the continent. It is possible, nonetheless, to identify certain shortcomings, if not full-blown problems. The most important point right now relates to the challenging task of making

the country's efforts matter on both a regional and a global scale.

Up until 2011, key African countries believed that Turkey's sudden interest in the African continent's affairs was primarily an economic adventure – which is why they concentrated on short-term benefits at the expense of the Turkish government's long-term contributions. Ankara's policy toward Somalia, however, helped transform perceptions of Turkey among both key nations and regional organizations.[35] Furthermore, official visits by Turkish leaders have contributed greatly to Turkey's positive image in the continent. However, in the coming years Turkey's position is likely to be put to the test alongside that of other critical players such as France, Great Britain and the United States, as Ankara has expanded its activities in Africa from development aid to themes of high politics such as security.

Domestically, the biggest challenge is the lack of understanding of Africa in both policy circles and academia, which remains the case despite more than a decade of engagement with the continent. There continues to be a shortage of African affairs experts in Turkish think tanks and academia. Although various Turkish institutions have launched Africa research centres in recent years, these organizations remain both ill-equipped and prone to reproducing extremely orientalist approaches that are on the verge of becoming obsolete in the West. The fact that Turkish institutions falsely present out-of-date Western arguments as new and original findings does not do justice to the country's increasingly prominent position in Africa. In this sense, the Turkish government needs to take the steps necessary to encourage graduate students and doctoral candidates to specialize in African countries in an effort to follow continental developments more closely. Furthermore,

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Turkish universities could establish Africa research centres to host lectures by prominent African academics in order to familiarize the continent's leading minds with Turkey.

Recommendations

After more than a decade of experience in Africa, Turkey is inclined to work more closely with the international community in the continent. Initially, Turkey approached the policies of Western countries with criticism and suspicion. However, this has started to change as Turkey has established itself as an actor in Africa.

Despite the change of mood in Turkey concerning possible cooperation with the EU and the US, potential partnerships are likely to be pursued on niche issues rather than as an overall approach. This requires some sort of framework for harmonization of Turkey-EU or Turkey-US joint policy towards Africa. So far there has been no special framework. For example, Turkey could be invited to the EU-Africa summits.

Turkey has been relatively successful in Somalia. It is now the role of the international community to help push regional powers in the Horn of Africa to continue the stabilization process in Somalia. Turkey is aware that if the international community does not pressure regional actors to be constructive in the Horn of Africa, the future of Somalia is uncertain. To date there have been talks about cooperation between Turkey and the Western countries in Somalia, but nothing has yet been agreed.

Overall, the ongoing nature of Turkey's relations with the West will most directly impact the chances for possible cooperation in Africa. One should not forget that the West's negative perception of President Erdoğan is

to a great extent shaping the nature of relations between Turkey and the West. If this persists, it will not only prevent joint efforts in Africa, but also may create a certain rivalry in Africa between Turkey and the West.

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5

THE EU'S STRUGGLE WITH NORMATIVE LEADERSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Bernardo Venturi

5.1 EU engagement and relevance in the region

The European Union (EU) has strong interests in strengthening relations with SSA countries and organizations in different fields, from security to development. Africa and Europe are close neighbours and the EU is the largest trading partner for African countries and the largest donor to the African continent. Africa is therefore considered a priority for the EU, at least from North stretching down to Central Africa. The recent EU Global Strategy (EUGS) states also that the EU "will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity."[1]

In this framework, the main document regulating EU-Africa relations is the Cotonou Agreement (2000) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which grew out of the Lomé Convention (1975-2000), and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) signed by 80 African and European heads of state.[2]

The Cotonou Agreement represents a comprehensive partnership agreement covering the EU's relations with 79 countries, including 48 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. Its central objective is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and to contribute to the gradual integration of ACP countries into the world economy. The current Cotonou Agreement will expire in February 2020 and, according to Article 95, the parties have to enter in negotiations on a successor agreement by 31 August 2018.[3] Notwithstanding the relevance of EU-ACP relations in the past, the rapidly changing global context with emerging powers and new alliances has put some pressure on the EU-ACP partnership. A progressive marginalization of the privileged relationship between the ACP and the EU is taking place, as both parties seek to defend their interests through alternative continental, regional or thematic bodies and forums. In addition, the CPA has been largely reduced to a development cooperation tool because the trade and political dialogue components of the ACP's three-pillar structure (aid, trade and political cooperation) are mainly taking place outside the ACP-EU framework. Overall, the political value of the CPA has been substantially reduced.[4] In this framework, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), as envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement, were meant to build on and foster regional integration processes in the ACP. EPAs are "development-focused" trade agreements negotiated between the ACP countries/regions and the EU.[5] The future partnerships after the Cotonou Agreement will probably adapt to the increasingly sub-regional approach that the EU has been following to address foreign policy, security, trade and development concerns in the ACP regions.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy, launched by the African Union (AU) and the EU in 2007, defines the overall Afri-

ca-EU Strategic Partnership.[6] The Strategy strives to bring Africa and the EU closer together through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development, democracy, peace and security. The First Action Plan (2008-2010) and the Second Action Plan (2011-2013) for the implementation of the JAES were focused on eight priority areas of cooperation.[7] The initiatives promoted in the JAES framework provided a balance between the issues of peace and security and development considering them as two sides of the same coin.[8] The current Roadmap 2014-2017 sets out concrete targets in a similar framework with a focus on 5 priority areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues.[9]

The Africa-EU relations have also been developed through formal dialogues at different levels since the historic first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000. The principal formal dialogue takes place in EU-Africa Summits at the level of heads of state or government in principle every three years, alternatively in Africa and in Europe. The fourth and most recent EU-Africa Summit took place in Brussels in April 2014 under the theme of "Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace."[10] The second level dialogue envisages regular ministerial-level meetings and gathers representatives from African and EU countries, the AU Commission, and EU institutions. These meetings take place on an ad hoc basis to monitor the progress achieved between Summits. The last meeting took place at the margins of the EU-Africa Summit in April 2014 on climate change. At another level, College-to-College meetings between the European Commission and the African Union Commission take place on an annual basis alternatively in Brussels and Addis Ababa to support po-

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litical and operational relations. Finally, the Joint Annual Forum and the regular High Level dialogues and expert level meetings gather sectoral experts from member states, institutions, civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders.

Overall, the JAES has received mixed evaluations. It represents a significant novelty in framing a more consistent EU policy toward Africa. The EU provides dedicated support for the implementation of the JAES through the Pan-African Programme (845 million euros for 2014-2020) and through the African Peace Facility (1,051 million euros for 2014-2016).[11] However, "it did not make a qualitative leap because it simply reiterated existing commitments on aid and trade and was adopted with little consultation of relevant stakeholders."[12]

5.2 The role of the EU in peace and security issues in SSA

EU-Africa relations were for a long time mainly based on the economic and development dimension, but the issues of conflict prevention and security have gained importance since the early/mid-1990s.[13] Addressing the instability of the African continent represents a major concern for EU member states, as they are experiencing its repercussions in terms of illegal immigration, drugs, arms and human trafficking, terrorism and organized crime.[14]

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy aims, in principle, "to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts."[15] Unity of intents between Africa and the EU is emphasized as

the way "to address issues of common concern in the global arena."[16] In this framework, the EU is determined to support African self-determination discourse based on local capabilities, for instance through the funding provided to the AU[17] and in particular to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[18] However, the potential balance in the partnership and the unity of intents remains unattained for several reasons. Firstly, the EU is still reluctant to fully rely on the AU in managing peace and security issues due to its lack of capabilities and resources. In addition, the EU tends to project its normative power in its relationship with the African continent by promoting its own values and agenda and thus reinforcing the African perception of an asymmetric relationship.[19] Criticisms emerged over conditionality measures the EU used to promote human rights. African civil society organizations and the AU itself contested preconditions determined by others as a condition for partnerships.[20]

In the framework of the APSA, the main EU financial instrument to support cooperation with Africa in the area of peace and security is the African Peace Facility (APF). The APF was established at the request of African leaders at the AU Maputo Summit in 2003. EU efforts are mainly directed at providing political backing as well as predictable resources to African Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and capacity-building activities as well as mediation activities at both continental and regional levels. A total amount of 1.7 billion euros has been contracted and almost 1.6 billion euros was paid through this instrument by the end of 2015.[21] The APF is funded through the EU's European Development Fund (EDF);[22] this choice on the one hand reflects the close links between development and security; on the other, it excludes military and arms expenditures. In fact, the

APF may for example cover allowances for the troops, salaries for civilians, logistical, transportation, medical, communication costs but in no way can it fund military equipment, arms, ammunition or military training.

The strategic orientation of the APF is based on a dual approach, which combines short-term funding for crises with a longer-term support to institutional capacity-building in peace and security. In recent months, the APF has continued to support the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) having a mandate in peace and security. The funded activities fall in three categories: 1) African-led PSOs (1 billion euros to 2015);[23] 2) operationalization of the APSA (97 million euros to 2015); 3) initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM, 15 million euros to 2015).[24] It clearly emerges that early response has a significant role, but a limited budget compared to other areas. In addition, some EU member states deploy missions in Africa and they have bilateral agreements with African states. As part of Operation Barkhane, for instance, France has 3,500 troops spread across five African countries (Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad).[25]

The EU is currently conducting nine Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Africa (out of 17).[26] These missions, however, have limited mandates (e.g., the stabilization of the security conditions or the improvement of the humanitarian situation) and short time frames and usually have marginal impact on the conflicts in the region. The missions, even those with a more comprehensive and long term approach, seem more oriented to establish the EU as a peacebuilding actor than as a game changer in African security,[27] probably with the exception of EUCAP NESTOR and EUNAVFOR on the high seas of the Horn of Africa. However, usually the EU missions are deployed alongside missions of African

regional organizations (ECOWAS, IGAD, UA), of the UN, or of EU countries (e.g., Barkhane).

The EU has therefore developed a substantial engagement in the field of crisis management in SSA, partially in close cooperation with the AU, partially through its own missions and operations.

5.3 The role of the EU in development issues in SSA

The relationship between the EU and SSA on development issues is regulated by the Cotonou Agreement and by the JAES, as mentioned above. The Cotonou Agreement is based on three pillars: development cooperation, economic and trade cooperation and political dimension. It entered into force in 2003, and in 2005 was revised including security as a priority. The second revision in 2010 strengthened cooperation in regional integration, climate change and the role of national parliaments as actors of cooperation.[28] This new framework has significantly improved the EU's aid capacities in SSA. Yet, some issues remain ambiguous, in primis local ownership. The EU has affirmed this concept in the new framework, but three issues have compromised the EU-SSA relations in this sector: the Commission's emphasis on trade liberalization over development; the risk of securitization of EU development policy; and conditionality to incentivize democratic governance.[29]

The Commission finances most of its development programmes for African partner countries through the EDF, established in 1958. The current EDF runs from 2014 to 2020 and includes a total of 30.5 billion euros. A slice of 2.7 billion euros was reserved for the above mentioned governance incentive. The Roadmap 2014-2017 of the JAES agreed on the strategic objective of human

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development in three specific areas: science, technology and innovation; higher education; mobility, migration and employment. It must be highlighted that the general criteria to allocate funds were not discussed with SSA's partners.

A recent tool financed by the European Commission along with 25 EU member states is the EU Trust Fund for Africa.[30] This emergency Trust Fund for stability, launched at the end of 2015 during the Valletta Summit on Migration,[31] aims to tackle the root causes of irregular migration from Africa and displacement in countries of origin, transit and destination. The Fund benefits a wide range of countries across Africa and therefore combines migration and development issues. In practice, through this approach the Commission would like mainly to reduce migration flows toward Europe. This Fund is now tied to the new Migration Partnership Framework introduced by the EU in June 2016 that fully integrates migration in the European Union's foreign policy and act combining different policy elements like development aid, trade, mobility, energy and security.[32]

However, the effectiveness and impact of this development approach on migration are not demonstrated and a proper evaluation of this programme could be very useful for future policies related to the migration-development nexus.

Another instrument to support sustainable growth in Africa is the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF).[33] Created in August 2015 and operational in November 2015, AfIF aims at fostering investments which could have a positive impact on socio-economic development, such as infrastructure in transport, communication, water, and energy as well as agriculture and private sector development. AfIF works as an innovative financial mechanism combining EU grants with other public and private sector

resources (non-refundable financial contributions from the European Union and other resources such as loans) and aimed at achieving complementarity between the different EU aid modalities and tools and improving the coordination of donor actions. However, the Commission has not clarified who the other donors are.[34]

AfIF is a blending facility which combines EU grants with other public and private sector resources such as loans and equity in order to leverage additional non-grant financing, and achieve investments in infrastructure and support to the private sector.

To summarize, in the last 15 years the EU has made great efforts to improve its aid impact, effectiveness and coordination among member states within a global vision of development for SSA. Yet, as discussed, several limitations are still jeopardising these efforts, chiefly related to equal partnership, ownership and coordination. A dilemma is also present. For the EU, as for other collective donors, better internal coordination and consistency could mean less space for negotiating with the receiving partners, and, consequently, less local ownership. The EU has begun to harness its development cooperation in the framework of the 2030 Agenda[35] and it will shape its priorities accordingly, and the above-mentioned dilemmas will be a keen litmus test for the effectiveness of the EU involvement.

5.4 The EU's interaction with other international actors in SSA

Today, the African continent is becoming a desired partner for the main global actors (China, Brazil, Turkey, the Gulf states and the US, but India could be included too), which inevitably challenges the EU's role as the main

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peace and security partner and donor on the continent. The triangular relationships between the EU and foreign powers in SSA is therefore an essential issue to be considered in order to analyse the present and the future of SSA in terms of peace, security and development cooperation.

Brazil has a growing engagement in Africa, but still limited interactions with the EU in the continent. The narrative of South-South cooperation creates a strong relationship in different sectors between Brazil and SSA and this relationship also has consequences for the EU. For instance, Brazil's trade relations are growing with SSA and diminishing with the EU.[36] China's growing and multilayered presence in Africa is probably the main factor challenging the historical and privileged relationship between the European and the African continents in different fields. Also as a consequence of the growing trading power of China in Africa, the EU has called for the development of an EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation, but with limited success. This is chiefly due to the different approaches of China and the EU toward Africa, to the lack a profound knowledge of China and Africa on the part of the Europeans[37] and to competing visions and approaches on development within the EU.[38] Regarding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the EU established bilateral relations with this area via the 1988 Cooperation Agreement, which regulates mainly economic and political relations. GCC countries have growing ties in Africa, but the interactions with the EU on the continent are limited. Turkey is part of the European continent and has undoubtedly strong ties with the EU. Turkey is also a candidate country for EU membership following the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 and has had a long association with the project of European integration. Yet, EU-Turkey cooperation in the broad surrounding regions

is more uncertain after the failed military coup in Turkey of 15 July 2016 and the consequent hard repression and limitation of freedom guided by President Erdoğan. EU and US influence in Africa is well established and cooperation between these two western powers in Africa is pivotal for the continent. Historically, American presence in Africa has been limited, but since the beginning of the 2000s the US interest has increased significantly, in particular in relation to security.

5.4.1 The EU's interaction with other international actors on peace and security

The EU's growing role in peace and security in Africa has diversified relations with the main international actors. Brazil is traditionally committed to multilateralism and non-intervention in domestic affairs of other countries, and it is reluctant to intervene outside the UN or the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) framework. EU-Brazil cooperation in this field is therefore possible through the UN or the AU. Interestingly, Lusophone countries received military training from Brazil especially for patrolling Brazilian vessels and this area represents another potential option for cooperation.

Regarding China, its pragmatic discourse on local sovereignty and non-conditionality – as present below referring to development – is not free of contradictions and is more and more subject to pressure.[39] For instance, security concerns changed China's perception of non-conditionality and non-interference and the Chinese government decided to support an UN-AU peacekeeping mission to solve the conflict in Darfur. The EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation[40] also guides the relations between the two powers in the field of peace and security on some key initiatives such as: enhancing coor-

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dination on strategic, political and security issues within the EU-China High Level Strategic Dialogue; enhancing consultations on Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and the respective neighbourhoods of the EU and China; and reinforcing cooperation in all relevant multilateral and trans-regional and regional fora. Potentially, the African Union could play the role of common ground for EU-China cooperation on peace and security in SSA. Yet, it should be remembered that Chinese engagement in peace operations in Africa is implemented almost exclusively through the UN. An exception was represented by a maritime operation against piracy off the Somali coast; China acted independently, but coordinated to a certain extend with other international actors.

With regard to Gulf countries, they have openly contributed to peace and security (or the lack thereof) in SSA in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular. African security could therefore represent a potential field of cooperation between the EU and Gulf countries. For instance, given the role of the US as a forerunner in the fight against terrorism, and the EU's role in its joint mission with the AU in Somalia against al-Shabaab forces, the US and EU – together with SSA countries – should demand more transparency from the Gulf states in the distribution of their Overseas Development Assistance.[41] However, in recent years, EU-GCC relations on peace and security have focused more on the Eastern neighbours (Syria, Iran, etc.) than on Africa. In fact, cooperation between the EU and GCC countries has not paid specific attention to SSA.

Turkey has become more involved throughout Africa since 2011 in the peace and security area. EU-Turkey collaboration has been increasing during the last 5-7 years. Since 2009, Turkey has played an active role in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and has provided military

support to fight against this scourge in cooperation with the EU.[42] In November 2014 Turkey's parliament voted to deploy peacekeeping troops to UN-approved EU missions in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Finally, the US and the EU cooperate closely in Africa. In 2011 the two powers signed a framework agreement on US participation in EU crisis management operations. This agreement provides the legal mechanism for the US to contribute civilian personnel to EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions and strengthens options for practical, on-the-ground EU-US coordination in crises.[43] The EU and the US are also negotiating an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which would facilitate cooperation on logistical support. The US contributes to the EU Security Sector Reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DRC), and European and American personnel and forces on the ground have worked together in Mali, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa. On political issues, including developments in the Great Lakes or the Horn of Africa, weekly exchanges between US and EU special envoys complement the monthly State Department-European External Action Service (EEAS) calls and there is significant in-country coordination, including joint demarches.[44]

5.4.2 The EU's interaction with other international actors on development cooperation

The EU's interaction on development with international powers in SSA is different from actor to actor. In some cases links are well-established, as with the US, in others they are weak, as in the case of the Gulf states.

