


The Middle East in London

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THIS ISSUE: YOUTH PRECARIETY IN MENA • MENA youth and the need for a political economy approach • (Arab) Youth, a versatile government category? • Middle East youth as 'the Precariat'? • Youth in the southern and eastern Mediterranean • Securitising youth migration to the EU and the Gulf • Youth prospects in Lebanon • The curious blend of youth participation and distrust in institutions • The unfinished story of youth precarity and struggle in Greece • **PLUS** Reviews and events in London



Hani Zurob, 'Flying Lesson #04'. Acrylic and pigments on canvas, 200X160cm, 2010. From 'Flying Lesson & Waiting Series', 2009 - ongoing. Courtesy of the artist

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The Middle East in London

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Dear Reader

Members of the Gaza Parkour Team jump off a wall at the beach.
Photo by Eoghan Rice / Trocaire from Ireland

Maria Cristina Paciello, Daniela Pioppi, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)

Today, precariousness seems to be the *leitmotiv* of life for young people in the Middle East and North Africa. This precariousness is experienced differently depending on a young person's social class, gender, place of residence, citizenship status, etc., but overall the current generation is faced with a much more difficult transition into adult life than their predecessors due to a variety of factors: insecure and low quality jobs or unemployment, constrained mobility, delays and difficulties in forming a family, finding a house and becoming independent. Underwriting all of this is a general *uncertainty* about the future.

This special issue of *The Middle East in London* focusses on different aspects of youth precariousness (or precarity) in MENA – from employment problems to migration to recent forms of youth activism – drawing from the results of a three-year-long research project, POWER2YOUTH, funded by the European Union's Seventh Framework Program and coordinated by the Istituto

Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. The project, carried out by a consortium of some 12 EU and south-east Mediterranean academic institutions including SOAS, sought to offer a critical understanding of youth in the south-east Mediterranean region through a comprehensive interdisciplinary and multi-level approach.

In Insight, we call for a political economy approach when dealing with youth and youth problems, whilst Myriam Catusse and Blandine Destremau analyse the varying definitions of 'the Youth' that actually seem to *institute* the youth across a series of divides (class, gender, etc.), thereby giving rise to a conception that favours governing parts of them deemed dangerous.

Linda Herrera (taking up the work of Guy Standing) argues that the youth of today are the new 'Precariat', and she criticises market-oriented policies that overstate the value of self-employment and entrepreneurship among the youth. Jon Pedersen and Åge A. Tiltnes present some of the results of the POWER2YOUTH

youth-survey (carried out in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon and Turkey) on issues of informality and precariousness. Françoise De Bel-Air looks at the securitisation of youth migration by the EU and Gulf countries. Mona Harb describes the situation of Lebanon's youth: trapped in a political system sealed by hegemonic political-sectarian parties. Amid this bleak picture, she finds some tenuous hope in recent youth initiatives. Nadine Sika reports on a summary of her empirical research that shows general youth distrust in political institutions has developed into new and unconventional forms of political participation in the region.

Finally, the issue concludes with Maria M. Mexi's analysis of the youth struggle in Greece, part of POWER2YOUTH's comparative effort that reaches outside of MENA, underlining the similarities of youth conditions and struggles in MENA and southern European countries.

Maria Cristina Paciello and Daniela Pioppi stress the need to study youth in context to avoid analyses that are reductive or romanticised

MENA youth and the need for a political economy approach



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Egypt

The current socio-economic and political crisis in the MENA region affects the whole of society with a greater burden on medium to lower social strata and other disadvantaged groups. But it is the youth of today who are caught in the eye of the storm; it is through the generation now entering the labour market that a number of 'normative ideas about responsibilities and entitlements of the previous welfare and developmental state are being re-negotiated' (Sukarieh and Tannock, *Youth Rising?*, 2015). The youth phase offers a privileged vantage point from which to observe broader processes of social change and continuity. It is during this time – when young men and women begin to make their transitions into adult life – that we are more likely to see change and continuity in working conditions, family forms and patterns of social inequalities.

Important as it is today the focus on youth, prevailing approaches to youth and youth problems in the region are problematic in many respects, most of all because they fail to place changing youth conditions, and the narratives associated with the youth category itself, into existing power relations and political economy processes.

It is the youth of today who are caught in the eye of the storm

A political economy of youth

Prevailing explanations of youth problems tend to emphasise the severity of demographic pressures (youth bulge) and a lack of adequate skills to meet market requirements (the so-called 'education-employment nexus'). In making youth employment problems purely a matter of individual characteristics and/or deficiencies of the education system, such analyses completely hide the structural factors behind the spread of precariousness and insecurity among the youth. Our understanding of youth-related problems needs instead to be set within the context of the structural transformations induced by the local implementation of neoliberal globalisation in the last three decades.

Neoliberal reforms have significantly reconfigured state-labour-capital relations in the MENA region in ways that have dramatically transformed the landscape of work. With the adoption of structural adjustment policies since the mid-1980s, incumbent regimes have abandoned the policy of offering jobs to university graduates leading to an increase in youth unemployment. Labour laws were revised to deregulate the labour market by ensuring

freedom of hiring and firing, restricting the right of strike and allowing the use of fixed-term contracts – which have become the most common type of contract among young people. The integration of the region into the international market, rather than creating quality job opportunities for educated young people, has been based on low-cost outsourcing in unskilled activities, often tapping into a reserve pool of young female labour.

Moreover, neoliberal restructuring has also reinforced labour fragmentation due to its selective and uneven implementation across space and time. Thus, while living a precarious existence, youth are today increasingly divided and differentiated along national, racial and gender lines. Inequalities between cities and rural areas have increased since governments have generally prioritised urban centres to promote capital accumulation.

The gradual dismantling of the welfare state has also further fragmented the experience of being young. Under the influence of international agencies such as the World Bank, reform of the educational system favoured the privatisation of universities which has augmented key structural inequalities. Public policies – such as the plethora of job creation programmes

Any analysis of youth problems and of the forms and dynamics of youth political participation needs to be placed in a broader context

established in the 1990s-2010s – have exacerbated precariousness and reinforced fragmentation by specifically targeting a particular subset of youth.

In addition, while pressure on youth to migrate has deepened under the drive of neoliberal reforms and war, the securitisation of migration policies in the EU (particularly since 2000) has furthered employment precariousness and insecurity with the spread of temporary and seasonal labour migration programmes for low-skilled workers. Yet, by excluding certain nationalities and prioritising specific groups of migrants (highly skilled workers and researchers), the securitisation of migration policies in the EU and the Gulf also appears to have reinforced labour market fragmentation among youth within MENA countries. The category of youth, therefore, hides a multiplicity of employment relations that are likely to produce very different experiences of 'being young' and trajectories to adulthood.

Youth as an actor of change?

Any major reconfiguration of state-labour-capital relations has an impact on every aspect of socio-political life and on the forms and dynamics of political mobilisation that are shaped today by increased inequalities, social fragmentation and overwhelming state repression. The 2010-2011 wave of popular uprisings in the Arab region were largely interpreted as being 'youth-led revolts'. All of a sudden, the global political discourse was full of references to 'youth revolutionary potential', 'youth agency' and 'youth transformative power'. Such a positive enthusiasm and emphasis on the youth's political role – both by global actors and, sometimes, by the protestors themselves – should not go unnoticed; in fact, it is in need of a critical analysis.

The idea of 'youth' as a coherent 'political actor' could be misleading in many respects. First of all, if taken as a whole, the current generation is facing a more difficult transition to adulthood with respect to previous ones; but young people are of course as diverse as the entire society. The use of the youth category could thus have a depoliticising effect, hiding other – we would say more relevant and certainly more

challenging – social divides, such as class. Also, the emphasis on youth has the effect of downplaying the role of adults and adult-led organisations and of interpreting current social conflicts as *intergenerational*, glossing over more significant issues of political economy that concern the youth and the society at large.

The uncritical appraisal of the youth's political role is also inextricably related to the liberal overemphasis of individual agency, thereby systematically downplaying the importance of well-structured mass organisations and underestimating the strength of power structures which, according to the narrative associated with youth, could be easily disrupted by the sudden mobilisation of atomised masses of (young) individuals.

Furthermore, the use of the youth category conceals a marked preference for certain forms of mobilisation more compatible with liberal civic values than other, more disruptive and less palatable ones. So, for instance, 'youth movements' are generally identified with the so-called 'new social movements': loose networks of techno-savvy individuals, urban and middle class-based. Other forms of mobilisation, such as the variety of Islamist movements or labour-based mobilisations, are either not considered 'youth movements' or – in agreement with the binary approach often associated with youth – are considered to be an expression of the 'bad', 'unsupervised',

'ill-guided' youth in need of control and repression. In order to understand recent waves of mobilisation in the region, to which young men and women are participating in various forms, we need to consider a much larger geography of protest, a geography in which 'the youth' appears to be more of a 'constructed' category (too broad and too narrow at the same time) than a political actor in itself.

To sum up, any analysis of youth problems and of the forms and dynamics of youth political participation needs to be placed in a broader context, in contrast to narrow prevailing approaches that have so far stressed the 'challenges of the youth bulge' or, paradoxically, 'the enormous potential of youth collective mobilisation', while underestimating, and sometimes hiding, existing power relations and political economy processes.

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Egypt

Myriam Catusse and Blandine Destremau on how the various definitions of youth can be used to govern, delegitimise and dissimulate segmentations of young people and their problems



© M. Catusse

Headquarters of the Democratic Constitutional Rally, Sfax, Tunisia, August 2013

(Arab) Youth, a versatile government category?

Who are the youth in Arab countries? What kind of specific problems are they dealing with? Can we tell them from their age, their looks, their presence in public spaces? Which public bodies and institutions care about them, and what for?

A team of researchers working on six countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey – examined these questions within the framework of the European-funded project POWER2YOUTH: Freedom, Dignity and Justice. We coordinated a body of research bearing on youth policies in four domains: employment, migration, family, and spatial planning, and the papers are available on the POWER2YOUTH website (Catusse and Destremau, *Governing Youth, Managing Society*, 2016).

After we noted the discrepancies in the definitions used by various institutions and organisations – from one country to another, between national institutions, as well as between national and international institutions, and depending on the issue at stake – we decided to tackle the questions ‘Who are the Youth?’ and ‘What does it mean to be young today?’.

In this short paper, we would like to explain how the varying definitions of ‘the Youth’ targeted by public policies actually

institute the youth across profound class, gender and territorial differentiations, and enable methods for governing the parts of them deemed ‘dangerous’ or ‘in need of control’. Even more: implementing ‘Youth policies’ can be a way to neutralise intergenerational issues, to dissimulate the collective problems of ‘young people’, and to disguise other kinds of social, economic, political or cultural inequities.

There is no such thing as THE youth!

The 2011 social upheavals experienced in the MENA region have commonly been associated with generational movements or explained by the ‘youth bulge’. MENA is the second youngest region in the world, after sub-Saharan Africa, but its countries display major disparities. Furthermore, all of these societies have experienced dramatic economic, social and anthropological transformations in recent decades.

Today, legions of young men and women are entering the workforce at a time when opportunities are limited, unemployment is high and public policy is constrained, due to structural adjustments and the economic crisis. Compared with the

previous generation, urbanisation rates and educational levels are historically high, marriage patterns have been disrupted and fertility rates are dropping. As Fargues’ early work has shown, the patriarchal system is shaken with the demographic transition, and with it inter-family relations and some political foundations (*Généralions arabes. Alchimie du nombre*, 2000). More recently, too, Courbage and Todd in *Le rendez vous des civilisations* (2007) have argued against culturalist interpretations of the clash of civilisations, while others have concluded that the ‘youth’ of the region are the new ‘dangerous classes of globalisation’.

Our work shows how the category of ‘youth’, far from stemming from nature and biology, is derived from the construction of a public issue haunted by implicit assumptions, marked by the 2011 uprisings and their wake and pegged to sectoral policies. ‘Youth’ appears as a euphemism, or a shielded category, for public action; there is no such thing as ‘the youth’.

