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Preventing Violent Conflict

Issues from the Baltic and the Caucasus

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
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
Preventing Violent Conflict

Issues from the Baltic and the Caucasus

A Joint Study of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen



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Ethnic Distribution in the Baltic States

ESTONIA:

Population	1,595 million (1992),	
	1,566 million (1989), of which:	
	Estonians	61.5%
	Russians	30.3%
	Belorussians	1.8%
	Others	6.4%

LATVIA:


Population	2,606 million (1994)	
	2,667 million (1989), of which:	
	Latvians	52%
	Russians	34%
	Belorussians	4.5%
	Poles	2.3%
	Jews	0.9%
	Others	6.8%

LITHUANIA:

Population	3,740 million (1994)	
	3,675 million (1989), of which:	
	Lithuanians	79.6%
	Russians	9.4%
	Poles	7%
	Belorussians	1.7%
	Others	2.3%

Source: *Die Völker auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen Sowjetunion. 1996*, Geographischer Informationsdienst, map 4.

Map of the Baltic Region




Ethnic Distribution in the Caucasus

Azeri:	6,273, 000	(only in the Caucasus)
Abkhaz:	96,000	
Adygey (Cherkess, Kabardin):	658,000	
Avar:	501,000	
Lezgi:	367,000	
Chechen:	792,000	
Ingush:	197,000	
Georgian:	3,479,000	
Mingrelian/Laz:	300,000	
Armenian:	4,205,000	
Greek:	163,000	
Kurd:	102,000	(only in the Caucasus)
Ossetian:	509,000	
Talysh:	21,000	
Tat:	23,000	

Source: National Geographic, February 1996, pp. 130-131.

Note: The map pursues two purposes. First, it demonstrates the distribution of states, ethnic groups, and groups with administrative-territorial autonomy in the setting of the Caucasus. Second, it pays particular attention to cross-border ethnic groups which can become a source of future conflict. The inclusion of Azeris in Northern Iran (Southern Azerbaijan) and Kurds in Turkey into this mapping of ethnic groups in the Caucasus has seldom been done before. This map presents selected ethnic groups with a population greater than 20,000 which have declared their discontent in one way or another in recent years. The map does not intend to present a complete picture of ethnic distribution in the Caucasus, and levels of concentration of different groups in different areas.

Map of the Caucasus Region



Conflict Prevention has recently become an important analytical, as well as practical, field of foreign and security policy. Its main concern is the large number of escalating disputes (some of them are inter-ethnic fights, some of them are civil wars) located mainly in critical regions of Europe, Africa and Asia. Each of these violent conflicts has its individual dynamics and characteristics, but all of them have tremendous damage potential which is unacceptable to civilized societies, both in the conflict area itself as well as outside. To understand the nature of the conflicts, to identify their causes, and to receive early warning on situations which may get out of hand and spill over into neighboring regions, are preconditions for any sensible response. A proactive policy not only saves lives, it may also save material and immaterial costs.

This volume is the result of a joint study by two research institutes which have tried to unfold this partly new area of security policy and, in this regard, to stimulate and encourage scholars and policy makers to think in new categories. *Preventing Violent Conflict in Europe* is the title of a two-year research project conducted jointly by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Ebenhausen. The project is financially supported by the Volkswagen Stiftung and directed by Gianni Bonvicini and Ettore Greco on the Italian side and Bernard von Plate and Reinhardt Rummel on the German side. Two intertwined activities form the core of the project: to study analytical and political tools of conflict prevention, and to train young scholars from areas of (potentially) violent conflicts in Europe in order to test these instruments for application in their home region.

In its first year the project concentrated on two conflict regions: the Baltic States and the Caucasus. Renatas Norkus, a Lithuanian scholar, was invited to work on the project and stayed with the IAI for 1996, while in 1997 the Bulgarian scholar Radoslava Stefanova succeeded him in this position. Likewise, the Georgian scholar Sopiko Shubladze joined the Ebenhausen conflict prevention team in 1996 and was then succeeded by Gevork Ter-Gabrielian from Armenia. The participants in the project have profited from the firsthand insight these scholars brought to the project from their experiences in the conflict prone regions in Europe while, in turn, the institutional affiliation as well as the wider context of the project has allowed the Scholars-in-Residence to deepen their knowledge of the subject and to extend their professional network.

This volume, which is based on the first project conference held in Ebenhausen in November 1996, serves as a forum for the Scholars-in-Residence and other participating experts and presents the progression of their work in an empirically and analytically demanding field. The findings and results are regarded as a contribution to the ongoing discussion on conflict prevention theory and practice and will

hopefully stimulate fruitful discourse on the topics raised, such as the scope and the usefulness of existing analytical and political instruments of conflict prevention and the limits of international norms against violence. A second conference at the end of the project will further develop some of the subjects addressed here and raise new ones such as the difficult role of local and regional actors in conflict prevention policy, the insufficient adjustment of international law to the problem, and the work in progress concerning the UN and European systems of conflict prevention. The contributions dealing with these subjects will be published in a separate volume in the course of 1998.

The editors express their sincere gratitude to the authors of the volume as well as to the project assistants (Sonia Lucarelli at the IAI and Claude Zullo at SWP) and the editorial staff (Peter Cross, Maria Meier, Christiane Seitz and Gevork Ter-Gabrielian in Ebenhausen).

The Editors

PART ONE

Challenges to Conflict Prevention Policy

1. A Conceptual Framework of Conflict Prevention

Renatas Norkus

This paper provides a rather general introductory overview of the conceptual issues related to conflict prevention (CP). Most of the recent books and articles dealing with conflicts, their causes and prevention refer to the CP measures by defining the terms in one way or another. There are, indeed, many viewpoints concerning the importance of CP and its constituent elements, which makes it difficult to extrapolate a univocal theory. In order to at least partly overcome this, the first section of this paper is devoted to a closer examination of different interpretations of CP concept. It results in an attempt to suggest a broad definition of CP encompassing a certain typology of conflict prevention measures.

The achievements in avoiding, preventing or constraining conflicts are not very impressive. Having said this, it is worthwhile to present some considerations on the conditions or prerequisites which are vital for the success of conflict prevention actions. The second section will focus on this aspect of CP.

The third section will consider some problems of CP which, in large part – due to the changing nature and dynamics of post-Cold War conflicts – present great dilemmas for both international and national actors.

I. Definitions

The term *prevention* literally refers to an advance action against something possible or probable. The term *prevention of conflict* involves a new element, conflict, which refers to competitive or opposing action(s) of incompatibles resulting in destructive modes of behavior (the most extreme of which is armed conflict), which is perceived by other national actors or the international community at large as an undesirable situation, and therefore has to be prevented. The term CP is frequently used and discussed in the literature dealing with Europe's new security and peace architecture. It is obvious that international relations and diplomacy are always concerned with the resolution of conflict, by and large reflecting a basic assumption that "conflict is not unavoidable but can indeed be prevented."[1] But equating CP with general objectives of international relations and diplomacy is not sufficient and can even be misleading, for a definition that embraces everything means nothing. The level of today's

1 Max van der Stoel, "The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE Preventive Diplomacy," in Sweden. Utrikesdepartementet, *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE* (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), p. 33.

development of CP allows one to characterize it as a specialized field of international relations. In this light, diplomacy appears as a technique that could be a part of CP.

Despite the prevailing view that there is a clear need for better CP, the concept remains rather blurred and has not been defined well enough. Not many authors give a precise CP definition, mainly due to the fact that it represents a highly complex issue, and therefore defining it is not an easy task. One notices that the debate develops in the direction of addressing the ways and means of implementing CP measures, rather than at its aims. Still, some suggested definitions differ as to what the ends of CP should be.

Stephen J. Stedman argues that while preventive diplomacy attempts to stop conflicts from becoming violent, CP aims at the supposed roots of such conflicts: poverty, environmental degradation, overpopulation, resource competition, and lack of legitimate political institutions.[2]

A similar approach is reflected in the meaning of John Burton's CP: "prevention of an undesired event by removing its causes, and by creating conditions in which it cannot occur."[3] Such an emphasis on long-term goals becomes wide-spread in different discussions on CP. However, from the perspective of implementation this understanding of CP is paradoxical: while neither of the above-stated problems can be remedied by using one rather short-term technique, one also cannot confidently identify with the circumstances in which these factors will necessarily generate large-scale destructive and violent conflict. Therefore, effective CP should definitely take these factors into account, but cannot limit its focus to them.

Another concept of CP has been suggested by Luc Reychler, who regards CP in a systematic connection to other activities related to the more general field of conflict management. In this approach, CP is distinguished from and understood in connection with conflict avoidance and conflict resolution.[4] Reychler characterizes the other two parts of the triad of conflict management activities as: "Efforts to avoid the development of contentious issues and the incompatibility of goals are called *conflict avoidance*; ... and any activated measures at the stage when a conflict involves incompatible goals, hostile attitudes and disruptive behavior – conflict settlement or in special cases *conflict resolution*."[5] Reychler's CP concept lies between conflict avoidance and conflict resolution, and encompasses "measures

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2 Stephen John Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventive Diplomacy," in *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (1995) 3, p. 18.

3 John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* (London: Macmillan and New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 233.

4 Luc Reychler, "The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice," in Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, eds., *The Art of Conflict Prevention*, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 7 (London, New York: Brassey's, 1994), p. 4.

5 Ibid.

which contribute to the prevention of undesirable conflict behavior once some situation involving goal incompatibility has arisen."[6] Contrary to Stedman, Reychler does not distinguish between preventive diplomacy and CP, pointing out that both refer to similar efforts.

A comprehensive approach towards the CP concept is offered by Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. His definition tries to grasp, in a formal way, the whole complexity of issues. Conflict prevention, he argues, "is an affair of multiple dimensions involving various time frames."[7] Expanding on this definition, he presents a distinction between short-term and long-term CP. Short-term CP aims at the prevention or containment of an immediate development towards escalation. According to van der Stoel, "it is in particular in the framework of short-term CP that early warning and preventive diplomacy have to play their crucial roles."[8] The long-term, or durable, prevention of conflict, however, requires a long-term perspective: "it involves building a viable democracy and its institutions, creating confidence between a government and population, structuring the protection and promotion of human rights, the elimination of all forms of gender discrimination, and respect for minorities."[9] It is easy to notice that long-term CP in van der Stoel's conceptualization comes close to Stedman's and Burton's understanding, while short-term CP merges with Reychler's concept. However, the short- and long-term aspects of CP are seen by van der Stoel as a part of an integrated strategy. He notices that in practice they should not be separated. It becomes clear from van der Stoel's conceptualization that long-term CP is and should be applicable to both pre-conflict and post-conflict situations. Even if violence has come to an end, very often the underlying causes which led to the conflict have not been removed. Such "post-conflict conflict prevention," as van der Stoel names it, has to be fully integrated in and coordinated with the strategy of peacebuilding.[10] To sum up, the OSCE High Commissioner's definition, which is certainly based upon the comprehensive approach to security, incorporates such activities as early warning, preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding.

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6 Luc Reychler makes the observation that the concept of CP "refers to two types of effort; those which prevent behavior defined within the relevant international system as undesirable, and those which attempt to confine conflict behavior clearly within the limits of permissible activity." See Reychler, "The Art of Conflict Prevention," p. 4.

7 van der Stoel, "The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner," p. 37.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 35.

One of the most elaborate (though it has not been spared strong criticism)[11] works as far as the conceptual framework for conflict prevention and resolution is concerned is Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*. Although not giving a precise definition of CP, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations defines the terms of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, which might be considered the principal and indispensable CP and conflict resolution measures. According to Boutros-Ghali; "preventive diplomacy is an action (1) to prevent disputes from arising between parties, (2) to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and (3) to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."[12] In order to effectively accomplish its mission, preventive diplomacy must accommodate such measures as confidence-building, early warning, fact finding, preventive deployment and, in some cases, demilitarized zones. In contrast to preventive diplomacy, the Secretary-General defines *peacemaking* as an "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations."[13] All of the measures he then mentions, including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, "good offices," are the same measures that can be used by preventive diplomacy or for preventing the outbreak of armed conflict in general. A further conceptual confusion appears when the Secretary-General includes the use of military force, inter alia, by "peace-enforcement units," among the peacemaking activities. Identification of use of force as peacemaking, rather than peace-enforcement or peacekeeping, unusually expands the scope of the concept of peacemaking. Meanwhile, peacekeeping is defined by Boutros-Ghali as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well."[14] Finally, *post-conflict peacebuilding* is an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."[15] These measures may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections. As Boutros-Ghali concludes, "preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained ... post-conflict

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11 Boutros-Ghali's CP terminology has caused some confusion among researchers and policy executors. See Trevor Findlay, "Multilateral Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," in *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1994, pp. 13-80.

12 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 45 (enumeration added).

13 Ibid., p. 45.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 46.

peacebuilding can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples."[16] Drawing from this conclusion and the way in which he divides different techniques into categories, one can notice that some of the mentioned activities fall directly under the CP concept (e.g., confidence building, fact finding, early warning, monitoring elections); some are clearly the tools of conflict settlement or resolution (e.g., peace-enforcement); and some may be applicable in expanding the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict, containment of its spread and its resolution (e.g., peacekeeping and preventive deployment). However, as Trevor Findlay argues, "most tools of conflict prevention and resolution can in fact be used at any point of the 'conflict spectrum.'"[17] The understanding that some and/or all of the CP techniques discussed in the Agenda could be used simultaneously, and not necessarily in the prescribed time sequence, is lacking in Boutros-Ghali's account (see annex).[18]

Following this comprehensive approach towards the understanding of CP, a clearer definition can be developed as has been spelled out by Margaretha af Ugglas. Defining preventive diplomacy in a wide sense, she refers to its use in: (1) preventing disputes from arising between parties; (2) preventing disputes from developing into conflicts,[19] (3) eliminating conflicts when they occur; and (4) containing and limiting the spread of those conflicts not amenable to swift elimination.[20] In comparison to van der Stoel, who does not foresee the role of preventive diplomacy alone in "deep-going resolution" of disputes (not to mention resolution of conflicts),[21] af Ugglas assigns preventive diplomacy to eventuate "elimination of conflicts when they occur." This clearly represents a new, though controversial, aspect of the CP concept, provided a distinction is made between conflict prevention and conflict settlement or resolution.

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16 Ibid.

17 Findlay, "Multilateral Conflict Prevention," p. 17: "Observer missions, for instance, can be seen as a conflict prevention technique, a type of peacekeeping activity or a confidence-building measure in a post-conflict situation. Preventive diplomacy can occur at any stage of a conflict, either before the outbreak of armed clashes, or after they have begun, in order to prevent escalation in to full-scale war. Humanitarian intervention can be carried out during a conflict, such as in former Yugoslavia, or after it, as in the case of the Kurds of Iraq. Peace negotiations can take place at any point in the conflict spectrum."

18 In annex 1 at least some of the peace-related activities which can be used for the achievement of several particular aims both in the fields of conflict prevention and conflict resolution have been identified.

19 We could presume that the term "conflict" here and further on is meant to be an "armed" or "violent" conflict. Otherwise the distinction between dispute and conflict is not very clear.

20 Margaretha af Ugglas, "Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy," in Sweden. Utrikes-departementet, *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE* (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), p. 12.

21 van der Stoel, "The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner," p. 38.

The interpretations of CP's aims discussed above provide a sound basis to suggest that *CP is a set of efforts, measures and actions which aim at*:

- preventing disputes from arising between parties;
- preventing disputes from escalating into conflicts;
- containing and limiting the spread of conflicts when they occur, and
- preventing post-conflict relapse into conflict by removing its causes and creating conditions in which it cannot occur.

The latter definition implies that CP can be distinguished from conflict resolution which consequently can be defined as a set of activated measures at a stage when conflict occurs aiming at:

- stopping violent and coercive behavior;
- enacting and enforcing cease-fires;
- bringing parties to an agreement through peaceful or, as applicable, forceful means.

For further elaboration of these definitions as well as for a certain typology of CP and resolution measures, see the attached matrix. The main idea behind this matrix is to show how they intertwine and may be performed simultaneously or at varying points when dealing with conflict, conjoining them with different tasks of CP and resolution, at the same time keeping various suggested conflict prevention and resolution measures conceptually distinct from one another. One should keep in mind that, though matrixes usually pretend to be "innocently correct," this should not be taken for granted in this case.

II. Conflict Prevention: Easier Said Than Done

Since the achievements of CP measures in avoiding, preventing or constraining conflicts are not very impressive it is worthwhile to raise the question: What makes CP successful? There is a limitation for giving a simple answer to this question. There are many factors related to conflict as such; local political, military and social conditions differ from one conflict situation to another, and many political disputes do not always lead to the use of armed force. "Whether or not a dispute becomes violent or is prevented may be determined as much by the nature of its causes as by whether or not anyone has done anything to prevent it."[22] Thus, it is difficult to draw a clear judgement to what extent deliberate preventive action makes the difference between a peaceful or a violent outcome of conflict. Even so, having in mind the assumption that some conflicts are not inevitable and that some can be prevented, one

22 Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 83f.

can try to indicate more generally what the factors are that determine success or failure of preventive actions.

What Makes CP Successful?

One of the conditions for successful conflict prevention is its *timeliness*. The widely accepted belief that the earlier third parties take preventive action, the more effective it is, finds support in general theories of conflict escalation. Clearly, the earlier a preventive effort addresses the dangers of potential military conflict, the less likely it is that conflict will materialize. Yet timeliness will not always mean involvement early on. It rather has to do with whether inducements to resolve disputes peacefully can be effective before the parties have actually engaged in conflict. In other words, as Christoph Bertram has put it: "the situation must be ripe for outside mediation and sensitive to outside pressures."[23] Some analysts suggest that third-party intervention must "wait" until the disputants have already reached some sort of stalemate following an initial engagement or have attempted themselves to come to terms, a situation otherwise known as "ripeness for resolution."[24] Lund, however, suggests that the above approach is deficient. He argues that once violence has begun, it escalates because of "an interactive process of attack and retaliation that leads to a self-perpetuating cycle. To end such a cycle, a mutual hurting stalemate may be indeed necessary, but the cycle itself is not inevitable."[25] In very much the same way as Bertram, Lund proposes the notion of "ripeness for prevention," which is a timely action that is neither "too little, too late" nor "too much, too soon."[26] In general, early action is vital before conflicts turn violent, since bloodshed fortifies entrenched hostile positions. On the other hand, it is equally important to undertake preventive measures when there is a registered sufficient motivation on the part of the belligerents to seek peaceful solutions, i.e., well into the dispute.[27]

Another condition for success, which is closely related to timeliness, is *leverage*. Without it, preventive action is reduced to appeals which the parties in the conflict can heed or reject without having to pay for a negative response or gaining an advantage from a positive one. One of the important guidelines for conflict

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23 Christoph Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," in *Survival*, 37 (1995) 4, p. 73.

24 Quoted in Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, p. 87 and p. 133.

25 Ibid., p. 134.

26 As an example of timing representing the "ripeness of prevention" is often given the preventive action of the HCNM to help resolve the dispute between the Estonian government and the Russian-speaking community in Estonia over proposed language laws; the problems of action "too little, too late" were illustrated in the case of Balkan war.

27 And yet, intervention taken untimely, may itself fuel tensions by creating an awareness of a dispute, stimulating demands and expectations, and provoking countermeasures from one or other party.

prevention is that it is not likely to be successful if it only consists of diplomats proposing solutions and urging reasoned compromise. Jennone Walker puts it this way: "Mediation efforts must be supported by a combination of political, economic and military muscle that promises (or threatens) an effective mix of pain and gain ... It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the credible threat of economic or military action should be an aid to mediation, *not* an alternative to it."[28] Lund names it "muscular mediation" – that is, a provision of rewards sufficient to gain disputants' compliance and/or imposition of penalties adequate to deter their noncompliance with processes of peaceful negotiation.[29] For example, leverage existed when a compromise over the status of the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia was worked out. The objective of the two Baltic States was not to antagonize the West over minority rights issues, and not to provide reasons for Russia to postpone the withdrawal of its troops. Equally, Russia was provided an incentive to keep to schedule with its troop withdrawal by the threat that U.S. and other Western economic aid would otherwise have been withdrawn. In the Balkan war, instead, as Bertram argues, the incentives or disincentives that existed were usually generated by internal events, not external pressures.[30] In conclusion, however, it may be said that the level of inducement that third parties must bring to bear in terms of carrots and/or sticks is relative to the scale and stage of development of the conflict being addressed.

A *prudent selection of a variety of political, diplomatic and military instruments* or "multifaceted action," as Lund calls it, is usually presented as a vital condition for successful conflict prevention. Furthermore, the various preventive measures should be well coordinated among all the actors involved. Parties to a conflict generally need more than a combination of carrots and sticks but also a variety of other conflict prevention measures, which might include assistance in alleviating distrust, promoting reconciliation, establishing channels through which to pursue negotiations, and formulating settlements. Two good examples of an attempt to employ a number of preventive actions, while at the same time managing coordination among the different actors involved are the cases of Macedonia and

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28 Jennone Walker quoted in Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Ethnic Conflict as Low Intensity Conflict in Post-Cold War Europe: Causes, Conditions, Prevention," in *Report ILIC 1995*. The First International Workshop on Low Intensity Conflict, Stockholm, Sweden, 29-31 March 1995, p. 33.

29 Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, p. 87.

30 Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," p. 76, where the author argues that "prior to the outbreak of hostilities, other incentives might have worked (in the Balkans). Indeed, the EU promised credits to underpin its request that the Yugoslav Federation be maintained, and threatened to withhold them if force were to be used. But this was too late and too little; ... Instead, an arms embargo was imposed which in practice affected only the Bosnian Army, not Serb or Croat forces, thus doing nothing to discourage the latter from ... continuing the war."

Estonia. The effectiveness of preventive effort in the former depended on the cumulative impact of US threats of military action and the presence of the UN peacekeeping force, the CSCE (OSCE) observer mission, several NGO dialogue and reconciliation projects, and the widespread diplomatic recognition of the new Macedonian government. Together, these official and non-official actions signaled to the various factions and neighbors a significant international presence and interest in Macedonia.[31] In Estonia, a fruitful interplay between a number of different CSCE (OSCE) instruments was established, which contributed highly to the effective settlement of dispute.[32] By contrast, in the cases of preventive diplomacy failure, like in the former Yugoslavia, only one or two preventive instruments were employed and these were targeted on only one aspect of the local dispute.[33] In complex situations with a variety of needs, importance must be placed on cooperation and coordination among third-party actors. Where cooperation and unity of purpose among third parties in a given conflict are weak or absent, preventive effectiveness is compromised.[34]

The prospects for preventing conflict are strongly determined by *the degree of political support or tolerance toward initiated preventive actions* extended by major powers, regional powers or neighboring states (and the public opinion they represent). Often the lack of progress in conflict prevention is not due to technical factors like the wrong level of mediation or insufficient competence or vision of third parties, but to the extent to which political support from the actors outside the conflict is exercised and consensus among them is achieved. It has been argued that the interests of a majority of OSCE countries seemed to be limited to containing the Yugoslav conflict within its boundaries and to preventing a possible spill-over into

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31 Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, pp. 104-105.

32 As a Chairman-in-Office, Sweden conducted an intensive dialogue with the Government of Estonia and other CSCE (OSCE) Governments on both troop withdrawal and the situation of the Russian-speaking population; the discussion of the troop withdrawal issue in the Committee of Senior Officials helped put the government of Russia under pressure; on citizenship and language issues, the High Commissioner on National Minorities pointed to the government of Estonia that the principles and values of a larger European community of nations are incompatible even with the slightest discrimination against the cultural rights of minorities; the CSCE (OSCE) Mission to Estonia assisted the HCNM in the preparatory stage, and also in the implementation phase, of his operations. See af Ugglas, "Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy," p. 25.

33 Bertram has argued that the main vehicle chosen to influence events in the Balkans, the UN presence, has been "designed and equipped not to shape the outcome of the war, but to accompany it, primarily through humanitarian efforts," which eventually "only served to constrain whatever more 'muscular' intervention was being contemplated," see Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," p. 75.

34 "The EC decision to recognize Croatia, for example, was taken against the wishes of the UN negotiator Cyrus Vance, who felt recognition placed further strains on the relationships among the republican leaders and increased the difficulties of reaching a political settlement". See Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, p. 104.

neighboring regions.[35] Reychler describes this lack of interest as due to "the weakly developed strategic culture in Europe," pointing out that "the 'we-ness' feeling of many Western Europeans does not seem to reach far beyond their *Little Europe*."[36] This example clearly explains the lack of political support.

The influence of major players can be exercised (for good or ill) in a variety of ways. Lund suggests that one way is through approving or vetoing the involvement of a regional organization of which they are members. Another way local actors, as well as major powers, can exert themselves is through the economic and/or diplomatic influence they enjoy in a given region.[37] In some regions, several outside or regional actors may have strategic interests to get involved. Individually and collectively they may have a tremendous impact on whether preventive action is taken and on its effectiveness. This is illustrated by the intensive and effective third-party activity in the Baltic States, which have historically enjoyed close relations with the West and the Nordic countries. On the contrary, the lack of interest (or imbalanced interest) in a particular region among the major powers may cause disputes there to be neglected.[38]

The success of preventive efforts is also conditional upon *political support and the general moderate disposition of the leadership of the parties to the dispute*. Lund has emphasized that "peaceful outcomes are more likely when the leaders of the parties to the dispute are moderate in their words, actions, and policies, make conciliatory gestures, and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations and bargaining to resolve the issues in dispute."[39] The chances of reaching a peaceful outcome were significantly enhanced in the Hungary – Slovakia dispute over the Gabcikov-Nagymaros hydro-electric project; the Estonia – Russia controversy over the interests of national minorities; and the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993, where the respective governments displayed greater restraint and showed themselves willing to accommodate the interests of other parties through negotiation and consultation. An example to the contrary, was the CSCE effort in preventive diplomacy in Kosovo, Sanjak and Vojvodina with the initial approval of the government of Belgrade. When the Belgrade authorities chose to withdraw that support, the local CSCE missions in the region had to cease their activities.[40] One has to agree with af Ugglas that no conflict

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35 Reychler, "The Art of Conflict Prevention," p. 10.

36 Reychler, "The Art of Conflict Prevention," p. 11, where he further elaborates that this "weak strategic culture" embraces several illusions: for example, the illusion of distance, or the feeling that one should not be too concerned with faraway conflicts; and the illusion of time, or the belief that important decisions can be postponed to the distant future.

37 Examples being Russian economic, political and military dominance in its "near abroad," which allows it to play active roles in many conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union.

38 As there has been the case in Moldova, or now in Chechnya.

39 Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, p. 100.

40 af Ugglas, "Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy," p. 14.

or dispute can be solved for the conflicting parties by a third-party alone; only the parties themselves can do so, with the assistance of a third-party.

Another set of conditions for successful preventive action has to do with *conflict prevention facilities* which refer, among others, to *involvement of encompassing institutions*, *effective decision making*, and *adequate infrastructure*. It is of great advantage if all the parties to the dispute are already members of the same organization, even more so if that organization authorizes interference in its members' internal affairs.[41] The advantage in having an encompassing institution is that mediators can concentrate on the substance of the issue, instead of having first to work out the procedures. A good example here is the way in which NATO has consistently been able to prevent military conflict between two of its members, Greece and Turkey. The procedural matters have a great impact on the timing of preventive action, thus, on its effectiveness.

It is believed that the issues pertinent to decision making within international organizations have an impact on the effectiveness of prevention. In all the regional organizations, decisions are made on the basis of consensus. The OSCE decision-making process is perceived as the most cumbersome. Certainly, if the regional organizations are to carry out preventive actions effectively, the process of decision making must be streamlined, while respecting an organizations' preference for consensual rules and practices. The impact of the decision making system should not be exaggerated. More important is the lack of will and consensus among the countries concerned.

Effective conflict prevention is also dependent on efficient contingency planning, availability of an adequate infrastructure for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and stronger financial support for these from the nations. It is clear that although conflict prevention is generally considered a cost-effective endeavor, it often requires substantial resources and investments to be successful.

III. Some Dilemmas Faced When Applying Conflict Prevention Measures

There are certainly some aspects of conflict prevention which present great dilemmas for both international and national actors. Some of them, those that most often appear to be the subject of examination by contemporary scholars, are touched upon here. The first issue, *external intervention versus sovereignty*, has to do with emergence of intra-state conflict as a new post-Cold War challenge to security. The other two conflict prevention dilemmas are pertinent to its practical application: *confidentiality versus transparency*; *the relationship between diplomacy and military force*.

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41 Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," p. 75.

External intervention versus sovereignty. At present, conflict prevention in an international system formed by states that are fiercely suspicious of external interference in their internal matters is hampered by the constraints imposed by the tenet of sovereignty. Because few inter-state conflicts have occurred recently, while the number of ethnic and other national conflicts has remained high,[42] conflict prevention no longer means only watching for cross-border aggression. Its mission is rather to devise an early warning system to deal with intra-state crises before they erupt into genocide, ethnic cleansing, state failure, or authoritarian usurpation of institutions. To exercise this mission, some kind of intervention is required. However, the widely accepted limitations on external intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states[43] have restricted the possibilities of action by international and national actors. Hence the dilemma: the predominance of these fundamental principles is being challenged by human and minority rights, the principle of intervention for humanitarian purposes, and, in general, by the demand to cope with intra-state conflict. In the case of Yugoslavia, the constraint imposed by the sovereignty of states was among the factors that impeded earlier action. In terms of international law, the conflicts in Croatia or in Bosnia-Herzegovina were, until the international recognition of those states, an internal matter within a sovereign state. Does this preclude all international action to prevent potential internal conflicts? There are some arguments that the principle of non-interference is not absolute, for the UN Charter allows for application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, and limits non-intervention to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of state.[44] Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe more or less willingly accept international interference in their internal affairs concerning minorities. Still the notion that national crises are a legitimate international concern is far from universally accepted; this is illustrated by the conflict in Chechnya. Serious efforts should be undertaken to resolve the fundamental tensions between these international principles.[45]

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42 As referred in the study of Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts," in *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1995, p. 21: "As was the case in 1993, no 'classic' interstate war was waged in 1994 – that is, the basic incompatibility in each case was not a dispute over territory or government between two states but between parties within states".

43 As stated in Art. 2.7 of the Charter of the United Nations, also as one of the Helsinki principles.

44 Gabriel Munuera, *Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience*, Chaillot Paper No. 15-16 (Paris: Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, 1994), p. 94.

45 Reychler and Bauwens suggest that the mentioned principles could be more elaborated, or guidelines should be provided on how to reconcile them with each other. See Luc Reychler and Werner Bauwens, "The Organisation of Conflict Prevention" in Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, eds., *The Art of Conflict Prevention*, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 7 (London, New York: Brassey's, 1994), p. 217.

Confidentiality versus transparency. Conflict prevention is very often challenged by the problem of how to strike a balance between "keeping quiet" and "going public," especially when exercising such preventive measures as negotiation and mediation. Confidentiality is important since parties directly involved often feel they can be more cooperative and forthcoming if they know that the discussions will not be revealed to the outside world. The risk of escalation of a conflict can be considerably reduced if a low profile is adopted. There is, however, an inherent contradiction between the demand for confidentiality and the need for political support that has been emphasized as one of the conditions for success of conflict prevention. But how can this support be accomplished if the substance of the negotiations is known only to the disputants and a limited number of actors concerned? There is no given answer to this dilemma. In search for a delicate balance between confidentiality and transparency, af Ugglas, then the Chairman-in Office of the CSCE, commenting on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process pointed out that transparency was important but "it is equally clear that the parties can not always be expected to compromise in open meetings attended by representatives of eleven governments."[46] The problem of the balance between public and quiet diplomacy is also built into the institution of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. It is recognized widely that its key to success is early action, however this must be as confidential as possible.[47]

Relationship between diplomacy and military force. As has been argued in the second chapter, one of the conditions for the success of conflict prevention activities is the application of a variety of political, diplomatic and military instruments. The greatest difficulty here appears to be how to make military force support diplomatic efforts in undertaking preventive activities. The relationship between diplomacy and military force is a particularly subtle one. As Bertram has pointed out: "too little force will be irrelevant, even counterproductive; too much could not only destroy diplomacy but also draw the powers using military force into a conflict."[48] It has been argued that the most effective way to assist diplomacy by military force is to threaten its use, not to use it. In other words, deterrence which does not aim at military solutions or victory, but at dissuading conflicting parties from using force, and persuading them to come to peaceful agreement, is the best military strategy in conflict prevention.[49] Certainly, this has to do with the leverage discussed earlier in

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46 af Ugglas, "Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy," p. 27.

47 Ibid. p. 28; also Ettore Greco, "The OSCE after Budapest Summit: The Need for Specialization," in *The International Spectator*, 30 (April-June 1995) 2, p. 15.

48 Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," p. 77.

49 Bertram suggests that deterrence, as a political concept, applies as much today as it did in the pre-nuclear past: "it is difficult to think of a better 'force-multiplier' to diplomacy than military deterrence." See Bertram, "Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution," p. 78.

the paper. Still, one wonders what the relationship between the civilian and military components should be when the military are actually involved in preventive action, i.e., peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities.

This list of dilemmas is not an exhaustive one. The following issues deserve further attention: selection of critical conflicts – what kind of conflicts should be tackled first? what are the criteria of prioritizing them? do these criteria, if any, reflect universal or particularistic perspectives? How can the explosive potential of a conflict be guessed in advance, and how to avoid these guesses becoming self-fulfilling prophecies? What is the relationship between state versus international organization as two actors in preventing and managing conflicts? How do the new realities of globalization, interdependence and emerging world regimes affect and influence the conflict prevention theory and practice? What is the role of Non-Governmental Organizations in conflict prevention, given that their presence in the conflict-prone areas significantly enhances over time?[50] Is it possible to operationalize these often too universal concepts in every particular case such as democracy-building, civil society, rule of law, etc., in their obvious relevance to conflict prevention activities? Is it possible to manage, or even promote, healthy political and social conflict and competition, a necessary attribute of development and progress, while excluding violence, in particular large-scale violent confrontation? Some of these problems and dilemmas will be discussed in detail in other essays of this book. Others will only be touched upon. Yet others, left out in the above sketchy account, will be introduced. But all of them constitute the complex universe of the field of inquiry and social and political action so enigmatically but nevertheless pointedly coined *Conflict Prevention*.

50 These and other problems have been identified in a study concluded by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). See Bernard von Plate, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt, *Conflict Escalation Control Policy* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 1995), unpublished Manuscript.

ANNEX

DEFINITION ⇒	CONFLICT PREVENTION aims at:				CONFLICT RESOLUTION aims at:		
ACTIVITIES	1) preventing disputes from arising between parties	2) preventing disputes from developing into conflicts	3) containing and limiting the spread of conflicts	4) preventing post-conflict relapse into conflict	1) stopping violent or coercive behavior	2) enacting and enforcing cease-fires	3) bringing hostile parties to an agreement (also by persuasion, coercion, force, etc.)
Early warning	*			*			
"Good offices"		*	*				*
Mediation		*			*	*	*
Negotiations		*	*		*	*	*
"Track-two" dialogues		*		*	*		*
International legal instruments (ICJ)		*			*		*
Arbitration and conciliation		*		*			*
Sanctions			*		*		*
Economic and humanitarian aid		*	*	*		*	

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Demilitarized zones, "safe havens"			*	*	*	*	
Arms embargoes		*	*	*			
Disarmament				*		*	
Fact-finding and observation		*		*			
CBMs	*			*			
Pre-emptive deployment		*					
Peacekeeping in active conflict situations			*		*	*	
Deterrence policies (incl. provisional security guarantees)		*	*	*	*	*	*

DEFINITION ⇒	CONFLICT PREVENTION aims at:				CONFLICT RESOLUTION aims at:		
ACTIVITIES	1) preventing disputes from arising between parties	2) preventing disputes from developing into conflicts	3) containing and limiting the spread of conflicts	4) preventing post-conflict relapse into conflict	1) stopping violent or coercive behavior	2) enacting and enforcing cease-fires	3) bringing hostile parties to an agreement (also by persuasion, coercion, force, etc.)
Use, threat, and / or limited shows of force			*		*	*	*
Forceful military interventions					*	*	*
Security guarantees	*			*			
Democracy, civil socviety, and institution-building	*	*		*			

2. Developing Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategies from Recent Experience in Europe

Michael S. Lund

I. Context and Rationale

Despite the expectation the end of the Cold War would bring fewer conflicts, new wars – mostly national in nature, have broken out in central Europe, as in Bosnia; in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, as in Abkhazia and Tajikhstan; and in other regions, as in Somalia and Rwanda. These conflicts have brought massive human suffering, dangers from intervention through unpopular peacekeeping missions, and financial burdens from humanitarian relief. They have strained the capacities of the UN and other multilateral institutions to realize a renewed post-Cold War commitment to address common problems through collaboration. Even where UN missions had been viewed as success stories, such as in Cambodia, there has been a relapse into violence. A result of all this has been growing interest in whether more cost-effective ways can be found to prevent violent conflicts from erupting in the first place – before they reach what seem almost unmanageable proportions. Where some peace has been restored, the quest is for ways to avoid a return to violence.

1. The State of the Art

Explicit discussions and action concerning conflict prevention have grown steadily since about 1992.[1] The UN General Assembly has discussed "preventive diplomacy" several times; a series of international conferences in Europe, Asia and the United States have taken up the idea; leaders and professional staff in the US, British, French, German, Swedish, Canadian, Norwegian, Australian and other governments have taken a special interest; prestigious organizations have set up study groups, special commissions, research and action projects on conflict prevention; several new books have come out; and plans have been sketched for a coordinated international prevention regime.

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1 The most prominent expression of this theme was the call by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali for more "preventive diplomacy," in *Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, June 1992), a document commissioned by the first-ever summit of heads of state of the members of the Security Council in January 1992. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), had already become active in this field.

But the idea is not limited to rhetoric, seminars, and study. Concrete initiatives have been launched in vulnerable countries like Macedonia and Burundi, and toward potential inter-state hot spots including the South China Sea dispute. These efforts have been undertaken by governments, like Canada and the United States; by the UN and regional multilateral organizations (RMOs), such as the OSCE, EU, OAU, OAS, and ASEAN; and by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as International Alert and Search for Common Ground. Some governments and multilateral organizations have set up special units and established procedures dedicated specifically to early warning and preventive response. In sum, not since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, or the arms control and peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s, has there been such widespread explicit international commitment and practical activity focused, not just on ending current wars, but on preventing *future* ones.[2]

Nevertheless, the new emphasis on deliberate action to avert incipient violent conflicts before they arise has progressed only so far. One-time, ad hoc preventive responses are scattered and hardly routine. Unless they are strategically important to a major power, or they might affect the reputation of a major multilateral organization, vulnerable countries are unlikely to get pro-active attention beyond an occasional demarche or visiting delegation. US preventive efforts have responded vigorously toward areas of strategic or regional importance such as China, North Korea, South Asia, and Ukraine. Similar rationales triggered the considerable US interest in the Baltics, Macedonia and the south Balkans, and the Greek-Turkey Aegean dispute. But preventive actions have been inconsistent toward hemorrhaging, less salient, but ultimately troublesome crises, such as eastern Zaire and Albania.

Sometimes, pro-active initiatives in serious conflicts are deterred by the implicit veto of interested global or regional powers and qualms about respecting national sovereignty. As to the new multilateral and governmental mechanisms, many are not yet operational, or if in place, they are not used. These constraints have been seen in the international stances toward the Chechnya conflict, the Kurdish conflict in eastern Turkey, Algeria's civil war, and the Nigerian and Burmese national crises. Thus, many potential conflicts that might bring serious bloodshed and regional problems in the next few years have been left largely unattended.

In short, monitoring potential conflicts and launching early responses are becoming more common, but they are far from standard global operating procedures, especially in relation to a range of possible causes of national conflicts.

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2 Yet because this emerging subtext in post-Cold War international affairs has been virtually eclipsed by the media, leaders' and analysts' attention to hot conflicts like Bosnia, conflict prevention remains, for the public at large, one of the era's best kept secrets.

A conventional explanation of the limited progress is the lack of "political will." But this notion seems borrowed from recent familiar contexts when the question was putting troops into situations of high risk. However, with regard to less risky, low-level political conflicts, this rather fuzzy notion cannot explain why some pre-conflict efforts have in fact been taken, even in relatively non-strategic areas such as Congo-Brazzaville. Nor does it quite fit the current climate in which high-level officials from major governments and international organizations have explicitly endorsed the notion of conflict prevention and even assigned some staffs to work on it. In the last four years, virtually the whole top echelon of US foreign policy officials, for example, has spoken publicly on behalf of "crisis prevention," "preventive defense," "enlargement of democracy," or similar notions, reflecting their agency's respective programs for dealing with potential conflicts.[3] Despite its reputation as responding only to crises, the Clinton Administration has been more explicitly supportive of prior responses to potential crises than any previous one.

A more likely explanation is simply that, despite some desire, large organizations that cope with current crises and routinely administer many programs worldwide lack the time, staff and resources to look down the road, especially with regard to countries that are not currently in crises. But there is also a second, less obvious, possibly more hopeful explanation of the lack of further progress: even the increasing number of policymakers and administrators who are now receptive to looking for and preventing future conflicts *do not know what they should specifically do.*

It is not that major governments and multilateral organizations have no concerns about, or operations in, any of the countries that appear on the "watch lists" of troubled places that warrant more preventive attention. In fact, governments, international financial institutions, and humanitarian organizations are already carrying out a variety of development, military and cultural missions and projects in these societies. Indeed, thousands of dedicated and smart professionals are working right now in many vulnerable developing societies under the auspices of hundreds of governments and international organizations. Cumulatively, huge budget resources are already being spent. But these efforts are routinely pursuing other more conventional functional agendas such as development of physical infrastructure, health and education, trade, conventional diplomatic and consular relations and

3 For example, US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake affirmed in 1993 that "in addition to helping solve disputes, we must also help prevent disputes, ... to place greater emphasis on such tools as mediation and preventive diplomacy (sic)." Remarks to the Brookings Institution Africa Forum, 3 May 1993. See also Brian Atwood, "Emerging Markets," Speech at Wharton Business School, 5 March 1996. After the Rwanda debacle of mid-1994, Clinton Administration interest in crisis prevention was stepped up and described as one of its major themes. See Thomas Lippman, "Finding Theme in Foreign Policy," in *Washington Post*, 30 June 1994, p. A 10.

economic and legal reform. While many of these programs may help prevent conflicts, their timing, allocation of resources, and other aspects are not always oriented effectively to specific known antecedents of instability and violence, or even monitoring their own possible effects in worsening conflicts, and their centrally-decided mandates do not authorize them to specifically address the sources of emerging, potentially violent, national conflicts.

Moreover, knowledge relevant to action does exist. We already know quite a bit about how to anticipate and prevent the escalation of violence. As to early warning, specialists are getting closer to characteristic antecedents of likely genocide and other man-made crises. They are investigating the most powerful general causes of conflicts affecting many societies and testing models of more detailed scenarios that can affect individual countries. As to early responses, empirical studies have found strong *prima facie* evidence to support the core belief underlying the interest in conflict prevention – that early interventions stem conflicts more easily than mid-conflict interventions. In addition, the general elements that prevent national political conflicts from escalating to violent conflicts are no great mystery: legal protection for minorities from human rights abuses that could provoke rebellions, governments that are legitimate through inclusive democratic bases, pluralistic public political debate, prompt discouragement of hate rhetoric against ethnic or other minorities, engagement of hostile parties in negotiations over abiding differences; and so on. Relevant programs and tactics to achieve these aims are also available and used, such as special envoys, international observers, preventive troop deployments where necessary, political and governmental institution-building, effective civil society-building, developing the deficient economic base that promotes violent competition for limited resources, and the like. As reflected by this volume's associated case-study project and a few other such projects, policy research examining and comparing recent cases have begun to suggest key factors, but their scattered conclusions have not been pulled together and presented to incumbent policymakers in a usable form.

What is lacking is advice based on this knowledge that is available to policy-makers as to how specifically to apply these measures to achieve the needed ingredients of violence prevention and immunization in particular places and times. Decision-makers and program administrators do not have policy guidelines about what programs and actions, in what mixes, and in what sequences, are most likely to be effective in particular contexts. Does effectiveness depend on who gets engaged in the situation? When they take action? The types and combinations of instruments they deploy? The issues in dispute? The nature of the regime? The local balance of power? The culture?[4] In the meantime, the explanations of conflicts and the prescriptions that

4 Positive empirical evidence on the effect of early timing on mediation into disputes is found, for example, in Jakob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, "The Nature of Dispute and the Effectiveness

policymakers are left with about what to do in particular hot spots is an assortment of one-size-fits-all supposed cure-alls like elections and freer trade, various partisan advocates' wish lists of programs, instant action recommendations from op-ed pieces, and a barrage of specific project proposals from NGOs. There is a tendency for solutions to chase problems, rather than the other way around. Thus, cogent strategies for advancing particular developing countries beyond political turmoil to sustained development are not being formulated. Among other things, what needs more examination in specific settings is the differential applicability, and sometimes unintended perverse effects in specific settings, of general nostrums such as democratization, rule of law, human rights, and economic reform.

Consequently, even were would-be conflict preventers do suddenly get the attention of more policymakers, they could not hand them a body of usable conflict prevention guidelines based on recent experience that might help decide where and how the policymakers might pro-actively intervene in emerging conflicts in the most productive ways.

Telling and Applying What We Already Know: The Education of Policy Elites

Foreign policies are governed largely by politics, which is of course, not always good advice. Still, in the current relatively receptive climate, analysts might be able to coax some shifting of additional time and resources to conflict prevention and otherwise neglected locales. Incremental progress might be made if analysts and converted officials could get to specific policymakers at the higher levels in major governments and multilateral organizations with the available plausible evidence, suitably packaged, that certain tools and strategies have in fact worked successfully in certain situations to head off brewing crises. Were there a way, there might be more will.

Thus, conflict prevention might advance a bit further if governments and other entities had some concrete, reasonably reliable "rules of engagement" for prevention policy and implementation that are based on sound assessments of past experience. With a more immediate sense that effective options have been applied, that sensible initiatives can be launched, and that strategies can be developed, policymakers might feel more confident that they can justify devoting more resources to launching more ad hoc conflict prevention efforts and even to institutionalizing prevention planning

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of International Mediation," in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37 (1993), pp. 670-691. Conflict resolution theory that focuses largely on the social psychological dynamics of conflict escalation is also supportive. See for example Connie Peck, "An Integrative Model for Understanding and Managing Conflict," in *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, 1 (May 1989) 1, pp. 7-36; Louis Kreisberg, *Social Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982), chapters 1-5; Ronald J. Fisher, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution* (New York: Springer, 1990), chapters 1 and 4; Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: Random House, 1993), chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6.

through proposing procedural and program changes to their superiors and to the legislators who decide their budgets. Indeed, policy executives might be surprised to find parliamentarians and taxpayers reply: if it is plausible and you could save lives and get real savings from relatively small changes, why have you not explored these options already?

Specifically, what steps might elicit at least more experimentation? First, the search for policy-relevant patterns in the past efforts to prevent incipient conflicts, both successful and failed, has begun. This work goes beyond the already more advanced research that is testing and refining indicators of early warning, for it addresses the question of what one does about early warnings once one receives them. A related catalytic task now going on is to identify the full inventory of the range of preventive options, or policy tools, that are used and usable for conflict prevention, and the assembling of methodical evaluations of the existing experience with these techniques, when applied individually and in combination.[5]

The initial findings of this literature need to be further tested and refined with respect to more cases and through using other modes of research. But even while this wider and deeper research is being carried out, what we can reliably say now about the ingredients of successful conflict prevention should be consolidated in the form of actionable preliminary findings that can be used in a heuristic way and disseminated to policy levels and units where there is some authority and potential interest to do something with them. Thus, a more vigorous effort is needed to distill key propositions from the already extant knowledge and to present them in consumable forms to specific policymakers, not only at headquarters but in the field.