The EU (but also the US) has a lot to gain from pulling Brazil – a country that has often been sitting midway between the West and the Global South – into their

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sphere. Triangular cooperation, however, remains a valid perspective for all sides, for instance with Brazil contracted to implement EU and US development programmes on the ground with African beneficiaries. It is possible that in the near future Brazil will prioritize traditional partners in Europe, the US and Mercosur.[45] An interesting example of Brazil-EU-SSA cooperation is provided by the energy sector. Gaston Fulquet and Alejandro Pelfini describe how "legally institutionalizing political cooperation with African countries in the biofuel sector reinforced Brazil's so-called 'Ethanol Diplomacy', which aims to create a strong ethanol market in southern and western African countries. Additionally these bilateral actions would be complemented by other political agreements with the USA and EU for fostering trilateral technical cooperation in Africa."[46] Christina Stolte confirms this trend on energy cooperation: "Using Brazilian technology, oil-rich Sudan has already become an exporter of ethanol. In 2010 it exported 15 million litres of ethanol to Europe, diversifying its range of exports and creating new sources of revenue."[47] Therefore, the energy sector could be an emerging relevant field of Brazil-EU-SSA cooperation both on security and development issues.

Regarding China, the main difference between EU and China cooperation in SSA is related to conditionality: while EU aid, investment and trade are conditional in order to promote good government and democracy, Chinese economic interaction is unconditional. For the EU, development cooperation is a key component of its normative aspirations abroad (e.g., promoting human rights, democracy, good governance, sustainable development and regional integration). As presented in the Cotonou Agreement, "negative" conditionality can involve the suspension of aid if the recipient country violates the conditions such as by committing human rights

abuses. The EU also has "positive" incentives at its disposal to encourage the promotion of certain norms. Conversely, Chinese leaders attach particular importance to a pragmatic, efficient and speedy policy and, contrary to the EU, refrain from advancing any discourse on normative principles.[48]

African ownership therefore remains a key issue. It is likely that Chinese foreign development aid labelled as "no-strings-attached" leaves more local freedom of action, but this approach also brings other negative consequences, for instance in terms of low standards of environmental protection and social rights for local workers. Yet, it has also been argued that political conditionality of aid leads to an asymmetrical power relationship between the donor and the recipient (in terms of global status, dignity, etc.).[49] Since the Cold War, China has stressed the primacy of the respect of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. By contrast, the EU continues to promote an approach based on a strong multilateralism calling for the development of well-functioning international institutions and an international order based on shared norms.[50]

Summing up, it is hard to assess who is contributing more to Africa's development because "both the EU and China have helped to develop Africa in different – sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting – ways."[51] What is probably true is that, due to the growing Chinese influence, the EU is shifting its approach to development aid to a more pragmatic and partnership-based approach. Certainly, "China's increasing involvement reflects a changing environment to which the EU needs to adapt its development policy if it wishes to maintain its strong presence on the African continent."[52]

Concerning the Gulf states, little to no interaction is present between EU and GCC in Africa on development

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cooperation.[53] The Cooperation Agreement between the EU and GCC provides for annual joint ministerial meetings between the EU and the GCC foreign ministers and for joint cooperation committees. However, the Agreement on economic cooperation focuses on issues such as energy, transport, research and innovation, and the economy.

Turkey's engagement with Africa has expanded significantly since 2005 and relevant interaction with the EU on the African continent has been developed. Yet, the relations with Turkey on development cooperation are almost non-existent. In addition, the deterioration of the relations between the EU and Turkey has pushed the Turkish establishment to strengthen their presence in SSA. Turkey has been looking for new allies in SSA mainly because it is interested in reducing economic dependence on traditional European and Russian trading. In the near future, development cooperation could be extended through a closer implementation of the 2030 Agenda (for instance, due to geographical proximity, on environmental issues) or through UN agencies in Africa.

Cooperation between the EU and the US on development is institutionalized through the High Level Consultative Group on Development (HLCGD), which was re-launched in 2009 to hold annual ministerial meetings meant to advance and guide the cooperation both at policy and country level. The dialogue brings together the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid, in close cooperation and consultation with the EEAS and their US and Canada Division, USAID and the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs. EU member states are also involved in the consultations.[54] The EEAS' Africa Division and the State Department's African Affairs Bureau hold monthly calls for greater coordination on political issues. The OECD's Development

Co-operation Directorate also serves as a platform for exchange and cooperation between the US and other donors, including a large number of EU member states. USAID is reviewing its financial guidelines to allow transfers of funds between the US and the EU for cross-programming and implementation.[55] In the future, the EU and the US should also be thinking creatively about new bottom-up models for development cooperation in Africa that are better suited for the changing global context.[56]

Conclusion: A comprehensive Africa policy for the EU

The EU's contribution to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa has become stronger in the last decade. However, internal division and inconsistency both among European institutions and member states have limited the EU's effectiveness and ability to be a game changer in the region. The EU has developed close cooperation in the field of crisis management with the AU, but it also acts independently with reduced and focused tasks implemented through its CSDP missions. In the development sector, the EU has significantly improved its capabilities to deliver, but some specific challenges, such as local ownership, should be addressed. The relations with the other international players in SSA are diversified and they need to be strengthened both in terms of coordination and of mutual understanding, combining tailor-made approaches with each partner and relations in multilateral settings.

On the basis of the analysis conducted above on EU-SSA relations in the field of peace and security and development, it is possible to set forth some recommendations for the EU:

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- The EU-AU partnership needs to be extended beyond the African continent and reach the relevant international frameworks. The ultimate objective is to establish a solid alliance on common interests such as terrorism, climate change, conflict prevention, non-proliferation and disarmament. This can only be achieved through a greater African presence in multilateral fora, promoted by the EU in accordance with the principle of equitable representation and democratic accountability of international institutions.

- The EU should also look more at the potential of a prosperous and powerful African continent as a neighbour and as a partner in multilateral fora. Africa represents the test bed *par excellence* for EU peace and security policy and can become a credible ally for the EU in its campaigns at the global level.

- The EU should promote a series of policy priorities and principles for action. First of all, building bridges with African players means establishing a real partnership with the AU, in the spirit of a continent-to-continent relationship in the field of peace and security. Cultural misunderstandings and different expectations have severely hampered a smooth implementation process so far. Practical cooperation on specific projects and a continuous interface with relevant actors are key factors for stimulating political understanding and agreement on basic concepts.

- Only an inclusive dialogue, which involves all stakeholders – not just the Brussels-Addis Ababa axis but also EU and AU member states, and also the RECs – can ensure a real implementation of common programmes. Political and financial constraints to the full participation of civil society actors should also be overcome in the name of the principle of a "a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partner-

ship"[57] and for the benefit of all the parties involved.

- The EU should have a truly open, inclusive and evidence-based driven debate on the future of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU should listen to what ownership means for African governments and civil societies and what vision they have for equal partnership.

- The EU should strengthen societies', markets' and states' resilience through durable solutions by investing in job opportunities, education, infrastructure and social protection, with the objective of making people self-reliant. In addition, the EU should also recognize the need for comprehensive, context-based, short and long-term analyses of migratory phenomena including the interplay between migration and development and the role of diaspora.

- The EU and US should interact more with the Gulf states, especially on the Horn of Africa. In particular, they could support the mediation of Qatar in order to settle the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute. They can also demand more transparency by the Gulf states in the distribution of their ODA in the region.

- Despite the common negative perception of President Erdoğan, the EU and US should involve Turkey on niche issues in Africa, rather than as an overall approach, for instance, on the stabilization process in Somalia, where Turkey has been relatively successful.

- Due to Brazil's expertise, the EU and the US should engage in more triangular cooperation with Brazil on the African continent, also involving Brazil in the OECD. In the security field, the EU and US should avoid expanding NATO in the South Atlantic.

- The EU should continue dialogue and cooperation with China in the framework of the Strategic Agenda

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2020. In addition, the establishment of China's diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa represents an opportunity for collaboration between China, the EU and the US to support the AU and its role in fostering African peace and security.

NOTES

1   High Representative of the European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European's Union Foreign and Security Policy*, June 2016, p. 36, http://europa.eu/!pr79yu.

2   Council of the European Union, *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, p. 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf.

3   Further information and analysis on the future of the Cotonou Agreement can be found in the ECDPM's dossier: *The Future of ACP-EU Relations Post-2020. An Overview of Relevant Analysis by ECDPM*, Maastricht, ECDPM, December 2014, http://ecdpm.org/?p=15695.

4   Jean Bossuyt et al., "The Future of ACP-EU Relations: A Political Economy Analysis", in *ECDPM Policy Management Reports*, No. 21 (January 2016), http://ecdpm.org/?p=20733.

5   EPAs are trade instruments that replace the unilateral trade regime that governed the trade relationship between EU and ACP countries for almost forty years. They are reciprocal, but asymmetric trade agreements, where the EU, as one regional block, provides full duty free and quota free market access to EPA countries and/or regions and where ACP countries/regions commit to open at least 75 percent of their markets to the EU. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), established in 2000, was the last one that granted unilateral preferences to ACP countries. See Jean Bossuyt et al., "The Fu-

ture of ACP-EU Relations: A Political Economy Analysis", cit.

6   For more information and updates see the Africa-EU Partnership official website: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org.

7   Peace and security, democratic governance and human rights; regional economic integration, trade and infrastructure; Millennium Development Goals; climate change; energy; migration, mobility and employment; and science, information society and space.

8   Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration, Brussels, 2-3 April 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/142096.pdf.

9   Fourth EU-Africa Summit Roadmap 2014-2017, Brussels, 2-3 April 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/142094.pdf.

10   Previous meetings held in Cairo (2000), Lisbon (2007) and Tripoli (2010).

11   See the Africa-EU Partnership official website: *Financing the Partnership*, http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/node/281.

12   Maurizio Carbone, "EU-Africa relations in the Twenty-First Century: Evolutions and Explanations", in Maurizio Carbone (ed.), *The European Union in Africa. Incoherent Policies, Asymmetrical Partnership, Declining Relevance?*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2013, p. 7.

13   Fernanda Faria, "Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Role of the European Union", in *EUISS Occasional Papers*, No. 51 (April 2004), http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/crisis-management-in-sub-saharan-africa-the-role-of-the-european-union.

14   Nicoletta Pirozzi, "Towards an Effective Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: Rhetoric or Facts?", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2010), p. 87; Fredrik Söderbaum, "The European Union as an Actor in Africa: Internal Coherence and External Legitimacy", in Maurizio Carbone (ed.), *The European Union in Africa. Incoherent Policies, Asymmetrical Partnership, Declining Relevance?*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2013, p. 25-42.

15   Council of the European Union, *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*, cit., point 13.

16   Ibid., point 14.

17   The partnership with the AU has three main dimensions: strengthening the political dialogue, making the African peace and security architecture fully operational and providing predictable funding for the AU's peacekeeping operations.

18   For more information on APSA, see the African Union Peace and Security Dept. website: http://www.peaceau.org/en/topic/the-african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa.

19   Nicoletta Pirozzi, "Towards an Effective Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security: Rhetoric or Facts?", cit., p. 88. The same Joint Africa-EU Strategy is ambiguous on African ownership. For instance, "EU support to Africa has been and continues to be guided by the principle of African ownership. At the same time, valuable guidance for the cooperation will, as appropriate, be drawn from the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts." Council of the European Union, *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*, cit., point 18.

20   Daniela Sicurelli, *The European Union's Africa Pol-*

icies. *Norms, Interests and Impact*, Farnham and Burlington, Ashgate, 2013.

21 European Commission, *Joint Communiqué by Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative/ Vice-President of the Commission; Neven Mimica, EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development; and Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security*, 1 August 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATE-MENT-16-2702_en.htm.

22 The 11th and last EDF was created by an intergovernmental agreement signed in June 2013 – as it is not part of the EU budget – and entered into force on the 1st March 2015, after ratification by all member states. The negotiations in the Council of Ministers on the different elements of the 11th EDF have taken place in parallel with the negotiations of other external Instruments financed under the budget, to ensure consistency.

23 Current support for PSOs takes place in Somalia, in the Central African Region (Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Central African Republic) to support the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army, in Guinea Bissau and Mali.

24 European Commission, *African Peace Facility Annual Report 2015*, June 2016, http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/node/8444.

25 French Ministry of Defence, *Carte opération Barkhane*, updated 5 August 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/sahel/cartes/carte-operation-barkhane.

26 The current missions are: EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya; EUCAP NESTOR, assisting host countries develop self-sustaining capaci-

ty for enhancement of maritime security; EUCAP Sahel and EUCAP Sahel Niger supporting the internal security forces in those countries; EUNAV-FOR, countering piracy off the coast of Somalia; EUTM Mali, a training mission for Malian armed forces; EUTM RCA in the Central African Republic, to contribute to the country's defence sector reform; EUTM Somalia, a military training mission in Somalia.

27 Fredrik Söderbaum, "The European Union as an Actor in Africa: Internal Coherence and External Legitimacy", cit.

28 Maurizio Carbone, "EU-Africa relations in the Twenty-First Century: Evolutions and Explanations", cit.

29 Ibid., p. 5.

30 The Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, is made up of 1.8 billion euros from the EU budget and European Development Fund, combined with contributions from EU member states and other donors.

31 European Council, *2015 Valletta Summit on Migration. Background on EU Action*, 11 November 2015, http://europa.eu/!jj79kq.

32 European Commission, *Migration Partnership Framework. A New Approach to better Manage Migration* (Factsheet), 16 September 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/node/9885_en.

33 For more information see the European Commission webpage: *Africa Investment Facility*, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa-investment-facility_en.

34 See the Action Document for the Creation of the Africa Investment Facility. European Commission, *Creation of the Africa Investment Facility. Action Fiche*,

29 July 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/cre-ation-africa-investment-facility-action-fiche_en.

35 UN General Assembly, *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (A/RES/70/1), 25 September 2015, http://undocs.org/A/RES/70/1.

36 World Bank and IPEA, *Bridging the Atlantic. Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South-South Partnering for Growth*, January 2012, http://documents.world-bank.org/curated/en/284591468193504731.

37 Anna Katharina Stahl, "EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations: A New Trend in International Relations", in *E-International Relations*, 16 September 2014, http://www.e-ir.info/?p=52056.

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39 Sarah Grauls and Anna Katharina Stahl, "European Development Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges of the Growing Chinese Presence", in *Émulations*, No. 7 (2010), http://www.revue-emu-lations.net/archives/n7/grauls.

40   Council of the European Union, China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation released at 16th China-EU Summit, 23 November 2013, http://eeas. europa.eu/china/docs/20131123_agenda_2020__ en.pdf.

41   See the chapter of Lidet Tadesse Shiferaw in this volume.

42   See the chapter of Mehmet Özkan in this volume.

43   See the chapter of Madeleine Goerg in this volume.

44   Ibid.

45   See the chapter of Frank Mattheis in this volume.

46   Gaston Fulquet and Alejandro Pelfini, "Brazil as a New International Cooperation Actor in Sub-Saharan Africa: Biofuels at the Crossroads between Sustainable Development and Natural Resource Exploitation", in *Energy Research & Social Science*, Vol. 5 (January 2015), p. 124.

47   Christina Stolte, "Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS Country Seeking Resources?", in *Chatham House Briefing Papers*, November 2012, p. 17, https:// www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/ view/186957.

48   Sarah Grauls and Anna Katharina Stahl, "European Development Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa", cit.

49   Ibid.

50   High Representative of the European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, cit.

51   Niall Duggan, "Is China Contributing More Than Europe to Africa's Economic Future?", in *Europe's World*, 2 July 2015, http://europesworld. org/?p=9271.

52   Sarah Grauls and Anna Katharina Stahl, "European Development Policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa", cit.

53 M. Evren Tok, "Gulf Donors and the 2030 Agenda: Towards a Khaleeji Mode of Development Cooperation", in *UNU-CPR Policy Briefs*, November 2015, http://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:3322.

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55 Alexander Gaus and Wade Hoxtell, "Connecting Security and Development: Towards a Transatlantic Strategy in Fragile States", in *Brussels Forum Policy Papers*, February 2015, https://shar.es/1Io6Ud.

56 See the chapter of Madeleine Goerg in this volume.

57 Council of the European Union, *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*, cit., point 8.

6

SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND DIPLOMACY: SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF THE US-SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA STRATEGY?

Madeleine Goerg

Debates about US leadership have been rife over the past decades, and have included fears about a possible retrenchment of the US from world affairs. The US provides a significant amount of development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and is the largest bilateral donor for peace operations. US-African relations have become more sophisticated over the last two decades as evidenced by a growing community of American Africanists[1] and the growing importance of Africa in the US foreign policy agenda. This chapter first offers an overview of US strategy and core interests in SSA. While economic considerations are gaining ground, security and development remain the primary lenses through which US engagement with SSA is viewed. Furthermore, development policy has in recent years been put on a par with diplomacy and defence as instruments forthe promotion of US interests abroad. In the context of relations with SSA, this is particularly apparent as development cannot

take place without security, and security cannot be sustained without development. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on US understandings of security and development cooperation with this region, paying particular attention to the role of the different agencies in an attempt to assess the relative weight of civilian and military concerns. Indeed, the relationships between the three Ds of defence, development and diplomacy, as represented by the US Department of Defense (DoD), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the State Department, will be at the core of this analysis. Economic diplomacy is a significant and growing part of US engagement with the region and will be addressed briefly. A more in-depth analysis of US-SSA economic relations is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter. The latter part of the chapter identifies areas of complementarity with European Union (EU) approaches and priorities.