Naming, categorising and governing

Regardless of its constitution, the image of the youth bulge remains useful for

‘Youth’ appears as a euphemism, or a shielded category, for public action; there is no such thing as ‘the youth’

explaining youth problems. We contend it is considered negatively only because youth are conceived of as a burden and a problem, not a resource.

Public policy discourses frame 'youth' in a particularly dualistic construction: on the one hand, as a political and security threat, a social and economic burden; on the other hand, as resources for the future, creativity and modernity. To a large extent, this strong cleavage reflects (but dichotomises and simplifies) real differences, inequalities and modes of integration, especially between social classes and places of residency.

Beyond, public action elaborates various categories of persons, at which specific treatment will be directed. While the idealised portrait of well-bred, forward-looking, proactive, consuming and investing young men is promoted and disseminated by national and international public policies alike, young women are supposed to navigate between, at best, professional achievement, and for most, tending to the family. Except in established frameworks, such as 'unemployed graduates', those who are incompatible with this happy picture are made inaudible and invisible through a range of political systems that include public discourses, statistics and policies of 'containment' resembling the walls erected along the streets of the cities to hide the slums.

If most young people are affected by one policy or another, according to their characteristics (gender, place of residence, education, standard of living, etc.), integration and framing schemes distribute them differentiated positions according to explicit or implicit processes of positive and negative selection. Hence, public policies are governing people's (young and elder) behaviour, representations and

Public policy generates, reproduces and legitimises inequalities between the various groups of youth

interrelations, through the mobilisation of tools that *reflect and produce* segmentation, intersections and fragmentations.

The first level of control consists of a regulatory framework – particularly regarding the family, gender and sexual norms – which intersects the area of employment. The second level is the institutional framework where sports policies, 'civil society' and 'development' (euphemisms for a liberal vision of self-realisation), entrepreneurship and consumerism, occupy a prominent place. Finally, governing 'youth' implies police repression and militarised intervention: multiple initiatives and social movements are subdued by force; young artists, journalists, bloggers, or those claiming alternative forms of freedom, find themselves exposed to outright violence from the authorities.

Hence, public action actually *institutes categories* framed by sub-narratives, as though they were real sociological groups. Public action is thus performative: by targeting them, it actually *generates* various types of youth, supposed to embody specific characteristics and to *deserve* various policies. In this perspective, public policy also generates, reproduces and legitimises inequalities between the various groups of youth.

Institutional stickiness

Public policy perpetuates a tension between two approaches: that of 'the problems of youth' and that of 'youth as a problem'. Urban youth, angry and frustrated by economic, political and social crises are

viewed as threatening, potential criminals or terrorists.

Regardless of warning signals, the six country studies – which survey a range of contexts including examples such as the regime change in Tunisia or the ephemeral experience of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt – demonstrate that five years after the first uprisings, no major changes have come about in public action. Instead, they highlight forms of 'institutional stickiness', described by Crouch and Farrel in their 2004 work 'Breaking the Path of Institutional Development? Alternatives to the New Determinism' (*Rationality and Society*, vol. 16, no. 1, 2004), and a reinforcement of previous trends with flagrant continuity after 2011.

Performing actions that generate and manipulate the categories of 'youth' and 'generation' seem to feed legitimacy for the policy-producing institutions and the policies themselves. Beyond, by muffling some of the tensions arising from fragmented social landscapes riddled with inequality, frustration and potential social conflict, they nurture a social, political and economic order that controls socio-economic mobility and protects the reproduction of power structures and relationships.

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
Blandine Destremau is a Sociologist, Research Director at the Iris/EHESS (Paris). She has co-authored Women and Civil Society Capacity Building in Yemen: a Research Perspective on Development (CEFAS/CNRS, Yemen, 2012). She has also edited L'Etat face aux débordements du social au Maghreb (IREMAM/Karthala, 2010)



Aram ash-Sharif (Esplanade of the Mosques), Jerusalem, November 2013

The old ideas are not working. *Linda Herrera* describes how MENA can better serve its youth and pave the way to opportunity and security

Middle East youth as 'the Precariat'?



Cover of the Arab Human Development Report 2016

In 2011, the year millions of people poured onto streets across the Arab states demanding 'bread, freedom and social justice', the western media and scholarly community dramatically changed its discourse on youth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Previously, it was common to read cautionary and alarmist descriptions of the frustrated 'generation in waiting' (for jobs and opportunities), who were 'at risk of Islamist extremism' and in need of 'democracy promotion' programmes. Suddenly in 2011, young people were rebranded as 'the non-violent champions of democracy' and the tech savvy and liberal 'Facebook youth'. I would argue that all these characterisations of youth were ideologically driven. A more accurate – if decidedly less shrill – term to describe the collective class of youth in all their diversity would be 'the Precariat'.

The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class by Guy Standing hit the bookstands in

2011 as the uprisings were unfolding. Standing, a labour economist and Professorial Research Associate at SOAS is not a specialist on the MENA region *per se*, yet the book describes the crisis of youth and the conditions of life and labour more lucidly and forcefully than the key policy literature on the region, a notable example being the *Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality*.

The AHDR report draws on a market-based language of youth empowerment and life choices that date back to the 1990s. It essentially extracts notions of 'power' from the concept of 'empowerment'. The term is imbued with individual self-reliance, the assumption being that young people can take charge of their own lives and become effective agents of change, irrespective of structural impediments.

The AHDR report downplays the

potential collective power in 'youth' by employing the terms 'youth' and 'young people' interchangeably (p. 25). The report does not make a distinction between 'young person', an individual of a particular age with no specific relation to history, and 'youth' which signifies a social collectivity similar to social class or ethnicity, and which occupies a distinct place in power structures and historical processes. This distorted framing of empowerment advances a development model in which young people are encouraged to break their collective bonds as 'youth' in exchange for facing the future as competing individuals.

The report stresses that policymakers and educators 'should strive to achieve a good fit between the output of educational institutions and the demands of the labour market' by, among other things, promoting 'entrepreneurial and management capacity and the value of self-employment' (p. 184).

We must ask, 'What are the demands of the labour market to which schools and universities must answer?' As Standing lays out in his 2016 book, *The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay*, the market favours

In 2011, young people were rebranded as 'the non-violent champions of democracy' and the tech savvy and liberal 'Facebook youth'

Evidence is mounting that youth entrepreneurship, while it clearly benefits a few in the short term, is more likely to lead the young into a debt trap

flexible, short-term and cheap labour; it thrives on educated, unstable and energetic people who are willing to intern, volunteer, work long hours, undercut the value of their labour, work remotely, continuously retrain and not make demands for benefits, collective bargaining or job security.

As the mainstream policy community focusses obsessively on educational outputs, testing and youth entrepreneurship, it misses the opportunity to retool education as a place to cultivate citizens, strengthen social solidarity, and provide a space for communities to imagine and experiment with solutions to the intractable challenges of our times.

Entrepreneurship is not the solution

It is not clear what percentage of the one hundred million 15-29 year olds in the Arab World, a third of the population, is supposed to become self-employed entrepreneurs. Such a push is reminiscent of the late 1980s, when UN agencies, global finance institutions and non-governmental organisations joined forces on a massive scale to promote microfinance to alleviate poverty. After more than three decades of experimentation and data collection, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the fact that microfinance does not cure poverty and has been called 'a death trap' and 'disaster' for many. Small-scale, temporary income generation cannot be a substitute for stable work and social protection.

Likewise, evidence is mounting that youth entrepreneurship, while it clearly benefits a few in the short term, is more likely to lead the young into a debt trap. We know from the student debt crisis in the United States and Britain that debt leads the young further into insecurity, feelings of hopelessness and precarity.

The pages of the report are peppered with examples of success stories, the dream being that any Arab entrepreneur could be the next Steve Jobs. While youthful drive and ambition are positive qualities, it is unfair and disingenuous to propagate the myth that anyone with an idea, grit and determination can be a successful entrepreneur.

Economist Mariana Mazzucato has written extensively on how companies in the 'new economy', such as Apple, Google and others, 'that like to portray themselves

as the heart of US entrepreneurship, have very successfully surfed the wave of US government-funded investments'. The Internet, GPS, touchscreen display and Siri are among the 'startups' that benefitted from steep US government funding. If Arab governments and businesses are serious about youth entrepreneurship, they should provide resources and support organisations to guide and support young talent, not lead them down a road of borrowing and debilitating debt.

What is a reasonable bargain for youth?

Today's youth in the MENA region, to borrow Guy Standing's words, 'are not offered a reasonable bargain'. If we listen to, respect and take seriously the voices of youth that rang out six years ago during the uprisings, we will hear that these old ideas are not working. If the international development community wants to sincerely work with youth and governments to advance security, dignity, livelihoods and democracy, it must exercise more self-reflection and be willing to accept at least some responsibility for misguided policies that have contributed to the sorry state of affairs. Standing posits that since youth 'make up the core of the Precariat' they are the ones who 'will have to take the lead in forging a viable future for it' (2011, p. 113). Let us, citizens, scholars and members of the policy

community, commit to supporting youth in their collective struggles to reach a road to opportunity, security and dignity, rather than push them further along a perilous path of precarity. It is the only way.

A different version of this piece was published on the website *Mada Masr* on 11 February 2017 with the title 'The precarity of youth: Entrepreneurship is not the solution'

Linda Herrera is a Professor in the Department of Education Policy, Organization & Leadership and Director of the Global Studies in Education program at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Her recent publications include On Silencing the Next Generation: Legacies of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution on Youth Political Engagement, Arab Youth: Disruptive Generation of the 21st Century? (2015), Revolution in the Age of Social Media (2014) and Wired Citizenship (2014). She curates the website for global citizenship education, Democracy Dialogue (www.democracydialog.com)

President Obama, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and three entrepreneurs sit on a panel at the Global Entrepreneurship Summit held 22-24 June 2016 at Stanford University in California, USA. GES Photo



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Unemployment, job insecurity and a lack of trust in institutions plague MENA's youth. *Jon Pedersen* and *Åge A. Tiltnes* explain the conditions that drive some young people to emigrate

Youth in the southern and eastern Mediterranean: between informality and precariousness



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'Challenge' by Peter Hudson. This photograph was taken in Muscat, Oman in April 2015

They want to leave. That is the stark reality of youth attitudes towards their situation in the six south-east Mediterranean countries covered by recent POWER2YOUTH surveys. Our research shows that in Tunisia as many as 34 per cent of youth respondents intend to move abroad to work or seek work in the coming five years, and while other countries have lower percentages, those wanting to leave are still substantial: Morocco, 27 per cent; Palestine, 24 per cent; Lebanon, 22 per cent; Egypt, 14 per cent and Turkey, 7 per cent. The figures are higher for men than women, reflecting the much higher male labour force participation rate in this region.

One reason for the desire to leave is high unemployment – young people cannot find jobs, or jobs they consider satisfactory. Reported unemployment among youth ranges from 20 per cent in Lebanon to respectively 50 and 51 per cent in Palestine and Tunisia. Furthermore, a substantial

number of young housewives and students not seeking work would have entered the labour market if they were offered a part-time or full-time job with a decent salary, suggesting that the 'true' unemployment rate is even higher.

However, unemployment is a characteristic of those that have not found a job they deem suitable and who can afford to be without one because they enjoy some sort of safety net: savings, support from family or other sources. Those who cannot afford to be without a job *must* work, and may accept conditions they would rather avoid.

The new precariousness

The labour market of the high-income welfare societies of Europe is changing. For many years, the rule was traditional,

relatively safe, full-time jobs with entitlements to social security within the formal sector. However, precariousness in the form of temporary jobs is on the rise. In contrast, low-income societies are characterised by labour markets with a high degree of informality: jobs without formal contracts, outside of licensing and taxation, unprotected by legal frameworks, and without welfare benefits.

Middle-income countries like those in the south-eastern Mediterranean share both characteristics. Informality remains and is sometimes on the rise, such as in Palestine, whilst modern forms of precariousness are being introduced in the labour markets. Thus, young people are faced with a double bind: the traditional informality and the new precariousness.

Those who cannot afford to be without a job must work, and may accept conditions they would rather avoid

The extent of traditional informality can be indicated by the relatively high degree of self-employment, i.e. between 20 and 30 per cent. In contrast, the average for the EU countries is 16.5 per cent.

