



Country Study: Italy

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Executive Summary¹

Italy is exposed to a wide range of natural hazards, and in particular earthquakes and forest fires. The complex Italian civil security system is based on a flexible interaction among its numerous institutional actors. Depending on the profile of crisis the central government or/and the local levels (municipalities, provinces, regions) intervene together with private actors and voluntary organizations. The Italian civil security system is based on the presence of civil defence and civil protection domains. While civil defence primarily regards *intentional* acts, such as terrorism or intentional release of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) agents, civil protection mainly concerns safeguarding, rescuing and assisting the population as well as protecting and recovering goods in the event of *involuntary* natural, accidental or man-made disasters. Such an equilibrium is based on a substantial complementarity and a certain degree of overlap between the two domains and the related institutional actors.

A National Civil Protection Service is under the coordination of the Civil Protection Department within the presidency of the council of ministers at government level. A Civil Defence Department is also established within the Ministry of Interior. Italy's dominant crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian activities but in some cases the military contribute to crisis management, particularly the Army and the Carabinieri. The civil security system adopts an all hazard approach to crisis management, and adjusts its interventions to each specific situation. Italy has developed a response system based on an up-scaling approach (the so-called principle of *subsidiarity*): action starts from the local level and involves the relevant administrations upwards. Disasters are classified in three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: "type a" (municipal level), "type b" (provincial and regional) and "type c" (national). Concerning the political dimension, the primary responsible of crisis preparedness and response is the mayor. In the event of a national emergency, the primary executive responsible is rather the president of the council of ministers. The president of the council of ministers is the apex of the Italian executive power, and coordinates institutional actors involved in civil defence and in civil protection domains.

Regarding the operational dimension, the Civil Protection Department has dealt with several crises. In the last decade, the major one has been the 2009 earthquake of magnitude 5.8 which hit the province of L'Aquila claiming the lives of 309 people, injuring thousands of citizens, causing 64,391 displaced persons and resulting in severe material destruction.

The external dimension of the Italian civil security system is characterized by both multilateral and bilateral cooperation, particularly with neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean region, including active participation the PICRIT, FIRE4, PPRD-South EUROMED and Adriatic Ionic Initiative projects.

The awareness that citizens have responsibility to protect their life and environment has increased in recent years, as showed by the growth of volunteer organizations. Half of the Italian citizenry (49 percent) perceive natural and man-made disasters as the threats most likely to hit the country, and the percentage of Italians concerned about earthquakes (58 percent) is much higher than the EU average (22 percent).

¹ This case study represents one of 22 country studies compiled in the context of the Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe (ANVIL) Project. The ANVIL Project aims to map the variety and similarities in Europe's regional civil security structures, practices and cultures and investigate how variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens. The results give policy stakeholders a clear overview over civil security architectures and EU-added value to the debate concerning "not one security fits all". Read more at www.anvil-project.net.

Tools such as the pamphlet *The Civil Protection Handbook for Families* are used to increase information. In 2005 there was the first official terrorist attack simulation/drill in Milan, involving 2,000 people representing different actors of the civil security system.

Undoubtedly, volunteer organizations – non-profit organization according to ANVIL terminology – such as the Italian Red Cross play a decisive role in Italy's civil security system by providing human resources and qualified support both in the preparedness and response phases. A particular aspect characterizing the Italian civil security systems is the solidarity role played by the Catholic Church.

Profit oriented organizations are becoming increasingly aware that they should be more active. For example, the private actors owning and/or managing critical infrastructures (CI) have to appoint a *liaison* security officer and to draft an *operator's security plan*.

The presence of civil defence and civil protection domains entails two different budgets within the civil security system. In 2012, EUR 1,747,977,737 have been allocated to the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and the Civil Defence Department, and EUR 1,670,392,269 have been given to the Department of Civil Protection.

As of November 2011, 60 percent of Italian citizens believe that Italy is doing enough to fight terrorism, while 52 percent think the country is doing enough to manage natural and man-made disasters. About the 54 percent, are not aware that EU coordinates civil protection both inside and outside the Union.

Key Findings

1. Good practice: flexible cooperation

The complex Italian civil security system is based on a flexible interaction among its numerous institutional and operational actors, as demonstrated by the complementary role played by civil defence and civil protection. For example, this works at horizontal level with strong civil-military cooperation: Italy's dominant crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian activities but in some cases the military contributes to crisis management with a cooperative role (*concorsoale*), particularly the Army and the Carabinieri (see Section 2.1 and 2.2). This is in line with the all hazard approach to crisis management adopted by the Italian civil security system, which adjusts interventions to each specific situation.

Such a mindset and praxis of flexible cooperation is particularly important in countries like Italy where a number of institutional actors and levels of governance are involved in the civil security system. It is noteworthy for European readers since it may represent a good practice and a feasible alternative to more centralized civil security systems based on different administrative traditions – in other words, it is an example of the ANVIL assumption that no single solution fits all.

2. Good practice: role of non-profit organizations

The volunteer (non-profit) organizations play a decisive role in Italy's civil security system by providing human resources and qualified support both in the preparedness and response phases. For example, the Italian Red Cross has 160,000 volunteers, 5,000 employees and 1,000 offices throughout Italy. A particular aspect characterizing the Italian civil security systems is the solidarity role played by the Catholic Church (see section 2.4).

The role of non-profit organizations is highly relevant for investigation by ANVIL. Italy, as probably other countries in Europe, shows strong social activism based on the richness and strength of the country's social ties; for example within the family, the villages or small towns, the variety of non-profit organizations, and the Catholic Church. Such ties and activism become more evident during the response phase to crises such as the earthquakes in Emilia Romagna (2012) and L'Aquila (2009) with rapid, substantial and autonomous response of citizens and non-profit organizations. Although specific social features of every EU country cannot be simply replicated elsewhere in Europe, encouraging such a role for citizens and non-profit organizations may be a good practice to be kept in mind.

3. Problematic aspect: levels of governance

Italy has developed a response system based on the principle of subsidiarity: action starts from the local level and involves the relevant administrations upwards. Disasters are classified in three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: "type a" (municipal level), "type b" (provincial and regional) and "type c" (national). Concerning the political dimension, the primary responsible of crisis preparedness and response is the mayor. In the event of a national emergency, the primary executive responsible is rather the president of the council of ministers (see Section 2.1 and 2.2).

This feature of the Italian civil security system is linked to the country's history marked by strong local identities and prolonged political, institutional and legal fragmentation until 1861. This situation may be similar to other federal European countries. A key point here is how and how much the various levels of governance cooperate with each other. It may be a problematic aspect, for example, if the up-scaling mechanisms are not streamlined, if the cooperation between national and local authorities is not based on a clear division of labour, etc. The debate occurring in Italy in recent years over the abolition of provinces demonstrates that there is some scepticism within the public opinion on the existing number of levels of governance in the country.

4. A major test: the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila

The major test for the Italian civil security system since 2000 has been the earthquake of magnitude 5.8 which hit the province of L'Aquila on 6th April 2009 claiming the lives of 309 people, injuring thousands of citizens, displacing 64,391 persons and resulting in severe material destruction. The response phase implied massive search and rescue activities in the aftermath of the earthquake, the establishment within few days of tents to host around 33,000 persons for 8 months, the building of earthquake-proof houses for 24,000 displaced persons completed by the end of 2009, as well as immediate and extraordinary measures regarding education, transport, judiciary and fiscal systems in the Province of L'Aquila (see section 2.2.3).

The response phase to the earthquake is a good example of strengths and weaknesses of the Italian civil security system, including those mentioned above. It has successfully proved the praxis of flexible cooperation among actors such as the Civil Protection Department, the Ministry of Interior including Fire Brigades, and the military deployed in L'Aquila for one year in order to contribute to local security and safety. The response phase has also showed the rapid and strong reaction of citizens and non-profit organizations, for example to alleviate the obvious difficulties of 33,000 people living in tents for 8 months.

On the other hand, it has highlighted the problematic issue of the relationship between central and local levels of governance. The response phase was marked by a strong lead of the presidency of the council of ministers through the head of the Civil Protection Department. This allowed a speeding up of the response phase and achievement of some substantial results in a reasonably short timeline, but at the same time it raised criticism from local authorities and sectors of public opinion about the marginal role in the decision-making enjoyed by representatives of locals such as the mayor of L'Aquila.

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List of Abbreviations

AIIC	Associazione Italiana esperti in Infrastrutture Critiche
ANAS	Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali
ANSF	Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie
CASE	Centri Abitativi Sismicamente Ecocompatibili
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCM	Centro nazionale per la prevenzione ed il controllo delle malattie (Centre for Disease Prevention and Control)
CDN	Centro Decisionale Nazionale (National Decision Center)
CI	Critical Infrastructures
CITDC	Commissione Interministeriale Tecnica per la Difesa Civile (Technical Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Defence)
CoPS	Comitato Politico Strategico (Political Strategic Committee)
ENAC	Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile (National Board for Civil Aviation)
ENAV	Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo (National Board for Flight Assistance)
EDA	Elaboratore Distacchi Automatici
EU TEREX	European Union Tuscany Earthquake Relief Exercise
F.I.R.E. 4	Force d'Intervention Rapide Européenne
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ILI	Influenza-Like Illness
ISPRA	Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale (Institute for Environmental Protection and Research)
MAP	Moduli Abitativi Provvisori
MIC	Monitoring and Information Centre
NISP	Nucleo interministeriale situazione e pianificazione (Situation and Planning Interdepartmental Unit)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSO	Piano di Sicurezza dell'Operatore (Operator's Security Plan)

1. Introduction

Italy has a complex civil security system, based on a flexible interaction among its numerous institutional actors. Depending on the profile of crisis that the country has to deal with, the central government or/and the local levels intervene together with private actors and voluntary organizations. The Italian civil security system is based on the presence of civil defence and civil protection domains. This has led to the development of a system of crisis management with dedicated branches for the two domains and complementarity among their actors at operational level.

The system has progressively reached such an equilibrium moving from a Cold War-era primacy of civil defence towards the current greater role of civil protection. This evolution has implied frictions among different institutional actors involved in the shift of competences and power. Today, the civil security system still witnesses a certain degree of overlap between the two domains coupled with a substantial complementarity. The president of the council of ministers, being the apex of Italian executive power, ensures the coordination among different institutional actors involved in the two domains (interview, Rome, May 2013).

Italy's national territory is exposed to a wide range of natural hazards and it is one of the Mediterranean countries with the highest seismic risk – due to its position at the convergence of the African and Eurasian plates. Besides, risks of technological and industrial disasters might come from big and small industrial complexes and factories, as well as from transportation of dangerous substances. In the past, disastrous earthquakes² and forest fires³ have scarred the land and left recognizable signs of recovery and reconstruction.⁴ In addition, poor land management and a disregard for town planning have often led to the construction of buildings in highly dangerous areas (as epitomized by the Genova flooding in November 2011, in particular near to the Foce quarter⁵). The most important crises⁶ affecting Italy's civil security system from 2000 to 2012 are shown by the table below:

² Like those in Friuli (1976) or Irpinia (1980).

³ During these 20 years, there have been about 232,930 forest fires.

⁴ In the last forty years, the economic damage caused by seismic events has been assessed at around 80 billion euros, plus the damage to historical, artistic and monumental heritage.

⁵ The term “foce” means “estuary”.

⁶ According to the ANVIL crisis definition.

Table 1 – List of relevant crises 2000-2013

Year/month	Crisis description	Site/area of crisis	Crisis category	Damage		
				# of persons killed	# of persons injured	# of persons affected
09/2000	Flood	Soverato	Natural disaster	12		
10/2000	Flood	North Italy	Natural disaster	23		40,000
10/2002	Earthquake	Molise	Natural disaster	29	100	3,000
10/2002-01/2003	Volcano eruption	Catania	Natural disaster			1,120
09/2003	Electricity black-out	Italy	Infrastructure failure			32 milion (electricity consumptions)
04/2009	Earthquake	L'Aquila	Natural disaster	309	1,500	65,000
06/2009	Train derailment + leakage of gas and toxic materials	Viareggio	Transportation accident + industrial disaster	31	17	
2009	H1N1	Italy	Infectious disease	260		2,000
10/2009	Mudslide	Messina	Natural disaster	37	95	2,000
01/2012	Costa Concordia disaster	Isola del Giglio	Transportation accident	32	110	4,232
05/2012	Earthquake	Emilia Romagna	Natural disaster	28	350	45,000
05/2013	Cargo ship accident	Genoa	Transportation accident	9	4	

Besides the relevant crises shown by the table above, the events of the 27th G8 Summit in July 2001 in Genoa are worth mentioning, which culminated with the death of a 23-year-old activist Carlo Giuliani during clashes with the police. Almost 200,000 people demonstrated against the G8 meeting, which was held inside a “Red Zone” in the center of town that had been declared off-limits for non-residents and surrounded by a barricade. Other extreme security measures were taken, such as an air exclusion zone around the city and the suspension of freedom of movement entitled by the Schengen treaty for the duration of the event.

Italy is also exposed to the terrorist threat to a variable degree, depending mostly upon domestic factors. One of the most relevant terrorist attacks since 2000 was the assassination of top Labour jurist Marco Biagi by the Red Brigades in 2002 (Global Terrorism Database 2013). Besides, from 2003 to 2012, there have been several arrests related to Al-Qaeda affiliated or inspired terrorism (EUROPOL Report), although the country has not been affected by major religiously-inspired terrorist attacks.⁷

Italy has rather experienced the return of the terrorist threat by the left-wing and, in particular, high attention is paid to anarchist groups such as the Informal Anarchist Federation (*Federazione Anarchica Informale*, FAI). In addition, the recent economic and financial crisis has also intensified this threat against financial institutions, banks and state fiscal agencies (Presidency of the Council of Ministers 2013).