6.1 The evolution of US's engagement with SSA

Key turning points in US approaches to and strategic orientation towards SSA can be identified in recent years. While the US boasts longstanding links with the African continent, engagement with Africa has historically not ranked at the top of the US foreign policy agenda, and interest in the continent had long been framed in humanitarian terms rather than those of strategic engagement. After a period of proxy conflicts and indirect support to "likeminded" regimes during the Cold War, the US largely disengaged from the continent in the 1990s. Prompted in part by the failure of intervention in Somalia in 1993 and the fallout of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, planners at the DoD stated in an official position paper published in 1995 that they could "see very little traditional strategic

interest in Africa" and that "America's security interests in Africa are very limited."[2] Three years later, the simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania started a shift, which was later confirmed with the 9/11 attacks in 2001. By 2002, the national security strategy published by President George W. Bush's administration included Africa as one of the fronts in the global War on Terror.[3] The strategic importance of Africa for US security interests was further affirmed by the creation of the DoD Unified Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) in 2007.[4] The decision by President Bush to establish AFRICOM to "enhance [US] efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa"[5] "by strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities"[6] was a significant shift and recognized that US interests in the region required long-term commitment.

After the election of Barack Obama as President in 2008, expectations soared in Africa that the continent would move up further on the list of US priorities. Interestingly, Obama's personal history did not initially play in favour of increased attention to Africa since he and his team saw an emphasis on Africa as a liability.[7] Indeed, US policy to SSA appeared to show significant continuity between the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Obama. The emphasis remained largely on security, strategic resources, energy, health, the promotion of democratic governance and trade. Although development assistance under Obama did not see a boost similar to that of the Bush years, Obama maintained funding levels for aid to Africa in a context of overall decreased development funding. The first US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa was published by the White House in 2012. It presents

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a broad outline to guide the action of government bodies.[8] The strategy aims to elevate the place of democracy promotion and broad-based economic growth, including through trade and investment, and establishes the reasons for US engagement in the region in terms of core national interests. These interests are defined as ensuring the security of the US, its citizens, allies, and partners; promoting strong democratic and economically vibrant states serving as strong partners for the US internationally and expanding opportunities for US trade and investment; preventing conflict and mass atrocities; and fostering broad-based, sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation.[9] The strategy also articulates four pillars for US policy towards the continent – namely, (1) strengthening democratic institutions; (2) spurring economic growth, trade and investment; (3) advancing peace and security; and (4) promoting opportunity and development.[10] These four pillars are supplemented by the four horizontal goals of engaging with Africa's youth and future leaders; empowering marginalized groups, with a focus on girls and women; addressing the needs of fragile and post-conflict states; and strengthening multilateral institutions and cooperation.[11]

Economic diplomacy has perhaps seen the greatest shift in emphasis under Obama. Given the economic progress in a number of African countries in the 2000s, and with increased interest in Africa from emerging powers, China most notably, significant attention has been paid to trade and investment in recent years. While Obama can be seen as the "first post-foreign-aid president,"[12] this change builds on steps taken during Bush's administration, first with the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002, and then with the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), another US foreign aid agency, in 2004. Both initiatives marked an

increased focus on outcomes over inputs and widened the sources of funding for development. Under Obama, Trade Africa, launched in 2013 to bolster internal and regional trade within Africa and to expand and strengthen economic ties between Africa, the US and other global markets, together with the first US-African Leaders Summit in Washington in August 2014, attest to the changing tone of US-Africa relations.

6.2 The US as a peace and security actor in SSA

The US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa highlights "Advanc[ing] Peace and Security" as one of its four pillars. US engagement is articulated around a set of actions, including countering terrorism; advancing regional security cooperation and security sector reform; preventing transnational criminal threats; preventing conflict; and supporting initiatives to promote peace and security.[13] By and large the US Government, with the State Department, the DoD and USAID, prioritize building Africa's defensive capacities as a means of achieving the stated goals and actions. Obama's promise in 2014 to add 5 billion dollars to counterterrorism partnerships globally points to ongoing support for military support programmes in Africa in the near future.[14] Furthermore, in its FY2016 budget, the State Department listed peace and security assistance as "one of the United States' highest priorities" in SSA, pointing to state fragility, conflict and transnational security issues as areas of concern.[15] The FY2016 request included nearly 470 million dollars for security sector reform and capacity-building; stabilization operations; counterterrorism and counternarcotics initiatives; maritime safety and security programmes; and other conflict-prevention and mitigation efforts.

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However, the complex web of legal authorities and programmes under the State Department and DoD makes it difficult to gain a comprehensive view of how much security assistance is provided to each African country.[16]

US security engagement in Africa is shaped by short-term concerns about countering terrorism, and a long-term mission to train African armies to handle future crises and transnational threats. It focuses on three geographical areas as priorities: East Africa, with an emphasis on Somalia and the fight against piracy; North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa, dealing largely with affiliates of Al-Qaida and stability in the Gulf of Guinea; and the Great Lakes region, including South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda.[17] Contributions to peace operations in Africa involve numerous government bodies, including the National Security Council staff, the State Department, DoD, and US missions to the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), and they build on relationships with international organizations, including the UN, the AU, regional economic communities (RECs) and the EU.[18] The US supports the AU's peace and security programmes, including assisting the African Standby Force (ASF), providing expertise to help to develop a maritime strategy, and improving the medical planning capability of the AU's Peace Support Operations Division. The US also provides communication equipment and training in the areas of strategic communications, conflict monitoring and analysis, and military planning,[19] and it deploys Special Forces and military advisors in support of both the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since 2007, US support for AMISOM has amounted to 258 million dollars, making the US the largest individual financial contributor to AU peacekeep-

ing operations in Somalia.[20] The US supported the building of the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) headquarters in Bangui in 2014 and deployed troops later that year to support the UN and AU "health-keeping" missions in West Africa.[21] In the Sahel, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership strengthens the border security and counterterrorist capacities of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. In terms of military assistance, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Africa count among the main recipients, as do Somalia, Mauritania and Chad.[22] Furthermore, relative to the size of their armed forces, Burundi, Uganda, Ghana and Sierra Leone also receive significant bilateral aid.[23] In 2014, President Obama announced two new security initiatives: the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) and the Security Governance Initiative (SGI).[24] The goal of the former is to build capacity for rapid deployment, and 110 million dollars annually over three to five years has been pledged to pursue this goal in six countries. APRRP will work with Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda on a bilateral level and does not have an AU component. The latter initiative focuses on building military and civilian capacities to fight extremism and terrorism. The SGI will start in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia, with 65 million dollars allocated to the first year of the initiative.[25] USAID is also present in the security field with programmes on conflict prevention and countering violent extremism.[26]

While Africa's relevance to the US has increased, the fundamental principle of to keep US forces out of direct combat roles in the region remains in place, with the exception of short and infrequent interventions where vital US interests or lives are at risk.[27] The US's security

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approach towards Africa is one of "light footprint" and "leading from behind." This was described by DoD as an "innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint [approach] to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."[28] This approach is based largely on the cooperation and training of national armies, which are expected to eventually become the primary security providers in the region, living up to the promise of "African solutions to African problems." Reliance on US Special Forces as "tactical force[s] with a strategic impact", regionally specialized brigades, and the use of surveillance drones and military drone strikes is unlikely to change given ongoing budgetary constraints and the changing nature of security threats.[29] DoD's geographic combatant commands are referred to as CCMDs. In contrast to other US commands, AFRICOM is referred to as a "CCMD Plus" because it combines the roles attributed to traditional geographic combatant commands with a broader "soft power" mandate to build a stable security environment and a larger allocation of personnel from other US government agencies to carry out this "soft power" mandate.[30] AFRICOM's status as a "CCMD Plus" and the inclusion of a broader "soft power" mandate have been the subject of discussion in Washington, and represents a "major break [in] conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies."[31]

The idea that, in Africa, DoD should focus more on preventing wars than fighting them has been received with mixed feelings. While the State Department and USAID welcome and recognise the ability of DoD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, the new mandate raises concerns that AFRICOM might overestimate its capabilities and its diplomatic role, or seek to pursue activities outside its core mandate.[32] Coordi-

nation between the State Department and DoD focuses on funding, training local security forces and mitigating the risk of recruitment by terrorist organizations. However, DoD manages an increasing number of security assistance schemes, including training and equipment programmes. Military assistance under the authority of DoD has more than doubled since 2005 and is directed more and more towards Africa.[33] The highly unequal allocation of resources between DoD, the State Department, and USAID has raised the question of the State Department and USAID's ability to act as "equal partners," and of the possible militarization of development and diplomacy.[34] In 2009 the State Department noted that AFRICOM "is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development and public diplomacy."[35] While AFRICOM may not have taken over the interagency lead between the DoD, the State Department and USAID, it has become a primary implementer of US foreign policy in Africa.[36] This view is echoed by US officials, who further contextualize disparities in funding by pointing to the relative cost of the activities implemented by each agency.[37] Furthermore, AFRICOM's funding is relatively limited, given the security challenges on the continent, a point which has been acknowledged by the AFRICOM leadership.[38]

Although the US's focus on training and capacity-building is understandable from a political perspective, especially for a region which is not at the top of the list of US interests globally, the effectiveness of this approach is contested. While AFRICOM's activities are based on the premise that the ability of African countries to manage their own security challenges needs to be developed, many of these countries currently have very weak security capabilities and do not have the financial resources to upgrade their capabilities to deal even with

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short-term priorities.[39] Since the War on Terror began, including in African countries, the US has sought to work with and through key countries to address threats on the continent under the banner of "African solutions to African problems." Although this approach implies limited costs and US involvement on the ground, it has disadvantages. First among these is the choice of partner countries and the consequent risk of counterproductive effects. Bronwyn Bruton and Paul Williams point to East Africa, where the US proxy approach has "arguably created more problems than it has successfully addressed" in Somalia.[40] The long-term consequence of this approach in East Africa includes raising the risk of retaliation against partner countries, possible corrupt and abusive behaviour displayed by African armies in the field, consolidating preferred power structures and advancing the agenda of partner countries rather than keeping the peace. Depending on the partner country, addressing security issues by proxy has also reinforced the view that security concerns trump concerns of democracy and human rights in Africa.[41] APRRP, for instance, will initially work with Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, a number of which do not boast strong governance track records and whose military has abused civilians at home and abroad.[42] The increase in peacekeeping operations in Africa has also shown some of the limits of the US approach. Training programmes have been broadened rather than deepened, training African peacekeepers to perform relatively basic peacekeeping tasks while struggling in several other areas. These programmes also have difficulty ensuring that the personnel trained and equipment transferred are then deployed to peacekeeping operations. It is also unclear to what extent an initiative such as APRRP matches the deployment capacity of the countries chosen.[43] Furthermore, APRRP

is driven by the White House, and it is not clear to what extent and at what speed it will be implemented by other US government bodies.

Three Maghreb countries – Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia – currently enjoy the status of "major non-NATO ally." Peter Pham argues that the US should develop "special" relationships with key African countries and that, with reforms and increased capacity, relationships with countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia or Kenya could be formally elevated, if not necessarily to the level of "major non-NATO ally."[44] Deepening relationships with key African partners would complement existing cooperation with NATO allies such as France and the UK. After a decade of progressive withdrawal, France is militarily re-engaging in the Sahel. Limited assets and resources notwithstanding, France's operational knowledge of the region and interest in the Sahel have proved to be valuable for the renewal of Franco-US cooperation. The US and the EU also cooperate closely on matters of security. In 2011 they signed a framework agreement on US participation in EU crisis management operations. This provides the legal mechanism for the US to contribute civilian personnel to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and strengthens options for practical, on-the-ground US-EU coordination in crisis situations. The EU and the US are also negotiating an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, to facilitate cooperation on logistical support. The US contributes to the EU Security Sector Reform mission in the DRC (EUSEC DRC), and EU and US personnel and forces on the ground have worked together in Mali, Somalia and the Horn of Africa.[45] On political issues, including developments in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, weekly exchanges between special envoys complement the monthly State Department-European External Action Service

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(EEAS) calls and there is significant in-country coordination, including joint demarches on specific occasions.[46] China's increasing security interests and engagement in Africa might open up other avenues for cooperation in Africa to the US.

6.3 The US as a development actor in SSA

A new concept of development is gaining ground in US development cooperation, with a shift in emphasis from aid-driven development to development driven by economic growth. Aid is mentioned once in President Obama's US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, while issues of economic growth are mentioned under pillars two and four: "Spur Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment" and "Promote Opportunity and Development."[47] The economic angle was also prominent during the 2014 US-Africa Leaders Summit.[48] More than 33 billion dollars worth of agreements, new initiatives and investments were announced during the summit[49] and new commitments were made to the Doing Business in Africa Campaign,[50] including interagency initiatives to support US exports and investment in Africa.[51] These complement the USAID-run Trade Africa programme announced by Obama in 2013, which supports increased US-Africa trade and investment, regional integration and trade competitiveness. Given the place of agriculture in African economies, trade and agriculture programmes are closely linked in USAID's work. The Feed the Future Initiative (FtF), USAID's main vehicle for work on agriculture, aims to boost agricultural productivity and spur economic growth. While this is a global programme that combines bilateral and regional activities in Asia, Africa and Central America, the bulk of the programming is

undertaken in Africa.[52] USAID's trade work furthers and integrates FtF objectives as regional trade hubs work to increase Africa's international competitiveness, bolstering intraregional trade and ensuring food security for African populations. Congressional support for the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act until 2025 also attests to the desire to create much closer links between supporting development goals in SSA and creating commercial opportunities for the US.[53] Economics has twice the weight in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that it did in the 2010 review.[54] Even if the Obama administrations have also taken on a markedly more multilateralist approach than those of their predecessors, development cooperation remains a largely bilateral affair.

Support for democracy, human rights and good governance is one of five main areas of work for USAID and is listed as the first pillar of the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. The Joint State Department-USAID FY 2014-2017 Joint Strategic Plan also includes "Protect[ing] core U.S. interests by advancing democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society" as one of five global strategic goals for US diplomacy and development cooperation.[55] While recognising the tensions which can arise between the pursuit of short-term and long-term objectives, the Joint Strategic Plan clearly links the promotion of democracy and human rights to the core US interests of addressing the causes of instability and violent extremism, and building strong political and economic partnerships.[56] While the Obama administration has worked to dispel this notion, the budgetary realities give the impression that boosting economic growth takes precedence over governance and democracy promotion. US democracy assistance reached its peak in 2010, followed by a 20 per cent drop over the following

four years. In 2015 this line of funding faced a cut of another 50 per cent. A significant element of democracy support is offered to SSA and cuts have therefore impacted on programming in the region. In SSA, almost 500 million dollars was allocated to economic development programmes and 115 million dollars to democracy, human rights and governance programmes in 2015. The top five recipients – South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Nigeria and Kenya – received more than 65 per cent of the total amounts allocated to democracy, human rights and governance assistance.[57]

Although health and energy do not feature prominently in the new US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, listed under the "Promot[ing] Opportunity and Development" pillar, both have been central to the articulation of US policy towards Africa and interests in the region. The very recent fall in oil prices and the energy revolution taking place in the US with the discovery of alternative energy sources have altered the picture somewhat, but access to strategic resources has long counted among US interests in the region. In 2014, Obama launched Power Africa, a 7 billion dollar programme to develop Africa's energy sector by providing technical assistance, financing and investment support, and for which a memorandum of understanding was signed with the EU to increase US-EU coordination.[58] According to Freedom House, budget cuts in democracy programming are also partially due to a reallocation of funding from USAID or the MCC to programmes such as Power Africa.[59] Supporting Africa to cope with its many humanitarian challenges is another priority of US-Africa relations. According to Peter Pham, while not quite an "interest" in political realist terms, the focus on humanitarian concerns, and health in particular, has been "part and parcel of the country's foreign policy throughout its history and has led to repeated instanc-

es where domestic politics create a foreign policy 'priority' in the absence of a hard 'interest.'"[60] The decision by Obama to deploy US military personnel in the fight against the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, at a significant cost,[61] exemplifies the importance of health in the calculus of US interest. More than 5 billion dollars was allocated to health programmes in SSA in 2015. While many of these have been successful in terms of delivery and access to health services, the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in particular, George Ingram and Steven Rocker argue that the way in which US health assistance to SSA is carried out – financing the delivery of health services rather than building sustainable health systems – cannot be maintained in the long run.[62]

According to the White House, the adoption of the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015 comes at a time of growing bipartisan consensus on the "importance of global development, and direct philanthropic contributions from the American people."[63] The first US Global Development Policy was published in 2010 and emphasizes many of the principles and objectives laid out in the 2030 Agenda. In this context, the US will build on existing (PEPFAR, FtF, Power Africa, and Let Girls Learn) and new (USAID's Vision for Ending Extreme Poverty) initiatives and prioritize action in areas that include global health, food security and nutrition, energy, reduction of extreme poverty, gender equality, education and open government to fulfill its commitments to the 2030 Agenda.[64]

Thinking in Washington is moving towards a "whole of government" approach, comparable to the EU's comprehensive approach. As such, while a significant portion of engagement with Africa falls under the mandate of USAID, programmes are meant to be carried out in coop-

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eration with the relevant departments such as the United States Trade Representative, the Department of Energy or the Department of Agriculture. The 2015 QDDR, however, does not emphasize coordination with government agencies, outside the State Department and USAID, which play a role in US development assistance, and it does not propose concrete ways for agencies to provide supporting roles.[65] According to interviews conducted with senior US experts, coordination beyond interagency coordination between the State Department and USAID at the level of regional bureaus remains limited and in-country coordination is largely personality-driven.[66] Furthermore, while USAID budgets are supposed to be driven largely by country-level analysis, input and priorities, significant portions of the budget are reserved through congressional earmarks or presidential initiatives, limiting the impact of the ground-up approach.

The US is now increasingly involved in building capacity for regional organizations, which was long seen as the purview of the EU. Indeed, in recent years, USAID has given a more prominent role to regional organizations in its strategic planning. This change reflects both a belief that regional integration will further economic development and stability in Africa, and an attempt to better integrate USAID and the State Department while more effectively harnessing US resources, expertise and cooperating with allies.[67] The State Department's first QDDR, published in 2010, urges regional bureaus to assert themselves to address increasingly regional and transnational policy challenges and to "develop more effective regional strategies on core policy objectives, situate bilateral relationships in a regional context, and strengthen our engagement with regional institutions."[68] USAID programming, however, continues to follow thematic logics by policy area rather than regional lines. To a certain extent, this ap-

proach hinders the development of longer-term regional strategies.[69] Furthermore, the recently published second QDDR, while reiterating the need to "strengthen the integration of [the State Department's] regional and functional bureaus,"[70] does not feature prominent support for regional processes and organizations.