The new precariousness can be approximated by considering people working in the formal sector with only temporary jobs or no contract, something that is the situation for 43 per cent of the youth employed in the government sector in both Tunisia and Turkey. The figures for the other countries are lower, but still substantial with Morocco at 13 per cent, Lebanon at 19 per cent and Palestine at 36 per cent. Not surprisingly, the situation in the private sector is worse: Lebanon apparently has the best conditions with 40 per cent of the youth having permanent jobs with contracts, while at the other end of the scale only 7 per cent of privately employed youth in Palestine have a permanent job with a contract. Overall, three quarters of young Lebanese and Turks have a job they consider permanent, which is twice the proportion of Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

Young people in the southern and eastern Mediterranean tend to work long hours with a typical work week lasting 40-50 hours, and in some countries (Palestine, Tunisia, Lebanon, Turkey) more than one in ten works in excess of 60 hours per week. Given the informality of employment relations, it should come as little surprise that young people's access to non-pay benefits is limited. In Palestine, for instance, only 24 per cent have paid sick leave, 12 per cent have a right to maternity/paternity leave, 13 per cent report access to a lump-sum

The fear of losing one's job is widespread amongst the young

retirement pension whilst 9 per cent have retirement benefits in the form of monthly stipends. Owing to the higher formalisation of employment relations, the situation is considerably better in Lebanon and Turkey, somewhat better in Morocco and Tunisia, but even poorer in Egypt, where three quarters of working youth report no employment benefits at all.

The employment incomes of youth captured by the POWER2YOUTH surveys are meagre; a median net monthly earning of €105 in Egypt and €357 in Palestine. Notwithstanding such low income levels, many youth express satisfaction with their earnings: Lebanon, 75 per cent; Turkey, 68 per cent; Morocco, 60 per cent; Tunisia, 45 per cent; Palestine, 43 per cent; and Egypt, 41 per cent. This paradox should, of course, be understood in circumstances characterised by excessive unemployment and high poverty rates: some income is better than no income. Highlighting the precarious employment relation in this region, the fear of losing one's job is widespread amongst the young and voiced by 72 per cent in Egypt, 67 per cent in Palestine, 64 per cent in Tunisia, 63 per cent in Turkey, and 53 per cent in both Morocco and Lebanon.

Developed welfare states have established safety nets both within and outside of the work place through a complex web of state regulations, labour union efforts and civil society participation. Often a tripartite cooperation of the state, labour

unions and employer organisations has been central. However, in the south-eastern Mediterranean, the surveys show that the youth of today has lost or never developed confidence and trust in such institutions. For example, a majority of youth, ranging from 71 per cent in Egypt to 90 per cent in Tunisia express little or no confidence at all in labour unions. Similarly, 88 per cent of Tunisian and 89 per cent of Lebanese youth do not trust their governments. Trust is higher in Turkey, with 'only' 49 per cent of young people having little or no trust in the government. (Dis)trust in local government is at about the same level as (dis)trust in central government, and trust in political parties, the parliaments, the civil service and humanitarian organisations is similarly dismal. Asked to assess the efforts of their respective governments to secure employment for young people, the percentage of youth who are very or rather dissatisfied varies from a 'low' of 50 per cent in Turkey to 83 per cent in Palestine and 89 per cent in Tunisia.

In light of the combined challenges of unemployment, informality and precariousness, this lack of trust in key social institutions that in principle should help them address such problems means youth in the southern and eastern Mediterranean see few options in their struggles to make a life for themselves at home. Given these conditions, migration is a logical response.

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'Crowd' by Jacqueline Mahan. This photograph was taken in Taksim in Istanbul, Turkey in 2016

Françoise De Bel-Air examines changing policies towards MENA youth migration and their implications

Securitising youth migration to the EU and the Gulf: a time bomb?



Schengen VISA

Youth migration from Arab and Muslim countries is today the main electoral target for populist movements in the West. The political and economic tensions of the 2000s that led to the Arab revolts in 2011, ensuing regime changes, economic crises and socio-political instability indeed spurred growing migration pressure from the Arab region, as witnessed during the years 2015 and 2016. Yet, migration from Muslim countries had been seen as a security threat in the West since the early 2000s, following the 9/11 attacks. Consequently, immigration policies increasingly aimed at limiting migration and at controlling its composition. Have EU policies effectively shaped the size and composition of migration from the MENA region since then? Do alternative destinations to the EU exist for these young migrants, for instance the Gulf States? How will the sealing of EU (and the Gulf States')

borders affect these regions' security?

Most North African and Turkish migrants choose Europe as a major destination. However, migrating there is increasingly difficult for these young nationals. First, the Schengen Agreements (1985) led to the strengthening of EU's external borders, to counterbalance the creation of an area of free circulation within the Union. Second, while the 'Europeanisation' of the migration agenda emphasised migrants' rights, promoted development in migrant-sending countries, and looked to attract more immigrant labour to 'eliminate bottlenecks in the labour market', it was also influenced by populist stances against EU enlargement. The events of 9/11 spurred suspicion towards Muslim populations, which further enhanced the 'securitisation' of the migration issue over the 2000s. Curbing 'irregular' migration thus became the fourth pillar of EU migration policies.

Existing rules of legal entry and sojourn in the EU were strengthened and the sending countries came under pressure to control the exit of their own nationals, as well as that of nationals from third countries transiting through their territory on their way to Europe. This *de facto* 'externalisation' of EU border control was reinforced in response to the Arab revolts, especially with the signing of Mobility Partnerships with Morocco (2013), Tunisia and Jordan (2014), and with a Readmission Agreement passed with Turkey (December 2013). The latter links the pursuit of Turkey's EU accession process, and eventually the visa-free access to Schengen space for Turkish nationals, to the country's management of irregular migrants – i.e. their arrests in Turkey and the readmission of those captured inside EU borders.

These policies had dire consequences for young Arabs and Turks. Eurostat records indicate, first, a drop in the number of new residency permits granted to these nationals. Moroccans, for instance, received 203,670 permits in 2008 and only 96,099

Following the 9/11 attacks, immigration policies increasingly aimed at limiting migration and at controlling its composition

Ignoring the socio-political factors that still act as 'push' factors commits the EU to privileging regimes that efficiently control their borders but display anti-democratic tendencies

in 2015. This indicates the progressive closure of avenues of legal immigration to the EU. Second, the structure of migration flows changed. The policy objective of 'better management of legal migration' streamlined specific categories of migrants. Among those immigrating for the purpose of working ('remunerated activities'), the 'highly skilled workers' and 'researchers' were the only ones to increase in numbers since 2008. In general, however, work is no longer the main avenue of migration to the EU. As of 2015, 60 per cent of Tunisians entered the EU as 'family dependants', compared to 40 per cent in 2008; 74 per cent of them were joining a spouse or partner in the EU. Third, the dynamics of youth migration also changed and the duration of young migrants' stays in the EU have become shorter. The share of residency permits granted for less than one year increased notably between 2008 and 2015, from 22 to 40 per cent of all first permits granted to Turkish sojourners, for instance.

Destinations other than the EU also increasingly closed their doors to young MENA citizens. Australia's and Canada's point-based immigration systems allow only small numbers of highly-educated and skilled young migrants into these countries. The six Gulf States, the privileged destination for young Egyptians and Middle East Arabs, strictly limit family reunion and deny foreigners avenues for settlement, since these are considered guest labourers on limited duration contracts. Since 2011, various measures were enacted to limit the numbers of selected Arab nationals. Amid general economic slowdown due to a fall in oil prices, drastic workforce nationalisation measures were passed, which could make certain categories of migrant workers redundant. Egyptians in Saudi Arabia, for instance, are often employed in white-collar, skilled and semi-skilled technical fields; yet, these are increasingly claimed by unemployed Saudis. The political crises that sending and receiving countries faced since 2011 have also affected Arab expatriates in the Gulf: several waves of Lebanese expatriates were expelled from the UAE,

some under the accusation of sympathy with Hezbollah. Hiring bans have also targeted Tunisians, Syrians and Egyptians in several Gulf States, as authorities feared the migrants could import political strife from their countries to the Gulf.

Such policy trends affecting the size, structure and dynamics of MENA youth migration could have several socio-political consequences. First, the continuous contraction of immigration opportunities signals the persistence of a depoliticising approach to migration as essentially driven by attraction ('pull') factors of an economic nature. Therefore, ignoring the socio-political factors that still act as 'push' factors (poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, nepotism and political repression, not to mention wars) *de facto* commits the EU to privileging regimes that efficiently control their borders but display anti-democratic tendencies. The EU-Turkey Agreements of December 2013 and March 2016 illustrate that point. Second, the stigmatisation of unmarried, low-skilled, economically active, young male migrants combined with the prominence of family reunion schemes over labour immigration paradoxically seems to encourage migrant families' long-term settlement. Restricting circulation (exits and re-entries) may be the only way to keep EU borders sealed. However, constrained settlement may

benefit receiving societies less than the chosen mobility of young professionals. Third, indeed, the (imposed) increasingly short-term employment mobility schemes risk bringing EU policies closer to Gulf States' 'guest workers' schemes, which perform a 'subordinate inclusion' of migrants: these are economically included (yet, compelled to work under conditions and for wages that locals shun), but at the same time prevented from social and cultural inclusion in host societies. Last but not least, the lack of legal migration channels and the strengthened policy focus on deterring 'irregularity' overlook the well-documented fact that this combination of measures actually produces more irregular migration.

Freedom to move is enshrined in Article 13 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet, it does not include the right to enter and live in any other country, 'hence the central importance of immigration policy' (Skeldon, R., *Skilled Migration: Boon or Bane?*, 2009). However, current policy orientations are not only economically and politically frustrating for young migrants, they are also counterproductive for receiving societies.

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Mona Harb examines the fragmented and depoliticising public policy discourses on Lebanese youth, and how new youth coalitions are attempting to challenge the locked political system

Youth prospects in Lebanon: tenuous possibilities amidst a bleak reality



© M. Harb

Community meeting in a public garden organised by Beirut Madinati (the independent campaign for 2016 municipal elections), 2016

The Lebanese state functions essentially as a political system sealed by hegemonic political-sectarian parties operating in competition and complementarity. Attempts to break this hegemony (from within or outside the system) result in small gains (like the municipal elections in 1998) that do not fundamentally challenge the system's elaborate machinery. Perversely, many attempts, like the Independence Intifada, get co-opted and end up reinforcing

the system's domination. The Election Law, which could serve as a substantive channel for political and social change, is another domain where reforms have fallen short: parliamentary elections still obey a political sectarian logic that facilitates the reproduction of existing power groups and the consolidation of their sectarian territories. The Election Law excludes from voting people below 21 years of age. It also restricts that act of voting to a person's original birthplace, even though this is

often a remote village or town they left generations ago. For instance, out of the 1.4 million Lebanese who inhabit the city of Beirut, a mere 400,000 people choose their parliamentary representatives and their municipal councillors. Moreover, the procedure for changing one's place of registration is neither socially or politically acceptable, nor facilitated administratively.

Within this locked political economy, public officials have two discourses on youth. The first is a public discourse that celebrates a specific category of Lebanese youth, namely those who are successful and who manage to emigrate. They are usually highly educated and highly skilled young men and women destined to broaden their horizons and carry

Lebanese youth are constructed through fragmented lenses and are the recipients of policies that are partial, unresponsive and often irrelevant

Amidst this bleak reality, some youth initiatives do provide tenuous possibilities for political change

Lebanon's name to great heights. And, if they are really successful, they re-invest their capital in the country. They are, however, not expected to return or to vote while they are abroad.

The second public discourse stigmatises 'the other youth', those who are poorly educated and unskilled, those who are seen as potentially subversive troublemakers and those that need to be policed and controlled. These youngsters are often the main target of sectarian political parties, who present viable employment and social services opportunities. They are typically categorised into two gendered groups: single young men with few qualifications or skills and a propensity to become radicalised, and/or single young women who will marry late or not at all and become spinsters – both ultimately becoming burdens on society.