Notwithstanding the absence of an official national security strategy identifying the main security threats and response guidelines at a strategic level (and according to some observers this absence means there is no formal definition for what “civil security” is in Italy), the ongoing evolution of the legal framework for crisis management has developed a common terminology at inter-ministerial level, including (Presidency of the Council of Ministers 2010):

⁷ A list of EUROPOL reports from 2003 to 2012 is available from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/25. [Accessed 15 January 2013]

- **Crisis situation:** any situation likely to be able to involve or endanger the national interest, that can originate from the perception of a potential hazard or in coincidence with significant events;
- **Emergency situation:** a dangerous situation that requires specific, urgent, necessary, and exceptional actions and measures;
- **International crisis:** events that trouble the relations between states, or at least likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and that may affect or jeopardize national interests;

Italy's civil security system is characterized by the presence of the civil protection and civil defence domain. The latter regards *intentional* acts, such as terrorism or intentional release of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) agents, while civil protection mainly concerns safeguarding, rescuing and assisting the population as well as protecting and recovering goods in the event of *involuntary* natural, accidental or man-made disasters.⁸

Civil protection and civil defence depend on two different administrations: the Civil Protection Department is part of the presidency of the council of ministers (within the government), while the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department are part of the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for civil defence. At the operational level, the set of their competences are complementary and coexist. More specifically the Civil Protection Department should be considered in terms of a "function" (exactly the function of civil protection) more than an "administration". In fact the civil protection system encompasses a number of actors (see Figure 2) depending on the kind of crisis including also the Fire Brigades (Ministry of Interior) that are the bulk of the civil defence system.

The civil defence is a system that it is *not* subject to decentralization while civil protection is an open system and it can be *subject* to decentralization to varying degrees (Palmieri 2004). This kind of decentralization entails many civil protection units at municipal, provincial and regional levels⁹, which may have different sizes and capabilities, as well as different performances. This decentralization is in line with the aforementioned principle of *subsidiarity*. This represents a double-edge sword. If the local authorities prove to be able to handle a crisis, such a system based on subsidiarity and decentralization works well with a proper involvement of upper levels when and where necessary. In contrast, if the local authorities prove to be unable to fulfil their tasks with respect to a crisis, the functioning of the system is hampered even if the upper levels step in to handle the crisis (interview, Rome, May 2013).

Italy's dominant crisis management approach is primarily based on civilian activities but in some cases (limited to particular and severe situations, see Section 3.1.2 "type c" events) the military contribute to crisis management and this is positively considered (interview, Rome, April 2013).¹⁰ The Armed Forces,

⁸ It is noteworthy to mention that in September 2011 the Civil Protection Department has also monitored the re-entry into the atmosphere of NASA's satellite UARS (Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite). The UARS entered the Earth's atmosphere with the possibility of the fall of satellite fragments on Italian territory. For this reason, from the 22nd to 24th September 2011, convened by the Head of the Civil Protection Department, an Operating Committee gathered in permanent session in order to follow the UARS.

⁹ For a list of regional civil protections see, <http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/componenti.wp>. [Accessed 14 January 2013].

¹⁰ The use of Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and Carabinieri) is envisaged both in case of civil protection and civil defence but is limited to particular and severe situations (see below "type c" events) by providing logistical and operational support, personnel and equipment as well as expertise in the prevention phase. The Armed Forces' tasks are defined in law 331/2000 related to "Norms for the institution of the professional military service". The Art. 1 point

especially the Army, play a cooperative role (*concorsoale*) and intervene following a request of the prefect. The coordination with the National Civil Protection Service is ensured by the defence chief of staff at the national level and by the regional military commands at regional level (Ministry of Defence 2002).¹¹

Italy's civil security system seems to adopt an all hazard approach to crisis management, and adjust its interventions to each specific situation. Italy has widespread risks throughout the territory, and has therefore developed a response system based on an up-scaling approach (principle of *subsidiarity*): authority and responsibility rest at local level with an up-scaling of authority when a crisis spreads across administrative entities and/or the crisis overwhelms local capacity. In Italy, disasters are classified as one of three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: "type a" municipal level, "type b" provincial and regional, and "type c" national (see Section 3.1.2).

2. Analytical Dimensions

2.1 Cultural and historical aspects of the civil security system

2.1.1 Administrative tradition

The civil security system is influenced by the evolution of the Italian institutional and legal context, characterized, until 1861, by the presence of different, separated and autonomous statutory authorities. With the 1948 Constitution, the Italian Republic has experienced a strong role of the Parliament and a system strongly limiting the powers of the president of the council of ministers (*Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri*) who is Italy's head of government.

Governance and administrative structure

Italy is a parliamentary republic with a rigid Constitution, which established a bicameral Parliament featuring the Chamber of Deputies (630 seats) and the Senate of the Republic (315 seats), having the same powers.¹² The characteristics of the Italian political and institutional system seem to match those outlined by Lijphart's theory on consociational democracy.¹³

Italy consists of 8,100 municipalities (*Comuni*), 110 provinces (*Province*), metropolitan cities¹⁴ (*Città Metropolitane*) and 20 regions (*Regioni*), autonomous entities with their own statutes, powers and functions according to the Constitution. Fifteen regions have an *ordinary statute* (*Regioni a Statuto*

5 states that "the Armed Services contribute to safeguarding free institutions and carrying out specific tasks in circumstances of public danger and in other cases of extraordinary necessity and urgency" (Ministry of Defence 2013).

¹¹ In this context, Carabinieri play a twofold role as a military corps with police duties: Carabinieri respond directly to the Ministry of Defence in case of military tasks¹¹, and depend "functionally" on the minister of the interior with regards to law enforcement and public security tasks. Moreover, they act as an operational structure of the National Civil Protection Service in case of calamity and natural disasters (Arma dei Carabinieri 2013).

¹² Art. 56 and art. 57 of the Italian Constitution.

¹³ Coalition cabinet; balance of power between executive and legislative power; mutual veto; rigid constitution; equality between ministers with a prime minister only *primus inter pares*; proportional representation.

¹⁴ The 14 metropolitan cities identified by the government are Italian administrative institutions which will enter into force in 2014. The *metropolitan city*, as defined by law, includes a large core city and the smaller surrounding towns that are closely related to it with regard to economic activities and essential public services, as well as to cultural relations and to territorial features.

Ordinario).¹⁵ Five other regions have a *special statute (Regioni a Statuto Speciale)*.¹⁶ Besides, there are 223 mountain communities (*Comunità Montane*), which are unions of municipalities and local authorities established between mountain municipalities (art. 27 of the Legislative Decree 267/2000).

Italy is characterized by an imbalanced geographical distribution of population.¹⁷ Especially at the local level, the population in municipalities ranges from 30 inhabitants to more than 2,600,000. Italy is also characterized by the presence of the so-called “*comuni polvere*”, meaning the 1,936 municipalities (out of the total of 8,092) whose population is below 1,000 inhabitants.

The prefecture is the local branch of the government with a representative office in each province, responsible for the implementation of ministerial directives as well as for the civil defence and civil protection at provincial level. In addition, he/she supervises the coordination of response activities together with the president of the region and with the mayors of municipalities affected by the crisis. Only in case of the declaration of state of emergency (see section 3.1.2), the prefect operates as a delegate of the president of the council of ministers.

Another important actor of the civil security system is the mayor who is responsible for civil protection and manages the volunteers, the local police and other local resources (see section 2.2.3).¹⁸

The Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers adopted on 5 May 2010 represents one of the cornerstones of the Italian crisis management organisation, as it modifies the composition of existing bodies and introduces new ones. From the top of the political and institutional level there are the following national *decision-making* bodies:

- **President of the council of ministers** is the head of the government (i.e. the prime minister) and he directs and coordinates the activity of the ministers. The Italian prime minister has less power than some of its European counterparts and acts as a *primus inter pares*.
- **Council of ministers** is composed of the president of the council of ministers, the ministers and the undersecretary to the presidency of the council.
- **Strategic Political Committee (Comitato Politico Strategico, CoPS)**¹⁹ provides national strategic guidance in crisis situations. It meets exclusively during a state of crisis, and builds on the elements previously elaborated by the technical staff. During the sessions, the CoPS includes several representatives of the presidency of the council of ministers, of the Civil Protection Department, of the defence staff as well as military and diplomatic advisers.

¹⁵ That means they have exclusive legislative power with respect to any matters not expressly reserved to state law, European law and international treaties. Regions with *ordinary* statute are Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Molise, Piemonte, Puglia, Toscana, Umbria and Veneto. Regions with *special* statute: Friuli Venezia Giulia (1963), Sardegna (1948), Sicilia (1948), Trentino-Alto Adige (1948), Valle d’Aosta (1948).

¹⁶ This provides further legislative powers vis-à-vis the state, i.e. by enabling them to enact legislation on some of their local matters.

¹⁷ According to the latest census, 45.8% of the Italian population live in the northern area of the country, 19.5% in the central part and the remaining 34.7% are located in the south and on the islands.

¹⁸ But he/she does not have the power over national agencies.

¹⁹ Formed by the president of the council of ministers and the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, interior, economy and finance.

- The **National Decisional Centre** (*Centro Decisionale Nazionale, CDN*), is the support site of the Strategic Political Committee (and alternatively of the council of ministers; this was the case for example in the immediate aftermath of 9/11), devoted to the information flow management and the decision-making. The National Decision Centre supports the consultations with ministries and relevant state administrations, in accordance with the various competences specified by the law.

The government is therefore the main actor involved in crisis management, in consultation with the Parliament. There are also national *coordination* bodies:

The **Situation and Planning Interdepartmental Unit** (*Nucleo interministeriale situazione e pianificazione, NISP*). The NISP supports the CoPS and the president of the council of ministers.²⁰ The NISP performs several tasks related to prevention and preparation activities as well as during crisis situations.²¹

The crisis management structure of civil defence

The NISP can be supported by the **Technical Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Defence** (*Commissione Interministeriale Tecnica per la Difesa Civile, CITDC*). Indeed, the 2010 Decree states that “for specific aims, the NISP can be supported by other interdepartmental commissions, research committees and study working groups” in relation to particular and specific issues.²²

The CITDC is supervised by the Ministry of Interior and chaired by the head of the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Protection Department. It includes the representatives of the presidency of the council of ministers, state administrations, of national boards and also private companies.²³ The prefects ensure coordination at the local level, and the operational phase is implemented by the Armed Forces, Carabinieri, police forces and civil protection.

The crisis management structure of civil protection

With the Act n. 225 of 24 February 1992, Italy has organised civil protection as a “National Service”, consisting of central and peripheral structures (see Section 2.2.1). The president of the council of ministers provides for the co-ordination of the National Service and for the promotion of civil protection activities through the Civil Protection Department.

²⁰ The NISP is composed of two representatives from each of the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence from the Ministry of Economic and Finance and one from the Ministry of Health; one representative from the Department of Civil Protection; one representative from the Security and Intelligence Department as well as one from the Internal and External Intelligence and Security Agencies; one representative from the Department of Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence.

²¹ For example, the NISP defines one or more “national positions” within international organizations participated in by Italy. It keeps the situation updated, according to the communications of international organizations, through the exchange of information between ministries and agencies and when deemed appropriate by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the direct exchange of information with the diplomatic missions.

²² Art. 29, law of 23 August 1988, n. 400. In addition, the 2010 Decree states that “for specific aims, the NISP can be supported by other interdepartmental commissions, research committees and study working groups” in relation to particular and specific issues.

²³ In particular it includes representatives of defence, interior, health and other ministers as needed), of the National Autonomous State Routes Board (*Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali, ANAS*), the National Inspectorate of the Military Body of the Italian Red Cross (*Ispettorato Nazionale del Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa, INCMCR*), the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (*Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale, ISPRA*), the National Board for Civil Aviation (*Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile, ENAC*), the National Board for Flight Assistance (*Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo, ENAV*), and relevant private companies participated by state such as *Trenitalia, Poste Italiane*, etc.

The department has a leading role, in agreement with regional and local authorities, on projects and activities for the overall prevention, forecast and monitoring of risks as well as intervention procedures. As far as the intervention proceeds, the Italy Situation Room (*Sala Situazione Italia*, SSI) acts as a national operational room, based within the Department of Civil Protection. The SSI operates 24 hours a day through SISTEMA, its national coordination system. The SSI permanent includes the staff of the Department of Civil Protection and a representative of the National Fire Brigades, Armed Forces, State Police, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, the State Forestry Corps, Port Authority - Coast Guard and Italian Red Cross. In ordinary time the room receives, demands, collects, processes and verifies information on planned responses or ongoing emergencies, in the national territories and abroad, at local and regional level. In case of emergency it becomes essential in order to support the Civil Protection Operational Committee (see Figure 1) and guarantees the implementation of the committee's disposals through the operational structures of the National Civil Protection Service.


The responsibility of civil protection has progressively moved from the state to local authorities: the Legislative Decree n. 112 dated 1998 and the reform of Title V of the Constitution (Constitutional Law 3/2001) redefined the civil protection organization, by transferring important functions to the local authorities – including operative ones – and by restructuring also the remaining state authorities.

The regions are responsible for civil protection and in particular for risk assessment, emergency forecasting and prevention programmes for their territory, on the basis of national directives.²⁴ The provinces are mainly responsible for forecasting and prevention activities, as established by regional programmes and plans, through the adoption of the necessary administrative acts. They also draft provincial emergency plans on the basis of the regional guidelines; supervise how the provincial structures of the emergency services are set up for civil protection, including the technical services to be activated in case of disasters. The functions ascribed to the municipalities concern particularly emergency preparedness, setting of plans and response activities such as activation of first relief service to the population and urgent interventions.²⁵

²⁴ The most important regional tasks can be summarised as follows: drafting regional programmes for risk prevention and forecasting; launching interventions through the National Fire Brigades in case of a crisis caused by an emergency or an imminent danger; formulating guidelines for the drafting of emergency provincial plans.

²⁵ The municipalities launch forecasting activities and risk prevention interventions established by regional programmes and plans; adopt decisions, including those concerning emergency preparation, necessary to assure first emergency relief in case of disasters at the municipal level ("type a" of disaster); draft municipal and inter-municipal emergency plans in the form of association or cooperation and through the mountain communities to control that these are implemented on the basis of regional guidelines.