After all, the policy processes of governments and multilaterals are not such that they act only after the most definitive and comprehensive studies have been completed. Even when it gets such research, it often does not use it. Quantitative studies with "large Ns" (many cases) help to isolate the most powerful explanatory factors, but provide no help about what to do in this or that place, which is one of the policy maker's prime concerns. Utilization is better explained by relevance than rigor and the usability of the analytical product. Accordingly, certain rules of thumb based on credible systematic analysis of several cases could have great utility and could stimulate policy decisions if they were presented in the form of suggestive guidelines – lists of considerations based on experience – even though they fall short of the most comprehensive data bases and most rigorous scientific methodologies.

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5 This kind of analysis has been started in Creative Associates International, Inc., *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Guide for Practitioners*, prepared for the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative of US AID and the US Department of State, 1997.

This paper starts down this path. It outlines a way to draw together lessons from past experience and put them in a policy-relevant usable framework, from which can be drawn prospective diagnoses of vulnerable places that may be threatened by escalation of disputes into violence, and then country-specific tailored strategies that fill gaps and strengthen existing positive developments.

First, it pulls together some of what is suggested from recent cases and other research, such as on so-called "ethnic" conflicts, about the key factors that appear to determine whether emerging national political conflicts escalate into violence or are handled peacefully. Looking at individual cases in isolation from other cases of a similar kind leads to merely collecting and recording a large set of facts, such as in narrative form, and cataloguing a list of differentiated causes with different weights. Part Two thus distills a number of findings from recent case-studies and gives examples of these factors' roles in recent conflicts. These conclusions can be considered grounded hypotheses for doing additional retrospective case-study and aggregate research intended to refine them further. Even in this form, however, the generalizations can be useful indications of the kinds of factors that in given potential trouble spots appear to be significant enough to warrant continuing attention and possible treatment, and they can be disseminated to sensitize policymakers and program administrators.

But a set of retrospective case conclusions do not make a White Paper with policy options for specific places. Translating them into more specific practically implementable time-sensitive, client-specific policy recommendations requires two more steps. The subsequent section describes how such preliminary findings could be the basis for a framework, or template, of key generic factors that can be applied prospectively to diagnose particular cases of vulnerable countries. What it provides is a checklist of the range of significant "risk" as well as "opportunity" factors that policymakers should watch, and a set of promising points of leverage that they might consider addressing as part of country-specific preventive efforts. The generic framework cannot provide an analysis of what factors are most important or how they specifically interact in a particular place and time. Thus, they should not dictate the tactical moves that policymakers and field practitioners make in this or that circumstance. Further prescriptions have to be undertaken by analysts and decision-makers, in particular governments and agencies, as to what the generic analysis means for them in particular places and times.

II. *Retrospective Analysis: Explaining Peaceful Settlement of Post-Cold War Political Conflict*

1. Kin-Group Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe: Similar Shocks, Different Outcomes

Understanding national conflicts and their prevention requires a sense of the basic global-historical forces that give rise to political tensions in certain regions over certain periods. The rising incidence and prospects of secessionist and other wars in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe derive fundamentally from the profound geopolitical and societal trends that swept this region and others with the ending of the Cold War. Essentially a region-wide revolution discredited Marxist state-socialist ideology; mobilized popular pressures for multi-partyism and political participation and dismantled or reshaped communist parties; pressured centralized economic planning and state enterprises to adopt market mechanisms such as unregulated prices and private ownership; reallocated the authority of central governments to sub-national entities and seceding states; and abrogated communist era inter-state security and trade agreements.

Tension and the chance of violent encounters increased because the weakening of communist controls and ideology in Eastern European states and the transformation of the Soviet republics into Newly Independent States created a new and more fragmented ethnic political geography in place of ostensible Marxist communities. As the existing state structures, policies and international links were overturned by looser liberal forms of autarkic politics and economics, ethno-nationalist movements arose to take advantage of their new-found democratic power and forge new political jurisdictions or rebuild old ones around particular group identities.

One frequent result throughout the region was tense political struggles over discriminatory citizenship policies and desires for more political self-determination. In places such as the Baltics, Moldova, Slovakia, and Croatia, groups that had been subordinate under a previous national or international regime were now dominant in a new or aspiring state. In already recognized states like Hungary, which were no longer restrained by bloc controls concerning their internal policies and relations to other countries, majority ethnic groups asserted a new-felt sense of ethnic nationalism. In federal Yugoslavia, groups that had increasingly been taking control of the public functions in their republics and sub-regions finally aspired to their own states. Similar sentiments arose in the Russian Federation. But this often meant groups that had been favored or protected through their ties to a wider communist entity like the Soviet empire, such as Russian speakers in Estonia, the Hungarians living in the states around its borders, and Serbs in Croatia were now in a minority and it led them to seek redress against actual and perceived discrimination imposed

by the new majorities through appealing to the minorities' ethnic kin in neighboring or nearby states.

Theories of social change and the origins of conflict assert that epochal changes such as the post-Cold War revolution increase the chances of mass violence, state repression, or militarized wars, for they define new interests for states and groups, create new clashes among their economic, social and political interests, and cause widespread uncertainty and insecurity. But the fact that such systemic forces do not always lead to armed hostilities was clearly demonstrated throughout the region, for ethnic or other wars did not break out in all republics and localities where there was added potential. Some local disputes did lead to bloody conflicts, such as in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia; Nagorno-Karabakh; Abkhazia; the "Dniestr Republic" in Moldova; and Chechnya. But in other places such as the Baltic States, Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Slovakia, Macedonia, and Tatarstan, more or less peaceful resolutions of political conflicts have been achieved.

The riveting question for the analyst of conflict prevention and policy-maker alike is why region wide pressures and divisive forces led to violent conflicts in certain settings, but non-violent peaceful settlements in others. Thus, this section seeks some tentative answers to that question by identifying and illustrating some of the most important "swing" factors, or variables, that appear to have determined whether a political dispute escalated to violent conflict or was handled peacefully. These generalizations have been synthesized from individual case-studies of erupted conflicts of recent so-called "ethnic" and other national conflicts, case-study comparisons by the author and others of apparent successes and failures in preventive action, and early warning research.

2. Distinguishing Levels of Causation

The question can be stated more precisely: what ingredients explain whether the conflicts of interests between parties that surface in political disputes are expressed through violence or coercion, on the one hand, or bargaining, negotiation, un-predetermined elections, or other non-violent means of political struggle, on the other?

Once violent conflicts erupt, they are explainable by no single cause. Violent conflicts emerge from a complex variety of different factors. Each conflict situation is idiosyncratic in its minute details and specific events. Similarly, when latent conflicts become expressed peacefully, several phenomena may be responsible. Since there are few tested generalizations or theories about conflict prevention, the analyst of particular conflicts can easily become bogged down in the myriad of personalities, events and other features that jump out from the story of any particular unfolding conflict. For any given conflict, typically a hodgepodge of short-term and long-term causes are clumped together, thus providing no where to start. But one way to

uncover clues or presumptions about the most important forces and their interactions is to mine relevant extant literature that deals with cases and theory about key factors and their interactions.

Immediacy of Causation

As we gather possible factors from this literature, it is useful to categorize the various determinants of conflict or peace along two major dimensions. One important distinction concerns directness of causation.[6] The connection of some causes to the manifest expressions of violence or peace is *direct* and immediate, e.g., arming of militias, an assassination attempt, or a leader's magnanimous gesture. The link of other causes is *indirect* and proximate, for example the lack, or presence, of a democratic government through which interest clashes might be adjudicated. Thus one important dimension has to do with the immediacy of the factor to manifest the state of a locale, that is, the extent that the factors operate in the actors' *societal or international environment* or in *the actors* themselves.

Actually, three gradations can be usefully delineated here. Certain *background conditions* exist in the received history and socio-economic structures of the societies involved. Being more or less built into a particular conflict arena, these factors are generally hard to change by specific policymakers or even governments, at least in their entirety and in the short run. An example is the varied ways in which the structural changes ending the Cold War impacted on the different former Soviet bloc countries in different degrees. Due to history, economic and other factors, emerging conflicts of interests were simply not as sharp in some societies as in others. Another variable concerns the *institutional and political channels* through which the structural forces are manifested and expressed. In some places, the underlying societal or international change may have been wrenching, but strong institutional and political infrastructures were in place that were capable of absorbing the resulting tensions and achieving necessary compromises. For example, some governments that engaged in reform efforts frankly had more coercive power vis-à-vis potential opponents, or regimes, opened up new political channels for expressing and addressing discontent which gave opponents several outlets for possible satisfaction. A third type of causal factor is *behavioral and attitudinal.* These pertain to the ways the parties affected by the conflict actually see the situation and comport themselves. Generally, behaviors and attitudes are more amenable to manipulation over the short run than the background givens, with institutions and processes being moderately changeable.

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6 See, for example, Jack Levy, "Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach," in Chester Crocker and Fen Hampson, eds., *Managing Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).

A second dimension for categorizing causes has to do with whether they originate mainly from *outside or inside the conflict arena.* Some factors are found in the surrounding national and regional context, while others arise from sources outside the region, such as the international institutions and global economic trends. Here it is critical to point out that, when it comes to examining how such national disputes are prevented from becoming violent, the local actors that can articulate conflicts of interests, may not only be part of the problem, but also part of the solution. As seen in the following discussions, "endogenous" domestic and regional factors such as a country's economic dependency, or actors such as moderate leaders, may help to offset the risks of violent approaches to resolving tensions, as much as increasing them. Conversely, exogenous, extra-regional, or international factors may actually worsen more than they ameliorate the chances of violence. The impact of the international community cannot be presumed as beneficial, such as by looking only at its explicitly-labeled "preventive diplomacy." Close examination is needed of what its various influences actually bring about.

This need to focus on the variable roles that national and regional actors might play arises from the interest of this enterprise in preventing national conflicts before they become violent. But prevention requires attention not only to blocking harmful tendencies but also buttressing helpful trends. Thus, the interest is not only in preventing bad things, pro-active violence avoidance, but reinforcing good things, preventive peacebuilding. Hitherto, most social science research about international conflict and related policy analysis focused on the former, not the latter. Perhaps the priority focus on the negative objective derived from the Cold War legacy in which the only opportunity that international actors such as UN Secretaries General had in the area of conflict prevention – to the extent they were even motivated to do so, as against supporting one or other of the contending world blocs – was to prevent nuclear wars and wars of aggression over national borders. Preventing wars, mostly inter-state wars, was the main aspiration. Thus, "peace studies" were relegated to the fringe. Notions like "cooperative security" were discussed by minority circles in countries that saw their roles as trying to prevent superpower confrontation from reaching the point of nuclear war or escalated regional crises. But in the post-Cold War context of a somewhat wider agreement about basic values and principles governing national life, international actors now have opportunities not only to stop inter-state wars but to strengthen domestic peace. Consequently, there is now a need not only to explain how wars happen, as there was before, but also to explain how peace is preserved and deepened. And major part of such explanations of how wars do not happen undoubtedly resides with whatever factors and actors within societies keep conflicts of interests from reaching the boiling point.

In sum, a mix of both local, or endogenous, and international, or exogenous, factors may be at work causing conflicts as well as "causing peace." Domestic and extra-regional factors may be harmful or helpful, depending on the case. Thus, the policy maker's question "What makes international preventive action effective?" is best addressed as part of the larger question: "What range of inside and outside factors prevent or encourage political conflicts from emerging into significant violence?"

Putting the two main dimensions together, we can organize the factors in a six fold table, as follows:

Typology of Factors Determining Peaceful or Violent Conflict Outcomes

Locus of Causalfactors			
		In Conflict Arena	*Extra-Regional*
	Actors' Environment	Social structure, conflict legacy	world prices for exports
Immediacy of	Institutions	viability of state	international stakes in the country
Causal Factors	Actor trails	militancy of group leaders	partisanship and timing of engagement

Accordingly, to do a plausible account of the emergence of political disputes in particular cases, the analyst needs to look at the direction taken by the factors in a certain set that are most pertinent. Whether or not conflicts of interests emerge into violence or not depends on the *net effect* produced by the several key forces arising from within and outside the conflict arena. In sum, explaining why political conflicts lead to peaceful or violent outcomes is like calculating the result of a mathematical equation composed of several distinct functions, each with differing magnitudes and signs, negative or positive.

For now, what appear to be some of the most important factors determining peaceful or violent outcomes of emergent conflicts of interests around post-Cold War national conflicts to date will be stated below. To anticipate the focus on policy planning in Part Three, what would otherwise be stated in declarative generalizations are already put in the interrogative form of questions. Analysts might pose these questions while they "interview" the diverse information that may be available about a particular case of potential conflict. How each factor can produce peaceful or violent courses in conflicts is noted, and brief examples of how they shaped recent

conflicts in Europe are given, drawn mainly from the former Yugoslavia and Moldova. Readers of other chapters may also see these patterns evidenced in the Baltic and Georgian cases discussed elsewhere in this volume.

3. Illustrative Factors Shaping Conflict of Peace: Tentative Findings from the Research Laboratory

Endogenous Sources

Analysis of options for international preventive efforts has to consider which conditions in the conflict arena itself contribute to, or inhibit, violent expressions of political differences. This helps to determine the comparative "degree of difficulty" that faces prevention-minded third parties from outside the conflict arena. Whether a political conflict is prevented or not may have more to do with how deep the basic differences are that underlie the conflict in the first place, then with whether any particular actors have taken any deliberate actions to reduce the conflict.

Received and Systemic Background Conditions: Potential for Mobilization of Grievances.

The *potential* for violent conflict is dependent on legacies bequeathed by history to the contemporary actors and on current structural conditions that are more or less built into the main parties' societal and international environment. In particular, these background factors affect for example the extent to which ethnic groups will assert their interests in militantly nationalist political movements that seek to exert political authority in the name of a group over a given territory. "... ethnic strife is related to variations in the constellation of political and ethnic constraints that impinge on elite and mass choices."[7] These conditions cannot be changed easily, but how they are interpreted can be shaped. Especially important factors in inter-communal conflict include:

1. *Extent of Violent History*: To what extent have current political groups and their governments dominated each other or engaged in violent conflicts in the recent past?

Past research has found a significant relationship between the extent of past antagonism and the likelihood that emerging disputes will become violent.[8] Research on mediations between states has found that mediations are twice as likely to be successful between previously friendly states as in disputes between former

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7 David Carment and Patrick James, "Ethnic Conflict at the International Level: An Appraisal of Theory and Evidence," in David Carment and Patrick James, *The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: Volume I: Theory and Evidence*, p. 14.

8 Butterworth, cited by Hugh Miall, *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), p. 77.

adversaries.[9] However, where there is some trust to build on, such a history can actually spur extra efforts to avoid repetition of past clashes, as seen for example, in recent German-Jewish relations.

The influence of this factor is well illustrated in the differing outcomes of the recent secessions from Yugoslavia. Because World War II memories of horrible atrocities by the Utashe and Chetniks occurred within the memory of living generations, newly-elected Serbian and Croatian leaders from 1990 to 1992 could still conjure up these killings with their respective constituents and thus instill distrust and suspicion toward the other community. This legacy fueled the violent escalation of the Croatian secession in 1991. In Macedonia in 1990 and 1991, the memory of Macedonians being killed by Serbs, and vice-versa, goes back much further to the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. Even then, Macedonian nationalism was less crystallized, for it had not as yet achieved the form of any political jurisdiction defined in ethnic terms and it was mixed in with wider currents of Bulgarian nationalism. Thus, rhetoric from nationalist Macedonian leaders in the early 1990s that sought to instill intensely deep hatred between these particular groups found little fertile ground. This was one factor explaining how Macedonia seceded peacefully.

2. Past nationalities policies: To what extent did past regimes or colonial powers give certain distinguishable groups a proprietary relationship to a given territory, or socio-economic advantages such as career and educational opportunities, thus bestowing superior status and material privilege on some groups relative to other groups?

In part to knit together inter-communal alliances under inclusive Communist ideologies and regimes, the nationalities policies of the Soviet Union, post-World War II Yugoslavia, and other communist regimes often used the constitution or policy favoritism to bestow political authority and group rights on specific ethnic communities. In some cases this meant separate but equal policies, and in others, benefiting some at the expense of others. This practice seems to have ingrained a sense of group entitlement and status-consciousness and rivalry that deeply imbues post-Cold War political debates in the Newly Independent States.

For example, though dominated by Serbia, Yugoslavia has encompassed other ethnic communities whose populations each generally have predominated in separate republics, such as Croatia and Slovenia, or in more localized autonomous jurisdictions such as Kosovo. In response to pro-democratic demonstrations of the late 1960's, the Yugoslavian republics' ties and federal organs were weakened by Tito's devolution reforms in the 1974 constitution. Tito's efforts to counterbalance the Serbs gave more powers to the republics, including that of controlling their own local

9 Bercovitch, cited by Miall, *The Peacemakers*, p. 130.

defense forces, and it granted political autonomy to groups in certain sub-regions. Foremost among these groups perhaps was the Albanians who now predominate in Kosovo, for the Serbs regard Kosovo as the cradle of their culture. Kosovo received its own seat on the federal collective presidency. Much of the virulence behind the Serbian nationalism that exacerbated the break-up of Yugoslavia is explained by the perceived threat to their hegemony which was posed by subsequently aspiring nationalist communities.

3. *Ethnic Proportions: Duopoly versus Oligopoly:* Are there only two major mobilized ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic society or must three or more compete for its political space?

A society composed of one majority and one minority mobilized group seems to hold more potential for intensified conflict than a society comprising three or more groups, especially where resources are scarce, there is a sense of a finite sized economic pie from which to draw. Satisfaction of basic needs seems to lead to zero-sum conflicts, where one group must advance at the expense of the other. Because the two groups of a pair compete with each other, their grievances tend to be focused on each other, thus building up mutual hostilities over time. In a more heterogeneous society, however, there are more pressures for its groups to bargain and set up coalitions with several other groups to obtain particular interests. These bargains may focus on different issues depending on the groups' nature and interests, and the coalitions may reconfigure over time.

Because of the presence of five more or less politically active ethnic communities before and since independence in Macedonia, although ethnic Macedonians comprise about 65% of the population, the country's political leaders have needed to negotiate with other groups and their political parties to form governments. Since 1990, Macedonia was run first by a trans-ethnic, post-Communist technocratic administration and then two coalition governments. President Gligorov now heads a coalition that shares executive power among three parties, which includes five Albanians in the Cabinet. Although inequalities and grievances persist, this power-sharing has made government policies less ethnic-nationalist in tone.

4. *Cross-Cutting Cleavages:* Do many differences in ethnicity, economic disparities, religion, language, and region that exist between social groupings in a country overlap, so they differ in many of these features at the same time? Or do groups share some commonalties?

A prominents factor in the ethnic conflict literature that is seen to shape whether political leaders can organize and mobilize particular ethnic constituencies to use violence or armed force – and thus whether conflicts between groups are likely to blow up – has to do with whether the members of active groups in a society share

with other politically active groups their economic circumstances, locale, cultural heritage such as religion and language, economic standard of living, or other traits. Where these groups differ from each other on many of those characteristics at the same time, the cleavages in a society are deeper, and violent conflicts may have greater potential, than where some "cross-cutting cleavages" are found.

The effect of several overlapping differences is shown in the struggles between local Russian speakers and the majority population in Estonia and Moldova. In both countries, the areas dominated by the Russian population also hold a high proportion of those countries' industry. Letting the Dniestr Republic secede, for example, would have deprived Moldova of 57% of its industrial production (as measured in 1993). But common interests shared among the groups within a country may constrain the leaders of ethnic group minorities toward their ethnic kin in other countries. For example, the inclination of Albanians living in Western Macedonia to seek support from Albania that would invite greater interference from the Albanian government or extremist groups is offset by the fact that Macedonian Albanians on average have enjoyed a higher standard of living than their kin across the border, thus sharing that with the ethnic Macedonian majority in that country.

A corollary of this factor is that the political mobility of potentially ethno-nationalist communities may be offset by internal conflicts of interests. With regard to tensions between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia, for example, although Albanians constitute about 23% of the population and are relatively less urban and educated than Macedonians, their political power has been limited to some extent by the divisions within their community, which are reflected in its political parties over issues and strategies. The ethnic Macedonian community is also somewhat fragmented in terms of religion, since some ethnic Macedonians are Muslim, as are the Albanians. Thus, commonalities and internal divisions may inhibit the extent of mobilization of ethnic groups against each other.

5. *Public Monopoly of Social Goods versus Civil Society:* To what extent is the allocation of material needs, such as career opportunities, education, and economic class, decided by the central government and the country's political institutions, so that whichever groups control state authority and political power also determine who enjoys rank, income, and social benefits?

When government and politics dominate who gets basic social goods, conflict becomes more intense because control of the state and political influence are the sole channels to achieve them. Conflict is less intense if many alternative non-governmental and non-political means for obtaining these goods, such as private businesses, are possible, for they operate separately from the main political parties and government. Thus, the stakes of political life and control of the state are not as high where numerous associations such as trade unions, benefit societies, business associations,

and churches promote commercial, professional, and welfare opportunities. Unless states tightly control non-state associations, the number and vitality of a society's commercial life and non-governmental infrastructure may depend to a great extent on how industrialized and urbanized the society is, for these forces tend to foster the creation of society-wide associations built around economic interests.

6. *Political Party-Ethnic Group Linkages:* Are the most important national-level political parties organized around ethnic groups or other dominant social cleavages, or alternatively, do strong parties exist that combine ethnicities around different sets of shared interests, such as political ideologies?

Where the former is the case, when elections are held, winning parties will reflect the power of the ethnic groups in the society, too. Elections in effect become political censuses. In the absence of countervailing bases of organization, political instability is increased because these groups are otherwise also polarized.

These patterns were evident in the republican elections in the years preceding the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. A common tactic of aspiring republican leaders like Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman was to first capture control of their parties by pushing moderates out, run on ethnic nationalist programs to get elected, and then unilaterally pass referendums at the most propitious moments to validate their parties' control of the republic. Increasingly, these leaders ran their own one-party ethnic state entities, setting their own rules and manipulating them for political ends. But in Macedonia, some parties that cross-cut ethnicity have created a counter-balance to the influence of ethnicity.

7. *Power Concentration and Balance:* Is political power one-sided, or shifting among major social groups and with government?

Low violence will tend to be associated with either oppressive regimes or equally balanced ethnic groups. It is more likely to flare up where the relative power possessed by contending national or regional antagonists is uncertain. In Kosovo, for example, street violence between the Albanian political movement and the FRY government has been kept at a low level since 1991 which, although higher than in Macedonia over the same period, is much less than all-out civil rebellion. One major reason is that the Kosovars have been vastly out-manned by the coercive power of Serbian security forces. But recently, the post-Dayton Accords defensiveness of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government and the greater assertiveness of Kosovo activists have led to a more volatile situation. Military weakness also helps explain Macedonia's peaceful secession from the rump Yugoslavian government, for Macedonia's defenseless army required President Gligorov to avoid antagonizing Serbian nationalists to pick a fight.

8. *Nearby calamities and cross-conflict "learning":* Did the political dispute arise before or after analogous conflicts that occurred nearby, thus affecting whether the disputants benefit from observing the effects of previous violence?

Domestic leaders may be repelled and constrained from violent escalation because they want to avoid the outcomes they have observed in nearby analogous situations. Such turmoil may temper the inclination to push disagreements too far. By causing domestic constituencies to uncontrollable anger that destabilizes their own states, conflicts might spiral outside the control of the existing leadership. Previous calamities or successes may also provide third parties with lessons making them more skillful in preventive intervention.

Several recent preventive intervention successes seem to have followed in time failed cases that resulted in wars. The following Eastern European disputes followed in time the atrocities of wars between Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia and Croatia (starting in mid-1991), and/or Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia and Bosnia (starting in mid-1992): Greece-Macedonia (early 1992 on), Czech and Slovakian Republics (1992-93), and Hungary/Slovakia (1992-94). But for all their mutually hostile positions, the leaders of Macedonia, Albania and Greece had the "advantage" of seeing bloody wars unfold before them in nearby Croatia and Bosnia. The Yugoslavian wars also had a chastening influence on Czech and Slovak leaders.

Inter-mediating Institutions and Processes: Inflaming or Moderating Mobilized Grievances

Historical legacies and systemic conditions may determine the potential for violent conflicts, but they are not sufficient in themselves to directly bring violence about or determine when or where it occurs. Violent conflict is actualized only if political processes and institutions translate the background conditions into pretexts for acting on unsatisfied grievances through using force.

9. *Elite Political Cooperation:* To what extent do the leaders of the major contending communities act within the framework of inter-elite agreements through which agreed-on governmental procedures comprise the effective arena within which the political power struggle is arbitrated, conflicts of interest between major social groups are negotiated, and compromise national policies are enacted and implemented? Or do one or more groups use the state's authority and resources to serve only their own parochial interests?

As we have seen, past policies and institutions of the state and informal political agreements can exacerbate social divisions arising from history and social structure. Where one or more groups continue such practices in the present by using the authority and resources of government to favor particular groups and dominate

others,[10] instability and violence are increased. In conflict situations that have resulted in violent outcomes, an identification between the government and one ethnic group, or a struggle between ethnic groups for the control of the government has often been evident. Where the government itself is identified with a particular ethnic group, they then take a role in that conflict and aggravate an already violent situation. But institutions can also mute or blunt social divisions by incorporating major groups' interests and acting as constraints on them by pursuing transcending interests. Governments thus become effective third parties.[11]

One arrangement that allows states to assume a mediating role is the inclusion of major social groupings in national power-sharing arrangements. Typically, executive cabinet positions are doled out among representatives of major social groups, thus keeping one group from disproportionately dominating policy-making to the exclusion of others' interests. Such arrangements may be brokered through forming an elite compact that is relatively insulated from direct popular democracy. Leaders of factions contending for power reach agreements with each other to control the making of policy issues affecting their respective groups, rather than leave those issues totally subject to popular pressures through public opinion or referenda. A compact may be promoted by moderate leaders who represent major constituencies but are committed together to keep effective control of national decision making. Violent tendencies may be lessened when such elites agree on policies before popular votes on them, rather than popular votes deciding these policies because competitive bidding among them, that might otherwise escalate conflict, is discouraged.

Elite political cooperation was the approach adopted by the established Czech and Slovak party leaderships, who agreed to the divorce of their republics before submitting it to popular vote. Similarly, though dominated by Macedonians and influenced by that group's nationalist desires, the coalition government in Macedonia since 1991 has included Albanians and other minorities and thus is not mono-ethnic. It is at least trying to achieve even-handed policies toward minorities in civil service recruitment, education, and other policy areas and is making some progress – notwithstanding that these efforts fall short in the eyes of the minorities. Such efforts at balanced government policies render a basic legitimacy to the government, in which complaints and debates are about policies, not the legitimacy of the state, and they discourage extreme behavior by disgruntled minorities or majorities.

In contrast, in Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992, a major factor making it difficult for international mediators to have any impact in keeping the dissolution of the federal government of Yugoslavia from erupting into violence was the disintegration that had

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10 Timothy D. Sisk, *Living Together? International Intervention and Power-Sharing in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming, 1996).

11 Miall, *The Peacemakers*, p. 83.

already been occurring since the late 1980s in the collective organs of the federal state such as the system of economic self-management, the collective presidency and the Yugoslav army. Before and during the debate between the republics over Yugoslavia's constitution, increasing control was being assumed by the republics presidents of each of them over political, administrative, economic, and increasingly, military forces. Similarly, the leaders of Moldova and the Dniestr republic shared few common political institutions before the conflict over the status of the latter. Elections were held unilaterally on each side of these conflicts early in the process as a means of pushing out moderates because competing leaders outbid each other on extreme demands. The new leaders on the conflicting sides often covertly encouraged violence while seeming to negotiate the issue.

10. *Institutionalized Politics:* Are the rules of political struggle regularized and predictable?

Although informal ethnic balancing and collaboration short of full popular democracy may help in the short run to avoid violence, more law-based constitutional democracy is needed in the long run. More or less representative governments that gain political legitimacy by incorporating some cross-section of the main social groups do not ensure against violence or coercion.

In elite compacts, violent methods of pursuing social interests are avoided to the extent that the wielders of effective political power voluntarily deal with one another through agreed upon rules and procedures that are not strictly based on partisan service to their respective constituencies. A representative elite must be sufficiently cohesive to hammer out common public policies that achieve acceptable results in order for their compact to retain control of appropriate state business. But the leaders of these groups may not always work effectively together to produce valued public policies or wield effective authority over the workings of government administration, social services, and other public functions such as education. Government can become fragmented by ethnic or other group partisanship, so public service becomes merely a vehicle through which the perquisites of government are divided up and parceled out among competing, stalemated groups. This encourages escalating competition, and the creation of extra-legal channels for pursuing these goods. If social mobilization and political participation are high, but state institutions cannot manage political demands, instability occurs, and institutions and groups eventually will rely on coercion to pursue their interests. If the state is not the venue for political conflict resolution, disputes become conducted outside established channels and thus in ad hoc ways subject to volatile power moves between political factions, or the whims of individual personalities.

The underlying feature of strong states, however, is that by incorporating interest conflicts within the decision making processes – executive bodies, governing

coalitions, legislatures, parties, interest groups, elections, provincial and local government – they can manage political disputes without violence or coercion. Incentives are created for participation in more or less stable processes for dispute resolution. Regularity in competitive politics discourages violence. The main factions possessing political power pursue their disputes within common, agreed-on, and enforceable governing procedures, norms, and institutions – embodied either in formal representative, executive and judicial institutions (legislatures, regularized elections, bureaucracies and court systems), supplemented by informal political deals, rather than determining on their own the formation and rules of these institutions.

11. *Constitutional control of the means of force:* Does the state ensure that the security and armed forces serve the interests of a constitutional order independent of the partisan aims of political factions vying for control of the state and public policies, or can these factions create or control their own armies or militias?

Violence is less likely where non-politicized military and security forces have the upper hand over factional militias or political terrorism that can pose threats to domestic security. Recent successful cases of conflict prevention within states took place within governing institutions that had control of their security and armed forces, such as Macedonia and Czech and Slovak republics. Though the police and military are led by Macedonians who generally held these positions during the communist era, civilian politicians exert significant control over these forces. In March, 1993, the commander of the armed forces was fired, for example, for allegedly exceeding his constitutional authority.

In recent violent conflicts, however, political leaders on the disputing sides assumed early effective control over their own distinct armies and militias that served their political aims. In the African context, they are called "warlords." In Moldova, as violence erupted on the left bank, interior ministry forces lined up against a local militia increasingly supported by the Russian 14th Army. Similarly, the Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian wars were preceded by increasing local political control of the republican militias prior to the formal dissolution of the federal government. As early as 1990, the republics were not sending conscripts to the Yugoslav army, and instead creating their own armed republican units within the police.

12. *The Neighbor Effect:* Toward particular national political disputes, do neighboring governments: (a) overtly or covertly support particular political or military factions that are vying for influence within the society, such as ethnic political parties, or the regime against insurgents; (b) remain neutral or indifferent by refraining from supporting one side or another; or (c) actively promote even-handed settlement of the disputes, such as through facilitating the involvement of international bodies?

Recent treatments of ethnic conflict often fail to include the influences of the international system on domestic conflict, and vice-versa.[12] A major example is the way countries next door and groups within them can either worsen national conflicts or help their peaceful settlement. This depends on whether neighboring governments or political leaders support one of the disputants in a direct, partisan way through moral and rhetorical support; political support, such as recognizing a secessionist movement as a state,[13] financial support, or military backing. They may oppose a nationalist government's interests in the international arena, such as by lobbying for international support for internal minorities, trying to shape the perceptions of third parties, and constraining preventive actions toward a national dispute through vetoing the involvement in the dispute of the UN or a regional organization of which they are a member.

Such a "backer effect" (Munuera) can arise to the extent that the groups in a country have ethnic, historical, or ideological affinities to groups outside their country, even though these groups do not necessarily share all interests with the outside group. The aspiring ethnic group within a state and its outside backer have a symbiotic relationship in which each can fuel extreme demands by the other[14] and this helps to escalate the internal conflict as well as the conflict between the two states. The elites of the outsider states see such ethnic affinities as political opportunities to retain office. Especially where these elites in the neighboring states face insecurity in maintaining power, there may be advantages to activating these latent group identities by showing support for an ethnic minority in a neighboring state, or to prop up the government in a conflict. The domestic groups whom these outside leaders appear to support see such affinities as potentially useful to promote their own interests within their country. Consequently, their attention and the prospects of outside support increase the incentives for the inside groups to organize themselves, mobilize a following, seek outside support, and possibly wage violent conflict as a way to achieve their political goals.[15]

An internal conflict can then escalate because the host country distrusts its ethnic minority to the extent it encourages or enjoys the support of the outsider.[16] The leaders of these countries can use the sources of state insecurity as a reason to justify repression of certain minorities or rival political groups, thus giving the groups within a further warrant to organize more in their own self-defense. Although this does not

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12 David Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics: Theory, Policy and Early Warning," in *Third World Quarterly*, 15 (1994) 4, pp. 551-582.

13 Ibid., p. 563.

14 Thomas S. Szayny, *Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe and the Balkans: A Framework on US Policy Options* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1994), p. 32.

15 Ibid., pp. 24 and 28.

16 Ibid., p. 32.

necessarily bring about armed conflict between the states,[17] it may push domestic tensions to high levels.

Examples can be cited of how this variable worsened conflicts, and where its absence helps explain the lack of violent wars. In the Balkans, the shift of the Yugoslav army from a stance of neutrality in the emerging conflict between ethnic Croatians and Croatian Serbs in 1991 toward direct support of the latter helped make that conflict into a full-fledged war. This came about in large part because of the presence of many ethnic Serbs in the Krajina region and the increasing Serbian composition of the Yugoslav army. Hungarian leaders have often made a cause out of the plight of their dispersed brethren in their neighboring countries, such that all political parties that hope to become significant are under pressure to pledge their active support. Even small amounts of discrimination have provoked a reaction.

The rhetoric of Russian nationalists like Zhironovsky, from December 1993 to spring 1993, suggesting Russia take control of the Baltic countries obviously heated up relations between those governments and put pressure on the Baltic States leaders concerning their Russian speaking minorities. In Moldova, the Russian 14th Army went beyond their peacekeeping role to support the Dniestr forces. The Dniestr leaders were able to stay in power in part because in 1990 Moscow aided them and other minorities in southern Moldova as leverage against Moldovan secession. Decisions to escalate the conflict were preceded by assurance of armed support from Moscow under the Soviets and the Russians. In the spring of 1992, Moscow media were full of groundless claims that could distort Russian and other perceptions of the issues there, such as that Moldova had decided to join Romania, was stockpiling weapons, and was committing genocide.

In contrast, violent conflict or even high tensions were avoided between the Czech and Slovak Republics in part because of the relative lack of minorities of one group residing in the territory of the other. And vis-à-vis Slovenia's and Macedonia's decisions to secede, Serbia had fewer incentives to hold onto them in part because of the much smaller percentage of Serbs living in those republics. The Slovenian war ended within days because of lack of Serb will and Macedonia seceded peacefully.

Behaviors, Perceptions, and Actions of the Disputants: Manifest Expressions of Conflict

A third set of variables has to do with the attitudes and perceptions that can shape the reactions of elites and their followers to the environment and to the institutional incentives that they face. They include the actions and policies that themselves can trigger or suppress hostile behavior. These factors may be relatively more amenable

17 Carment, "Ethnic Conflict at the International Level," p. 8f.; Carment, "The Ethnic Dimension in World Politics," pp. 5 and 7.

to change, at least in the short run, than the systemic and institutional factors described above.

13. *Accommodating Leadership:* To what extent do the leaders of the conflicting parties, such as governments and organized groups, show moderation in their words, actions, programs, and policies; make conciliatory and reciprocal gestures; and seek bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations and give-and-take bargaining to resolve them – rather than engaging in demagogic rhetoric, unilateral provocative acts, uncompromising policies, or coercion and force to seek their objectives but that worsen tensions and discourage compromise?

A major pattern noted in more recent studies of the emergence of ethnic conflicts emphasizes the independent effect that the behavior of individual ethnic group leaders can have in shaping the political atmosphere and the reactions of the rank and file to it. Unilateral and coercive actions provoke reactions of the same nature, thus escalating the conflict into a vicious cycle of increasing hostility and violence, and moving it further and further away from a mutual agreement. "... where ethnic groups attempted to impose a settlement, either by making a secession attempt, or by using control of the government to dominate an ethnically divided society, violence was the result. Thus neither attempting secession nor seeking to establish a dominant national identity by excluding ethnic groups is likely to result in peaceful resolution of conflict."[18]

A crucial dynamic that often lies behind the escalation process starts with the desire of aspiring leaders of groups who are losing power or seeking power to seize control of the group by outbidding their opponents in the competition for its leadership.[19] Where groups are insecure about their political status, aspirants can succeed by taking antagonistic positions against the group's perceived opponents and manipulating the rank and file perceptions of the other group's motivations. This escalates violence by causing a violent reaction by the other group, thus confirming the initial group's suspicions. Sometimes, elites will deliberately organize covert violence against the other side to provoke the confirming behavior desired and thus further mobilize one's own following, which helps in turn to increase the leader's position.

However, reciprocal and conciliatory behavior, such as agreeing to follow agreed-on procedures, moderate declarations of intent, and enacting institutional reforms and policies, such as minority rights protections,[20] are conducive to non-violent dispute outcomes because accommodating the other side's demands helps to pre-empt more

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18 Miall, *The Peacemakers*, p. 84.

19 Sisk, *Living Together*, p. viii.

20 Miall, *The Peacemakers*, pp. 86-88.

extreme demands[21] and can foster a "virtuous circle" of increasing cooperation. "The ability of political leaders to persuade their constituents to act peacefully, is the most important variable in creating improved relations among ethnic groups."[22]

The Yugoslavian and Moldovan cases reveal numerous instances of group leaders engaging in provocative and divisive nationalistic rhetoric through the media, taking political action unilaterally such as ad hoc referendums and declarations of independence, covertly building up armed forces, resorting immediately to force or coercion, and resisting international influence and assistance, except where it appears to consolidate one's own gains. Several analysts attribute the eruption of the Croatian and Bosnian wars to these elite motivations and tactics. To fend off their domestic challengers in the new democratic climate, Serbian and Croatian leaders intensified a perception of common ethnic group interests through populist appeals to emotion-laden ethnic identities and images of exclusivist ethnic cultures, and away from constitutional issues. Fears were created about the motives of other groups by conjuring up memories of past threats by the group, although the previous perpetrators had been in the minority in both populations. To increase the perception of threat, clashes were provoked to intensify the hostilities along ethnic lines thus achieving a self-fulfilling prophecy because of the reaction of the other group is cited as proof of the initial complaint, thus advance one's own program and preserving the leaders' domestic bases of power.[23]

The Moldova violence was similarly elite-provoked on the Dniestr side. A Russophone protest against a 1989 language law was led by Russian industrial workers, although they were less affected by it; the protests were organized by the industrial enterprises, who paid the workers; and although the law allowed local governments to make Russian the language of government and commerce, communist party city council members voted to defy the law rather than exempt their constituents.

Contrasting examples of how ethnic group leaders' can choose to have a moderating, rather than provocative impact on rising tensions come from Macedonia and Kosovo. When Albanian professors unilaterally announced they would create a new all-Albanian university in Tetovo in 1995, police actions against the demonstrations led to several deaths. But the chair of the main Albanian national party went on television to ask Albanians to stay off the streets, rather than taking

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21 Donald Rothschild, *Africas Interethnic Conflicts: The Linkages among Demands, Regime Strategies, and the Management of Conflict*, paper prepared for a research conference on Conflict Resolution in Africa, sponsored by the Brookings Institution (Washington, DC: 15-18 October 1989), pp. 24-27.

22 Sisk, *Living Together*, p. xi.

23 V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," in *International Security*, 19 (Winter 1994/95) 2, pp. 132-136.

advantage of the situation by inflaming passions. Similarly, after a demonstration against police in the Bit Pazar market in late 1992 and an arms smuggling episodes in 1994, Albania's President Sali Berisha publicly exchanged calming words with President Gligorov. They have met to pledge mutual respect for the two countries' existing borders. In Kosovo, though it makes a virtue out of a necessity, the LDK's non-violent doctrine obviously has helped keep a volatile situation in Kosovo from escalating into ethnic war.[24]

Exogenous Factors

Systemic and Institutional

14. *Extent of state interests in economic and political integration:* To what extent are the protagonists state actors who have high stakes in having their economy linked with a larger regional or global economy and their governments participants in functioning global, regional or subregional multilateral organizations? Or are the chief actors political groups within states who aspire to its control or their own states?

One of the most powerful variables to be associated with a range of indicators of "state failure" is the extent of isolation of economies from trade and commercial relations with other economies. Global and regional organizations have procedures that encourage regular contacts and active dispute mediating procedures between governments and internal groups, such as regular forums for discussing common issues, special envoys, confidence-building measures, negotiations, and the like.

Past research finds a strong association between peaceful dispute outcomes and whether the parties to the disputes are states. States wish to preserve and improve their positions in the international system and need to pursue a variety of diplomatic, economic, legal and political interests at any one time, such as trade, aid, security,

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24 The peacefully resolved dispute between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea has ingredients similar to the Moldovan case: the presence of a Russian-speaking majority in the area and other eastern parts of Ukraine who have been attracted to retaining links with Russia, Crimean leaders who have risen in part from local aspirations for independence or autonomy, and a major military presence left over from the Soviet period in the form of the Black Sea Fleet. But the fact that the tensions over possible Crimean separatism that at one point caused considerable international concern have since abated can be explained mainly in terms of the larger stakes involved in the overall Ukrainian-Russian relationship, especially the negotiations over the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear weapons and Ukraine's considerable economic dependency on Russia. But it is important also to note that Ukraine's policy toward minority rights and interests has been one of the most liberal in the area. Although serious issues regarding Crimea remain unresolved, moderate policies have undoubtedly kept discrimination charges from inflaming this issue. Unlike many other former Soviet Republics, Ukraine defines itself as a territorial and legal entity, not a nation of a certain people; its people are defined in terms of their place of residency, not ethnic or linguistic terms; and its legislation regarding employment, education, and culture protects every citizen regardless of ethnic origin, language, religion, and so on. Ukraine has also turned to the OECD and the UN to help it with dealing with its local minority problems.

and so on. Thus, the inclinations of governments to actively support neighboring ethnic communities' political goals may also be tempered to the extent that the outsider countries and host states have wider, more compelling interests and incentives that counterbalance their perceived gains from promoting ethnic or other social strife. If the neighbors are heads of sovereign states in the international community, powerful constraints and interests that have to do with retaining the integrity, prerogatives, and benefits of that status. Ethnic conflicts which also involve territorial claims have been found to be more likely to be resolved without major violence, because such disputes can be settled in the interests of one of the contending states with offsetting guarantees for the ethnic group belonging to the other state. Thus, if territorial issues are involved in ethnic conflicts, they become more of a matter between governments and they may be easier to defuse. The ethnic element is cooled since the governments are not fully aligned with the interests of ethnic groups.[25]

In Europe, such state interests appear to be basically conservative in terms of their effect on inciting internal ethnic violence. The desire of leaders of established states to continue to preside over stable, successful governments and, where possible, to increase the material well-being of their constituencies usually outweighs the gains to be achieved from inciting, beyond a certain rhetorical level, one's own nationalist chauvinist fervor or even from stirring up the animosities of an ethnic "kin-group" within a neighboring state. Another deterrent against undermining another state through its minorities is fear of one's own balkanization; ethnic restiveness against one state might give minorities in others the same ideas. Thus, the specific response of a potential supporter of a kindred ethnic minority in a neighboring country may be shaped by the extent to which it wants to maintain its status quo position and opportunities as a state, or on the other hand, either has aspirations to greater powers, or its borders are not final and its statehood is not secured.

In particular, the status of a government as a recognized sovereign state or a government that aspires to such recognition seems to restrain the extent to which it actively supports ethnic brethren in a neighboring state. Benign neighbors are fostered when governments develop strong stakes in receiving the benefits of membership in the international community, such as membership in regional economic organizations like the EU and IMF and World aid. And there is a difference between, on the one hand, providing armed or even legal and political support directly to the group behind the back of the host government and on the other, raising their situation before the government itself or through the CSCE or CE.[26]

The tempering influence on conflicts of state interests is also clear in other instances of potential kin group conflicts. In successful outcomes of ethnic dispute

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25 Miall, *The Peacemakers*, p. 83.

26 Szayny, *Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe and the Balkans*, p. 29.

that involved states – such as between Estonia and Russia and Hungary and Slovakia, some of the protagonists were leaders of established, internationally recognized states. The mother countries were constrained in their support to kindred groups next door by other states and international norms because they stood to lose more in the aid, multilateral memberships and other inducements the international community could bestow or withhold than they could gain politically from promoting ethnic nationalist causes. After 1991, the various potential hot spots around Macedonia all involved recognized governments as one of the parties – rump Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Macedonia itself – the middle three of which were long established states. Only in the Kosovo and domestic Macedonian disputes are one of the parties not states, but (Albanian) political movements aspiring to more state power, if not their own states. Thus, for example, although the leaders in Albania have voiced moral support for the Albanian minority in Macedonia, this support has stopped far short of armed backing and has been balanced by Albania's recognition of the new state and forswearing of any intent to change borders through force. Because the relatively weak Macedonian state and its weak army may be relatively easily disrupted by domestic turmoil, it is probably more in Albania's interests that Macedonia's politics be managed successfully than for it to fall under more Albanian influence. Despite the economic embargo it imposed on Macedonia in response to its dispute over the new country's adopted name, even Greece ultimately has ultimately stood to gain from maintaining a stable buffer state in Macedonia. Were the Bosnian war to spread to Macedonia, Greece might have to host thousands of refugees. Undoubtedly for these kinds of reasons of state, the leaders of Macedonia, Albania, and Bulgaria have initiated diplomatic contacts and regional military agreements with each other to reduce the likelihood of miscalculations. And the irredentist or revisionist tendencies in countries such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, for example, are offset by potential counter claims against them, so they may be regarded as reluctant or conditional status quo powers.[27]

Actors' Behavior and Perceptions

15. *Whether Third Parties Engage before Violence or Coercion*: Have significant governmental third parties outside the arena of the conflict applied strong positive or negative incentives to pressure the disputants unequivocally to pursue their differences peacefully – before one or other party has mobilized a significant political following or exercised armed force or coercive power to achieve their aims, such as to gain territory or control of a government?

27 Ibid., p. 36.

If third parties become engaged in the early stages of a dispute by providing positive or negative inducements to the parties to follow a peaceful course that are more compelling than the parties perceive the gains to be had from engaging in violent or coercive methods, it appears that the chances are quite high that the parties will "talk" rather than "fight." Thus, third parties need not only to be involved early, but must put sufficiently weighty political, economic or military pressures on the disputing parties to bring disputants to the negotiating table to work toward a mutual solution. This is needed in order to pre-empt the dynamic of escalation that might otherwise be unleashed if either party has begun to garner political support for its cause, or take coercive steps to gain its objectives. The impact of the same amount of pressure is likely to be much less if it comes into play after one or other party has already made gains.

In the Hungarian-Slovakian dispute, third party involvement was not especially early. The parties themselves had requested outside assistance several times and been turned down. Even when the EU did offer mediation, it initially failed to get an agreement. Nevertheless, a settlement was achieved once it was clear to Hungary and Slovakia that their membership in the EU would be hindered if they continued to balk at settling the issue. Similar monetary rewards were held out to Estonia as an inducement to modify its minority legislation, and Russia was provided an incentive to remain on schedule with its troop withdrawals by the threat that US and other Western economic aid otherwise would be withdrawn.