Lebanese youth are hence constructed through fragmented lenses and are the recipients of policies that are partial, unresponsive and often irrelevant. Young people are marginalised into a peripheral ministry – the Ministry of Youth and Sports – where their issues are reduced to social and cultural concerns and divorced from politics under the fake narrative of separating politics and conflict from society. The tentative attempt to develop a Youth National Policy ended up being co-opted by youth wings of political parties and diluted into a generic policy agenda. Instead, youth policies ought to be elaborated relationally, taking into account a multiplicity of indicators that reveal how being young is a diverse and subjective experience that intersects with other relationships and inequalities.

International donors address youth better, mostly via funding provided to NGOs which translates into political, social and rights-based initiatives. However, as Nagel and Staeheli argue in their article 'International Donors, NGOs, and the Geopolitics of Youth Citizenship in Contemporary Lebanon' (*Geopolitics*, 2017), donors mostly advance their own geopolitical agendas, promoting youth's depoliticisation 'by shifting political energies away from "sectarian politics" and towards pragmatic problem-solving at the local scale'. The private sector also contributes to the youths' depoliticisation by categorising them as future successful

entrepreneurs, who should aim to become competitive capitalists in the market economy.


Amidst this bleak reality, some youth initiatives do provide tenuous possibilities for political change. After the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, a new typology of youth groups emerged to challenge the sectarian and corrupt political system and to shape youth's political consciousness. These groups were keen on specific issues: reclaiming the Parliament as a legislative institution, protecting a threatened section of Beirut's coast, fighting a highway cutting across a heritage neighbourhood, reclaiming a closed-off public park, demanding a sound waste management policy or reclaiming the municipality as an organisation of city planning. Many of these groups operated as a loose coalition of individuals without clear leadership or a definite membership. Many intentionally avoided registering as NGOs and experimented with horizontal and flexible forms of organisational structures. They learned from other activist movements' experiences and tactics in the Arab region and beyond. They were keen on informing their actions with research and expertise and by investigating how the law can best serve their aims. They relied extensively on social media platforms to exchange information, debate, and mobilise. They appropriated streets and open spaces, claiming their rights to the city.

However, as expected, the ruling oligarchy intervened to protect its interests and did not let such mobilisations coalesce: Salloukh et al. in *The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon* (2015) discuss how they halted efforts using a range of strategies varying between co-optation, manipulation, neutralisation, and/or violent repression. The youth groups themselves did not manage to crystallise into a consistent, durable political movement that could plausibly challenge the oligarchy due to limited resources as well as internal dissent and/or rivalry. The fact that the oligarchy had systematically dismantled labour unions certainly does not help advance possibilities for political change either. The journey to change is indeed arduous, and it will require extensive and relentless efforts

– but the first seeds toward political change have been planted.

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Cover page of the Lebanese Youth Policy Document published in 2011



Nadine Sika outlines how distrust increased political and social activism among young people in MENA

The curious blend of youth participation and distrust in institutions



© Hema Ezzat

Cairo, Egypt

It is widely recognised that the youth played a key role in the Arab uprisings of 2010/11. While youth demonstrations and contestations have since receded, they have left an indelible mark: these young participants have developed new patterns for civic and political engagement.

After almost three years of extensive fieldwork with young people in the MENA region, especially in Egypt, my research (within the scope of the POWER2YOUTH project) reveals interesting trends. Whereas in Europe, distrust in institutions is largely associated with youth abstention from political participation, it seems that distrust in MENA is actually positively related to youth participation. While trust levels amongst young people in the region are generally very low, young activists

in particular tend to be more suspicious and less trustful than other youth in the region. The relations between distrust, civic and political engagement has developed into new and unconventional forms of participation in the region.

Trust in the military tends to be highest among MENA's youth, however, trust in other formal institutions – like the police, courts, parliaments, political parties, central and local governments – is rather very low when compared to the rest of the world. Trust levels are a reflection of young people's understandings and perceptions of the political systems they live in. For instance, young people in Turkey tend

to have higher levels of trust in their institutions than the rest of the MENA regimes. Trust in the courts is also very low in the region, and can be related to young people's perception of corruption. Young people argue that there is no due process and that the law is selectively applied against opposition figures in countries like Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey.

Young people perceive the political elite, whether pro-regime or in the opposition, to be corrupt. In Tunisia for instance, young members of political parties do not trust the political parties they belong to themselves. They argue that the leadership is interested in defending their personal

Young people perceive the political elite, whether pro-regime or in the opposition, to be corrupt

interests rather than the interests of the country at large. Some have asserted that in the 2014 parliamentary elections, young members were excluded from the Nida' Tunis party's electoral list. Unsurprisingly MENA parliaments have the lowest trust levels amongst young people worldwide. For instance in Morocco, young people are more interested in unconventional forms of civic and political participation rather than in formal political participation; some Moroccan activists have argued that they are not interested in participating in parliamentary elections, because they believe that political reforms are only cosmetic.

Interestingly enough, this rising distrust toward formal institutions in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings manifested in new ways of civic and political participation. In Lebanon, young people have time and again articulated their frustration with formal politics and with civil society organisations, as exemplified by the #YouStink movement. Though the movement initially mobilised against the rising environmental hazards and uncleanliness in Beirut, young activists' demands surpassed this. As the demonstrations developed, transparency and accountability in the governance process became one of their major demands. In Turkey young people who actively engaged in the Gezi Park protests

Young people are pushing the limits for more change, inclusion and civic and political participation

felt that it was impossible for them to change mainstream politics. Instead they chose to participate through informal channels and organisations, protest movements or demonstrations. After the Gezi Park protests, young activists continued to mobilise and work apart from the conventional political parties and civil society organisations. They developed new urban solidarity movements, like the Caferağa Dayanışması (Caferağa Neighbourhood Solidarity) whose main goal is to resist large urban projects.

Other new forms of participation can be seen in the development of small, issue-oriented initiatives by a small number of young activists. In Egypt for instance, in the two years following the uprising a plethora of small initiatives developed. Of these, the *No to Military Trials* initiative stands out: members would screen movies demonstrating the brutality of military trials against civilians in major city squares or in front of public buildings. In Turkey, *We Will Stop Femicide* was essential in bringing the issue of female murders to the forefront of political debates. Then there is the *Electronic Intifada* in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This 'Intifada' provides a Palestinian perspective on the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and makes it available to try to counterbalance Western, pro-Israeli media. In Morocco, initiatives like *Falsafa fi Zanka* ('Philosophy in the Street') and *Café Citoyen* ('Citizen Coffee Shop') develop youth-led cultural and intellectual associations to raise political and social awareness among Moroccan youth.

Though trust levels are very low and venues for youth participation are being closed off by MENA regimes, young people are still finding ways to alter and influence the public sphere through their mere presence and operation in society. Instead of abstaining from participation and waiting for MENA regimes to open political opportunities, many young people are carving out their own opportunities. Instead of waiting on the government to generate jobs, they have developed their own youth-led employment initiatives and small business start-ups. When the crackdown occurred on public demonstrations, street activism moved online and began crowd-funding. Young people are pushing the limits for more change, inclusion and civic and political participation. Though it seems that authoritarian rule is entrenched in MENA politics, these young activist demonstrate that people who are able to resist and instigate change through peaceful, indirect and incremental means still exist.

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Istanbul, Turkey

Maria M. Mexi looks back at the youth struggles in one of the deepest economic and political crises to affect a southern European country and draws parallels with the MENA region

The unfinished story of youth precarity and struggle in Greece



Image of Syntagma Square where 100,000 people gathered on 29 May 2011 to protest against austerity measures. Photograph by Kotsolis at English Wikipedia

'Precarity' is increasingly used to describe the detrimental combined effects of the economic crisis and of European austerity on youth transitions. Read through Bourdieu, it refers to a multidimensional 'weight of the world', embodying 'social suffering' through degradation of work, demoralisation and lavish social vulnerability. This process of material and immaterial deprivation is seen to provoke – similar to Polanyi's proposition relating to the social crisis of the 1930s – the contentious anti-precariety movements of today.

Translated into a social movements discourse, 'precariety' represents a signifier of struggle, describing a possible rallying point for resistance, an interpellation of youth social movements generating bold narratives for contesting old power structures – political, social and ideological – and uprooting older generations from their certainties. It encompasses contemporary

transformations and struggles of varying shapes and scales in different parts of the world: from the youth mobilisations of the Arab Spring to Brazil's Tropical Spring movement, and to Spain's and Greece's Indignants. These anti-precariety struggles appear to share common features in terms of contesting the relevance of policy environments in mitigating contemporary risks while denoting a disposition for agency and readiness to make youth voices better heard.

A critical question, embodied in contemporary youth anti-precariety struggles is how precariety mobilises contention and whether it embodies transformatory potential. Thus broader research on youth precariety, resistance and participation is emerging in social and political studies, bringing to the fore important questions and calling for a deeper understanding of youth agency and social change. When and how do anti-precariety activists achieve their goals?

Is protest mobilisation a sufficient condition for mitigating the unequal burdening of toxic risk experienced by young people globally?

These questions have been uppermost in the context of debates about the MENA youth after the Arab uprisings, and this article draws some parallels from the recent Greek experiences. The story of youth struggles through the recent Indignant movement in Greece offers a fecund point for understanding the potential and the limitations of precariety as a force driving transformation.

Over the past six years the combined effects of an acute economic crisis and the politics of austerity have contributed to increasing deterioration of youth working conditions and livelihoods in Greece. These spaces of precariety have sharpened resistance manifested in mass mobilisations, some of the most impressive instances of which have been the May-July 2011 protests of the Indignant movement (or *Aganiktismeni* in Greek). Inspired by the events of the Arab Spring, and in particular by the all-out occupation of Tahrir Square, Indignants occupied Syntagma Square in front of

Anti-precariety struggles appear to share common features in terms of contesting the relevance of policy environments while denoting a disposition for agency

None of the current political forces have so far managed to express the young people's voices or to convince young Greeks that they have viable answers to their problems

Parliament in Athens, erecting protest camps lasting for several weeks. Participation was overwhelming; at their height, these gatherings of the Indignants drew up to 100,000 people.

Young activists were prominent. The *Guardian* saw the active engagement of young Greek activists in the 2011 collective mobilisations as a basis for larger political agency: 'What marked out this summer's demonstrations in Athens' Syntagma Square and across the country was the high proportion of young people: hyper-educated, under-employed and radicalized... [It's] this class – the young, with a sense of being cheated out of a decent future – combined with the public sector workers facing job losses and drops in pensions and salaries, who combine into the most interesting political force'.

The Indignant movement was crucial in reinforcing young Greeks' growing readiness to adopt forms of activism as a way of striking back against precarity, which was seen as part of a 'failed system'. The main slogan of the Egyptian Arab Spring – 'Bread, freedom, human dignity' – which called for resistance against poor economic conditions, inequality and lack of democracy, was enthusiastically taken up by the young Greek Indignants. Just before the unfolding of the debt crisis of 2010, 'generation 700 Euros' was used as a term best codifying the challenges facing young Greeks, who were underpaid, debt-ridden and insecure. As the crisis started, precarity was instrumental in unleashing and legitimising a torrent of moral outrage, which gradually led to mobilising and radicalising young people not only toward the far-right but also toward the far-left of the political system; thereby, pointing to a 'two-way radicalization', which was particularly evident in the Indignants' mobilisations.

During the 2011 mobilisations, protestors had diverse and rather conflicting political claims and identities. Left-wing Indignants called for 'Direct democracy now!', distancing themselves from the Arab Spring protestors' call for 'Real democracy now' and emphasising that their claims were incompatible with the official institutions of representative democracy that had prioritised elites' interests over their own. For the (extreme) right-wing Indignants, politicians' management of the crisis was

not simply an issue of the inefficiency of representative democracy and social injustice. It was primarily an issue of national treason and the necessity of imposing punishment. Hence, while problems like poverty and increasing precarity had managed to unite numerous and diverse groups of young people (from working class to middle class strata), political priorities and value predispositions often competed in moulding their *we-ness* or collective identity (which usually defines a social movement).