Cooperation between the EU and the US on development is institutionalized through the High Level Consultative Group on Development, which was relaunched in 2009 to hold annual ministerial meetings meant to advance and guide EU-US cooperation both at policy and country level. The dialogue brings together the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid), in close cooperation and consultation with the EEAS and its US & Canada Division, and USAID and the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs. EU member states are also involved in the consultations.[71] The EEAS's Africa Division and the State Department's African Affairs Bureau hold monthly calls for greater coordination on political issues. The OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate also serves as a platform for exchange and cooperation between the US and other donors, including a large number of EU member states. According to US officials, the US is broadening cooperation with non-traditional partners. China, for instance, has become an important partner on health issues.[72] Analysts in the US have also called for increased use of triangular cooperation with Brazil.

6.4 Recommendations for US and EU engagement with SSA

The US and Europe are SSA's largest development and security partners and will continue to play a significant

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role in the region in the coming years. However, given the current budgetary constraints, faced by the US, the EU and its member states, and their limited appetite for increased development and security cooperation with SSA, transatlantic partners should look for points of convergence and complementarity in their engagement with the region. The EU and the US need to think creatively about new, leaner[73] and bottom-up models for development cooperation that are better suited to the changing global context.

- **On institutions**: As the US moves towards a "whole of government" approach and attempts to integrate security and development cooperation more, lesson's learned from the EU's experience with the institutional tools and mechanisms of the comprehensive approach could be valuable. Indeed, beyond the political commitment to a "whole of government" approach, few institutional mechanisms have been introduced to facilitate coordination among these three areas. Implementation, on the one hand, of the "whole of government" approach and, on the other, of the comprehensive approach, which the EU seeks to expand, will need to be grounded in best practice to deliver impact and would benefit from lessons learned on either side of the Atlantic. The launch of the EU Global Strategy should also prompt EU and US policy-makers to exchange on their respective articulation of diplomacy, defence and development policies as means of addressing current challenges. While AFRICOM has become one of the primary implementers of US foreign policy towards the region, the EU has traditionally been more reluctant to use development tools for security cooperation, and budgets earmarked for security cooperation remain

lower than development aid budgets.[74] However, building on the European Commission's latest efforts to strengthen the link between security and development, the EU Global Strategy mentions the need for greater connectivity between "diplomacy, CSDP and development"[75] in addressing a range of issues in SSA. This latest policy document can provide the basis for aligning approaches and increasing coordination between the EU and the US.

- **On regional organizations**: Support for regional organizations has become increasingly important for US-SSA engagement. Regional strategies and cooperation with regional organizations have been developed for programmes on agriculture, food security and trade. In the areas of energy, security and health, however, work with regional organizations continues to be on a more ad hoc basis. Furthermore, USAID does not systematically work with or build capacity for RECs, as recognized by the AU, instead prioritising policy-relevant groupings. Activities in support of regional organizations and regional integration are, among others, discussed with EU policy-makers in the framework of the USAID-EuropeAid policy dialogues. These particular discussions, however, do not rank very high on the US's and the EU's respective agendas.[76] The EU Global Strategy, which calls for more flexibility and partnerships in engaging with regional groupings in Africa, including both regional and subregional organizations, and "functional cooperative formats in the region,"[77] presents an opportunity for greater EU-US coordination. Building on existing dialogues and policy orientations, the EU and the US should attempt to align their support for regional organizations, clarifying with African countries which organizations should be supported in

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order to avoid fragmenting further the regional integration processes.

- **On people**: Prior to AFRICOM's creation, officials from DoD intended that the command's headquarters should include personnel from other agencies. Despite this goal, at its height in 2011, AFRICOM had less than 2 per cent of headquarters staff from other agencies.[78] Under the first High Representative, the EEAS successfully managed to integrate staff from EU institutions (European Commission and European Council) as well as diplomatic staff and military from member states. Furthermore, the EU's significant network of delegations and member state embassies should be leveraged to offset the US's weak presence on the ground in Africa. According to US officials, readings of situations on the ground tend to align, and cross-briefings relying on EU monitoring capacity are at times organized in countries where the US is not present.[79] Moreover, by cultivating a cadre of experts of a certain stature and experience, who could serve as points of reference and knowledge where the US lacks regional expertise, the EEAS would add significant value to existing EU-US cooperation.[80] In regard to security cooperation, for instance, Williams argues that the number of US practitioners with direct experience of UN or AU peace operations is small and that US personnel would benefit from first-hand knowledge of operational realities in African crisis zones.[81] The EU and its member states are natural partners to fill the gap.

- **On security cooperation**: The EU Global Strategy marks a departure from previous strategies with its clear emphasis on interests. Both the EU and the US identify security as a core interest and see a link between internal and external security. On the ground,

threat assessments also tend to be similar. Building on comparable assessments and existing frameworks for cooperation and coordination, the US and the EU should attempt to align their security cooperation with key African countries and regional organizations. While the EU places significant emphasis on support for the AU and other regional organizations, US-SSA security cooperation remains largely on a bilateral basis. Increased coordination would ensure more impact on the ground. Such coordination already exists for AU-led peacekeeping operations where the US and the EU match their funding structures to avoid duplication. Furthermore, in the area of security cooperation, which remains largely intergovernmental on the European side, the added layer of coordinating with member states is crucial. In the context of security cooperation with SSA, France and the UK play a key role. The quarterly dialogues on security and political issues between the US, France, and the UK could be broadened to include the EU. Sustained coordination between the four will prove even more important following the results of the UK referendum on EU membership. In the current context there is little indication that the upcoming administration, Democratic or Republican, would sharply deviate from the current strategy of a "light footprint" and "leading from behind." The US has long been calling on European states to invest in their security and defence capabilities, a sentiment which is echoed in the EU Global Strategy. Despite limited support at home for boosting defence spending,[82] European member states will need to up their capabilities to continue to be credible partners for the US.

- **On approaches to development**: A striking feature of US development cooperation is the reliance of

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USAID on a wide network of private sector for-profit and non-profit implementing partners, which is viewed by US experts and officials as a strength, especially as non-governmental organizations and private sector actors are called upon to play a growing role in development cooperation.[83] While the EU has a strong advocacy component and track record of working with governments, its relationship with the private sector is more complicated. USAID's ability to mobilise quickly and to use non-governmental channels can complement expertise of working through government routes in SSA to achieve common development goals. At the country level, EU delegations should have the leeway to build on cross-briefings and joint demarches, and to explore ways of cooperating with their US counterparts on programming. According to Gaus and Hoxtell, USAID is reviewing its financial guidelines to allow transfers of funds between the US and the EU for cross-programming and implementation.[84] The EU Global Strategy reiterates the EU's commitment to partner with the private sector and civil society organizations, and it aims to do so "in traditional ways – through dialogue, cooperation and support – and through innovative formats such as exchanges, embedded personnel and joint facilities, harnessing knowledge and creativity in our system."[85] In thinking through both traditional and innovative ways of broadening the EU's base of partners, EU policy-makers should draw on the US Government's significant experience of working with these sectors.

- **On political dialogue**: Existing coordination mechanisms at member-state level and EU level can also serve to increase complementarity between EU and US engagement in SSA. Bilateral dialogues take place

between the US and the EU, the US and France, and the US and the UK on a monthly basis, and security and political issues are discussed among the US, France and the UK on a quarterly basis, with meetings rotating between the three capitals. Policy-makers from the US, France, the UK and the EU also meet at conferences, such as the UN General Assembly. Without overburdening the agendas, the regular political dialogues already in place are certainly a starting point from which to improve transatlantic coordination. Given the emphasis on the presidential initiatives of the Obama administration, one of the challenges for the US will be the continuity of engagement with SSA and ensuring the implementation of commitments. Pham argues that in the current political climate, both US political parties, Democratic and Republican, will need to demonstrate their ability to govern. Given the divisiveness of current political debates, the next administration will need to identify areas for bipartisan consensus.[86] Africa policy has historically been an area of relative bipartisan consensus and has seen significant continuity, which is likely to carry on with a Democratic administration. The political momentum around the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement could further encourage continuity and the implementation of existing commitments by the next administration. What will remain a challenge, however, is the asymmetry between what needs to be done in Africa, the US's narrow interests there and the American public's limited appetite for more global engagement. Although the EU's interests in Africa are more immediate, especially with regard to counterterrorism and organized crime, migration and border management, the public in the EU have also become increas-

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ingly inward looking.[87] Since this trend is unlikely to abate on either side of the Atlantic, the focus should remain on strengthening and broadening of existing mechanisms for dialogue and coordination between the EU (especially key member states) and the US, and ensuring the implementation of current commitments.

NOTES

1   Most of the top US foreign policy think tanks work on SSA in one capacity or another from publications and research to initiatives or programmes dealing with the region.

2   US Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Africa*, August 1995, p. 3, http://oai. dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA297401. See also J. Peter Pham, "AFRICOM's Evolution from Bush to Obama", in Maya Kandel (ed.), U.S. Strategy in Africa, in *Études de l'IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 33, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014.

3   Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa: Risks and Contradictions of the 'Light Footprint' Strategy", in Maya Kandel (ed.), *U.S. Strategy in Africa*, in *Études de l'IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 16, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014.

4   AFRICOM's Service Component Commands and Theater Special Operations Command component are (1) US Army Africa: operating from Vicenza, Italy, which conducts sustained security engagements with African land forces to promote security, stability, and peace (1,600 personnel); (2) US Naval Forces Africa: headquartered in Naples, Italy, its primary mission being to improve the maritime security capability and capacity of African partners; staff are shared with US Naval Forces Europe (900 personnel); (3) US Air Force Africa: based at Ramstein Air

Force Base, Germany, which conducts sustained security engagement and operations to promote air safety, security and development in Africa (954 personnel); (4) US Marine Corps Forces Africa: located in Stuttgart, it conducts operations, exercises, training and security cooperation activities throughout the African continent; staff are shared with the US Marine Corps Forces Europe (319 personnel); (5) Special Operations Command Africa: a theater Special Operations Command component, it is is co-located at AFRICOM's headquarters in Stuttgart (600 personnel); (6) Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: located at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (approximately 2,000 personnel). See David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years: The Maturation of a new U.S. Combatant Command*, Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, August 2013, p. 19, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1164.pdf.

5   White House, *President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa*, 6 February 2007, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html.

6   J. Peter Pham, "AFRICOM's Evolution from Bush to Obama", cit., p. 31.

7   Nicolas van de Walle, "Obama and Africa. Lots of Hope, Not Much Change", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 5 (September/October 2015), p. 54-61.

8   The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14 June 2012, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf.

9   Ibid., p. 1-2.

10   Ibid., p. 2.

11   Ibid.

12 Nicolas van de Walle, "Obama and Africa", cit.,
    p. 60.
13 The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saha-
    ran Africa*, cit., p. 4-5.
14 Interviews with senior US experts, 2016.
15 US Department of State, *FY 2016 Congressional
    Budget Justification - Foreign Assistance Appendix
    2*, February 2015, p. 302, http://www.state.gov/f/
    releases/iab/fy2016cbj/pdf.
16 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, *Statement before the Sen-
    ate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee
    on Africa and Global Health (Hearing: U.S. Securi-
    ty Assistance in Africa)*, 4 June 2015, p. 3, http://
    www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/security-assis-
    tance-in-africa-06-04-15.
17 Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit.; Nicolas
    van de Walle, "Obama and Africa", cit.
18 Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace
    Operations in Africa", in *Council Special Reports*,
    No. 73 (May 2015), p. 11, http://on.cfr.org/29PjXTs.
19 US Department of State, *The United States and the
    African Union. Fact Sheet*, 19 April 2011, http://
    www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/161212.htm.
20 Ibid.
21 Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace
    Operations in Africa", cit., p. 13.
22 For Chad the figures are relative to the size of the
    country. Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit.,
    p. 22.
23 Ibid.
24 Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace
    Operations in Africa", cit., p. 21.
25 Manuel Manrique Gil, *Something New Out of Afri-
    ca? Chinese, US and EU Strategies for the Continent*,
    Brussels, European Parliament, April 2015, p. 12-13,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549031/EXPO_IDA(2015)549031_EN.pdf.

26 USAID website, *Where We Work: Africa*, updated 12 April 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/africa.

27 William M. Bellamy, "African Security. Time for a Change in Doctrine?", in Richard Downie (ed.), *Africa in the Wider World*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 4-6, https://www.csis.org/node/26464.

28 US Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, p. 3, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

29 Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit., p. 18-19.

30 David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years*, cit., p. 21.

31 J. Peter Pham, "Getting AFRICOM Right", in *World Defense Review*, 15 February 2007, https://shar.es/1ZnXmG. See also Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa", in *CRS Reports for Congress*, No. RL34003 (22 July 2011), p. 6, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.

32 Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command", cit.

33 Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit.

34 Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command", cit.

35 US Department of State, *Inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs* (OIG Report No. ISP-I-09-63), August 2009, p. 8, https://oig.state.gov/reports/8227. See also Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit., p. 16.

36 David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years*, cit.

37 Interviews with senior US officials, 2016.

38 "Unfortunately, the resources the command requires if it is to do even this much have not been

readily forthcoming – and that was before the fiscal austerity. In fact, AFRICOM Commander General Ham acknowledged earlier this year that 'due to the vast challenges and opportunities on the continent, as well as current fiscal realities, we have prioritized regions in Africa to better focus our exercises, operations, and security cooperation activities.'" J. Peter Pham, "AFRICOM's Evolution from Bush to Obama", cit., p. 40.

39   Ibid.

40   Bronwyn Bruton and Paul D. Williams, "The Hidden Costs of Outsourcing the 'War on Terrorism'", in Maya Kandel (ed.), *U.S. Strategy in Africa*, in *Études de l'IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 69, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014.

41   Ibid.

42   Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa", cit., p. 21-22.

43   Ibid.

44   J. Peter Pham, "Africa", in The John Hay Initiative, *Choosing to Lead. American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World*, October 2015, p. 59, http://www.choosingtolead.net/book.

45   The White House, *U.S.-EU Cooperation on Common Security and Defense Policy*, 26 March 2014, http://go.wh.gov/X3spsm.

46   Joint demarches have taken place in the Great Lakes, for instance. Interviews with senior US officials, 2016.

47   The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, cit., p. 3 and 5.

48   The US-Africa Leaders Summit was the largest event held by a US president with African heads of state

and government. The summit aimed to strengthen ties between the US and Africa, and specifically advanced the administration's focus on trade and investment in Africa and meant to highlight the government's commitment to Africa's security and democratic development. See The White House, *U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit*, Washington, 4-6 August 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit.

49   The FY2014 requested budget for bilateral and regional foreign assistance in SSA was almost 33 billion dollars (including development assistance, economic support fund, foreign military financing, global health programmes – state, global health programmes – USAID, international disaster assistance, international military education and training, international narcotics control and law enforcement, international organizations and programmes, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programmes, peacekeeping operations and other accounts. See US Department of State, *FY 2014 Congressional Budget Justification - Foreign Assistance Summary Tables*, May 2013, http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2014cbj/pdf.

50   The Doing Business in Africa campaign, launched in 2012, is furthering the president's vision to help US businesses identify and take advantage of the many export and investment opportunities in SSA. See The White House, *The Doing Business in Africa Campaign*, 5 August 2014, http://go.wh.gov/MpShwX.

51   Ibid.

52   See the US Government website, *Feed the Future*, http://www.feedthefuture.gov.

53   That the EU has signed Economic Partnership Agreements with a number of regional blocs in Af-

rica has not gone unnoticed by the US Government. Indeed, thinking on trade with Africa reflects in part growing advances in regional integration, such as the Tripartite and African Continental Free Trade Area initiatives, and in part competitive pressures from trading partners such as Canada and the EU, which are refocusing their non-reciprocal preference programmes on the poorer African countries. See US Trade Representative, *Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the Beyond AGOA Hearing*, Washington, 28 January 2016, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/January/Remarks-Ambassador-Froman-Beyond-AGOA-Hearing. The presence of China in Africa also looms large over the push towards more economically driven relations with Africa, especially in the energy and natural resources sectors.

54 Daniel F. Runde and Helen Moser, "The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review", in *CSIS Commentaries*, 18 June 2015, https://www.csis.org/node/25369.

55 US Department of State and USAID, *FY 2014-2017 Joint Strategic Plan*, April 2014, p. 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223997.pdf.

56 Ibid., p. 30.

57 See the ForeignAssistance.gov website, http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore.

58 European Commission, *European Union and the U.S. Power Africa Initiative Join Forces to Assist Partner Countries to Reduce Energy Poverty and Increase Access to Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14 July 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/web-release-power-africa-eu-mou-addis_en.pdf.

59 Freedom House, *Five Things Everyone Should*

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7

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE CASE OF SOMALIA

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Somalia is a place where the international community is present to a considerable degree and has engaged closely through activities such as peace support operations (PSOs) and capacity building, as well as in terms of financial commitment for both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the implementation of development projects. The international community at large has greatly supported the peace and state-building processes throughout their different phases, notwithstanding their extreme complexity.

Since 2012, the handover from transitional federal institutions to a federal government has relaunched the state-building process in Somalia, with improvements in the security situation and the emergence of a certain degree of hope for the future of the country. In this phase, the role of the international community has been crucial in supporting the process, both politically and financially. International and regional organizations as well as a sig-

nificant number of states – among which the USA, UK, Italy and Turkey have a prominent role – renewed their engagement with Somalia after a period of disengagement that followed the failure of international interventions in the early 1990s. As a result, greater support for the Somali transition has resulted in the wider availability of resources, but also in increased complexity that is linked to actors' density around the multiple issues that the case of Somalia implies. In this context, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have been core actors, and have played interlocking and complementary roles in Somali state-building.

However, despite the support received and measures implemented so far, the country still presents a number of challenges that revolve around the domains of security and development as well as the peace-building and state-building processes. In fact, several layers characterize the long-lasting Somali crisis with an extensive number of challenges that range from human security to state-building, encompassing confidence-building, economic and infrastructure development, and a number of governance issues. Furthermore, the relevance of Somalia for both international and regional actors underlies the existence of multiple dimensions that complicate the picture and represent both an additional challenge and a window of opportunity for sustainable peace and security. In fact, the side effects of Somali instability – piracy and terrorism in particular – have fostered international engagement by directly affecting the economic and security interests of the international community at large.