The multiple preventive measures in Macedonia were taken to ensure against Serbian clandestine efforts to destabilize Macedonia by Serbia directly or through intensifying the suppression of the Kosavar Albanians, as well as to signal international support for the maintenance of political cooperation among its ethnic groups and their parties. To the extent these measures have been effective, it may be because they involved symbolically powerful deterrent measures that were put in place largely *before* any of the potential external or internal sources of instability had a chance to impose its will in Macedonia through force or agitation. These deterrents included the periodic warnings from Presidents Bush and Clinton to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to refrain from any Serbian armed movement in Kosovo or against Macedonia, or they would be met by firm US retaliatory measures, which have been understood to mean military intervention. The other action was the UN peacekeeping force set up in 1993 to patrol the Serbian-Macedonian border, thus after the Yugoslav Army had withdrawn from the area, as a tripwire to deter their return. The fact that Macedonia is recognized in international law as a state by many other countries and is a member of the UN may also be a significant deterrent effect of a normative kind, because combined with the other measures, this "draws a line in the sand" *before* the fact of any encroachment.

The reason that these actions are probably more effective than the recognition of Croatia in early 1992 was that Macedonia was not simply endowed juridically with the status of a sovereign state prior to any takeover by hostile elements, but also that some military protection was provided to enforce it. Although the 1000-man force would in fact be no match for a Serbian Army invasion, incursions across the border would now be aimed directly at Western forces and violate firmly accepted norms against international aggression, thus possibly triggering a much more vigorous countermeasures, i.e., US and perhaps other military intervention.

None of the recent political disputes in Europe which eventuated into violence or deadlock show evidence that muscular third party efforts were made before significant inter-communal violence or the preemptive use of armed force. In Moldova, no international body took an interest in the growing contention between the Moldovan government and the Dniestr separatist movement on the left bank until the CSCE mediated a cease-fire in 1994 and placed an observer mission to monitor it. By that time, local forces had captured the territory they wanted. Similarly, in the years and months preceding the outbreak of war in Chechnya in December, 1994, although there were several bilateral negotiations between the Moscow authorities and the Chechen political leadership, and requests were made for international mediation, the only international mission apparently sent was a fact-finding mission by the non-governmental International Alert in 1992.

In the growing conflict between the Yugoslav federal republics after the breakdown of the communist party, several outside efforts were made beginning in early 1991 to pressure the republics to stay together or negotiate their differences. In this case, the problem was not that no mediation efforts were made. To dissuade the nationalist leaders in the republics from pursuing independence unilaterally, the EC used admonitions, the power to withhold recognition, threats of economic sanctions, and proffering of a negotiations table. But the EC and the US's pleadings and offerings of economic assistance came at a time in 1991 when political separation had already gone very far and military preparations and actions on the ground were already underway. In comparison to the gain in popular support and territory through a unilateral *fait accompli*, the rewards for cooperating in a peaceful solution and the penalties for pursuing independence by fiat were apparently insufficient.

In sum, the level of inducement that third parties must bring to bear in terms of carrots and/or sticks is relative to the strength of disputing parties and scale of the conflict being addressed. Measures applied early in a conflict require less pressure and costs than measures applied later. To the degree that the use of coercion or force to gain territory or control over a government is imminent, or deployed, preventive action must wield a great deal of counter-force to deter or reverse it, whether in the form of material rewards or military deterrence. Diplomacy and good offices may

require very attractive rewards or the contingent threat of force or other forms of coercion such as effective sanctions, before the parties to a mature dispute or an engaged violent conflict will contemplate a peaceful settlement.

16. Multi-Faceted Interventions: Are the several short-term and long-term sources generating potential for violence in the conflict arena being addressed through an appropriate mix of carrots, sticks, facilitative services, or other tools?

A number of sources suggest that in order to be effective, preventive interventions must "mix and match" several kinds of remedies to come to terms with the several forces or conditions that are driving the conflict. One dimension to look at concerns the various structural, political and constitutional, or substantive, levels of the problem, each of which may entail a different time frame – long-term, medium term, and short term.[28] The tools must operate on the various fronts or levels of society in which the conflict is being waged, and thus vis-à-vis the associated local players. Thus, power-based, official mediation approaches may produce temporary settlements among elites that maintain power relations, but would not address underlying issues concerning abiding needs such as participation, security, and identity. Long-term structural approaches will not be effective toward emerging disputes.[29] Incentives for reconciliation may need to be both broad – to include hard-liners – and deep – to reach key publics.

In sum, one or more tools may be needed to: reduce tensions, assure immediate security needs, mitigate severe economic conditions worsening the conflict, improve trust, alter mutual perceptions, begin inter-communal reconciliation, both nationally and at grass-roots, fostering communication between the parties and engage them on the substantive issues in dispute, provide specific structural or other substantive proposals, strengthen mass-elite agreement around peaceful goals, stem the flow of arms, and deter specific hostile policies, actions, behavior, and rhetoric.

Unfortunately, the third parties most engaged may not have in their repertoire the particular tools and experience that are needed. Emissaries from governments and the UN and regional organizations are generally used to negotiating and bargaining over tangible assets and among state actors. They are less familiar with issues of status or identity and thus non-governmental actors. But while NGO's may have experience with the latter elements, they are not usually brought into the picture in major roles.[30]

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28 Raimo Vayrinen, *The United Nations and Preventive Diplomacy. The Need of New Approaches*, paper prepared for the conference on The United Nations Between Sovereignty and Global Governance, LaTrobe University, Melbourne, 2-6 July 1995, p. 6.

29 Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970s* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969).

30 Miall, *The Peacemakers*, p. 185.

A further key notion is of an appropriate balance or weighting of various objectives within an overall strategy that, over time, sees conflict prevention leading to peacebuilding in an overall process of peaceful change. The aim must be a properly paced and scheduled transition toward desired goals that are ultimately sustainable in the social and political context, not merely quick attainment of specific procedures or objectives that the local body politic will reject. Outsiders promoting democracy, for example, must take into account the domestic effects of rapid shifts in power that may threaten potential losers so much they perpetrate covert subversive actions or ethnic hate campaigns. Since political predictability is important in avoiding violence, sudden changes in power allocations, e.g. ill-timed elections, dramatic redistribution of power through peace accords, and so on, can create instability. Stability is more likely where rates of change between groups and institutions are slower.

Thus, specific incentives may be needed to bring conservatives along in reforms.[31] Finally, the appropriate "fit" to local conditions must adapt to their changes over time so a sense of the appropriate sequence or schedule for achieving different ends is needed: settlement of political issues, security, human rights, justice.

Finally, to achieve the appropriate mix, breadth, depth, and modulation over time, the sense of a coherent strategy, authority to orchestrate it, and capacity to monitor it has to reside somewhere.

17. *Nature of Major Powers' Involvement:* To what extent are major global or regional powers' policies toward the country: (a) oriented to increasing these power's economic or political influence and advantages in the country, and thus approach it in a way that views it as serving the powers' immediate national interests; (b) seeking to strengthen its ability to handle domestic political disputes in balanced ways, such as by supporting or at least tolerating an active dispute settlement process; or (c) indifferent to the country's course?

By examining more and more cases, one can test, refine and add to these propositions and progressively develop more reliable and comprehensive explanations. Conclusions about some cases can be treated as hypotheses to be tested as one digs into others. The research method of "structured, focused comparison" can be used to, in effect, "interview" the data from various cases in order to derive answers to theory-informed stipulated questions about plausible operative factors. In this way, retrospective analysis can be used to develop generalizations that help to explain the course and outcome of many cases, even though particular generalizations may need to be rejected or modified as subsequent findings dictate.

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31 Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict," pp. 165-166.

The ultimate practical purpose of doing further case-studies is to suggest how more deliberate preventive actions can apply knowledge of past experience in taking future preventive actions in like situations. Thus, the next step is to use the body of accumulated generalizations to diagnose new potential conflict situations. Even before further refinement is conducted of the most important factors that prevent conflicts – this being a rolling process – its preliminary findings can make up a framework that is disseminated to current analysts and decision-makers as a way to begin to sensitize and inform their current practices. A set of key factors of the sort illustrated above serves as a basis for two tasks in prospective policy planning:

- *Risk/Opportunity Assessments*. The key variables indicate generic factors that analysts, political officers, and policymakers who are focused on different countries or sub-regions can use as a checklist to assess the probabilities of serious escalation emerging in particular potential conflict situations and the existing defenses against them.
- *Context-Specific Priority Setting and Strategy Development*. The framework also provides guidance as to which actions the policy-maker might be most appropriate and worth taking with regard to a particular possible conflict. By matching the ingredients in a particular locale with the items in the framework, it uncovers elements in the situation that may be present or absent, and thus pinpoints particular "fronts" or leverage points that may warrant the most concentrated efforts. The main requirements found by past experience to form part of successful conflict prevention can be matched against the ingredients found in a particular situation in order to uncover gaps. These elements might be put together in more comprehensive and coherent but yet tailor-made preventive response strategies.

Risk Opportunity Assessments

If we can identify retrospectively the key factors that help to determine whether political disputes escalate into violence or are settled peacefully, they also can be applied prospectively. They form a checklist of "swing factors," or variables, to be individually evaluated in particular countries to determine the extent to which emerging political disputes are vulnerable to violent conflict. The question is what the direction of the variables suggest are the weak spots that policymakers should address in a conflict setting, and the strong spots that require buttressing. Such assessments will uncover differing particular configurations of national vulnerabilities and strengths. The variables help gauge the potential for conflict or lack of it, and thus can be used to search out risks and opportunities that are setting-

specific. Although a set of more or less consistent generic factors provides the basis for the checklist, the outcome of the exercise will reveal that local needs vary in urgency and priority, depending on which are already provided by the conditions, institutions, and parties in the arena of the conflict.

As we have seen, every incipient conflict situation has a number of direct, proximate, and underlying factors governing it that determine the balance it strikes between conflict and peace-received legacies of conflict, ethnic group-political party links, accommodating leaders, operating regional networks, and so on. Pre-violent conflict situations involve several facets or "fronts" of vulnerability to violent ways of resolving political disputes. Each situation reveals differing local capacities for dealing with the forces driving toward intensified conflict. Examples include the need for basic security, a negotiations process, and so on, as described by the tasks implied by the past lessons. This calls for a kind of "needs assessment" or inventorying of the configuration of ingredients for avoiding the violent resolution of emerging disputes that appear to be required based on the cases of past experience. Whether a potential violent conflict in a particular threatened setting is likely to actually erupt depends on whether the particular set of causal factors in that arena are favorable or unfavorable to preventing rising instability and violence escalation.

Using a list of this kind the analyst can examine the particular features of a place during a time of rising social turmoil or political controversy and investigate the current status in the context of each variable. The question to be asked is whether the direction of each key factor is conducive to a violent or non-violent course for dealing with the situation. Note that rather than focusing only on "early warnings" that presage violence, the checklists of generic variables examine both conflict vulnerabilities and conflict prevention capacities in particular domestic and regional settings. The latter elements indicate possible indigenous points of entry for positive peacebuilding, not only causes of conflict that require suppression.

Calculating the Vulnerabilities and Capacities in Particular Contexts

How does one conclude from the framework the specific probability of violence? To be sure, this analytical process is not a mechanistic procedure of predicting certain results from a set of variables. Although it is aided by a case-based method for gathering and checking the most relevant factors, it is still a matter of qualitative analysis and probabilistic judgments, not precise mathematical deduction. Nevertheless, metaphors from algebra and arithmetic may be helpful, if not taken literally. We referred earlier to analyzing the sources of conflicts being like looking at the signs of the various functions in an algebraic formula. Said another way, judging a locale's vulnerability to conflict is like compiling the score from several events of the competitors in the decathlon. How well a competitor does in the overall rankings

does not depend on any single event, but on the composite score from all ten events. In the same way, the extent to which a given place is at risk of violent conflict or rather, is prepared to manage political disputes peacefully, depends on its composite "score" on all the variables in the conflict risk assessment. An overall judgment must be based on the net direction that results from measuring each factor and tallying up their total score. With both competitors and conflicts, poor scores on some criteria may be compensated for by good scores on others.

The dynamics through which various short, medium and long-term factors interact should be understood as accurately and sensitively as possible. The challenge is to develop a coherent account by discerning evident causal patterns in the ways that conditions, institutions, attitudes, and actions interact to produce certain results. Unfortunately, we do not know enough yet to tell which functions in the formula may generally be the most important, or about how they interact. But we do know that success in most cases of national conflicts probably requires attention to a certain range of needs.

Vicious and Virtuous Cycles

By and large, the more and stronger the factors that have a negative effect on conflict prevention are, the more grounds there are to worry, and the more and stronger the factors are that show a positive direction, the less cause there is for concern and the more basis exists for building a lasting peace. We can speculate that the key factors tend to feed on and reinforce one another. Thus, those situations ranking high on one will tend to rank high on others, too. The indicators in the most threatened situations may exhibit several negative tendencies simultaneously – for example, increasing militias detached from central political control, weakening central institutions, immoderate ethnic divisions, and so on. This suggests a syndrome or vicious cycle of violent conflict. Similarly, the least vulnerable situations will show up with several positive indicators, reflecting a virtuous cycle.

Designing Context-Specific Strategies

Because the analytic process uncovers those causal factors that are relatively supportive, and are relatively incompatible, the checklist used for risk/opportunity assessments also provides a basis for setting action priorities. Needs assessment helps to pin down what kinds of preventive priorities are most appropriate in a specific situation and in what magnitudes. Having identified the presence or absence of key variables and needs, it becomes more apparent what the most important tasks are for preventive action to attend to. Deciding which interventions are most fitting depends on which aspects of the specific place and time are most urgent.

Setting Priorities and Sequencing Objectives

The checklist of needs referring to possible causal factors and tasks thus can be used to generate various priorities and options for action. Although in most instances, *all* the needs are likely to be present in *some* measure, not all will be needed in equal or great amounts, because of the peculiar causal dynamics and the local capacities and resources present. A given situation ordinarily calls for more emphasis on some tasks rather than others. Cost effective conflict prevention requires thinking in terms of a hierarchy of short and longer term needs or goals that are attainable progressively over time. Although not always carried out in practice, the implicit logic of prevention suggests that goals such as basic order have to be sought in the short run and more ideal ends of social transformation, aimed at enduring peace pursued in the long run. Such a hierarchy might include the following goals, listed in an order ranging from minimal to the optimal:

1. physical security and public order
2. political engagement in negotiations over issues
3. settlement of issues in negotiation
4. intercommunal trust and reconciliation
5. more just intercommunal relations.

Choosing Policy Instruments

The next task is to consider the range of responses that might be made to the ascertained needs of the situation. This raises the question of which policy instruments and action tools may be most necessary. Such matching of tools to needs and priorities seems only common sense. But as happened in the Yugoslavian conflicts, much international conflict management and even policy analysis automatically resorts to advising certain habitual tools of intervention. These include diplomatic recognition and sanctions, while giving little consideration to their possible impact on the dispute or conflict "on the grounds" that the tools are supposed to be a remedy. In the desire to "do something," to focus on one familiar tool when another has greater urgency, however well-intentioned, can spell failure. Paying little attention to how certain preferred methods of intervention affect the context in which they are introduced, rather than first assessing the mix of needs that may be required to maintain peaceful resolution of disputes, has had destructive consequences. Nor are multi-tooled, more holistic strategies usually contemplated.

The Toolbox for Conflict Prevention

Definitions of preventive action have differed in terms of the particular means, methods, techniques, or policy tools that are included, and therefore, the

corresponding organizations and actors that employ these means. Boutros-Ghali lists five tools or techniques under "preventive diplomacy": early warning, fact-finding, confidence building measures, preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces, and demilitarized zones. Despite the "d" word suggesting only the intermediary functions performed by countries' official emissaries, Boutros-Ghali, like Hammerskjøld before him, includes military as well as non-military methods. Preventive diplomacy could be implemented by the UN Secretary-General, Security Council, General Assembly, and RMO's in cooperation with the UN.

But there seems to be no reason to arbitrarily circumscribe the list of tools that might be usable for conflict prevention *a priori*. The essence of preventive action is avoiding the use of force to settle political issues, so it has to do primarily with the *timing* of actions to preempt certain emerging conditions, specifically in places where tensions are rising and violence is anticipated in the foreseeable future, not with any particular *means* of action. The concept embraces a range of methods and is not defined by a specific technique. It is a preparedness, capacity and a disposition that may energize a range of actions so that latent or manifest disputes do not worsen. A wide range of intercessory (diplomatic), political, military, economic, judicial-legal and other techniques and programs might be applicable. A full list might include mediation, power-sharing, problem-solving workshops, peacekeeping, collective security, track-two diplomacy, rule of law, coercive diplomacy, human rights promotion, arms embargoes, peace commissions, conditional or targeted economic assistance, indigenous dispute resolution procedures, peace radio, to mention just a few. Consequently, it could also involve the many different actors or agents who implement these many tools – including the parties to the dispute themselves as well as various third party governments, multilateral organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and individuals.

Part Five provides a list of tools that might be used for preventive diplomacy. As shown, the tools operate in several functional policy sectors: official diplomacy, military affairs, economic measures, judicial reforms, democracy-building, and so on. While all these methods might be employed in principle, the key to whether the tools and their implementers actually do play this role and have such effects, or not, depends on when and how they are used at incipient stages of violent conflicts.

As can be seen, conflict prevention includes both efforts to strengthen or enhance certain positive conditions, such as promoting human rights and more social justice (i.e., preventive peacebuilding), as well as to address certain negative factors in the situation, such as thwarting the use of violence and establishing simple stability (i.e., crisis or violence avoidance). Because it is place and time-specific, we distinguish preventive action from general efforts at societal and international betterment in non-threatened settings, such as public education or commercial and trade relations

between nations. But some of those tools can be used adroitly in violence-vulnerable situations to do positive peacebuilding. Although preventive action is not the same as stopping manifest hostilities, such as through military intervention, some preventive diplomacy tools deter potential use of force. In most cases, some *mix* of tools, providing carrots, sticks and services, is needed to address various needs.

We can now suggest which tools might be most appropriate for situations in which differing priorities are at stake. For example, to the extent that confrontation, hostility, tension and suspicion characterize the protagonists' current relationship, and thus the prospects for armed force or violence are imminent. Provisions to avoid the use of violence and restrain the means of carrying out violence must take priority over efforts, say, to transform the attitudes and institutions of these actors themselves and the conditions in which they operate. Where and when actual military confrontations or wars are likely in the short term, preventive diplomacy must apply strong measures behind the more negative goal of mere crisis prevention and the preservation of stability because they are needed to deter or block the feared aggressive or repressive acts themselves and protect the physical security of those threatened. These measures might entail threats of economic and diplomatic sanctions directed at likely belligerents, specific military deterrence provided by a powerful state, arms embargoes, a preventive peacekeeping force, activating a war crimes tribunals (set up before violations are committed), or non-violent "people power" campaigns by oppressed groups against a repressive regime.

In other places and moments, however, an outbreak of violence may be possible but not imminent. To the extent that violence is less likely, preventive action thus has time to concentrate on other fronts of the conflict, or aspects of the situation, such as building common institutions between the parties and engaging them in political dialogue. And for example, it can reduce, restrain or regulate the weapons that disputants might be tempted to take up to advance their cause in the near or far future for exerting armed force and coercion. Thus, measures might be most appropriate for disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation enforced by international agreements. In an inter-state context, this may mean security guarantees provided by a defense alliance.

Where violence is very unlikely in the short term, but national or international disputes that could become violent in the future lack channels for peaceful resolution, preventive diplomacy involves positive efforts in an aspect of pre-conflict peacebuilding involving institutional capacity-building. Where they do not exist, preventive diplomacy should concentrate on creating these institutions so future disputes might be channeled into these peaceful mechanisms of resolution. These could mean national decision-making forums or structures to make them more representative such as power-sharing, special impartial commissions, and federalism or autonomy,

or it could inaugurate international negotiations. And where existing institutions that are normally used for resolving political disputes do operate, but are weak, such as the legislative and executive organs of governments themselves, preventive interventions should concentrate on strengthening these institutions and should avoid policies that may displace or destroy them. Finally, where egregious material needs and gross social inequities provide tempting pretexts for power-hungry leaders to foment violence, preventive diplomacy could provide politically-conditioned economic aid and target it on especially grievous areas or groups.

Where institutions are in place and working, but explicit disagreements have emerged among particular parties that remain unaddressed, preventive diplomacy sponsored by a third party government, the UN, regional organizations, or a prominent individual can actively engage the disputants in communications to resolve their differences through tools such as good offices, mediation, and negotiations. Or it could channel them into the arbitration and adjudication procedures of international tribunals or the International Court of Justice. If distrust and hostile relationships among opposed, non-communicating groups might invite violent hostilities, "track-two" preventive diplomacy conducted by Non-Governmental Organizations at national or grassroots levels might try to dispel mutual misunderstandings through media projects to encourage reconciliation, low key non-official "problem-solving workshops," and dispute resolution training. Between states, it could promote confidence-building measures for more transparency between national militaries.

Just as finely calibrated preventive diplomacy strategies must be tailored to reflect realistic assessments of what is and what is not needed in a specific country or regime at a given moment, so they must also be planned and operated with an eye to what future medium and long-term goals are attainable at different points in the future. This requires that their application in particular countries and regions must stay flexible and responsive to changing tactical and political considerations. Among other things, early warnings of troubled areas must continue to operate beyond the initial alarm, in order to monitor progress by watching key indicators and thus help to set short- and long-term goals.

IV. Conclusion: Dollars or Design?

Is the prevalence of unprevented conflict the result, as one prominent theme in the international policy debate would have it, that we simply do not have enough development resources going into the societies and states of the new or old developing world? Or is it that the resources and policies that are already directed that way do not focus resources in a way that is guided by any theory of conflict emergence, and are not implemented in ways that take into explicit account their

negative effects or optimize their positive effects in preventing or aggravating violent politics – such as on the existing social and institutional infrastructures, such as the prevailing distributions of political power, institutions for allocating material benefits such as jobs, education, and societal capacities for managing disputes?

While the developing world will only come out from under the shadow of destructive conflict when economic growth and political legitimacy through more inclusive governments have been achieved, current third party activities in those countries could be measurably improved in terms of conflict prevention by infusing current knowledge into existing policies. More conflicts could be prevented long before social scientists have discovered the ten definitive causes and indicators of, say, ethnic civil wars, and short of installing in New York, Brussels, and other capitals a fully functioning system for early warning and preventive response. Improving conflict prevention does not necessarily require creating a new centralized system for predicting specific threatening events in remote places so action and resources can be deployed anew to respond to those signs. The problem is not solely one of freeing up more resources to do something new and organizationally distinct to which we give the explicit label "preventive action." Money is already being spent on programs that may themselves be contributing to violent conflicts.

The task is rather doing what we are already doing in those places but in modified ways, by organizing and mobilizing them in more conflict-sensitive, focused ways. It thus involves the whole range of programs and contacts – diplomacy, economic aid, trade, democratization efforts, military contacts, and so on – that third parties already have operating in vulnerable areas of the world, or that at least are already affecting them (and in that sense, are already "intervening"). This entails taking another look at existing reporting procedures, conflict indicators, eligibility conditions, administrative rules, and other features that will make them more conflict-sensitive, either by simply "doing no harm" to worsen the situation or better, by directly helping to reverse the several forces that contribute to violent conflicts. An example of such a modification might be conflict impact statements to accompany scheduled economic reforms. We need anti-conflict guidelines and pro-peace strategies for old and new policies.

V. A Preventive Diplomacy Toolbox

1. Development and Humanitarian Tools

Cause: Socio-Economic Resources Scarcity

One reason violent conflicts arise is because nations or groups lack sufficient basic material resources such as food, health needs, shelter and the means of livelihood to go around and therefore a severe competition is created for limited resources, which

tempts the use of violence to obtain them. In view of relative deprivation, it is important to point out here that these systemic conditions refer not only to a possible absolute lack, or small base, of such resources, but also to the perception of their inequitable distribution or unfair shifts in them, i.e., a *relative* lack of resources in terms of the proportion of whatever aggregate amount is available that is enjoyed by any given cognizant party, in relation to other parties that it takes as its "reference group." So, violent conflicts may arise even when absolute resources are at a high level, and conversely, low levels of resources need not automatically lead to violent conflict.

Humanitarian assistance is usually used during times of crises and conflict as an emergency measure to restore the material needs that are destroyed by violent conflicts. In that sense, it is not a tool of conflict prevention, but of conflict mitigation. But in situations where conflict is at a low level or has recently abated, this aid can be used to hasten the process of post-conflict reconciliation and thus prevent future conflicts, through the ways in which it is distributed. At a minimum, it needs to make sure it "does no harm" by being perceived to favor one party over another, thus increasing their incentive to use violence.

In sum, both forms of material provision have to pay heed to the timing and distribution impacts of improving economic conditions, otherwise they might help create violent conflicts, rather than avoid them.

Tasks

Alleviating egregious, elemental human needs, extreme social and economic conditions, that can occasion incitements to group violence or armed force. Addressing more fundamental sources of disputes in material deprivation. Redressing inequities in the distribution of the resources that are available.

Tools

- targeted or conditioned economic development assistance
- cross-communities development projects
- income redistribution
- distribution-sensitive humanitarian relief.

2. Political Development and Governance Tools

Cause: Poor Governance

Parties may or may not have an immediate dispute, but even if they do not, they lack some ongoing governmental institutions and political processes at the national level, or inter-governmental bodies at the international level, that they share and view as legitimate vehicles through which they might resolve any future differences that may

arise. The parties may also lack non-governmental means and a public life through which to express demands and aggregate their preferences.

Task

Set up or strengthen permanent political institutions through which negotiations can be regularized. Create permanent non-partisan state and inter-state institutions and procedures that can serve to manage any future dispute that arises and can enforce public decisions that are made. Endow them with impersonal legitimacy through ensuring some form of constituent representation and political equality. Engender the creation of a public life and public discourse independent of the state to which it is ultimately accountable. Promulgate norms of responsible citizenship, debate, and give and take.

Tools

- elections and electoral assistance
- governmental capacity-building or reform of legislatures, administration and the civil service, and judicial systems
- constitution drafting assistance
- executive power-sharing
- allocation of political authority through federalism, autonomy, decentralization of governmental functions
- political prty development
- civil society building through grass-roots movements and civic organizations
- non-violent grass-roots movements, demonstrations, boycotts
- peace education
- media programs.
- development of diverse, non-political media
- trusteeship, protectorates

International

- multilateral organizations with executive, representative and judicial functions.

3. Diplomatic Tools

Cause: Non-engagement

Parties in particular disputes may lack an acceptable way of engaging in communication or negotiation with each other over particular issues that separate them, either because they lack common institutions or those common institutions have been discredited in their eyes. Thus, no effective procedures or institutions exist through which the dispute can be discussed and solutions sought. The perceptions and attitudes of the parties toward each other are so negative that they can't get beyond

their feelings to consider particular solutions, or comply with them. Or, the parties may be engaged at the negotiating table and they seem willing to settle, but they still are unable to reach agreeable settlements because of lack of good ideas, distrust or lack of strong motivation to budge.

Tasks

Engage the parties in communication and dialogue, either face-to face or indirectly through the "diplomacy of prevention": through temporary channels and processes for discussion or negotiation. Address the substantive issues in dispute. Generate a range of possible settlements. Induce parties to adopt solutions. Provide mutual assurance. Change attitudes and perceptions. Reduce tensions when they arise. Dispel distrust and suspicion through building relationships and foster reconciliation.

Tools

- good offices
- mediation
- peace conferences and summits
- arbitration
- "track-two" problem-solving workshops or other non-official dialogues
- incentives to negotiate and settle, such as security guarantees, promises of aid or membership in multilateral organizations

4. Military Tools

Cause: Threats to Physical Security

There are few or no restraints on the ability of parties to resort to violence or armed force as a way to achieve their demands, so one or more faces immediate threats to their physical security. This encourages fear and insecurity and acts to counteract the perceived threat through arming or preemptive strikes.

Tasks

Deter, suppress or contain threats of violence or escalation of low levels of violence. Deprive parties of arms. Provide protection against their use. Maintain or restore public order.

Tools

- preventive peacekeeping force
- targeted deterrence or contingent threats of force
- enforceable demilitarized zones, safe havens
- military observers

- confidence-building measures and collective security
  - arms embargoes
  - coercive diplomacy (sanctions, threats of force, exclusions from international organizations, deprivation of aid, etc.)
  - policy functions
  - war crimes tribunals,
  - military assistance
  - military reform

3. Norms against Violence: Intrastate Conflicts as a Challenge to the Preventive Policy of the OSCE

Bernard von Plate

The OSCE represents a systemic order to which its member states should align themselves. Early warning and conflict prevention count among its primary tasks. These two roles create a certain tension since interstate wars, which begin with a cross border attack, have become quite unlikely in Europe. Since 1990, the confrontation between the two blocs has been replaced by a mixture of reinvigorated and new conflict potential. The security *between* states is beginning, more than ever before, to be determined *within* them. It would seem that what the experts are calling a "comprehensive approach to security" takes this fact into account, although a clear term for this much cited paradigm change is still lacking. Security, for example, is still primarily regarded as an interstate affair, as the current debate over NATO enlargement towards the East and South demonstrates. The intrastate dimension of security is, however, one of the major concerns of the OSCE, and it is this challenge that will decide both the present and future position of the organization in the new European security architecture. Where this position will finally be located depends on whether, and to what extent, the participant states can agree on prerogatives for the OSCE. When it comes to intrastate causes of conflict, this agreement will allow for greater freedom of action.

A military attack seldom comes without forewarning. If it does occur, then any remaining doubts regarding the security problems in that region are removed. Intrastate conflicts are not able to send such clear signals, at least not in every case. From which point in time, then, do human rights infringements, violations against democratic and constitutionally-based minimum standards, disregard for religious and ethnic minorities and similar matters, become a danger for neighboring countries or a whole region? From which point in time are the security interests of one state endangered through the developments in another? In some cases there are clear answers to these questions. A flood of refugees, for example, is visible and measurable as its material consequences can be calculated. Something, however, went wrong beforehand: namely the prevention of conflict, which then served as the grounds for the exodus of refugees. Conflict prevention is, therefore, the declared aim of security precautions. As such it is their function to not only identify intrastate conflicts at an early stage, but to treat them as international concerns. Unfortunately the *interstate* dimension of intrastate conflict can frequently not be identified at a strategically significant point in time when preventive political action would be most

appropriate. Intrastate events, in a third country, are rarely perceived as a potential threat to one's own security at an early enough stage.

The dilemma being dealt with here is how a bridge can be built between the potentially relevant security developments within a state, and the interests of third parties, to put these developments on the international political agenda while there is still time to do something about them. This leading question does not imply that states completely disregard the internal violations of norms and principles as long as their direct interests do not appear to be at stake. The assumption, however, is that the short term decision to either act or stand idle and the long-term interest to contribute to the interstate prerequisites for stability "based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law" (as originally stated in the CSCE document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the human dimension) cannot always be smoothly fused together to create an optimal solution.

It is against this backdrop that the OSCE deserves special attention. How far should the Vienna organization take account of the fact that the security-related importance of developments evolving from within a state are often recognized too late by others? With regard to the OSCE, the answer is to provide the Vienna based organization with the autonomy to act as the main advocate of domestic norms of behavior, as long as states are not, or are not yet, able to do so. In view of the principles of the Human Dimension the OSCE has a comparative advantage over the other security relevant organizations in playing this role.

The intrastate dimension of security after the end of the East-West conflict demands a qualitative developmental leap on the part of the OSCE. This is a challenge if the European-Atlantic security region is to represent a qualitative unit other than just a simple geographical conglomerate. A security model for Europe will not only develop out of harmonized cooperative work among international organizations alone, it will remain incomplete as long as the intrastate prerequisites for interstate stability do not assume a position of equal status. To end the war in Bosnia, the signature of President Milosevic was required. Lasting stability in the Balkans, however, will require the democratic transformation of the state which Milosevic presently represents.

I. The Background: An Old Argument in a New Context

The struggle for power among states is a decisive factor in international politics. Since their existence, sovereign nation states have been anxious either to defensively protect or to offensively extend their power and area of influence. A suprastate authority, equipped with an enforcement mechanism that can prevent states realizing their interests through means of power and violence, is not only not yet in sight: it

simply is not feasible. Despite its efforts, the United Nations cannot, due to several reasons, truly fulfill this function. As a result the international system remains in the most general sense, as it has historically been, in a condition of anarchy. Within this a climate of long-lasting mistrust reigns, which in turn produces manifestations of *interstate* violence. States seek to protect themselves from the unpredictability of the international system, either alone or in conjunction with others, through military preventive measures. Such measures, however, only manage to reduce the risks for those directly involved but do nothing to eliminate, or diminish, the risks *per se*. In particular, those states who are not in the realm of the protective guarantees of an alliance, regard the uncertainties of the international system to be threatening and perceive themselves as unable to match the power aspirations of others.

The preceding paragraph sketched an analytical construct which is known as the 'security dilemma' in international political theory, and which underpins the so-called realist and neo-realist schools of thought. In the contemporary political agenda, the concept, although only scarcely expressively mentioned, appears primarily in two contexts:

- in the worried warnings of a "re-nationalization" of foreign and security policy, in particular of those states which joined together under the conditions of the East-West conflict in the Atlantic Alliance, and now see themselves as being confronted with the task of adjusting their alliance to changed conditions, and
- in the debate on NATO enlargement towards East and South and the wide front of objections which the idea of membership of further states has met with in Moscow.

In particular, the security dilemma plays a classic role in the NATO enlargement question, at the expense of opposing assertions. All the Polish governments to date have justified their request to be accepted into NATO through references to the historical and intellectual association of their country with the values of the Western World. The other potential new members state a similar case. The arguments from Warsaw indeed ring true and are to be taken seriously. They, however, only partially describe Polish interests. Along with the desire to belong to the West, the unstable situation in the East and the shadow of the West's dark past are hardly less important motives. The worry about external security and protection in the face of the potential ambitions of powerful neighbors are reasons that are as decisive for the Polish desire to join NATO as the desire to finally end the unstable transitional stage. These motivations seem even less doubtful for the Baltic States, particularly when considering their relationship with neighboring Russia. In the Russian reaction to the discussion on NATO expansion, practically every sentence reads as proof for the security dilemma theory.

It is the dominance of traditional security concerns and the desire for protection from potential external threats which dominates today's security debate and which, to a great extent, resulted in turning it into a NATO and an enlargement discussion. The well-founded assumption that the conventional causes for interstate conflict (power expansion through territorial gains) have lost their meaning, at least in Europe, or have become entirely improbable, are – on the other hand – treated rather informally and abstractly.

Security dilemma theory is bound up with the intention of explaining the causes of conflicts which emerge from the relations between states. The concept serves to explain the mistrust and tension *between* states, as the enlargement debate illustrates almost daily. The need to analyze conflicts on traditional terms still exists even though the East-West conflict has come to an end. This is particularly true when one realizes that despite the elimination of the confrontation between two power and socio-political blocs, the international system of sovereign states has continued. The old order (or rather disorder) of the international system, to which a still rising number of partially fragile states has been added, is clearly influencing international relations more now than during the past 40 years. The numerous warnings of a "re-nationalization" of foreign and security interests and respectively, the sluggish willingness to act in a multilateral framework, are undoubtedly reflected in today's realities.

But, at the same time, one must ask whether it is true that this process only represents a case of returning to what once existed. Was the East-West conflict then a historical exception and, following its disappearance, can one have a more or less smooth transition to what had previously been the norm? The concept of "re-nationalization," which either relates to the epoch between the World Wars or to the volatility of alliance relationships in the past century, obscures the view of what is new. The East-West conflict was not only an interruption of traditional state relations, it bound them in a confrontation between two blocs and, in doing so, froze them. What has been overlooked is that, beyond the confrontation itself, an increasing socialization of international relations was simultaneously, but asymmetrically, taking place between East and West. Foreign policy is no longer, or at least less than before, solely an interstate matter. What takes place within a state affects the security of its neighbors, even though it is not always as clearly identifiable as a direct threat. Therefore, developing a security policy that is once again restricted to the relations between states would not be appropriate within this reality. This should be taken as grounds for establishing a new foundation for the preparedness of states to act multilaterally. The old mechanisms were more or less forced through the East-West situation and seem to be endangered, if not already eradicated, since its collapse. While in the past it was first and foremost a question of joining together to block a

potential external threat, the current challenge is to cooperate, as an international community, to deal with intrastate conflict issues.

Proponents of the so-called liberal theory counter their 'realist' critics with the argument that international relations are determined, above all, by the social structure of states, by the events within them and the "social interweaving" at the varying social levels among them. The lively scholarly debate questioning whether, and under which conditions, democratic, constitutional states wage war against one another, takes this liberal theoretical stance and uses Kantian peace theory as its starting point.

This paper will not contribute to this theoretical discussion. It also does not claim to apply theoretical findings to operational politics. The paper proceeds, without further reasoning, from the assumption that weighty motives in the NATO enlargement debate speak for a power politics approach to international politics. This is valid both for those interested in joining NATO and for the opponents of NATO enlargement, as much as for its proponents within the Atlantic Alliance itself.

In this paper, sides are emphatically taken with those who speak in favor of the intrastate dimension of security. This is not in order to confront one conceptual monopoly with another, however, the intention remains to push the emphasis clearly in the direction of the intrastate security dimension. The following four questions will be addressed:

- Where does the importance, and the ambivalence, of intrastate conflict lie in interstate action, particularly in light of the means to address such conflict?
- What has taken place up until now, above all in the CSCE/OSCE, in terms of intrastate causes of conflict?
- What are among the gravest difficulties in implementing what has been agreed upon?
- Where are the unexploited areas of opportunity that would enable the intrastate dimension of conflict to be even more clearly recognized?

II. Intrastate Conflict: A Challenge in the Present and Future

What necessitates the focus on the question of intrastate conflict? It is the observation that the crucial consequences of the paradigmatic change during 1989 and 1990 – which, during the past few years, has been discussed to the saturation point – is the shift of security relevant factors into the domestic realm of states. Or, taking it a step further,the protection of borders is only one security aspect of amongst many.

The label "turning point" (in German, *Wende*) describes an event which took place within states. It initiates a change in interstate relations and continues to influence the way in which they will evolve in the future. If this characterization were inaccurate, then the interest in a successful economic transformation of the east and central

European states, in the development of democratic and constitutional state principles, in the opportunities of the individual as well as entire ethnic groups for self-determination, would be of philanthropic, but not of direct political relevance.

This enumeration, however, does not call for the rule of non-intervention to be completely disposed of and for its replacement with a strict rule of intervention. What is requested, though, is to elevate the importance of developments within states and grant them the same prominence on the security agenda that interstate matters already have. This request is generally accepted at an abstract and non-binding level. What takes place within states counts ordinarily as an essential component of international security. When it becomes a question of transposing that recognition into actual political action, the interstate aspects of security invariably return to their dominating role.

That security begins in the states themselves is not a fundamentally new discovery. It was already a characteristic of the confrontation of the two blocs that, in the course of their development, the social and political *status quo* also became an important condition of stability. In the years prior to 1989 it was in the interest of interstate security, as well as a fixed component of political reason, to refrain from any direct political efforts to induce change in the communist-socialist states. To put it differently the intrastate dimension of security was taken into account at least insofar, as the west abandoned without saying to actively influence the domestic scene beyond its borders. The internal situation of the antagonistic system was, at best, the indirect aim of political action.

The silent terms of engagement of East-West relations made it clear that they were characterized by both a traditional power conflict as well as the confrontation of two opposing concepts of political order during the course of forty years. While, in terms of the reciprocal opportunities for influence, they were completely taboo, these relations stood to a certain extent as substitutes for the intrastate dimension of security, which is, in a sense, also a child of the East-West conflict. It froze a development which, after the Cold War's conclusion, spread with increasing vehemence to those parts of Europe in which an inner pluralization of the societal power distribution had previously been largely hindered.

The decisive turning point at the beginning of the 1990s was not a unique event, limited in time, which once again secured recognition for a definition of security as an exclusively interstate problem. Nation states have not been replaced as the primary focus of political loyalties and as actors in the field of external security. However, they are confronted with security problems on the substate level. The question that must be asked is whether conventional diplomatic means and methods can be used to tackle such problems. For example, who represents an ethnic-religious minority at the interstate level if they are excluded from the representative organs of their states, but

are themselves of potentially decisive importance for the stability of a state and the security of a region?

The social dimension of security has taken a quantum leap nationally, as well as internationally. Political research is increasingly occupied with the phenomenon of international socialization, both literally as well as conceptually. From a security point of view it is the ambivalent effects of this development which are of primary interest. Where and how, for example, do the forces which are directed against a 'world society' make themselves noticeable, forces which manifest themselves within states in the form of ethnic conflict and an unrestrained type of nationalism? It is more or less undisputed that these forces should be, and are, regarded as the dominant danger for European security. The actual challenge for a European security order is the answer to the question: to what extent are the instruments of multilateral diplomacy able to adequately tackle substate reactions to international socialization and effectively address the intrastate causes of conflict? Furthermore, where do the limits of traditional diplomacy, those which can only be overcome with the help of new and additional actors and agreements, lie?

The end of the Cold War in 1989/90 does not mark the overcoming of the traditional causes of conflicts. The violent expansion of one's own territory at the cost of a neighbor is not a historically redundant phenomenon. "Warfare in the CSCE region to achieve hegemony and territorial expansion continues to occur," reads the CSCE summit declaration from Budapest in December 1994. However, the collapse of the communist-socialist state and social system was, when it comes down to it, only indirectly the result of an interstate victory. This is even more so since the performance of a state – which encompasses all areas of economic and societal life – determined, and still determines, the success and failure of states, as well as their respective existence and non-existence.

The sharp division between two blocs has been replaced by a comprehensive social dimension of security, one that can no longer be embedded in the framework of sovereign nation states. The possibilities for states to act have started to move in two directions: "upwards," generally characterized by the catch word *globalization*, (something that will not be dealt with any further) and "downwards" in a complex substate context, which includes as much regional as autonomous societal developments. A return to traditional interstate conceptions of order, which the East-West conflict had preserved, and which established a clearly identifiable line of conflict, is thus no longer possible. With the end of the confrontation between the blocs, the security challenge has become primarily an intrastate matter and, only secondly, an interstate problem.

III. Intrastate Conflict: A Taboo Subject in International Law and Politics?

Irrespective of the changes that have already taken place, a state's internal affairs are still treated as a "holy sanctuary" of state sovereignty, protected by a wall of non-intervention. Even when one does not share the view in this pointed form, the phenomenon remains in need of clarification. In particular it is unclear why the OSCE states during the course of the last few years have come to an understanding concerning an extensive catalogue of norms, based on the conditions within the states, whose implementation, however, is still checked only selectively or not at all.

The events in and around Chechnya, especially at the beginning of the conflict, and the unsuccessful attempts to bring human rights violations in Turkey to the international stage of the OSCE, are exemplary of an obviously tenacious and probably even intended misinterpretation. Neither in Chechnya, nor elsewhere, is the issue the questioning of the intrastate aspects of the events. The practice of coupling "domestic affairs" in an almost knee-jerk fashion with the principle of non-intervention cannot, in many cases, be either politically or legally justified under international law. It is, remarkably, not only the affected states who invoke this principle and guard themselves from having to lay their domestic affairs before the outside world. Third parties also make use of international law when reticence looks to be politically advisable.

How can this state of affairs be explained? What causes the tendency of states to keep a distance from the internal affairs of others? Are there imaginable ways and means to narrow the gap between the security significance of intrastate conflict potential and the willingness of third parties to act? The fact that states involved in the conflict refer to the principle of non-intervention and their sovereign right to make decisions is certainly understandable. But why do third party states also react in this way and thus forgo the option of coming into discussions on the causes of intrastate conflict at an early stage? When there is not a lack of early warning but rather early action, as has been confirmed through the United Nations time and time again, there must be good reasons why reactions are invariably hesitant towards the intrastate causes of threatening interstate conflicts. Some of these reasons will be discussed below with a particular emphasis on the question as to how far they are irrefutable or, at any rate, how they can at least be partially compensated.

IV. Intrastate Conflicts: Looking into the Crystal Ball

Among the most likely explanations for states having the tendency to hold back from intrastate conflicts, where possible, is an unclear perception of interests: do events in a neighboring state, or anywhere else on the planet, affect one's own state interests or not? How far does this frequently asked question go to the heart of the problem? Is

the argument that self-interest be a precondition for a decision to become involved, or hold a conflict at arm's length, convincing? Even when it can be assumed that a clear conception of national interest is present, laying aside the essential difficulty of formulating that in itself, the question as to whether, and in what way, these interests are endangered through an intrastate conflict in a third state frequently remains unanswered.

The causes for this are not in the first instance problems of defining state interests. It is more often the ways in which the causes of intrastate conflict manifest themselves which make it, in many cases, impossible to assess the significance of events in a third state for one's own state interests. No two conflicts are alike. That truism is also valid for those cases which, superficially, can be labeled as ethnic-religious tensions. In reality, the similarity of outward forms of manifestation distracts attention from the fact that every conflict can only be understood and dealt with in terms of its own context. It is thus difficult to calculate the conflict's dynamics and possible interstate significance. Although, for preventive reasons, it is crucial to address a conflict at its embryonic stage, the difficulty in assessing the impact of a potential intrastate conflict, weighs particularly heavy. That is, above all, the case because a consistently valid list of criteria against which the relevance of intrastate conflict causes can be judged does not, and probably cannot, exist. Correspondingly it is not possible to identify the genuine point of intersection at which third states should automatically develop an interest to become engaged.

Even in cases where the connection between intrastate problems and the interests of third parties is recognizable, and thus, the previously mentioned points do not apply, there are frequently conflicts of aim or interests. To present once again the already cited example of Chechnya, why should the Russian government be urged to hold to signed agreements, when in the context of other interests – for example a common non-proliferation policy for weapons of mass destruction, or a concerted action in the Balkans to stop the Bosnian war – it seems advisable to hold back and to hide this stance behind the principle of non-intervention?

The optimal situation in which no conflict of interest occurs is without doubt an exception. The fact, however, that many intrastate developments are not addressed at all, or not soon enough, cannot be explained by a lack of early warning signals. What is frequently missing is the desire to build a bridge between conflict potential within states and the interests and means of third parties to step in from the outside. Does this dilemma allow itself to be defused?

V. *The Implementation of Norms as State Interests*

It is correct that interests determine the essence and ultimate ends of state actions. Just as accurate is that due to the unpredictability of intrastate conflict potential, state interests appear frequently to be unaffected. But even when this is not the case, opposing state interests often mutually block each other. Interests determine either the individual states or international (but interstate) organizations when the issue at stake is the willingness of states to act. Interests are in an almost unchallenged monopolistic position. It goes without saying that the point is not to impute a principal opposition between state interests on the one hand and the compliance with intrastate norms on the other, even though, as it is well known, they are not identical. The question as to when and with what effectiveness reactions to violations of intrastate norms occur via international pressure, is decided on the basis of interests which very often overlook, or at best, undervalue the inner dimension of security. The issue is not to chase after a utopia of human rights policies which is in every respect identical with the conceptualization of foreign policy interests. The emphasis should rather be placed upon a process in which intrastate development is perceived more resolutely than before as a challenge to the security of every state and is regarded as a general concern for all. Norms and principles, beyond the level already reached, should become – not only for security reasons – an immediate component of state interest.

International organizations offer one of the only possibilities to operate in this direction, and this option is as banal as the chances for its realization are politically complicated. Today, there is no other viable mechanism for bridging the gap between the interests of sovereign individual states and the requirement to act early enough for the benefit of preventive measures, except for the one already offered – in principle – by international organizations. International organizations can only, however, serve as catalysts insofar as they become more independent from the necessity to refer back to the decisions of their members in each individual case. Here we are not talking about majority decisions in an organization, but rather about the degree of autonomy that an organization possesses. To what extent can it take its own initiative, without being bound to the individual interests of states, which are often short-term and occasionally tactical? The answer lies in an agreed upon framework of norms and procedures which is certainly not established beyond any state interests, but which is at least freed from short-term opportunistic considerations. That would mean gradually giving organs of international organizations executive powers to take up matters even when their members do not perceive it opportune to do so. A *sovereignty* transfer is hence open to discussion in areas which are presently still seen by states as their exclusive prerogative.