Figure 1 – Civil protection organization and tasks




Source: IAI elaboration based on Vademecum – Civil Protection

The Civil Protection Department coordinates the response to natural disasters, catastrophes or other events that by virtue of intensity and extent may require extraordinary powers and means. The department divides its activities following a “risk-based approach”: (1) Seismic risk; (2) Volcanic risk; (3) Hydro-meteorological risk; (4) Fire risk; (5) Health risk; (6) Nuclear risk; (7) Environmental risk; (8) Industrial risk. In cases of “type c” events, the head of department convenes the Civil Protection Operational Committee which ensures joint management and the coordination of emergency activities.²⁶

²⁶ The Operational Committee is made up of representatives of: Department of Civil Protection; fire department; Armed Forces; each of the police forces; State Forestry Commission; Italian Red Cross; National Health Service; national voluntary organizations; Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Economic Development; National Mountain Rescue and Speleological Corps; Port Authorities; Institute for Environmental Protection and Research; National Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology; National Research Council; Regions designated by the unified State-Regions-Cities conference. In addition, regional and local civil protection interested in specific emergencies can also participate in the operational committee.

In emergency situations the definition of the chain of command and the coordination take place in a flexible way. In addition, the government may appoint an extraordinary commissioner either through *ad hoc* legislation or by the use of a law decree. Often the extraordinary commissioner coincides with the head of the Civil Protection Department.

Figure 2 – Italian civil security system overview



2.1.2 Government/social culture

According to the five dimensions analysis provided by the Geert Hofstede's Index, Italian society seems "to believe that hierarchy should be respected and inequalities amongst people are acceptable. Italy as a whole seems to have an individualistic culture, especially in the big and rich cities of the North. In southern Italy, this dimension does vary and less individualistic behaviour can be observed where the family network and the group one belongs to are important social aspects" (Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G.J. and Minkov, M. 2010). Finally, Italy seems to show a high sense of competition, coupled with a high score on uncertainty avoidance which means that Italians are not comfortable in ambiguous situations. As a result of its traditions and history, Italy seems to have a short-term orientation culture. The World Value Survey puts Italy within Catholic European countries with a stable degree of traditional/secular-rational values and with a high degree of self-expression, even if lower than other comparable countries.²⁷

Despite the several calamities which have historically hit the territory, according to opinions recently expressed by managers of civil defence, a weak "emergency culture" characterizes Italy (with few exceptions, see the "Safe School" project in section 2.3.3). Another aspect to mention is the insufficient respect for the prevention rules of town plans of land management, together with the presence of unauthorized buildings in highly dangerous areas. Such cultural aspects weaken the actions of the crisis management system, since they increase vulnerabilities and undermine the effectiveness of management.

On the other hand, from 1960s to 1980s Italy successfully faced a persistent and strong domestic terrorist threat, which has led public opinion to develop a solid awareness and sensibility on this issue. This background has contributed to the acceptance of counterterrorism measures deemed necessary in order to ensure and safeguard their lives, such as those adopted after the 9/11 2001 attacks.

2.2 Legal/constitutional aspect

2.2.1 Statutory basis

The evolution of the legal and institutional framework of the Italian crisis management system was also driven by several disasters (i.e. the earthquakes in Friuli in 1976 and Irpinia in 1980) that struck Italy and posed a significant risk management challenge for the country, leading to the implementation of new institutional arrangements yielding improvements in disaster preparedness, prevention, response and recovery provisions (Lanfranco 2012).

The civil defence legislation

To date, Italy has not developed specific legislation defining the scope of civil defence (Istituto Alti Studi per la Difesa 2001-2002). According to article 14 of Legislative Decree n. 300 dated 30 July 1999, the Ministry of Interior – in its capacity as the institution responsible for security and safety – is entrusted with civil defence. The Central Directorate for Civil Defence and Civil Protection Policies was established within the

²⁷ Such efforts to classify a wide range of extremely different countries worldwide shall be balanced by an in-depth and country-based analysis of national culture, in order to avoid risks of misunderstanding, stereotyping and oversimplification. For example, Italian social culture is used to deal with complexity and uncertainty generated by both different local traditions and a complex legal and institutional framework.

Department for Fire Service, Public Rescue and Civil Defence with the specific aim of carrying out this institutional mission.

The legal framework related to the operational and planning domain of civil defence is composed of confidential documents and dispositions issued by the minister of interior and the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department (Toseroni 2009). However, with regards to the planning level in case of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks, a National Civil Defence Plan has been developed in order to define threats, identify the possible scenarios as well as measures to be undertaken. This plan is the overall framework acting as a cornerstone in order to draft the “descendants” and sector plans (*Piani discendenti e di settore*) as well as the 103 provincial plans prepared by the prefects. In order to test their functionality and operational effectiveness, these plans are subject to periodic exercises (see section 2.2.3).

The civil protection legislation

The law n. 996 dated 1970 is the first law that outlined an overall framework of civil protection interventions, specifying the notion of natural calamity and catastrophe. However, the regulation implementing the law was approved only after 11 years (in 1981) and after disastrous earthquakes hit Friuli in 1976 and Irpinia in 1980, causing respectively 976 and 2,570 victims. The lack of coordination and slow rescue operations paved the way for the creation of the “National Civil Protection Service” which was institutionalized by the law n. 225 adopted on 24 February 1992 (Department of Civil Protection 2012). Historically, law 225/92 represented a move from a centralized phase of crisis management to a decentralized one. As a result, the role of regions, provinces and municipalities was significantly increased with regards to prevention and forecasting. However, operative capabilities remained under the responsibility of the central and peripheral administration of the state, and the government kept the power to declare a “state of emergency” (see section 3.1.2).

The Legislative Decree 112/98 further transferred important civil protection functions to the local authorities, and reformed the state role in this regard. Finally, the Constitutional Law 3/2001, which changed the overall relations between state and regions, for the first time introduced in the Constitution the function of civil protection, under concurrent competence of state and regions.²⁸ The law no. 401 dated 2001 assigned to the prime minister the supervision of state role in civil protection, and the Department of Civil Protection was put within the presidency of the council of ministers. As a counterweight to the re-found centrality of the role of the prime minister, a joint state – regions – local authorities committee was established in the Prime Minister’s Office.

2.2.2 Political dimension

The primary responsible person at the local level of crisis preparedness and response is the mayor, who disposes of the resources of its municipality to tackle the specific risks of its territory. He is responsible for coordinating the local operational structures, comprising voluntary groups of civil society which respond to him.

In the event of a national emergency, the primary executive responsible is instead the president of the council of ministers, who, together with the National Civil Protection Department, directs and coordinates

²⁸ That means the state sets the fundamentals of policies, the main guidelines and the general objectives by law, while the Regions determine specific laws and rules to achieve the established objectives.

the activity of the operational structures of civil protection in accordance with the regional authorities. The council of ministers is responsible for declaring the state of emergency (see section 3.1.2). As a consequence, the head of the Civil Protection Department may take “extraordinary powers” and related measures may be taken in derogation from the provisions in force to respond to disasters.²⁹ However, According to the law 24 February 1992, n. 225, the president of the council of ministers can appoint a deputy commissioner to implement civil protection interventions necessary in emergency situations. The president of the council of ministers maintains the responsibility of intervention but he transfers the managing powers to the deputy commissioner.

Regarding civil defence, according to article 14 of Legislative Decree n. 300 dated 30 July 1999 the Ministry of Interior is the competent body (see section 2.2.2). The Central Directorate for Civil Defence and Civil Protection Policies is established within the Department for Fire Service, Public Rescue and Civil Defence with the specific aim of carrying out this institutional mission. At the local level, the Ministry of Interior is supported by the prefectures. In addition, the above mentioned Technical Interdepartmental Commission for Civil Defence (CITDC) is responsible for the assessment of crisis and the planning of measures to be taken.

Civil defence is a service of the Ministry of Interior but civil protection is a department of the presidency, thus its intervention directly reflects on the president of the council and on the government at large. This largely explains the obvious preference demonstrated by many Italian chiefs of the government toward civil protection, especially if it can give a greater visibility and the impression that the personal commitment of the president has been instrumental for increasing the level of aid and its swiftness. Thus the interventions of the department have generally been characterized by a high level of visibility and personalization (the special powers attributed to the department head by the president of the council of ministers increase such visibility). It also allows for the swift utilization of special emergency funds and other reserve funds otherwise immobilized or unavailable, thus giving to the president a great leverage over the ministries normally administering the public budget autonomously.

2.2.3 Operational dimension

Civil defence crisis management

According to available sources, the national civil defence crisis management system has been activated twice, in view of the Millennium Bug – on the basis of the ministerial circular adopted of 3 December 1999 – and during the 9/11 terrorist attack. Beyond these particular cases, civil defence planning (see Section 2.2.1) has been activated several times at provincial level, according to the 103 Provincial Plan established by prefects (interview, Rome, May 2013).

²⁹ Apart from the state of emergency, law 185/92 on the National Solidarity Fund regulates the declaration of state of calamity, concerning the contribution given to face damages to agricultural, productive and commercial infrastructures and activities, following exceptional atmospheric or meteorological events. On such events, the president of the region may request to the minister of agriculture to declare the state of calamity, which allows the affected regions to have access to the National Solidarity Fund. While the state of calamity refers to crises affecting specific sectors, the state of emergency is declared when crisis and disasters undermine the functioning of the majority of society structures. The states of emergency and calamity cannot be declared simultaneously (Bignami 2010). For instance, the state of emergency was declared on the occasion of the earthquake in May 2012, hitting the region of Emilia Romagna, and after the environmental disaster caused by Costa Concordia last year. Instead, the state of calamity was declared in the region of Campania after the exceptional rainfalls of January 2013, and in the region of Lazio as a consequence of a landslide in April 2013.

On that occasion, a specific task force was established at the National Decisional Centre (*Centro Decisionale Nazionale*, CDN) with the tasks of coordinating and monitoring at the strategic level the evolution of the possible crisis deriving from the Millennium Bug. It comprised a committee, named Committee Year 2000, chaired by the under secretary of the presidency of the council of ministers and composed of the ministers of the interior, of defence, transports, communication, health, industry and trade, who monitored the evolution of the situation as concerned their area of competence. The military advisor to the president of the council and the person responsible for telecommunications also contributed with their support.

This task force was in constant contact with the seats of the major national infrastructures (transports, telecommunications, trains, airports, energy) and also with the civil protection. The task force assessed the conditions of all infrastructures over the following three months: phones and radio operators, banks and financial services, defence industry, health system and communication. No damages were recorded in any of them, neither in the seats of the diplomatic and consular services deployed abroad. In the end, the Millennium Bug did not hit the system in Italy and the task force was discharged in March 2000.

Civil protection crisis management

The mayor is the first public authority responsible for civil protection on the territory. He/she has the task to cope with the initial moments of a calamity and provide relief to the population, by coordinating the local operative structures including civil protection volunteers. The mayor responds to emergencies through the activation of the Municipal Operational Centre (*Centro Operativo Comunale*) that coordinates the rescue services and operational forces. Following the up-scaling approach (the principle of *subsidiarity*) if the municipality cannot cope with the emergency on its own, the province, the prefecture, and the region intervene by activating the available resources for the areas affected by the calamity (Department of Civil Protection 2013). In “type c” events, the national government intervenes: the president of the council of ministers assumes direct responsibility operating through the Civil Protection Department.

Emergency actions are planned according to the principles of the “Augustus method” and, above all, on the Directive and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, dated 3 December 2008. The “Augustus method” represents the cornerstone for the planning of emergency response at the various levels of competence. Besides providing flexible guidelines for emergency response, it identifies clearly the working method and the procedures to apply in order to maximize synergy and coordination among the available resources in response. On the basis of the Augustus method the response is organized in three parts: information collection, identification of objectives and of responsibilities, and operational flexibility during support activities. In other terms, the Augustus method defines diversified response plans (according to the types of risks) which eventually combine through flexibility at the operational level (Toseroni 2009).

The 2008 reform established an operative committee to ensure coordination of emergency response activity. The committee is chaired by the head of the Civil Protection Department, and includes representatives of the operative structures of the National Civil Protection Service and of public and private bodies and administrations which manage the emergency together. The reference point of the National Service of Civil Protection is the coordination centre SISTEMA (see section 2.1.1).

Illustration of the civil security system: earthquake

This section covers a typical crisis case that Italy faces on a regular basis. Seismic activity is relatively common in Italy and therefore the functioning of the civil security system in case of earthquake will be

analyzed. In this case, the Department of Civil Protection takes the lead on response activities and the head of department coordinates the response measures in order to assist the population affected by the crisis.

On 6th April 2009 an earthquake of magnitude 5.8 hit the province of L'Aquila claiming the lives of 309 people, injuring thousands of citizens, causing 64,391 displaced persons and provoking severe material destruction. In a few hours, the fire brigades, the volunteer organizations part of the Civil Protection National Service and the Army were deployed in L'Aquila from all over Italy to search and rescue the victims of the earthquake. The very same day a state of emergency was declared by the president of the council of ministers (Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 2009), and the head of the Civil Protection Department, Guido Bertolaso, was appointed as special commissioner with the extraordinary powers to take any action to assist the population hit by the earthquake and respond to the emergency. Actually, the commissioner took a strong leading role with respect to the local authorities for the following 10 months. On April 6th any taxation or payment or trial involving residents in the municipalities hit by the earthquake were suspended until 31st December 2012, and then until 31st December 2010 (Department of Civil Protection 2009).

Within three days, tents were established to host around 33,000 displaced persons providing accommodation and meals, while another 10,000 displaced people were located in hotels in the Abruzzo Region and in neighbourhood regions (Lazio, Umbria, Marche), organized by the Civil Protection Department. On April 9th seven integrated operational centres were established in the area hit by the earthquake to coordinate response activities. In particular, the Fire Brigades and Civil Protection Department fulfilled the task to check the buildings damaged by the earthquake to determine those safe to be inhabited and those to be repaired, and to put in place the temporary structures to prevent further damage to the latter. People able to rent a flat and/or to find an autonomous accommodation (i.e. hosted by relatives and friends in surrounding areas) were reimbursed up to 400 euros per person. Primary and secondary schools were allowed to complete the academic year earlier in order to let students obtain their degrees. The payment of electricity bills was suspended. (Department of Civil Protection 2009).