The 2013 Somali Compact capitalized on both renewed internal hope for the country and external engagement in Somalia, thus marking a milestone in the processes of peace-building and state-building.[1] Thanks to these converging factors, a new cooperative architec-

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ture among national, regional and international stakeholders was put in place to support and sustain state formation and peace-building. Furthermore, a holistic approach has been put in place to tackle the numerous existing challenges in Somalia by considering them as interconnected rather than separate issues, in stark contrast with the previous state security focus. At the end of 2016, a new phase of the Somali peace- and state-building processes begins, with the expiration of the Somali Compact and the establishment of new state institutions after the electoral process.

This chapter provides an analysis of the current situation in the country by focusing on the role of international actors in security and development. The first section investigates existing security dynamics in Somalia with a view to identifying the synergies and shortcomings of international action and the potential for better exploiting policy interactions. The second section adopts a similar approach in the field of development, with a specific focus on coordination in priority-setting and operational governance as a crucial factor in determining development outcomes. Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations addressed in particular to the EU and the USA as prominent actors engaged in Somalia.

7.1 Security dynamics: Shifting towards holistic approaches

Security considerations have long been the core of international and regional efforts in Somalia with the primary objective of reaching stability. However, approaches to security have evolved over time, moving from a classical focus on state security to a more holistic approach that encompasses a wide range of policy fields, including

development and humanitarian policies. Several factors explain this shift in policy-making: first, the failure of previous peace-keeping missions showed the ineffectiveness of more traditional approaches in such a context; second, threats such as piracy and terrorism, with the related spill-over effects, attracted renewed international attention; third, growing attention to the root causes and drivers of conflict showed that sectarian approaches in conflict-affected countries hampered peace potential. Thus, once the international community regained interest in Somalia, a slow development towards "whole-of-government" approaches gained room in policy-making on Somalia and also fed more global discussions on the security-development nexus and peace-building in conflict-prone areas.[2]

Currently, the Somali Compact constitutes the bulk of engagement in Somalia around the five peace-building and state-building goals (PSGs): inclusive politics (PSG 1); security (PSG 2); justice (PSG 3); economic foundations (PSG 4); and revenues and services (PSG 5). There are also a number of cross-cutting issues: gender, capacity development, bringing tangible results to people, respect of human rights, external relations.[3] PSG 2 identifies four priorities: strengthening the capacity and accountability of state security institutions to recover territory, stabilize and provide basic safety and security; integrating security forces into federal institutions; implementing a national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants; and developing an effective maritime strategy.[4] However, links between PSGs are obvious, and substantiate the holistic approach to fragility which is at the heart of the New Deal principles. Therefore, to better grasp underlying dynamics, the security situation in Somalia needs to be assessed more broadly than with the pure PSG 2 priorities. Overall, four core themes have emerged from concerted efforts in Somalia, and they

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offer guidance in analysing security dynamics: first, the internal dynamics of power-sharing; second, the struggle against *al-Shabaab*; third, the establishment of Somali army and police forces; and fourth, maritime security.

The security situation has significantly improved in recent years thanks to renewed confidence in the possibility of achieving peace and to the efforts in combating *al-Shabaab*. In fact, state-building and peace-building processes have registered meaningful achievements in transforming the internal dynamics that had sustained the civil conflict in Somalia.[5] An inclusive approach with enlarged consultation processes has concretized the possibility of reaching agreements through diplomatic tools rather than armed struggle. In this respect, the role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – and its Somalia unit in particular – has proven crucial in bringing different parts of Somali society to the negotiation table through significant mediation capacity. Major outputs of this mediation effort have been the formation of interim regional administrations and a continued dialogue between these administrations and the federal government.[6] This renewed approach has de facto complemented the traditional top-down focus on the federal government with a largely bottom-up approach to power-sharing. Indeed, inclusive negotiations for the formation of regional administrations have incorporated local clan-based claims into the broader state-building effort. However, tensions are still present in the country among clans and between regional administrations with disputed boundaries – for example, Puntland and Somaliland and Puntland and Galmudug.[7] Internal dynamics in the country will require continuous commitment by local and international actors to ensure that boundaries are set among federated entities and that negotiations concerning clan-based grievances are addressed.

The struggle against *al-Shabaab* constitutes the major pillar of regional and international efforts in the security domain in Somalia, and it has registered a significant concerted effort among international and regional players, to the point that a real regime complex has emerged around peace-keeping in Somalia.[8] The AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has played a major role in contributing to stabilization efforts in the country, even if its mandate involves peace enforcement actions rather than peace-keeping ones. The international community largely sustained its efforts, with the EU providing extensive financial support and training, the UN providing political and logistical backing, and the USA supplying mainly in-kind support as well as targeted drone strikes. De facto, the struggle against *al-Shabaab* operates as a unifying factor in Somalia both internally and externally. Internally, it has emphasized cohesion in support of peace-building efforts by demarcating the difference between armed struggle and negotiations;[9] externally, counter-terrorism has constituted one of the major concerns for the international community since 2001 and the so-called war on terror. However, several issues concerning both the sustainability of AMISOM and its operational cohesion across contingents stand as a major point of discussion among partners. On the one hand, AMISOM had not been conceived to be a long-term mission in Somalia. On the contrary, the UN peace-keeping force was supposed to take over as soon as conditions allowed a transition. Unfortunately, the UN has clearly stated that these conditions have not yet been met,[10] creating frictions between the AU and the UN in regard to funding and sustainability of the operation. Furthermore, the EU decision to reduce contributions through the African Peace Facility (APF),[11] the major source of financing for AU peace-support operations, and AMISOM

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in particular, has further increased pressure on the AU to find alternative sources of funding.[12]

The struggle against *al-Shabaab* does not pertain to the battlefield alone, however. In recent times, the international community has agreed on the need to tackle the issue from a broader perspective through significant links with development policies. "Winning hearts and minds" has become a sort of mantra for engagement in countering violent extremism, with a multiplication of efforts aimed at designing programmes that reduce the potential attractiveness of engaging in violent extremism. All major international contributors in Somalia have adopted global and regional strategies to tackle violent extremism – including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the EU and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).[13] These policy documents adopt a development perspective by focusing on the drivers of violent extremism rather than on purely repressive measures, thus marking an important shift from the previous modalities of the "war on terror," even if the ultimate goal of countering terrorism still represents a priority. Poverty eradication, education and particular attention to youth as well as reintegrating disengaged combatants into society have assumed a prominent role in international efforts in violent extremism-prone areas, thus clearly bridging security and development policies in many respects.

The establishment and training of Somalia security forces has attracted significant international attention and support within the broader capability development objective. Training for Somali security forces has been provided by both the EU – through the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia and the AU through AMISOM – with an operational division of labour, the former providing more specialized training and the latter basic military

training.[14] The creation of a viable model for the army and police has registered some difficulties owing to the necessity that regional and central administrations agree on an integrated model as well as the lengthy process for revising the Provisional Constitution and defining state and regional competences. Particular difficulties have been registered as regards police forces, with the Heegan Plan for the creation of integrated police forces being revisited several times, insofar as negotiations have progressed on the division of competences between federal and regional states.[15] The issue of stipends also represents a major concern for the sustainability of the Somali National Army (SNA) and police, especially because delays in troop payments have affected the battle against *al-Shabaab*, with unpaid soldiers leaving their positions.[16] Major donors have covered a significant part of arrears for both the army and the police forces, with the former being mainly supported by the UK and the USA and the latter by the EU and Japan; the United Arab Emirates is also contributing, but data are unavailable.[17]

Within the broader Somali Compact principles and priorities, the question of stipends raises at least three crucial issues. First, there is the necessity of putting in place strong financial and revenue management on the side of Somali institutions, and the connected need to establish a federal model and the division of competences between federal and regional states. Second, there is a need to increase donor coordination to ensure predictable funding and availability of data – so as to avoid non-registered transactions and the implications these have for financial management. Third, closer coordination with local and federal authorities is required, to ensure coherence for the overall security sector and to prepare the transition to financial responsibility being taken by Somali authorities.

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Maritime security is the fourth priority identified in the Somali Compact, and its baseline is represented by the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy. This is a document that identifies shortcomings in the legal and operational components of maritime resources and security.[18] However, the sector of maritime security has not registered significant progress in recent years, apart from the approval of the Coast Guard law and the establishment of working groups to further develop the sector, owing to higher priorities.[19] Notwithstanding this, maritime security continues to receive substantial support from international partners, and it constitutes the only sector in which capacity replacement has been carried out by international actors, mainly through counter-piracy measures. In particular, counter-piracy has registered a proliferation of operations in the Gulf of Aden, of particular relevance being the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta (EU), Ocean Shield (NATO) and the Combined Task Force 151 (multi-national). The EU has also launched a capacity-building mission, the EU Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP NESTOR), but it has found difficulties both in adopting a regional approach to maritime security and in providing the necessary equipment for local forces to put into practice the training that they receive.[20] These difficulties stress an underlying tension between local and international actors as regards priorities in the maritime sector. While, for Somali actors, higher priority has been put on the management of maritime resources, with interconnected economic implications, the international actors have been focusing on counter-piracy as a primary objective, for obvious interest-based evaluations. In terms of comprehensiveness of actions the two domains are interlinked, as an efficient legal and operational framework would improve the management of resources, but the

divergence in the ranking of priorities brings the risk of jeopardizing efforts that address the numerous needs of the country, especially when considering that available financial resources are limited.

7.2 Development dynamics: The coordination game

The development component has been steadily expanding its importance over time as a result of the shift towards more comprehensive actions to address the multiple challenges in Somalia. The Somali Compact has further strengthened this process by setting interlocking priorities that span across security, capacity-building and long-term development objectives. Available data show that in the period 2005-2012 humanitarian aid constituted the greatest share of aid flowing to Somalia, with 3.3 billion dollars (65 percent of reported official development assistance), while development aid amounted to 1.78 billion dollars for the same period. In contrast, between 2013 and 2015 development aid increased to 1.81 billion dollars, thus reflecting a significant difference between short-term and longer-term objectives for policy planning.[21]

A more comprehensive approach and the increased density of actors in and around Somalis made coordination a key issue in assessing international involvement in the country. Coordination can be seen as two track: coordination between international donors and local institutions on the one hand, and among donors on the other. According to the spirit of both the Somali Compact and more general discussions on peace and development, coordination between international and local actors is of the utmost importance in ensuring local ownership and buy-in by the primary actors. Therefore, this section

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approaches development dynamics from a coordination perspective that accounts for both operational coordination – taking into account aid management policies – and priority-setting, with the aim of discovering the potential for improvement.

As regards aid management, the Somali Compact put forward a system for aid coordination that was based on nine principles and the establishment of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), in order to set out an agreed principle-based partnership and to centralize aid management.[22] The first principles address coordination between government institutions and partners (1 to 5), in order to ensure Somali ownership and avoid frictions between internal and external priorities; while principles 6 to 9 stress the importance of capacity-building, aid coherence, transparency and predictability for funding, as well as conflict sensitivity for all actions.[23] In spite of a general commitment to the principles, several shortcomings have been identified in the 2015 Compact Report. The lack of programmatic guidance in the Compact leaves wide room for manoeuvre for partners, with alignment being mostly among the top-level priorities; strategic consultations seem to be insufficient for the Somali authorities, as only projects financed through the SDRF are brought to the attention of the government for discussion and endorsement, and the main consultations are only at programme and project level, thus limiting the concept of ownership. In addition, the share of "on treasury" aid results is low, 8 percent in 2015, compared to the requested 15 percent from the Somali government, and no code of conduct for the provision of external support has been adopted to date.[24]

The Compact established the SDRF as a steering coordination mechanism for development aid flowing into

Somalia, and the Federal Government indicated it was the preferred funding window through which donors should channel their aid (partnership principle no. 5).[25] In 2015, donors channelled 31 percent of aid through the SDRF, compared to 13 percent in 2014.[26] Currently, two funds are active under the SDRF funding window:

Table 1 | UN Multi Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) overview 2015 (million dollars)

Amount	Covered PSGs	Project areas	
116.8	1 to 5 + cross cutting	State formation, constitution, electoral support, parliament support, rule of law, youth employment, institutional capacity development, local governance and centralized service delivery, UN enablers	
		Contributions	
Donors		**Paid in**	**Pledged**
Denmark		2.5	18.5
DfID (UK)		10.7	13.5
EU		27.9	35.3
Italy		0.7	3.2
Norway		4.7	10.4
SDC (Switzerland)		2.3	6.4
SIDA (Sweden)		13.1	24.9
USAID (US)		0.5	0.5
Peace-building Fund (PBF)		4.1	4.1
Total		66.5	116.8
Additional funding channels within the Fund		**Amount**	**Implementing body**
Joint programme on Local Governance (JPLG)		180	UN agencies
National Window		2	government

Source: Author's compilation on data from Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, cit., p. 66-67; World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia*, cit., p. 5.

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the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF).[27] In addition, the SDRF also includes a further financing window – the Somali Infrastructure Trust Fund (SITF) – supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB), which makes investments that help to build institutional capacities in the energy, water and sanitation, transport, and information and communications technology (ICT) sectors. (PSGs 4 and 5).[28] Tables 1 and 2 sketch the composition, scope and donors of the two multilateral funds activated within the SDRF, so as to provide an overview of current activities and the amount of aid channelled through these funds.

Table 2 | World Bank Multi Partner Fund (MPF) overview 2015 (million dollars)

Amount	Covered PSGs	Project areas	
183.5	4 and 5	Effective and accountable government, enabling economic growth, core economic infrastructure	
		Contributions	
Donors		**Paid in**	**Pledged**
Denmark		0	12.6
EU		24.3	48.8
Italy		0	2.2
Norway		4.9	19.0
Sweden		17.6	21.7
Switzerland		4.2	8.3
UK		30.8	62.9
WB SPF		8.0	8.0
Total		89.8	183.5

Source: Author's compilation on data from Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, cit., p. 68-69; World Bank MPF webpage, https://www.somaliampf.org/mpf-basics.

As far as on-treasury aid is concerned, partners have fallen short of the government-desired 15 percent of aid to be dedicated to this support. However, it is important to note that non-traditional donors have mostly preferred on-treasury aid rather than multi-partner funds. In 2014, the Arab League, Turkey, China, Nigeria and Qatar provided budget support, while traditional donors only provided on-treasury aid through the MPF, which allows for budget support contrary to the MPTF.[29] The reason for this clear-cut distinction may well be that multilateral funds provide better guarantees compared to on-treasury support in terms of reporting and monitoring to traditional donors, which are usually bound by strict financial regulations. This is also shown by the existing differences in the availability of data for traditional and non-traditional donors.[30]

In regard to priority-setting, the Somali Compact does not provide an actual ranking of priorities or PSGs in line with the New Deal principles that aim to combine previously detached policies in order to foster a comprehensive approach to dealing with complex environments. However, aid flows do not allocate the same amount of resources to all PSGs or to the outlined priorities, thus suggesting that donors operate strategically when planning financial flows in support of different sectors in Somalia. Table 3 shows the amount of financial aid provided to Somalia – or committed resources for 2016 – per sector, and it correlates the available sectorial data to the Compact priorities. PSG 5 "Revenues and Services" and PSG 4 "Economic Foundations" receive the greatest funding, followed by PSG 2 "Security," while PSG 3 "Justice" is the sector receiving least funding. However, the emphasis on PSGs 4 and 5 should be interpreted as mirroring a development approach to fragility only partly because, first, these two goals in-

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clude the broadest categories with significant needs, and second, because one should note that the available figures for PSG 2 exclude all military spending, as this category is excluded from official development assistance (ODA) reporting. For instance, ODA reporting includes the EU's support to AMISOM through the APF, but it excludes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) missions and operations active in Somalia.[31] When considering the exclusion of military-related activities from financial flows to Somalia, it appears clear that financing of the security goal is much bigger than the presented figures. The EU and US military contributions to the security sector outside ODA reporting are a case in point. EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta has an operating budget of 6.3 million euros for 2016 only counting common costs under the Athena mechanism, thus excluding costs related to state contribution;[32] the EUCAP NESTOR budget is 12 million euros for the period from 16 December 2015 to 12 December 2016;[33] and EUTM Somalia has a budget of 19.7 million euros for the period April 2015 to December 2016.[34] The USA – the largest individual financial contributor to AMISOM – has provided 258 million dollars to the mission since 2007.[35] In addition, the USA – and other countries – also provide support to Troop and Police Contributing Countries to AMISOM,[36] thus enlarging the picture in terms of financing even further.

ODA reporting does not account for several security activities such as counter-piracy operations, support to AMISOM for military spending, training, equipment and targeted operations, such as the drones strikes conducted by the USA. Therefore, bearing in mind the number of contributing countries in this sector, it is reasonable to conclude that security still constitutes a top priority for the international community in Somalia, probably far

beyond development assistance. Stabilization still represents the core of international intervention in Somalia in many respects, and this is even more striking when taking into account that, first, stabilization has been financed through the cross-cut issues identified under the Compact, and, second, that the justice sector has been under-financed in comparison to the other sectors, even if it represents a crucial component of a functioning security system.

Therefore, development dynamics in Somalia present significant challenges as far as coordination is concerned. The analysis of both operations and priority-setting in providing resources to the different components of the Somali Compact has shown a number of underlining tensions that need to be addressed. First, despite a general agreement on using the SDRF as a governance tool in administering aid, this tool is under-exploited by development partners even when using multilateral funds. Second, on-treasury aid falls short of the Federal Government requests; thus it does not alleviate the problem of budgetary gaps. Third, in spite of the commitment to overarching approaches to complex environments, resource allocation seems to be mostly stability oriented, thus better addressing international partners' interests rather than genuinely supporting locally determined priorities.