Not only is the story of the Greek Indignant movement informative regarding how precarity experienced by young people may in certain conditions become a vehicle for mobilisation and resistance, but also in terms of how its transformative potential has been played out in the social and political domains. The movement's imprint upon the Greek psyche has had tremendous repercussions in restructuring the party system away from the domination of a two-party configuration, while allowing new or transformed political actors to enter the field with high prospects of success. Yet, none of the current political forces (left or right-wing) have so far managed to express the young people's voices or to convince a large proportion of young Greeks that they have viable answers to their problems.

Apart from its immediate impact on the party system, the 2011 Indignant movement does not seem to have brought about an overwhelming change in the sense of

upsetting the structural transformations causing youth precarity. Whereas young Greek Indignants were able to mobilise on the basis of what they did not like (lower pay, greater insecurity, unaccountable politicians), they were less successful in reflecting what they would like, as competing political identities prevented them from always identifying positively with each other. In this sense, young anti-precarity Indignants were not able to move from protest to politics by consolidating a shared *transformatory* agenda of the many different young people they represented and pushing this agenda into the policies and institutions of Greece.


Just like the aftermath of the Arab Spring has left many of its young protagonists disillusioned, today Greece's young people are still vulnerable and scorned. With major grievances still unmet, the story of the 2011 anti-precarity struggles appears, in Gramscian terms, to have heralded a moment of crisis where the old is dying but where what is yet to be born remains obscured.

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Over one million people gathered in Tahrir Square in February 2011 demanding that president Hosni Mubarak step down.
Photograph by Jonathan Rashad



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Discourses of Ideology and Identity: Social Media and the Iranian Election Protests

By Chris Featherman

Routledge, 2015, £95.00

Reviewed by Mohsen Biparva

Much has been said about the Iranian election of 2009 and the subsequent protests. The protesters' use of Twitter, a new phenomenon at the time, resulted in the unrest being dubbed a 'Twitter Revolution' (Andrew Sullivan, *The Atlantic*, 13 June 2009). There was much enthusiasm in the air about the liberating power of Twitter and its role in spreading democracy. Other observers, such as Evgeny Morozov in his book *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom* (2011), who labelled the aforementioned enthusiasm as 'cyber-utopianism' were not so optimistic about the whole process.

Discourses of Ideology and Identity, written by Chris Featherman, applies several theories to establish the link between language and 'new media' discourse by specifically looking at Iran and the 'Twitter Revolution'. It looks at the role of ICTs (Information and Communications Technology) in the shift towards network society and the role of language in globalisation. Social media – like Twitter – have brought new possibilities, but they have also increased the risk of information overload and reinforced the tendency to make snap judgements, side-lining a more lengthy engagement in social dialogue.

Featherman's book is mainly about Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which, at its heart, is a set of tools that enables researchers in the social sciences and humanities to analyse language materials, such as written texts or conversations. Essentially it entails borrowing tools from linguistics for use in

the social sciences. Discourse analysis in the social sciences in particular is informed by the works of Michel Foucault. With this Foucauldian orientation, CDA takes a critical attitude toward the structural relationships of power and dominance to try to disclose power relations, discriminations and inequalities inscribed in texts. Here language is not merely a tool or a medium of communication but rather a constructive part of social life.

CDA has had its critics. Among other things, it is mainly criticised for being too political and less scientific: by drawing from eclectic theories such as Foucault's formulation of power/knowledge and discourse, Gramsci's notion of hegemony, Althusser's concept of interpellation and so forth it is seen as lacking a specific and unitary theoretical framework. Featherman's aim is to find a way to apply CDA to a socio-political issue by addressing these criticisms.

His way forward entails forgetting CDA as a theory or method and accepting it as a series of interdisciplinary approaches. He maintains that his work is not a case of theoretical eclecticism. To make it more scientific and less prone to political bias, he applies a research approach within CDA, known as the Sociocognitive Approach formulated by Teun van Dijk. The Sociocognitive Approach, as Featherman puts it, 'considers social cognition as the interface between society and discourse' (p. 42). Thus he looks to maintain the critical vigour of CDA against claims of discrimination and racism by including an analysis of behaviour and language.

His approach marks a third path between the aforementioned optimism and pessimism towards the new media. He is not completely optimistic that ICTs and the new media will (eventually) promote democracy and liberal values. Neither though is he too pessimistic to believe that every discourse in the new media is ultimately determined by hegemonic powers, big players and the like. He shows, through his example tweets, that creating new network identities and global solidarities free from geographical boundaries, all via a text medium – the tweet, is possible through the formation of new counter discourses and the legitimisation of new forms of resistance against dominant ideologies as an ongoing battle for power and influence.

The book provides useful insights for understanding relations between old and new media and the role of language in social media. As the emergence of new online identities, imagined transnational communities and online affiliations become more important, having access to this set of tools is essential. However, it remains difficult for the reader to distinguish between Featherman's 'interdisciplinary' approach and the oft-criticised 'eclectic' approach in CDA.

Mohsen Biparva is an independent scholar, researcher, writer and art critic. He writes on contemporary art, cinema, media and culture. He has a PhD in Media Arts from the University of London

The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman: Paths to Conversion

By Anabel Inge

Oxford University Press, November 2016, £22.99

Reviewed by Sarah Stewart

In December 2015, Chancellor Merkel declared that 'Multiculturalism creates parallel societies and remains a Grand Delusion'. President Sarkozy, in a speech in February 2011 was more forthright; 'Multiculturalism has failed' he said, a view endorsed by at least half of the candidates in the forthcoming French presidential election. Meanwhile, the leitmotiv of the Trump campaign (both before and in office) 'Make America Great Again' is understood by liberal America to contain a coded rejection of multiculturalism.

Whilst European and American storm clouds were gathering over the increasingly toxic issues of asylum and migration, Anabel Inge gained privileged and intimate access to a small group that in many ways symbolise the debate surrounding assimilation, *laïcité* and multiculturalism – British Salafi women.

Over a period of several years, she gained both the confidence and trust of twenty-three converts, their teachers, imams and community leaders. It is a trust well earned. Yet distance and objectivity are maintained. In her own phrase, she sought 'empathy, not sympathy'.

What did she learn? In restrained, measured and accessible prose published in her book *The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman*, Inge debunks many of the easy assumptions that have dominated the public discourse. Each convert, no matter her ethnicity or social background, had agency. The proposition that they, or any of them, were victims of brainwashing is untenable

and treated with derision by the women themselves.

The most outward demonstration of agency is also the one most likely to be misunderstood by press and politician alike: dress. As 'Safia' told Inge:

When you see a sister in a light blue abaya, you know with her yellow hijab, to me, it's like she is trying to fit into society, you know. Where you know from the Salafi sisters, when you just see the black, black, black niqab, niqab, niqab ... I see them as very firm and not trying to conform to society at all. It's like 'I'm not even bothered about what you think of me'... The way I look at sisters with jilbab and niqab, I am truly inspired by them. (p. 91)

As Inge describes in Chapters 5 and 6, the life of a Salafi woman in a liberal democracy is far from easy. The contradictions abound. Contrary to popular belief, Salafi women are not required by their faith to remain at home, wholly dependent upon a husband or family. Yet higher education and the workplace are difficult to navigate whilst remaining true to Salafi core principles. As the author observes, these contain myriad injunctions and prohibitions that govern every aspect of day-to-day living. Young Salafi women intent on avoiding the sin of 'free mixing' will inevitably find a university campus or lecture theatre a place of anxiety. Most employers, unless also Salafi, are understandably reluctant to remodel their working environment to accommodate the demands of strict segregation.

Inge also explores the theme of Salafi




exclusivity within the Muslim world itself. Salafism holds that its practices alone are rooted in the early faith and therefore authentic, *al-salaf al-salih*. Any deviation is 'reprehensible', *bida*. Salafis consequently claim that the famous hadith that consigns 72 sects to the torments of hell, sparing but one, is irrefutable validation for the correctness of their beliefs. Salafis are the 'Saved Sect'.

Unsurprisingly, such an interpretation is contested by non-Salafis. As Inge succinctly describes, many voices within contemporary Islam compete to be heard, such that it can be particularly difficult for the outsider to distinguish the significant differences between them.

Salafism rejects terrorism in any form. This matters, because groups that lay claim to the Salafi name, or profess to have adopted Salafi teaching and yet promote *jihad* (e.g. Al-Muhajiroun) have been roundly condemned and anathematised by Salafi leaders. Yet this important and courageous stance has been largely ignored by both press and politician.

Anabel Inge has shown that Salafism is not the enemy within. More broadly, she has underscored the extent to which Islam is richly multifarious. Her book is useful reading for Western policy-makers everywhere.

Sarah Stewart is a member of the magazine's Editorial Board




Prozak Diaries: Psychiatry and Generational Memory in Iran

By Orkideh Behrouzan

Prozak Diaries is an analysis of emerging psychiatric discourses in post-1980s Iran. Through the lens of psychiatry, the book reveals how historical experiences are negotiated and how generations are formed. Orkideh Behrouzan traces the historical circumstances that prompted the development of psychiatric discourses in Iran and reveals the ways in which they both reflect and actively shape Iranians' cultural sensibilities. A physician and an anthropologist, she combines clinical and anthropological perspectives in order to investigate the grey areas between memory and everyday life, between individual symptoms and generational remembering. *Prozak Diaries* offers an exploration of language as experience. In interpreting clinical and generational narratives, Behrouzan writes not only a history of psychiatry in contemporary Iran, but a story of how stories are told.

October 2016, Stanford University Press, £22.82




Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906: Narratives of the Enlightenment

Edited by Ali M. Ansari

The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 opened the way for enormous change in Persia, heralding the modern era and creating a model for later political and cultural movements in the region. Broad in its scope, this multidisciplinary volume brings together essays from leading scholars in Iranian Studies to explore the significance of this revolution, its origins and the people who made it happen. As the authors show, this period was one of unprecedented debate within Iran's burgeoning press. Many different groups fought to shape the course of the revolution, which opened up seemingly boundless possibilities for the country's future and affected nearly every segment of its society. Exploring themes such as the role of women, the use of photography and the uniqueness of the revolution as an Iranian experience, the authors tell a story of immense transition, as the old order of the Shah subsided and was replaced by a new social and political order.

November 2016, Gingko Library, £65.00




Soundtrack of the Revolution: The Politics of Music in Iran

By Nahid Siamdoust

Music was one of the first casualties of the Iranian Revolution. It was banned in 1979, but it quickly crept back into Iranian culture and politics. Over time music provided an important political space where artists and audiences could engage in social and political debate. Now, more than 35 years on, both the children of the revolution and their music have come of age. *Soundtrack of the Revolution* offers an account of Iranian culture, politics and social change to provide an alternative history of the Islamic Republic. Drawing on over five years of research in Iran, including during the 2009 protests, Nahid Siamdoust introduces a full cast of characters, each with markedly different political views and relations with the Iranian government. Taken together, these examinations of musicians and their music shed light on issues at the heart of debates in Iran – about its future and identity, changing notions of religious belief and the quest for political freedom.

January 2017, Stanford University Press, £20.99




The Oslo Accords: A Critical Assessment

Edited by Petter Bauck and Mohammed Omer

More than 20 years have passed since Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization concluded the Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements for Palestine. It was declared 'a political breakthrough of immense importance.' Israel officially accepted the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the PLO recognised the right of Israel to exist. Critical views were voiced at the time about how the self-government established under the leadership of Yasser Arafat created a Palestinian-administered Israeli occupation, rather than paving the way towards an independent Palestinian state. Through a number of essays written by renowned scholars and practitioners, the years since the Oslo Accords are scrutinised from a wide range of perspectives. Did the agreement have a reasonable chance of success? What went wrong, causing the treaty to derail and delay a real, workable solution? What are the recommendations today to show a way forward?

January 2017, The American University in Cairo Press, £24.95




Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East

Edited by Nader Hasehmi and Danny Postel

As the Middle East descends ever deeper into violence and chaos, 'sectarianism' has become a catch-all explanation for the region's troubles. The turmoil is attributed to 'ancient sectarian differences', putatively primordial forces that make violent conflict intractable. In media and policy discussions, sectarianism has come to possess trans-historical causal power. This book challenges the lazy use of 'sectarianism' as a magic-bullet explanation for the region's ills, focussing on how various conflicts in the Middle East have morphed from non-sectarian (or cross-sectarian) and nonviolent movements into sectarian wars. Through multiple case studies – including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen and Kuwait – this book maps the dynamics of sectarianisation, exploring not only how but also why it has taken hold. The contributors examine the constellation of forces that drive the sectarianisation process and explore how the region's politics can be de-sectarianised.