On April 15th a military force of 700 units was tasked to patrol the city centre of L'Aquila and other major towns to avoid looting of the abandoned houses. The same day the prefect of L'Aquila was appointed deputy commissioner. On April 21st the commissioner was tasked to launch an information campaign to communicate the measures undertaken to manage the crisis for the local population. The commissioner was also tasked to set up the procedures to build temporary houses (*Moduli Abitativi Provvisori*, MAP), whose areas were identified by 17 July 2009. (Department of Civil Protection 2009). On April 28th, the commissioner was tasked to set up the procedures to build earthquake-proof households, (*Centri Abitativi Sismicamente Ecocompatibili*, CASE) (Department of Civil Protection 2009).

On May 1st, two other deputy commissioners were appointed to support the crisis management, and the mayors of the municipalities hit by the earthquake were tasked to implement the decisions taken by the commissioner (Department of Civil Protection 2009). On May 11th, the 17 areas to build the CASE centres were designated, most of them close the villages hit by the earthquake.

On July 9th, the commissioner was tasked to set up the procedures to build temporary schools (*Moduli ad Uso Scolastico Provvisorio*, MUSP) including kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools, whose areas were identified on July 31st (Department of Civil Protection 2009). By September 2009, all schools and the university – whose admission fee was cancelled for two years - regularly began the academic year, and 99 percent of students returned to classrooms.

By December, 2009, 17,000 displaced people were located in the 17 CASE centres, and 7,000 were located in the MAP. At the same time, around 18,500 citizens had rented a house, found an autonomous accommodation or stayed in a hotel, whose costs were reimbursed by the Civil Protection Department. Several hundred were located in the police academy of Coppito and in a military barracks nearby. As a result, all tents – which have been hosting up to 33,000 people for eight months – were closed. On February 2010, the Head of the Civil Protection Department handed over the commissioner seat to the governor of the Abruzzo Region. The response phase ended and the recovery phase began.

2.2.4 External dimension

The external dimension of Italy's civil security system is characterized by a multilateral and bilateral approach, in line with traditional Italian foreign and security policy. Italy is a member of the Council of Europe, the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN. Italy participates in the EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection with the Department of Civil Protection (see section 4).

In addition, Italy takes part in numerous European and international initiatives regarding the improvement and the implementation of specific policies related to civil security, namely in the organization of training activities, exchange of experts and joint exercises. For instance, the Department of Civil Protection was involved in the project on "Strengthening the National Strategy for Forest Fire Fighting" in Lebanon aimed at strengthening Lebanon's forest fire prevention and forecasting capacity (OECD 2010).

In particular, because of its position in the Mediterranean, Italy has established and promoted different kinds of programmes and partnerships with neighbourhood countries. Italy plays a key role in several cooperation frameworks, including for example (Acrimas 2011):

- PICRIT Project: co-funded by the 2007-2013 ALCOTRA Programme, it aims at finding effective measures to cope with natural hazards affecting cross-border areas of Italy and France, by enhancing the effectiveness of established systems of civil protection and management of national emergencies, paying particular attention to the safety of the European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) of this area.
- Force d'Intervention Rapide Européenne (F.I.R.E. 4) is a cooperation project among Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) facing similar typologies of risk, promoted in the framework of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. The goal of the initiative is to ensure a better protection of European citizens by developing an EU rapid response facing all risks related to natural disasters. In February 2008 the steering committee of F.I.R.E. 4 decided to include Greece as a partner of the project, so the initiative is now known as F.I.R.E. 5. (Department of Civil Protection 2009).
- EUROMED Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD-South EUROMED): it has the objective to develop and reinforce the quality of civil protection services in the Euro-Mediterranean region through institutional cooperation in the field (Official site of EUROMED Programme on Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters 2008).
- Adriatic – Ionian Initiative (AII): organizes several roundtables to enhance cross-border cooperation on environmental and fire protection.

Italy has also signed a number of bilateral cooperation agreements and/or technical cooperation pacts on civil protection with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYROM, Germany, Malta, Montenegro, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sovereign Military Order of Malta and Swiss Confederation. Additionally, the country has established agreements with non-European countries³⁰

Moreover, Italian municipalities, provinces and regions have the authority to establish cross-border cooperation projects with the aim to enhance the preparedness and response activities focused on specific geographic areas³¹. These agreements, which come in different forms (treaty, memorandum, protocol, exchange of letters, etc.), promote the development of joint programmes and projects, in particular in the fields of forecasting, prevention and mitigation of natural and manmade risks, in management of emergency situations and reciprocal assistance in the event of calamities (see table 3).

2.3 The relations between the civil security system and citizens

2.3.1 Expectations

Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution states that “the Republic expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled”, connecting, through this expression, the concept of solidarity to that of responsibility of citizens in protecting their life. This sense of solidarity finds one of its best expressions in volunteer organizations. With law n. 225/1992, civil protection assumes the meaning of “widespread culture” by declaring the responsibility of all citizens to effectively contribute to the protection and preservation of territory, environment and society. Moreover, the gradual decentralization of civil protection functions has enhanced the population’s awareness, consensus and participation in civil protection activities through the voluntary programmes.

As concerns citizens’ expectations towards the government’s responsibility, there are no poles related to crisis management, nor specifically to the prevention phase. However, certain episodes (especially related to recent calamities) let us say that citizens’ expectations towards the government have hardly been met, especially during the reconstruction phase. For instance, significant protests took place in February 2010 in L’Aquila against the slowness of the reconstruction process: during the so-called “wheelbarrows riot” hundreds of citizens gathered voluntarily to remove tonnes of rubble from the city centre (Özerdem and Ruffini 2013, p. 128). Criticisms have also been made concerning the current lack of prevention plans and the state’s inaction in the improvement of safety measures for buildings, in particular schools and hospitals (Mazzantini 2013).


According to the Special Eurobarometer 383 published in June 2012, about half of the Italian citizens (49 percent) perceive natural disasters and man-made disasters as the most likely threat. 36 percent of Italians are very concerned about terrorist attacks and armed conflicts (European Commission 2012). As shown by the figure below, the percentage of Italians concerned about earthquakes (58 percent) is much higher than the EU average (22 percent). Landslide represents a concern for a small percentage of Italian citizens (11

³⁰ Such as Argentina, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Indonesia, Morocco, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (official website of the Department of Civil Protection 2012).

³¹ For example, the autonomous Region Valle D’Aosta participates in the 2007-2013 ALCOTRA Programme with 13 projects that encompass the monitoring of seismic events, technological risk and CBRN threats (Region of Valle D’Aosta 2013).

percent) which is nevertheless higher than the EU average (7 percent). In contrast, Italians are less worried about industrial accidents, flooding, violent storms, forest fires, marine pollution and nuclear accidents than the EU average.

Figure 3 – Risk perceptions of natural and man-made disasters



Source: IAI elaboration based on Special Eurobarometer 328 data

2.3.2 Information

The 2009 Special Eurobarometer Report 328 reveals that 28 percent of Italian citizens feel informed on crisis preparedness, in line with European average (29 percent) while only 29 percent of Italian citizens feel informed on disaster response (European Commission 2009). With regards to information channels, 47 percent of Italian citizens rely on scientists to receive background information on possible disasters. The next most trusted source for disaster information is the national government (34 percent), followed by European institutions (30 percent), journalists (18 percent), and NGOs (18 percent).

The Department of Civil Protection conducts several activities to increase public awareness about natural hazards, and to improve resilience through campaigns, exhibitions and publications. For instance, the pamphlet *The Civil Protection Handbook for Families* describes various types of natural hazards, emergency procedures, how to prepare for them, what actions must to be taken before, during and after the crisis and what authority to call for help (Department of Civil Protection 2007).

The mayor of a municipality affected by a crisis is responsible for risk communication and information to citizens, while the Department of Civil Protection promotes the dissemination of information.³² It seems that Italy does not have a siren system or a system for radio/tv warnings to alert the citizens in case of calamities.

A recent development in means of communication is represented by social networks. An extensive use of this type of communication is made by citizens: for example, especially in the latest events of the

³² A contact center is dedicated to citizens, institutions, organizations and companies that wish to receive information or give reports on activities of the Civil Protection Department’s area of competence. The Civil Protection Department provides information on: local risks and rules of behaviour; national regulations; activities and competences of the Department and of the National Civil Protection Service; initiatives and information material.

earthquake in Emilia Romagna 14,535 tweets containing information on the evolution and on emergency contacts were sent by people in the first two hours following the first shakes. The Department of Civil Protection, which at the time did not have either a Facebook or Twitter account, initially criticized such use of social networks since brief and quick communication in case of emergency might cause panic.

This initial attitude has changed in the recent events of the earthquake that hit the region of Tuscany (January-February 2013): the regional Department of Civil Protection has kept citizens regularly informed by using both Facebook and Twitter. Such information exchanged on social network is also used through open source applications such as “crowd mapping” to locate geographically the origin of a Facebook message or a sent tweet.

2.3.3 Education

Education activities are carried out at various levels, with particular education programs provided by the Department of Civil Protection, by NGOs, by the Ministry of Interior and by its specific departments such as the National Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and Civil Defence. Voluntary organizations also realize education/training programmes for volunteers involved in civil protection (see section 2.4.1) while evacuation drills are organized in schools, private companies and public buildings on the basis of emergency plans.

“Safe School” Project

The Safe School Project, realized by the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the Department of Civil Protection, was launched as a pilot project in 1992 and has gradually extended to all Italian provinces. It has the objective to educate children and teachers on issues like solidarity, cooperation and self-control, so that they are able to behave correctly during emergency situations. A national committee coordinates the project at the central level and establishes guidelines for local activities, while at the local level the prefectures and a provincial committee define educational programs accordingly (Ministry of Interior 2012).

Training and Exercises

The training activity of the Department of Civil Protection aims in particular to promote the growth of a shared “culture of civil protection”, including common operational procedures and methods to be implemented throughout the country. To this end, volunteers, competent local levels and young citizens are the main targets of the department’s training (Department of Civil Protection 2012). In addition, Civil Protection organizes relief drills at national, regional, provincial and local levels. Drills are an important tool for prevention and for checking emergency plans, with the objective to test the intervention model, update territorial knowledge and suitability of resources. It also aims to instruct those involved in emergency management and the population on the correct behaviour to adopt.

The National Fire Brigades provide “internal” and “external” training programs. Internal training aims at the qualification and specialization of all National Fire Brigades staff while external training addresses various categories of citizens responsible for the implementation of measures regarding fire prevention and firefighting. Each year an average of 1,000 professional firefighters and 30/40 technical officials are trained

by the National Fire Brigades. Similarly, the Italian Red Cross offers both internal and external training and education programmes.³³

On September 2005 the first official terrorist attack simulation/drill was held in Milan. Four different locations were selected – the Northern Milan Railways station Cadorna, the Cadorna Underground station, Linate Airport and the Milan Town Hall – and the people involved, more than 2,000, belonged to the prefecture, police forces, Armed Forces, Fire Brigades and the Health Service.³⁴ While the expected time of the simulation was 1 hour and 15 minutes, the drill was performed in 2 hours and 45 minutes due to problems related to traffic and vehicles access to the disaster area. However, the civil defence and civil protection forces were reportedly well-coordinated in working together to protect the population.

SERIT platform

In terms of research & development in the fields of security, the government and national research institutions encourage cooperation between stakeholders that operate in security and crisis management (industry, universities, RTOs, end users, etc). For example, Security Research in Italy (SERIT) is the R&D platform for national security jointly promoted by the National Research Council (*Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche*, CNR) and Finmeccanica, Italy's leading industrial group in the defence and security sector. SERIT was launched in 2011 and among its goals it intends to provide input on research priorities in the homeland security domain.³⁵ The SERIT regularly identifies key sectors, deemed as a priority for the country's investments with regards to Italian specificities ("SERIT - SEcurity Research in ITaly 2012", Vol. 2, June 2012), while including input for Horizon 2020 (see the "Food for Thought Paper on H2020", February 2013³⁶).

If we take into account the overall state-funded R&D we should notice that "security" does not seem to be a priority (interview, Rome, April 2013). Even the "Horizon 2020 ITALIA", issued in March 2013, does not modify the previous approach in which the national research program was linked to national technology clusters without a specific cluster related to "security". According to some observers, the point is critical because it would be desirable to reflect the European approach which has led to "security" achieving status and visibility (also in relation to the budget issue) in Horizon 2020 (interview, Rome, January 2013).

2.4 The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security

2.4.1 Role of societal/non-profit organizations/NGOs

The world of societal/non-profit organizations/NGOs operating in the civil security system is extremely diverse and only some of these provide direct support to crisis management through a formal partnership with the government. This is the case with the Italian Association of Experts on Critical Infrastructures (*Associazione Italiana esperti in Infrastrutture Critiche* – AIIC) which intends to create and sustain an

³³ More detailed information about internal and external training of Italian Red Cross is available from: <http://cri.it/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/IT/IDPagina/647>. [Accessed 19 December 2012]

³⁴ In addition, four hospitals, the Italian Red Cross, local transport services and the Civil Protection Dept. took part in the simulation. Other resources included 156 Civil Protection vehicles, CBNR task forces, 70 ambulances, two helicopters and 170 Civil Protection volunteers. The forces engaged in the simulation were coordinated by a prefecture team.

³⁵ The SERIT platform official website is: <http://security.cnr.it/index.php/en/serit>. [Accessed 14 January 2013]

³⁶ Available from: http://server5.iit.cnr.it/~intreg/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Position-Paper-on-H2020_v01-1-.pdf

interdisciplinary culture for the developing of strategies, methodologies and technologies able to adequately govern critical infrastructures, especially in crisis scenarios resulting from both natural and man-made disasters.³⁷ The AIIC is aimed at promoting and disseminating a “security culture” by acting as a forum in order to exchange experiences and knowledge. The members of AIIC include also officials of the Civil Protection Department and presidency of the council of ministers.