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Table 3 | Development aid (ODA) per sector (million dollars)

	PSG priorities (as defined in the Compact)	Themes	2014	2015	2016
PSG 1 Inclusive Politics	1. Federal and regional administrations	Federalism and resource sharing	0.3	4.8	2.9
	2. Federal constitution	Constitutional review and implementation	1.4	8.3	4.2
	3. Elections 2016	Democratization and electoral process	6.3	13.4	4.8
		Inclusive political dialogue and social reconciliation	17.7	13.8	20.3
Total			**25.7**	**40.3**	**32.2**
PSG 2 Security	1. Capacity and accountability of state security institutions	Strengthening security institutions and national security	33.6	50.2	52.9
	2. Integrate security forces into federal institutions				
	3. Implement national programme for disengaged combatants	DDR (Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration)	7.0	7.3	5.3
	4. Maritime security strategy	Maritime security	2.7	5.8	4.2
Total			**43.3**	**63.3**	**62.4**
PSG 3 Justice	1. Priority laws and reorganization of judiciary	Justice	9.7	10.7	18.7
	2. Address grievances				
	3. More Somalis access fair and affordable justice				
Total			**9.7**	**10.7**	**18.7**

PSG 4 Economic Foundations	1. Productivity of high-priority sectors	Private sector development and employment	22.2	20.7	30.1
	2. Expand opportunities for youth	Community-driven development	7.0	7.0	9.2
	3. Sustainable development and management of natural resources	Natural resource management (NRM), resilience, productive sectors	50.5	58.6	84.4
		Infrastructure	51.1	50.6	49.4
Total			**130.8**	**136.9**	**173.1**
PSG 5 Revenues and Services	1. Social services	Education	48.6	40.8	27.1
		Health	198.7	152.3	145.0
		Social protection	3.6	2.9	2.5
		Other social services	6.7	10.9	13.2
		Solutions for the displaced	14.5	19.8	12.6
	2. Transparent and accountable revenue generation	Public financial management and revenue	8.7	24.2	23.2
	3. Public management of financial resources	Budget support, salaries, stipends	58.7	31.6	30.0
Total			**339.5**	**282.5**	**253.6**
Cross-cutting issues	Gender	Gender equality	8.2	5.9	8.7
	Capacity development	Capacity development	6.5	12.8	15.9
	Respect of human rights	Human Rights	1.8	5.7	9.3
	Bringing tangible results to people	Other cross-cutting activities	24.8	28.7	20.5
	External relations				
		Stabilization	17.3	16.4	14.3
Total			**58.6**	**69.5**	**68.7**

Sorce: Author's compilation on data from World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia*, cit., p. 9-11; Somalia Federal Republic, *The Somali Compact*, cit., p. 5-12.

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Recommendations

International efforts contributing to Somalia's long-term goals have been arranged around the Somali Compact. Whole-of-government strategies have been core to a shift in addressing peace-building and state-building processes, thanks to raising awareness about the links between security and development, and the value of governance in ensuring sustainability for these processes.[37] However, several shortcomings are present in the implementation of both the Somali Compact and this holistic approach. A closer analysis of security and development dynamics has identified both procedural and planning deficiencies that need to be addressed as the country moves towards a new phase of its state-building process, with new institutions and progress in the formation of regional administrations. Furthermore, as the Somali Compact is close to expiration, it is important to tackle these shortcomings as a process of lessons learned that is crucial when dealing with complex realities.[38] In particular, recommendations are addressed to the EU and the USA as major actors and core contributors to both security and development policies in Somalia.

Security-development nexus

In spite of commitments to holistic approaches, international engagements seem to be mostly security-driven, with a significant focus on repressive measures in terms of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, thus reflecting international actors' major interests in stability and containing side effects of fragility. Even if both the EU and the USA have incorporated a security-development nexus approach in their strategic thinking, security is still considered to be a primary goal.[39]

The struggle against *al-Shabaab* has a two-fold nature: a repressive and a preventive feature. In terms of the military aspects, AMISOM-contributing countries should ensure better coordination to streamline procedures and ensure that the mission operates in an organic manner. In this respect, closer coordination between the EU and the USA could maximize the leverage that the two actors have with the AU and the Troop Contributing Countries, respectively. Second, better coordination has to be envisaged for both humanitarian and development planning in order to prepare multi-phase planning for recovered areas, as part of a longer term civil-military coordination in which the EU, in particular, can provide expertise by virtue of the importance that the civilian component has within CSDP. Third, donors should pay closer attention to ensuring the sustainability of the payroll system for the SNA and police, which is closely connected with ensuring financial capacities for the federal and regional administrations. Fourth, given the complex nature of Somali societal relations, attention should also be given to estimate the potential for competitive clan dynamics to permeate security forces, as this may engender risks for the sustainability of the security sector establishment in the long term.

As far as the preventive aspect of countering violent extremism, progress has been seen, with significant programmes for the reinsertion of ex-combatants being undertaken by the UN, the EU and the USA.[40] However, all stakeholders should foresee a broader engagement in providing services to the population and in ensuring greater opportunities for youth. In this respect, education programmes for youth and families in particular, but also private sector development, should become the focus of international and local engagement in preventing violent extremism. Moreover, the role of the Gulf states in proving support and promoting education

in Somalia should be clarified, with a view to ensuring that non-transparent financial flows do not end up fuelling extremism. In this respect, both the EU and the USA could play a crucial political role in fostering discussions with the Gulf states.

More broadly, international efforts have sidelined internal dynamics of security concerns, with the exclusion of IGAD support in sustaining governance and state-building. Wide grassroots reconciliation processes have received little commitment from development partners, as figures in Table 3 show.[41] Notwithstanding this, sustainable peace-building is of the utmost importance in Somalia to prevent a relapse into conflict both in the short and in the long term. Currently, we are witnessing a latent convergence between peace-building and state-building processes in regard to international commitment, with most of the reconciliation activities being dealt with as part of the state-building process, with a focus on power-sharing and the electoral process. However, peace-building should be understood as a broader exercise that goes beyond state formation in order to bypass the ineffectiveness of top-down approaches that hamper local ownership, and ultimately fuel such side effects as terrorism.[42] Major donors should prioritize this aspect in their strategic planning to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to it. Furthermore, they should support Somali authorities in this exercise as well as in the solution of boundary issues among regional states, as foreseen by the government's programme Vision 2016, although accomplishments in this field have been delayed.[43]

Coordination

Coordination shortcomings have been evident between international partners and government institutions. In

particular, frictions have emerged both in priority-setting and in management of resources. In terms of priority-setting, the government has lamented that coordination with local institutions only takes place at programme and implementation levels, with little strategic discussion taking place before partners' programmatic documents are adopted.[44] At management level, commitments to centralize resources to the SDRF and provide on-treasury support have not been fully implemented. These aspects imply significant shortcomings in terms of local ownership and strategic oversight by local authorities. In terms of operationalization and implementation, the constant budgetary issues of federal institutions affect overall country-system management, as demonstrated by the case of soldiers' salaries.

As major donors in Somalia, the EU and the USA have a huge role to play in fostering greater coordination between international partners and local institutions. However, both identified issues present problems in terms of procedures for the two actors. In terms of priority-setting, it would be unthinkable for either the EU and the USA to discuss their strategic priorities with third-party countries, especially when the EU has been moving towards a more interest-based approach in its external action.[45] Further consultations with the Somali authorities are a reasonable objective, especially when the government of Somalia will implement the National Development Strategy, a programmatic document that should guide the country after 2016.[46] Such consultations should include: programmatic fine-tuning to ensure cooperation over actions and disposable resources; issues of visibility and how to best promote local institutions' image to the population; the involvement of relevant government departments/ministries in the design and execution of programmes; predictable funding; and strengthening pub-

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lic financial management. Furthermore, coordination should also include ways of expanding the involvement of local actors in implementing projects, as currently most programmes are implemented by international actors, such as UN agencies or international NGOs.[47] In view of the objective to further engage with civil society, this constitutes a crucial aspect that would both increase local ownership and empower communities to address their own needs, thus contributing to growing resilience.

With regard to the management of resources, most concerns for international partners, and surely for the EU, with its strict financial regulations, and the USA, with USAID "dollars-to-results" initiative,[48] are linked to monitoring and evaluation schemes that have to account for effective spending. However, in the context of limited state capacities such as Somalia, these accounting procedures engender the risk of putting an excessive burden on administrations, with the result that international management is preferred to a local one, which does not solve the vicious circle of limited capacities, bounded ownership and scarce implementation possibilities. Empowering people and building capable and resilient societies and institutions is crucial to address the necessity of local ownership. Major donors should discuss potential avenues for breaking circles of mistrust vis-à-vis local management as a crucial exercise that empowers local actors, ensures ownership and paves the way for self-sustaining, resilient governance structures.

NOTES

1   The Somali Compact is a document implementing the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and outlining the priorities for Somalia around five peace-building and state-building goals (PSGs): legitimate politics, security, justice, revenue and services, and economic foundations. See Somalia Federal Republic, *The Somali Compact*, 16 September 2013, http://new-deal.so/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Somalia-Compact_English.pdf; OECD, *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation*, 1 December 2011, http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm.

2   On Somalia see, for instance, Ken Menkhaus, "Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia", in *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), p.149-165; Mireille Affa'a-Mindzie, "Security Council Istanbul Retreat: The Security-Development Nexus in Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa", in *IPI Meeting Notes*, 13 February 2014, https://www.ipinst.org/?p=1226. For broader discussion, see Agnès Hurwitz and Gordon Peake, "Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice Since the 1990s", in *IPI Meeting Notes*, 14 May 2004, https://www.ipinst.org/?p=6800; Brian-Vincent Ikejiaku, "Poverty-Conflict Nexus: The Contentious Issue Revisited", in *European Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012), p. 127-150, http://www.ecsdev.org/ojs/index.php/ejsd/article/view/10.

3   Somalia Federal Republic, *The Somali Compact*, cit.

4   Ibid.

5   For further information on the evolution of the Somali conflict, see Rossella Marangio, "The Somali Crisis: Failed State and International Interventions", in *IAI Working Papers*, No. 15 (May 2012), http://www.iai.it/en/node/1452.

6   Interview, IGAD Official, 2016; Interview, Official, Office of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, 2016; Interview, EU Officials, 2016.

7   UN Secretary General, *Report on Somalia* (S/2016/763), 6 September 2016, p. 2, http://undocs.org/S/2016/763.

8   Malte Brosig, *Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa. Exploring Regime Complexity*, London and New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 178.

9   Interview, IGAD Official, 2016.

10   UN Security Council, *Resolution 2297* (S/RES/2297), 7 July 2016, http://undocs.org/S/RES/2297(2016).

11   UN Secretary General, *Report on Somalia* (S/2016/430), 9 May 2016, http://undocs.org/S/2016/430.

12   The AU Assembly approved a major decision on AU finances in July 2016. In particular it established "a 0.2 percent levy on all eligible imported goods into the Continent to finance the African Union Operational, Program and Peace Support Operations Budgets starting from the year 2017." African Union Assembly, *Decision on the Outcome of the Retreat of the African Union* (Assembly/AU/Dec.605(XXVII), Kigali, 17-18 July 2016, para. a(i), https://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/decisions/31274-assembly_au_dec_605-620_xxvii_e.pdf.

13   UNDP, *Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach*, November 2015, http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/reports/preventing-and-re-

sponding-to-violent-extremism-in-africa--a-deve; European Commission, *STRIVE for Development: Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism*, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, September 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.2841/440196; US Department of State and USAID, *Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism*, May 2016, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf; USAID Kenya and Eastern Africa, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 2 February 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/CVE - Somalia Feb 2 2016.pdf.

14   Interview, EU Official, 2016.

15   The Heegan Plan is a planning document for the period 2017-2025. It implements the New Policing Model by detailing how the police service is going to be restructured within the federal context and what roles and responsibilities federal and regional authorities will have. Cf. UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), *A New Policing Model for Somalia*, 24 March 2016, http://unsom.unmissions.org/node/100040390; UN Secretary General, *Report on Somalia* (S/2016/763), cit., para. 31.

16   UN Secretary General, *Report on Somalia* (S/2016/763), cit., para. 34.

17   Ibid., para. 35.

18   Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy*, September 2013, http://www.somalilandlaw.com/SomaliMaritimeStrategyFINAL_1_2013.pdf; Somalia Federal Republic, *The Somali Compact*, cit., p. 7.

19   Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, February 2016, p. 30, http://new-deal.so/reports.

20   In particular, Kenya and Tanzania did not take part in

the mission because of their frustrated expectation of receiving heavy equipment. Cf. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, *Eighth Report of Session 2013-14*, 15 July 2013, p. 105, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-viii/83viii.pdf.

21 World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia. Analysis of Aid Flow Data*, February 2016, p. iii, https://www.somaliampf.org/node/72.

22 Somalia Federal Republic, *The Somali Compact*, cit., p. 13-18.

23 Ibid.

24 Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, cit., p. 52-54 and p. 60-65; World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia*, cit., p. iii.

25 Somalia Federal Republic, *The Somali Compact*, cit., p. 14.

26 World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia*, cit., p. 5.

27 Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, cit., p. 66-71.

28 Ibid., p. 70.

29 World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia*, cit., p. 6.

30 For the purpose of this article, traditional donors are OECD Development Assistance Committee members.

31 The EU treaties formally exclude the possibility of using the EU budget for military-related support. The APF is a financial instrument created within the European Development Fund (EDF), thus outside the EU budget, to provide support to African regional organizations in the field of peace and security. See the European Commission website: *African Peace Facility*, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en.

32 European External Action Service, *EU Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta*, http://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20160620_EUNAV-FOR_Factsheet.pdf.

33 Council of the European Union, *Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2275 amending Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR)*, 7 December 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex-:32015D2275.

34 European External Action Service, *Factsheet on EUTM Somalia*, April 2016, http://europa.eu/!FG-86JG.

35 See the chapter of Madeleine Goerg in this book.

36 Ibid.

37 For further reference, see Rossella Marangio, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus in Conflict-Affected Countries: Post-2015 Perspectives and Way Forward", in *The ITPCM International Commentary*, Vol. XIII, No. 39 (July 2015), p. 20-25, http://www.itpcm.dirpolis.sssup.it/files/2014/12/39-RE-CENT-CHALLENGES-TO-THE-INTERNATION-AL-COMMUNITY-July-2015.pdf.

38 See Emery Brusset, Cedric de Coning and Bryn Hughes (eds.), *Complexity Thinking for Peacebuilding Practice and Evaluation*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

39 European Commission, *National Indicative Programme for Federal Republic of Somalia 2014 to 2020*, 19 June 2014, http://europa.eu/!QG98jF; The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14 June 2012, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf; US Department of State, *Background Brief-*

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44 Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, cit., p. 60.

45 European External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, June 2016, http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/node/2.

46 Somalia Federal Republic, *Somali Compact Progress Report 2015*, cit., p. 6; Somalia Federal Government, *National Development Plan 2017-2019*, October 2016, http://mopic.gov.so/national-development-plan.

47 Interview, Somali source, 2016; World Bank, *Aid Flows in Somalia*, cit., p. 7.

48 See USAID website: *Dollars to Results*, https://results.usaid.gov.

8
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOMALIA: ATTEMPTS TO SUSTAIN FRAGILE GAINS

Cleophus Thomas III

The aim of this chapter is to highlight some of the key security and development challenges that Somalia must address in order to sustain the modest gains in stability it has made in the last four years. It also makes recommendations to the European Union (EU) and its partners on what steps they can take to support stabilization. Like many other fragile states, Somalia is at a crossroads. When Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, a career educator and non-governmental organization leader, was elected president in September 2012, it had barely been a year since al-Shabaab was pushed out of Mogadishu and the country needed a concrete vision about where it would be headed over the next four years. As a result, the president published a Six-Pillar Plan to illustrate the policies he would prioritize, including "stability, economic recovery, peacebuilding, service delivery, international relations and unity."[1] The international community also worked with the Somali government to devise a Vision

2016 framework to help the government focus on the tasks of building regional administrations, revising and ratifying the provisional constitution, and holding democratic elections.[2]

As of November 2016, Somalia has only partially fulfilled the objectives laid out in Vision 2016.[3] The state formation process has resulted in the establishment of four new administrations, including the Interim Jubaland Administration (IJA), Interim Southwest Administration (ISWA), the Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA), and the Interim Administration for Hir-Shabelle (IAHS), while the status of Banaadir region, which includes Mogadishu, has yet to be determined.[4] Hir-Shabelle was only formed as recently as October 2016. Its legitimacy has been limited because a dissident group led by Hawiye-Hawadle clan leaders in Hiiraan region, as well as other clans in Middle Shabelle, disputed the organization of the state formation process and how political appointments had been allocated to clans.[5] These kinds of dispute linger in several other regional administrations, showing the difficulty that regional leaders have had in gaining credibility from local communities.[6] Lastly, the process to revise the provisional constitution has taken a back seat to attempts to hold national elections for the next administration. As of mid-November 2016, the electoral process has been significantly scaled down from the initial plan of universal suffrage, as well as encountering numerous claims of fraud, intimidation, and corruption, and being postponed multiple times.[7]

Nevertheless, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its Somali counterparts continue to make progress against al-Shabaab, and the Somali government has successfully developed its own National Development Plan.[8] It is on the basis of these modest gains that Somalia must move forward in accomplishing its remain-

ing security and development objectives. Key challenges include creating capable and inclusive security forces, addressing clan conflict, and building institutional capacity to deliver goods and services and ensure economic prosperity.

8.1 Security challenges

Security in Somalia still varies widely across the country as terrorism, clan-related violence over political and territorial power, and crime comprise the predominant forms of insecurity in central and southern parts of the country. Mainstream Western outlets consistently highlight high-profile terrorist attacks in the capital, Mogadishu, but the resilience of Somalis to rebuild and recover from attacks is not always properly reported. Mogadishu and other urban areas continue to experience a different kind of boom through the increase in the construction of restaurants, improved ports, houses, markets, and hotels.[9] Entrepreneurs have shown a deep-seated resilience in rapidly reconstructing buildings destroyed in al-Shabaab attacks.[10] Similarly, thousands of Somalis regularly attend Somali football league games, where the rousing atmospheres highlight a growing confidence in security during major public events.[11] In northern Somalia, Puntland remains relatively secure as pockets of al-Shabaab have been confined largely to remote areas in the Galgala mountains, but regional security forces are unable to maintain a permanent presence throughout the region.[12] As a result, in October 2016, militants loyal to the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) took over the port town of Qandala. This raised fears the group could evade al-Shabaab's suppression of rival jihadi groups in the south by exploiting security vacuums in other regions.[13]

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The following section explores the challenges of building and sustaining a Somali security apparatus that can address terrorist threats, transcend clan rivalries, and maintain security independent from AMISOM. It also explores the successes and shortfalls of the African Union peacekeeping mission, and how al-Shabaab continues to exploit weaknesses in coalition attempts to defeat it. While there have been major victories against al-Shabaab in the last five years, the gains are fragile owing to the impermanence of foreign troops and the unpreparedness of Somali forces to replace them.