February 2017, Hurst, £20.00




The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty:

The Husaynis 1700-1948

By Ilan Pappé

The Husayni family of Jerusalem dominated Palestinian history for 250 years, from the Ottoman times through to the end of the British Mandate. At the height of the family's political influence, positions in Jerusalem could only be obtained through its power base. In this political biography, Ilan Pappé traces the rise of the Husaynis from a provincial Ottoman elite clan into the leadership of the Palestinian national movement in the 20th century. In telling their story, Pappé highlights the continuous urban history of Jerusalem and Palestine. Shedding new light on crucial events such as the invasion of Palestine by Napoleon, the decline of the Ottoman Empire, WWI and the advent of Zionism, this account provides an unforgettable picture of the Palestinian tragedy in its entirety.

March 2017, Saqi Books, £12.99




The Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence 1914-1948

By Laila Parsons

Revered by some as the Arab Garibaldi, maligned by others as an intriguer and opportunist, Fawzi al-Qawuqji manned the ramparts of Arab history for four decades. In his most famous role he would command the Arab Liberation Army in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In this biography Laila Parsons tells al-Qawuqji's story and sets it in the full context of his turbulent times. Following Israel's decisive victory, al-Qawuqji was widely faulted as a poor leader with possibly dubious motives. *The Commander* shows us that the truth was more complex: although he doubtless made some strategic mistakes, he never gave up fighting for Arab independence and unity, even as those ideals were undermined by powers inside and outside the Arab world. In al-Qawuqji's life story we find the origins of today's turmoil in the Arab Middle East.

February 2017, Saqi Books, £20.00




Negotiating Dissidence: The Pioneering Women of Arab Documentary

By Stefanie Van de Peer

In spite of harsh censorship, conservative morals and a lack of investment, women documentarists in the Arab world have found ways to subtly negotiate dissidence in their films. In this book, Stefanie Van de Peer traces the beginnings of Arab women making documentaries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Supporting a historical overview of the documentary form in the Arab world with a series of in-depth case studies, Van de Peer looks at the work of pioneering figures like Ateyyat El Abnoudy, the 'mother of Egyptian documentary', Tunisia's Selma Baccar and the Palestinian filmmaker Mai Masri. Addressing the context of the films' production, distribution and exhibition, the book also asks why these women held on to the ideals of a type of filmmaking that was unlikely to be accepted by the censor, and looks at precisely how the women documentarists managed to frame expressions of dissent with the tools available to the documentary maker.

March 2017, Edinburgh University Press, £70.00



The Fatimid Empire

By Michael Brett

The Fatimid empire in North Africa, Egypt and Syria was at the centre of the political and religious history of the Islamic world in the Middle Ages, from the breakdown of the Abbasid empire in the 10th century, to the invasions of the Seljuqs in the 11th and the Crusaders in the 12th, leading up to its extinction by Saladin. As Imam and Caliph, the Fatimid sovereign claimed to inherit the religious and political authority of the Prophet, a claim which inspired the conquest of North Africa and Egypt and a following of believers as far away as India. The reaction this provoked was crucial to the political and religious evolution of mediaeval Islam. This book combines the separate histories of Isma'ilism, North Africa and Egypt with that of the dynasty into a coherent account. It then relates this account to the wider history of Islam to provide a narrative that establishes the historical significance of the empire.

February 2017, Edinburgh University Press, £29.99

Events in London



Mohamed Abdalla Otaybi, Sudan: *Emergence of Singularities* (see Exhibitions p. 34)

THE EVENTS and organisations listed below are not necessarily endorsed or supported by *The Middle East in London*. The accompanying texts and images are based primarily

on information provided by the organisers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the compilers or publishers. While every possible effort is made to ascertain the accuracy of these listings, readers are advised to

seek confirmation of all events using the contact details provided for each event.

Submitting entries and updates: please send all updates and submissions for entries related to future events via e-mail to mepub@soas.ac.uk

BM – British Museum, Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3DG

SOAS – SOAS, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG

LSE – London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2 2AE

APRIL EVENTS

Saturday 1 April

10:15 am | **The Danger of Words in an Age of Danger** (Symposium) Organised by: Exiled Writers Ink and the Centre for Cultural, Literary and Postcolonial Studies, SOAS (CCLPS). Symposium setting out to examine the contemporary danger of words as it affects exiled writers. It will interrogate diverse aspects of the 'Danger of Words' from denying exiled writers the freedom to write about the ills in their societies, to the manipulation of words, as it affects exiled writers. Tickets: £12/£8 EWI members/ asylum seekers and students free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS. [E jennifer@exiledwriters.fsnet.co.uk](mailto:jennifer@exiledwriters.fsnet.co.uk) [W www.exiledwriters.co.uk](http://www.exiledwriters.co.uk) / www.soas.ac.uk/cclps/

1:15 pm | **Light and Islamic Art** (Gallery Talk) Hilary Lewis Ruttley (Independent Speaker). Organised by: BM. Admission free. Room 34, BM. [T 020 7323 8181](tel:02073238181) [W www.britishmuseum.org](http://www.britishmuseum.org)

Wednesday 5 April

Time TBC | **Syria: Six Years On- From Destruction to Reconstruction** (Two-Day Conference: Wednesday 5 – Thursday 6 April) Organised by: European Centre for the Study of Extremism (EuroCSE). Conference seeking to kick start the creation of effective dialogue, by promoting national reconciliation across Syria. Tickets: Various. Pre-registration required. Venue TBC. [E syriaconferenceuk@gmail.com](mailto:syriaconferenceuk@gmail.com) [W www.eurocse.org](http://www.eurocse.org)

1:15 pm | **Unwrapping Islamic Art** (Gallery Talk) John Reeve (Independent Speaker). Organised by: BM. Admission free. Room 34, BM. [T 020 7323 8181](tel:02073238181) [W www.britishmuseum.org](http://www.britishmuseum.org)

5:30 pm | **Vestiges of Dissolved Libraries: Tracing Damascene Manuscripts** (Lecture) Konrad Hirschler (Freie Universität Berlin). Organised by: Al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation. Hirschler discusses the rich manuscript and library culture of Damascus up to the twentieth century in order to suggest possible approaches for future provenance research. Admission free. Pre-registration required. Al-Furqan headquarters office in London, 22A Old Court Place,

London W8 4PL. **E** info@al-furqan.com **W** www.al-furqan.com

Thursday 6 April

Time TBC | **Syria: Six Years On- From Destruction to Reconstruction** (Two-Day Conference: Wednesday 5 – Thursday 6 April) Organised by: European Centre for the Study of Extremism (EuroCSE). See above event listing for more information.

4:00 pm | **The Visible Dead: Dolmen Tombs and the Landscape in Bronze Age Levant** (Lecture) James Fraser (BM). Organised by: The Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF). Admission free. Pre-registration required. **T** 020 7323 8181 **W**

www.britishmuseum.org **BP** Lecture Theatre, Clore Education Centre, BM. **T** 020 7935 5379 **E** execsec@pef.org.uk **W** www.pef.org.uk

7:00 pm | **Iranian Music Refined and Recharged** (Concert) Organised by: Department of Music, School of Arts, SOAS. Sponsored by: Iran Heritage Foundation (IHF), with additional support from Mrs Soudavar and the Nava Arts UK Centre. Saeid Kordmafi on *santour* is joined by vocalist Mehdi Emami and Fariborz Kiannejad on *tombak*, showcasing the intricate characteristics of vocal and instrumental genres in classical Iranian music, preserved during time through aural traditions. Admission free. Pre-registration required. Brunei Gallery Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **T** 020 7898 4500

E musicevents@soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk/music/events/concerts/

7:30 pm | **Battersea Power Comedy** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis, a London based comedian of Iraqi and Palestinian descent. Admission free. The Grove, 279 Battersea Park Road, London SW11 4NE. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

Monday 10 April

7:00 pm | **Screening: Letters from Baghdad + Q&A** (Documentary) Organised by: Frontline Club. The story of the British spy, explorer and political powerhouse Gertrude Bell — sometimes called the “female Lawrence of Arabia”. Letters from Baghdad chronicles her extraordinary

journey into both the uncharted Arabian desert and the inner sanctum of British colonial power. Followed by Q&A with directors Sabine Krayenbühl and Zeva Oelbaum. Tickets: £10/£8 conc. Frontline Club, 13 Norfolk Place, London W2 1QJ. **T** 020 7479 8940 **E** events@frontlineclub.com **W** www.frontlineclub.com

Tuesday 11 April

1:15 pm | **Silk Road Traders: the Sasanians** (Gallery Talk) Diana Driscoll (Independent Speaker). Organised by: BM. Admission free. Room 52, BM. **T** 020 7323 8181 **W** www.britishmuseum.org

6:00 pm | **Mental Health System Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territory** (Lecture) Hanna Kienzler. Organised by:



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Fees: £250 (10% discount for early-bird registration by Monday 17 April 2017: £225).

To register visit www.soas.ac.uk/lmei/events/.

For more information **T** 020 7898 4330/4490 **E** vp6@soas.ac.uk

Organised by: London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI)

Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL). Kienzler will present a case study that examines how mental health system reform processes in the West Bank are shaped by particular political events and power inequalities and investigates the ways in which local and international mental health providers relate to these processes. Admission free. British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. **T** 020 7969 5296 **E** cbri@britac.ac.uk **W** www.cbri.org.uk

Thursday 13 April

1:15 pm | **The Myth of Osiris in Ancient Egypt** (Gallery Talk) George Hart (Independent Speaker). Organised by: BM. Admission free. Room 4, BM. **T** 020 7323 8181 **W** www.britishmuseum.org

Saturday 15 April

2:00 pm | **Artists' Film Club: Basim Magdy + Q&A** (Film) Organised by: Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA). Egyptian artist Basim Magdy's work reflects upon how we deal with the present social and economic climate in a pragmatic and humanistic way and provides an innovative narration of his own personal experiences and frank observations while evaluating the political histories of his nation. Tickets: £5. Cinema 1, ICA, 12 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. **T** 020 7930 3647 **E** info@ica.org.uk **W** www.ica.org.uk

Sunday 16 April

11:00 am | **Digital Workshop:**

Egyptian Photo Booth Organised by: BM. Become an Egyptian pharaoh, god or dancer on a wall painting. Admission free. Samsung Centre, BM. **T** 020 7323 8181 **W** www.britishmuseum.org

Tuesday 18 April

6:00 pm | **Was Aleppo a Levantine City?** (Lecture) Philip Mansel (Institute of Historical Research). Organised by: Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL). Lecture to commemorate the life and work of archaeologist Crystal Bennett. From the sixteenth century after its conquest by the Ottoman Empire through to the French Mandate of the early twentieth century, Aleppo has been the residence of foreign consuls, and a centre of scholarship and

modernisation. Tracing several centuries of history, Mansel asks: can we consider Aleppo to be a Levantine City? Admission free. British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. **T** 020 7969 5296 **E** cbri@britac.ac.uk **W** www.cbri.org.uk

7:00pm | **Whatever did the Iranians do for Georgia? – Coexistence and Conflict** (Lecture) Donald Rayfield (Queen Mary University of London). Organised by: The Iran Society. Doors open 6:30pm. Georgians made many important contributions to Iran, particularly under Shah Abbas I, as military men, provincial governors and builders. Did Iran contribute nothing to Georgia other than ruin and destruction? Admission free for Society Members plus one guest. Pall Mall Room, The

POWER STRUGGLES IN THE MIDDLE EAST


The Islamist Politics of Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood

Eva Dingel

Who are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah? What do the two movements - one Sunni and one Shi'a - have in common? Despite being classified by a number of countries as 'terrorist' organisations, both are in fact serious political players in the states in which they operate - Egypt and Lebanon. Both have, at various points, advocated pan-Islamism: the unity of Muslims under an Islamic state or caliphate, but, rather than considering them as extremist religious movements, Eva Dingel here studies them as players within the political process. She considers why, at certain points, they have chosen to play by the conventional political rules, while during other periods, they have applied different, more extreme, methods of political protest. Dingel's comparative history of two of the most prominent political Islamist movements sheds light on the complex - and often misunderstood - interaction between Islam and politics in the Middle East.