Undoubtedly, volunteers’ organizations – non-profit organizations according to ANVIL terminology – play a decisive role in Italy’s civil security system by providing human resources and qualified support both in the preparedness and response phases. The legal framework that regulates volunteers’ organizations within the civil security system includes the law n. 266 dated 1991, the law 225/92 and, finally, the Decree of the President of the Republic n. 194/2001. The first recognizes the added value of organized volunteering as an expression of solidarity, participation and pluralism and the second considers the volunteers’ organizations as a “national operational structure”, part of the National Civil Protection Service. The Decree of the President of the Republic n. 194/2001 completely regulates voluntary organizations.

Overall, the voluntary organizations engaged in civil protection number approximately 3,000.³⁸ The total number of Italian volunteers related to civil protection is growing and currently amounts to approximately 1,500,000; 60,000 of them are theoretically ready to intervene rapidly in case of crisis on their territory (Santojanni 2007). In compliance with the Italian law, in order to benefit from state funding, non-profit organizations have to be entered in the register referred to in Article 6 of the law 266/1991. Consequently, the laws n. 266/1991 and n. 383/2000 point out that non-profit organizations derive economic resources for their functions and activities from contributions of the state, public authorities or public institutions aimed only at supporting specific documented activities or projects. In addition, art. 96, law n. 342/2000, acts as a milestone in financing provisions of non-profit organizations related to civil security. It is declared that since 2001 a share of the national fund for social policies [article 59 (44) of the law 449/1997] is determined annually by the minister for social solidarity, in consultation with the minister of the Treasury, budget and economic planning for the purchase of ambulances and capital goods used directly and exclusively for socially useful activities.

A particular aspect characterizing the Italian civil security systems is the solidarity role of the Catholic Church. Besides the financial aid for reconstruction efforts, during the Emilia earthquake the Italian Caritas – the charitable arm of the Italian Bishops Conference (*Conferenza Episcopale Italiana*, CEI) – has supported the affected population by coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations coming from different regions and by creating the so-called “Community Centers” (*Centri di Comunità*), (Caritas Italiana 2013).

Italian Red Cross

The Italian Red Cross is a non-profit NGO and is part of the International Movement of the Red Cross. During all its activities at the international level, the Italian Red Cross works closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It works closely with the ministries of Health, Economy and Finance and Defence. The Red Cross has four Central Committees and more than 1,000 offices throughout the country. This organization has 160,000 volunteers and 5,000 employees (Italian Red Cross 2012). The Italian Red Cross is mainly involved in the

³⁷ For more information about the Italian Association of Experts on Critical Infrastructures see http://www.infrastrutturecritiche.it/aiic/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=219&Itemid=125. [Accessed 19 January 2013]

³⁸ For the list of voluntary organizations related to civil protection see, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/organizzazioni_volontariato.wp, [Accessed 16 January 2013]

preparation and the response to national and international disasters and acts as the “operational structure” of the National Civil Protection Service. The *Regulations for the organization of emergency activities* is the legal basis regulating the organization of all national and territorial structures with regard to the preparation and response to disasters (Italian Red Cross 2010). The organization is part of the civil protection domain and is involved in assistance to the population and logistics in case of crisis. The Italian Red Cross can utilize its network of local units to gather information on the evolving events and share them with the Civil Protection Department, while at the same time can forward information coming from other institutions to local units. When a crisis occurs, the two main operating structures of the Italian Red Cross are the crisis unit (*Unità di Crisi*) and the coordination and assessment team (*Team di Coordinamento e Valutazione*). The first is the operational centre and defines how to respond according to the type of crisis. It meets only in case of a signature crisis either national or international. The second assesses the situation and supports *delegates* in coordinating the initial response to the event.

Through the role of the *delegates*, the Italian Red Cross coordinates its civil protection activities at regional, provincial and local levels. In particular, the coordination encompasses planning, preparedness and response phases.

2.4.2 Role of profit-oriented organizations

An important premise is that in the past private actors were largely passive (i.e. they expected to be protected by the state). According to law 225/92, private organizations can participate in the implementation of the civil security system but they are not legally obliged. For this purpose, the national and local structures of civil protection can stipulate conventions with public and private subjects. According to available information, it does not seem that public agencies outsource crisis responsibilities to profit oriented organizations. Nowadays the private sector is becoming aware it shall be more active. For instance, there are specific tasks in Italy for private actors regarding the protection of critical infrastructures (interview, Rome, July 2012).

Critical Infrastructure Protection

The case of critical infrastructures (CI) deserves particular attention as in Italy, like in other European countries, private actors are owners of CI and/or manage their security. The overall legal framework on the protection of Italian critical infrastructure is the Legislative Decree n. 61 dated 11 April 2011 that transposes the EU Directive 2008/114/EC. This decree establishes procedures for the identification and designation of critical infrastructures covering the fields of energy and transport. It also defines how to assess the safety of these facilities and their minimum standard of protection against natural and man-made disasters, industrial accidents and voluntary human threats (Information Security 2012). As specified by the EU Directive and by the Legislative Decree n. 61, in order to ensure the protection and the *service continuity*, the CI identified is required to appoint a *liaison* security officer and to draft an Operator’s Security Plan (*Piano di Sicurezza dell’Operatore*, PSO) (Associazione Italiana esperti Infrastrutture Critiche, 2011). The PSO identifies the elements that compose the CI and highlights for each of them the existing security measures.

The NISP and the Critical Infrastructures Secretariat (*Segreteria Infrastrutture Critiche*, SIC) play a key role for the identification and designation of CI. The NISP acts as the national contact point with other European states and the European Commission while the SCIC supports the NISP with technical and scientific

activities. The SIC was established in 2010 in order to ensure coherence and synergy between the initiatives and activities of the state administrations involved in the protection of CI (Il Giornale della Protezione Civile 2011).

At the national political level, the ministries of Interior, Defence, Economic Development, Infrastructure and Transport and the Civil Protection Department set the relevant actions and measures necessary to ensure the protection of CI located in national territory, keeping the NISP informed.³⁹ At local level, the responsibility for protection of CI is assigned to the prefect. In case a CI covers the territorial competence of more than one prefect, the Ministry of Interior identifies the responsible one.

3. Quality Measures

3.1 Effectiveness

3.1.1 Assessments through professional and political inquiries

Political and professional inquiries have been carried out respectively by the Parliament, national courts and disciplinary boards, and tend to investigate and analyze the effectiveness of prevention and preparedness measures.

Train derailment in Viareggio

A first case is related to the train derailment that took place in Viareggio on June 29th, 2009. Even in this case an inquiry ministerial commission was established.⁴⁰ The freight train carrying LPG was passing the station of Viareggio. The structural failure of the axle of one of the two wheel-sets of the first carriage of the first wagon created instability in the equilibrium of the forces acting on the trolley, immediately causing the derailment. Around 345 m farther, a collision with the platform provoked the reversal of the first wagon. Consequently, the other four wagons overturned, their cisterns cracked, resulting in leakage of LPG along the railway centre and in the surrounding areas. Three minutes after the derailment and two minutes after the wreckage came to a halt, a powerful explosion occurred, causing 32 deaths, dozens of injuries, serious damage to rail infrastructure and several houses near the train station.

A Plan of Railway Emergency was declared immediately and included the order of evacuation, rescue operations to isolate the area and block off the movement of trains (communication was launched even

³⁹ In this context, cybersecurity is one of main area of concern and intervention. In January 2013, through a Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, Italy has released its cybersecurity strategy defining the institutional framework aimed at protecting national security and critical infrastructures, with particular regard to the protection of cybersecurity system at national level. To this end, the strategy has defined the tasks assigned to each actor involved, the mechanisms and procedures in relation to vulnerability, risk prevention, response to the attacks and the timely restoration of systems' functionality in case of crisis (Corriere Comunicazioni 2013).

⁴⁰ The Commission had to wait until March 2011, when the gathering evidence before a criminal trial was prepared by the judge for the Preliminary Investigation of the Prosecutor of the Republic of Lucca in order to execute a series of destructive laboratory tests on materials and components for the railway wagons, materials and components involved.

before the explosion).⁴¹ The ensuing investigations proved that the preparation of the train was in accordance with the Safety Management System, and that the activities of employees were regular. Furthermore, the equipment, controls, skills and procedures in the maintenance of the rolling stock and accessories responded to current industry standards.⁴²

The core question placed by the disaster of Viareggio concerns not only the identification of the cause of failure of a structural component of the wagon, but also the reasons why the progression of the fracture was not detected and discovered before complete rupture. In these terms, the Commission proposed recommendations to both the normative and the technical-operational order. The survey highlighted that the safety supervision system should be reviewed, especially in terms of standards for systematic checks and security guarantees even in the operating processes at European level. To increase the active and passive safety levels, it urges to act on the indirect causes, and structural aspects of the rules increasing the likelihood of errors should be enhanced. Additionally, there is the urgency of structuring an effective regulatory framework and providing it with an integrated system of adequate controls. In the regulatory field, we need to entrust the European Railway Agency (ERA) with further crucial tasks⁴³. In the operating range, new visual and instrumental inspections should be conducted over sample surveys. Moreover, a system of full traceability of the axles is required, together with the obligation to register the results of the tests carried out on the axles and on all the important components for railway safety. Finally, the Commission considered the importance of laws in the field of wagon leases.

L'Aquila earthquake

One of the most controversial cases concerned the role of the National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks of the Civil Protection Department a few days before the earthquake struck L'Aquila causing 309 victims.

⁴¹ The railway emergency plan provides for the so-called "Extended Emergency Plan", with its main lines of activities identified by the General Plan of Emergency by the station of Viareggio. After a serious train accident, at least four levels of intervention are activated: 1. emergency relief; 2. concrete actions, technical and / or prescriptive to prevent the occurrence or continuation of any condition of danger of further damage and to restore of rail traffic; 3. investigation of the judiciary; 4. identification of the technical causes of the accident. According to Directive 49/2004, in Italy the National Agency for the Safety of Railways is the 'safety authority'. In addition, the improvement of railway safety through the pursuit of operational objectives, consisting in identifying the causes of accidents or incidents of exercise, is the general objective of the activities of the Directorate General for Train Investigations.

⁴² Railway enterprises are subject to the control and supervision of ANSF (*Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie*), the company issuing the security certificate – and infrastructure manager. In the Viareggio case, the ANSF with a series of measures (eg provision n ° ANSF 03502/09 of 02.07.2009, ref. ANSF 03556/09 of 03/07/2009) imposed carrying out special audits on the axles, aimed at identifying any defects; it imposed for wagons registered in Italy and for those registered abroad but circulating in Italy the obligation on the part of railway companies, the owners / charterers / users to ensure that the traceability of axles of Type "A" (ref. Fiche UIC 510.1) was guaranteed, and otherwise to conduct special audits to check for any defects. (note n ° ANSF 04738/09 of 26.08.2009).

⁴³ The European Railway Agency (ERA) should be in charge of the maintenance of a register on the EU rolling stock operating on the European Union network, as it happens by analogy to carriage by air; the definition of maintenance standards with related operating procedures valid throughout the territory of the Union; certification of entities authorized to carry out maintenance on rolling stock operating on European territory; procedures and / or systems to monitor and control on the work of the employees authorized to carry out periodic and extraordinary maintenance operations; introduction of a penalty system to be implemented in case of proven violations of the rules and safety standards. Moreover, corrective actions should be directed to the freight sector with particular reference to the transport of dangerous goods.

In October 2012, seven Italian earthquake experts – members of the National Commission before the earthquake – were sentenced to six years in jail for failing to give adequate safety warnings to the residents of a seismically active area.⁴⁴ Six days before the earthquake, the National Commission met to assess the situation after several months of frequent small earthquakes: after the meeting, some commission members gave encouraging statements to the news media, which prosecutors said gave residents an overly reassuring picture of the risks they faced. According to prosecutors, the commission did not uphold its mandate and consequently did not allow residents and the population to make informed decisions about whether to stay or leave their homes (La Stampa 2013). Such a judgment has been subject to numerous criticisms from the international scientific community which feared that the sentence might pave the way for legal actions against scientists who evaluate the risks of natural hazards which by their very nature cannot be forecast or ruled out with absolute certainty (Corriere della Sera 2012). After the sentence, the members of the National Commission resigned, creating the risk of paralysis in prevention and prediction activities carried out by the commission.

2003 electricity black-out

The third case regarded the electricity black-out that affected the Italian network in September 2003. An inquiry commission was established in order to analyze the events causing the “black-out” of the national electricity system, their causes and development as well as to identify any corrective measures to be undertaken (Ministry of Economic Development 2003).

The chain of events was triggered by a 3,000 MW electricity discharge along the Swiss electric circuit at 3:01 am on September 28th, after a collision with a tree. Despite several manual arrangements aiming at closing the circuit, at 3:11 a request of modification was addressed to the Italian GRTN.⁴⁵ According to the conventional rules, the entire manoeuvre is required to be concluded within 20 minutes. Italy observed exactly the rule, replying at 3:21. However, Rome underestimated the importance of the request due to the incomplete compliance with the agreed procedure of the Swiss counterpart, ETRANS. In the meantime, the load spread over the other Swiss electric circuits. In the next four minutes, at 3:25, Italy was at a deficit of 6,000 MW.⁴⁶ Consequently a disconnection between the Italian and the European circuit occurred inevitably, resulting in the black out.

There were three main countermeasures to prevent the case. They are based on automatic and manual alarm systems and automatic instruments for balancing the power capacity. Presumably Italy was able to act promptly in the request-manoevres time interval. However, there were several problems, such as the dysfunction of the telecommunication mechanism or ambiguous interpretations of the rules, which led to the mismanagement of the risk.⁴⁷ What is more, even the commission work lacks completeness due to the limited time at its disposal.

⁴⁴ The written explanation of the verdict was issued in January.

⁴⁵ GRTN stands for “Gestore della rete di trasmissione nazionale”. It is a joint-stock company aiming to promote, give incentives and enhance developments of renewable resources in Italy.