This idea is not new and is usually opposed with the argument that it does not take account of the tension between *Realpolitik* and moral politics and is therefore not up

for negotiation. The protagonists of this verdict appear, however, to overlook the fact that they stick to an antiquated differentiation between interstate interests and intra-state causes of conflict. This dividing line drawn by the so called realists is, however, even from a traditional security point of view, as much outdated as it is justifiable to imply an incompatibility of real interests on the one hand and supposedly moral demands on the other.

Due to the extension of the security dimension into states themselves, it has been shown, repeatedly and with far-reaching consequences, that the question of whether and when the security interests of third parties are affected can rarely be answered in a clear fashion as in the case of traditional interstate conflicts. This factor of uncertainty proves particularly problematic when the issue is to determine, in the interests of effective conflict prevention, an optimal point of time for action.

Events, which in the first instance appear to be "merely" morally questionable, and correspondingly receive minimal attention, can in fact expand into a very real security threat. If it is true that the interstate consequences of intrastate conflict cannot always be adequately assessed at an early stage, two conclusions can be drawn:

1. a clear catalogue of norms which extends into intrastate affairs is necessary, and in addition
2. special international organizations, or their organs that can call upon agreed values and procedures, without being invariably dependent on consensus or on the majority decisions of their members.

Here the issue is exclusively concerned with expanding the *right* of international institutions to take the initiative. For the willingness of states to act there is, however, no substitute on the international level.

Who else other than an international institution endowed to do so, could direct attention towards a conflict in which a substate actor is involved? The state concerned is usually interested in solving conflicts with a region or an ethnic or religious minority through its own means and to its own advantage. A non-state partner in a conflict is, however, only to a very limited degree and in exceptional cases, in a position to generate the attention of an international forum without belonging to it itself. As such, the example of Crimea is more an exception than a typical case. The interstate significance of the constitutional dispute over the status of the peninsula caused organs of the OSCE to take up the problem, since representatives of Crimea were not authorized to do so on their own behalf. Conflicts such as those in South-Ossetia or Abkhazia have also been framed within an international context from the start and hence have become a matter for the United Nations and/or the OSCE. In other cases, an interstate conflict dimension is not always clearly recognizable or regarded as debatable especially in its early stages.

For what reason did the war in Chechnya at first qualify as an intrastate matter? Was it an attempt to declare the international community of states incompetent? Or did it occur because of the difficulty in answering the question: how far does an intrastate abuse of norms infringe on interstate interests? Because clear-cut answers to these questions do not exist and because these interests can be caught in the net of conflicting interests, attention has to be directed to those authorities which are not burdened by governmental considerations. The fact that an OSCE mission was nevertheless subsequently sent to Chechnya, was due to the initiative of the then Chairman in office. A genuine mandate to act as an organization, e.g. based on the *Code of Conduct*, and to bring the developments in the North Caucasus onto the agenda of the participant states did not, and does not, exist.

These problems cannot be solved through a formal entry for substate actors into international organizations. That would not only be unacceptable for the state affected, but would most probably convey a wrong, or at least an over hasty signal, to a region or ethnic group which harbors secessionist ambitions. For the same reasons, it would be problematic to allow Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs – notably not International Non-Governmental Organizations – INGOs) to come forward as international actors, especially because, as experience shows, they frequently turn into the spokesperson of an intrastate conflict partner and hence lose their role as neutral negotiators. The development in which the NGOs in Nagorno-Karabakh case have gone through, is an example. After they had negotiated the mutual exchange of prisoners, they started adopting the official positions of the conflict parties and thus gave up their role as impartial brokers.

There are only a few cases where intrastate conflicts can be turned into an international matter and have influence exercised upon them. Only agencies of international organizations such as the OSCE which, within the framework of agreements on the *human dimension*, step forward as representatives of unanimously agreed upon principles and behavioral norms, and not of power interests, have a not yet exhausted potential to act. However, in order to use it, the OSCE must be equipped with the option of putting events of an intrastate nature on the international agenda. The following four points must be examined:

1. To what extent should the recommendations of participant states, continuously repeated since 1992, which seek to give the OSCE a legal quality, be limited to fixing the status quo? Should the effort of putting the OSCE as a whole on a legal basis not include, at all costs, a strengthening of, and a larger measure of freedom of action for, the General Secretary as well as of the *Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights?*
2. Should legal prerequisites not be created to not only entitle the participating states to establish liaison offices in Vienna, but give the OSCE a better chance to

establish itself to a greater extent in the participating states themselves? To what degree can the OSCE, in this respect, be endowed with a mandate similar to that of the EU? A representation in each participant state would not only serve as a permanent contact in all questions of the *human dimension*, it could also be regarded as a follow-up contact after the mandates of long-term missions have expired.

3. De facto the *High Commissioner on National Minorities* has in previous years already become involved in events within the area of the *human dimension* and in doing so, has stepped beyond the strict interpretation of his 1992 mandate. This practice can be thankfully traced to, above all, the sensitivity and prudence of the present incumbent in office. The question is whether the mandate of the *High Commissioners on National Minorities* should be extended expressly to the whole area of the *human dimension*.
4. Finally, one has to decide if, considering the interstate relevance of intrastate aspects of security, the time has come to set up a series of confidence building measures for the *human dimension* as introduced first in the military field in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

What is being asked for here is that states, or more precisely their international organizations, have strengthened political consequences from a continually deepening process, namely, an increase in the importance of intrastate developments for states themselves. This fact is no longer disputed. The international rules, however, adhere to a notion of sovereignty, which does not correspond to the security consequences of intrastate developments and hence poses the danger of becoming increasingly anachronistic.

The issue on the OSCE's agenda is to develop a common and comprehensive security space. That means far more than protection from one another, as was the case under the conditions of the East-West conflict, or as in the last century when the security order of the day was dominated by the acts of individual states. In the Lisbon Declaration of December 1996 on a 'Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century', it was once again explicitly stated that in the OSCE the issue is respect for values, responsibilities and norms. In this context, the OSCE plays a "key role." It does not stand at the top of an institutional hierarchy, but it comprises the rules of the game which are binding for all security-relevant institutions in Europe. Or, put another way, the OSCE is responsible for the process whereby the intrastate conditions in participant states permit and lead to a European security order. When speaking in favor of building a stronger community in the area of the *human dimension*, what is meant here is the decision to move together in a particular direction, which does not necessarily mean to mirror the integration of Western Europe.

The inner fabric of states and the degree to which they are susceptible to conflict cannot be calculated with the same statistic precision as economic facts. Furthermore, the objection has been taken into account that states are unwilling to allow international organizations to interfere in areas which have up to now been regarded as the sanctuaries of state sovereignty. Only gradual, not fundamental, differences exist between the prerogatives of the European Union and the degree to which it can make binding decisions and the right of an organization which is bound by an intrastate code of conduct. At the outset one is informed that there is a correlation between the mutual mistrust of states (the security dilemma) and the intensity with which they communicate with one another. Applied to the enormous significance of domestic roots of conflict for interstate stability, this means that the conflict potential within state borders must be more strongly integrated into interstate discussions.

VI. The OSCE at the Crest of the Avant-garde

No other international document drew such rapid and lasting attention to the societal dimensions of security as the "Charter of Paris for a new Europe" of November 1990. Given the wars waged in this decade in the former Yugoslavia and on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the declaration of the Paris CSCE meeting of the Heads of State sounds unrealistic and as if it comes from a dream world. The question remains as to how far the Charter can be disregarded as a faded signal of euphoric expectations of fundamental change, or whether it has to be read the same as before as an admonishing reminder of an unattained vision of a future security landscape.

Even before 1989, the CSCE/OSCE participant states had begun to breach the phalanx of intrastate affairs. Since then they have often made an effort to further curtail the non-interference principle in terms of its content and procedure. In the concluding document of the third follow-up meeting of the CSCE in January 1989 in Vienna, the term "Human Dimension" was introduced. It essentially encompassed the accepted obligations in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms, human contacts and "other issues of a related humanitarian character" that existed at the time.

But substantial progress on the question of the *human dimension* only came with the second of the three conferences agreed upon in Vienna. The Copenhagen Document of June 1990, after the fundamental change in east and central Europe had already started, outlined a previously unattained catalogue of human rights and constitutional obligations, as well as guarantees for the protection of national minorities. Moreover, it declared the "development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law [as] prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting

order of peace, security, justice and cooperation." The democratic order in the participant states has thus achieved the position of a factor for peace. This development found a hymnal climax in the Charter of Paris.

The third meeting on the *human dimension* in October 1991 in Moscow ended with the declaration stating "that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned." This declaration was lent additional significance through the agreement that "a particularly serious threat to the fulfillment of the provisions of the CSCE human dimension" can be made a matter for all with a quorum of ten participating states without the consent of the state in question. At the fourth council meeting in Rome in December 1993, the participating states tightened up the initial deadlines for the so-called Moscow mechanism. At their summit conference in Budapest, they agreed "to draw more widely on the possibilities offered by the Moscow Mechanism for examining or promoting the solution of questions relating to the human dimension on their territory." The Summit Declaration of Lisbon finally states that the comprehensive security notion of the OSCE "requires improvement in the implementation of all commitments in the human dimension."

Out of this continuing development of the human dimension, a clear-cut conclusion can be drawn that the participating states can no longer evade external protests when basic questions of human rights, of the process of democratization and the constitutional state are at stake on their territories. Through the cited agreements the non-intervention principle becomes more flexible for the OSCE region.

A further intrusion into the domain of states is bound up with the "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security" from the Budapest (1994) OSCE summit. Its 7th chapter contains regulations on democratic control of military forces, on the rights and duties of their members and principles to be taken into account in case a decision "to assign its armed forces to internal security missions..." is made. The Code contains no specific monitoring procedures corresponding to those in the field of the human dimension. However, paragraph 38 states, "Each participating State is responsible for the implementation of this Code." It continues: "If requested, a participating State will provide appropriate clarification regarding its implementation of the Code. Appropriate CSCE bodies, mechanism and procedures will be used to assess, review and improve if necessary the implementation of this Code."

Why do the political practitioners make use of the possibilities agreed upon only with the greatest restraint, if at all? This question is justified first of all vis-à-vis the assertion, which has practically become routine, that states want to engage "regularly" in the future in the problems related to the *human dimension*. This applies to the council meeting in Rome as well as to the Budapest Summit Declaration.

Nevertheless, at the second OSCE implementation meeting the expectation was once again expressed "to fully integrate the human dimension into the OSCE process."[1] That this is not so, reasoned Arie Bloed, was due to "the priority for security matters in the Vienna circuit."[2] The author who, on the basis of his support function for the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), is especially familiar with the OSCE, raises the question as to why the human dimension of the Moscow mechanism has only been applied in a few cases up until now. The answer he gives is revealing: As long as the human dimension has a firm place in official statements,[3] but the transition from principle to practice is not made, the call for a greater consideration of the human dimension will continue.

The human dimension, so sings the critical tenor of many other voices, does not yet have the status it deserves in the security conceptions of states. The Budapest Summit Declaration's statement (which has not been repeated with the same clarity in Lisbon) that "Human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and democratic institutions ... [are] the foundations of peace and security, and ... [represent] a crucial contribution to conflict prevention,"[4] is not yet implemented with the vigor which would correspond to a comprehensive security concept. What are the obstacles and difficulties in reaching this goal?

VII. The Monopoly of State Actors

The degree of independence of the OSCE is – as with all international organizations – conditioned by the interests of its members. The OSCE also faces the fundamental difficulty that the virtually complete monopoly of governments on one side, and the prerequisites of preventive policies on the other, are quite understandably, not always in harmony. That is particularly significant under the premise that the point of time at which the first preventive step is taken can be decisive for the success or failure of the policy, but this point does not by any means coincide with a state's interest to act.

As already mentioned, only two OSCE organs have, to some extent, the freedom to maneuver independently of national governments at their disposal. There is, first of all, the High Commissioner on National Minorities. His mandate allows him to provide for early warning, without being explicitly authorized by the participating states in each individual case. It is his duty to react "to tensions involving national

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1 "The Second OSCE Implementation Meeting, Subsidiary Working Body 2," in *ODIHR Bulletin*, 4 (1996) 1, p. 49.

2 Arie Bloed, "The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Past, Present and Prospects," in *ODIHR Bulletin*, 3 (1995) 3, p. 20.

3 "The Human Dimension," in *Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era*, CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, 21 December 1994, pp. 21f.

4 Ibid., para. 2.

minority issues" when, in his opinion, they develop in a way that affects the "peace, stability or relations *between* participating States." The HCNM acts in these cases "on CSCE principles and commitments." That means on the basis of norms which make him independent from the consent of governments, at least as far as his first steps are concerned. The right of initiative of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, on the other hand, does not go so far. It is more or less limited to the right to make proposals for the carrying out of obligations in the area of the human dimension.

The "bodies, mechanisms and procedures" which are referred to in the Code of Conduct to assure its implementation, are dependent on – with the exception of the HCNM and the ODIHR – governmental decisions which have to be considered anew in each single case. That is also the case for the Moscow Mechanism of 1991. It, however, provides in its strongest version, that in case of a "particularly serious threat to the fulfillment of the provisions of the CSCE human dimension," a group of at least nine participating states, excluding the state in question, can decide to dispatch a rapporteur mission. Thus, in extreme cases the required quota was explicitly lowered without an exact description of what identifies such cases. Needless to say, the option of making intrastate developments a multilateral matter at the very moment they infringe on commitments in the framework of the human dimension has not yet been taken advantage of.

There are a series of reasons which are repeatedly given for this. The willingness of states to allow internal developments to be assessed against international standards never was and never will be large. The opening of one's own borders for rapporteur missions, or missions of other types, is also felt to be a loss of prestige even when such an option was specifically agreed upon.

It is not only the states to which the inquiries are directed which attempt to prevent prying eyes from getting behind their borders. Third parties also recoil from taking up such initiatives. Why set a procedure in motion which could just as well be directed against oneself or which appears to be politically inopportune? The instruments of the OSCE, and those of other international organizations, are furnished with a blocking mechanism due to their close links to, and their dependence on, state interests. It functions without any restrictions as long as the OSCE's ability to demand and to bring forward state action, forgetting the few exceptions, remains exclusively the prerogative of government initiative.

This assessment is not undisputed. In particular, it must be compared with the argument that agreed upon mechanisms – not only in the area of the human dimension – do not, or seldom, reach implementation because they are practically substituted by permanently present organs of the OSCE. To be named within this context is, above all, the *Permanent Council*, whose weekly meetings offer adequate

opportunity, not only to deal with problems in the area of human dimension but also to call for the implementation of the *Code of Conduct*. Institutions of the OSCE, it is therefore argued, take over tasks which were primarily attributed to the agreed mechanisms.

The connection between the institutional development of the OSCE and the receding importance of the ad hoc mechanisms and procedural modalities for the illumination of intrastate events is undisputed. The chance to deal with events in the area of the human dimension through the *Permanent Council* has the question of when to make them a subject for debate veiled from the public eye. Whether their importance will be adequately addressed by the council remains unclear. The handling, provided that it really takes place, of internal events in one of the participating states behind closed doors in weekly meetings has, without a doubt, opened up areas for diplomatic activity. Comparable room for maneuver on the basis of the Moscow mechanism is not available as long as it requires unanimity, or at least, a certain quorum of participating states. Not all states declare themselves unwilling to cooperate in a multilateral move into the area of potential intrastate conflict. This is confirmed by the nine OSCE long-term missions that were carrying out their work in different participating states at the end of 1996. But the positive examples also confirm that questions relating to the human dimension – and that manage to make it onto the agenda of participating states – must go through the needle-eye of governments' interests. Thus, they remain subject to the limitations of interstate diplomacy.

VIII. Norms against Interests: No End to Pragmatic Politics

The OSCE does not have, either as a unit or in its individual organs, the ability to impose sanctions. The annulment of Yugoslavia's participation in the OSCE was, until now, the hardest measure which had been imposed against a state. With this measure the arsenal of the OSCE is exhausted. What can be expected from the provision of OSCE organs with a governmentally-independent right to take initiatives when these organs still remain dependent on state support? Or, which interest could and should states have, in such a situation, to commit themselves to decisions taken by autonomously acting international organizations?

Even if no fundamental contradiction exists between norms and less strict principles (as for example those of the human dimension) and the interests of states, they are not always the same. This explains the tension between the lofty aims of the agreed norms and principles and the requirements of every-day political life. To put it simply: the world designed at conference tables does not correspond to reality. We

are not short of examples of this. But what follows from this undoubtedly accurate assessment?

The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, of principles of a constitutional state and a pluralistic democratic order and the compliance with agreements which a state is party to, are intrinsically linked to the socio-economic conditions of a society and are an expression of the so frequently mentioned political culture of a state. The aims which are explicitly or implicitly bound up with the commitments states adhere to, in many cases, can only be realized as the result of a long process. These aims are formulated following a time scale measured by a clock that runs slower than the one upon which states should base their decision to act, if indeed they decide to act.

There are constraints behind which longer term goals are not always identifiable or, moreover, completely lost sight of. It seems that the need to react on an ad hoc basis is increasing rather than decreasing in an interdependent world. The considerations presented here rest on the premise that supposedly short-term or pressing tactical interests on the one hand, and long-term conceptions of a political order on the other, are not two different levels. They are, instead, the two opposite poles of a finally coherent political strategy. The difference between both poles is, however, that the respective advocates they mobilize are not equally strong.

In front of this backdrop greater autonomy for international organizations or their organs, especially the OSCE, is argued for. The OSCE has to be regarded as representing a conceptual vision of a political order, which the participating states have agreed upon, even though it is not always perceivable that they stick to it in their daily political business. An organization bound to norms, regardless of whether it is on a legally (European Council) or a politically-binding (OSCE) basis, does not remove the tension between interests and norms. It also does not generate a fundamental contradiction between them. It may be considered an institutional attempt to continually influence the often ad hoc short-term oriented interests of states and to put them under the pressure of a long term goal.

4. Conflict Prevention in Multi-Ethnic Societies: The Impact of Democracy Building

Renée de Nevers

Events in recent years have shown both that democratization can provide an opportunity to resolve previous imbalances in ethnic relations, and that the process can unleash explosions of ethnic violence that may prove fatal to the democratization process itself.[1] In the case of South Africa, the end of minority rule and the establishment of an inclusive political system brought an end to apartheid and provided an opportunity to develop peaceful relations among the country's ethnic groups, on an equal footing. In the Soviet Union, in contrast, Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to liberalize the authoritarian Soviet regime unleashed both nationalism and ethnic conflicts, which contributed to Gorbachev's downfall as well as to the eventual collapse of the USSR.

The spread of democracy, or attempts to install democratic governments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s has created an opportunity to study the efficacy of democracy as a means to assuage existing conflicts within societies. At the same time, the East European and former Soviet states face particular obstacles in their effort to reform their systems.[2] They face the pressure of conducting a simultaneous economic transformation from a socialist, centrally planned economy to a market-based economy, for which no previous experience existed when the socialist system collapsed.[3] Added to this many, if not most, states

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1 The author would like to thank Karen Ballentine, Brian Taylor, and the editors of this volume for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

2 Indeed, substantial debate has arisen over the question of whether the transitions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are comparable with those in Latin America and Southern Europe, where much of the comparative work on democratic transitions has focused. On this debate, see Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?," in *Slavic Review*, 53 (Spring 1994) 1, pp. 173-185; Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?," in *Slavic Review*, 54 (Spring 1995) 1, pp. 111-127. ("Consolidologists" refers to those who focus on the consolidation of democracy).

3 Few analysts had considered this problem prior to 1989, since the prospect of such a sudden move toward market economies seemed remote. Among the many useful books that appeared on this topic in the early 1990s are Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); George W. Breslauer, ed., *Dilemmas of Transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1991); Janos Matyas Kovacs and Marton Tardos, eds., *Reform and Transformation in Eastern Europe: Soviet-type Economics on the Threshold of Change* (London/New York: Routledge, 1992); Maurice Ernst, Michael Alexeev and Paul Marer, *Transforming the Core: Restructuring Industrial Enterprises in Russia and Central Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

in this region perceive themselves to be victims of the Soviet system.[4] Finally, the ethnic, territorial, and environmental legacy of the Soviet Union has proven particularly troublesome, especially in the former Soviet republics.[5]

This chapter examines the cases of the three Baltic republics and Georgia. It assesses internal conditions in each state when the Soviet Union collapsed, and efforts that have been undertaken since then to establish independent democratic structures. Additionally, it looks at efforts to mediate the different ethnic disputes these states confront, to determine how well these have been resolved.

I argue here that while democratic institutions have the capacity to restrain potential sources of conflict within states, the successful establishment of democracy is dependent on other environmental factors which allow or prevent the introduction of democratic institutions. Thus, there is a fundamental chicken-and-egg problem in trying to attribute conflict prevention to "democratization," or particular democratic institutions. If these institutions can only be introduced in stable environments (i.e., those with low levels of tension or experiencing a respite from an ongoing conflict), then we cannot attribute conflict mitigation to democratic institutions. Rather, this would suggest that both conflict resolution and the initiation of democracy are made possible by other, pre-existing conditions, notably conditions leading to a comparatively stable social and political climate.

Moreover, the ability of democratic institutions to mitigate conflict is not automatic; to diminish the potential for conflict, democratic structures must be designed and implemented to address the features of a particular state and society. No single "model" of democracy exists that can resolve the problems of every state. Avoiding conflict requires particular attention to the ethnic circumstances of a state. If different ethnic groups exist then care has to be taken to ensure that the future interests of both the minority and majority groups will be accommodated in the new government. Thus, it is necessary to examine the environmental factors in a given state to determine whether conditions are ripe both for the relaxation of conflict, if it exists, and for the introduction of democratic institutions.

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4 This includes Russia; indeed, some Russians argue that Russia suffered the most under the Soviet system. This is not an absurd claim, given the impact of collectivization and the Stalinist purges, but it is one that many other groups may not accept.

5 This is not to suggest that a negative legacy is unique to this region. Authoritarian regimes leave difficult legacies in most democratizing states, and many new regimes face disturbing choices between establishing accountability for the past, while at the same time ensuring that former authoritarian leaders do not reassert control to protect themselves from prosecution or imprisonment. For some of the problems facing states after authoritarianism see Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, 3 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975), pp. 175-412.

The former Soviet and East European cases also underscore the important role that international and geopolitical factors can play in encouraging or impeding the circumstances necessary to allow the introduction of democratic institutions. The international factors most critical to the relative success or failure of democratization efforts are the degree of external interest in, and incentives given to a democratizing state. These can have a dramatic effect on both leaders' inclinations toward moderate or extreme positions when initiating change in government, and on shaping the economic prospects open to a democratizing state. The circumstances of the former Soviet republics vary with regard to external interest, in ways which have dramatically affected the success or failure of democratization efforts. Notably, the West's focus on the Baltic republics had a positive impact on both democratization and the avoidance of conflict, while Western inattention to Georgia may have contributed to the distortion of early democratizing efforts there. While this factor may have particular saliency in this region, due to the history of East-West tension and competition for influence along the East-West divide, other studies suggest that international, and particularly Western interest plays an important role in helping sustain the introduction of democracy, or allowing it to falter.[6]

In this paper I will first examine some environmental factors that make the successful introduction of democratic institutions more or less likely. I then briefly lay out both the "core" institutions central to democracy, and some specific institutions that may be necessary in ethnically divided societies. I will then examine the cases of Georgia and the Baltic States in the former Soviet Union, to determine whether the climate in each state favored conflict prevention and the introduction of democratic institutions, and what structures have been introduced in these states. While ethnic minorities are present in both the Baltic republics and the newly independent Caucasus states, ethnic tensions have been quite different, with important consequences for each republic's efforts at state-building. Finally, a comparison of these cases may help clarify how and why both democracy and ethnic tensions have been handled so differently, with such different outcomes, in these regions.

I. The Effect of Environmental Factors on the Introduction of Democratic Institutions

The successful establishment of democratic institutions in a democratizing state depends on an assortment of environmental factors. Only if internal circumstances in a state are conducive to the acceptance of change will reforms have an opportunity to establish themselves.

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6 See, for example, Thomas Carothers, "Democracy without Illusions," in *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (January/February 1997) 1, pp. 85-99.

Four environmental factors influence whether conditions will favor democracy and conflict prevention: the ethnic composition of the state; the degree of ethnic conflict at the time of democratization; the degree of moderation or extremism of the opposition leadership's views; and the degree of external interest in, or interference in, a particular state. Added to these, the timing with which ethnic issues are handled in the process of democratization can be critical to the prevention or exacerbation of tensions.[7]

1. Ethnic Composition and Territorial Location

Understanding the ethnic makeup of the state is critical, because the relative size of ethnic groups may affect whether democratization minimizes or exacerbates tensions. It is generally agreed that if ethnic groups are roughly equal in size and power, then the danger of one group automatically being excluded from power would be low. Relative parity means that ethnic groups should be less likely to see democratization as an opportunity to exploit the use of ethnic extremism out of fear for their groups' interests; similarly, they are less likely to feel threatened by the possibility of such exploitation by other groups in the state. This creates the possibility, however, that elections can become merely censuses supporting the larger group, rather than political competitions, and if ethnic divisions are already tense then rough parity could exacerbate tensions, since large sections of the population would by default oppose the majority.[8] Similarly, if ethnic groups are of greatly uneven sizes, this could raise the prospect of political domination by the majority group, which would heighten fears by the minority that its interests will be overlooked.

The geographical mix of ethnic groups within a state is also important. If ethnic populations are mixed throughout the state, then their political efforts are likely to focus on ensuring individual, group, or human rights within the framework provided by the state. Alternatively, if different ethnic groups reside in separate parts of a state, there is a greater likelihood that one ethnic group may opt for independence or secession.[9] Democratic solutions must take into account whether ethnic groups are

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7 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it highlights some factors with particular impact on the political climate in a state. This section draws upon previous research by the author. See Renée de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict," in *Survival*, 35 (Summer 1993) 2, pp. 31-48.

8 See Donald Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 116.

9 Yet secession is not *only* possible in states with ethnically distinct territories, as the example of Bosnia showed; competing claims to land led to the "ethnic cleansing" of mixed groups from territories over which one group wanted to sustain its control. For an analysis of Serbia and ethnic conflict in Bosnia, see V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," in *International Security*, 19 (Winter 1994/95) 3, pp. 130-166.

mixed together throughout the state, or distributed more homogeneously in different parts of the country, to determine what structures are appropriate.[10] The ongoing struggle in Canada to find an acceptable solution to Quebec's insistence on greater protections for French-speakers, and recently renewed calls for the province's secession from Canada, illustrate the difficulty of assuaging all groups' concerns even in societies with relatively low levels of ethnic tension.[11]

2. The Degree of Ethnic Tension

Second, the degree of ethnic conflict at the time of democratization will effect the role that ethnicity plays in the democratization process. Indeed, this could determine how much attention ethnic concerns receive during negotiations on a new political arrangement. There are three possibilities in this respect. First, ethnic tensions might be absent. Either due to earlier repression or a limited history of ethnic tensions, there might be little indication that ethnic groups in a given state were potentially conflictual.[12] In this case, different ethnic groups could exist in the state, without having a noticeable impact on the political situation. Second, tension between ethnic groups could be moderate. The previous regime might have contained existing ethnic tensions so that these played no role in the authoritarian demise, but cleavages within society were clearly visible.[13] Third, ethnic conflict might be high, to the point of influencing the previous regime's downfall. This could result either from direct ethnic

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10 The example of Switzerland suggests that preventing ethnic tensions is possible, as was also seen in Lebanon's constitutional agreement from 1943 to 1975. The Lebanese case, however, illustrates the difficulties of reaching solutions among closely balanced ethnic groups by relying on fixed quotas. See David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," in *Survival*, 35 (Spring 1993) 1, pp. 72-73. This also supports Arend Lijphart's conclusion that proportionality must be fluid rather than fixed in a given constitution, which cannot take into account future birth rates. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in *World Politics*, 21 (January 1969) 2, pp. 205-223.

11 Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," pp. 70-72. On Quebec's debate over secession and its future, see David T. Jones, "An Independent Quebec: Looking into the Abyss," in *The Washington Quarterly*, 20 (Spring 1997) 2, pp. 21-40.

12 For example, there was little evidence suggesting that the Tamils and Sinhalese could not live together peacefully in Sri Lanka prior to decolonization. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*.

13 This may have been the case in Romania, where the regime's repressive powers did much to intimidate the population, but little to mask the existence of continued distrust between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. During the revolution Romanians and ethnic Hungarians worked together in opposition to Ceausescu's rule; however, ethnic conflicts quickly resurfaced in the post-revolutionary period. For an analysis of the transition in Romania, see Nestor Ratesh, *Romania: The Entangled Revolution* (New York, Westport and London: Praeger for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991).

pressure on the regime for change, or simply because the regime was unable to solve problems in the society and state at large which were the result of ethnic strife.[14]

Strong historical grievances can also play a critical role in the degree of ethnic tension. Past ethnic domination or the presence of strong ethnic stereotypes will undoubtedly make bargaining among different groups in a state more difficult. It is also important to know whether the previous government took deliberate steps to affect the ethnic distribution within the state. An authoritarian regime might have adopted expulsion or extermination policies in order to create a homogeneous population; alternatively, it might forcibly have moved different ethnic groups from one part of the state to another in order to dilute strongly homogenous regions. If the previous regime manipulated the ethnic mix in some regions, one would expect that ethnic tensions could easily reemerge. This could cause resentment against the previously dominant ethnic group, or demands for repatriation or resettlement. Given the new round of upheaval such adjustments would invariably create, this could greatly complicate the process of reaching an equitable distribution of power among national and regional groups.

3. Leadership Attitudes (Moderation or Extremism)

Equally critical is the nature of the leadership of the main opposition groups.[15] Moderate leadership is critical for the mitigation of ethnic problems during democracy building. Moderation has two definitions in this context. In democratization processes, moderation implies support for negotiated settlements to change the power balance, rather than resort to violence.[16] In ethnic disputes, moderation means avoidance of extremism and hostility in developing positions vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. Democratization has the greatest chance of avoiding ethnic conflicts if both of these definitions apply to the leaders of the major opposition groups. Notably, if one group – or one leader – sees an advantage in continuing a conflict, it will

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14 South Africa would appear to be a case in which direct ethnic pressure has pushed the regime toward democratization, while one could argue that the Soviet Union's demise was due in part to its inability to allay increasing ethnic conflicts and obstructionism throughout the empire. On the demise of the USSR, see Victor Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies," in *Daedalus*, 121 (Spring 1992) 2, pp. 97-122. For an assessment of developments in South Africa, see Vincent T. Maphai, "A Season for Power-Sharing," in *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (January 1996) 1, pp. 67-81.

15 I refer here to the "opposition," meaning those groups previously opposed to an authoritarian regime in a state, which would be most likely to come to power if democratization were initiated. Obviously these groups are no longer opposition once they gain power, but the policies they espouse during the struggle to change the system of government could have an important effect on ethnic tensions within a state, and consequently on the likelihood that democratic institutions would have an opportunity to take root.

16 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 121-124.

continue. So long as some leaders think continued obstruction or fighting will favor their ends, they will be unwilling to consider a negotiated settlement. This prevented solutions to the civil war in Sudan for years.[17]

The ethnic composition of the opposition to the previous regime will also affect ethnic relations during the transition, and the positions of opposition leaders. If the main ethnic groups in the state were united in opposition to the previous regime, either in a single opposition movement or a coalition, democratization has a better chance of avoiding or mitigating ethnic tensions. If the opposition leadership included members of different ethnic groups, this would provide a cooperative foundation both for building a new system of government, and to ensure that members of different ethnic groups would participate in the negotiating process over a new political structure.[18]

If opposition to the authoritarian regime was dominated by a single ethnic group, or fragmented along ethnic lines, moderate ethnic attitudes are less likely to prevail during the struggle for democracy, and the process of negotiating a new political structure would be more difficult. If only one ethnic group is involved in establishing a new political structure for a multi-ethnic state, the odds that the end result will satisfy all the affected groups in the state are small. Negotiations dominated by one ethnic group will be less likely to address issues of minority rights and acceptable representation in creating a new constitution. If the ethnic balance is severely skewed in favor of a dominant ethnic group this might be inevitable, but a strong majority position does not mean that ethnic conflicts can be avoided in the long run. Rather, this may drive other groups to more extreme forms of protest against majority domination.

4. External Interest or Neglect

In addition to these ethnic factors, both external interest and interference can influence the political climate in a state that is moving toward democracy. This is

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17 Horowitz, "Ethnic Conflict Management for Policymakers," pp. 117-119. On the role of extremist leaders, see Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 1-31.

18 Czechoslovakia provides an example of the harmonizing effect such unity can have; the two prominent heroes of the Velvet Revolution in 1989 were Vaclav Havel, a Czech, and Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak, while the main opposition to the communist regime was a coalition between Civic Forum in the Czech lands and the Public Against Violence in Slovakia. The irony in this case is that no agreement could be reached on an ethnic balance in the formation of the new governmental structure, but this is due primarily to the obstinacy of some key figures and the exploitation of extremist ethnic positions in Slovakia. On the demise of Czechoslovakia see Jiri Pehe, "Czechoslovak Parliament Votes to Dissolve Federation," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 1 (4 December 1992) 48, pp. 1-5; Paul Wilson, "Czechoslovakia: The Pain of Divorce," in *The New York Review of Books*, 39 (19 December 1992) 21, pp. 69-75.

because a state's desire for external aid, and for integration into the international economy, can be a powerful lever on the policies a new government will adopt. Arguably, if it believes that substantial Western support for economic reforms and democratization is likely, then a new regime is more likely to avoid internal policies which might damage its standing with important external lenders. This has obviously changed over time; during the cold war, Western support was more likely to go to anti-Communist regimes regardless of their internal policies.[19] This concern about external opinion could lead a regime to make provisions for ethnic groups which are perceived to be in line with international or Western standards, so as to avoid international censure.

Alternatively, in states which do not perceive that significant international aid or attention is likely to be forthcoming, or which reject involvement in the international economy, the regime may prove less likely to adopt policies that coincide with international norms on issues like minority rights. This is not to suggest that "Western" or "international" standards are the only way to ensure fair policies toward different groups within a state; certainly moderate leaders can adopt even-handed policies toward minority groups for purely internal reasons. Rather, this is meant to suggest that external interest can, in some cases, encourage the adoption of moderate policies; it can also be a useful counterbalance against potential interference by neighboring states in the domestic politics of a newly democratizing state.[20]

5. When Ethnic Issues are Addressed: Timing

Finally, democratization is most likely to succeed in mitigating or preventing ethnic tensions if ethnic questions are addressed early in the transition process. If ethnic issues are simply ignored or overlooked in the early stages of constitution-building, democratization may exacerbate rather than mitigate ethnic tensions. The evidence from cases such as Sri Lanka and Nigeria, in which constitutional safeguards for minority rights were not included at independence, reinforces the importance of addressing ethnic issues early, so as to avoid creating opportunities for different political parties to exploit extremist ethnic views later on. The lack of such provisions

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19 On the conventional wisdom about the utility of foreign aid and its ineffectiveness during the Cold War, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1987), esp. chapters 1 and 7.

20 One prominent example of the positive role that external influences can play is from the Cold War; the Helsinki Process, by legitimizing human rights as an area of internal and external concern, helped weaken the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the USSR. See John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1985); Vojtech Mastny, *The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991: Analysis and Documentation* (New York: New York University Press, 1992).

during the democratization process in Sri Lanka had devastating consequences by inadvertently encouraging the use of ethnic extremism in electoral competition. Even in cases with no apparent ethnic problems, it is important to build safeguards against exacerbation of ethnic tensions into the system. Thus, if potential ethnic grievances can be anticipated in advance and avoided during the writing of a new constitution, even before there is an obvious need for such efforts, the danger of ethnic conflicts may be lessened.[21]

II. Democratic Institutions and Conflict Prevention

The relationship between democracy and conflict prevention is not a given, for several reasons. First, there are different definitions of democracy, and not all of them would result in a state structure which of necessity would meet the concerns of minority groups in the state. The most basic denotation of democracy holds that a government is democratic when it is accountable to the people through regular elections, with participation on the basis of universal adult suffrage.[22] Such a structure is sufficient to mitigate conflict in a relatively homogenous society, but in a heterogeneous society, such a system will not secure minority interests, since they will always lose in elections.[23] As a refinement of this denotation, Adam Przeworski has argued that democratic institutions will survive only if the organized political forces in the state consider it to be in their interests to work *within* the democratic framework.[24] This implies that democratic institutions must guarantee that minority rights will continue to be recognized, because if they do not sustain provisions against too much power for the majority, then significant forces in the state would lose faith in their ability to contest political issues within the democratic political system. Thus, it is in the majority group's interest to ensure that the democratic structure protects the rights of minorities as well the majority.

Second, the "core" institutions of democracy of themselves do not guarantee that ethnic or minority rights will be preserved. Opinions vary on which institutions are central to democracy.[25] It seems safe to argue, though, that free elections, a multi-

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21 For more on this see de Nevers, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict."

22 On the essential characteristics of democracy, see Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1971).

23 I am grateful to Karen Ballentine for pointing out this distinction.

24 Adam Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 40-41.

25 Indeed, there is no clear agreement on which democratic institutions are essential to the establishment of a democratic system. One definition suggests that the "core institutions of a democratic political society" are political parties, legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and interparty alliances. The courts, central banks, the armed forces and regulatory agencies are not considered central democratic institutions, though they clearly affect citizens' lives. From another perspective, only two institutions are central to the establishment of

party system, and the rule of law constitute the core institutions of democracy, in the sense that they allow us to distinguish between "democracies" and other, authoritarian forms of government.[26]

Third, some combination of institutions beyond the core components of democracy may be necessary to ensure the rights of all groups in ethnically mixed societies. Only if these rights are both guaranteed and provided are "democratic institutions" likely to mitigate conflict. Some of the institutions which may preserve minority rights are electoral rules and proportional representation, federalism and citizenship and franchise rights.

III. Core Institutions

1. Elections

Elections have become the standard barometer by which to judge whether a state is "democratic" or not. Elections provide citizens with an opportunity to make their preferences both known and taken into account in government practices. They play a critical role by regularizing the process of leadership change. This is necessary to ensure that the government remains accountable to the populace, one of the core requirements of democracy.[27] Regularized elections are necessary to ensure that majority groups do not establish a de facto dictatorship over minorities or opposition groups.

Of course, elections must be viewed widely to be free and fair in order to play their assigned role in supporting a democratic system. Similarly, founding elections play a key role in states moving toward democracy, because they represent the first

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democracy: legislatures and political parties. These are seen as the political institutions that symbolize a commitment to democracy in most countries, and therefore they are sufficient. Other scholars have focused on the importance of establishing the core concept of a "rule of law" based state, rather than particular institutions per se. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," in *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (April 1996) 2, p. 17; Michael Mezey, "Institutions and Processes for Debate, Consensus, and Conflict Management," in *The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop*, National Research Council (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), p. 43; John Norton Moore, "The Rule of Law," in *The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop*, pp. 41-42.

26 There is general agreement in the theoretical literature on what constitutes an authoritarian government. Simply put, political systems in which "significant procedural proscriptions on political contestation or inclusiveness" exist can be defined as authoritarian. A regime would be considered authoritarian if the choice of the state's government is not determined by a competitive process, either because there are no means for elections or these are substantially restricted in their scope. See Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," p. 255; H Gordon Skilling, "Group Conflict and Political Change," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 215-234.

27 See Dahl, *Polarchy: Participation and Opposition*, pp. 1-16.

opportunity reliably to determine the opinions of the electorate, and they tend to attract greater popular participation than subsequent elections.

2. Political Parties

There is broad consensus that the party system commonly associated with democracies is strongly related to the persistence and stability of democratic systems, by allowing for the representation of diverse interests. A multi-party system provides a way to recruit new elites into the political process, and parties can coordinate the political education of society, and legitimize political decisions.[28] They also play an important role by providing a loyal opposition, in the sense of opposing particular government policies without challenging the system of government itself. This helps ensure both that the government must continually justify its choices, and that alternatives to government policies will be generated within the democratic framework.

Political parties can help mitigate ethnic tensions if they are broadly based and appeal to more than one ethnic group. Yet a fundamental problem in divided societies moving toward democracy has been the challenge of establishing broadly based parties, rather than narrow, ethnically based parties. Clearly, when parties are narrowly based or highly ideological, they can reinforce internal divisions rather than diluting them, and this can make both nation-building and democracy building more difficult.[29]

3. The Rule of Law

Two factors are central to the rule of law: the existence of laws and political guarantees, generally through a constitution and related documents; and enforcement mechanisms in the form of an independent judiciary. By introducing norms to govern behavior in the state, constitutions seek to make certain political, and potentially social and economic, rights inviolable over time, which is central to democracy. Constitutions make these guarantees credible for the long run, by establishing guidelines not only for current, but also for future generations of leaders and citizens.[30] This is an important safeguard to ensure that minority or opposition groups believe that their rights are protected. As part of this, constitutions provide basic guarantees of the protection of human rights, another core element of democracy.[31]

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28 Mezey, "Institutions and Processes for Debate, Consensus, and Conflict Management," p. 43. For a definitive discussion of the role of political parties, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1968), esp. chapter 7.

29 Mezey, "Institutions and Processes for Debate, Consensus, and Conflict Management," p. 44.

30 Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy*, pp. 50-51.

31 Moore, "The Rule of Law," p. 42.

Constitutions also codify a variety of features of the state which are critical to the reduction or exacerbation of societal tensions, such as the legislative structure, and the structure of the state itself. A strong judiciary is necessary to enforce the constitution, and to ensure that provisions are maintained to sustain the separation of powers, respect for human rights, and preserving limited government and federalism.[32] This must exist in practice as well as on paper.

IV. Specific Democratic Features

1. Electoral Rules

Meaningful elections cannot be held until a variety of decisions have been made, including which parties may participate in elections; the formula for distribution of seats within constituencies, as well as the shape and number of constituencies within the state; and the structure of the governmental system for which seats are being contested.[33] Electoral rules determine both voter eligibility, as well as the eligibility of candidates to run in elections. The way these issues are handled is critical to the perceived fairness of elections in any democracy. Under current international norms, elections cannot be perceived as free and fair unless a majority of a state's adult population is able to vote. In democratizing states discrimination against people on the basis of membership of a particular group is likely to exacerbate tension. Similarly, the basis on which the eligibility of individual candidates or parties to contest elections is determined will affect both the perceived fairness of the electoral process, and also the views of different groups in society about whether their rights are being respected or violated.

Electoral rules also determine whether political representation will be proportional, or winner takes all. Candidates can be chosen by party lists, with the distribution in legislative bodies made proportional to the number of votes a political party receives nation-wide, over a minimum percentage necessary for representation. Alternatively, candidates may gain seats in a first-past-the-post manner based on voting in each district. The choice represents a tradeoff between establishing workable majorities, or ensuring accurate representation of society in the parliament. Minimum percentages for representation may improve the functioning of the parliament, since this limits the fragmentation of legislative bodies. But depending on how high electoral hurdles are raised, this may also be perceived as a way to exclude

32 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

33 O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, pp. 59-61.

minority groups from participation. This may cause greater friction in states where divisions are ethnic, rather than ideological.[34]

The geographical mix of ethnic groups within a state will also influence the appropriateness of different electoral choices during a transition. If ethnic populations are mixed throughout the state, avoiding ethnic tensions while ensuring minority acceptance of electoral results may require the development of an electoral structure that encourages intra-ethnic voting. At a minimum, electoral solutions must take into account whether ethnic groups are mixed together throughout the state, or distributed more homogeneously in different parts of the country, to determine what types of voting districts are appropriate.

2. Federalism or Confederalism

The choice of a federal or confederal system can also diminish the potential for conflict, depending on how different groups are distributed throughout a state. Those who favor federalism argue that it can be a "celebration of diversity through unity," a means of reflecting the interests of many small groups within a larger construction.[35] Federal systems generally add an additional legislative level, which allows for representation based on the state or province as well as by population.[36] If more or less homogenous groups live in different regions of the state, then a federal structure may offer a means to ensure minority representation in the central government. Yet the success of federalism depends on whether ethno-regional units can help establish dual identity in the state, or if instead they reinforce existing ethnic or tribal divisions. This can also create different problems, if the majority group believes that minorities are accorded greater representation than they may, by their numbers, deserve. This is one of the contradictions that ethnically diverse states must resolve. Finally, if ethnic groups are not homogeneously distributed in a state but instead are intermingled in heterogeneous communities, then federal or confederal structures may be less likely to secure minority representation.

3. Citizenship/Franchise Rights

Citizenship issues are equally important to resolving ethnic issues, because of their impact on franchise rights. Regularized processes for achieving citizenship are critical to sustaining long-term support for the democratic process among different groups. Excluding groups from participation in the political process on the basis of

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34 Graham Smith, ed., *Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge* (London/New York: Longman, 1995), chapter 1.

35 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

36 Unitary systems can approximate this through quotas or proportional representation mechanisms.

ethnicity is likely to ensure that these groups will not assume that the state will protect their rights, and therefore this is likely to exacerbate conflicts between groups, since excluded groups may turn to means outside the political structure to achieve their aims.

4. Summary

The factors elaborated here are not the only institutions which will affect the shape of a democratizing government. Moreover, considered in isolation, these elements can tell us little about the comprehensive framework of a new government. The state's electoral system, the structure it chooses, and the party system, for example, are interrelated; a federal state may tend to develop regional, ethnically based parties, which could lead to a variegated party structure in the national parliament, with multiple party representation. This need not automatically mean ethnic division, since a multi-party structure requires coalition-building in order for any party to gain sufficient strength to govern. This might promote moderation by different ethnic parties. The opposite is possible as well if a society is seriously divided; the point here is that no system by its structure guarantees either the mitigation or the exacerbation of ethnic tensions. Political leadership is critical in this respect; moderate leaders are more likely to be able to reach compromises that will make tolerable outcomes possible. Avoiding ethnic conflict is easier when group leaders perceive their interests to lie in cooperation, and the perception that extremism is unnecessary or may be politically harmful is an important one to cultivate. Extremists in any group, either minority or majority, can obstruct the search for moderate resolution. Finally, if new political leaders of any group are not democratically inclined, it will be difficult to ensure regular political turnover in the state, which is fundamental to the sustenance of democracy.[37]

V. Democratic Institutions in Practice

Georgia, the Baltic republics and other states of the former Soviet Union have faced particular problems in attempting to establish democracy, because of the nature of the previous Soviet system. First, the unitary party system of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) led to widespread distrust of political parties. This has complicated efforts to establish new political parties which are effective in supporting democratic institutions throughout the former Soviet Union. Independent political parties were not legalized in the Soviet Union until January 1990, and few have

37 Huntington, for example, sets a "two turnover" rule for determining when a democracy can be considered consolidated, in Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 266-267.

managed since then to establish the kind of party discipline commonly associated with stable democratic systems.

Second, the conventional wisdom holds that the internal borders of the USSR republics and autonomous regions, some of which are now international frontiers, were set arbitrarily and often designed to break up cohesive ethnic or national groups. Some recent studies have suggested, however, that the early Soviet leadership in fact took care to establish internal borders with ethnic considerations in mind, and encouraged the establishment of nationally-based regional and autonomous government structures.[38] One consequence of this, however, was that nationalism was the only alternate source of group identification (besides communism) which was tolerated in the USSR; and once communism disintegrated, only nationalism was left as an ideology.[39] This has complicated efforts to establish modern political parties across ethnic lines in ethnically mixed communities and republics.[40] For those Russians now outside the Russian Federation, they must also confront the switch to being the minority group in a country they previously ruled.[41]

Third, populations were moved throughout the Soviet Union both for punitive reasons and to provide a labor force for new industries. The residue of changed ethnic compositions has created tension in many places since the fifteen Soviet republics gained independence in 1991. Yet attempts to overcome the legacy of the Soviet past could lead to the adoption of short-term policies to address some of these issue that will have negative consequences in the long run; the choices made now may create worse problems later.[42]

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38 See on this point Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," in *Slavic Review*, 53 (Summer 1994) 2, pp. 414-452; Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies," pp. 97-122.