8.1.1 Lack of reliable and integrated security forces

The failure of central government and regional administrations to pay security forces on a regular basis is one of the fundamental limitations that impedes Somalia from optimizing its current level and capability of forces. Unpaid security forces have little incentive to do their job effectively. Over the last several years, these forces have taken drastic actions as a result of not being paid, including the establishment of illegal checkpoints on roads to extort money from civilians and commercial vehicles, as well as withdrawing from towns captured from al-Shabaab.[14] As a result, Somalis often cannot count on government troops as a reliable protection force.

A recent incident that illustrates this point is the case of Marka, a strategically located port town 73 km from Mogadishu. AMISOM and Somali forces captured the town from al-Shabaab in August 2012, but it has been difficult for government-allied forces to resolve clan tensions in the town. On 12 July 2016, a Somalia National Army (SNA) contingent stationed in Marka vacated the town, claiming their salaries had not been paid in months.[15] When al-Shabaab asserted it had moved its

forces into Marka, AMISOM denied the statement but noted that it did not have a permanent presence in the town. The mission clarified that its nearest base was 800 metres from Marka, which made its assessments about the status of the town less credible.[16] The next day, al-Shabaab bolstered its claim that it was present in the town by posting photos of its fighters in Marka surrounded by dozens of children, who probably had no choice but to attend the midday propaganda event.[17] Unpaid salaries are not just a problem for central government. Regional administrations have also experienced accountability problems with paying their regional forces. On 12 June 2016, police in Puntland staged a large protest in Galkayo after months of missing salary payments.[18] The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and regional administrations will continue to struggle to pay troops consistently unless government officials are held accountable for these failures.

8.1.2 Slow integration of security forces

The SNA – tasked with defending the country from external threats – remains a fractured, clan-oriented organization, and military leaders and defence officials have poor command and control of their troops.[19] The United Nations (UN) estimates that the SNA comprises 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers.[20] These forces are deployed only in central and southern regions because Puntland and the FGS have yet to fulfil their agreement to integrate 3,000 Puntland troops into the SNA, and Somaliland's claim of independence precludes it from participating in a national army.[21] The international community's Guulwade Plan seeks to build a SNA composed of 10,900 troops that can hold territory taken by AMISOM.[22] The militia integration process, undertaken by the National Integration commis-

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sion, is a key component of this effort because it provides a framework for negotiations.[23]

8.1.2.1 ASWJ, Puntland, and Jubaland

Many of the attempts to integrate militias have been directed towards three entities: the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) militia, and troops in the Jubaland and Puntland regions. ASWJ is a Sufi militia formed in 2008 in response to al-Shabaab's attacks on Sufi shrines and supporters. Since its inception, it has been one of the key groups fighting al-Shabaab in south-west and central Somalia, but it has never completely reconciled its command, goals, and objectives with the FGS. In March 2010, ASWJ signed its first deal to integrate into the SNA. At the time, then-Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke and ASWJ leader Sheikh Mahmoud Sheikh Hassan praised the deal as a game changer in the fight against al-Shabaab.[24] However, the agreement was never properly implemented, and ASWJ continued to operate outside the auspices of the Somali government or as a proxy force of Ethiopian forces deployed in the country.[25] In August 2015, Galmudug and ASWJ signed an integration agreement that recognized four previously failed integration agreements, in 2010, 2013, 2014, and March 2015.[26] However, the disagreement about how ASWJ could participate in the process to form the new regional administration led to violent conflict between ASWJ and pro-government militias, ultimately resulting in ASWJ's continued estrangement from the FGS. The integration of ASWJ into the SNA has not occurred largely because the Somali government has failed to deliver promises of financial assistance, equipment, and political dispensation following the signature of previous agreements. In September 2016, ASWJ protested that the group had

been sidelined from most national-level dialogues on major political issues, including national elections.[27] As long as these demands go unfulfilled, ASWJ will probably remain an autonomous militia in central Somalia.[28]

The Somali government's negotiations with Jubaland stakeholders has fared better than its efforts with ASWJ. In August 2013, the IJA and the FGS agreed after weeks of deliberations on the status of the regional administration: that Jubaland troops would be integrated into the SNA while regional police would remain under the command of the IJA. Over one year later, at a ceremony in Kismayo in November 2014, over 1,300 Jubaland troops officially began a training exercise as the first part of the process to become integrated into the SNA.[29] By July 2015, the training had been completed and the forces were inaugurated as the SNA's 43rd brigade.[30] However, in an October 2016 report, the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group noted these troops lacked sufficient weapons to carry out major offensive operations and that the FGS allegedly had privileged certain clan units. This highlights the need to ensure the FGS provides the necessary assistance to integrated troops without prejudice to clan interests.[31]

The FGS has struggled to integrate troops from the Puntland administration as well. In the last four years, Puntland has "suspended relations" with the FGS on multiple occasions, claiming it has not been consulted on critical national issues and that the FGS violated various terms of the provisional constitution.[32] However, in April 2015, after a series of negotiations to get the relationship back on track, Puntland pledged to contribute 3,000 troops to the SNA as part of a cooperation agreement intended to expand the inclusivity of the SNA among the country's regions.[33] While there have not been any Puntland troops integrated into the SNA yet, the integration

commission is reportedly engaged with regional authorities on the timeline for placing some regional troops under national command.[34]

Overall, Somalia's national and regional leaders must have more consistent dialogue about how to build and improve Somalia's security architecture. A dilemma remains on whether much of the integration process should be top-down – in order to ensure that Somali elites reach a consensus on key issues – or bottom-up – so that locals, who must live with the consequences of militia integration, have a significant voice in the transformation of the security sector. Both approaches are probably required, but a bottom-up approach to security sector reform should not be under-estimated because communities across the country have different needs and aspirations in terms of security. Aspirations could involve expanding community watch and local policing, which has improved coordination between locals and security forces where it has been implemented.[35] These needs should be addressed in assessing which security forces should be deployed in specific towns, and more broadly, how the SNA can be reconstructed.

8.2 Political and social reconciliation

Somalia's dilemmas around militia integration and building a capable army cannot be resolved without comprehensive social reconciliation, particularly in regions where clan-related violence poses a threat to stability. The scale of clan-related violence has declined since the 1990s, in part thanks to an increased focus on supporting locally led peacebuilding that engages local communities in order to create credible reconciliation agreements, rather than Western-led conferences.[36] However, many of the

causes of social violence remain the same, including control of land, water, and political positions. For example, since the beginning of the civil war, there has been a protracted conflict in Lower Shabelle between the Dir-Biyomaal clan, a traditionally less powerful community, and the historically more powerful Hawiye-Habar Gidir and Abgaal clans over territorial control, land, and political power. The conflict has proved intractable regardless of the mediators that have attempted to de-escalate the conflict. Al-Shabaab, Hawiye-Mudulood clan elders, and Somali authorities have all carried out separate attempts to reconcile these clans, and each deal has failed to lead to sustained peace between the communities – showing how immensely difficult the problem is and how high the stakes must be for the clans involved.[37]

In addition, Somalia's federalism process has also raised the risk of violent conflict because the fate of individual and community representation in local and national politics has been at stake. During the process to form the Jubaland administration, multiple deadly battles were fought in the streets of Kismayo leading up to the beginning of the conference and following the election of Ahmed Madobe as regional president. Much of this violence was driven by perceptions that the process was not fair or inclusive, or that it was being instigated by foreign countries, which inevitably led militia leaders to take up arms in defiance.[38]

Another important example of how federalism has raised the stakes is the contestation of the boundary between Puntland and Galmudug regions. During the Somali civil war in the early 1990s, areas around the Mudug region and its capital of Galkayo saw some of the worst bloodshed, as clan fighting between Hawiye and Darod militias led to a tremendous number of killings. On one side was a predominantly Darod-Majerteen clan

militia in the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led by Abdullahi Yusuf. On the other side was the mostly Hawiye-Habar Gidir militia known as the United Somali Congress (USC), under the direction of Mohamed Farah Aideed. On 4 June 1993, the two sides signed a historic truce to end the violence. Under the terms of the deal, Galkayo city would be divided between clans as it had been during the colonial era.[39]

However, ambiguities in the constitutional requirements to form new regional administrations fundamentally undermined the credibility and sustainability of the Galkayo peace agreement, which stood as a foundational document for peace in the region for twenty years. Article 49 of the provisional constitution stipulated that regional administrations must be established from two or more regions merging together, with many observers highlighting that regions could not be split in this process. However, Article 142 of the provisional constitution stated that Puntland would retain the rights and powers as defined in its regional constitution until it was harmonized with its federal counterpart, and Puntland's regional constitution claimed parts of the Mudug region.[40] The IGA, formed in mid-2015, claimed the other half of Mudug, as well as the Galgaduud region. Since Somalia lacked a constitutional court through which the case could be settled, regional militias took the matters into their own hands on several occasions. Between July and December 2015, several deadly clashes over control of the border and construction of local infrastructure occurred, despite the signing of a ceasefire. The violence killed scores of people and displaced at least 40,000 residents in central Somalia.[41] In October 2016, fighting erupted again in Galkayo when Puntland continued construction of a livestock market in a disputed area. The violence killed at least 45 people and displaced approx-

imately 90,000 residents.[42] While another ceasefire was reached in November, the fundamental tensions that remain between the two regional administrations could cause similar violence in the short-term.[43]

8.2.1 AMISOM: Present and future

AMISOM first deployed to Somalia in February 2007 as a small force:[44] it was composed of approximately 7,000 troops from Uganda and Burundi.[45] Since then, the mission – and its expectations – have ballooned significantly. Currently, it is a force of over 22,000 troops composed from additional countries, including Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. One of AMISOM's biggest accomplishments has been that it has captured and maintained control of most major urban areas in southern Somalia. The first of these victories, arguably AMISOM's greatest to date, came in October 2011 when Ugandan, Burundian, and Somali forces finally ousted al-Shabaab from the capital. This attempt jump-started a major reformation in Mogadishu that spurred economic investment, attracted diaspora back to the city, and enabled the capital to function more effectively.[46] By September 2012, Kenyan forces – not yet aligned with AMISOM – along with Somali partners captured the port town of Kismayo, which had served as a key hub for al-Shabaab to import weapons, export valuable charcoal, and tax a large urban population.[47] The most recent major urban operations took place in July 2015 when Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali forces took the towns of Baardheere and Diinsoor from al-Shabaab, leaving the Middle Jubba region as the largest single chunk of major territory held by the militants. The importance of maintaining trust of communities by holding key towns cannot be underestimated. In the past, when al-Shabaab has retaken towns from govern-

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ment-allied forces, the militants often arrest and behead civilians for "collaborating" with AMISOM, or destroy key infrastructure such as water wells as they are forced to flee upon losing the town again.[48]

AMISOM still has shortfalls that need to be addressed. Firstly, the mission struggles with coordinating responses to crises, most recently in regard to al-Shabaab's mass raid tactics. More specifically, the mission lacks a quick response force and force enablers, including helicopters, under the direction of the AMISOM force commander, that can come to the aid of troop-contributing countries when crises arise.[49] In addition, AMISOM often struggles to account for civilian casualties. The mission's mandate provides that it keeps track of all incidents involving peacekeeping forces and civil casualties under a framework known as the Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis, and Response Cell (CCTARC). Nevertheless, there is a perception that troop-contributing countries do not always hold their forces responsible for potential crimes committed during their deployment. Somali civilians injured in operations have the opportunity to report incidents to CCTARC, but it is unclear to what degree AMISOM is considering these data.[50] While Uganda was responsible for one of the most grisly incidents of violence against civilians at a wedding party in Marka in July 2015, it has also exhibited the most evidence by far that it is consistently prosecuting its forces for misbehaviour and criminal activity in public military trials.[51] No other forces are performing at this level of accountability. The most concerning lack of responsibility sits with Ethiopia, whose forces have been accused of killing scores of Somali civilians in sporadic clashes for several years, particularly in the border regions.[52] While these incidents have not attracted a high level of attention in the international community, they do decrease the trust that Somalis have in AMISOM.

8.2.1.1 The future of AMISOM: A troubled transition?

Countries providing AMISOM forces seek to begin a withdrawal from Somalia in 2018, but SNA forces are far from being prepared to assume responsibility for security.[53] In an optimal scenario, AMISOM would have been able to capture territory from al-Shabaab and hand it over to Somali security forces to hold, which would allow AMISOM to commit forces for further offensive operations, rather than as a holding force. But since Somali forces are incapable of this role, AMISOM has become bogged down and overstretched, preventing it from making progress in other urban areas and the vast rural landscape in which al-Shabaab still finds safe havens.[54]

The dilemma of an eventual transition has AMISOM at a crossroads. When the EU cut salaries for AMISOM by 20 percent in January 2016, it sent shockwaves through the defence ministries of troop-contributing countries. Uganda and Kenya briefly threatened to pull out of the mission, and highlighted long-time complaints that the force had not been provided with attack and utility helicopters as critical force enablers.[55] Meanwhile, the fate of the Burundian contingent was at risk as well, as a civil crisis in Burundi led the EU to consider measures to channel peacekeeping funding around the Burundian government.[56] Overall, there is a perception among troop-contributing countries that the international community is not serious about providing the financial and material support that is needed to finish the mission, and this could impact the timeline and nature of its withdrawal.

In 2015, George Washington University Professor Paul D. Williams and Abdirashid Hashi of the Heritage Institute of Policy Studies hypothesized several scenarios for AMISOM's exit. These options included transitioning AMISOM into a UN peacekeeping force, creating a hybrid

AU–UN force, or transferring security to Somali forces.[57] Another potential option would be that some troop-contributing countries withdraw unilaterally in frustration at the pace of the mission's success. In order to sustain the gains and sacrifices that AMISOM and Somali forces have made in the last ten years, there must be a consensus soon regarding the most feasible option for a transition, keeping in mind the realistic expectation that training and arming a capable SNA will take more than two years.

Most importantly, the Somali government must feel pressure to improve its ability to provide security independently. The international community can assist in this regard by working with the Somali government and local authorities to identify specific towns where a transfer of responsibility can feasibly occur, leading up to 2018. This could be a useful approach for a transition because it would facilitate a bottom-up approach to the rebuilding of Somalia's security apparatus and facilitate local dialogue about the roles of local militias, police, and the SNA, which would help with militia integration. Ultimately, AMISOM countries are probably more likely to commit to ensuring a smooth transition if they see a more genuine attempt by Somalia to take more responsibility for security.

8.3 Al-Shabaab and the jihadist threat

Al-Shabaab has its roots in the insurgency following the demise of the Islamic Courts Union in the mid-2000s. It has remained resilient in the face of the ten-year AMISOM-campaign and a continuously eroding public tolerance for the group's violent attacks. Since 2008, Somalia and its international partners have continued to take senior al-Shabaab leaders off the battlefield through diverse

means, including ground raids, offering amnesty for defectors, and drone strikes.[58] More recently, al-Shabaab faces new competition as support for ISIL has drawn more than 100 members away from al-Shabaab under the leadership of Abdulkadir Mumin, whose fighters have pledged allegiance to ISIS and are based in Puntland region.[59] To date, ISIL leadership has not officially accepted this group as an affiliate, like other groups in Libya and Nigeria. In addition, both al-Shabaab and Somali authorities have taken a hardline stance against the emergence of pro-ISIL elements in the country. Since November 2014, al-Shabaab has threatened to behead ISIL supporters, has unleashed raids against potential ISI hideouts, and has banned ISIL propaganda in its areas of control.[60]

Al-Shabaab has taken a pragmatic approach to battling AMISOM, which it sees as an impermanent opponent it must demoralize and outlast rather than militarily defeat.[61] For example, when AMISOM and Somali forces execute major offensives against the group, its militants tactically withdraw from major towns to preserve its forces.[62] Then, al-Shabaab pressure AMISOM and Somali forces in smaller towns, often forcing pro-government forces to withdraw and allow al-Shabaab to take control.[63] This has a serious impact on Somali communities because it creates doubt in which forces they should trust as potentially the long-term security provider, particularly in remote areas.

8.3.1 Mass raids

One of the most important changes in al-Shabaab's strategic capabilities in the last two years has been its tactic of amassing fighters armed with vehicle-borne explosive devices (VBIEDs) and assault rifles in surprise dawn attacks on remote and often vulnerable AMISOM bases. The first time this strategy was employed occurred on

25 June 2015 when hundreds of al-Shabaab militants attacked a Burundian base in Leego located near the border of Lower Shabelle and Bay region. More than 70 Burundians were killed at an outpost where 100 troops were stationed, and al-Shabaab displayed photos of equipment it looted from the attack.[64] Days later, Ethiopian troops recaptured the base from al-Shabaab, but the attack portended a new threat for AMISOM troops.[65] Since the Leego attack, al-Shabaab has staged three further mass raid attacks against Kenyan, Ugandan, and Ethiopian forces, with only the Ethiopians successfully defeating the militants in these operations.[66]

Following the attack at El Adde against Kenyan troops in January 2016, there were small signs that *al-Shabaab* had succeeded in forcing Kenya to reassess its commitment to the mission. Kenyan troops withdrew from at least two remote and vulnerable bases in Somalia and retreated to positions close to the border, and Kenyan politicians released statements calling for an exit plan.[67] While the Kenyan government ultimately reaffirmed its commitment to AMISOM,[68] approximately 70 percent of Kenyans believed the country's troops should be redeployed from Somalia, according to a November 2016 poll conducted by Twaweza East Africa.[69]

Lastly, mass raids are also high visibility events that draw attention to the group and refute the Somali government's narrative that its attacks are the "last kick of a dying horse."[70] Promoting a narrative of strength is critical for al-Shabaab, as an al-Qai'da affiliate, as it competes with ISIL for recruits and influence among jihadists.