⁴⁶ It is a noteworthy reminder that Italy is an importer of electricity and, at that moment, its imports exceeded 300 MW.

⁴⁷ The first mechanism (Rule No1; N-1) did not work due to the fact that Switzerland did not specify either the urgency of the question or ask for the pumps detachment, leading Italy to underestimate the problem; the second was not successful because of the lack of an EDA mechanism for intervening in due course; the third was only acting “virtuously”, in light of its 85% reliability and its deficient functioning in the south of Italy.

As a result, the commission proposed to complete the investigation and to implement measures in the short and medium term. These measures consisted of strengthening of the “dialogue” on security issues between managers through the knowledge-facility of their networks. Moreover, neighbouring countries should agree on rapid and systematic implementation of the N-1, the capacity limits of the lines associated, the real-time representation of the most significant parts of the neighbouring networks and related measures and alarms. In addition, the commission deemed it necessary to strengthen the direct means of reliable communication between managers and neighbouring train staff in the control room; review the systems of protection and control of large thermoelectric units; enhance preventive measures and make the Automatic Detachments Calculator (*Elaboratore Distacchi Automatici*, EDA) more flexible.

3.1.2 Limits to national capacities

As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms are activated when national capacities are not sufficient to cope with a certain crisis. The main examples of requested external assistance are related to financial needs.

Declaration of state of emergency

The council of ministers, through its deliberation, declares a state of emergency in case of natural disasters, catastrophes or other events whose intensity and extent require extraordinary powers and means (Camera dei Deputati, n.d.). As mentioned before, in Italy disasters are classified into three different types based on extension, intensity and responsiveness of civil protection: “type a” (municipal level), “type b” (provincial and regional) and “type c” (national).

“Type a” events entail the intervention of single administrations through ordinary measures. In this case, the mayor is responsible for addressing and coordinating the operational activities together with volunteer organizations. “Type b” are natural or man-made events that involve the coordination of different local administrations of two and more municipalities through ordinary measures. In this case, the prefect, the province and the region manage the crisis and coordinate the emergency response by assisting the affected population. Finally, “Type c” events (i.e. natural calamities) require an extraordinary means and power to be exercised for a limited period of time. Following the request of regional administration, the council of ministers declare a state of emergency.

According to the last reform of civil protection (law n. 100 dated 12 July 2012), for the “type c” events the council of ministers declares a state of emergency upon proposal of the president of the council or the president of the region affected by the crisis. Following the declaration, the head of the Civil Protection Department takes “extraordinary powers” and related measures may be taken in derogation from the provisions in force. The law n. 152 of 2005 establishes that even in the event of natural disasters or major events abroad, the Department of Civil Protection may define the measures, approved by the president of the council of ministers, to declare a state of emergency and to respond to disasters (Department of Civil Protection 2013).

3.2 Efficiency

The presence of civil defence and civil protection domains entails two different budgets for the civil security system. The General Directive for administrative activity and management for the year 2012 issued by the

minister of the interior, allocates a total of EUR 1,747,977,737 to the Fire Brigades, Public Rescue and the Civil Defence Department. Within this sum, EUR 4,497,208 aims at improving the crisis management's planning of the national civil defence system, while EUR 1,743,480,529 are allocated for risk prevention and public rescue with the objectives to:

- Improve the rescue activities of National Fire Brigades;
- Increase the monitoring of the application of fire prevention's rules;
- Strengthen rescue during major disasters;
- Disseminate and promote the culture of safety to the citizens;

Concerning civil protection, in 2012 the financial resources for the Department of Civil Protection have been EUR 1,670,392,269 distributed as follows (Presidency of the Council of Ministers, n.d.):

- 71 percent of the total to: a) pay mortgage rates contracted by the regions to finance the reconstruction and repair of the damages caused by major natural disasters that have occurred in recent years; b) fund the organization of "Major Events" such as the Mediterranean Games (2009) and World Aquatics Championships (2009);
- 22 percent of the total for other interventions authorized by the legislation;
- 7 percent of the total to: a) finance institutional activities of prevention and forecast of emergency; b) cover the costs related to the management of the air fleet; c) the general expenses of the Department of Civil Protection.

In addition, as a consequence of the cuts resulting from the adoption of the Stability Law (the Italian law on the national budget) the budget allocated to civil protection shows a decreasing tendency from 2011 onwards. In fact, in 2010 the amount was EUR 2,072,525,900, decreased to 1,891,846,340 in 2011. Finally the budget allocated for last year (2012) amounted to EUR 1,670,329,269.

Legislative initiatives concerning financial aspects of crisis management have been recently adopted. With the Law Decree n. 59 of 15 May 2012, converted by law 12 July 2012 n. 100, the time-span for a state of emergency for civil protection has been shortened: the period, now, cannot exceed 90 days plus a 60-day extension. In addition, the state no longer finances interventions in support of damages to houses and buildings of citizens who, therefore, may only rely upon private insurances. Regions may also increase the excise tax on fuel by 5 cents to finance civil protection. Moreover, Law Decree n. 195 of 30 December 2009, concerning the management of the response actions in L'Aquila, envisaged the establishment of the so-called "Protezione Civile Servizi Spa", a joint-stock company that was expected to be under the supervision of the presidency of the council of ministers which was also supposed to be its exclusive owner. The aim of this joint-stock company was to make crisis management "more flexible and prompt" (Law Decree n. 195 of 30 December 2009). However, after being largely criticized for attempting to privatize the state's responsibility in crisis management, the relevant article was deleted and not included in the following act converting the Law Decree into law. The most controversial aspects of the project of "Protezione Civile Servizi Spa" were linked to the issue of transparency: the fact that it was supposed to be owned and managed by the presidency of the council of ministers was perceived as a threat to dialogue and confrontation among all political parties. In addition, some argued that the very founding principle of civil protection, that is voluntary solidarity, would be distorted as a result of privatization.

Regarding equipment⁴⁸ and technology, it seems that no major investments have been made so far: in fact, Italy's CM budget appears to be limited (see also *SERIT Platform* in Section 2.3.3). From an R&T point of view there are two main streamlines for improvements, although constrained by the availability of national funds:

- A better management of the risk evaluation aspects;
- An improved capability and efficiency for the management of critical, unexpected "black swan" emergencies management "Black Swan"⁴⁹.

The first line of improvements might provide a better assessment and quantification of the status of natural disaster in order to avoid an underestimation of the threat and possible damages, being limited by the current understanding of the underlying physical comprehension of the phenomena (earthquakes, floods and combination of natural/manmade cascading effects); nevertheless there is room to improve forecasting methods and monitoring networks. Such a development is, however, constrained by the availability of national funds to sustain targeted research and acquisition. The second line relates to the ability to manage unexpected aspects of low probability; a big crisis which overcomes the national capabilities to manages such an occurrence. Example may be a super volcano eruption of the Campi Flegrei or the impact of Tyrrhenian underwater sliding generating high impact tsunami waves. For such contexts the development of new means for crisis management and dedicated infrastructure to train personnel facing complex multidimensional, multidisciplinary operations is a key capability to develop. Serious game technology and environments coupled with new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) might be the right receipt to increase preparedness on such extreme events (interview, Rome, April 2013).

In addition, constrained national funds also affect the implementation of relevant prevention measures by administrative and political authorities: implementation is in fact not mandatory, particularly when it has significant budgetary aspects, and there are no immediate consequences if it is disregarded or only sloppily applied.

3.3 Legitimacy

3.3.1 Political support

As stated in section 2.2.1, the management of earthquakes in Friuli and Irpinia was characterized by slow rescue operations and lack of coordination. As a result, a debate started on how to overcome the old operative system – more centralized and based on a cause and effect approach – by assuming that civil protection could embrace forecasting and preventing activities. In case of severe crisis, usually "type c", the government and the Department of Civil Protection intervene by adopting legislative dispositions in order to support the response and recovery phases. Usually, these dispositions are aimed at declaring and/or extending the state of emergency and/or at allocating significant financial resources towards the area affected by the disaster (Presidency of the Council of Ministers, n.d.). Following the last reform of civil

⁴⁸ In terms of equipment, it shall be mentioned that there is an increasing political awareness towards the future utilization of dual-use technologies and assets able to operate both in the civil protection and civil defence domains (interview, Rome, May 2013).

⁴⁹ Black Swan type scenarios meaning scenarios that are not fully covered by the current crisis plans and/or may present severe impacts on society due to the domino effect on population, infrastructure, transportation, other.

protection, response measures are adopted by the chief of the Department of Civil Protection and no longer by the president of the council of ministers. Currently, ordinances issued within 30 days from the declaration of the state of emergency are immediately effective, without the need for a preventive control by the Ministry of Economy (Department of Civil Protection 2012). On the one hand, this allows the Department of Civil Protection to act with more flexibility but, on the other hand, it reduces the government's role in emergency response. In addition, the latest reform has also weakened the role of coordination within the presidency of the council of ministers, in favour of other actors at the national and local levels: this was evident, for example, in the case of the recent earthquakes in Emilia Romagna in 2012 if compared with that in Abruzzo in 2009 (Interview, Rome, May 2013).

One of the important innovations of law 401/2001 (see Section 2.2.1) was the introduction of the so-called "Major Events" among the competencies of the Civil Protection Department. A Major Events is an important and public "event of particular organizational complexity in terms of safety, public order, mobility, reception and medical assistance, which requires the adoption of extraordinary and urgent measures, to ensure regular development of the event" (Department of Civil Protection 2012).⁵⁰ This definition was amended by Law Decree n. 343 of September 2001, which broadened the category of Major Events under the competence of the Civil Protection to include also those events that did not require the declaration of a state of emergency (Il Giornale della Protezione Civile 2011). This raised significant criticisms related to the management of funds and tenders by the Civil Protection in case of events that hardly required the adoption of extraordinary and urgent measures for safety reasons. Following the law n. 100 dated 2012, the management of "Major Events" still falls within the competence of civil protection but only for those events requiring the declaration of a state of emergency (interview, Rome, May 2013).

Finally, the complexity of the chain of command, the high number of responsible authorities and Italians' traditional scepticism toward the government's willingness and ability to deal effectively with their problems has favoured the consolidation of a preference for emergency; exceptional measures that greatly shorten the usually very long decision time. In this way, both the traditional individualistic culture and the drive to protect as rapidly and as well as possible its own interests and well-being coalesce in what we may call a "preference for emergency". It is justified by the ineffectiveness of the normal administration, but also suggesting that it may be simpler not to reform and increase the effectiveness of "normality" when the "emergency" can be better manipulated and more rewarding.

3.3.2 Legal support

It seems that no ombudsman petitions concerning civil protection have been filed so far. As outlined in section 3.1.1, seven Italian earthquake experts, members of the National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks of the Civil Protection Department, were sentenced to six years in jail for failing to give adequate safety warning to the residents of a seismically active area. Such a judgment has been subject to numerous criticisms from the international scientific community, which feared that the sentence might open the way to legal actions against scientists who evaluate the risks of natural hazards. Recently, the former mayor of Genoa (Northern Italy) is being investigated by city prosecutors for suspected slander


⁵⁰ For example, events such as the G8 summit involve both security aspects – for example the protection against terrorist attacks – and the coordination of various branches of the civil security system, including different ministries and various levels of local and central authorities. In these circumstances the government could declare a "Major Event" and task the Civil Protection Department to act as point of contact among different actors involved in order to ensure an adequate management of the event.

and manipulating documents in an investigation surrounding the 2011 deadly Genoa flood. According to prosecutors, documentation regarding the precise timing of when the city launched a flood alert in the fall of 2011 was tampered with by city officials (Ansa 2013). As concerns the financial management of Major Events, the former head of the Civil Protection Department, together with the head of the Council for Public Infrastructures, was subject to investigation in 2010: they were accused of corruption in the management of tenders for the preparation of the Major Event of the G8 in La Maddalena in 2009. The former head of Civil Protection Department, after rejecting all the accusations, resigned in 2010.

3.3.3 Popular trust and support

According to Special Eurobarometer 371 on Internal Security dated November 2011, 60 percent of Italian citizens believe that Italy is doing enough to fight terrorism while more than half (about 52 percent) think that the country is doing enough to manage natural and man-made disasters. It shall be noticed that natural and man-made disasters in the last decade have been more numerous and had greater effects than terrorist attacks.

Figure 4 – National actions on fighting terrorism



Source: IAI elaboration based on Special Eurobarometer 371 data

The popular perceptions during a major crisis tend to not change and the public trust/support remains high in particular during the response phase of the disaster. In general, the public perception towards civil protection is very high and the Civil Protection Department is deemed as one the institutions closer to the citizens' needs. This in turn has caused in some regions a kind of moral hazard for which citizens tend to not be responsible by expecting in any case a public intervention (interview, Rome, May 2013). However, the general perception could radically change negatively especially during the recovery and reconstruction activities (see Section 2.3.1) as happened after the 2009 earthquake that affected L'Aquila (Corriere della Sera 2010).

4. Italy's Civil Security in the EU Context

Following the information provided by the European Community Civil Protection Mechanism, Italy has activated the Commission's Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) eight times between 2007 and 2011 (Overview of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism activations - 01/2007-12/2011). The MIC activations

concerned specific types of disasters, in particular forest fires, landslide, floods and earthquakes and, in some cases, involved the participation of other European Member States such as France and Spain (see section 2.2.3). As analysed in section 3.1.2, Italy has also received significant resources from the EU Solidarity Fund for two major earthquakes, in Emilia-Romagna (2012) and L’Aquila (2009), with a total amount of EUR 1,170 million. From an overall assessment of the EU Solidarity Fund interventions since 2002, it emerges that Italy is the first beneficiary country with a total aid granted of EUR 1,246.6 million .