'An innovative, well-argued and thoroughly researched addition to the debates surrounding the development of political Islam'

– Rachid Ouassa, Philipps-Universitaet Marburg



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Nadim Karam, *Baby Phoenician on a Camel, Hannibal on an Elephant, Pomegranate Carrier on a Wild Cat* (2017), Polished Stainless Steel and Corten Steel. Courtesy of the artist and the Fine Art Society. Nadim Karam: Urban Stories (see Exhibitions p. 34)

Army & Navy Club, 36-39 Pall Mall, London SW1Y 5JN (Dress code calls for gentlemen to wear jacket and tie). **T** 020 7235 5122 **E** info@iransociety.org **W** www.iransociety.org / www.therag.co.uk

Time TBC | **G&B Comedy** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis. Tickets TBC. Downstairs at The Royal George, London WC2H 0EA. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

Wednesday 19 April

7:00 pm | **Living with the Shahsevan: Before they became famous for their textiles** (Lecture) Richard Tapper (SOAS). Organised by: Oriental Rug and Textile Society, UK (ORTS). Doors open 6:00pm. Tapper describes life among the Shahsevan nomads, giving some background to their history and details on the weaving that he observed, all illustrated with slides from the field. Tickets: £7/£5 students. Membership of one year for 11 events at £20. The Church Hall Conference Room, St. James Church, 197 Piccadilly, London W1J 9LL. **T** 020 7639 7593 **E** membership.orts@gmail.com **W** www.orientalrugandtextilesociety.org.uk

Friday 21 April

9:30 am | **Mapping Cultural Policy in the Arab Region** (Conference) Organised by: Arab Media Centre and the Communication and Media Research Institute (CAMRI). The Arab Media Centre's twelfth international conference will look at the role of 'culture' and 'cultural policy' in the Arab region within a context that takes into account the recent historical and political events that are reshaping the region's societies, economies and culture industries. Tickets: £85/£43 students. Pre-registration required. University of Westminster, 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2HW. **T** 020 7911 5000 **E** har-events@westminster.ac.uk **W** www.westminster.ac.uk/arab-media-centre/events / https://camri.ac.uk/events/

Tuesday 25 April

4:30pm | **Mainstreaming Climate Change into GCC Economic Diversification Plans** (Seminar) Aisha Al-Sarihi (LSE). Organised by: LSE Kuwait Programme. Using specific examples, Al-Sarihi will focus on the drivers of climate change action in the GCC, and potential factors and challenges to including climate change plans in economic diversification strategies. Chair:

Courtney Freer (LSE Kuwait Programme). Admission free. Pre-registration required. Room 9.04, 9th floor, Tower 2, Clement's Inn, LSE. **T** 020 7955 6639 **E** i.sinclair@lse.ac.uk **W** www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/home.aspx

5:45 pm | **Hadhramaut and its Diaspora: Yemeni Politics, Identity and Migration** (Panel Discussion) Muhammad Bin-Dohry, Noel Brehony, William Clarence-Smith, Thanos Petouris, Helen Lackner, and James Spencer. Organised by: London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI) and the Hadhramaut Research Centre (HRC). Event to mark the launch of the Hadhramaut Research Centre's first academic book *Hadhramaut and its Diaspora: Yemeni Politics, Identity and Migration* (Edited by Noel Brehony) which examines the Hadhrami diaspora, who travelled as religious scholars, traders, labourers and soldiers, to understand their enduring influence and the Hadhrami identity. Chair: William Clarence-Smith (SOAS). Part of the LMEI's Tuesday Evening Lecture Programme on the Contemporary Middle East. Admission free. Wolfson Lecture Theatre, Paul Webley Wing (Senate House), SOAS. **T** 020 7898 4330/4490 **E** vp6@soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk/lmei/events/

Wednesday 26 April

6:00 pm | **The PEF and its Photographs of Jerusalem** (Lecture) David Jacobson (UCL). Organised by: Anglo Israel Archaeological Society (AIAS) and the Institute of Archaeology, UCL. Admission free. Lecture Theatre G6, Institute of Archaeology, UCL, 31-34 Gordon Square, London WC1H 0PY. **T** 020 8349 5754 **E** sheilarford1@sky.com **W** www.aias.org.uk

7:00 pm | **From Literature to Palaeography. Two Centuries of Research on Islamic Calligraphy** (Lecture) Nourane ben Azzouna (University of Strasbourg). Organised by: Islamic Art Circle at SOAS. Chair: Scott Redford (SOAS). Admission free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **T** 07714087480 **E** rosalinghaddon@gmail.com **W** www.soas.ac.uk/art/islac/

Thursday 27 April

5:45 pm | **Making a Mark: A History of the Middle East through Postage Stamps** (Lecture) Matthew Corbin Bishop (Artist, Historian and Author). Organised by: MBI Al Jaber Foundation. Part of the MBI Al Jaber Foundation Lecture Series. Admission free. Pre-registration

CENTRE FOR IRANIAN STUDIES – SCHOLARSHIPS

SOAS, University of London, is pleased to announce the availability of several scholarships in its Centre for Iranian Studies (CIS).

The Centre, established in 2010, draws upon the range of academic research and teaching across the disciplines of SOAS, including Languages and Literature, the Study of Religions, History, Economics, Politics, International Relations, Music, Art and Media and Film Studies. It aims to build close relations with likeminded institutions and to showcase and foster the best of contemporary Iranian talent in art and culture.

MA in Iranian Studies

In 2012/13 CIS members successfully launched an interdisciplinary MA in Iranian Studies, the first of its kind, which will be offered again in 2016/17.

Thanks to the generosity of the Fereydoun Djam Charitable Trust, a number of Kamran Djam scholarships are available for BA, MA and MPhil/PhD studies.

For further details, please contact:

Scholarships Officer

E: scholarships@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7074 5091/ 5094
W: www.soas.ac.uk/scholarships

Centre for Iranian Studies

Dr Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (Chair)
E: aa106@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7898 4747
W: www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis



Image: Anvari-Suhayfi (Lights of the Caropous) Manuscript (Ref: MS10102) from: Anna Contadini (ed.) Objector! Instruction: Treasures of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 2007, p.25.

MA in Iranian Studies

Dr Nima Mina (Department of the Languages and Culture of the Middle East)
E: nm46@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7898 4315
W: www.soas.ac.uk/nme/programmes/ma-in-iranian-studies

Student Recruitment

T: +44(0)20 7898 4034
E: study@soas.ac.uk

required. MBI Al Jaber Seminar Room, London Middle East Institute, SOAS, MBI Al Jaber Building, 21 Russell Square, London WC1B 5EA. **E** info@mbifoundation.com **W** www.mbifoundation.com

7:00 pm | **Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought: The Life and Times of Ahmad Fardid** (Book Launch/Documentary) Ali Mirsepassi (New York University). Organised by: Centre for Iranian Studies, SOAS. Event to mark the publication of Ali Mirsepassi's *Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought: The Life and Times of Ahmad Fardid* (Cambridge University Press, 2017). By following the intellectual journey of the Iranian philosopher Ahmad Fardid, Mirsepassi offers an account of the rise of political Islam in modern Iran. The documentary film, *The Fabulous Life and Thought of Ahmad Fardid*, is based on Mirsepassi's book about Ahmad Fardid and is made by Ali Mirsepassi and Hamed Yousefi. Discussants: Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (SOAS) and Hamed Yousefi. Admission free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **T** 020 7898 4330 **E** vp6@soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis/events/

Saturday 29 April

Time TBC | **Camel Cultures: Historical Traditions, Present Threats, and Future Prospects** (Two-Day Conference: Saturday 29 - Sunday 30 April) Organised by: SOAS. Fourth international conference examining, documenting and celebrating camel cultures from around the world covering both Dromedaries and Bactrians. Tickets: TBC/Free entry for SOAS staff, academics and students. Venue TBC. Pre-registration required. **E** ed.emery@soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk

2:00 pm | **Everything you always wanted to know about Ancient Mesopotamia** (Lecture) Irving Finkel (BM). Organised by: BM.

Finkel introduces the world of ancient Mesopotamia – the 'land between the two rivers' (the Tigris and the Euphrates), now part of modern Iraq. Tickets: £5/£3 BM Members/conc. BP Lecture Theatre, BM. **T** 020 7323 8181 **E** tickets@britishmuseum.org **W** www.britishmuseum.org

Sunday 30 April

Time TBC | **Camel Cultures: Historical Traditions, Present Threats, and Future Prospects** (Two-Day Conference: Saturday 29 - Sunday 30 April) Organised by: SOAS. See above event listing for more information.

EVENTS OUTSIDE LONDON

Saturday 1 April

7:30 pm | **The Comedy Ladder** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis, a London based comedian of Iraqi and Palestinian

descent. Tickets: £5. The Cross Keys East St, Thame OX9 3JS. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

Saturday 8 April

TBC | **The Comedy Ladder** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis. Admission free. The Comedy Ladder, Backstreet Coffee Shop, Lower Church Street, Stokenchurch, High Wycombe HP14 3TH. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

Tuesday 11 April

Time TBC | **Third Biennial Conference on Iranian Studies** (Two-Day Conference: Tuesday 11 - Wednesday 12 April) Organised by: Symposia Iranica. Conference covering all aspects of Iranian studies from prehistory to the present within the art, humanities and social sciences. Tickets: £50. Pre-registration required. Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1RF. **E** office@

symposia-iranica.com **W** http://symposia-iranica.com/

Wednesday 12 April

Time TBC | **Third Biennial Conference on Iranian Studies** (Two-Day Conference: Tuesday 11 - Wednesday 12 April) Organised by: Symposia Iranica. See above event listing for more information.

Friday 14 April

7:30 pm | **Funny Girls** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis. Tickets: £5. The Caroline of Brunswick, Ditchling Road, Brighton BN1 4SB. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

MAY EVENTS

Tuesday 2 May

5:45 pm | **The Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab Independence**

Mo Abbaro, Sudan: Emergence of Singularities (see Exhibitions p. 34)



1914-1948 (Lecture) Laila Parsons (Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University). Organised by: London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI). Lecture by Parson's on her latest book *The Commander: Fawzi al-Qawuqi and the Fight for Arab Independence 1914-1948* (Hill and Wang, 2016). Revered by some as the Arab Garibaldi, maligned by others as an intriguer and opportunist, Parsons tells Qawuqi's dramatic story and sets it in the full context of his turbulent times. Chair: Charles Tripp (SOAS). Part of the LMEI's Tuesday Evening Lecture Programme on the Contemporary Middle East. Admission free. Wolfson Lecture Theatre, Paul Webley Wing (Senate House), SOAS. **T** 020 7898 4330/4490 **E** vp6@soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk/lmei/events/

Saturday 6 May

10:00 am | **BATAS 2017 Spring Symposium** Organised by: British Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS) in association with the London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI). Speakers include: Uluç Gürkan (Former Deputy Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), Scott Redford (SOAS), Ezgi Başaran (Programme on Contemporary Turkey at SEESOX (South East European Studies at Oxford)), and Rachel Harris (SOAS). The Spring Symposium, one of BATAS's two regular annual events, aims to bring together a diverse range of topics relating to Turkey and its cultural/geopolitical area; this year history, architecture, music, religion and current affairs are all represented. Tickets: TBC. Wolfson Lecture Theatre, Paul Webley Wing (Senate House), SOAS. **T** 01962 889014 **E** jill.sindall143@gmail.com **W** http://batas.org.uk/

8:45 am | **Ibn Arabi and the Philosophers: Reason, Revelation and Inspiration** (Symposium) Organised by: The Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society

and the Department of the Languages and Cultures of Near and Middle East, SOAS. Annual symposium bringing together people from many different fields and traditions, including scholars, students, and anyone interested in what Ibn 'Arabi has to say. Tickets: £50/£45 Society Members/£10 students. Brunei Gallery Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **E** events.uk@ibnarabisociety **W** www.ibnarabisociety.org