39 Zaslavsky, ibid., p. 107.

40 It has also left ethnic Russians in particularly perplexing circumstances. Since Great Russian nationalism came to be associated with the CPSU, Russians face the added hurdle of trying to establish a Russian identity separate from that of the former Soviet regime. On the issue of Russian identity, see Gail W. Lapidus and Renée de Nevers, in *Nationalism, Ethnic Identity and Conflict Management in Russia Today* (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1995).

41 On the question of the Russian diaspora outside what is now Russia, see Igor Zevelev, "Russia and the Russian Diasporas," in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 12 (July-September 1996) 3, pp. 265-284.

42 A discussion of the causes for the Soviet Union's collapse is beyond the scope of this paper. Certainly, ethnic tensions alone did not destroy the empire; however, by 1991 they were clearly a factor in the inability of the central government to hold the country together. For some analyses of the collapse of the USSR, Jack F. Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire* (New York: Random House, 1995); John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael Waller, *The End of the Communist Power Monopoly* (Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); Michael E. Urban, ed., *Ideology and System Change in the USSR and East Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Nancy Bermeo, ed., *Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

1. Georgia

The situation in Georgia in the late 1980s presented several obstacles to the establishment of stable democratic institutions. Notably, environmental factors in the state did not favor the introduction of democratic institutions or conflict prevention when Georgia gained its independence in 1991. In terms of composition, ethnic Georgians are a clear majority in the state, making up 70% of the population. Moreover, no single minority group within Georgia comprises over 10% of the population; less than 3% are ethnic Ossetians, and less than 2% Abkhazians. The largest minority group is Armenian, with 8% of the population, and about 6% are ethnic Russians. These different minority groups live in distinct parts of the state. The central part of the state is predominantly Georgian. In both the north and south of the state, Georgians are mixed with different ethnic groups; Abkhazians, Cherkessians, and Ossets inhabit the north of the state, from west to east, while Adzhars, Armenians and Azeris live in the south.[43] (For an outline of environmental factors in Georgia and elsewhere, see table 1, p. 116.)

While strong nationalist sentiment existed in Georgia throughout the Soviet period, the degree of ethnic conflict in the republic was moderate when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and initiated Perestroika.[44] Yet by the time it became independent in 1991, ethnic tensions within Georgia were quite high. Ethnic Georgian nationalism rose significantly between 1985-91. Georgian intellectuals had been concerned about the Russification of their republic from the 1970s on, so it is not surprising that when independent political groups emerged under glasnost, in 1987, they took on nationalist characteristics. Yet nationalist sentiment was aimed more against the minorities within Georgia than it was against the central Soviet government, though all political parties in the state supported independence from the USSR when the first round of competitive elections were held in 1990.[45] As a result,

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43 Henry R. Huttenbach lays out the different ethnic groups in these three bands, which helps clarify the distribution of groups within the state. Huttenbach, "Chaos in Post-Soviet Caucasia, Crossroads of Empires: In Search of a US Foreign Policy," in John W. Blaney, ed., *The Successor States to the USSR* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1995), pp. 223-239.

44 Demonstrations occurred in Georgia in 1924 to restore Georgian independence, and in 1956 and 1978 in support of Georgian nationalism. Notably, these were demonstrations against Soviet/Russian control. See Stephen Jones and Robert Parson, "Georgia and the Georgians," in Graham Smith, ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, Second Edition (London/New York: Longman, 1996), p. 297.

45 Georgia's communist party leaders did not favor the democratization advocated by Moscow during the early years of Perestroika, in spite of the fact that Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev's foreign minister and ally, was a Georgian. Instead, Shevardnadze's successor as Georgian party boss spent the first few years of Perestroika removing officials appointed by Shevardnadze from political office, and replacing them with his own appointees. Nonetheless, by 1990 the Georgian Communist Party advocated independence from Moscow, in an effort to garner nationalist support. See Shireen T. Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict*

both Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalist political groups had emerged by 1989, motivated by concern about Georgian efforts to "Georgianize" the republic. For example, in 1988 some Georgian leaders called for a new language law declaring Georgian the only official language in the republic, despite the inability of many in the minority ethnic groups to function in Georgian.[46]

Both because of the early emergence of ethnicity as a political factor and exacerbating it, leaders who rose to prominence in opposition to the ruling communist party in Georgia endorsed extreme nationalist positions. This was particularly true of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who became the country's first non-communist leader in 1990. The leaders of the Abkhaz and Ossetian minority groups also adopted strongly nationalist positions. There did not appear to be room in the political debate within any ethnic group for moderate leaders – except, perhaps, in the Armenian, Azeri, and Russian minorities, which were largely unaffected by the conflicts between the Georgians and the two smaller minorities. This is odd, since each of these three latter groups had potential ethnic allies in a state bordering on Georgia, and would appear to present at least an equal if not a greater threat to Georgia's territorial integrity.[47]

External interest in Georgia at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse was low. This was due to Georgia's comparatively isolated geographic location in the Caucasus, which led many Western observers to conclude that Georgia was likely to remain in a de facto Russian sphere of influence, since the West was unlikely to find sufficient funds to support its efforts to democratize.[48] There was also concern about encroaching in Russia's "back yard" during a difficult transition period. This inattention and Russia's own interest in preserving its military presence in the Caucasus led to minimal Western support for early democratization attempts in Georgia.

Finally, there was a clear failure to address ethnic tension early in the transition process, at least in ways that might have avoided inflaming tensions. The opposite occurred; as soon as independent political groups emerged in Georgia, ethnic issues were exploited to garner ethnic political support against both other ethnic groups and other factions within a particular ethnic group, as well as to gain independence from the central Soviet state.

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), pp. 114-115. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia," in *Daedalus*, 121 (Spring 1992) 2, p. 134.

46 Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition*, p. 123.

47 While no problems appeared to exist with regard to the Russian minority, there were strains with the ethnic Azeris. See Jones and Parsons, "Georgia and the Georgians," p. 300.

48 Hunter also points out that Western effort to aid in Georgia's economic development suffered because of Western opposition to accepting Iranian involvement in any energy deals which might be worked out in the Transcaucasus. Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition*, p. 137.

Table 1 – Indigenous Environmental Factors

Country	Ethnic Composition	Degree of Tension	Leadership of Opposition	External Interest	Timing
Georgia	70% Georgian, many minorities in distinct regions	high	strongly nationalist	minimal	exacerbated situation early
Estonia	61.5% Estonian, 30.5% Russian, Russians in distinct regions	moderate: low violence, resentment of Russians	nationalist	high	citizenship issue prolonged
Latvia	52.5% Latvian, 34% Russian, populations mixed in state	moderate: low violence, resentment of Russians	nationalist	high	citizenship issue prolonged
Lithuania	80% Lithuanian 8.9% Russian, mixed in state	moderate: strains toward ethnic poles	nationalist/ communist mix	high	ethnic question resolved early

With this background, it is not evident that democratic institutions had any chance to mitigate problems in Georgia when it became independent.[49] The collapse of communism was not seen as an opportunity to mitigate the danger of ethnic conflict, but just the reverse. This is not entirely surprising. New political groups had little chance to attempt to negotiate new political structures in a stable political environment, which might have provided an opportunity to address ethnic issues in more moderate ways. Moreover, few alternatives to the extreme nationalist figures emerged, which limited the likelihood that moderate policies toward ethnic minorities could have been adopted, either before or after the Soviet Union's collapse. Finally, in some cases ethnic conflicts had erupted into violence well before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

These handicaps notwithstanding, Georgia attempted to introduce some democratic institutions in the early 1990s. Opposition parties and the Communist Party contested the October 1990 elections, and Gamsakhurdia's Round Table party won a majority in the new 250 seat parliament. He was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in November 1990, thereby becoming head of the state. Following this, a referendum on Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union was held in March 1991. 90% of the electorate voted for independence, which was declared on 9 April 1991.[50] Presidential elections were held in May 1991, and Gamsakhurdia won 86% of the vote.[51] Thus, by mid 1991, several elections had been held in Georgia, a variety of political parties existed, and a new legislative structure appeared to be in place, consisting of a presidential-parliamentary system. (See table 2, p. 118, for an outline of democratic institutions in the republics under discussion here.)

However, these fledgling democratic institutions collapsed almost immediately. Notably, intra-ethnic tensions among Georgian factions proved especially destructive to these early democratic institutions. Gamsakhurdia himself became increasingly erratic and dictatorial during 1991, and by the fall of that year he had imprisoned some rival politicians, arbitrarily dismissed several government officers, and dissolved the parliament that had been elected the previous year. Coincident with these actions, several armed groups emerged in the state that were virtually private armies and were associated with rival Georgian political parties, opposing Gamsakhurdia's rule. These groups both exacerbated conflicts with the Osset and

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49 Nowhere in the Caucasus do efforts appear to have been taken to address ethnic concerns by means other than force either before or after the Soviet Union collapsed; this was particularly true in Georgia.

50 This was the second anniversary of the Soviet attempt to quell a demonstration in Tbilisi with force; notably, the demonstration itself was catalyzed as a protest against Abkhaz separatism. See Jones and Parsons, "Georgia and the Georgians," p. 301.

51 Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition*, pp. 116-120.

Table 2 – Democratic Institutions

Country	First Election	Subsequent Elections	Political Parties	Rule of Law	Electoral Rules/ Citizenship	Federal or Unitary Structure
Georgia	10/90 parliament	5/91 president 10/92 parliament 11/95 president/ parliament	6 parties 5 electoral blocs in 3/90 elections	constitution established 8/95, but Status of Abkhazia and Ossetia unresolved	10/90 elections excluded regional parties, Soviet military	unresolved
Estonia	3/90 supreme council	9/92 parliament/ president 10/93 municipal 3/95 parliament 9/96 president	16 parties in 3/90 elections 9 blocs or coalitions in 9/92	constitution ratified 6/92	citizenship based on 1940 citizenship; resident vote in municipal elections only	unitary parliament
Latvia	3/90 supreme council	6/93 parliament 5/94 municipal	3 blocs in 3/90 elections 23 parties in 6/93 elections	constitution ratified 7/93	citizenship based on 1940 citizenship; resident vote in municipal elections only	unitary parliament
Lithuania	2/90 supreme council	10-11/92 parliament 2/93 president	2 main groups in 3/90 elections and in 10/92 elections	constitution ratified 10/92	"zero option" adopted citizenship to all inhabitants of Latvian Soviet Republic	unitary parliament

Abkhaz minorities, and impelled a virtual civil war within Georgia by the end of 1992. Gamsakhurdia was forced to flee from Tbilisi in January 1992, and a military council composed of the leaders of several armed factions took power in his place.[52]

By 1994, political institutions in Georgia had almost entirely dissolved; democratic structures had vanished.[53] This is partly due to intra-Georgian conflicts; but Georgia had also found itself fighting against secessionist movements in both Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1992, and factional fighting continued throughout the state. These conflicts dominated Georgian politics until 1994. A cease-fire was reached in Ossetia in June 1992 with Russian help, and a tripartite peacekeeping force, composed of Russians, Georgians and South-Ossetians, was installed there to maintain peace. Yet in August 1992 war broke out over Abkhazia's effort to secede from Georgia. In September 1993 Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze demanded special powers from the parliament in order to deal with the state's catastrophe, thereby concentrating even greater power to himself in an effort to win the war.[54] Yet only after he capitulated to Russian demands, first by joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and later agreeing to allow Russia to retain military bases in Georgia, did the Russian government finally help Georgia end most of the fighting in Abkhazia, in April 1994.[55]

Conditions improved somewhat in 1995. The parliament adopted a new constitution in August 1995, which provided for a unicameral legislature, an executive branch reporting to the president, and an independent judiciary. New elections were held in November 1995 for both parliament and president, and Shevardnadze was elected president. The constitution provides a basis for the rule of law, and offers protections for human rights, but respect for these provisions has developed only slowly. Shevardnadze has been struggling to gain military control

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52 Ibid., pp. 120-128; Jones and Parsons, "Georgia and the Georgians," pp. 304-305.

53 The military council that took over in 1992 asked Shevardnadze to return from Moscow and take power in Georgia, which he did in March 1992. New parliamentary elections were held in October 1992 to replace the parliamentary body that Gamsakhurdia had dissolved, but these were elections not perceived to be entirely fair. Shevardnadze himself ran for Chairman of the parliament – unopposed. See Jones and Parsons, "Georgia and the Georgians," p. 305.

54 Ibid., p. 306.

55 The fighting continued sporadically until mid-1994. It appears that the Russian military supported the Abkhaz separatists at least in part out of a desire to humiliate Shevardnadze, whom they blamed for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the central Russian government was willing to allow this to continue so as to gain the political leverage it wanted over Georgia. This was a common pattern in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union; Russia appeared unwilling to allow conflicts in the former Soviet republics to be completely resolved, since continued stalemate gave Russia, the only military force of note in the region, continued leverage over the fragile governments in these states. On this point, see Renée de Nevers, *Russia's Strategic Renovation: Russian Security Strategies and Foreign Policy in the Post-Imperial Era* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1994) pp. 44-57.

over the country, and to rid it of the different armed factions, with some success. Human rights protections remain sporadic, however, with assassinations, disappearances, and torture continuing.[56]

Democratic institutions do not appear to have helped prevent or mitigate conflict in Georgia. This is mainly because they were either not introduced, or the institutions that emerged took forms that exacerbated tensions, rather than providing opportunities for their reduction. Political parties, for example, have provided the foundation for factional conflicts among Georgians, and have aggravated conflicts among ethnic groups. The electoral law under which the October 1990 elections were contested excluded parties that were not active throughout Georgian territory, which guaranteed that ethnic and regionally-based parties would be denied representation. This has further exacerbated these tensions and promoted secessionist tendencies by the minorities.[57] Political leadership, a critical factor in democratization, was either negative or ineffectual in Georgia. Gamsakhurdia manipulated nationalism for his own ends, and proved to be dictatorial, not democratic. Shevardnadze was unable to resolve the state's crises, and further hindered the establishment of a democratic system by trying to centralize power in the presidency. Two parliamentary and presidential elections have been held in Georgia since independence in 1991. Yet the fairness of these elections varied greatly, and in the period between these elections the country fell into chaos. Moreover, democratic institutions cannot be fully established in Georgia until the state resolves the status of the two regions which continue to insist on, at a minimum, greater autonomy: Ossetia and Abkhazia. The state's political structure remains unresolved, and the different parties to the conflict may not yet be ready to discuss new political arrangements – especially between Abkhazia and Georgia.[58]

2. The Baltic Republics

The ethnic composition in the three Baltic States varies, in ways with important consequences for their policy choices. In Lithuania, the population is 80% ethnic Lithuanian, with 8.9% ethnic Russians. Latvia and Estonia have larger Russian minorities. Ethnic Latvians make up 52.5% of Latvia's population, with 34% Russians, while ethnic Estonians comprise 61.5% of the population in Estonia, with

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56 *Georgia Human Rights Practices*, 1995, US Department of State, March 1996, pp. 3-13.

57 Soviet military personnel posted in Georgia were also denied voting rights. Jones and Parson, "Georgia and the Georgians," p. 302.

58 In contrast, there have been recent indications that Ossetia and the Georgian government may be moving closer to discussing solutions to the ongoing stalemate over Ossetia's status. Georgian and Ossetian leaders visited each others' capitals in early January 1997, the first such exchanges in five years. See *OMRI Daily Digest*, 16 January 1997 and 21 January 1997.

30.5% Russians. In all three states, the remainder of the population is a mix of Belarussians, Ukrainians, and smaller groups from neighboring states.[59] In Latvia, the Russian and Latvian populations are mixed throughout the country, while in Estonia, the Russian population is concentrated in the capital, Tallinn, and in the north-eastern part of the state.[60]

Ethnic tension appeared to be at a moderate level in all three Baltic republics when Gorbachev came to power in 1985. The indigenous groups in the Baltic States dislike the Russians, and rejected their incorporation into the USSR. But while this hostility existed and continues, by and large it has not resulted in ethnic violence.[61] The Soviet government was by 1990 openly viewed in the Baltic region as an occupying government, of either Russian or communist derivation. Nonetheless, the degree of ethnic tension in the Baltic republics remained moderate at the time of their independence, or "restoration." There was resentment of the Russian minority among the "titular" population, but this had not provoked ethnic violence or even substantial friction. The protests that broke out prior to the Soviet Union's collapse were directed against Moscow, and not against the Russian population closer to home.

External interest in the Baltics at the time of their independence was comparatively high. This reflected both their location on the Western edge of the Soviet Union, strong and active émigré communities lobbying for Western attention, and the fact that most Western powers had not acknowledged their incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 as legitimate.[62] As a result, the Baltic States enjoyed relatively high levels of Western aid and trade, and substantial Western attention both to domestic policies within these states, and their relations with Russia.

Estonia

While ethnic tension was moderate at the time of independence, Estonia's new political leaders shared a common goal of restoring the pre-1940 republic, and restricting citizenship to those who had lived in the interwar republic and their descendants. This made the leadership's position more radical than it would otherwise have appeared. Nonetheless, the combination of mainly moderate environmental factors and a high degree of Western interest suggests that the climate in Estonia

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59 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 403.

60 Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 184.

61 On the attitude of the Baltic inhabitants, see Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, pp. 185-186.

62 The Baltic republics also strove, prior to their independence, to promote their location between East and West as useful bridge for trade. See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *Baltic Independence and Russian Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 14-28.

overall favored both the introduction of democratic institutions, and to a lesser degree, the possibility of conflict mitigation. Yet the potential exclusion of ethnic Russians did not bode well for peaceful relations with Russia, Estonia's new neighbor, or with the indigenous Russian population. Moreover, since ethnic Russians are largely grouped in one region of Estonia near the Russian border, the potential for a secessionist movement could not be ruled out entirely.

Having declared its sovereignty in 1988, Estonia declared independence on August 21, 1991, in the aftermath of the coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR. A variety of political parties had emerged well before this. The Estonian Communist Party had splintered by 1990, consolidating into two new parties, one favoring cooperation with the CPSU, and an independent Estonian Communist Party (ECP). A "Popular Front" organization was established in Estonia in 1988, led by reform-minded Communists.[63] But a separate Estonian National Independence Party was also created in mid-1988, and it established the Congress of Estonia, in February 1990, in which participation was based on citizenship in the 1940 republic. Estonia's independence movement was strongly influenced by the Congress of Estonia and the Estonian National Independence Party, though the Estonian Supreme Council remained the official governing body until new elections in 1992. Elections to the Supreme Council were held in 1990, and were dominated by the Popular Front. The dissident Estonian community maintained its separation from the reform-minded communists, and did not compete for seats in the 1990 elections.[64]

In the fall of 1991 the Supreme Council and the Congress of Estonia, by then the two rival political structures in the state, convened a Constitutional Assembly to draw up a new constitution. Participation in the Constitutional Assembly was based on parity between these two bodies. The Assembly rejected the call by the head of the Popular Front for a system with a strong executive, and instead adopted a parliamentary model of democracy. A referendum on the new constitution, based on the 1938 constitution, was held in June 1992. This established a unicameral legislature, the prime minister as the head of government, and a president as the chief of state. New parliamentary elections were held in September 1992 and Mart Laar, head of the National Coalition Party, "Pro Patria," became prime minister.[65] Nine

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63 "Popular Fronts" were established in each Baltic State in 1988, led by reform-minded communists. These groups led early resistance to CPSU control, though in many cases they were founded by communists or former communists. These movements incorporated members of both the indigenous and Russian populations.

64 Tomu Parming highlights this distinction between the different independence movements. He stresses that this played an important role in the economic development of each state after independence. See Parming, "The Baltic Countries: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," in Blaney, *The Successor States to the USSR*, pp. 240-262.

65 The Popular Front had become the dominant group in the Estonian Supreme Soviet in 1990, and its founder, Egdar Savisaar, had become prime minister. His government fell in the fall of 1991,

blocs, or coalitions, contested these elections, and gained the minimum support necessary to be represented in the parliament.[66]

The core democratic institutions of elections, political parties, and the rule of law appear to be well-established in Estonia. Moreover, the democratic structure has survived more than one election with turnovers in leadership, so that democracy would appear to be moving smoothly toward stability.[67]

Yet in terms of both democratization and conflict prevention, the citizenship question remains problematic. In February 1992 Estonia's citizenship law of 1938 was "renewed," allowing citizens from the 1940 state and their descendants automatic Estonian citizenship.[68] Those who arrived after the "occupation" by the Soviet Union began would be eligible for citizenship after two years of residency, retroactive to 1990, and proof of basic comprehension of the Estonian language. The citizenship law also provided for resident alien status and naturalization, for which most of the ethnic Russians in the state would be eligible by March 1993. This ignored the question of voting rights, however. Naturalized residents were allowed to vote in municipal elections, but not in federal elections.[69] One consequence has been that ethnic Russians have concentrated their political efforts in local elections in those regions where they are the majority group.

Latvia

Like Estonia, Latvia had a fairly moderate degree of ethnic tension at the time of independence; and it shared Estonia's concerns about restoring pre-war citizenship in the new state. Latvia's first step toward independence was the adoption of a "Declaration of Sovereignty" by the Latvian Supreme Council in July 1989, asserting the supremacy of Latvian laws over those of the USSR. As in the other Baltic

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and was replaced by an interim government led by Tiit Vahi. Parming, "The Baltic Countries: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," pp. 245-248.

66 Very few of these referred to themselves as "parties"; one of the few to do so was the Estonian National Independence Party. Other groups contesting the elections included the Fatherland's list, the Secure Home bloc, the Center party, and smaller electoral coalitions. Riina Kionka and Raivo Vetik, "Estonia and the Estonians," in Smith, ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, p. 141.

67 Estonia had four prime ministers between 1991 and 1994, when Laar's government lost a vote of no confidence and new elections were held. Parming, "The Baltic Countries: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," p. 259.

68 Estonian leaders justify their citizenship laws by arguing that as restored states, citizenship is based on the pre-1940 constitutions, and also that Russian migration was illegal under international law. Estonians point to the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits an occupying power from moving population masses into territories it has seized. See *The Citizenship and Alien Laws Controversies in Estonia and Latvia*, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 1994, p. 12.

69 *US Department of State Background Notes: Estonia*, Internet Version (Washington, DC: US Department of State), p. 3, http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/eurbgnhp.html.

republics, a Popular Front was created in 1988. Latvia followed Estonia's example and established the Council of Latvia in 1990, though in contrast to Estonia, members of the Congress of Latvia worked with the Latvian Popular Front, which became an umbrella group, rather than insisting on remaining completely independent. Similarly, the Latvian National Independence Party became affiliated with the Popular Front, and participated in the Latvian Supreme Council after new elections in 1990. Popular Front candidates won two-thirds of the seats in the new Supreme Council elected in March 1990.[70] In March 1991 a referendum on independence was held and passed, and on August 21, 1991, the Latvian government declared de facto independence.

A political movement made up mostly of Russian speakers was established in Latvia in late 1988, with the stated aim of supporting Perestroika.[71] The International Front, or Interfront, reflected the impression among the ethnic Russian community in Latvia that the Latvian Popular Front did not address their concerns. Yet many of its members were associated with the KGB and other Soviet ministries which backed central control, and it clearly favored continuation of the federal Soviet state. Nonetheless by 1990 support for the Interfront was weakening, in favor of support for an independent Latvian state.[72]

Having relied on three interim documents to serve as the basis for its laws after independence in 1991, a new Latvian constitution was ratified in July 1993.[73] This established a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral legislature, a government headed by the prime minister, and a ceremonial presidency. In elections held in June 1993, a center-right coalition took power. The Popular Front, which had led the country since 1990, did not pass the minimum hurdle of electoral support necessary to gain representation in the new parliament.[74] Municipal elections were held throughout the country in May 1994; conservative and right-wing parties won the majority of seats in these elections, while the governing party fared poorly.

This suggests that the democratic system is fairly stable; a variety of political parties both contested two series of elections, and have accepted the results, and a

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70 For a detailed description of the Baltic efforts to regain independence, and of Soviet efforts to prevent this, see Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, pp. 214-255.

71 A similar movement was established in Estonia in 1988. See Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, pp. 190-191.

72 Smith, "Latvia and the Latvians," pp. 161-162; see also Clemens, *Baltic Independence and Russian Empire*, pp. 170-171.

73 The Latvian government declared in 1992 that three documents would serve as the basis for its laws until a new constitution is ratified: the 1922 constitution of the earlier republic; the 1990 declaration of renewal of independence; and the "Basic Law for the Period of Transition" passed in 1991. See *US Department of State Background Notes: Latvia*, Internet Version (Washington, DC: US Department of State, August 1994), p. 2.

74 Of the twenty-three parties which ran, only eight made it into the parliament.

constitution has been established as the basis for the rule of law. Yet as in Estonia, citizenship remains a source of tension in Latvia. In March 1991 the Supreme Council passed a law guaranteeing "equal rights to nationalities and ethnic groups," which promised equal rights to "work and wages." While also prohibiting discrimination based on nationality, this did not resolve the issue of citizenship or voting rights. Moreover, initial suggestions for citizenship requirements included a sixteen year residency requirement, and proposed setting quotas for naturalization of non-citizens. A naturalization law passed in July 1994 would enable resident non-citizens to apply for citizenship within ten years, something the ethnic Russian population considered unacceptable.[75] The issue of citizenship for ethnic Russians remains unresolved.

Lithuania

Environmental factors in Lithuania suggested a climate favorable both to democratic institutions and conflict mitigation. Ethnic tensions were moderate at independence, and in contrast to Estonia and Latvia, the Lithuanian leadership was not concerned about citizenship questions, because of the unquestioned primacy of ethnic Lithuanians in the state. Thus, in Lithuania, ethnicity and citizenship were a non-issue; the state adopted the "zero-option," granting citizenship to anyone who was a permanent resident when the citizenship law took effect.[76]

The Lithuanian Popular Front, Sajudis, emerged in mid-1988. A separate "Lithuanian" entity was not established to balance the Popular Front; instead, the Popular Front was the focus of the independence movement, because there was no major divergence in the political community that the reform movement wanted to represent, as there was in Estonia and Latvia. Sajudis pressured the Lithuanian Supreme Council into passing constitutional amendments giving Lithuanian laws primacy over Soviet legislation, legalizing a multi-party system, and annulling the 1940 proclamation that made Lithuania part of the USSR.[77] Sajudis received significant support from members of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP), which itself split in December 1989. This split was influenced in part by Sajudis's success in winning the majority of seats for the new USSR Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989. One of the new parties formed at that point was the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), headed by Algirdas Brazauskas, a reform-minded communist who had been head of the LCP in 1988. More conservative elements of

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75 *US Department of State Background Notes: Latvia*, p. 14; Jeff Chinn and Lise A. Truex, "The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics," in *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (January 1997) 1, p. 137.

76 *The Citizenship and Alien Law Controversies in Estonia and Latvia*, pp. 7-11.

77 *US Department of State Background Note: Lithuania*, Internet Version (Washington, DC: US Department of State, August 1994), p. 11.

the LCP formed the LCP-CPSU, which continued to favor strong ties to the USSR; notably, this attracted both ethnic Russian and ethnic Polish support.[78]

In March 1990 new elections were held and Sajudis-backed candidates won the majority of seats in the Lithuanian Supreme Council. Vitautas Landsbergis, Sajudis' head, was elected its chairman. He promptly proclaimed the restoration of Lithuanian independence (on March 11, 1990), and appointed a new prime minister. Having thus been the first Soviet republic to declare its independence, Lithuania was subjected to strong pressure from Moscow to revoke this declaration (which it did); and in January 1991 the Soviet leaders attempted to overthrow Lithuania's government.[79] Moscow's attempt failed, and in February 1991 a referendum on independence was held, and 90% of those who voted supported Lithuanian independence. Landsbergis continued to lead the government until new elections were held in October 1992, though his effort to institute a presidency by referendum failed in May 1992. A new constitution was approved simultaneous with new elections, and the LDLP, led by Brazauskas, won a parliamentary majority in October 1992. As had also happened in Latvia, the Popular Front Sajudis lost, with only 19% of the vote.

The Lithuanian constitution provides for a strong presidency; and in February 1993 Brazauskas won election as president. Several elections have been held since independence which appear to be free and fair. And in contrast to its Baltic neighbors, Lithuania has no citizenship controversy; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it granted all previous residents the automatic right to citizenship.[80] Interestingly, Lithuania's early relations with its Polish minority were more strained than those with the ethnic Russian community. Shortly after gaining independence in 1991, the Supreme Council attempted to suppress local governments in two regions of the state, both of which had opposed Lithuanian independence, and which had large Polish populations. While relations have improved, this continues to be a delicate issue, as seen by criticism of President Brazauskas for being both too "soft" and too "harsh" on the Polish community.[81]

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78 Alfred Erich Senn, "Lithuania and the Lithuanians," in Smith, *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*, p. 177.

79 Lithuania's leaders were disappointed that the other two Baltic States did not join them in asserting their independence in March 1990. Latvia made a declaration restoring its sovereignty in May 1990, and Estonia did not declare its independence until August 1991, after the coup in the Soviet Union. See Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, pp. 241-244.

80 This was the norm throughout the former Soviet Union; only Latvia, Estonia rejected this. Chin and Truex, "The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics," p. 135.

81 See Senn, "Lithuania and the Lithuanians," pp. 178-181.

3. A Comparison of the Cases

How did the situation differ in the Baltics and Georgia, and what are the implications of these differences? How well have democratic institutions functioned in preventing conflicts? The Baltic republics and Georgia share a history of independence, and new political leaders in each state argued that they were "restoring" sovereignty, rather than advocating a new independence. Moreover, ethnic minorities existed in all four republics, though the minorities differed in relative size from state to state. The minority groups in Georgia were also more distinct from each other than were the ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians who comprised the Baltic minorities. Finally, the majority ethnic groups in each state were led by nationalist leaders.

The differences between these states are more marked. First, while the ethnic Russians in the Baltics were more likely to support the preservation of the Soviet Union, and some members of this community clearly feared the consequences of independence, no significant effort physically to secede from the Baltics, and to remain part of the USSR or the Russian Federation, emerged in the Baltic republics. While opposition to the previous Soviet regime was dominated by the titular nationalities in these republics, there was not a clear break along ethnic lines either for or against independence. Pro-independence Russian intellectuals worked with the "popular front" movements which sprang up in each republic, and there was some support for Baltic independence among the local Russian populations. While hard-line elements in each state tried to manipulate the ethnic Russian population to support continued Soviet rule, with some success, it should be noted that support for the Soviet Union was found among both the ethnic Russian and the indigenous population, rather than breaking along ethnic lines.[82]

In Georgia, in contrast, both the Ossetian and Abkhaz minorities tried to get out of the Georgian republic. Their goal was to become part of the Russian Federation, out of recognition that they probably could not survive as independent states. While undoubtedly provoked by the actions of ethnic Georgians, their moves to secede clearly aggravated tensions within the state, and catalyzed violence when the Georgians tried to prevent them.

The different historical background of the two regions helps explain the different reactions of these minorities. A substantial part of the ethnic Russian population in Latvia and Estonia migrated to the region during the period of Soviet rule, both in search of jobs, and as a result of Soviet policies aimed at diluting the ethnic majority. In contrast, the Abkhaz have inhabited the territory they live in for several hundred years. Indeed, the Ossets are considered by the Georgians to be comparative

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82 Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, chapter 7; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 408.

newcomers to South Ossetia; they have only lived in the region for 200 years.[83] Georgia's territorial borders have also changed over the last 100 years in ways which affected its minority groups; both Abkhaz and Osset territory shifted between first Russia and Georgia, and then between the Russian Soviet Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (GSSR).[84] Moreover, the Abkhaz population is no longer a majority on the territory of what was the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic within Georgia; an influx of ethnic Georgians over the last fifty years made Georgians the majority of the population by a substantial margin.[85]

The borders of the Baltic republics changed as well after their incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940. This did not, however, have a significant impact on the ethnic mix in these states. Rather, the ethnic balance in the Baltic republics, primarily Latvia and Estonia, shifted as a result of Soviet population and industrialization policies following World War II.[86]

Clearly, ethnic minorities in these states had both different goals and different threat perceptions, which were fed by the actions of the majorities. Yet the majority populations used institutional means initially to try to address the ethnic questions they faced. Notably, in both the Baltics and the Caucasus, ethnic questions were initially addressed in legal fora rather than with force, but they have tended to exacerbate tensions, rather than resolving them. This is equally true in Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia; Latvia's and Estonia's citizenship laws have provoked fears of statelessness among the ethnic Russian minorities, while Georgia's attempt to abolish the autonomy of the Ossetian and Abkhazian regions within its borders provoked secessionist conflicts. Both policies reflect the larger problem that nationalist leaders are often willing to rely on hostility toward minorities to retain their base of popular support in the dominant ethnic group. It is likely, of course, that moderate policies would probably have ensured the defeat of those leaders advocating them in each of these states; nonetheless, this factor should be recognized as a serious obstacle to the development of more ethnically impartial political systems.

A second significant difference between the Baltic republics and Georgia is the level of *intra-ethnic* violence. In the Baltics, competition between the leaders of

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83 In contrast, at least until recently Georgians accepted that the Abkhaz have a long history on the territory they occupy. On both of these points, see Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition*, pp. 123-124.

84 Abkhazia, in fact, was a Union republic and a separate signatory to the formation of the USSR. It became part of Georgia again in 1938. Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition*, p. 125.

85 The refugee flow that occurred during the conflict in 1992-1994 changed this, as at least 200,000 ethnic Georgians fled Abkhazia.

86 One should note as well that significant numbers of people were deported from the Baltic republics both in 1940-1941 and in 1949, during the drive to collectivize farming in the region. See Kionka and Vetik, "Estonia and the Estonians," p. 133, and Smith, "Latvia and the Latvians," p. 151, both in Smith, *The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States*.

various ethnic groups existed, but this remained confined within the emerging democratic structure. In Georgia, conversely, disputes within the Georgian community dissolved into violence by late 1991. Moreover, Georgian political leaders competed to be more nationalistic than each other, which exacerbated already simmering tensions with the Abkhaz and Osset minorities. This points back to an important factor in the establishment of democratic institutions; they cannot work unless all major groups accept that political differences can only be worked out *within* the democratic framework.

Third, both external *interest* and *interference* differed in critical ways in the Baltics and Georgia. There was a significant difference in Western interest and attention to the Baltics as opposed to Georgia, which had two effects. The desire to be part of the West, and to join Western institutions had a moderating influence on Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian behavior; this worked against intensifying ethnic tensions. Both the Latvian and Estonian governments were willing, because of their desire to be part of the West, to try to resolve their citizenship issues in ways which were nominally compatible with Western norms.[87] At the same time, Western interest moderated Russian behavior toward the Baltics. Russia too wants to preserve good ties with the West, and since the West is clearly concerned about Russian behavior in the Baltics, Russia's government has been careful not to encroach too far. Though Russia adopted an increasingly belligerent attitude toward Estonia and Latvia in 1993-94, it did not follow up on threats to suspend the withdrawal of its troops from the region.

Neither of these moderating effects applied to Georgia. The evident lack of strong Western interest in Georgia and the Caucasus after the USSR's collapse meant that Russia could, it felt, get away with meddling in the Caucasus states to achieve its own goals in this region. Russia has as a result proved willing to exploit the situation in Georgia for its own benefit.[88] This is partly out of a desire to preserve its own position in the Caucasus, which Russia perceives as critical to its strategic defense. Yet Russia has other motives for exploiting the conflicts in Georgia; significantly, the Russian military hates Georgia's current president, Eduard Shevardnadze, who is blamed for the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it wanted to maintain Russia's military bases in Georgia. Western leaders realized by 1994 that if they did not want

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87 As noted earlier, this has been somewhat problematic; while the Council of Europe has acknowledged that at least Estonia's citizenship laws fall within what is considered acceptable in Europe, this does not mean that they necessarily are appropriate to the situation. Meeting the minimum acceptable standards, in terms of those West European states with the most restrictive citizenship laws, will not necessarily resolve the problems created by stateless ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia.

88 In contrast, Russia actually supported Baltic independence in 1991 when Yeltsin, as president of the Russian Federation within the USSR, was maneuvering to gain more power in his struggle with Gorbachev over control of the entire state.

Russia to reassert its control throughout the former Soviet Union, then the West would have to take greater interest in the region. This has helped to some degree, but Russia has been loath to accept substantial outside involvement, especially since increased Western attention to the former Soviet republics coincided with heightened Russian suspicions about Western intentions.[89]

Fourth, the leadership of minority groups in these states differed. There were notable divisions within the ethnic Russian communities in the Baltic republics; some supported the preservation of the Soviet Union, but others supported independence, and desired Baltic citizenship. Thus, in spite of its own sense of dislocation, the ethnic minority has not been unified in opposition to the new political power in these republics.[90] Conversely, in the Abkhaz and Osset communities there is a much stronger consensus that these groups are threatened by Georgian policies.

The differences between Georgia and the Baltics also highlight the importance of economic prospects during transitions. All ethnic groups in the Baltics agreed that the Baltic republics will be economically better off independent from the rest of the Soviet Union. Even among ethnic Russians, there is still a strong sense that their future is better there than it would be within the Russian Federation.[91] In Georgia, economic prospects were not central to the drive for independence. Georgia was more obviously tied to the Soviet economic system, and had fewer alternatives given its location and isolation from the West; and Georgia's economy virtually collapsed after it gained independence because of internal conflict. Part of the drive to join Russia among Ossets and Abkhaz may have been influenced by fears for their economic future within Georgia.[92]

VI. Conclusions

The differences between the Baltic republics and Georgia suggest that democratic institutions can have stabilizing effects. The establishment of a regularized political

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89 The beginning of NATO's discussion about enlargement to the East was a major catalyst provoking Russian suspicion. For some analyses of this debate, see Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," in *Survival*, 37 (Spring 1995) 1, pp. 34-52; Dana H. Allin, "Can Containment Work Again?," in *ibid.*, pp. 53-65.

90 This is not to suggest that most ethnic Russians are happy about their circumstances. Having gone from being part of the "ruling" group to being a minority in a foreign country was difficult, and a substantial number of ethnic Russians who voted in Russia's 1993 elections supported Zhirinovsky or the communists. Parming, "The Baltic Countries: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," p. 253.

91 Graham Smith notes explicitly this change of attitude in Latvia, where he states that many Russians had came to believe, by 1990, that they would be better off in a Western-style economy, rather than the Soviet Union. See Smith, "Latvia and the Latvians," p. 162.

92 Hunter notes that this was stated by Abkhaz leaders even before the Soviet Union collapsed; Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition*, p. 126.

system undoubtedly eased the situation in the Baltics for all of its inhabitants. Regularizing the political system in Georgia, conversely, will probably not be possible until the fundamental structure of the state is agreed upon, and with it, the status of the ethnic minorities residing in different regions.

Nonetheless, democratic institutions have not resolved potential, or actual, conflicts in the states examined here. In part this is because democratic institutions associated with conflict mitigation have not been developed fully in Georgia or the Baltic republics, save for Lithuania. The Baltic republics have established the core institutions of democracy. But since Russians and other minorities remain in good part excluded from the political process in Estonia and Latvia, democratic institutions cannot be seen to have contributed directly to the lack of conflict in these cases. In Georgia, limited progress toward the establishment of core democratic institutions has been made, and this is not likely to change until the state's physical structure is decided.

In fact, the differences between Georgia and the Baltics more clearly illustrate the importance of previous conditions, and geopolitics. The Baltic republics share a strong sense of wanting to be part of the "West," as well as of belonging there. This made the democratic model, in spite of the current flaws in its implementation, virtually the only option available in these states, since democratic government was an integral part of being "Western." This yearning for inclusion in the West has also overwhelmed, to date, the urge for vindictiveness or retribution against minorities. The awareness of Western interests and attention has probably acted as a restraint, preventing Estonian and Latvian leaders from adopting restrictive citizenship policies, or harsher measures to contain the ethnic Russian population. This is not to suggest that repressive policies were even considered, but that is the point. Georgia, in contrast to the Baltics, developed a more "traditional" nationalist attitude in the late 1980s, as ethnic Georgians resorted to defensiveness against other groups within their own state.[93] In Georgia, moreover, more divisive policies toward minorities led to conflict early in the transition process, and the violence that ensued will complicate efforts to establish stable working relations between the different groups in the state for some time to come. The progression of early ethnic conflict was not leavened by the geopolitical benefits of Western interest or expectation of inclusion. Indeed, one reason Shevardnadze was asked to return to Georgia in 1992 was to exploit his strong support in the West, in order to secure more aid. In the event, Georgia has had better but still limited success with both democratization and Western support under Shevardnadze's rule.

This points to a dilemma: Is the establishment of democratic institutions the critical factor, or are the *tendencies* toward democracy and the pull of the West the

93 Zaslavsky, "Nationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies," p. 109.

more decisive indicators of whether democracy is likely to succeed or fail in a particular state? This clearly matters to whether democratic institutions can help prevent conflict. The evidence of these cases tells us more about external influence than about democratic institutions' ability to mitigate conflict.

Recent research has proposed that a reasonable level of affluence, previous experience with pluralism, if not with democracy, and the degree of sociopolitical influence from the Western democratic states, are important to a state's efforts to establish democratic government.[94] This would suggest that international institutions and prospects can play an important role. To the degree that international organizations pay attention, and dangle the prospect of including new members or establishing better ties to them, then they may be able to induce more democratic behavior, and to censure conflict. Yet the caveat remains that external influence can only reach so far, and may have a negative effect if it is perceived to support corrupt or repressive leaders. Moreover, outside (Western) powers have limited interest in many regions, which limits what they will be willing to do to support either conflict prevention or democracy.

The fact that pluralism has to date been sustained in Georgia suggests that it is not impossible to begin on the path toward democracy, even from virtual chaos. It seems reasonable to propose that if it could establish more democratic institutions which provided safeguards for the rights of all groups in the state, then this might both promote democracy and encourage better ethnic relations. But this also highlights the enormity of the obstacles facing such institutions, both because current tensions do not necessarily permit discussion of future options, and because badly designed, though nominally "democratic" institutions could be worse than the current situation, as Georgia's own history in the early 1990s made clear.

94 Carothers, "Democracy without Illusions," pp. 85-99.

PART TWO

The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: The Cases of the Baltic States and Georgia

5. Preventing Conflict in the Baltic States: A Success Story That Will Hold?

Renatas Norkus

It is often argued that the situation in the three Baltic States, especially for the first three years since the reestablisment of their independence, contains most of the ingredients for a classical post-Cold War confrontation. Even today, the three countries are sometimes referred to as representing a potentially explosive area of tension which could erupt into violence and eventually armed conflict. In reality, however, at the time of writing, this worst-case scenario has not materialized; the region seems quite stable, with diplomacy and compromise reigning, rather than conflict and violence.

In terms of conflict prevention, to what extent can the case of the Baltic States be called a "success story"? In this study I attempt to focus upon both conflict and peace in the region. Therefore, answering the questions: *What may explain the fact that the sensitive security situation of the Baltic States has not escalated into violent conflict?* and *Where does the future of Baltic stability lie?* may be regarded as the main objectives of this study.

In order to answer these questions an analysis of critical factors that might have generated violence in the Baltics is required. I shall, therefore, discuss the sources of instability in the Baltics to find out w*hat issues – conflict generating factors – the Baltics are faced with*, and *what policies have been chosen to prevent them from developing into violent conflicts?* This will be covered in the Chapter "Issues and Policies" which will, however, be briefly preceded by an historical and political background of past and current developments in the Baltic States.

Then, in the third Chapter – "Assessment and Prospects for Enhanced Stability" – after having dealt with the main arguments of what has made conflict prevention actions in the Baltics successful, I shall proceed with the discussion of *some prospects for future stability in and around the Baltic States.*

I. Historical and Political Background

The Baltic countries and their inhabitants differ from the rest of the former Soviet Union in some key cultural, historical and political aspects which give the area a unique character. An understanding of this uniqueness, before, during and after the Soviet period, is essential for a clearer view of the present trends and developments.

1. A Glance at the Past

The Baltic nations evolved historically as part of the Western cultural and economic sphere. Western influence was transmitted primarily through German and Swedish invaders, and in the case of the Lithuanians, through the Poles. The German Teutonic Order established itself in the area in the early 13th century and eventually converted Estonians and Latvians to the Lutheran faith. They opened the area to Western trade, and considerable development followed – several Baltic cities joined the Hanseatic League and promptly achieved remarkable economic prosperity and cultural progress. Later, the Latvian and Estonian lands fell under the control of Sweden, which established a fairly liberal rule for that time. Lithuania, which received Christianity from Poland and became Catholic, has the most distinguished history of the Baltic nations. The Lithuanians were able to forge a centralized political state by 1236, beat back the Teutonic Knights, and achieve considerable power,[1] both independently and as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

At the beginning of the 19th century, however, all three Baltic peoples were incorporated into the resurgent Russian empire, and this marked one of the most difficult periods in their history.[2] By submerging the Baltic people's diverging experiences of statehood and religion, the Tsarist regime engendered highly active opposition: the strengthening national movements eventually adopted political aims, striving for self-determination and political independence.

Such an opportunity arrived in the aftermath of World War I. With the collapse of the Russian monarchy and the simultaneous defeat of Germany, the Baltic States proclaimed independence in 1918. The freedom of the Baltic nations was to last only 22 years, but despite this historically short time, the three republics were able to establish political systems that proved rather viable and generally liberal. During this period they experienced an unprecedented cultural and economic growth.[3] Democratic institutions were introduced soon after independence, with an emphasis on strong parliamentary government, and in 1921 the Baltic States joined the League

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1 By the early 15th century, the Lithuanians conquered an expanse of Slavic lands down to the Black Sea and created the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which provided an insurmountable barrier to westward expansion by the Mongols of the Golden Horde who ruled Russia in the 14th and 15th centuries.

2 The Baltic nationalities were subjected to increasing political oppression and massive Russification pressures: Russian was often introduced as the only legal language in the schools; religions other than the Orthodox were severely circumscribed. In Lithuania, between 1864 and 1905, all publications not printed in the Cyrillic alphabet were outlawed.

3 The three republics fared rather well economically, and standards of living during the period of independence were vastly superior to those in the Soviet Union and compared to those of the Scandinavian countries. For a detailed study of the period of Baltic independence, see Georg von Rauch, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence, 1917-1940* (London/Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1974); also V. Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, eds., *The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917-1945* (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).

of Nations. These democratic developments were overshadowed in all three countries by economic and political crises culminating in a transition to authoritarian regimes. This happened in the form of a coup as early as 1926 in Lithuania, while the other two republics put democracy aside in 1934.[4] Through the interwar period the statehood of the Baltics was somehow associated with insecurity as they were caught between Germany and the Soviet Union. All three countries, however, were fully independent, as independent as every other European country of that time. This fact distinguishes the three Baltic countries from the rest of the former Soviet Union's republics.

The fate of the Baltic republics was sealed by the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. According to this the Baltic area was included in the Soviet sphere of influence. In the following months, the Soviets first won the right to keep large military bases in Baltic territory; then in June 1940, they occupied the Baltic republics outright. This occurred despite the fact that the Soviet Union had signed friendship and non-aggression treaties guaranteeing Soviet non-interference in the domestic affairs of all three countries in 1920. Two months later, the Baltic States were formally incorporated into the Soviet Union as Union republics.[5]

What makes the history of Baltic States exemplary is the fact that they did not have the chance to reestablish their independence immediately after the Second World War, as other countries occupied during the war did. The West did little (or had no effective means) to help them, although the United States, and most other European nations, never gave *de jure* recognition to the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union. The Baltics, however, were unique not only in the way they lost their independence, but also in the way they pursued its reestablishment. The three republics often represented a model for escape from the "inner empire" of the Soviet Union.[6] Their legal, moral, and political battle during the years of Soviet domination, which was "as effective as it was non-violent"[7], finally resulted in the restoration of their statehood. Their independence received worldwide recognition in the Autumn of 1991.