8.3.2 Civilian blockades

When towns are captured from al-Shabaab, the militants often impose blockades on those towns, and this

prevents these communities from accessing vital goods and services. Al-Shabaab is able to execute this strategy because AMISOM and Somali forces are often unable to control roads and areas outside major urban areas. As a result, al-Shabaab is able to regulate activity by taxing vehicles on roadways and threatening or preventing commercial trucks from entering into government-controlled areas. Some of the towns that have experienced these blockades include Wajid, Buulo Burte, El Buur, and Hudur.[71] These blockades often cause the price of food and other goods to skyrocket, making them unaffordable to communities that already live in remote areas with little outside support.[72]

Al-Shabaab's blockading strategy is intended to discourage communities from living in government-controlled areas and to make the Somali authorities appear incapable of ensuring economic prosperity. The most feasible way for AMISOM and Somali forces to keep al-Shabaab from being able to implement blockades would be to actively pursue al-Shabaab in rural areas. However, government-allied forces have been hesitant to do so, potentially because taking the fight to remote areas gives the advantage to the non-conventional fighting tactics that al-Shabaab performs better than other forces in the country. As noted earlier, Somali security forces who do not receive regular salaries have little incentive to fight these kinds of battles.

8.3.3 Future of al-Shabaab and regional implications

The ability of al-Shabaab to adapt will have significant ramifications for the region. In 2011, al-Shabaab committed its first major attack abroad when it attacked World Cup viewing sites in Kampala, Uganda, killing 74 people.[73] Since that time, the group has success-

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fully carried out major attacks in Djibouti and Kenya, which have experienced the brunt of external attacks. In September 2013 and April 2014, al-Shabaab committed its most high-profile attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing at least 67 people, and its most deadly attack at Garissa University College, killing more than 140 people.[74]

In order to mitigate the ability of al-Shabaab to execute major external attacks, Somalia's partners must improve coordination with Somali stakeholders and address the dynamics of radicalization in their own borders, including unemployment, marginalization, and abuses by security services.[75] In addition, Kenya has labelled Somali refugees as breeding terrorism at Dadaab camp, despite the fact that in many cases it is Kenyan citizens of varying ethnic origin and economic class that have been involved in terror attacks.[76] Four out of the five Garissa University attackers were Kenyan citizens, including the young son of a government official who graduated from the country's best law school.[77] In contrast, Ethiopia has still not suffered from a major al-Shabaab owing to the effectiveness of its community policing, a mechanism that other countries in the region could look to implement and improve.[78]

Lastly, if ISIL emerges as a greater threat in Somalia, it would further jeopardize security in Somalia. It would increase the number of jihadists planning attacks and recruiting members in Somalia. It would also lead to more attacks against Somalis and AMISOM forces, as well as violence between al-Shabaab and ISIL elements. In both scenarios, Somali civilians would be adversely impacted and would raise the risk of an increase in the level of internal displacement.

8.4 Trade, infrastructure, and food security

The improvement in stability in Somalia has allowed for modest gains to be made in the country's trade, infrastructure, and food security sectors. Increasing growth is critical for the development goals Somalia has laid out.[79] However, technical challenges, climate factors, and failures in government performance hamper further progress. Somalia's ability to optimize trade in livestock, expand exports of other goods, and enhance its response to food crises will play significant roles in the country's economic future.

In the last two years, there has been a resurgence in the number of livestock exports, primarily to the Middle East. In 2015, Somalia exported approximately five million animals at an estimated value of 384 million dollars, with an increase of 6 percent from the previous year, according to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).[80] Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with support from the EU, have implemented key interventions focused on improving the health of livestock through vaccinations, and these have driven the improved performance of the country's livestock sector.[81] Unfortunately, Somalia has not been able to receive proper certification to export other goods, including sesame seeds, more efficiently, and this has limited the global reach of Somali commodities.[82]

Somalia's food security at home also remains a challenge. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is used in the UN to assess food security. Figure 1 draws on UN data to show the number of Somalis in IPC Phase 2 (Stressed Acute Food Insecurity), often denoted in documentation as "in need."

Figure 1 | Somalis in stressed acute food insecurity

As the data show, the number of Somalis living "in need" has increased in the last year. In addition to the aforementioned al-Shabaab blockades, it is clear that flooding, drought, famine, and insufficient preparation and response to these humanitarian crises have been at the root of Somalia's struggles when it comes to food security. These events are all part of a pattern of extreme weather events – including the El Niño effect – that threaten the country. As FAO explains, "While some countries experience depressed rains during El Niño events, Somalia experiences heavier rainfall amounts that usually lead to flooding that may cause diseases, death and destruction of property and infrastructure."[83]

Drought and famine are the other major climate factors in Somalia that have a huge impact on human security and development. The drought that took place in Somalia between July 2011 and mid-2012 resulted in the death of 260,000 people, about 20 percent of whom were children under the age of five.[84] According to experts, the famine crisis in Somalia has occurred for three reasons. First, long-term droughts cause low harvests and subsequent inflation in the price of goods. Secondly, droughts often result in the death of livestock, taking away a vital source of income and purchasing power that is needed

to buy everyday goods. Lastly, the Somali government has not developed institutional capabilities to respond to these crises effectively and swiftly. As a result, Somalia must rely on external early warning and quick response efforts to fill the gap and minimize the number of people who are left vulnerable. For example, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) has been crucial in compiling data regarding the risk factors that could lead to drought, famine, and other disasters in Somalia, and in working with UN organizations to provide supplies in anticipation of extreme weather events.[85]

Political infighting also contributes to delay humanitarian responses. In November 2014, residents in Somalia's Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions endured a serious spate of flooding when the Shabelle River's banks burst, displacing thousands of people in both regions. At the time, the senior Somali leadership was entrenched in an internal battle that involved the president attempting to oust Prime Minister Abdifarah Shirdon. Somali media reported that this internal discord contributed to a delay government response to the crises.[86]

Conclusion and recommendations

Since 2012, Somalia has seen numerous accomplishments that should be celebrated. Somali forces and their allies have captured key urban areas from al-Shabaab. The government completed the establishment of regional administrations that comprise the country's developing federal government. These gains, however, are fragile. Somali forces are currently unprepared to take over territory from AMISOM by 2018, highlighting the importance of building a stable and credible Somali military and police force. And while new regional administrations have

established basic political structures, there is significant work to be done to expand the credibility of federal states within their respective regions and to define how central government and the outlying regions will divide responsibilities to maintain security and deliver services to local communities. These details will need to be codified into the provisional constitution as it continues to be revised.

The EU has the opportunity to assist Somalia in making tangible progress toward another major transformation in the country's security and development sectors during the tenure of the next president. The EU and its partners should work with Somali authorities on security issues to continue militia integration as well as processes that biometrically register security forces.[87] Once Somali security forces on are credible rosters, Somali officials should be held accountable for paying forces on time, because AMISOM cannot begin to hand over control of areas to Somali forces as planned without a coherent and compensated security apparatus. Receiving regular salaries will reduce the risk that troops trained by Somalia's international partners will desert, thereby assuring the value of external training.[88]

More broadly, Somalia cannot achieve its security, political, and development goals without greatly improved financial accountability. Somalia performed second worst on perceptions of corruption, according to the most recent Transparency International report,[89] and the UN has raised severe concerns about the lack of transparency behind major government contracts that have been signed in recent years.[90] Nevertheless, there are very few occurrences of Somali officials being successfully prosecuted on graft charges. It is clear that the government does not feel sufficient pressure to make reforms on graft, and this is an issue that requires attention from its partners and donors.

The EU should focus on continuing programmes that have shown great success, including those that ensure the health of livestock, which have helped to boost exports.[91] Somalia's partners should also prioritize sectors and projects where international assistance can be most effective, such as rebuilding roads and improving ports as a means to bolster Somali supply chains.[92] Additionally, cash-for-work activities that pay communities to rebuild infrastructure and help farmers maximize yields through high-performance seeds and timely planting can mitigate the negative impact of climate change and drought.[93]

Pressure from diplomats on the ground has been a key part of reaffirming the commitment of the EU to promoting Somali success toward Vision 2016 goals and holding Somali stakeholders accountable for accomplishing key political goals in a timely manner. EU officials have made consistent trips throughout Somalia to monitor and support various political processes in the country. While the EU's involvement in Somali politics has not always yielded inclusive agreements, the EU has been critical to keeping Somali stakeholders on track and maintaining the relationships that are necessary to sustain progress.[94]

Lastly, as Somalia's electoral process continues, the EU and its partners should encourage presidential candidates to lay out specific policy and programmatic priorities similar to Vision 2016, so that once in office, partners can help facilitate support in areas of mutual interest. While the Vision 2016 plan was not completely fulfilled, it provided a worthwhile framework that the FGS and diplomats used to guide their engagement and accomplish key tasks during the government's tenure. With a clear plan from government and sufficient international support, the next administration can make even more gains in the next four years.

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NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

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This section highlights some of the main issues discussed during the final conference of the research project "The EU, the US and the International Strategic Dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa" held in Nairobi on 8 December 2016. The event gathered together African, American and European scholars and practitioners to discuss the role of external powers in Sub-Saharan Africa in peace, security and development. The points below should be considered as a supplement to the previous chapters in respect of further research. Following the structure of the conference, the topics are organized around three clusters: the role of external actors in peace and security, the case of Somalia, and the role of the EU and the US.

Peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): the role of external actors

- The debates highlighted the fact that none of the external actors represented in the research are "new"

actors. For instance, China, the Gulf countries and Turkey all have historical ties to Western Africa. These actors cannot be characterized according to the dichotomy of "new/old" or "traditional/emerging," but can be better defined by the expression "external strategic partners." In addition, the idea that the Gulf countries or Turkey are investing primarily in 'Muslim countries' has some limitations. In contrast, Western countries could be considered to be investing in Christian countries more than in Muslim states. Rather, the following question should be asked: what factors besides conditionality have allowed these investors to penetrate Sub-Saharan African countries more easily than the West?

- Some of the factors identified as relevant to explain "easier" penetration by countries such as China and Turkey are, for example, tangible investments (e.g. infrastructure) as opposed to intangible investments (e.g. education or healthcare). The principal features of emerging states' approach are that they are concerned with key resources related to extraction and commerce. As Sub-Saharan countries become stronger, they will need a fresh approach to deal with this scenario.

- Competition among external actors is real, as seen for instance in Saudi Arabian and Qatari policies. Economic benefits have caused alliances to shift, demonstrating that SSA countries are not passive actors. The EU has adopted a new approach based on "principled pragmatism" as indicated in the European Union Global Strategy, in part in response to competition from other actors.

- Several African countries are becoming increasingly more confident and employing their own strategies for interacting with and influencing one another. This

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shift should be taken into careful consideration by the external powers, and their perceptions of African capabilities in peace, security and development should be fine-tuned accordingly. The SSA region should not be considered a "field of operation," and post-colonial thinking should be left behind.

- The debate, however, revealed some challenging contradictions. For instance, African and Western actors should spend time listening to and learning from each other, understanding what "local ownership" means and acting as equal partners, but it is also necessary to respond in a timely manner to a very quickly changing environment. Colonial approaches should be abandoned, but historical ties will remain strong. Conditionality is relevant for promoting good governance, but it has consequences for sovereignty that should be taken into account.

Peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa: the case of Somalia

- Security in Somalia has improved in recent years, and al-Shabaab currently does not control any major towns. The country is on the right track and the next parliamentary elections represent a significant step forward for the country.
- Somali women are making a significant contribution to the peace process in the country. Since 1991, women have not had a formal place at the peace table, but many of them have been indirectly engaged in the process. For instance, Somali women have acted as "peace vectors" by reading poems – traditionally a male activity – invoking peace during clan meetings or in front of powerful men. Somali women

have also contributed to conflicts and violence in the country, for instance by joining militias or encouraging the men to fight. However, once they have seen the devastation brought by war, many of them have become advocates for peace.

- Interestingly, a survey conducted in 2014 in four Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) countries (Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda) found that peace and security was the main priority among women. The participation and influence of women in social and political life is rising, but some challenges still exist, especially lack of awareness about the rights of women and problems of exclusion.

- The main determinants for peace and security in Somalia were also outlined: the need for political will to prioritize reconciliation; land property and the return of illegally seized land and property (e.g. lands grabbed during the war); restoration of public services that have long been suspended; a united national army to replace clan armies or dependence on international peacekeeping forces; a central taxation system, still to be discussed within the new federalist system; and finally, putting an end to the ongoing glorification of the warlords and excluding them from leadership positions in the country.

- The panel also proposed five guidelines for the implementation of the peace process: the strengthening of territorial recovery, the consolidation of peace, the establishment of state control and of the social contract, and ownership of the state by the citizens. All these issues need to be handled in a comprehensive manner.

- The security sector remains a critical issue in Somalia. Building a strong Somali army has been very difficult because of the lack of stability and unity. In addition,

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the effectiveness of foreign support has been limited due to security issues and the weakness of political institutions. Al-Shabaab has been able to increase its strength based on well-trained troops, internal and external financial support and a defined ideology.

- The panellists also noted differences in approach and in the use of terminology between Somali and external actors. For instance, countering violent extremism (CVE) is a common expression in international politics but it can be understood in varying ways. For Somalis, many of whom practise resilience and face radicalization on a daily basis, it might seem ridiculous to attend remote training abroad on CVE or resilience. In addition, because many areas of Somalia are in fact safe, external actors should fine-tune their perceptions and representations of the country.

The EU, the US and the international strategic dimension of sub-Saharan Africa

- The EU and the US are key external actors, but they are not the only ones in Africa. The presence of many other active stakeholders makes cooperation among them even more important, specifically in the field of security. The EU and the US have at times adopted different approaches: in general, the EU has tended to work through regional organizations, due in part to its own nature, while the US has preferred to work bilaterally.
- The US approach toward Africa has been significantly altered in the past 20 years. The US disengaged following the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, and in 1994, after the Rwanda genocide, engaged in some new initiatives. However, the terrorist attacks on the

US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 1998 provided a new entry point. The George W. Bush administration focused on finding African solutions to African problems by shifting efforts from aid to trade. It was in this period that AFRICOM was established. The Obama administration generated great expectations, but he was reluctant, probably due to the accusations related to his Kenyan roots. His strategy was based on four pillars: the strengthening of democratic institutions, economic growth, peace and security, and the promotion of opportunity and development. The strategic importance of Africa for the US in aspects beyond security emerged from the panel discussion.

- However, as the EU and the US currently are the main security providers, they should coordinate their efforts in this field. The European and American strategies do coincide in some ways, but it remains unclear how these strategies could be coordinated and how they could avoid conflicting with those of other international actors.

- The panel also discussed the new African protagonism and the importance for international actors to keep their feet on the ground in order to truly understand local dynamics. The turnover rate among international representatives is often high in Africa, and these individuals often lack basic cultural and anthropological knowledge relating to the region. Even the US often does not have a full understanding of operational details in Africa, for instance in the political sector.

A consensus emerged from the conference that while Sub-Saharan Africa remains a region plagued by security challenges, including terrorism, state fragility and piracy,

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the prospects for growth and development in key African countries are creating a new dynamism in the continent. The increasing assertiveness of some African states and the proliferation of external actors with vested interests in the resources of the region have made it imperative that both the EU and the US revise their approaches and find new avenues for cooperation with each other and with other international partners. The ultimate aim is to reshape the relationship between the West and SSA in a way that is more equal and beneficial for all.

Photos from the conference "The EU, the US and the International Strategic Dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa" held in Nairobi on 8 December 2016

The EU, the US and the international strategic dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa:
Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa

Nairobi, December 08, 2016

Hotel Villa Rosa Kempinski

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABC	Agência brasileira de cooperação
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfIF	Africa Investment Facility
AFRICOM	US Africa Command
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APRRP	African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
ATDC	Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center
ATLASUR	South Atlantic Naval Exercise
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CCMD	Combatant Command

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTARC	Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell
CDB	China Development Bank
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPLP	Comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DEIK	Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey
DoD	US Department of Defence
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EMBRAPA	Empresa brasileira de pesquisa agropecuária
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ERM	Early Response Mechanism
EU	European Union
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
Exim	China Export-Import Bank
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization

FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGS	Somalia Federal Government
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FtF	Feed the Future Initiative
FYP	Five-Year Plan
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Countries
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
HLCGD	High Level Consultative Group in Development
HoA	Horn of Africa
IAHS	Interim Administration for Hir-Shabelle
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IBSAMAR	India, Brazil, South Africa Naval Exercise
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IGA	Interim Galmudug Administration
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IHH	Internationale Humanitäre Hilfsorganisation
IJA	Interim Jubaland Administration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ISIL	Islamic State of Syria and the Levant
ISWA	Interim Southwest Administration
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Governance
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation

MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIC	Middle-Income Country
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the DRC
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPF	Multi-Partner Fund
MPTF	United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	Natural resource management
OBOR	One Belt, One Road
ODA	Official Development Aid
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PALOP	Paises africanos de lingua oficial portuguesa
PBF	Peace Building Fund

PERPFAR	US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PSG	Peace-building and State-building Goal
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAT	Underwater Offence Group
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
SEZs	Special Economic Zones
SGI	Security Governance Initiative
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SITF	Somali Infrastructure Trust Fund
SNA	Somali National Army
SNA	Somalia National Army
SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TCG	Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Giresun

TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNASUR	Union de Naciones Suramericanas
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress
VBIEDs	Vehicle-Borne Explosive Devices
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
YTB	Presidency for Turks abroad and related communities
ZOPACAS	Zone for Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic

The strategic significance of Sub-Saharan Africa has increased considerably in recent decades, with various international actors establishing diversified yet increasingly important levels of engagement in the region. Countries such as Brazil, China, the Gulf states and Turkey have a significant presence in Africa, and some of them have well-established historical ties to the region as well. This edited publication – as the final result of a project on "The EU, the US and the International Strategic Dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa: Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa" – aims at identifying the role of key external powers in promoting peace, security and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis pays attention to how African countries build their own capacities to deal with multiple partners and the new position in which they find themselves. In addition, a concrete and region-specific analysis is dedicated to the Horn of Africa and to Somalia in particular. The publication also provides recommendations for the external powers examined, with specific attention devoted to the European Union and the United States.