Table 2 – EU Solidarity Fund interventions since 2002: ITALY

Occurrence	Nature of disaster	Category	Damage (million €)	Aid granted (million €)	Total aid granted (million €)
October 2002	Earthquake (Molise)	Regional	1.558	30.8	1,246.6
October 2002	Eruption of Volcano Etna	Regional	894	16.8	
April 2009	Earthquake (Abruzzo)	Major	10.212	493.8	
October 2010	Flooding in Veneto	Regional	676	16.9	
October 2011	Flooding in Liguria/Tuscany	Regional	722.5	18.1	
May 2012	Earthquakes Emilia-Romagna	Major	13.274	670.2	

Source: EU Solidarity Fund

On 6 April 2009 an earthquake of magnitude 5.8 hit the Italian province of L’Aquila claiming the lives of 309 people, injuring thousands, resulting in 35,000 refugees and provoking severe destruction of infrastructure, private households, public buildings, businesses and the region’s important cultural heritage. The European Commission through the Solidarity Fund decided to grant assistance to Italy amounting to EUR 493.8 million:⁵¹

- EUR 50 million for first emergency operations;
- EUR 350 million for the housing projects in L’Aquila where currently around 12,000 people live.
- EUR 93.8 million for over 3,100 small temporary housing units for up to 7,000 people, in the proximity of the little villages surrounding the city of L’Aquila.
- 32 high quality temporary schools have been built to ensure the education activities of over 15,000 students whose schools have been affected by the earthquake.

In the case of the 2012 earthquake in the region of Emilia-Romagna⁵², after the financial resources of the Solidarity Fund were originally denied by five EU Member States (Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and UK) the EU finally managed to allocate EUR 670 million, the greatest aid ever allocated for natural disasters since the creation of the EU Solidarity Fund in 2002 (European Commission 2012).

⁵¹ For an overview of the EU Solidarity Fund see

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm#6. [Accessed 9 January 2013]

⁵² A first earthquake with a magnitude of 5.9 on the Richter scale hit the area north of Bologna, towards Ferrara, causing fatalities and massive destruction to ancient buildings in surrounding towns. The second, with a force of 5.8 on the Richter scale hit the same region, this time towards the north of the city of Modena, on May 29th. The earthquakes caused 27 deaths; an estimated 350 people were injured and over 45,000 people had to be evacuated. There was serious and widespread damage to buildings, infrastructure, businesses, industrial facilities, agriculture and to the important cultural heritage sector. By far the biggest part of the damage (nearly 92%) was recorded in Emilia-Romagna, particularly in the provinces of Modena, Ferrara, Bologna and Reggio Emilia. Lombardy and Veneto were affected to a lesser extent with nearly 8% and 0.4% of total damage respectively.

Moreover, Italy has contributed to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism especially in terms of training, exercises and exchange of experts programs, organized by the participant states with co-financing from the Commission. Between 2010 and 2012, the Civil Protection Department has coordinated one EU-level exercise in 2010, EU TEREX in Tuscany that simulated an earthquake scenario, and has taken part in four EU-level simulations. Another exercise organized by the department was ES-2008 ERMES, related to a *seismic* event in the Messina Strait. It shall be noted that in 2013 the Department of Civil Protection will organize a further exercise, i.e. TWIST, and will participate in the EU TARANIS exercise coordinated by Austria (European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection website). In addition, for the period 2007-2011 Italy has offered assistance to other countries through the Mechanism, as reported by the Table 3 (see below).

Section II and Section III of the Eurobarometer 383, dated June 2012, analysed the attitude and the general awareness of European citizens with regards to the EU coordination of civil protection. More than a half of Italian citizens, about 54 percent are not aware that EU coordinates the civil protection both inside and outside the Union. This lack of awareness is confirmed by the fact that about 69 percent of Italian citizens declare to be not “Well informed” or “Not very well informed” about civil protection activities of the EU. The correspondent European averages on the same data are even worse (respectively 57 percent and 80 percent), nevertheless we cannot deny that EU visibility on the ground as concerns civil protection is lacking. Regarding the EU role in civil protection, 34 percent of Italians “totally agree” that a coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than action by individual countries, with respect to the 42 percent EU average. Almost half of the Italians, 48 percent, tend to agree on this statement, vis-à-vis 40 percent for the EU average. By adding the percentages related to “Totally agree” and “Tend to agree”, an overwhelming majority of Italian citizens (82 percent) believe that a coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than actions by individual states, perfectly in line with the EU average (82 percent).

Table 3 – Italy’s assistance to other countries between 2007-2011

Period	Crisis type and country	Contribution
28.06-30.06.2007	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs CL-415
05.07-9.07.2007	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs CL-415
25.07-14.08.2007	Forest fires in Albania	2 Canadairs CL-415 IT has been awarded with a Transport Grant
16.08-24.08.2007	Earthquake in Peru	Italy sent bilateral assistance
24.08-07.09.2007	Forest fires in Albania	2 Canadairs, Italy has been awarded with a Transport Grant
24.08-05.09.2007	Forest fires in Greece	1 Canadair
12.11-10.12.2007	Oil spill (marine pollution)	Italy was part of a MIC assessment team deployed in Kiev on 18.11
13.05- 27.06.2008	Earthquake in China	Italy was part of a MIC assessment team deployed on 17.05.2008
13.06-16.06.2008	Forest Fires in Norway	Italy offered aerial firefighting capacity
24.07-28.07.2008	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs CL-415
23.07-20.08.2008	Forest fires in Montenegro	1 Canadair
4.09-3.10.2008	Haiti stor cyclones “Fay”, “Gustave”, “Hanna” and “Ike”	Italy was part of a MIC assessment team deployed on 13.09.2008
13.08-14.08.2009	Forest fires in Albania	Italy offered 1 Canadair CL 415 but it was not accepted due to availability time
22.-26.08.2009	Forest fires in Greece	2 Canadairs
31.08-3.09.2009	Forest fires in Portugal	2 Canadairs
7.01-21.01.2010	Floods in Albania	2 helicopters CH47, medicines, 500 kitchens sets x 5 pers. each, 4400 blankets, 15 generators , 8 water pumps, 6 boats, 80 tents (22 m ²), 5 WP units, 30,000 sandbags
13.01-06.04.2010	Earthquake in Haiti	Italy provided water purification tablets and tents; 12 experts in assessment team, was part of an EC co-financed Preparatory Action Module;
01.03-07.06.2010	Earthquake in Chile	Mobile hospital and experts for MIC assessment and coordination teams
27.07 – 2.08.2010	Forest fires in Portugal	2 Canadairs C-415
04.08-30.11.2010	Floods in Pakistan	In-kind assistance; Italy was part of a EUCP team deployed on 19.08
03.08-20.08.2010	Forest fires in Russian Federation	Italy contributed to air-crews and water discharges
4.10-18.10.2010	Speleologic Relief in France	1 divers team composed of 7 people
21.10.2010-14.12.2010	Haiti cholera outbreak / hurricane Tomas	Italy delivered four Inter Agency Diarrheal Disease Kits (IDDK) as well as medical equipment and material for the treatment of cholera (9.5 tons of material) on 7.12.2010
01.12.2010-05.01.2011	Floods in Albania	Food supplies (80 m ³ -25 tons.), hygienic material (40 m ³ -4 tons), suits and rainproof suits (80m ³ -5 tons); 1 high capacity suction pump; 2 light towers; 2 generators
02.12- 08.12.2010	Forest fires in Israel	12 tons of “Fire Troll 931” (flame retardant foam); 69 tons of “Fire Troll 931” and 2,000 lt fire foam (total value of € 300,000)
08.12-22.12.2010	Floods in Montenegro	4.000 blankets; 2 boats 10 rolls (plastic, 4x60 mt); 504 kitchen sets

		5 Generators 5 Kva 3 Generators 10 kva 2 Generators 18 Kva 120 Tents 25 m2
25.02-14.03.2011	Earthquake in New Zealand	8 experts for DVI – offer declined by NZ later on
01.03-01.08.2011	Repatriation of TCNs (Lybia conflict)	Contribution to air transports capacity; to EUCPT Bravo deployed on 12/13/04; medical kits, medicines, tents, blankets, kitchen sets, hygiene kits
26.06-29.07.2011	Argentina-eruption of the Puyehue – Cordón Caulle volcano in Chile	Geology, volcanologist
11.07-13.07.2011	Explosion/power shortage in Cyprus	Contribution to EUCPT team
25.08- 08.09.2011	Forest fires in Albania	3 Canadairs
25.08-30.08.2011	Forest fires in Greece	Italy sent one plane for a cascade system
24.10-22.11.2011	Earthquake in Turkey	Tents

5. Conclusion

As a whole, the Italian civil security system proves to be tailored to national specificities. It deals mainly with natural disasters and particularly with earthquakes because these are the major crises affecting the country. It is based on a complex but flexible framework, which couples the principle of *subsidiarity* with coordination at government level, and is implemented by various bodies and actors, because this reflects the Italian polycentric institutional landscape. It is primarily civilian but with a significant military contribution in line with the country's history. It benefits from a strong role of volunteer organizations, and only to a lesser extent from profit organizations' activism, building on the strong social ties of Italian society. It is making a significant effort in terms of information, education and training but not on a systematic basis. It has a strong bilateral, multilateral, Mediterranean and above all EU dimension, in line with traditional Italian foreign policy. It shows citizens' perception and support similar to the EU average, as in many other fields, and a specific, active scrutiny by the Italian judiciary system – as for other domestic policy areas. Finally, it passed the dramatic test of the L'Aquila earthquake by meeting very high response standards.

The Italian civil security system presents two further significant characteristics linked to the country's recent history. First, as outlined in this report, the system has been subject to several waves of reforms, sometimes heading towards opposite direction across the continuum between centralization and decentralization poles. This reflected the political competition in the last two decades between those pushing for a stronger power of local authorities and those keen to enhance the role of the president of the council of ministers; a fight which led to a series of constitutional, legal and regulatory changes – as well as attempted changes. A second feature of the Italian civil security system is the role of legal frameworks. Italy is a civil law country where, generally speaking, state and local authorities heavily regulate almost every aspect of social life, thus empowering various bureaucracies. This sort of overregulation theoretically poses a huge amount of constraints to public and private activities. In this context, the legal framework is particularly important to define roles, competencies and hierarchies among various actors involved in the civil security system. At the same time, in case of emergency it may be necessary to overcome constraints posed by such a legal framework through extraordinary measures. This situation was epitomized by the appointment of a special commissioner by the president of the council of minister to deal with the 2009 earthquake in L'Aquila, who *de facto* directed and speeded up the crisis response through his special powers.

Annex I – Coded Data

**ANVIL PROJECT
MAPPING PRTOCOL - WP2
ITALY**

1	Introduction	Scoring instruction	Score	Source	Comments (in case of specific problems with data)
1. a	Is there an official/formal definition of crisis?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 1	
1. b	Is the crisis management approach primarily based on military or civilian operations?	Military = 1 Civilian = 2	2	See section 1	
1.c.	If civilian operations dominate, is the military used for support for crisis management operations?	No = 0 In exceptional situations = 1 Regularly = 2	2	See section 1	
1.d	Does the country take MAINLY an all hazards/generic or MAINLY a specific/functional threats approach to	Mainly all hazard = 1 Mainly specific threats = 2	1	See section 1	

	crises and disasters?				
2	Analytical dimensions	Scoring instruction	Score	Source	Comments (in case of specific problems with data)
2.1	Cultural and historical aspects				
2.1.1	Administrative tradition				
2.1.1.a	Is the state unitary or federal?	Unitary = 1 Federal = 2	1	See section 2.1.1	
2.1.1.b	Is the political system parliamentary or presidential?	Parliamentary system = 1 Presidential system = 2	1	See section 2.1.1	
2.1.1.c	Is the country a monarchy or a republic?	Monarchy = 1 Republic = 2	2	See section 2.1.1	
2.1.1.d	Is the political system a consociational or a majoritarian democracy?	Consociational democracy = 1 Majoritarian democracy = 2	1	See section 2.1.1	
2.1.1.e	Is delegation constructed in a top-down or bottom-up fashion?	Top-down = 1 Bottom-up = 2 Both = 3	2	See section 2.1.1	
2.1.2	Culture				
2.1.2.a.i	Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - DPI		50	http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html	

2.1.2.a.ii	Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - IDV		76	http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html	
2.1.2.a.ii	Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - MAS		70	http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html	
2.1.2.a.i	Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - UAI		75	http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html	
2.1.2.a.v	Geert Hofstede country national cultural score - LTO		34	http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html	
2.1.2.b	World Value Survey's national score on dimension 1 - traditional vs. secular		0.13	http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/	Year 2006
2.1.2.c	World Value Survey's national score on dimension 2 - survival vs. self-expression		0.6	http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/	Year 2006
2.2	Legal & constitutional aspects				
2.2.1	Statutory basis				
2.2.1.a	To what extent is the legal framework that regulates civil security centralized versus fragmented?	Highly centralized (1-2 key laws regulates civil security) = 1 Neither centralized nor fragmented (3-5 key laws regulates civil security) = 2 Highly fragmented (6 or more key laws regulates civil security) = 3	1	See Executive Summary, section 1 and 2.2.1	

2.2.1.b	When was the last major reform in the civil security field undertaken?	Provide the year of the reform	2012	Section 3.1.2 and 3.2	
2.2.1.c	Does the statutory basis of the civil security system rely on formal legislation or executive order?	Formal legislation = 1 Executive order = 2	1	See section 2.2.1	
2.2.1.c	Are formal legal provisions in place allowing the state to call for a state of emergency (including derogations from political order)?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 3.1.2	
2.2.1.d	Are formal legal provisions in place allowing the state to call for a state of disaster (facilitated operational coordination mechanism)?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.2.3	See Note 30 of Section 2.2.3
2.2.2	Political dimension				
2.2.2.a	On what level of government does executive responsibility for civil security FIRST AND FOREMOST rest?	At the national level = 1 At the regional level = 2 At the local level = 3	3	See Executive Summary, section 2.1.1 and 2.2.1	
2.2.2.b	On what level of government does policy formulation for civil security FIRST AND FOREMOST rest?	At the national level = 1 At the regional level = 2 At the local level = 3	2	See section 2.2.1	