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4 For the discussion of factors which generated the falling to authoritarian dictatorships in the Baltics, see Olav F. Knudsen, "The Foreign Policies of the Baltic States: Interwar Years and Restoration," in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 28 (1993) 1, pp. 49-52.

5 An account of the circumstances and events leading to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics is contained in Boris Meissner, "The Baltic Question in World Politics," in Vardys and Misiunas, eds., *The Baltic States in Peace and War*. The documentary evidence concerning the annexation is provided in Bronis J. Kazlas, *The USSR-German Aggression Against Lithuania* (New York, 1973).

6 The influence of Baltic independence movements, especially during the "perestroyka" time, extended also to Ukraine and Belarus, propagating a model for democratic and nonviolent liberation.

7 Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," in *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (September/October 1994) 5, p.75.

2. Beginning of Transition: Political Features

With international recognition of their restored independence, the Baltic republics embarked upon the task of becoming "normal countries." First and foremost, it was the domestic political vulnerabilities of the three countries and, for obvious reasons, their relations with Russia, that dominated the difficult Baltic transition agenda.

In the domestic policy realm, the Baltic States had to develop the legal and political state foundations, and effectively support them with new institutions. This development, especially in its initial phase, was highly affected by an internal institutional power struggle. In Lithuania, for example, efforts to institute a strong presidency diverted the country's attention from more pressing problems such as economic reforms, and prevented the parliament from functioning normally for most of 1992. The confusing and conflict-ridden nature of party politics in the Baltics also contributed to rather chaotic decision-making. The "National Fronts" of Estonia and Latvia, and the "Sajudis" of Lithuania, which had brought about independence, virtually collapsed during 1991-1992. This gave way to the gradual emergence of a fragmented spectrum of political parties, groups and movements indulging in constant political infighting.[8] As a result, frequent rotation of governments and, thus, internal political instability were the features present in the Baltic States in the immediate aftermath of their regained independence.

There were several serious sources of contention in Baltic-Russian relations. The unwelcome presence of the Soviet troops represented both an obstacle and a threat to Baltic sovereignty and independence building, and was seen, not least, as being able to trigger serious armed incidents between Russian and Baltic forces, given the ever-present risk of provocation. Ethnic composition was another most prominent matter affecting the relationship between the Baltic countries and Russia. The Baltic societies have always been multi-ethnic without any major difficulties for mutual coexistence. When they regained independence, however, the crucial problem facing the governments was the integration of other ethnic minorities into the rest of society. Indeed, the numbers of non-indigenous peoples (mostly, but not exclusively, Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, and also – in Lithuania – Poles) in the Baltic countries are significant. Of course, the mere presence of multi-ethnicity in the Baltics, and the existence of differences between minorities and indigenous populations did not automatically have to lead to violent conflict. It was clear, however, that the way in which it was to be handled would have affected not only Baltic-Russian relations, but also the future stability of the area.

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8 For a good discussion on party formation and domestic political process in the Baltic States, see Olav F. Knudsen, "Baltic Security: Domestic Factors," revised version of a paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meetings, Acapulco, Mexico, 23-27 March 1993, published by NUPI.

In addition, the different interpretation of the legal basis for inter-state relations between the Baltic States and Russia has been the underlying problem in a whole complex of issues contained in that relationship. Russia and the Baltic States disagree in their interpretation of the Baltics' legal continuity as states from 1940 to 1991. The Baltic States consider their incorporation into the Soviet Union a military annexation and occupation during which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania retained their legal continuity. September 1991, the date the then Soviet Union finally recognized the independence of the Baltics, is seen as the end of the occupation. While the countries of the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and even the Ukraine and Belarus got their independence as a consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Baltic republics succeeded in breaking away before final collapse of the USSR. It is ironic to note that to some extent, the Baltics wished the Soviet Union had lasted a bit longer than it did because they believed that, had more than four months elapsed between the reinstatement of their independence in August 1991 and the final collapse of the Soviet Union in December of that same year, the Baltics might also have had the opportunity to present themselves as belonging to the emerging geopolitical entity of the Visegrad countries, and perhaps even turning the Visegrad Three into the "Visegrad Six."

Russia, however, regards the Baltic States as entirely new countries that emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. This view permits Moscow to disregard treaties and accords that Soviet Russia signed with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the interwar period, such as the 1920 Peace Treaties which recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Baltic States and specified the borders between them and Russia. It is important to have a clear understanding of this legal-political dispute between the Baltics and Russia, as many other internal as well as external conflict-generating issues are directly or indirectly linked to this.

3. International Context

The three Baltic States re-entered an international setting where the rules and patterns had been determined without their participation. At the same time, the changing nature of the European security system represented a factor of uncertainty in itself. Some formerly considered this system wrong and unlawful, but stable. It was now deemed, or claimed to be, both just and lawful, although it remained confused, unpredictable, and highly unstable. Having completed the period of confrontation between two military blocs, the international community was now faced with the task of creating the new rules for coping with new emerging patterns of potential conflict.

Almost immediately after the restoration of their independence, the Baltic States were admitted to both the United Nations and the CSCE (since 1995 – OSCE). The latter connection was the more important one, since the CSCE seemed to be the right

forum in which the most pertinent Baltic issues (i.e. the withdrawal of foreign troops, the minorities' problems, etc.) could be internationalized. In March 1992, on the initiative of Germany and Denmark, the Baltic States joined with these two countries as well as Finland, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden to become founding members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The CBSS is a broad regional organization, which attempts to foster cooperation mostly in the economic, technological, and cultural spheres thereby reducing tensions in the Baltic Sea sub-region. The CBSS also holds significant potential for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as a means of moderating any desire for domination in the area by the large power – Russia. The admission of Lithuania and Estonia (in May 1993), and later Latvia (in February 1995) to the Council of Europe was particularly gratifying for these countries since the organization not only stresses the protection of human rights as one of its major goals, but set it as a membership criterion. In June 1993 the Baltic States also expressed strong interest in associate membership of the then European Community (EC – since 1993 – EU). The intention was to become a reality two years later, when the three Baltic countries signed Europe Agreements with the EU with a view toward full future integration into the organization.

Since the re-establishment of their independence the Baltic States have also developed ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU). All three are members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), founded in 1991; they have joined and have actively participated in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program since its inception in 1994. Furthermore, with Lithuania leading with its application of 4 January 1994, the Baltic States have officially applied for full membership in the Alliance; in May 1994, they became Associated Partners of the WEU. This wide range of integration processes, and increased cooperation between the Baltics and the Euro-Atlantic security community, has kept the three countries rather visible in the context of on-going developments of the post-Cold War international environment. There was little doubt that the higher the international profile maintained by the Baltics, the greater the chances for enhancing their security.

The major external players in and around the Baltic States have been, and will continue to be, the Nordic states, Poland, Germany, the US and, obviously, Russia. The small powers of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland, each with its different level of involvement, have provided important economic and diplomatic support for the Baltics. Poland's main interest has been its traditional ties with Lithuania. Germany has had a historic presence in all three Baltic countries and is, therefore, more involved in the region than any other European Community and NATO member. The role of the US has always been major, given the small but well organized lobbies of ethnic Balts in North America. The key question for the Baltic

States has been the relationship with, and developments in, Russia. After the initial positive attitude of the Russian leadership towards the Baltics, it gradually showed great difficulty in coming to terms with its' changed status. It seemed incapable of redefining its relations with the ex-Soviet republics, including the Baltic States. As Russia fell back on a generic approach of "special rights" and "near abroad," trying to denigrate the "foreign country" status of the Baltic States, any steady improvement of the Baltic-Russian relationship became difficult.

In this international environment the avoidance of serious conflict in the Baltic region was conditional upon several factors, including above all, the internal stability of the Baltics. Also included were Russia and its evolution toward a democracy, Baltic and Russian involvement in international organizations, and the role of other outside powers in the area.

II. Issues and Policies

1. Foreign Troops: Withdrawal and Their Legacy

Conditions and Realities of the Pullout

Legally, the issue of Russian troops was more clear-cut than other issues: firstly, the restoration of independence removed all possible justification for their continued presence; secondly, foreign troops cannot be stationed on the territory of another state without that state's consent. In practical terms, however, the withdrawal of troops was hampered by several mutually reinforcing factors. During 1991-1992 Russia had refused to negotiate any pullout schedule, which led the Baltic States to internationalize the issue by appealing to the UN and CSCE to pressure Russia to withdraw. Even after the CSCE 1992 Helsinki Summit, which called for "early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States"[9] Russia attempted to postpone the withdrawals. It presented various excuses, pointing mainly to its own domestic problems and concerns over the plight of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics. Withdrawal schedules proved difficult to negotiate also because the Baltic States wanted the Russian troops to leave immediately, whereas Russia was short of housing for returning army families. In the course of negotiations Russia pursued a differentiated policy towards the three states using a variety of instruments (suspension of talks, forms of military demonstration, low-rank representation at the talks, etc.)[10] which resulted in differently paced and uneven progress in handling the withdrawal problem.

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9 *The Challenges of Change*, CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 (Helsinki, 1992), p. 8.

10 For a good overview of the withdrawal process see *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1993, 1994, 1995.

Lithuania's flexible attitude to dealings with Russia (on issue of, citizenship, housing, property and social provisions for departing troops) cleared the way for the solution to the Russian military presence in that country. The last Russian combat troops left Lithuania on 31 August 1993. The withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia, however, was not smooth as Russia used delay tactics, pressure and other measures to link withdrawal with the status of the Russian-speaking population in the two states. Moscow also took advantage of some incidents to slow down the process.[11] All the problems notwithstanding, on 31 August 1994 the Russian military forces stationed in Estonian and Latvian territories were withdrawn. The majority of their military bases and installations were also transferred to the respective Baltic authorities. Only a small unit at the Paldiski submarine training center in Estonia (210 military personnel) remained until 1996 to dismantle the two nuclear reactors at the base. In the Skrunda radar station, Latvia, 500-600 Russian servicemen have remained to run the facility until the year 2000.

Military Pensioners

Even after the Russian forces had been pulled out from the Baltics, some reasons for concern still remained. One of the most controversial issues, which constituted a part of the Russian troops withdrawal package, was the status of Russian military pensioners and their families in Latvia and Estonia.[12] Shortly before the departure of the Russian troops, there were approximately 22,000 and 10,500 retired Russian officers living in Latvia and Estonia respectively. Consequently, a widely shared fear prevailed in the two countries that this group could serve as a propaganda resource and a potentially active "fifth column" for Russia. Although some of those pensioners were relatively young military professionals who retired from the army in 1992 or later, many of them were of advanced age, in poor health and with no place to go in Russia.[13] Since both Estonian and Latvian citizenship legislations were rather restrictive regarding the former Russian military and KGB officials, any deliberations on the status of this specific group of residents became politically sensitive issue. A solution to the problem had to be found also because the issue appeared to dominate

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11 On 10 January 1994, a serious incident occurred in Latvia when the Vidzeme district municipal authorities handcuffed two Russian generals and placed them in a police vehicle do be driven to the Russian border and expelled. In reaction to the incident, several Russian army units near the Latvian border as well as Russian militaries stationed in Latvia were put on full alert.

12 In Lithuania's case the issue of Russian military pensioners has not been much of a problem, primarily due to the inclusive citizenship policies of Lithuania. The agreement with Russia on social guarantees for military pensioners, which Lithuania succeeded in avoiding before the pullout of Russian troops, however, was signed thereafter, on 18 November 1993.

13 According to the survey of April 1994, conducted by the Institute of International and Social Studies of Estonia, 28% of all interviewed retired officers were aged 50 and under, 30% were 51-60 years old, and 42%- 61 or older.

the ongoing negotiations on Russian troop withdrawal, as Russia tied the pullout to social guarantees for military pensioners.

The basis for the solution to the problem was reached by concluding two agreements: the 30 April 1994 "Latvian-Russian Accord on the social security of Russian Federation military retirees and their families who reside on the territory of the Republic of Latvia," and the 26 July 1994 "Estonian-Russian Agreement on the Russian military pensioners in Estonia." According to the Latvian agreement, which the government leaders believed was "the best that could have been obtained,"[14] all those Russian military pensioners who had retired before 28 January 1992 would be granted the status of permanent residents and could be naturalized as Latvian citizens under Latvian law.[15] A special commission whose task was to oversee the implementation of the accord was set up in Latvia. The Latvian government accepted the agreement only under strong pressure from the US and other Western countries. Many Latvians believed that the West forced its government to grant too many concessions on social guarantees for military retirees but recognized that they were needed to overcome Russia's intransigence and to finally complete troop withdrawal.

The Estonian-Russian agreement declared that the social and economic rights of retirees would be protected by the Estonian state as soon as they were issued residence permits in accordance with the Estonian law. Unlike in Latvia, the Estonian government retained the right, however, to deny residency to any applicant who posed a threat to the security of Estonian state. One could have assumed that with such a provision in the agreement some military retirees would surely have been refused residence permits, followed by strong protests from Russian officials, yet the actual implementation of the agreement seems to be proceeding rather smoothly.[16] What is noteworthy in this respect is that the OSCE, and its representatives, have been involved in the work of the Government Commission formed specifically to deal with residence permits.

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14 Saulius Girnius, "Relations between the Baltic States and Russia," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 3 (26 August 1994) 33, p. 31.

15 It also contained some rights and privileges for the retirees, such as the right to continue to live in Latvia if they had resided there permanently since the retirement, to dispose their property as they wish and receive their pensions taxfree from Russia. The additional protocol to the agreement deals with the repatriation of military retirees and their families who wish to return to their native land. See Dzintra Bungs, "Russia Agrees to Withdraw Troops from Latvia," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 3 (3 June 1994) 22, p. 7.

16 A total of 19,340 retirees have applied for residence, of which 14,392 received five year permits, and 331 two-to-four year permits. Though the Estonian government put off a final decision on granting residence permits to other 4,077 by giving them six-month residence permits, it was said most would receive permits soon. See *Omri Daily Digest* (12 July 1996) 134.

2. Ethnicity Related Questions

The Origin of Ethnic Composition

The current demographic situation, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, is largely the result of planned, systematic Soviet policies aimed at the denationalization and Russification of the Baltic peoples, which began at the same time as their annexation. The Soviet Union's deportation of several hundred thousand Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians,[17] and the flight of many thousands more in the face of the Soviet invasion, were followed by an even more massive influx of Russian and other Slavic settlers.[18] (See table 1).

Primarily because of its far higher birth rate and a larger rural population, which supplied the work force needed for the urban industries established after the war, Lithuania was not as overrun as Latvia and Estonia with immigrants from the other Soviet republics. In 1994, there were 705,000 non-Lithuanians living in the country.[19] On the contrary, as a result of the low birth rates and the tremendous losses these nations suffered from emigration and deportations, Latvian and Estonian populations are still below their prewar levels. By the beginning of 1995, there were approximately 435,000 ethnic Russians and 100,000 people of other ethnic origin living in Estonia (while the number of Estonians in 1995 was approximately 956,000).[20] The ethnic situation in Latvia is very similar to that of Estonia. Out of a total Latvian population of 2.51 million inhabitants, only 1.42 million are Latvians (56.5%). There are 765,896 people of Russian origin (30.43%) and the remaiming 300,000 are either Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles or Lithuanians.[21] In six of the

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17 According to Alexander R. Alexiev who used the sources of Encyclopedia Britannica, 20,000 Estonians and 105,000 Latvians were deported in 1945-1946. After the fall of 1944, 60,000 Lithuanians were deported to Siberia, to be followed by 145,000 more in the next two years. The final wave of deportations took place in all three countries in the spring of 1949 in connection with the forced collectivization campaign. 60,000 Lithuanians, 70,000 Latvians, and 80,000 Estonians were deported. Overall, some 600,000 Balts were deported – a figure which, given a total population ogf about 6 million, approaches genocidal proportions. See Alexander R. Alexiev, "Dissent and Nationalism in the Soviet Baltic," Study R-3061-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, September 1983), pp. 5-6.

18 Between 1937 and 1989, for example, the native share of the population in Estonia decreased from 88,2% to 61,5%, while the Russian share increased from 8,2% to 30,3%. In the same time period, the Latvian proportion has shrunk from 76% to 52%, while the Russian increased from 10,6% to 34%. Only in Lithuania has the indigenous population managed to keep its share at about 80%, while the Russian grew from about 2% to 9,4%.

19 Notably, the same number of non-indigenous population resided in Lithuania before the Second World War. Today, the two biggest national minorities are Russian and Polish, which constitute respectively 8,7 and 7,1% of the population. The rest are Belorussians (1,6%), Ukrainians (1,1%), Jews (0,2%), Latvians (0,1%) and Tatars (0,1%).

20 *Estonian Human Development Report 1995* (Tallin UNDP / Kolding Trykcenter A/S, 1995), p. 30.

21 *Latvia Human Development Report. 1995* (Riga: UNDP, 1995), p. 22.

seven largest cities, including the capital, Riga, Russians form almost one-half of the population, while Latvians account for little more than one-third. This is quite an extraordinary situation, and it largely explains why ethnic Estonians and Latvians consider it difficult at times to maintain their national identities in their own countries.

Table 1 – Population of the Baltic States by Nationality, 1937, 1989, 1994-1995

		Population composition by nationality (percentages)		
Republic	Nationality	1939	1989	1994-1995
Estonia	Estonian	88.2	61.5	63.2
	Russian	8.2	30.3	29.4
	Other	3.7	8.2	7.4
Latvia	Latvian	75.7	52.0	56.5
	Russian	10.6	34.0	30.5
	Other	13.4	14.0	13.0
Lithuania	Lithuanian	81.0	79.6	81.1
	Russian	2.3	9.4	8.7
	Polish	3.0	7.0	7.0
	Other	14.0	4.0	3.2

Sources: Toivo U. Raun, "Ethnic Relations and Conflict in the Baltic States," in W. Raymond Nuncan and G. Paul Holman, eds., *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 160-161; *Estonian Human Development Report. 1995* (Tallinn: UNDP / Kolding Trykcenter A/S, 1995); *Latvia Human Development Report. 1995* (Riga: UNDP, 1995); Martin Klatt, "Russians in the 'Near Abroad,'" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 32 (19 August 1994), table 2, p. 35; Alfonsas Svelnys, *Report on National Minorities and National Harmony*, under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, p. 1.

This recent Baltic experience does not exactly facilitate inter-ethnic harmony. Indeed, the Soviet ethnic policy generated the two main dimensions of national identity: for Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians it was an ethno-cultural identity; for the Russophone population, a political (Soviet) identity. This is one of the main reasons why the re-creation of independent Baltic States and the dissolution of the USSR were accepted in different ways: for most Balts, it meant the restoration of a linkage between nation and state; for many Russian-speakers in the Baltics, it meant a psychological shock – a sense of disappointment at the loss of their accustomed (Soviet) identity. This further produced a potentially disturbing situation: large groups of the non-indigenous population did not perceive a Baltic nation-state as open to

them and were thus looking for a different or somewhat distinct community in order "to feel at home."[22] Two cases in Estonia and Lithuania can serve as a good illustration.

The largest concentration of people belonging to the Russian or non-Estonian language group is found in North-Eastern Estonia, in particular in the towns of Narva, Sillamae and Kohtla-Jarve, as well as Tallinn.[23] In July 1993, Russian-speaking communities, which constitute an overwhelming majority in Narva and Sillamaae, held a referendum demanding a special territorial autonomy status for the North-Eastern industrial part of Estonia. Voters in both cities were overwhelmingly in favor of autonomy, however, the Estonian Supreme Court ruled that the referendums were unconstitutional. The event indicated the relatively high instability and fear for their personal future being felt by people in these cities. In the meanwhile, a certain stabilization of the problem seems to have taken place.[24]

In Lithuania, relations with the Polish minority have been somewhat tense. Almost half of the Polish minority lives in relatively compact communities in the Vilnius region of Eastern Lithuania.[25] The tensions between Lithuanians and Poles in Lithuania must be seen in the entire historical context.[26] Given the history of Polish-Lithuanian relations, it was not surprising that Sajudis, the Lithuanian popular front, did not initially devote much attention to the Polish community in Lithuania. As a consequence, the latter chose to ally itself with the local Russians rather than with the Lithuanian majority in the country. Culturally, this tendency was also favored throughout the Soviet period by Lithuania's Poles, since their knowledge of Russian was much better than that of Lithuanian.[27] In September 1991, the Lithuanian

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22 For a discussion on the Baltic nation-state related problems, see Knudsen, "Baltic Security: Domestic Factors," pp. 14-18.

23 During the Soviet period, the cities of Narva and Sillamae were closed to Estonians, due to the uranium enrichment factory in Sillamae. According to the 1989 census, 96% of the population in Narva, and 79% in Kohtla-Jarve were non-Estonians. See Aksel Kirch, "Russians as a Minority in Contemporary Baltic States," in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 23 (1992) 2, p. 205.

24 Data from the end of 1994 show that a status of administrative and territorial autonomy for the North-East region is demanded by only 16% of Estonia's Russians. See Marika Kirch and Aksel Kirch, "Search for Security in Estonia: New Identity Architecture," in *Security Dialogue*, 26 (1995) 4, p. 442.

25 Vilnius region, which excludes Vilnius city, is 60% Polish; Salcininkai region is over 80% Polish.

26 Although the Lithuanians were not ostensibly conquered in earlier centuries (unlike the Estonians and Latvians), over time the relationship with Poland became a kind of subordinate one. For instance, the hostility engendered by the issue of who should control the Vilnius region was such that the two countries did not even have diplomatic relations for almost the entire inter-war period. For useful overviews, see Stephen R. Burant, "Polish-Lithuanian Relations: Past, Present, and Future," in *Problems of Communism*, 40 (1991) 3, pp. 67-84.

27 Some data on language choice and competence in the Baltic States from 1989 suggested that 57,9% of Poles preferred the Russian language as their second language and only 15% of those considered Lithuanian as their second language. See the table in Toivo U. Raun, "Ethnic

government dissolved the local governments of the two regions, Vilnius and Salcininkai, and imposed direct rule there. This action was justified by accusations against the Polish leaders of the regional governments of supporting the attempted coup in Moscow.[28] Indeed, before August 1991, the Lithuanian government had reason to fear that its Polish minority was disloyal: the Vilnius and Salcininkai regions continued to receive Soviet supplies after trade was cut off with the rest of Lithuania in response to the declared independence on March 1990. In February 1991 less than a third of the population in the two regions took part in the referendum on Lithuanian independence, while only a month later the majority actively participated in the referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, which was officially boycotted by Lithuania.[29] Some ethnic Polish political activists had envisaged and promoted the creation of a Polish Autonomous Territorial Region within Lithuania, with its own flag, army, police, and parliament. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempts by Moscow to use the Polish minority against Lithuania ended.

In all three republics, this potentially disturbing diversity of identification, resulting in a lack of congruence between the prevalent idea of the nation-state and the heterogeneity of the population has played an important role in designing their ethnic policies. The resulting citizenship legislation, however, has been different in each country as has the level of tension and potential for ethnic conflict.

Citizenship Policies: Different Approaches

It was due to Lithuania's favorable ethnic composition, that the country granted all permanent residents of the republic the chance to gain citizenship, regardless of nationality, as early as 1989. This liberal approach to citizenship policy removed a major source of possible discontent among the country's minorities and in turn made most Lithuanians rather moderate.

The *Lithuanian* Citizenship Law of December 1991 extended citizenship to all persons born on Lithuanian territory, to those who were citizens prior to 1940 and their descendants, and those who became citizens under the legislation in effect prior to the new effective date of the new law. Naturalization procedures were inclusive. Those living in Lithuania when the citizenship law was adopted could become

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Relations and Conflict in the Baltic States," in W. Raymond Nuncan and G. Paul Holman, eds., *Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 166.

28 Some Polish activists, especially in Salcininkai, had put their weight behind the putsch. Newspaper editors printed pro-Soviet propaganda, and some Poles even went so far as to appear in public to call for armed struggle against Lithuania. Tim Snyder, "National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989-1994," in *East European Politics and Societies*, 9 (Spring 1995) 2, p. 320.

29 More on these facts, see Snyder, ibid., p. 320; also Saulius Girnius, "The Baltic States," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 3 (22 April 1994) 16, p. 6.

citizens by making a formal request, swearing loyalty, and giving up any other citizenship. Today, the majority of ethnic Poles, Russians, and others are citizens of Lithuania, and can participate fully in the state's political life. In addition to the same and equal rights to all citizens provided by the citizenship legislation, the distinct treatment of national minorities is spelled out in special articles of the Constitution and the Law on National Minorities.[30]

In Estonia and Latvia, different and much more cautious policies for granting political rights to ethnic Russians were implemented. The basic concept of the Estonian and Latvian approach reflects the republic's legal continuity from pre-war to present times. Accordingly, *automatic* citizenship rights were given only to those who were citizens of the respective republics on 17 June 1940 (the day the Soviet armed forces occupied the Baltic countries) and their direct descendants. This meant that in Estonia, only 10% of ethnic Russians were eligible for automatic citizenship (30% in Latvia).

Estonia's new citizenship law entered into force in April 1995. There was no significant change with respect to the previous law of 26 February 1992, which was, in turn, a re-enactment of the 1938 citizenship law. For post-war immigrants the law includes requirements for naturalization, such as a two-year residency requirement, to be followed by a one-year waiting period, as well as knowledge of the Estonian language and an oath of loyalty. The legal basis for the residence of non-citizens in Estonia is provided by the July 1993 Law on Aliens, the document that has faced the sharpest critique from both inside and outside Estonia. According to the law, only Estonian citizens have an automatic right to reside in Estonia; all others have to apply for a residence permit regardless of whether they were born in Estonia or have lived there for decades. This produced hostile reactions from Russian officials.[31] Another source of tension between the Estonian government and Russian-speakers has been the Estonian legislation on language. The Law on Language (adopted by the Estonian Parliament in 1989, and revised in 1995) declares that knowledge of Estonian, as the state language, is a professional skill necessary for a number of jobs, as well as

30 For example, the Law on National Minorities (amended in January 1991, following the proposals of Polish members of Lithuanian Parliament) provides that the local language of the national minority can be used along with the state language in local institutions and organizations of administrative territorial units with dense population of a particular national minority.

31 Foreign Minister Kozyrev declared that Estonia had taken a step "along the road of apartheid by declaring a third of its population aliens"; Churkin, Deputy Foreign Minister, claimed that Estonia had taken the path of ethnic cleansing; and President Yeltsin asserted that "the Estonian leadership, yielding to the pressures of nationalism, had forgotten certain geopolitical and demographic realities, which Russia could remind it of". See Ann Sheehy, "The Estonian Law on Aliens," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 2 (24 September 1993) 38, p. 9.

absolutely essential for citizenship.[32] At the same time, this law contains some guarantees for the use of minority languages.[33] For many Russian-speakers the language barrier is more than evident: one research study found that 40% of Russian-speakers were able to carry on a conversation in Estonian, although the level of their linguistic competence was difficult to assess.[34] Although the need for knowledge of the Estonian language is increasingly appreciated by the majority of the Russian population,[35] many of them still consider the language requirement to be the main obstacle to obtaining Estonian citizenship. While knowledge of the state language is a reasonable criterion for citizenship, it should be realized that many non-citizens – the elderly, the less-educated, those living in monolingual residential areas – may never gain full mastery of Estonian.

In *Latvia*, the process of drafting a citizenship law has been rather long and complicated, often raising tensions within Latvia and between Latvia and Russia. Although adoption of the citizenship law was postponed until after the election of the new Saeima (parliament), an interim policy (as in Estonia) automatically restored citizenship for citizens of interwar Latvia and their descendants. Other residents had to apply for naturalization which required, *inter alia*, 16 years' residence in Latvia and a basic knowledge of the Latvian language.[36] As a result, almost 34% of Latvian residents were unable to vote in the June 1993 elections.

Only in the beginning of June 1994 did the Saeima pass the citizenship law which included at least two controversial requirements: a system of annual naturalization quotas for non-citizens and a ten year residency threshold. After the Latvian President's refusal to sign the law – largely in response to pressure from Russia and various international organizations – the Latvian Parliament modified it by suspending the quotas and reducing the required residence period. The citizenship law was finally signed by the President on 11 August, replacing the quota system with a step-by-step naturalization timetable. As a result, as of 1 January 1996, persons born in Latvia may apply for citizenship; as of 2001, applications will be open to persons not born in Latvia. Citizenship can be obtained by persons with five

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32 Would-be citizens must demonstrate conversational ability in Estonian, requiring a knowledge of about 1,500 words.

33 The Estonian state is willing, given a request by the local government, to grant the Russian language status as administrative language in regions where Russian-speakers form a majority of the permanent residents – as in Narva, Sillamae and several other towns.

34 Richard Rose and William Maley, "Conflict and Compromise in the Baltic States?," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 3 (15 July 1994) 28.

35 According to the researchers from Estonian Academy of Sciences, "about 80-90% of Estonia's Russians have accepted the idea that everybody in Estonia must know the local language," see Kirch and Kirch, "Search for Security in Estonia," p. 443.

36 Ilmars Viksne, "Latvia and Europe's Security Structures," in *The Baltic States: Security and Defence after Independence*, Chaillot Paper No. 19 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies/ Western European Union, June 1995), p. 57.

years' permanent residence and a legal income in Latvia; a basic knowledge of the Latvian language, the Constitution, the main rights and duties of the citizen and the history of Latvia are required. Applicants also have to take an oath of loyalty to the state and people of Latvia and renounce other citizenship.

Though major disagreements over the citizenship issue seemed to have been resolved, the unclear legal status of the non-citizen population for some time to come continued to spur tension between Latvia and Russia. In this context, a very important development was the adoption of the Law on Non-citizens by the Latvian Parliament on 12 April 1995. The new law gives legal status to over 700,000 Latvian residents who entered or were born in Latvia to non-citizen parents after World War II. It confirms that former Soviet citizens have all basic rights as spelled out in Latvia's constitutional law and permits non-citizens to choose a place of residence in Latvia freely, as well as to leave the country and return. All subjects of the law are entitled to receive non-citizens passports which would serve as travel documents. It is of key importance, however, that the new law be implemented in a strictly impartial and fair manner by the Latvian authorities.[37]

In general, it is argued that the Estonian and Latvian citizenship legislation is perfectly acceptable with regard to future immigrants to these countries. It is problematic, however, to apply them to people who have resided in the country for many years, sometimes even their entire lives. Many of the Russian-speakers, despite their ethnic origin, have no link with the pre-war Estonian or Latvian Republic. Thus, they cannot restore their citizenship and have to go through the naturalization process. The consequences of this process, however, have not been very inclusive so far: both Estonian and Latvian laws state that non-citizens may not vote or be elected to office (except that in Estonia permanent residents may vote in local elections); they may not own property (in Estonia this applies to property ownership in the cities); and they may not carry or purchase weapons. The Latvian social pension (paid to those who do not receive a job-related pension) is reduced by 10% in the case of non-citizens. In terms of comparison, the extension of citizenship to those wishing it is proceeding much more slowly in Latvia than in Estonia.[38]

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37 As it has been reported, "administrative abuse of non-citizens by the arbitrary actions of the Citizenship and Immigration Department (CID) of the Ministry of Interior of Latvia appears to underlie the large majority of complaints by the non-citizen community. The problems arrise mainly from CID refusing to register a significant number of inhabitants depriving them of the personal code number which is essential to a wide range of fundamental activities: applying for jobs, paying taxes, acquiring lodging, receiving social benefits, registering marriages and divorces, etc". Quoted from the *Update Report of CSCE Mission to Latvia*, Prague, 1 March 1994.

38 In Estonia, the naturalization is proceeding slowly but steadily: by 1995, more than 50,000 non-citizens had been naturalized; while in Latvia, by the fall 1995 parliamentary elections, the number of those naturalized was only a few hundred. See Jeff Chinn and Lise A. Truex, "The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics," in *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (January 1997) 1, p. 137.

As already mentioned, Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies came under pressure from both sides, from Russia and from the West. Russia accused the Baltic States, most significantly Estonia and Latvia, of human rights violations. These allegations were intended primarily for Western audiences, and served a multifold purpose. By internationalizing the issue, Russia sought firstly to establish a link between the minority treatment question and the withdrawal of its troops, and thus, to delay a comprehensive troop withdrawal; secondly, to compel Estonia and Latvia to grant immediate and automatic citizenship to all their inhabitants – the so-called zero option; thirdly, to claim that perceived Estonian and Latvian discrimination against the Russian-speaking population would inevitably lead to internal instability and violent conflict; and fourthly, to present itself as the defender of the rights of Russians (not only citizens of Russia) living in the Baltic States, thereby legitimizing their intervention in the event of conflict. In expressing specific objections to the Latvian and Estonian approach, Russia called for citizenship rights for all permanent residents, including retired Soviet military personnel; elimination of the language requirement or at least a lowering of the level of language knowledge needed for citizenship; full elimination of the language requirement for the elderly; no residency requirements or quotas in distributing citizenship; automatic residency permits for those who immigrated into the Baltic republics during Soviet times.[39] Latvia and Estonia have not satisfied these Russian desires.

In the West, concerns were also raised about the legislation and practices in the Baltic States regarding treatment of the non-indigenous population. Thus, in addition to unilateral activities, the international institutions of which the Baltics were members, or which they hoped to join, also became involved.

The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, and the two OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia were most heavily involved. The quiet diplomacy practiced by the OSCE helped to identify major points of contention over the ethnic issues in both countries. After several visits to the Baltic States, the HCNM made a series of recommendations to the Estonian and Latvian foreign ministries where a number of practical suggestions, all aimed at a fair and impartial application of the laws, were spelled out.[40] The most direct comment on the

39 See Guntis Stamers, "The Ethnic Issue in Baltic-Russian Relations," in Atis Lejins and Daina Bleiere, eds., *The Baltic States: Search for Security* (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 194.

40 For details on the process of engagement of the HCNM, see *The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention. A Report prepared by the Office of the OSCE HCNM* (compiled and edited by Rob Zaagman, Adviser to the High Commissioner), The Hague, 30 June 1995, on Estonia pp. 44-46, on Latvia pp. 62-64, on Lithuania p. 64; for the

question of citizenship can be found in his December 1993 letter to the Latvian Foreign Minister concerning the controversial annual naturalization quotas installed in the Latvian draft law on citizenship.[41]

On the initiative of Estonia and, somewhat later, Latvia, two OSCE long-term missions were established in Tallinn and Riga and went into operation in February 1993 and November 1993, respectively. They were able to follow the process of formulating and implementing the legislation on citizenship and aliens, collect information, provide advice and detailed expertise on the laws and their individual elements. Both missions had a similar objective – to help the integration of the Russian-speaking population into Estonian and Latvian societies. In politically sensitive North-Eastern Estonia and in the city of Narva[42] the presence of the OSCE mission has, among other things, had an early warning function of monitoring the situation and proposing action, which has prevented conflicts from breaking out.[43]

In addition to the OSCE's preventive diplomacy, the Council of Europe has played an active role in giving a legal evaluation of the criticized laws. It recommended the changes that would make the laws consistent in principle with European practices. In Latvia, it was the provision on naturalization quotas mentioned earlier which was modified in response to CoE recommendations. In the case of Estonia, the most important recommendation was to make the language requirement less burdensome. The CoE, in cooperation with OSCE representatives and individual participating states, such as the Nordic countries, engaged in setting up language training programs for the minority population.

The EU also played an important diplomatic role with regard to both Russia and, more importantly, the Baltic States. A great deal of pressure was put on Tallinn and Riga to be more open in their approach to non-indigenous populations. Finally, in February 1994 a free trade agreement was offered by the Commission, which included the prospect of concluding European Agreements later in Summer 1995.

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texts of the HCNM recommendation as well as the replies by the Baltic States and Russia in 1993, see *Human Rights Law Journal*, 14 (1993) 5-6, pp. 216-225.

41 The HCNM commented: "It is essential for a society based on the rule of law that the people know about their rights and the rights be established and granted in clear terms by the law. A quota system, however, could lead to considerable uncertainty amongst a large part of the population about their future status." For the whole text of the HCNM letter to the Latvian foreign minister, see "Documents of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities" in *Helsinki Monitor*, 5 (1994) 2, pp. 109-113.

42 The OSCE mission in Estonia has its branches in Kohtla-Jarva and Narva.

43 In 1994 the OSCE mission and the HCNM, by meeting with Narva pro-Communist Russian leaders, were able to find out about a so-called civil disobedience campaign being planned, with the object of persuading non-citizens not to register for residence permits. If the campaign had been successfully organized, a situation in which those refusing to register in legal terms would have faced the threat of expulsion from Estonia, could have lead to a serious conflict with Russia.

Moreover, in 1994, in response to a French initiative, the EU initiated negotiations on a Pact on Stability in Europe aimed at bilateral and multilateral settlements and agreements concerning good-neighborly relations and minority and border issues among those states applying for accession to the EU. It is noteworthy that Russia, after being merely an observer, contributed to the results in the end.[44] The WEU, on its part, has involved the Baltic countries in its activities since 1992, with the creation of the Forum for Consultation; it further strengthened the perspective of closer association by offering them "associate partner" status in May 1994, thereby, perhaps helping to moderate Baltic fears vis-à-vis Russia and reduce the negative effect on the non-indigenous population of this anxiety among Latvians and Estonians.

It may be argued that Russia's internationalization of ethnic issues in Estonia and Latvia created a situation that, in terms of balance, worked in the favor of the Baltic States. The Western countries and international organizations firmly rejected the attempts to link troop withdrawal to any other issue; the numerous international observer missions discovered no evidence to substantiate the Russian charges of massive or systematic violations of human rights; no international organizations recommended application of a "zero option" citizenship policy to Latvia and Estonia. In effect, it was generally recognized that neither the citizenship nor naturalization laws of Estonia and Latvia represented human rights violations. Most important, however, is that international involvement in both countries helped to achieve progress in reducing tensions by fostering mutual understanding and an overall improvement of the minorities' status within the countries as well as to calm down the accusations of Russia.

Noticeably, the Estonian and Latvian governments not only supported the establishment of the OSCE missions on their territories, but encouraged international observers to investigate the situation of Russians in their states. Moreover, they were able to come up with their own initiatives contributing to the settlement of existing tensions. In order to improve community relations in Estonia, the Presidential Round Table of non-citizens and ethnic minorities was established in June 1993. This arrangement, comprising representatives of the Estonian parliament, the Russian-speaking population, and the OSCE Mission, provides an essential framework for institutionalized dialogue in which many of the Russophone communities problems are debated and further proposals to the President are prepared.[45]

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44 On the evolution and the results of the Stability Pact, see Florence Benoit-Rohmer and Hilde Hardeman, "The Pact on Stability in Europe: A Joint Action of the Twelve in the Framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy," in *Helsinki Monitor*, 5 (1994), pp. 38-51; also: Harry Helenius, "More Stability in Europe," in *OSCE Review*, 3 (1995) 1, pp. 8-9.

45 In late 1994, the Round Table submitted a list of recommendations to the parliament criticizing the draft of the citizenship law; some sociological studies concerning attitudes of Estonian residents on inter-ethnic relations were undertaken on the initiative of the Round Table.

Baltic – Russian Dimension

After the restoration of independence in the Baltic States, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former "internal" borders in the Soviet Baltic area were upgraded to the status of inter-state frontiers. However, the present Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian borders are not identical to those of the prewar republics recognized by Moscow in the 1920 peace treaties of Tartu and Riga (See Annexes: Map 2.) The transformation of Estonia and Latvia into SSRs entailed territorial losses as Stalin transferred certain areas to the Russian Soviet Republic. Estonia forfeited about 5% of its territory (areas in the Narva and Petserimaa districts) and 6% of its population, while Latvia lost about 2% of its territory (the town of Abrene and six rural communes) and 2% of its population. Today, these areas are populated overwhelmingly by Russians (over 90% of the population).

Latvia has apparently opted not to raise any territorial claims and has, so far, given relatively low priority to border issues in its negotiations with Russia. The reasoning behind this approach is primarily that the potentially disputed Abrene region has been largely Russified; the majority of Latvians who lived in the area before World War II either perished or fled westward during the war and the local community has not formed any pro-Abrene lobby. Still, the Latvian Supreme Council Decree on the Non-recognition of the Annexation of the Town of Abrene and the District of Abrene, adopted on 22 January 1992 considers, albeit indirectly, the current Latvian-Russian border to be a temporary one. In addition, a declaration on the USSR's and Germany's occupation of Latvia during World War II, passed by the Latvian Saeima on 23 August 1996, calls on the world community to help Latvia remove the consequences of Soviet rule, pointing out that the Abrene district of Latvia was unlawfully incorporated into Russia in 1944.[46]

In Estonia, where the validity of the Tartu Treaty is confirmed by the 1992 constitution,[47] there was an initial demand that the border be restored to its location prior to World War II, which would mean transferring about 2,000 square kilometers of land from Russia to Estonia. This was vigorously rejected by Russia. The dispute heated up in mid-1994, after Russian attempts to equip the current Estonian – Russian border installations in their existing configurations.[48] This action was

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46 Saulius Girnius, "Latvian Declaration of Occupation Surprises Russia," in *Omri Daily Digest*, (26 August 1996) 165.

47 The article 122 of the Estonian 1992 Constitution states: "the land border of Estonia shall be determined by the Tartu Peace Treaty of 2 February 1920 and other international border treaties." See Girnius, "Relations with Russia Turn Bitter," in *Transition*, 31 May 1996, p. 45.

48 President Yeltsin's decree of 21 June 1994 ordered a unilateral demarcation of the border by 31 December 1994.

denounced by the Baltics as unilateral and illegal. Although Estonia is no longer seeking the return of the territory in exchange for Russia's acceptance of the mentioned treaty,[49] the two countries have yet to agree formally on the demarcation of their borders. Russia perceives the Tartu treaty as a merely historical document with no relevance to the present. Moscow has insisted that the relevant document on the Russian-Estonian border is a 12 January 1991 agreement on bilateral relations. Although Estonia has not moved from its insistence that the continuing validity of the Tartu treaty be recognized, it has tried to facilitate such recognition for Russia. In July 1996 Estonia proposed a draft political declaration that would affirm the recognition of the 1920 treaty without implying that Estonia could reclaim land Russia later annexed, however, Russia refused to negotiate the proposal.[50] While the possibility of arriving at a mutually acceptable settlement is very remote, many find Estonia's mulishness on the issue surprising as well as politically and practically unwise.[51] Officials of the EU and the Council of Europe have urged Estonia to resolve its border dispute with Russia, repeatedly suggesting that a resolution would be an important prerequisite for Estonia's eventual membership in the EU.[52]

The border questions are proving to be more challenging to Estonia and Latvia than to Lithuania (which has only a relatively short frontier with Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast), which faces a different situation as far as its current borders are concerned. Though it also signed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia in July 1920, it has placed less emphasis on its validity than have Estonia and Latvia. Whereas the latter countries sustained territorial losses after World War II, the administrative borders of the Republic of Lithuania in 1990 were essentially the same as those recognized by Russia in 1920.[53] Furthermore, Lithuania has not officially been questioning its

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49 See "Estonia May Give up Territorial Claims, Opposition Asserts," in *Baltic Independent*, 4 (11-17 June 1993) 165, p. 3.

50 *Omri Daily Digest*, (11 July 1996) 133.

51 "While these claims are understandable in legal and symbolic terms, they are very unwise in political and practical terms. ... A mutual effort should be made to put this irritant out of the way," Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," in *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (September/October 1994) 5, p. 82.

52 The European Commission has warned Estonian officials that it was important for Estonia to settle its border with Russia since it could become the outer limits of the EU. See Girnius "Update on Estonian-Russian Border Talks," in *Omri Daily Digest*, (15 March 1996) 54, part II.

53 It is important to note, however, that Lithuanian territory was a subject of losses in the period between 1920 and 1940. Right after the Treaty of Suwalki, which designated Vilnius and its surroundings as to Lithuania was signed on 7 October 1920, the Polish troops took over the city and the region, and maintained control until 1939. The Klaipeda region (Memel in German, which before WWI had been a part of Germany's East Prussia) had been transferred to Lithuania by the Allied Supreme Council on 24 March 1919, and Lithuanian jurisdiction over it was internationally approved by the Klaipeda Convention on 8 May 1924. On 22 March 1939, facing the risk of German invasion in the region, Lithuania ceded Klaipeda region to Germany. For the discussion of these complex events see von Rauch, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence.*

border with Kaliningrad Oblast or Russia's jurisdiction over the region. Lithuania considers the treaty on bilateral relations with Russia of 29 July 1991 as the legal document regulating, among other things, the border between the two states. Nonetheless, although the actual negotiations on the demarcation of the Lithuanian-Kaliningrad border began in the Fall of 1993, little progress, especially with regard to the sea-border,[54] has been made. In the Spring of 1996, some members of the Russian Duma expressed territorial claims with regard to the Lithuanian Klaipeda region, warning Russian negotiators "not to sign any border agreements with Lithuania unless the relevant circumstances were figured out."[55] As the Russian government has failed to comment upon this, the generally constructive relations between Russian and Lithuanian negotiators have been disturbed.

Although the issue of borders could remain essentially one of symbolic disagreement, it could be instrumental in slowing down, or even blocking, an overall process of relationship-building between the Baltic States and Russia, thus contributing to increased tension in the Baltic area. Moreover, Estonia and Latvia's claim to their historical-legal rights to the territory may well play a counterproductive role for their ethnic and national security interests. However, as all the parties to the dispute are participants in the OSCE, they are politically obliged to abide by the OSCE principles, which only allow for a change of borders and exchange of territory by peaceful means and appropriate agreements.

Inter-Baltic Dimension

In addition to Baltic-Russian frontier issues, the three Baltic States have engaged in rather serious disputes over their sea borders among themselves. The issue represents a new phenomenon, given that the three countries have mostly been viewed as a "joint venture" by the international community. The roots of the recent Lithuanian-Latvian and Latvian-Estonian disputes partly lie in the fact that the sea borders between the three republics were more administrative delineations during the Soviet era than definite demarcations. Thus, after independence, the new border demarcations had to be negotiated among the respective countries. In the Latvian-Lithuanian case the main problem was determining the borders of the economic sea zones which may contain oil fields. Moreover, since Latvia has signed oil exploration

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54 The oil field No. D-6 on the Baltic Sea shelf remains the main obstacle to the border agreement. Lithuania protested a 1995 agreement between Russian and German oil companies to exploit the oil field, arguing that the border should have first been settled. See Saulius Girnius, "No Progress in Russian, Lithuanian Sea-Border Talks," in *Omri Daily Digest*, (19 April 1996) 78, part I.

55 "N. Ryzkovas pareiske teritorines pretenzijas Lietuvai" ("N. Ryzkov Made Territorial Claims to Lithuania"), *Lietuvos Rytas*, 14 June 1996.

agreements with two foreign oil companies[56] in disputed waters claimed by both countries, the negotiations seemed deadlocked. Lithuania has been standing by its position that the sea border must be settled before any talks on oil deposits can begin.[57] Latvia, however, pressed by business interests, has been anxious to comply with the deadline for ratification of the mentioned agreements. It is likely that international mediation will be required to find a solution to the dispute that is acceptable for the interests of both countries.

The dispute between Latvia and Estonia began in the spring of 1994 when Estonian border guards started to detain Latvian vessels fishing in Estonia's unilaterally declared territorial waters in the fish-rich Gulf of Riga. The row reached boiling point in April 1996 when Latvia demarcated a line on the map and threatened to send warships to protect its fishermen in that zone if necessary;[58] it also intended to refer the dispute to an international court or arbitration. However, in mid-July, with the help of Swedish mediation,[59] the two parties managed to reach a maritime border agreement: Estonia backed down on its sea border near the island of Ruhnu in the Gulf of Riga, which it had unilaterally declared in 1993; Latvia, in turn, gave up some of its claims in the region.

Although progress in the Lithuanian-Latvian negotiations is still pending, one has to agree that the general trend in dealing with the inter-Baltic dimension of border issues is encouraging. As the Estonian-Latvian case shows, the Baltics are determined to solve border problems by diplomatic means, through negotiations and on the basis of international law. Thus, the chances of finding solutions for the Lithuanian-Latvian dispute are also good, but will take time. The best conflict prevention tool in these inter-Baltic contrasts is their understanding that only good neighborly relations and cooperation with each other will pave their way to the EU.