Sunday 7 May

Time TBC | **Arabs Are Not Funny** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis. Tickets TBC. Courtyard Theatre, London N1 6EU. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

Monday 8 May

6:00 pm | **Finding the Philistines: Ceramic Evidence of the Northern Sea Peoples at Tell Tayinat** (Lecture) Brian Janeway (Tell Tayinat Archaeological Project). Organised by: Anglo Israel Archaeological Society (AIAS) and the Institute of Archaeology, UCL. Admission free. Lecture Theatre G6, Institute of Archaeology, UCL, 31-34 Gordon Square, London WC1H 0PY. **T** 020 8349 5754 **E** sheilarford1@sky.com **W** www.aias.org.uk

Tuesday 9 May

6:00 pm | **Polis to Medina Revisited: urban change in the Levant between Antiquity and Islam** (Lecture) Hugh Kennedy (SOAS). Organised by: Council for British Research in the Levant (CBRL). Admission free. British Academy, 10 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. **T** 020 7969 5296 **E** cbrl@britac.ac.uk **W** www.cbrl.org.uk

Wednesday 10 May

7:00 pm | **Reforming Culture: Art and Imitation in Tunisia**

(1830-1881) (Lecture) Ridha Moumni (Institut de Recherches sur le Maghreb Contemporain, Tunis). Organised by: Islamic Art Circle at SOAS. Chair: Scott Redford (SOAS). Admission free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **T** 07714087480 **E** rosalindhaddon@gmail.com **W** www.soas.ac.uk/art/islac/

Tuesday 16 May

7:00 pm | **Centenary Lecture: Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel Peace Prize winner** Organised by: SOAS. Mohamed ElBaradei was Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is currently Director General Emeritus. In his lecture he will examine the inextricable link between human dignity and a sustainable world order and will focus on the increasing global inequity and insecurity that mar our world leading to a serious crises of global governance. Admission free. Pre-registration required. **W** www.eventbrite.co.uk Brunei Gallery Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **T** 020 7898 4054 **E** centenary@


soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk/centenary/centenary-events/

7:00pm | **Yazd in the Early Modern Period** (Lecture) Derek Mancini (SOAS). Organised by: The Iran Society. Doors open 6:30pm. Annual General Meeting at 6:15pm. Admission free for Society Members plus one guest. Pall Mall Room, The Army & Navy Club, 36-39 Pall Mall, London SW1Y 5JN (Dress code calls for gentlemen to wear jacket and tie). **T** 020 7235 5122 **E** info@iransociety.org **W** www.iransociety.org / www.therag.co.uk

Thursday 18 May

5:45 pm | **Arabia on a Plate: Eating and Sailing on the Trade Routes from the Gulf to the Red Sea Ports and Beyond** (Lecture) Sarah Al-Hamad (Author). Organised by: MBI Al Jaber Foundation. Lecture by Al-Hamad, author of *Cardamom and Lime: Recipes from the Arabian Gulf*. Part of the MBI Al Jaber Foundation Lecture Series. Admission free. Pre-registration

Nadim Karam, *Trou de Mémoire* (2017) Courtesy of the artist and the Fine Art Society. Nadim Karam: Urban Stories (see Exhibitions p. 34)



required. MBI Al Jaber Seminar Room, London Middle East Institute, SOAS, MBI Al Jaber Building, 21 Russell Square, London WC1B 5EA. **E** info@mbifoundation.com **W** www.mbifoundation.com

6:30 pm | **Sacred Landscapes and Alalakh as Hittite Cult Center: Tell Atchana Excavations** (Lecture) K Aslihan Yener (The Oriental Institute, University of Chicago & Koç University). Organised by: British Institute at Ankara (BIAA). Oliver Gurney Memorial Lecture. This lecture will focus on the recent excavations at Tell Atchana, which provide fresh information about the site's chronology and sacred architecture, and include the discovery of new seals and burial practices. Tickets: £10/ BIAA members free. British Academy, 10-11 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. **E** biao@britac.ac.uk **W** www.biao.ac.uk/events

Wednesday 24 May

Time TBC | **Yahweh comes from the South Revisited** (Lecture) Robert D. Miller (Catholic University of America). Organised by: The Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) and King's College London. Admission free. CL Nash Lecture Theatre, King's Building, King's College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS. **T** 020 7935 5379 **E** execsec@pef.org.uk **W** www.pef.org.uk

Thursday 25 May

6:00 pm | **Parsi Traders and Travellers: Global Zoroastrians in the Age of Empire** (Lecture) Jesse Palsetia (University of Guelph, Canada). Organised by: Department of Religions and Philosophies, SOAS in association with The World Zoroastrian Organisation. Twentieth Dastur Dr Sohrab Hormasji Kutar Memorial Lecture. Palsetia examines the spread of Parsi traders and travellers from the



Kamala Ibrahim Ishaq, Sudan: *Emergence of Singularities* (see Exhibitions p. 34)

eighteenth to the nineteenth century. Admission free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS. **E** ah69@soas.ac.uk **W** www.soas.ac.uk/religions-and-philosophies/events/

EVENTS OUTSIDE LONDON

Monday 22 May

7:00 pm | **The Quest for the Historical King David: New Light from Khirbet Qeiyafa and Khirbet El Rai** (Lecture) Yosef Garfinkel (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem). Organised by: Anglo Israel Archaeological Society (AIAS). Admission free. Manchester Jewish Museum, 190 Cheetham Hill Road, Manchester M8 8LW. **T** 020 8349 5754 **E** sheilarford1@sky.com **W** www.aias.org.uk

Friday 26 May

7:00 pm | **Comedy San Frontières** (Performance) Comedy with

Jenan Younis. Donations to Médecins Sans Frontières. Junkyard Dogs, Brighton BN2 0JG. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

Saturday 27 May

7:30 pm | **Legends Comedy Club** (Performance) Comedy with Jenan Younis. Tickets TBC. The Oakhouse, Essex CM9 5PF. **E** jenanyounis@gmail.com

EXHIBITIONS

Until 2 April | **Iranian Voices: Recent Acquisitions of Works on Paper** Made by Iranian artists of different generations and including a variety of media from collage to artist books and photography the narratives of the works on display highlight an engagement with Iranian history from the legendary tales of the *Shahnameh* to insights into the politics of recent decades. Admission free. Room 34, BM. **T** 020 7323 8299 **E** info@britishmuseum.org **W** www.britishmuseum.org

Until 29 April | **The Ocean Can Be Yours** Exhibition showcasing Persian culture and its merged visual art and linguistic practice via the interpretation of international poetry through the lens of four Iranian artists. Afsoon, Ghalamdar, Jason Noushin and Katayoun Rouhi explore a tradition rooted in their shared heritage and use it as the launch platform for diverse practices spanning performance and Calligraffiti to drawing and allegorical painting. Admission free. Saturdays and by appointment Monday to Thursday. Gerald Moore Gallery, Mottingham Lane, London SE9 4RW. **T** 020 8857 0448 / 020 7830 9327 **E** janet@janetradyfineart.com **W** www.geraldmooregallery.org / www.janetradyfineart.com

Until 19 May | **A Tale of Two Rivers: The Lower Wye and the Nubian Nile** The Nile in Sudan, the Wye in Wales/England – what do they have in common? Herman Bell presents images and artefacts that link the two rivers and reflects on how the people of each river valley are dealing with threats to

their environment. Admission free. Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies 'The Street', University of Exeter, Stocker Road, Exeter EX4 4ND. **E** m.j.williams2@exeter.ac.uk / cas@soas.ac.uk **W** <http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iais/events/exhibitions/>

Until 29 April | **Return to Kurdistan** Exhibition of contemporary photographs of Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Iraq by Gulan's Creative Director Richard Wilding, alongside historical photographs taken in the 1940s by British photographer Anthony Kersting whose archive is held by The Courtauld Institute of Art's Conway Library. The Courtauld Institute of Art, Somerset House, Strand, London WC2R 0RN. Admission free. **E** info@gulan.org.uk / kurdistan@courtauld.ac.uk **W** www.gulan.org.uk/ / <http://courtauld.ac.uk/>

Until 6 May | **Sudan: Emergence of Singularities** Interdisciplinary Sudanese contemporary art

exhibition which will include a series of film screenings, talks and events exposing a mix of voices and new perspectives for understanding Sudanese society and cultures. Admission free. P21 Gallery, 21 Chalton Street, London NW1 1JD. **T** 020 7121 6190 **E** info@p21.org.uk **W** www.p21.gallery/ / www.emergingsudan.com

Until 23 May | **Egypt, The Eternal Inspiration** Paintings by the artist Dina El-Sioufi inspired by Ancient Egyptian murals and sculptures. Egyptian Bureau for Cultural & Education Affairs, 4 Chesterfield Gardens, London W1J 5BG. **T** 020 7491 7720 **E** administration@egycculture.org.uk

Friday 7 April

Until 17 June | **Still** UK based artist Judy Price presents a unique and complex body of work focused on Palestine. Two multi-screen installations and

a photographic piece reflect in very different ways on Palestine's colonial past and the current lived experience of occupation. Admission free. The Mosaic Rooms, A.M. Qattan Foundation, Tower House, 226 Cromwell Road, London SW5 0SW. **T** 020 7370 9990 **E** info@mosaicrooms.org **W** <http://mosaicrooms.org/>

Monday 24 April

Until 19 May | **Nadim Karam: Urban Stories** Lebanese artist and architect Nadim Karam's first major London exhibition, best known for his large-scale urban art projects which explore the use of public art as an instrument of storytelling and activism, Karam's work focuses on re-examining perceptions of pluralism and difference within societies as a source of enrichment rather than conflict. Admission free. The Fine Art Society, 148 New Bond Street, London W1S 2JT. **T** 020 7629 5116 **E** art@thefineartsociety.com **W** www.thefineartsociety.com

Nadim Karam, *Desert Sand*, Chatsworth, UK. Courtesy of the artist and the Fine Art Society. Nadim Karam: *Urban Stories* (see Exhibitions p. 34)





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Beginners Persian (Level 1)

This is an introductory course which aims to give the students a reasonable grounding in the basics of Persian grammar and syntax as well as to enable them to understand simple and frequently used expressions related to basic language use. They will be able to hold uncomplicated conversations on topics such as personal and family information, shopping, hobbies, employment as well as simple and direct exchanges of information related to familiar topics. By the end of the course they will also progress to read simple short texts.

Beginners Arabic (Level 1)

This is an introductory course in Modern Standard Arabic. It teaches students the Arabic script and provides basic grounding in Arabic grammar and syntax. On completing the course, students should be able to read, write, listen to and understand simple Arabic sentences and passages. This course is for complete beginners and does not require any prior knowledge or study of Arabic.

Beginners Arabic (Level 2)

This course is a continuation of Beginners Arabic Level 1. It completes the coverage of the grammar and syntax of Modern Standard Arabic and trains students in reading, comprehending and writing with the help of a dictionary more complex Arabic sentences and passages.

To qualify for entry into this course, students should have already completed at least one introductory course in Arabic.

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This course provides an introduction to the politics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It gives on a country by country basis, an overview of the major political issues and developments in the region since the end of the First World War and addresses key themes in the study of contemporary Middle East politics, including: the role of the military, social and economic development, political Islam, and the recent uprisings (the 'Arab Spring').

Culture and Society in the Middle East

This course examines the major cultural patterns and institutions of the MENA region. It is taught through a study of some lively topics such as religious and ethnic diversity, impact of the West, stereotyping, the role of tradition, education (traditional and modern), family structure and value, gender politics, media, life in city, town and village, labour and labour migration, the Palestinian refugee problem and Arab exile communities, culinary cultures, music and media, etc.

Timetable

Courses are taught Mon-Thu each week. Language courses are taught in the morning (10am-1pm) and the Politics and Culture Courses are taught in two slots in the afternoon (2:00-3:20 and 3:40-5:00pm).

FEES

Session (5 weeks)

19 June-20 July 2017 (two courses)
(one course)

Programme fee*

£2,700
£1,400

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For more information, please contact Louise Hosking on LH2@soas.ac.uk. Or check our website www.soas.ac.uk/lmei