2.2.3	Operational dimension				
2.2.3.a	Is there a specialised agency for crisis response at the national level?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.1.1 and 2.2.3	
2.2.3.b	Are there specialised agencies for crisis response at the regional level?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.1.1 and 2.2.3	
2.2.3.c	Is the exercise system formalised by law or executive mandate?	No = 0 By law = 1 By executive mandate = 2	0	See section 2.3.3	
2.2.3.d	How many major exercises with a national dimension have been organised in the period 2008-2012?	Register the number	1	See section 2.3.3	
2.2.3.e	How many major exercises with an international dimension have been organised in the period 2008-2012?	Register the number	2	See section 4	
2.2.4	External dimension				
2.2.4.a	Has the country signed bilateral agreements with all neighbouring countries?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.2.4	
2.2.4.b	How many countries has the country signed bilateral agreements with OTHER THAN the neighbouring	Register the number.	10	See section 2.2.4	

	countries?				
2.2.4.c	How many regional/multilateral agreements on RESPONSE oriented disaster management (i.e. not general conventions on environmental protection) is the country part of?	Register the number.	4	See section 2.2.4	
2.2.4.d	Has the country received assistance from partner/neighbouring country/ies in response to MAJOR DISASTERS (not day to day cross-border help) during the period 2000-2012?"	No = 0 One or two times = 1 More than two times = 3	3	See section 4	
2.3	State-citizens relations				
2.3.1	Expectations				
2.3.1.a	Do citizens have a formal/legal obligation or responsibility in civil security? Please choose the maximal score on a scale (i.e. option 2 includes yes option 1 as well).	Not formally specified = 0 Temporary support upon request by public authorities = 1 Regular private responsibilities for disaster management (e.g. mandatory civil	4	See section 2.3.1	

		service and/or insurance) = 2			
2.3.2	Information				
2.3.2.a	Does the country maintain a siren system?	No = 0 Yes = 1	0	See section 2.3.2	
2.3.2.b	Does the government have a system for radio/TV warnings	No = 0 Yes, at the local/regional level = 1 Yes, at the national level = 2 Yes, at both local/regional and national levels = 3	0	See section 2.3.2	
2.3.2.c	Does the government have a central website with updated information on crisis events?	No = 0 Yes, at the local/regional level = 1 Yes, at the national level = 2 Yes, at both local/regional and national levels = 3	3	See section 2.3.2	See Note 33 of section 2.3.2
2.3.2.d	Does the government make use of social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) to update citizens on relevant crisis issues?	No = 0 Yes, at the local/regional level = 1 Yes, at the national level = 2 Yes, at both local/regional and national levels = 3	2	See section 2.3.2	

2.3.2.e	Does the government have a mobile application for reaching citizens with vital crisis/security information?	No = 0 Yes, at the local/regional level = 1 Yes, at the national level = 2 Yes, at both local/regional and national levels = 3	0	See section 2.3.2
2.3.3	Education			
2.3.3.a	Is civil emergency training (not/except basic FIRST AID) part of the school curriculum?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.3.3
2.3.3.b.	Do societal/voluntary actors offer civil emergency training?	No = 0 To members/professional = 1 To members and limited public outreach = 2 To members and wide-spread training programmes for general population = 3	3	See section 2.3.3
2.3.3.c	Does the government run TV campaigns to raise awareness of crisis issues among the public?	No = 0 Yes, moderately (once per year) = 1 Yes, extensively (more than once per year) = 2	2	See section 2.3.3
2.3.3.d	Does the government provide for a budget for sponsoring research/technologic	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.3.1

	al developments on civil security/crisis management?				
2.3.3.e	If yes, please provide the overall volume of research funding for civil security	Register the number	N.A.		
2.4	Role of private sector				
2.4.1	Role of societal/non-profit organisations				
2.4.1.a	Do societal/non-profit actors play an official/legally mandated role in EXCEPTIONAL crises?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	See section 2.4.1	
2.4.1.b	Do societal/non-profit actors play an official/legally mandated role in the REGULAR provision of civil security?	No = 0, In parts of civil security (e.g. emergency medicine) =1 In (almost) all aspects of civil security = 2	2	See section 2.4.1	
2.4.2	Role of profit-oriented organisations				
2.4.2.a	Do for-profit/private actors play an official/legally mandated role in EXCEPTIONAL crises?	No = 0 Yes = 1	0	See section 2.4.2	
2.4.2.b	Do for-profit/private actors play an official/legally mandated role in the REGULAR provision	No = 0 In parts of civil security (e.g. emergency medicine) = 1	1	See section 2.4.2	

	of civil security?	In (almost) all aspects of civil security = 2			
3	Quality measures	Scoring instruction	Score	Source	Comments (in case of specific problems with data)
3.1	Effectiveness				
3.1.2	Limits to national capacities				
3.1.2.a	How many times has external assistance been received during a crisis?	Register the number for 2000-2012.	N.A.		Data available only from 2009
3.1.2.b	How many times have a state of emergency or disaster been declared AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL as a consequence of a crisis?	Register the number for 2000-2012. If there are no legal provisions for state of emergency/disaster, note NA	N.A.		Data available only from 2009
	How many times have a state of emergency or disaster been declared AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL as a consequence of a crisis?	Register the number for 2000-2012. If there are no legal provisions for state of emergency/disaster or data is not accessible at this level, note NA	N.A.		Data available only from 2009
3.3	Legitimacy				
3.3.1	Political support				

3.3.1.a	How many major reforms have been undertaken?	Register the number for 2000-2012.	2	See section 2.2, 3.2 and 3.2	
3.3.1.b	How many major national political debates on crisis management structures or performance have taken place (2000-12)?	Register the number for 2000-2012.	N.A.		
3.3.1.c	How many formal and politically instituted inquiries/committees on civil security have been undertaken at the national level?	Register the number for 2000-2012.	1	See section 3.3.2	
3.3.1.d	Has there been a premature change in the government (replacement of individual ministers up to full resignation of government) due to civil security issues?	No = 0 1-2 instances = 1 3 or more instances = 3	0	See section 3.3.2	
3.3.2	Legal support				
3.3.2.a	How many NATIONALLY NOTED judicial challenges or ombudsman petitions concerning the civil security system have been filed?	Register the number for 2000-2012.	0	See section 3.2.2	

3.3.2.b	How many landmark judicial or ombudsman rulings have affected the civil security legal and/or institutional framework?	Register the number for 2000-2012.	0		
3.3.2.c.	Are there restrictions on judicial oversight powers over the REGULAR civil security system (i.e. except in cases of exceptional states of emergency)?	None = 0 Partial (legally defined leeway for operational crisis management) = 1 Extensive (e.g. no civilian jurisdiction over military actors in crisis management) = 2	1	See section 2.1 and 3.1.2	
3.3.3	Popular trust and support				
3.3.3.a	Based on Eurobarometer data, what percentage of respondents feel that their country is doing enough to manage natural and man-made disasters?	Record the sum percentage for "Agree" and "Tend to agree"	52	Special Eurobarometer 371 (2011)	
3.3.3.b	Based on Eurobarometer data, what percentage of respondents feel that their country is doing enough to fight terrorism?	Record the sum percentage for "Agree" and "Tend to agree"	60	Special Eurobarometer 371 (2011)	
3.3.3.c	Do official actors maintain registers for volunteers in crisis management?	No = 0 Yes= 1	1	http://www.nonprofitonline.it/docs/dottrinarapporti/718.pdf	

3.3.3.d	If yes to above, list number if accessible	Register the number per 1000 capita for 2011			
3.3.3.e	If no to 3.3.3.c. or 3.3.3.d is unreliable, how many volunteers are estimated to be in the non-profit sector?	Register the number per 1000 capita for 2011.	more than 1 million		
4	Civil security in the EU context	Scoring instruction	Score	Source	Comments (in case of specific problems with data)
4.a	How many times has your country activated the Commission's Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) – 2007-2011?	Register the number for 2007-2011	To be completed by UI/IFHS	http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/disaster_response/EUCPM_activations_since_01012007.pdf	
4.b	How many times has your country contributed to a MIC request - 2007-2011?	Register the number for 2007-2011	To be completed by UI/IFHS	http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/disaster_response/EUCPM_activations_since_01012007.pdf	
4.c	Does your country participate in the EU civil protection mechanism's training programme?	No = 0 Yes = 1	1	Hollis, Simon (2010). National Participation in EU Civil Protection. Swedish National Defence College.	
4.d	If yes to question 4.b, approximately how many practitioners participated in the EU civil protection	Register the number for the 2009-2010 training cycle	44	Hollis, Simon (2010). National Participation in EU Civil Protection. Swedish National Defence College.	

	mechanism's training programme in the 2009-2010 training cycle?				
4.e	How many EU-led civil protection simulation exercises did your country participate in between 2002-12?	Register the number for 2002-2012	15	http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/prevention_preparedness/preparedness_en.htm	
4.f	How many times has the country received financial support through the EU's Solidarity Fund (SF) due to natural disasters (2002-Sept. 2012)?	Register the number for 2002-Sept 2012	6	http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/doc/interventions_since_2002.doc	
4.g	How much aid has the country been granted through the SF due to natural disasters (2002-2012, Sept.)?	Register total financial assistance in million euro for 2002-Sept 2012	1246.6	http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/doc/interventions_since_2002.doc	
4.h	Based on Eurobarometer data, what percentage of respondents are aware that the EU coordinates civil protection both inside and outside the EU? (Proxy for awareness)	Register the percentage	36	Special Eurobarometer 383 (2012)	

4.i	Based on Eurobarometer data, what percentage of respondents believe that a coordinated EU action in dealing with disasters is more effective than actions by individual states? Record the sum percentage for “Agree” and “Tend to agree” (Proxy for attitude)	Register the percentage	82	Special Eurobarometer 383 (2012)	
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Annex II – H1N1 in Italy

In Italy the arrival of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus was faced with an integrated response, mainly based on the 2006 National Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan (Ministry of Health 2006). Overall, from week 31 (27 July – 2 August) of 2009 to week 17 (26 April – 2 May) of 2010, there were approximately 5,600,000 cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) which received medical attention (with almost 2,000 laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza from May to October 2009). A total of 1,106 confirmed cases were admitted to hospital for serious conditions, of which 532 were admitted to intensive care units. There were 260 reported deaths due to pandemic influenza, a much smaller number compared to deaths caused each year by seasonal influenza (Rizzo et al. 2010).

Approximately 870,000 first-doses of the pandemic vaccine were used, representing a vaccine coverage of only 4 percent of the target population.

Italian health authorities at national and regional levels share the responsibility for public health. In particular, the National Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (CCM)⁵³ acts as a bridge between the Ministry of Health and regional governments regarding surveillance, prevention and responding to emergencies. The Strategic Committee is the political steering committee of the CCM, chaired by the health minister and including representatives of the regions, the Department for Civil Protection and the Ministry of Defence.

After the first pandemic influenza alert was announced by the World Health Organization (WHO) in late April 2009, a National Crisis Management Committee, headed by the minister of health, was established with the aim of coordinating the strategies related to preparedness, response and communication during the pandemic. The surveillance of seasonal influenza is based on a nationwide sentinel surveillance network called INFLUNET.⁵⁴ The system covers about 1.5–2 percent of the general population, with the aim of monitoring the incidence of medically attended ILI.

Phase I – Containment measures

Containment measures were implemented in April 2009, including social distancing measures and antiviral prophylaxis for close contacts of cases. A stockpile of 40 million doses of antiviral drugs stored by the Ministry of Health was distributed to the regions, together with recommendations for their correct use. This recommendation remained in force until July 2009.


Phase II – Mitigation measures

⁵³ It was set up by Law 138 of 26 May 2004 and by the Decree of Ministry of Health 1 July 2004, then amended by the Labour, Health and Social Policy Ministry Decree of 18 September 2008, which redefined its structure.

⁵⁴ For the INFLUNET website see <http://www.iss.it/iflu/>, [Accessed 14 December 2012].

When WHO raised the influenza alert level from phase 5 to phase 6,⁵⁵ regions were required to deliver a report illustrating the number of probable, possible and confirmed cases and deaths. At the same time, the existing surveillance systems were enhanced and expanded.

Figure 5 – Pandemic influenza phases in 2009



Source: World Health Organization

In September 2009, according to the National Pandemic Plan, the Ministry identified the categories to be vaccinated with the now-available pandemic vaccine. As mentioned before, about 870,000 first doses of the pandemic vaccine were put into use, representing a vaccine coverage of only 4 percent of the target population.

An evaluation of the Italian response to the 2009 influenza H1N1 reveals that regional authorities implemented *local* pandemic plans in terms of logistics, strategy of the vaccinations and general practices. As a consequence, the Italian response to H1N1 was not carried out in a uniform and homogeneous way but it enhanced the collaboration between central and local levels. Communication activities to the citizens were centralized at the national level and the Ministry of Health decided to publish daily and weekly reports on the official website. However, communication strategy has been a problem as uncertainty in data about affected individuals and deaths caused a high degree of frustration that influenced the vaccination campaign. As analyzed, in fact, the vaccinations covered only 4 percent of the target population, 15 percent of the healthcare personnel and 1.5 percent of the general population (Rizzo et al. 2010).

The media coverage on the early cases of H1N1 – in Italy and abroad – was extremely high and marked by over-estimated forecasts on the diffusion and lethality of the influenza. As a result, part of the Italian citizenry and public opinion supported the proposal to close kindergartens and primary schools, but the government deemed it a too drastic and unnecessary measure. At the end of the day, neither the number of deaths due to H1N1 nor the number of ILI were higher than normal yearly influenza. Both the available anti-flu drug stockpiles and the amount of vaccine acquired were more than sufficient to deal with the H1N1. The crisis did not have a structural impact on the functioning of Italian society, for example in terms of services disruption; neither has it drastically changed the way the civil security system deals with this kind of threat. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the low vaccination coverage at the national level, the vaccine stock at the Ministry of Health remained high and part of the doses (2.4 million) were donated to WHO for developing countries.

⁵⁵ Phase 6 is characterized by community level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the criteria defined in phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic is under way.

Annex III – Resources

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