4. Military Imbalance

It may be argued that in today's relatively favorable political climate, the issues of a military nature, such as huge military potential in the vicinity of the Baltic States and Russian military transit through the territory of Lithuania, can hardly be seen as an independent conflict-generating factor. What they do represent, however, is a factor

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56 The license agreement between Latvia and Amoco/Opab companies was signed on 31 October 1995. The agreement enters into force after it is ratified by the Latvian Parliament and the border issue between Latvia and Lithuania is resolved. In case the mentioned conditions fail to be complied with by 31 October 1996, the two companies enjoy the right to discontinue the venture. See "Latvia's Golden Coin in the Sea," in *The Baltic Times*, 15-21 August 1996, p. 12.

57 See *Omri Daily Digest*, (19 September 1996) 182.

58 See "Update: Latvian-Estonian Border Talks," in *Omri Daily Digest*, (9 April 1996) 70, part II.

59 Sweden hosted seven secret meetings of Latvian and Estonian officials during which the details of the agreement were worked out.

of uncertainty for the Baltic States. It has been feared, for example, that in certain situations the high concentration of forces near the Estonian border might encourage an ethnic conflict in Narva, or that a semi-transparent military transit from Russia to Kaliningrad might eventually be used by Russia for political intimidation or provocative purposes. Russia is a militarily preponderant power in the area, and this leads to the most important task: to build confidence and stability among unequal partners. Let's take a closer look at those issues and the policies aimed at their management.

Militarized Vicinity

Part of the problem relates directly to the military concentrations near the borders of the Baltic States. This issue surfaced after the May 1996 Vienna conference reviewing the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The three Baltic countries, as with Sweden and Finland, are not parties to this treaty. The Baltic region, however, seems to suffer perverse military effects, rather than receive advantages from the CFE Treaty, they did not seem to have any major security concerns, provided the treaty was correctly implemented.[60] As of mid-1993, however, they followed Russia's reiterated dissatisfaction with the CFE treaty flank limits with particular interest.[61] Finally, pointing to the changed geopolitical situation and well-known problems it had been facing in Northern Caucasus, Russia succeeded in reaching an agreement with other treaty countries that has effectively changed the previous flank-related requirements. These changes introduced conditions for an increase in the concentration of the Russian armed forces on the borders of the Baltic States. (See Annexes: Map 3.) The Pskov Oblast, bordering on Estonia and Latvia, was exempted from the flank limits and permitted a deployment of 600 armored combat vehicles as opposed to the previous ceilings of 180. Not surprisingly, the

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60 The CFE Treaty set equal ceilings within its Atlantic-to-the-Urals application zone on the treaty-limited equipment (TLE) of the groups of states parties, originally the NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states (now 30 states parties), was essential for launching surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive operations. The reduction of excess TLE was to be completed in three one-year phases by 16 November 1995.

61 In autumn 1993, Russia and Ukraine formally opened discussions on the flank zone. Because of flank limitations, Russia was allowed to deploy only 18% of its TLE in the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts (MDs), together covering more than half of its European territory. The deployment asymmetry may be illustrated by the fact that Russia could have 6 times more tanks and 15 times more armored combat vehicles in the tiny Kaliningrad region than in the whole flank zone. Regarding the flank issue in 1993 and 1994, see Zdzislav Lachowski, "Conventional Arms Control and Security-Cooperation in Europe," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*, pp. 571-574; "Conventional Arms Control and Security Dialogue in Europe," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, pp. 769-773; "Conventional Arms Control and Security Cooperation in Europe," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1996*, pp. 718-725 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 1995, 1996). See also R. A. Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings," in *International Security*, 19 (Spring 1995) 4, p. 118-144.

Baltics have reacted with alarm and gloom. Shortly after the new limits became known, the three Baltic Heads of Government noted in a Joint Statement "the lack of political consultations" before and during the negotiations between the CFE member states and "other legitimately concerned countries." They called for "political support and increased technical assistance" from the United States and West European countries in integrating the Baltic States into NATO and European institutions.[62] Similar concerns were also raised by the three Presidents during the meeting with their US counterpart, and also by Baltic parliamentarians during the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in late July. The Estonian government has also decided to double its military expenditures.[63]

One has to note that, although presumably intended to favour Russia's interests in the North Caucasus, the amendments to the CFE treaty have, indeed, also increased the military imbalance in the Baltic area, which is less exposed to the arms control regime than most of the rest of Europe. Interestingly, neither Russia nor the other Baltic Sea littoral states seem to be eager to initiate any regional arms control measures, but for two different reasons: the latter fear domination by Russia in such an arrangement; the former is rather satisfied with having the right to have a huge military arsenal, especially in the Kaliningrad region.

As a result of the dissolution of the USSR, the region of Kaliningrad – a territory of 15,100 square kilometers with about 902,000 inhabitants – came into existence as an enclave of Russia surrounded by Lithuania, Poland and the Baltic Sea.[64] The neighboring countries, but especially Lithuania – given its historical ties to the region and the issue of land access – are anxious about what happens in Kaliningrad, mainly because of the high concentration of forces in the area. This concern has several dimensions:

- Firstly, the validity and transparency of information on military deployment in the region has been far from satisfactory. Estimates of the number of troops there vary from 100,000 to 200,000, yet the data given by Russia to Lithuanian officials refers to about 40,000 troops.

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62 See *Joint Statement of the Heads of Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Latvia on the Vienna conclusions of the Review Conference on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty*, Vilnius, 16 June 1996.

63 The latter fact has been reported in *The Washington Times* as quoted in *Transition*, 12 July 1996, p. 67. For more information on the Baltic responce to the changes regarding the CFE flank limits, see *The Baltic Times*, (4-16 July 1996) 16.

64 Before World War II, the area formed the Northern half of the German province of East Prussia, with its center in Konigsberg. Stalin demanded and received the region at the Potsdam Conference in 1945, citing the need for an ice-free Russian port on the Baltic and for some territorial reward at the expense of Germany. Although the area was assigned to Soviet administration, its permanent status was to be determined in a final conference ending World War II, which never took place. See Raymond A. Smith, "The Status of the Kaliningrad Oblast under International Law," in *Lituanus*, Spring 1992, pp. 7-52.

- Secondly, such a concentration exacerbates the already formidable problems of supply and reinforcement – raising the need for regulation of military transit, both in the air and on the ground. Moreover, since the air space of the Kaliningrad region is too narrow for adoption of a dense air posture, Russia often uses the adjacent air space.[65] Such actions do anything but reduce the level of inter-state confidence and induce appropriate countermeasures to be used.
- Thirdly, under the CFE treaty, Russia is formally allowed to deploy sizable armed forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast, as the area is not under the flank limits;[66] this gives Russia no real incentive to make moves towards reduction of troops in the region.

Transit through Lithuania

Lithuania is a transit country for the land link between mainland Russia and the Kaliningrad region. As a result, it is particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. In 1994, Russia doubled import duties on Lithuanian goods, trying to compel it to sign an agreement on military transit to and from the Kaliningrad region. This turned the problem into the most debated political issue in Lithuania.

The broad political consensus that emerged claimed that, from a national security perspective, any such agreement was extremely undesirable. Some opposition parties were generically opposed to Russia's military transit through Lithuania, arguing that Russia might provoke incidents and then use them against the country. Moreover, in their view, there was no military necessity for Russia to use the transit route through Lithuania at all. And last, but certainly, not least, they believed military transit could hinder Lithuania's integration into Western security structures.[67] Though not all political forces in Lithuania were against military transit in principle, they were, however, convinced of the futility of any agreement with Russia to this effect. All they believed was needed were unilaterally established general rules for military and other dangerous transit applicable to all countries.[68] The most important of these rules, approved by the government in October 1994, was the requirement to obtain

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65 The Lithuanian Air Force service reported at least 16 illegal and unnotified intersections of the sovereign air space of the republic by Russian military aircraft and helicopters from January 1995 to July 1996.

66 Kaliningrad military district is the only remnant of the enlarged European region which, in the original CFE context, consisted of the Baltic, Belorusian and Kiev military districts. Accordingly, the quota for the Oblast is 4200 tanks, 8760 amored combat vehicles and 3235 artillery systems, and is by no means at capacity. See *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, p. 774.

67 There was also an argument that in 1995 Russia will have been able to use the ferry line from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad, built specifically for this purpose. See Evaldas Nekrasas, "Lithuania's Security Concerns and Responses," in Atis Lejins and Daina Bleiere, eds., *The Baltic States: Search for Security* (Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 72.

68 For more on this political debate see ibid., p. 72.

special permission from Lithuanian authorities for each border crossing. Thus, the Lithuanian position was that it did not have any commitments to Russia concerning military transit and that Russia did not have any indisputable rights to it.[69] Yielding to Russian pressure, however, the government agreed to prepare a bilateral document specifying some financial and other details of Russian military transit, but Russia wanted a comprehensive political agreement. The difference between the positions risked breaking the negotiations and destabilizing the rather moderate relations between the two countries.

International response to the problem was largely in support of Russia's position, pressing Vilnius to reach some accommodation with Moscow on the issue. In the middle of 1994 some Western politicians urged Lithuania to sign an agreement on military transit, and at the end of the year, the embassies of the EU countries in Lithuania expressed their wish for a concluded agreement. A compromise appeared to be possible in January 1995, when it was announced that a temporary solution had been reached. First, Russia agreed to give Lithuania most favored nation status, and, second, Lithuania agreed that until December 1995 Russia's military transit to and from Kaliningrad would be continued according to regulations established in the old Lithuanian-Russian agreement on the transit of Russian troops withdrawing from Germany;[70] the regulations were later extended to January 1997.

In the short-term the solution of the transit issue may be seen as a constructive compromise on the part of both Lithuania and Russia. In the long run, however, if the demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad region does not move forward, Russian military transit through Lithuania will continue to represent a regular potential source of uncertainty in the area.

III. Concluding Remarks: Prospects for Enhanced Stability

1. A Success Story?

To what extent, in terms of conflict prevention, can the case of the Baltic States be called a success story? If we accept the widely-held understanding that differences, divergence of interests, values and controversy are not negative *per se*, but rather the very essence of politics, then when we say "prevention of conflict" we actually mean the "prevention of violent conflict," not prevention of all contrasts. In this regard, the most visible feature in terms of conflict and its prevention in and around the Baltic

69 Speech by Lithuania's Deputy Foreign Minister Albinas Januska at the opening of preparatory conference of the OSCE 1995 Summit in Budapest. See *Lietuvos Rytas*, 12 October 1994.

70 The latter agreement had specified the use of Lithuania's railway system and other transportation facilities, especially the ferry line from Mukran (Rügen) to Klaipeda for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany. Although Russia had completed the pullout in August 1994, this agreement was in force until 31 December 1994.

States has been the tradition of non-violence in the political culture of these countries, both earlier in the 20th century and in the recent past.[71] At first glance, it might appear that the Baltics, especially Latvia and Estonia with their large non-indigenous populations, would be probable candidates for a potentially explosive area of tension which could erupt into violence and eventually armed conflict. The reality, however, is that at the time of writing this worst-case scenario has not materialized; diplomacy and compromise rather than violence have prevailed in the region. A closer look at the situation suggests that the credit for this record of non-violence should certainly go to the presence, or absence, of several factors in the Baltic region.

Some of the factors that have accounted for non-violent development in the area are structural or systemic. One can argue that the latter, which are by and large less susceptible to deliberate human manipulation, have played an important role in mitigating the potentially conflictual situations in the Baltics. What are these factors?

First, in the interwar era, the Baltic States established a precedent for constitutional government and representative democracy that served as a basis for gradualism in Baltic politics after they regained independence. Therefore the early adoption of constitutions in the Baltic States introduced a significant element of stability in the daily political life of the societies. Ethnic policies, expressed in the citizenship legislations of the Baltic countries may be analyzed as potential factors of inter-ethnic discontent. On the other hand, the adoption of these legal documents also plays a crucial stabilizing role, for they constitute a factual object to be debated, endorsed, corrected, changed or upheld. Hence the argument is that *the legacy of the pre-war statehood of the Baltics facilitated the progress of political development and state-building after these countries regained independence* and helped the elaboration of relatively coherent policies for dealing with conflict-generating problems.

Another non-manipulable factor has to do with the fact that, since the minorities in the Baltic States are overwhelmingly recent immigrants, *the major ethnic issues in the Baltics lack deep-seated historical antagonisms, "ancient hatreds" and centuries-old feuds.* Though the recent Baltic experience of Soviet ethnic policies does not exactly facilitate inter-ethnic harmony, in essence, ethnic relations remain negotiable and tend towards improvement.

Other factors, such as *the aims, attitudes, and behavior of the disputants or the timing and skill of third-party involvement,* are subject to human manipulation, and

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71 Since the Gorbachev era, no one has been killed in the Baltic States for ethnic or political reasons, except by Soviet repressive forces. The two major instances of regime-sponsored violence occurred in Vilnius (15 dead) and Riga (6 dead) in January 1991 as part of the then Soviet Union's ill-fated crackdown in the Baltics and then again in July 1991 at a Lithuanian border crossing (7 dead). See *The Baltic Independent*, 16-22 August 1991, p. 1.

thus have realistically been targets for preventive action in the Baltics.[72] It is emphasized, that "peaceful outcomes are more likely when the parties to the dispute are moderate in their words, actions, and policies, make conciliatory gestures, and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations and bargaining to resolve the issues in dispute."[73] In this respect, the chances of reaching a peaceful outcome in the case of controversy over the interests of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia, but also regarding border issues, have been and remain rather good. The respective governments, on the one side, and the Russian-speaking communities, on the other, have, in most instances, displayed great restraint and have shown themselves willing to accommodate the interests of other parties through negotiation and consultation. Conflict settlement was also made possible by the successful internationalization of the issues by the Baltic States and the mounting pressure which the West brought on Moscow to convince it that its interest in cooperative relations required political compromises, not maximalist positions.

Another condition for successful conflict prevention in the Baltics has been *a prudent selection of a variety of political and diplomatic instruments* or "multifaceted action."[74] Moreover, it is noteworthy that such action has mostly been coordinated among the third parties involved. The OSCE, like the CoE, has played a major role in defusing crises arising over the issue of non-indigenous minorities in the Baltics. A fruitful interplay between a number of different OSCE instruments was established, contributing considerably to the effective settlement of disputes: as then Chairman-in-Office, Sweden conducted an intensive dialogue with Baltic governments and other OSCE governments on both troop withdrawal and the situation of the Russian-speaking population; the discussion of the troop withdrawal issue in the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) helped put the government of Russia under pressure; on citizenship and language issues, the HCNM pleaded the case of the larger European community of nations with Baltic governments; the OSCE Missions to Estonia and Latvia assisted the HCNM in the preparatory and implementation stages of his quiet diplomacy operations.

The presence of leverage is another factor which has contributed to the successful conflict prevention effort in the Baltic States. Without it, preventive action could have been reduced to appeals which the conflicting parties could have heeded or rejected without having to pay for a negative response or gaining an advantage from a positive one. For example, leverage existed when a compromise over the status of the

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72 For more detailed theoretical study on manipulable and nonmanipulable factors explaining why emerging political disputes do not always lead to violence see Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 89-90.

73 Ibid., p. 111.

74 Ibid., p. 104.

Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia was being worked out. The incentive for reaching a compromise there was a powerful one: not to do so could have risked further prospects of closer relations with and integration into the EU and the North Atlantic Alliance; equally, the lack of a will to compromise would have led, most obviously, to a delay in the departure of Russian armed forces – both issues of major strategic concern. Analogously, Russia was provided with an incentive to keep to schedule with its troop pullout by the threat that US and other Western economic aid would otherwise have been withdrawn. Yet another instance in which leverage has a certain role to play is the future settlement of the border issues, both between the Baltics and Russia and among the Baltic States themselves.

2. Prospects for the Future

The absence of violence in the Baltics, however, does not necessarily mean the absence of issues that could lead to serious conflict. The questions of ethnic populations in Estonia and Latvia, the border issues, both between Baltics and Russia and among the Baltic States, as well as uncertainty pertaining to the Baltic States' militarized vicinity are matters present in Baltic domestic and international agendas. Therefore, the continual need for confidence-building policies by the Baltic States, as well as for preventive efforts by the international community, and a certain improvement of both, seems to remain essential. These basic requirements may be further elaborated by suggesting several policy areas of which the pursuance and eventual advancement would enhance stability in the Baltic States.

Firstly, the crucial role in preventing conflict has to be played by the Baltic States themselves by continuing and improving their actions and policies based on both principle and compromise. An example would be the policies towards Russian-speakers. It is correct that the Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies place them inside the mainstream of European practice, for they are not fundamentally different from the more liberal provisions of Sweden, France and Britain, on the one hand, and the exclusionary approaches favored by Germany and Switzerland, on the other.[75] But the regulation of nationality is not exclusively a legal question, it is also political. In the long run the presence in Estonia and Latvia of a large proportion of the population without citizenship and the right to participate actively in political life that nationals enjoy, may have unwanted consequences and eventually lead to instability and conflict. Moreover, the burdensome requirements in acquiring Latvian or Estonian citizenship rather encourage non-citizens to become citizens of the Russian Federation. It is unlikely that such a development would promote stability, as it could

75 For comparative study on citizenship policies in the Baltics and other European countries see Chinn and Truex, "The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics," pp. 133-146.

provoke Russian interference in the country's internal affairs in order to protect its own citizens. Experience has shown that Russia emphasizes diplomatic multilateral efforts in dealing with ethnic issues, instead of taking unilateral action. However, defense of the so-called Russian speakers in the Baltic States is a stable component of Russian foreign policy strategy and even, at least formally, of its military strategy.[76] It is not entirely inconceivable that this component could take on strength if there were political shifts in Russia. The Baltics do not have a great ability to influence Russia's desire to use the Russian speakers as a tool to serve Moscow's political interests, but that does not mean that they are entirely powerless in the matter. Focussing not so much on averting a Russian threat as on minimising Baltic vulnerability to that threat may be the formula.

If the main incentive for inter-ethnic problems in the Baltics stems from Russia's policy of manipulation,[77] then the primary objective of the Baltic States should be to create conditions for non-indigenous populations that would encourage them to rely on existing legislative mechanisms in their residence countries when seeking solutions to their perceived problems, rather then turning to the motherland for political or military protection. Confidence-building measures undertaken by local elites and governments are the most effective instruments to this end. Such measures must be appropriate to the needs of those who feel vulnerable to the majority-backed state. To reassure ethnic people about their future, one has to make it easier for those who wish to integrate to do so. Acknowledging and showing respect for differences and agreeing to share resources, state positions, and political power with ethnic people provide incentives for cooperation and consolidation along political lines, not ethnic symbols. This helps the establishment of a political nation and reduces the opportunities for ethnic conflict.

Secondly, the existing institutions and mechanisms of the OSCE, e.g. its premises for inclusive European security dialogue, the HCNM and the missions, have demonstrated their usefulness in the Baltic States. For example, Estonia has sometimes been referred to as "the success story of the OSCE." Obviously, as already mentioned, it was not the structure of the institution but rather the structure of the conflict – the level of it, the issues and commitments – which determined the appropriate results of conflict prevention in the Baltic States. However, it has

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76 See "Voyennaya Doctryna Rossyi" (Russia's Military Doctrine), in *Rossiyskye Vesti*, 18 October 1993, pp. 1-3.

77 Richard Rose and William Maley, "Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States?," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 3 (15 July 1994) 28. According to the results of the surveys in the Baltic States reported in the article, there was not so much conflict between the Baltic peoples and the Russian speaking population in the area as was often suggested in Moscow and elsewhere; see also William Maley, "Does Russia Speak for Baltic Russians?," in *The World Today*, January 1995, pp. 4-6.

undoubtedly been and will continue to be in the future advantageous to have the OSCE at hand as an institution for legitimate international engagement in sub-regional conflict prevention. The OSCE has also been an asset in strengthening European military stability through such instruments as military Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). Arrangements concerning peacetime military activities increase knowledge and transparency, prevent misunderstandings, and forestall the use of military pressure. From the perspective of the Baltic States, there may be room for improvement of this OSCE dimension. On the one hand, the international community has to be able to ensure that agreed measures, among others, the mechanism for unusual military activities, work in crisis situations. On the other hand, "the flank rules" amendments of the CFE Treaty and the likelihood of its further modifications, but also a certain unpredictability of the military developments in the Kaliningrad region, suggests that sub-regional application of the existing CSBMs in the Baltic Sea area could be constructed.[78] Such an eventual arrangement, functioning within the OSCE framework, would not substitute for but rather strengthen and complement current all-European arms control developments. Consequently, it would aim at confidence-building with a clear conflict-prevention function.[79]

Thirdly, since the stability and peace in the Baltic region continue to be heavily influenced by Russia's domestic and external political evolution, Western policies with regard to Russia play an important role. The EU and NATO have been cautious in their approach to the disputes between the Baltics and Russia at least in part because of the problems of dealing with the latter; the fact that Russia has the means to impose its will by force (with respect to the Balts) but no prospect of integration into the EU or NATO, reduces the EU's leverage and invites caution on the part of NATO. In this context, the development of a NATO – Russian partnership remains a sound and essential goal, the accomplishment of which would meet the interests of the Baltic States. Obviously, the prospects for such a partnership, and thus for stability in the Baltics, as well as in Europe at large, depend in no small measure on Russia's ability to develop negotiated relationships of mutual benefit with its partners and neighbors. But for that to happen, Russia must maintain a minimum of political stability at home.

Finally, an important aspect of preventive policy in the Baltics has to do with the role of the Baltic States' westward integration process. Integration into the Euro-

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78 For more details on eventual Baltic Sea regional CSBMs, see Renatas Norkus, "Enhancing Stability in the Baltic Sea Region. Lithuanian View," in Axel Krohn, ed., *The Baltic Sea Region. National and International Security Perspectives* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), pp. 61-71.

79 A similar initiative has been analysed by Olav F. Knudsen and Iver B. Neumann. See Olav F. Knudsen and Iver B. Neumann, "Sub-regional Security Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area. An Exploratory Study," in *NUPI Report*, (March 1995) 189.

Atlantic security community is a foreign policy priority of the Baltic States. Thus, prospects of membership, primarily in the EU, but also in NATO, clearly represent a positive inducement for settlement of any problems which might delay or postpone the integration of the Baltics. So far this "carrot" has proved to be rather effective in practice. Though Western institutions have been rather slow or "careful" in drawing the Baltic States closer, an "open door" policy towards them now appears to be the trend in both the EU and NATO. The clearly stated intention to eventually admit the Baltics into the EU has made them more responsive to external advice and increased the European Union's leverage. The NATO approach towards the Baltic States is still evolving.

This, however, brings up a critical issue, namely that the prospects for preventing conflict in the Baltics are strongly determined by the degree of political support they receive from their Western partners. Individually and collectively the Western European countries have a tremendous impact on whether preventive action is taken. The Baltic States have historically enjoyed close relations with the West, especially the US and the Nordic countries. In the past, morality found common cause with legality in that most Western nations had never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltics. But at some critical juncture in Baltic history, morality and legality collided with the Realpolitik of Western governments – what is often referred to as the "Baltic dilemma."[80] This has important repercussions for the security perspectives of the Baltic States today. In Lithuania at least, it is a common understanding that the most eminent risk to its security is not so much Russia itself with all its instability but rather Western hesitation about where "to place" the Baltic States.[81]

80 For more on the "Baltic dilemma" see Maris Mantenieks, "The Baltic Dilemma," in *Foreign Affairs* (Comment and Correspondence), 69 (Summer 1990) 3, pp. 167-169.

81 Nekrasas, "Lithuania's Security Concerns and Responses," p. 62.

6. Responding to Conflicts in Georgia: A Need for Prevention?

Sopiko Shubladze

Dialectically, in parallel with the disintegration of the Soviet Union the former Soviet republics embarked on the process of independence and ethnic groups within those republics increased their demands for autonomy and self-determination. This has led to disputes between ethnic minorities and central governments in many of the Newly Independent States. However, local ethnic clashes are only one of several unstable factors in Central Asia and the Caucasus as they are closely linked to a number of transregional components, among them the powerful influences of Russia, Iran and Turkey. The newly asserted cultural-religious identities and the newly established trade routes are increasingly determining the dynamics of an emerging strategic center in the South of the Russian Federation, with American oil and gas companies in a prominent position.

From a Moscow perspective the stakes in this region are rising. It is no wonder that President Yeltsin is asking his partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to wake up and take on their responsibilities:

> "Aren't we infected with the virus of political complacency? I suppose that we should pay more attention to the issues of ensuring security and developing military cooperation. This is all the more necessary because of the continued attempts to create certain power centres in the territory that used to be the Soviet Union. If not this, what else is then behind the maneuvers around the Caspian Sea? Yes, quite a few problems have accumulated in this sphere, and they must be solved, taking into consideration the long-term interests of the countries of the region, in the first place. I am sure that none of us needs a 'new Persian Gulf' on our borders."[1]

Certainly, it is this interplay of long-standing ethnic rivalries and more recent transregional interests which could form a potentially explosive set of events but which could also be used to develop new ways of stabilizing cooperation.

The Caucasian state of Georgia represents this mixture of local (ethnic) dispute over territorial rights and political autonomy as well as an overriding strategic economic interest in the region. This is being expressed through plans such as the construction of an important gas pipeline from Baku at the Caspian Sea over Georgian territory to the Black Sea. In order to identify signs of potential violent escalation early on, this contribution analyzes the political and ethnic dynamics in Georgia and suggests elements for response. Of the many conceivable critical

1 Quoted from the translation of President Boris Yeltsin's speech at the CIS Summit Session, 29 March 1997.

situations which are discussed in the following article the re-ignition of the fighting between ethnic Georgians and the people of Abkhazia seems to be the most dangerous and the most imminent. Given the failures of the past how can this case be perceived to be a conflict prevention policy success story?

I. Potential for Violent Conflicts in Georgia

The conflicts throughout Georgia are inter-linked politically. Nevertheless, each one of them merits separate attention as it portrays different characteristics in terms of sources, goals, actors involved, and instruments used. This study concentrates on the ethnically based political disputes as they may evolve from the various minorities (Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians, Azeri, Adjarians) on the one side and the Georgians on the other. Will the Abkhazians and the Ossetians go back to their war of the early 1990s with the forces lead by Tbilisi (post-violence conflict prevention cases)? Will the Armenian minorities, the Azeri minorities or the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria be dragged into violent conflict against the Georgian side for the first time (potential pre-violence conflict prevention cases)?

1. Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Post-Violence Cases?

The violation of human rights and political discrimination are the primary sources of conflict in Georgia. Ethnic minorities play an important role in Georgia, both with respect to their numbers and to their geographic distribution. Almost 30% of the population is of non-Georgian origin. Abkhazians were a distinct minority not only within Georgia but also within the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.[2]

They have, however, become the majority in their own region, following the massive emigration of ethnic Georgians during and after the Abkhazian-Georgian war at the beginning of the 1990s. This contrasts with the Ossetians in the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia who have always been, and remain, an ethnic majority within their own region.[3] The claim of independence of these two areas has been a major challenge for Tbilisi. Together the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia amount to 18% of the current territory

2 Also, on the dynamics of the growth of the Abkhazian population in the autonomous republic, see *The Historical, Political and Legal Aspects of the Conflict in Abkhazia* (Tbilisi: Samshoblo Publishers Press, 1994).

3 According to the Major Results of the All-Union population census in 1939, the share of Ossetians in the Autonomous Region was 68% while Georgians accounted for 26%. These numbers remained remarkably stable for over forty years with insignificant changes. According to the 1989 census, Ossetians accounted for two-thirds (66,61%) of the population and Georgians for the other third (29,44%). The remaining 4% is made up of Russians, Armenians and Jews.

of Georgia. The perspective that nearly a fifth of their perceived territorial extent would be transferred to other states, or dislocated from its present jurisdiction, has worried the Georgians all along. Georgian territorial concerns and Abkhazian and Ossetian strife for identity and independence have marked Georgia's internal policy in the last years.

Table1 – Population of Abkhazia in 1989

Whole population	525,061	100.0%
Georgians	239,872	45.7%
Abkhazians	93,267	17.8%
Armenians	76,541	14.6%
Russians	74,914	14.3%
Greeks	14,664	2.8%
Ukrainians	11,665	2.2%
Belorussians	2,084	0.4%
Jews	1,752	0.3%
Ossetians	1,165	0.2%
Tatars	1,099	0.2%
Azeris	517	0.1%

Sources: *Natsionalnyi Sostav Naselenia SSSR* (*National census of the population of the USSR*), Moscow 1991.

When, at the outset of the 1990s, the Ossetian and Abkhazian disputes turned into violent conflicts, the international organizations and their resulting conflict prevention policy did not address them at an early stage of their escalation. The United Nations (UN) did not (and, under international law, could not) become involved in the crisis until after violence had occurred. Although there was an early warning of the conflict almost nothing was done to prepare for it. Politically, the Soviet Union's veto right prevented any attempt by members of the Security Council to draw attention to these situations. Legally, the traditional restrictive principle of non-interference in internal affairs prevailed. International action in these regions became possible only when the UN was sure that the Soviet Union and the subsequent independent 15 republics would grant it the freedom to contribute to regional stabilization, especially in the Transcaucasian countries.

Similar reasons explain the absence of action by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as other international organizations in the initial stages of the Georgian conflicts. The OSCE was able to deal with the conflicts

in Georgia only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and after the acceptance of the Transcaucasian countries as full members of the OSCE in January 1992.[4] Georgia sent its application for admission even later and entered the OSCE only at the Council's Helsinki Additional Meeting on March 24, 1992.

Conflict in and on Abkhazia

Relations between Abkhazians and Georgians have been tense for many decades. Historically the Abkhazians have often attempted to separate from the Republic of Georgia. In 1918, the Independent Abkhazian State was established, but existed for only 40 days and was soon included in the Georgian Democratic Republic. Abkhazia's autonomy was confirmed immediately after Georgia declared its independence (May 26, 1918), even before establishing the constitution (February 21, 1921), in which the autonomy of Abkhazia was officially recognized,[5] Abkhazia enjoyed a confederate treaty-based relationship with Georgia. In February 1931, changes were made in the constitutions of both Abkhazia and Georgia, and Abkhazia became the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia.

The cultural and educational policy of Tbilisi in general, and the decision to open a Georgian branch of Sukhumi University in Abkhazia, caused a conflict between Abkhazians and Georgians in the 1980s. The restoration of two constitutions, the 1921 version of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the 1925 constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, came into conflict during the "war of laws" from 1988 to 1992, increasing the tension in the region of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. This conflict worsened under the Tbilisi leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who denied the existence of a separate Abkhazian national identity both during his leadership under Soviet rule and his presidency in the early 1990s.[6]

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4 See more on this subject in Oliver Paye and Eric Remacle, "The UN and the OSCE: Facing Conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh," in *Peace and the Sciences*, 25 (September 1994), pp. 1-18.

5 *The Constitution of Georgia*, chapter II (Tbilisi, 1992), in Georgian, pp. 107-108.

6 In December 1990, historian Vladislav Ardzinba succeeded in winning the elections as the head of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Abkhazia. A major catalyst of tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia was an all-Union referendum on 17 March 1991. The referendum was boycotted by Georgia, but the Abkhazian electorate did take part and the majority (98,6%) of those who voted (52,3%) favored remaining within a union of sovereign republics. The Georgian government threatened to dissolve the Abkhazian Parliament.
In negotiations with the Georgian government headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose domestic policy towards ethnic minorities carried much of the responsibility for the escalation of the conflict, Abkhazia was allowed to hold new parliamentary elections according to a new electoral quota. This, in fact, meant the agreement on a new election law in Abkhazia which allocated a set number of parliament seats to each ethnic group. Of the 65 parliament seats 28 were to be allocated to Abkhazians, 26 to Georgians, and 11 to other minorities. In December 1991 the new

Protesting against what they perceived as the "Georgianization" of Abkhazia, Abkhazian intellectuals and nomenclature repeatedly petitioned Moscow to separate the republic from Georgia and attach it to Russia. A "Peoples Forum of Abkhazia" was organized in 1988 and on March 18 of the following year, in the village of Likhny, the so-called Likhny Declaration proclaimed Abkhazia independent from Georgia. The rally and the declaration caused the first military clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians.[7] Georgian troops took the strategically important city of Gagra on the north-western coast of Abkhazia, close to the Russian border. By that time volunteers from the North Caucasus started arriving in Abkhazia to help the Abkhazian units.[8] Heavy fighting ended with the military victory of the Abkhazian side in September 1993 thanks to the active support of the North Caucasus as well as Russia. The results drifted far from the original objectives announced by the Georgian government and resulted in violent clashes which lasted for more than one year. The

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Parliament was elected on this basis. Although the disproportionate representation in the Supreme Council of Abkhazia was given as a compromise for remaining in the Republic of Georgia, this did not ease the tension between the Abkhazians and Georgians. The Supreme Council split into two opposing factions, and for all intents and purposes, it ceased to function.

In January 1992, Zviad Gamsakhurdia was overthrown by a military coup, which seized power in Tbilisi to hand it over shortly thereafter to Eduard Shevardnadze. International recognition of Georgia was granted in March 1992, which also implied recognition of the borders claimed by the country's government. Therefore, Abkhazia remained an autonomous republic within its territory.

On 23 July 1992, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia suspended the constitution of the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the territory of Abkhazia and reinstated the Abkhazian constitution of 1925, in which Abkhazia had the status of a sovereign republic. As the Abkhazian side reports, this was in response to the Georgian government's decision to reinstate the 1921 Georgian constitution, in which there was no specific mention of Abkhazia. However, this is not true. In the first article of the declaration, reinstating the 1921 Georgian constitution, it is emphasized that this basic law is going to be adopted, taking into consideration the current situation without changing the borders of Georgia and the status of both the Abkhazian and Adjari Autonomous Republics.

7 The decision of the Georgian State Council to send units of the National Guard to the capital of Sukhumi to protect the railway line directly provoked the violence. The Georgian side made the crucial mistake of sending armed forces to the autonomous republic. This was perceived by the Abkhazians as a violation of their rights as an autonomous republic and, thus, fighting broke out. Abkhazians opened fire on the Georgian troops deployed for the protection of the railway from terrorist acts.

8 Their support came from the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus (CPC), largely at the initiative of the Abkhazians. The CPC was set up on 11 November 1991 by representatives of 16 Caucasian peoples gathered in Sukhumi. Its initial affiliation to Abkhazia was demonstrated both by the admission of the Abkhazians into CPC and by the decision that the Abkhazians' capital would be the new center of the Confederation.

Abkhazian victory was accompanied and followed by ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia which ended in almost total exodus of the Georgian population there, some 250,000.[9]

During the 1992/93 fighting various delegations were sent by the UN and other international organizations, as well as by Russia, in order to negotiate several cease-fire agreements. The OSCE has succeeded in establishing a long term mission in Georgia. There are currently around 125 UN military observers[10] stationed at the Georgian-Abkhazian border, together with 1,500 Russian troops to monitor CIS peacekeeping forces in the region.[11] These organizations succeeded in restraining the violence for some time, but basically the Abkhazian experience showed that cease-fire agreements were abused by both sides and were used to regroup the troops and prepare for the next offensive.

Russia's Role

Together with the UN, Russia has mediated talks on the conflict. Representing the regional external actor in all the Georgian cases, Moscow became the main peace-keeper in Abkhazia.[12] Georgians have an ambivalent attitude towards Russia's role in the Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. Some blame Russia for using the existing conflict as an instrument to keep the Newly Independent States dependent upon it, with the clear aim of maintaining Russia's permanent domination in the Trans-caucasus. Others insist that there is no substitute for Russia's leading role in managing conflicts in the country. However, it is unlikely that Russia either could, or has, remained neutral towards what is happening in its own backyard, for both political and strategic reasons. Therefore, its peacekeeping efforts in Georgia could indeed be based on ulterior motives.[13]

The Russian army played a dual stabilizing and destabilizing role in the conflict, having systematically supplied financial and logistical support to the Abkhazians. The

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9 According to most sources, there are some 250,000 displaced people from Abkhazia, and the total number of the people who fled conflicting zones of Georgia and are displaced within the country varies between 280,000 and 300,000.

10 The UN has been involved in the conflict in Abkhazia not only through its efforts in monitoring the cease-fire agreements, but also through its important role in humanitarian assistance. The United Nations inter-agency humanitarian assessment mission coordinated by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs includes representatives of various UN agencies, i.e. the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

11 *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News*, 15 July 1996.

12 On 14 May 1994, the Georgian and Abkhazian sides agreed that CIS peacekeeping forces would be deployed on the border between Abkhazia and Georgia. *The United Nations and the Situation in Georgia*, Reference Paper, April 1995.

13 Dmitri Trenin, "Russian Peacemaking in Georgia," in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna Kreikemeyer and Andrei V. Zagorski, eds., *Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995).

Russian's direct involvement in the first few months of the conflict is unclear. The Georgian nation of 3,5 million people should have been able to protect its territory from a minority which consisted of less than 100,000, and whose total troop strength has been estimated at around 5,000 and the North Caucasus component, even if the Georgian army was poorly disciplined and badly trained.

Regardless of the role of the Russian military, the Russian political leadership has been supporting the Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze (albeit only after Tbilisi's decision to join the CIS in October 1993). Yeltsin has repeatedly affirmed his support for Georgia's territorial integrity. Although the involvement of the Russian Federation in the internal conflicts of Georgia is apparent, it has to be assumed that after 1993 Russia played a positive role in reducing tensions. In fact, all three cease-fires between the Georgian government and Abkhazian separatists have been reached through Russia's brokerage.

In an attempt to explain Russia's role, the existence of two Russias has been assumed: a reactionary Russia and a democratic one. The first one increases the potential for conflicts, while the second tries to prevent them. Uniting the simple dual logic of the two Moscows' behavior is the preservation of its own strategic interests in the Caucasus.[14] Moscow had been concerned that if the Abkhazians lost, Shevardnadze would drive the Russians out of Georgia, and seaports and bases would be lost to Russia. At the same time, the people in the North Caucasus area of Russia would see this as a betrayal by Russia and this might trigger a conflict in the North Caucasus, with the result that the Russians might lose their bases there as well.[15] The war in Chechnya started to change the situation as well as Russia's attitude toward the conflicts in Georgia. Although Abkhazians, South Ossetians and Chechnians are ethnically not strongly linked, all of them represent Caucasian peoples, and they support each other in their separate movements towards independence. Many Chechnians fought in Abkhazia against Georgia, and there are some Abkhazians supporting the Chechnians against the Russian army. Therefore, it became almost impossible for Russia to simultaneously back the Abkhazians and oppose the Chechnians.

Given the potential for conflict in Georgia, even if the most important factor for the successful prevention of future conflict escalation (the willingness to compromise of those parties directly involved) can be reached, however this might still be heavily dependent on the extent of Russia's involvement.

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14 Revaz Gachechiladze, "Geopolitics and Georgia," in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 6 (December 1994), 12.

15 George Mirsky, *Russia in the Midst of Change* (Institute for National Strategic Studies, July 1994).

Recent Development of the Conflict

At present (April 1997) negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict are deadlocked: the Georgians have proposed a federal agreement, under which Abkhazia (and Adjaria) would have their own constitutions, legislatures and executive and judicial systems, whereas the Abkhazians have been holding out for a confederation. In Tbilisi it already has been stated several times, that, if negotiations fail, the Georgian side will not exclude the possibility of finding "other means to deal with the problem."[16] Does this mean that the efforts to find a solution for the Abkhazian issue may fail?

One indicator for the calming of tensions was Vladislav Ardzinba's, the Abkhazian President, response to Eduard Shevardnadze's proposal to discuss the future status of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian President readily agreed to a face-to-face meeting to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with central Georgian authorities.[17] The meeting would have been held under the Russian and UN representatives' supervision. However, it is still not clear whether or not the meeting will take place.

What is clear is that the Abkhazian side is unwilling to restore Georgian jurisdiction in the Gali region at the Abkhazian-Georgian border. This appeared to have been agreed upon during the negotiations in August 1996, which extended the mandate for the Russian peacekeeping forces.[18] Large-scale exercises of the Georgian military, including air and naval forces, took place shortly after Abkhazian army exercises near Sukhumi that were held under the supervision of Abkhazian Defense Minister Vladimir Mikanba and the President Vladislav Ardzinba.[19] The Georgian exercises were attended by representatives of the OSCE mission to Georgia, by representatives of the UN mission of military observers, by the head of CIS peacekeeping forces in conflicting zones of Georgia, General Yakushev, and by the commander of the headquarters of the Defense Ministry of Abkhazia, Vladimir Arshba.[20]

Obviously, the exercises were a demonstration of the new capabilities of the Georgian military. And it was probably also by design that they took place in the western part of Georgia, not far away from Abkhazia. Most likely, the aim was to intimidate the leaders of the separatist regime. The Georgian side demonstrated that it was continuing its efforts to build up its military forces. The political Tbilisi may have considered a demonstration of the military's improved combat power to be a

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16 *Segodnia*, (15 August 1996) 146.

17 *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News*, 15 July 1996.

18 The Abkhazian position became clear when the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Pastukhov, visited Abkhazia. See *Segodnia*, (24 August 1996) 153.

19 Liz Fuller in *OMRI Daily Digest*, (6 August, 1996) 151.

20 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 147 (1226), 10 August.1996.

measure of bringing Abkhazians to the bargaining table, but this type of showing may have rather intensified the tensions and forced the military leaders within the two conflicting parties to improve their military capabilities in preparation for renewed warfare.

Tensions between Sukhumi and Tbilisi escalated in late 1996 because of Vladislav Ardzinba's decision to hold new parliamentary elections on 23 November 1996. The Georgian government expressed its opposition to holding elections before ethnic Georgians are allowed to return to their homeland. The UN Security Council had also called on the leadership of Abkhazia to postpone elections until a political settlement is reached on the region's status vis-à-vis the Tbilisi government.[21]

Nevertheless, the elections took place as Vladislav Ardzinba had announced. Russia did not come out with a clear position on the Abkhazian plans. On 2 October 1996 the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution condemning the Abkhazian parliamentary elections as illegal. In the same resolution, Russia's mediation role in the conflict was dubbed unsuccessful, and a proposition was made to create a state commission to reassess Georgia's entire policy towards Russia, including the issue of Russian military bases. Thus, the Georgian parliament threatened to annul the agreement, which allows Russia to have four military bases on the territory of Georgia, as it was conditional on Russian assistance in reasserting Georgian jurisdiction over Abkhazia.

At this point the situation in Georgia regarding the Abkhazian case is developing towards an escalation of conflict, rather than its prevention. Hope, however remains, due to the recent official announcements from both sides of their inclination to resolve the conflict by peaceful means only. Vladislav Ardzinba stated his willingness to continue negotiations under the aegis of the UN and with Russian mediation, and Eduard Shevardnadze said, he believes the "the UN, European Structure and Russia have not yet exhausted the possiblities for a political settlement"[22] in Abkhazia.

Conflict in and around South Ossetia

The situation in Georgia at the end of the 1980s was characterized by a massive movement toward independence. The leader of the national independence movement, later the first president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, based his popularity on a nationalist agenda, which made ethnic minorities feel threatened and led them to organize themselves. In the spring of 1989, Alan Chochiev, the leader of the popular front ("Adamon Nykhas") formed by the South Ossetian nationalists in 1988, started to encourage Abkhazians in their campaign against the opening of a Georgian branch

21 Fuller, in *OMRI Daily Digest*, (23 October 1996) 206.
22 Ibid.

at Sukhumi University. When he continued his support of the Abkhazians in their struggle for independence against Georgia, this caused the first clashes between Ossetians and Georgians in the Autonomous Region. The fighting between the Ossetians and the Georgians,[23] however, did start only after the Georgian government abolished South Ossetian autonomy in December 1990.[24]

The war, which lasted for a year and a half, was stopped by the cease-fire agreement negotiated between the presidents of Russia and Georgia in June 1992. This agreement established joint Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the OSCE which became the first international actor to address

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23 South Ossetians are largely Orthodox Christians like the ethnic Georgians, but the Georgian and Ossetian languages belong to different language families. According to one version, South Ossetians are Indo-European descendants of the Alan ethnos with ancient Persian origins.

24 Tensions were aggravated after the 14th session of the 20th convocation of the Regional Soviet of the People's Deputies of South Ossetia adopted the declaration transforming the South Ossetian Autonomous Region into the "South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic" (20 September 1990). On 21 September 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia annulled this "illegal and unconstitutional" resolution of the Regional Soviet of South Ossetia. Nevertheless, the 15th session of the 20th convocation of the Regional Soviet (16 October 1990) confirmed its previous decision and elected the provisional executive committee of the so-called republic, adopted a provisional statute of election and formed the central election commission.

Despite the Georgian administration's official warning, the election of the Supreme Soviet of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic was held on 9 December 1990, followed by a session of the Supreme Soviet on 11 December. The Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia retaliated by adopting a law on 11 December 1990, abrogating the statute of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region which was created in 1922 against the will of the indigenous Georgian population of the region and to the detriment of the interests of the entire Georgia.

On 7 January 1991, Soviet President Gorbachev issued a decree condemning the South Ossetian declaration of independence and the Georgian parliament's abolition of Ossetian autonomy and called for the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the area. The Georgian parliament voted to refuse to comply. In May 1991, the Soviet of South Ossetia voted to abolish the self-proclaimed South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic and to restore the Region (Oblast) status under the Russian Federation. This was promptly rejected by the Georgian Supreme Soviet's presidium.

The Georgian parliament's decision to authorize the use of militia formations in order to enforce its decision to abolish the autonomy of South Ossetia and its deployment of the National Guard in the region's capital, Tskhinvali, and other parts of its territory caused the final escalation of tensions. The intensive fighting in the region resulted in thousands of deaths and the movement of tens of thousands of displaced persons. The South Ossetians were able to push Georgian forces out of their territory with the help of North Ossetia and the Russian military.

On 7 December 1991, South Ossetia officially declared its independence and elected Torez Kulumbegov as the Chairman of the Parliament.

In the fall of 1991, President Gamsakhurdia had found himself faced with paramilitary opposition in Tbilisi and after just seven months in power, he was overthrown in January 1992. The newly formed Georgian government under Eduard Shevardnadze quickly showed signs of taking a more conciliatory line, condemning his predecessor Gamsakhurdia's approach to the problem in South Ossetia. On 24 June 1992, Shevardnadze and Yeltsin met in Sochi to discuss the question of South Ossetia. A cease-fire agreement was signed by the two leaders. (See Dennis Sammut, *The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance: Confidence Building Matters, 3* (London: VERTIC, November 1994).

the conflict in South Ossetia.[25] It also provided assistance in humanitarian aid and protection of human rights in the conflict-ridden zones of Georgia with specific focus on South Ossetia, helped in organizing meetings between Georgian and South Ossetian personalities, and mediated negotiations.

The arrangement of joint peacekeeping forces has managed to implement the cease-fire very successfully. Important contacts are being monitored through the OSCE and the peacekeeping forces as well as through some of the NGOs, which are quite active in this regard.[26] After a slow start in 1993/94,[27] the OSCE mission to Georgia has intensified its activities in several areas.[28] It has increased its efforts to foster and focus dialogue between Georgians and the authorities in the region of South Ossetia concerning a political solution to the conflict. It also sponsored a round table discussion between leading Georgian and South Ossetian personalities on the nature of conflict in March 1995. The Mission proposed a broader effort to encourage the economic reintegration of South Ossetia into the Georgian economy. At the same time, as mandated in March 1994, the Mission has continued to monitor the joint peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia.

The May 1996 Georgian-Ossetian Memorandum mediated by the OSCE contains, among other things articles on refusal to use military force or pressure, amnesty for those who fought in the war but did not commit war crimes and improvement of confidence-building measures in order to reestablish the cooperation between the parties.[29]

In comparison to the Abkhazian case, the situation in South Ossetia seems to have reached a stage of substantially reduced aggression. A considerable part of the Ossetian community is prepared to accept Georgian jurisdiction. This is strengthened by the trade and human contacts between the two sides. The change in leadership of South Ossetia seems to have played an important psychological role.[30] The fact that the representatives of the new regional government were not involved in the conflict at its earlier violent stage when negative attitudes were forming, renders it easier for them to compromise.

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25 The tripartite forces include one Russian airborne regiment of 950 men and three Georgian-Ossetian battalions totaling about 1100 men, while another 1000-man Georgian-Ossetian force is held in reserve. See Roy Allison, *Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States, Institute for Security Studies*, Chaillot Paper No. 18 (Paris: Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, November 1994).

26 See Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski, *Confidence-Building Matters: The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict* (London: VERTIC, March 1996).

27 During 1992-1994 very little progress had been made in resolving the conflict in South Ossetia.

28 See *Annual Report 1995 on OSCE Activities.*

29 *Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik*, 6 June 1996.

30 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 147 (1226), 10 August 1996.

Despite the fact that the conflict in and on South Ossetia was eclipsed by the war in Abkhazia, recent developments promise further reductions in violence and even peace. The task has shifted from short term conflict prevention efforts to conflict resolution measures. The main obstacle in this regard remains the constitutional status of South Ossetia. Since the Georgian government agreed to reestablish autonomy, the South Ossetians are trying to raise the status of the autonomous region to the status of an autonomous republic. It is hard to assess how the situation will develop in this respect, but the high degree of willingness of the parties to find an acceptable political solution for both sides seems to promise that South Ossetia is not turning into a post-conflict conflict prevention case.

2. The Potential for Pre-Violence Cases[31]

While the conflicts on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are developing in opposite directions, the path of a few other potential disputes in Georgia is undecided. Among them are the interests of substantial Azeri and Armenian minorities in Georgia. This case, which will only be discussed briefly, is potentially controversial due to the transportation of Caspian oil through the territory of Georgia and its impact on the issue of Armenian and Azeri minorities.

Azeri and Armenian Minorities

Georgia's strategic location provides an incentive for its neighbors to cooperate with the country, but at the same time, this strategic location might also be a reason for the countries current uncertainties.[32] Although access to the Black Sea gives Georgia a great advantage, its geopolitical location is not as favorable as first impressions might suggest. Georgia's South-Eastern neighbour is Azerbaijan, the two countries have developed a de facto strategic partnership due to certain common interests. When Georgian overland routes with Russia were temporarily cut off by separatists during the civil war, passengers and goods were transferred on Azeri railways and highways.[33] In return, the Azeri community gained access to Georgian Black Sea ports. Three regions in the border areas of southern Georgia hold substantial Azeri communities: 80% in Marneuli, 65% in Bolnisi and 64% in Dmanisi.[34] Currently

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31 In discussing the following cases as pre-violent, I do not mean that their escalation into violence is an automatic consequence of current conditions. These are cases where violence has not yet occurred and may not even escalate into the evident violent conflict. Nevertheless, the potential exists, and the sooner it is discovered and addressed, the better.

32 Revaz Gachechiladze, "Geopolitics and Georgia," in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 6 (December 1994) 12.

33 Ibid.

34 Results of the population census in 1989.

Azerbaijan and Georgia have no mutual territorial claims, but the existence of a small Georgian minority in Azerbaijan and the large and growing Azeri community in Georgia could be used by nationalistic forces on both sides as an instrument of provocation in the future. This can occur if either side fails to respect human rights or discriminates against its respective minorities.

Armenia lies South of Georgia and is a country which is intrinsically linked to Georgia through various factors. Armenia's landlocked location requires it to place significant importance on its relations with Georgia for access to the sea. Armenia, consequently, relies heavily on Georgia for the supply of vital fuel. Relations between the two countries have been complicated by a comparitively large, compactly residing Armenian minority in Georgia. The Armenians located in the provinces of Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda amount to around 90% of the population in these regions. Authorities of regions where Armenians make up a substantial part of the population in Georgia have supported the Georgian central government in return for non-interference in their specific regional affairs. Even though there are no major problems between the Georgian and Armenian governments or between the Georgian central government and the authorities representing the Armenian minority at the moment, the political situation in other parts of Georgia, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, may well effect and give rise to irredentist tendencies among Armenian minorities. In fact, the Georgian Minister of the Interior recently referred to the existence of anti-Georgian organizations in critical regions of the country.[35]

In June 1996 Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossyan visited Georgia and together with President Shevardnadze signed several bilateral agreements and a communiqué emphasizing the inviolability of the Armenian-Georgian border. The predominantly ethnic Armenian population of Georgia's Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki provinces took advantage of two presidents' visit to the region to ask for some degree of autonomy.[36] Armenians in the region have their own schools, theaters and official newspapers. While the two presidents were visiting the region, journalists were not invited,[37] which may indicate an unwillingness on the part of the Georgian government to acknowledge the existence of a problem in the region. This may well be understandable as Georgia may want to avoid another conflict in addition to the problems in other parts of the country. On the other hand, ignoring such issues may escalate rather than mitigate the conflict. If claims and disputes were to grow, the cordial relationship between the leaders of Armenia and Georgia may become strained and the Georgian government may no longer be willing to peacefully manage all conflicts, following its experience with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

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35 *Segodnia*, (6 August 1996) 139.

36 Fuller, *OMRI Daily Digest*, (7 June 1996) 111.

37 *Segodnia*, (6 August 1996) 139.

The Autonomous Republic of Adjaria

The Autonomous Republic of Adjaria is one of the two Soviet administrative subdivisions that were established on religious considerations.[38] Adjarians themselves are ethnic Georgians but most of them are Muslims, who converted to Islam during the centuries of Ottoman rule.[39] Nevertheless, there have not been any religious tensions between them and Christian Georgians. Georgia has a great economic and strategic interest in Adjaria. Access to the sea is currently available through this autonomous republic, while Abkhazia is *de facto* outside the jurisdiction of Tbilisi. Georgia, as well as the region itself, derives benefits from its location along the Black Sea in the south-west of Georgia and its 60 km border with Turkey. Under the Soviet Union the only existing customs point with Turkey was located in Sarpi in Adjaria and the regional cooperation with the neighboring country became a good basis for the developing economy in the autonomous republic.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Adjaria has been an oasis of relative stability in Georgia. Its economy has benefited from the cross-border trade with Turkey. Batumi, the capital of Adjaria, has a large and well-developed infrastructure with facilities for loading oil tankers and handling dry cargo. There are also good rail connections to the rest of Georgia, to Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The leader of Adjaria, Aslan Abashidze, is the most interesting and potentially powerful political personality in Georgia after Eduard Shevardnadze.[40] His success is due to many factors including his achievement to keep the region peaceful while the whole country dealt with pressing problems in other regions, especially Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Abashidze strengthened his position by trying to make peace in the conflict between Tbilisi and Megrelia[41] and mediating several cease-fire agreements between the central government and the supporters of the ex-president Gamsakhurdia. Abashidze also successfully handled relations with the Russian military. He was able to avoid confrontations while the decision on Russia's control of the border with Turkey was being negotiated. He considered the stationing of Russian troops on the territory of Adjaria to be a guarantee of stability. At the same time, he worked to develop projects with American and European investors in order to promote the economy of the region.

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38 Paul B. Henze, *Georgia in 1995: Recovery Gaining Momentum* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1995).

39 The Autonomous Republic of Adjaria was established in 1921 and the Soviet government with this establishment made political advances to Turkey. See D. L. Muskhelishvili, *Georgia – "A Small Empire"?!* (Sarangi Publishers, 1990), in Russian.

40 More on this subject see in Liz Fuller and Aslan Abashidze, "Georgia's Next Leader?," in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, 2 (5 November 1993) 44.

41 This is the western part of Georgia, the home-land of the ousted president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

These factors had a decisive influence on Abashidze's popularity and on Georgian parliamentary elections in November 1995. The All Georgian Revival Union headed by Abashidze received 25 seats out of a total of 146.[42] Georgia's new constitution, adopted by the parliament on August 25, 1995, created a federal state system. In the federal agreement proposed by Georgians, Adjaria and Abkhazia would have their own constitution, legislature and executive and judicial systems. As a result, Adjaria is far more autonomous since independence than it was under the Soviet regime. This arrangement also suits the Georgian central government, which can now be confident that it will not face conflict in this part of Georgia. However, the Adjarian leader is still regarded by quite a few Georgians in Tbilisi with profound suspicion because of his authoritarian style of leadership. There is a lack of information on the internal situation in Adjaria, which might in itself be a warning and warrant early action. A lack of available information not only creates difficulties for assessing the situation, but it also arouses mutual suspicions which could lead to conflict.

The fact that the Adjarian government did not allow the OSCE representatives to monitor the September 22, 1996 parliamentary elections caused bewilderment among officials in Tbilisi as well as in the OSCE office in Georgia. The election law in the Autonomous Republic says that the observers should be representatives of Georgian political parties and organizations. According to the former representative of the OSCE in Georgia, Dieter Boden, the OSCE has a right to attend any kind of election.[43] However, the elections took place without OSCE monitoring and as it was widely predicted, the election coalition composed of the All-Georgian Revival Union led by Aslan Abashidze and the ruling political party in Georgia, the Union of Georgian Citizens, led by Eduard Shevardnadze, got 83% of the vote.[44]

If democracy in Adjaria lags behind the rest of Georgia and Abashidze's government is truly authoritarian, there might be a potential for political conflict in the region. The central government, nevertheless, prefers to ignore the lack of efforts toward democracy-building in Adjaria, in the name of avoiding another conflict on its territory. While the central government's behavior can, in this case, be understood through the lessons learned in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian experience, democracy building in the country at large is complicated when one region lags behind. Therefore, the government of Georgia should work on the homogeneous development of the country from a systemic point of view.

Religion is not, directly, a potential source of a conflict in Adjaria. Although the majority of the population is Muslim, the younger generation appears to be less

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42 Shevardnadze's party – the Union of Georgian Citizens – got 90 mandates, and the National Democratic Party received 31.

43 *Segodnia*, (20 September 1996) 172.

44 Lowell Bezanis, *OMRI Daily Digest*, (26 September 1996) 187.

fundamentally Islamic. Abashidze himself changed his religion and currently belongs to the Georgian Orthodox Church.[45] Georgia is religiously tolerant, and there are not only Georgian Orthodox churches and mosques, but also synagogues and Armenian churches for the respective communities. However, religious differences do exist in Adjaria, and should problems arise due to the lack of democratic institutions, religious factors might be an instrument for Abashidze to distract the attention of both Adjarians and the central government away from political problems in the region. Therefore, respective institutions should be aware of the problems relating to democracy-building in the region in order to prevent a political as well as a religious conflict in Adjaria.

Caspian Oil Issue

Many sectors of the Georgian economy are currently experiencing problems. Since 1990, the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have severely aggravated the economic crisis which resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Massive disruptions in agricultural and industrial production have been reported, along with a decline in Black Sea tourism. The entire annual budget at the end of 1995 was $200 million, more than half of it made up of Western aid.[46] Georgia is suffering from an energy crisis, due to difficulties in financing even minimal imports. Most Georgian delegations to neighboring countries in 1993-1994 were sent because of economic issues. They were aimed mainly at negotiating gas and other energy supply agreements.

One of the areas to which Georgia attaches its hopes is the development of international transportation through the Black Sea port of Batumi, which is located in Adjaria. Therefore, Georgia has become interested in the transportation of Caspian oil and gas. The so-called "Oil Contract" was first signed on June 4, 1993, by the Azeri State Oil Company and five other foreign companies. Within a month of implementation, the contract was suspended because of the military coup to oust the Azeri president. The contract was re-negotiated and signed on September 20, 1994.[47] The investment totals more than $8 billion. The duration of the contract is thirty years and covers an expected production of some 511 million tons of oil.

Apart from the Caspian states themselves, a number of countries will be included in Caspian oil projects, due to the possible transit of oil through their territory, Georgia is among these. Azerbaijan, as the prospective exporter of oil, has an interest

45 Paul B. Henze, *Georgia in 1995: Recovery Gaining Momentum* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995).

46 George Khutsishvili, *Consolidation or New Conflict*, War Report, June 1996.

47 Rosemarie Forsythe, *The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Adelphi Papers No. 300 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).

in increasing its economic independence, and thus its political independence from Russia. Turkey, another actor in the Transcaucasus, no less important than Russia, has suggested several options for overland oil pipelines to the Mediterranean, in an effort to reduce Russia's monopolistic tendencies in the region. The Russian port in Novorossiysk also has less capacity than some of the other potential ports, and it is closed at least one third of the year due to the weather conditions. All these factors considered, Georgia placed a lot of hope on a decision to run the pipeline through its territory. Therefore, since 1995 it has begun the reconstruction of the Tbilisi-Batumi pipeline, which aims to increase the capacity of the pipeline from five to some seven million tons.

At the same time, Russia did not try to disguise its interest in having the pipeline cross its territory, however, Russia was against signing the "Oil Contract" in 1993. In order to secure its consent, the Russian oil company LUKOIL received 10% of the consortium shares from Azerbaijan at the expense of its own share. Even this did not satisfy Russia's interest and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that the oil fields of the Caspian shelf should be jointly owned by all bordering countries. The agreements with Georgia and Armenia allowed Russia to establish military bases on their territory and committed Russia to the defense of their external borders, which has prevented the three Transcaucasian republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – from cooperating in a common effort to rid themselves of Russian control. However, the "oil contract" did force Georgia, along with other regional actors, to develop a regional policy. Transcaucasian countries are faced with the stage of their development in which cooperation within the region should become relatively independent of Russia.

Because of the huge monetary value and vital necessity of oil, additional pressure has been put on negotiations between governments, companies and international organizations.[48] Some questions arise: Is a new economic conflict arising? Is Georgia getting involved in a game which might result in conflict? What kind of impact will this issue have on the situation in the Armenian and Azeri regions of Georgia? Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia might be a guarantee to some extent for the security of the Azeri minority near the border in Georgia and for the relations developing between these two neighboring countries, especially since the relations between the two countries and the situation in the Azeri minority region have not been strained. Since the option that oil might go through its territory has been excluded, Armenia has been left out of this cooperation. Despite the Caspian oil

48 As the Deputy Undersecretary at the MFA in Ankara, Temel Iskit, stated, "the Gulf War reminded us that oil is still such an important strategic asset that it is worth waging a war for"; see Temel Iskit, "Turkey: A New Actor in the Field of Energy Politics?," in *Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs*, 1 (March-May 1996) 1.

issue, Armenia's geographical location in the Transcaucasus means that friendly relations and the ability to use safe roads inside Georgia are in its vital interest. Therefore, Armenia might be interested in the successful implementation of the contract and in having an economically developed neighboring country which will always assist it in the delivery and transportation of cargo through its territory. Thus, it seems that the cooperation in the transportation of Caspian oil will help to revitalize the economies and promote cooperation in the region.

There is a catch 22: If the pipeline is laid through this region and oil flows, then not just one or two countries, but all the participating actors will benefit economically and through the resultant conflict prevention. But oil will not flow unless security is achieved in the region. Indeed, political events in the Caucasus, including the conflict in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya, as well as in Turkey, will have an influence on the projects to export oil and gas.

All the suggested options for the pipeline's route run through territory containing ethnic tensions. The security of pipelines across the North Caucasus is a concern which is difficult to calculate under the present circumstances, with the situation in Chechnya being far from settled. Pipeline security is also a concern in Turkey, due to the tensions in the Kurdish region. It is difficult to calculate whether one area is more likely to remain safer than another over an extended period of time because the whole Caucasian region is extremely ethnically heterogeneous. This formed the basis for a strong argument for multiple routes and explains the decision for a twin pipeline made on October 9, 1995: Baku – Batumi and Baku – Novorossiysk. Preference was given to those paths which promised more security. Even though the current situation in Georgia seems quite complicated, the choice that the international community made demonstrates that the US and Turkey both view the current situation in Georgia as relatively stable.

This perception still needs to be affirmed by the efforts of Georgian society to manage the internal, as well as regional, problems. If the cooperative oil production and transport can be developed and exploited, it will not only help to develop the main basis for economic growth in Georgia and throughout the whole Transcaucasus area, but might also directly serve as an instrument of conflict escalation control policy at the structural level. This could introduce regional economic cooperation as a tool for preventing future tension among the various ethnic groups.

II. Challenges for Conflict Prevention Policy in Georgia

Taken together, the list of potentially violent conflicts in Georgia represents a rather mixed record. The possibility of increasing tensions in South Ossetia seems quite unlikely, and the potential for intrastate ethnic conflicts in the regions of the

Armenian and Azeri minorities also does not seem high. Most pressing is the Abkhazian crisis which seems to need increased attention to prevent it from escalating.

1. Concentrating Preventive Efforts on Abkhazia

The Abkhazian conflict has been escalating due to a number of major questions which have not been answered and agreed upon by the disputing parties. The two most pressing questions refer to the future constitutional setup of Georgia and to the fate of the many displaced persons within the country. These issues may take a while to be negotiated and implemented, but it is psychologically important to work together to open up a perspective of solvability. In the meantime the maintenance of an atmosphere of stability and security by the peacekeeping forces, in order to allow for negotiation and cooperation, is indispensable.

Which Peacekeeping Forces?

While comparing the two post-war cases within Georgia, one may say that "the idea of a joint peacekeeping force was quite innovative in that it brought the Georgians and South Ossetians into a joint effort"[49] in the South Ossetian case. Unlike the case in Abkhazia, the parties to the conflict were directly involved in the peacekeeping operation. According to the Moscow agreement of September 3, 1993, a trilateral peacekeeping force, similar to the one created in South Ossetia, had to be deployed. But in Abkhazia only UN observers were deployed to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement. When it became clear that the Sochi Agreement had failed to restore peace in September 1993, the UN tried to assume the leading role in the peacemaking process.

The preference for joint peacekeeping has much to do with the attitude toward Russia. Observers and researchers agree that the Russian forces were not innocent onlookers in the conflicts Georgian territory. In any case, the defeat of Georgia, in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, fitted perfectly into Russian political and strategic interests in the region at that time. Georgia agreed (or had to agree) to the membership of the CIS and accepted an agreement which allowed Russia to have its military bases on Georgian territory for a period of 25 years.[50] However, Russia itself might have had a very complicated strategic dilemma: if it provided support for Georgia, that would immediately antagonize North Caucasian minorities on the territory of Russia and jeopardize the security of the Russian border areas in the region; but if it supported Ossetians and Abkhazians, Georgia may turn to Turkey as

49 Sammut and Cvetkovski, *Confidence-Building Matters: The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict.*
50 Ibid.

its only potential ally in the region.[51] Because of the fact that both Ossetian and Georgian parties were blaming Russia for supporting the other and, therefore, because of their mistrust of Russia, the joint Russian-Georgian-South Ossetian Control Commission undertook efforts to make all parties feel personally responsible for keeping the peace in the region and reestablishing contacts within this framework.

The Russian peacekeeping forces were supposed to accommodate the return of people who fled Abkhazia to their homeland, but failed to do so. Therefore, the Georgian parliament, on April 17, 1996, adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia, unless they were able, within the next two months, to protect ethnic Georgian refugees wishing to return to their homes.[52] The mandate of the Russian peacekeeping forces was, however, extended in August 1996 for the following six months without significant changes, much to the dissatisfaction of Georgian authorities.

Currently, Abkhazia is *de facto* lost to Georgia. Tensions are still high between Abkhazians and Georgians and the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping forces may lead to new clashes.

How to Treat the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)?

Because the Abkhazian side wants to legalize the results of the ethnic cleansing, it sometimes agrees to negotiate and then breaks off negotiations in order to gain time. Some of the agreements that were signed were never implemented, such as the one on the return of internally displaced persons. This issue was frequently used by the Abkhazian side to their benefit during negotiations. The quick resolution of the problem of internally displaced persons is extremely important for Georgia. As was mentioned before, there may be as many as 250,000 which, together with IDPs from South Ossetia, make up more than 8% of the country's native population. They currently live in hotels, former rest-houses and resorts, hospitals and various other institutional buildings. Most of them suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders or other psychological side effects stemming from the frustration of being prevented from returning home. During the last couple of years, providing basic economic assistance and social protection to these people remained one of the most important objectives in the country. Obviously, the humanitarian support provided by international organizations will never be enough, and Georgia itself does not have the resources to adequately deal with them. Such a high level of displacement within a country, certainly, has a great influence on the rate of the economic development.

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51 Sergei Solodovnik, in Ehrhart et al., eds., *Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia?*

52 Fuller, *OMRI Daily Digest*, (18 April 1996) 77, part I.

The Abkhazian side knows this better than anybody else. The Georgians as well as the UNHCR have insisted on the unconditional return of the refugees, but the Abkhazian side insists on a preliminary condition, international *de facto* and *de jure* recognition. All of these factors increase tensions between the two sides.

While discussing this issue, one must also bear in mind that the problem of returning IDPs is more complicated than it might appear at first glance. Even if the repatriation is successfully implemented, the problem will not be completely solved. If all IDPs were brought back to their homes, then a new and different potential for a conflict would arise. It is a known fact that the former Georgian villages are now occupied by Abkhazians, and those houses of ethnic Georgian IDPs which were not burned down during the war are currently occupied by Abkhazian families. Is there enough property for everybody? How should the property be divided and by whom? This is another issue which might be a source of conflict.

Which Constitutional Structure for Georgia?

Georgian authorities insist on the fact that Abkhazia as well as South Ossetia are indivisible parts of Georgia. This fact is recognized by the UN and by the Budapest Summit Meeting of the OSCE, in which more than 52 states participated. The territorial integrity of Georgia was officially confirmed by Russia and more recently by the leaders of other CIS countries at their meeting in Minsk.

President Shevardnadze considers that, beyond this sensitive issue, everything can be negotiated.[53] In Georgia's constitution, adopted on August 29, 1995, provisions on territorial structures have been left open, partly in order to leave room for negotiated solutions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as well as with Adjaria). The key principle of the article, which should be written in cooperation with the former autonomous republics/regions, will be the statement that Georgia is a federal formation. Abkhazia and Adjaria would then become republics with their own constitutions. South Ossetia's status would still need to be determined.

The government of Georgia has already finished working on the bill; accordingly Abkhazia will have its own constitution, parliament, flag, emblem, ministries and administrations, and legal apparatus. It will also have an independently managed economy, and retain complete independence in the field of culture. But there are some sectors of the economy which need to be managed at a higher level, amongst these are the railways, energy supply and roads.

For his part, Ardzinba does not agree on the federal structure of Georgia, and instead offers a kind of "horizontal relationship" which is neither a federation, nor a confederation. According to his plan, five or six spheres of competence and authority

53 *Novoye Vremya*, (February 1996) 9.

will be jointly managed. These include fields which are perceived by the Georgian government as secondary, especially given the current conditions in Georgia, i.e. provision of human and civic rights, ecology and dealing with the consequences of natural disasters. In fact, according to the document prepared by the Abkhazians, Abkhazia is ready to give Georgia responsibility for foreign policy and the regulation of borders. The return of refugees was considered only for the Gali region and has not yet been implemented, and the Russian Ruble will supposedly be the currency in Abkhazia. These conditions are unlikely to satisfy Georgia.

2. Considering the Range of Preventive Measures

The potential for further escalation seems real and the necessity of addressing it with conflict prevention policy is evident. Recently, possible new clashes in the case of Abkhazia have appeared imminent and the question of what can be done about it needs to be answered soon in order to prevent an outbreak of violence. What are the instruments that might be used to address this escalating potential and who are the actors that are supposed to implement the preventive policy?

Economic Sanctions

Most of the leaders of the CIS countries supported Georgia at their meeting in Almaty and signed the memorandum that isolates Abkhazia and establishes a political and economic blockade. But will it lead to the desired results and bring peace to the region?

Economic sanctions are unlikely to force the Abkhazians to allow the Georgian refugees to return, thereby turning themselves into the ethnic minority. Besides, it is not clear what kind of sanctions the memorandum advocates. Officially, Abkhazia has been under a Russian blockade since 1994, although most ships can still get to Sukhumi port without difficulty. Other CIS countries play only a symbolic role in this case as Abkhazia only has common borders with Georgia and Russia. The threat to block what has already been blocked on paper, but has not been implemented, does not sound all that serious, and the actual usefulness of the economic sanctions in this case is doubtful, especially since a complete blockade seems to be impossible to implement.

The Mandate of the Peacekeeping Forces

At an earlier stage the Russian peacekeeping forces played quite a positive role in the efforts to stop the conflict. Currently, the objectives are different to what they were two years ago, and they require a different political approach. The Russian Federation Council voted on August 8, 1996, to extend the mandate of the Russian-dominated

CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia by six months, to January 31, 1997. But extending the mandate of the peacekeeping forces as it existed in the past does not make sense. Therefore, a decision should be made not only about the mandate's technical extension, but also about its substance.

The official Georgian position is that the mandate of the peacekeeping forces should be extended to all of Abkhazia and that those forces should be granted police powers in order to protect repatriates in case of possible reprisals by Abkhazian militants. However, even if these demands are satisfied, it still will not lead to the return of displaced persons.

First of all, the mandate should include a strict schedule of repatriation. It should specify dates and the number of people to be repatriated within a specific period of time. Only in this way can the peacekeeping forces play an essential role in the process of helping IDPs return home, rather than involuntarily protecting the separatist regime. Repatriation of people who fled Abkhazia should be implemented on both the Abkhazian-Georgian and Abkhazian-Russian borders. Later on, the mandate of the peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone could be extended again in order to help reestablish the railway and other communications throughout Abkhazia.

Secondly, none of these changes in the mandate of the peacekeeping forces will result in the repatriation of refugees and IDPs unless the Georgian side starts to reflect self-critically about domestic causes of the conflict and the Abkhazian side expresses a real interest in bringing the conflict to an end. Therefore, in parallel with other measures, both sides should recognize the mistakes they made in the past, and confidence-building measures should occupy a central place. NGOs and the mass media could play an essential role in this endeavor as well.

Establishing a Joint Mission

Currently, while the war is stopped and the two parties' interests are moving towards each other, there is a need to establish a joint mission in order to assess the political as well as the economic situation in the region, just before IDPs begin returning home. Also, a sociological survey should be conducted to identify the attitudes of people from both parties towards each other. This would create a secure foundation for peace, not only at the governmental level but also at the level of the inhabitants of Abkhazia.

Those who establish the mission should be outside international actors. For instance, the mission might build on the foundation provided by the UN or the OSCE missions to Georgia. However, it would be worthwhile to involve NGOs as well. Representatives of the Abkhazian and Georgian sides should also be involved. On the one hand, involving so many very different actors could raise the risk of conflicting

interpretations, but on the other hand, if an agreement can be reached, the joint mission might provide real assistance in preventing further escalation.

Economic Support to Abkhazia

Talk of repatriating IDPs is useless without taking into consideration the current conditions of the region in terms of existing property and possibilities for support. Georgia does not have enough resources to provide people with their basic needs which are especially necessary for the first stage of starting life in the territory of Abkhazia. There is also a need for financial as well as human resources to rebuild the region. International funds and financial organizations might carry out this task, creating specific projects of financial support to help Abkhazia create an economic foundation on which to live. IDPs and refugees from both sides as well as people who remained in the territory of Abkhazia could be directly involved in the process of rebuilding the region.

Direct Work with IDPs

Because of the large number of IDPs from the Georgian zones of conflict and their traumatic experiences, work needs to be done at the grass roots level in order to bring the two ethnic parties closer to one other. After all, the IDPs themselves should be viewed as the people who will rebuild the region. No inter-governmental decisions can decree cooperation. There is a necessity to carry out intensive social rehabilitation work, as well as alternative conflict approaches, educational projects and involving the IDPs in those projects, regardless of their ethnicity. This way, it will become easier for these people to view the problems and their past experience from a different perspective, to see their role in the whole process of reconciliation and to live peacefully after their return to the region. Being directly connected to the public sector, NGOs might be most suited to this task.

Democracy Development in Georgia

None of the instruments, either actual or long-term, will succeed if democracy building and development is not promoted in the country. Increasing efforts towards democratic state-building might serve as a background for the successful implementation of conflict prevention policy. This applies not only to Abkhazia but also to Georgia as a whole.

Since the new constitution gave strong powers to the president, and the popular political culture largely identifies state authorities with a single leader, presidential elections were considered to be the most important part of the November 5 vote. Although in the three years of Shevardnadze's rule Georgia lost the war in Abkhazia

and a part of its territory, and the living conditions of the population have deteriorated dramatically, his image was largely identified with stability. This is especially true after he removed criminal militias from the political arena and made life more orderly, two crucial conditions for developing democracy. It should come as no surprise, then that he got 72.9% of the votes.

In May 1996, Georgia was granted "special guest" status in the Council of Europe. On July 14, 1996, the Georgian Foreign Minister sent a formal request for Council of Europe membership to the Council of Europe Secretary General. International organizations are aware of Georgia's efforts to build democratic structures. President Shevardnadze expressed his hopes that the country would be able to develop democracy to the extent that he might attain Council of Europe membership within the next one or two years.[54]

During his visit to Tbilisi, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe announced that it insists that Georgia finds exclusively peaceful ways to deal with the conflict in Abkhazia. High-ranking officials from the Council of Europe called upon Georgia to abolish the death sentence and promised in return to provide expertise in developing local legislation in accordance with European norms.

Currently, the development of democracy and protection of human rights not only play a great role in crises settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but might also serve as a guarantee for stabilization in the regions with sizable Armenian and Azeri minorities, as well as in the Autonomous Republic of Adjari. Either by using the incentive of becoming a member of the Council of Europe, or by accepting Georgia into this organization, and then promoting the process of democracy building, the Council of Europe could play an important role in the implementation of conflict prevention policy in Georgia.

Coordination of All Actors

There is a direct and strong link between developing democracy in Georgia, on the one hand, and the willingness of Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials to reintegrate their regions into Georgia on the other hand. Thus, the need for cooperation between all actors is evident. The problems in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia are very much inter-linked and need to be dealt with as a whole. Only if outside as well as inside sources are brought together, will it be possible to prevent the further escalation of conflicts in Georgia and find ways of resolving them.

54 *Segodnia*, (16 July 1996) 124.

Several factors make the Georgian case an interesting study for conflict prevention. First of all, it involves two post-conflict cases in two different regions of the country. In addition to these, there are other, smaller cases where, as it was already discussed, the potential for conflict exists, and this makes the case of Georgia even more complicated.

The implementation of conflict prevention policy in Abkhazia faces some obstacles. The most important is the political interdependence of problems in Georgia, as well as in the Caucasus. Crises in different parts of the country can hardly be studied separately from each other. While dealing with the conflict in Abkhazia, the impact of this case on other parts of Georgia should not be ignored. Also, the development of the situation in the Caucasus should be taken into consideration.

These factors were some of the major reasons for the failure of international organizations at an earlier stage of their involvement in the conflicts. The OSCE was the first international organization which started mediating the conflict in South Ossetia. Therefore, the UN on the assumption that the OSCE was already taking care of the case, became involved in the conflict in Abkhazia. It is evident now, that this type of division of labor between the two main international actors did not bring positive results.

Currently, however, the situation is quite different, and as a result of efforts made by the OSCE, the UN, different international and local NGOs, and regional actors both outside and inside, the fighting has stopped. Some steps towards peace have been made and the government of Georgia is ready to implement a federal structure in order to manage the problems of the country. Ethnic minorities in Georgia have also changed their attitude towards Russia. If the ethnic minorities had wanted to join the Russian Federation earlier in the conflict because it promised them more security and better economic conditions, they became disillusioned with Russia's ability to handle minority rights after the war in Chechnya broke out.

The time for demanding to join the Russian Federation is almost over and ethnic minorities are trying either to establish independent states, which is unlikely to happen, or to claim their rights within Georgia. The regions with a substantial number of ethnic minorities within Georgia are asking for one-degree-more autonomy than they enjoyed before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This applies to the Abkhazians demanding confederation, the South Ossetians trying to get the status of an autonomous republic, and the Armenians asking for any kind of autonomy. If Georgia grants Abkhazia and South Ossetia the status of an autonomous republic, it might encourage the Armenian minority to ask for a higher degree of autonomy. How is the Georgian government going to deal with this problem?

However, even if a federation is established, it might not solve all of Georgia's problems. How are ethnic Georgians going to perceive the federal structure of the country? The public opinion and prevalent attitudes toward federal structures are not yet universally positive and need to be reinforced. Currently, one may speak only about limited acceptance of democratic values such as the freedom to publish, to demonstrate and to found political parties. There is a fear that the federal structure of the country will always provide a foundation for the secessionist movement of ethnic minorities within Georgia.

After all, the situation in Georgia should not be pessimistically evaluated. There are several positive changes promising peace. Among the sources for future stability the constitution should be mentioned. Although it might take some time to complete the process of developing the independent judiciary, the constitution adopted in August 1995 provides for a strict separation of powers and an effective system of checks and balances.[55]

The country has a democratically elected parliament and a president with a high international profile. Both are committed to free-market-based democracy, which in itself is an important factor contributing to stability. As a result of the pragmatic foreign policy of Georgia, the Friends of Georgia group is growing and the support of the US, the European Union and international financial institutions is assisting economic recovery.

It is only through a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention policy and the integration of all resources, both internally and externally, can lead to real peace in Georgia.

55 Gela Charkviani, "Georgia, the Transcaucasus and Beyond," in *Perceptions*, 1 (September–November 1996) 3, pp. 34-52.

PART THREE

Moving Beyond "Preventive Diplomacy"

7. Emerging from Conflict: The Role of the International Development Finance Institutions

*Katherine Marshall**

The challenge of building a lasting peace lies at the core of the development business and, more specifically, of the international financial institutions. Their institutional and intellectual foundations were established in the final years of World War II, as world leaders sought actively and consciously to reconstruct war-battered economies and to prevent future conflicts. During the subsequent half-century, the end to conflicts in many parts of the world has seen a call on development institutions to move urgently to support the rebuilding of infrastructure and institutions and thus help cement the peace. These interventions have taken many forms, along a continuum ranging from classic emergency aid, generally directed at direct victims of violence, through the broad array of investment actions that merge into classic development finance operations per se.

The framework for discussing post-conflict reconstruction has taken on important new dimensions in the period since 1989, in large measure as a result of the vast geo-political shifts that have taken place. As the nature of conflicts has shifted, so have the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. The explosive demands for humanitarian aid (which consumes a rapidly rising share of funds going to development assistance), the disruptions of populations on all continents through refugee flows, and the cyclical trends of violent outbreaks in several regions of the world present a new set of problems to leaders in virtually all segments of the international community.

The tasks of rebuilding battered nations, cementing reconciliation, and redirecting development to avert future conflicts are thus much more central challenges for the development institutions today than they were a decade ago. An active international debate is underway that aims to enhance and clarify the roles of different institutions in these various activities and, overall, to find better formulas to build peace and help avoid recurrence or outbreaks of conflict.

This chapter summarizes the roles that the World Bank and its multilateral partners have played and might play in post-conflict situations, and some institutional and operational issues that follow. No one called upon to act in a post-conflict situation can avoid a related and fundamental question: how can we work toward preventing violent conflict in the future? Thus the discussion also addresses the

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* This contribution expresses the opinion of the author only and is not an official World Bank statement.

complex issues that revolve around understanding and acting to address the underlying causes of conflict, and the broad spectrum of efforts to tie programs that aim to promote "sustainable growth with equity" to those that work to promote peaceful societies.

I. Competing Frames of Reference: Diplomacy or Development?

Most chapters in this book focus on security issues and address the diplomatic aspects of conflict prevention and resolution. In some important respects the frame of reference and vocabulary in this field tend to differ from those commonly employed by development practitioners. This is a common and unavoidable hazard in our ever more complex society, and efforts to talk across disciplines call for some special efforts. This general comment applies between disciplines and professions, among institutions, and within institutions. One manifestation is the very different stance that some nations take in the United Nations General Assembly (where generally ministries of foreign affairs are in the lead) and in the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (the province of ministers of finance).

National leaders and diplomats in high stress situations are likely to find the focus of development practitioners on socioeconomic trends and issues, which play out over quite long time frames, at times rather abstract. The development finance institutions are mandated to address a country or sector situation in a medium to long term framework, and to make specific efforts to refrain from comment and action on the proximate political causes. Vocabulary and approach are colored by the underlying social and economic objectives which drive the institutions, and the long-term purposes for which they were founded. Even in fast-moving crisis situations they work to keep these objective anchors in mind. This may explain some seeming tensions between the rhetoric around the very immediate and humanitarian imperatives of peacemaking and peacekeeping and the apparently dry social and economic criteria which feature in discussions within and around the development finance institutions. I argue, though, that this gap is more style than substance.

The result of the contrasting perspectives can be a glazed eye look or an impatient shrug when such issues are raised. Rarely do long term trends appear as the direct or precipitating cause of a crisis, and the actions needed to address them tend to involve an intricate set of actions that promise to show results only over an extended time frame. The tendency is therefore to seek to relegate such matters to the post-crisis phase. Even if terminology, concepts, and orders of priority differ, though, the essential objectives of the respective institutions and individuals have much in common, and efforts to bridge the communications gulfs are needed. Some essential

issues turn around time frames and the respective perceptions of the urgency or sequencing of action.

Two contrasting approaches, with "real world" significance, suggest themselves as illustrations. First, a hypothetical crisis erupting in violence is plainly tied to high and rising unemployment. It might be readily apparent that its causes lie in several long-term social and economic trends: demographic patterns that saw a sharp increase in young workers coming onto the labor force, delayed modernization of industry, and eroding labor force skills and structural rigidities in hiring and firing practices. The unemployment crisis is likely, however, to manifest itself essentially as a political struggle among political coalitions and interest groups. In addressing such a crisis, as it threatens to erode peace and give rise to violent action, the proximate political frictions and problems are likely to absorb the attention of policy-makers, much more than the longer term socio-economic issues. In contrast, seen from the vantage point of the development institutions, diagnosis of the crisis itself and definition of policy options to address it will take as a starting point the socioeconomic factors as inextricably linked to the combustible forces that provoke crises and violence. The immediacy and urgency of action to address underlying social issues, such as broad-based education programs and family planning measures, emerges more starkly taking this approach.[1]

The ongoing military and economic crises in Angola offer another illustration which has posed starkly the question: must economic and education reform in Angola wait for a more solid peace? The "political" tendency has been to answer yes: the tough reforms needed can and should not be "pushed" before peace is assured. The World Bank and the IMF view, however, has been and remains that no peace is conceivably possible with inflation passing 5,000% a year and with rapidly declining social indicators spelling horrible suffering throughout the population. The two dimensions of the problems: political solutions to the war and socioeconomic measures that stand to arrest the mounting crisis are so intertwined that the classic "phased" approach, peace first, economics second, would at best leave an impossible legacy for those who inherited the peace.

Few would dispute the idea that socioeconomic issues are linked to conflicts and to their prevention. The argument that prosperity brings peace goes back as far as Aristotle. "Large-scale human suffering is a continuing threat to world peace," is the opening phrase of a recent book that highlights the role of the humanitarian crises,

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1 Following the hypothetical unemployment crisis, a political approach to the problem could well light on short term job training and specific measures to avert firing and offer incentives to hire new workers, both visible and immediate, if political, responses. In contrast, a medium term socioeconomic perspective would likely focus on secondary education reform, as more likely to align skills with labor force demands, and tax and labor policies that would over time enhance competitiveness.

public policy, and the media.[2] Roots of virtually every crisis can be traced to a similar set of issues, all turning on human suffering, opportunity, and inequality. The complication is that they translate only indirectly, and often with delays, into the proximate causes of crises and evolving events, and these immediate issues are what tends to get most attention. Particularly in a crisis, discussion of social and economic indicators, such as life expectancy, population growth and even migration, dynamics of unemployment, economic growth rates, and inflation management policies may seem abstract and removed from immediate action imperatives.

There is much compelling evidence that concerns about war and peace and about prosperity need to be brought closer together. A popular book by Paul Kennedy illustrates well the intellectual path of a brilliant thinker from affairs of nation states to the social and environmental challenges that confront the world's leaders. He cites the "vast nonmilitary threats to safety and welfare of the people of this planet" as major issues for stability.[3] Marten van Heuven's recent review[4] of three important new works on the Balkan crisis puts a strong focus on Susan Woodward's basic argument, in *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, to the effect that the roots of crisis, and the place where it might have been prevented, lie squarely in the domain of economic and social issues. This is an apt illustration because it takes the crisis directly to the areas and issues where the international financial institutions are active.

Looking beyond the underlying, and often unspoken, assumptions about causes of conflicts and thus the ways to address or avert them, there are continuous and vitally important battles for priority in attention and action, that often are played out between the immediate and the long term, between diplomats and economic actors. Always tricky and subject to complex judgment, the issues of how to manage economic and social reform can be particularly sensitive where urgent issues of war and peace are involved. The choices though are far from abstract: When is the right time to move? What will be the social response to an unpopular reform? When is it that the chances of lasting investment exceed the risk of destruction? How should we judge and explain important social actions now when political action calls? What is the political cost of increasing gaps in incomes? What area or group will respond and benefit most from financial support? And how best can we help improve quality of life for people?

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2 Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996).

3 Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Random House, 1993).

4 Marten van Heuven, "Understanding the Balkan Breakup," in *Foreign Policy*, 103 (Summer 1996), pp. 175-188; Commenting on Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996).

This paper traces only a sketch of these issues, and clearly there are many wise people who navigate with wisdom and skill among many disciplines. The central point here, though, is that communication across the worlds of diplomacy and development, politics and social action, has never been more important, and has never been more difficult to achieve, than it is in the increasingly interconnected world of today.

II. "Sustainable Basis for Development": What Does It Mean and How Can It be Achieved?

The central aim of the development institutions, and of the World Bank, is to "build a sustainable basis for development." Underlying this objective are assumptions about linkages between poverty and violence. These have central importance for the role that the institutions play in societies emerging from conflict, and even more looking to conflict prevention, The linkages go two ways, as poverty is seen as a crucial cause of conflict, while it is also evident that conflict accentuates poverty.[5] The image of a whirlpool is apt, as conflicts both aggravate and perpetuate poverty, potentially in a descending spiral.[6]

The cause of conflict debate ties directly into the policy debate about conflict prevention and its ties to the conduct of social and economic policy. The scope of the question is vast, however, with countless parameters and uncertainties. Two ancient questions are cited as illustrations, cum cautionary tales. What is a finance or economy minister to make of the ancient observation (advanced among others by Alexis de Tocqueville writing about the French Revolution) that many conflicts erupt in times when expectations just begin to rise with a breath of prosperity?[7] Beyond an admonition to remain alert and monitor tensions more carefully than has been the case, the operational implication is foggy. Of much more direct significance for immediate policy-making is the ongoing debate on links between inequality in

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5 An interesting recent discussion about the consequences of war in Frances Stewart, Frank P. Humphreys, and Nick Lee, "Civil Conflict in Developing Countries over the Last Quarter of a Century: An Empirical Overview of Economic and Social Consequences," in *Oxford Development Studies*, 25 (1997) 1. This highlights the large economic and social costs of wars, above direct battle deaths. Another finding points to the wide range of impacts among different countries, with government performance emerging as a key factor determining how badly a country is affected, and how swiftly it recovers.

6 For a thoughtful and provocative discussion of evidence on the economic causes of conflict, covering an extraordinary range of conflicts over more than a century, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil Wars," Centre for the Study of African Economies, Study of African Economies, Oxford University, Working Paper, September 1996. To summarize very briefly, looking at data on Africa, the authors conclude that accelerating economic growth and diversification are important factors that reduce the risk of civil war.

7 Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Garden City/New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 173.

societies and medium to long term stability. While there is excellent reason to believe that in the long term wide inequalities in societies, like those, for example, that mark South Africa, exacerbate tendencies for conflict, there is also some evidence that suggests that unequal societies can be more stable at least in the short term as the leadership may have a strong ability to mobilize and control resources, which in turn may ensure peace and stability, at least for a time.[8]

For all these complications and areas of uncertainty and debate, the link between poverty and human suffering and violence is patently clear. Looking at the world map in early 1997, the red splotches that mark conflicts in large measure overlay some (certainly not all) of those marking the poorest regions and countries. Today's wars are above all located in poor countries. Sixteen of 20 of the poorest countries in the world, or half of all low income countries have experienced conflict in recent years.[9]

Beyond the observation that the poor countries suffer far more from wars and conflicts in today's world, a growing body of evidence shows that economic and social issues, notably inequalities and long-term poverty, specifically breed social tensions and conflicts. Perhaps more important is analysis that points toward some of the ways in which this happens. Here too the evidence tells a far from straightforward story, and many questions have yet to receive a satisfactory response. To cite one example which reflects the quest for better answers, a recent piece proposing a "skeleton" predictive model of state collapse and ethnic violence, by Pauline Baker and John Ausink, focuses on socioeconomic issues: demographic pressures, uneven economic development, sharp and severe economic distress, and progressive deterioration or elimination of public services.[10] Further, it is obvious that the destruction of war gives rise to suffering and missed opportunities, and that long bouts of conflict and war delay development. At the broadest level, therefore, the task of development, with its focus on poverty alleviation aims at promoting more peaceful societies. More concretely, efforts to direct resources to the poorer segments of societies, through the large array of policy measures and investment and specific social safety net programs, have a fundamental objective of enhancing stability through greater equity and prosperity.

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8 Collier and Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil Wars."

9 Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 590. Michael E. Brown includes much information on the pattern of conflicts in the world of 1995. This large work reflects a large team effort to review the profile of conflicts worldwide, and their causes. A concluding comment is worth citing: "Some scholars downplay the importance of economic factors in bringing about internal conflicts. I argue that they can be key in this context. Although Karl Marx was off target in thinking that class struggles were the be and end all of all conflict, he was right in pointing out the economic dimensions of political turmoil."

10 Pauline Baker and John A. Ausink, "State Collapse and Ethnic Violence: Toward a Predictive Model," in *Parameters*, 26 (Spring 1996) 2, p. 26.

The tragedy of Mozambique, a nation with great natural resources and now with socioeconomic indicators at the bottom of the world economic ladder, offers a graphic illustration of some of the most straightforward linkages between poverty and conflict.[11] The nature of the conflict, the long grinding years of war, the shadow support of outsiders, the sporadic interest of the outside world, reflected Mozambique's low level of development. The decades of war left untold destruction in their wake and Mozambique emerged far behind countries that began with similar assets. In crafting development strategies for a postwar future, reality comes back again and again to the fact that the lost human capital (deaths, disruptions, foregone education, and demolished schools and clinics) is an even more binding and lasting impediment than damaged roads and bridges and buried land-mines. This figures centrally in the challenge of development, as the generation that missed its chance at education and basic health care and institution strives to catch up with decades of delayed human investment. Extraordinary efforts are called for now to recapture the lost time as Mozambique faces the challenge of operating in today's competitive global environment.

A final note, quoting from a Washington Post article by Stephen Rosenfeld, which puts the focus on the limitations on the role of outside partners in this endeavor:

> "Bosnia and the rest are now being required to claw their way back to the development starting line that most other countries pushed off from long ago. Any country that leaves the initiative in that vital national project to national aid has given up. Not that aid has no role. But it is bound to be small against the leadership, enterprise, and sacrifice demanded of the nations themselves. It is unfair. It is the way things are."[12]

III. "Integrating Concern for Conflict into Development Operations"

The World Bank has acted in a wide variety of settings over the past decade to support investments in countries where conflict is ending or has ended and the path to a socioeconomic development agenda is thus taking shape. The largest single programs at present, both of which have required extraordinary programs and institutional mechanisms, are those supporting development in the West Bank and

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11 A compelling account of the Mozambique war and its impact presented in two *New Yorker* articles by William Finnegan, "The Emergency" (parts I and II), 22 May, 29 May 1989. Finnegan is a prolific commentator on Mozambique, with strong views on the role of external institutions in exacerbating crisis. Much of his factual basis is questionable but he illustrates the kind of critique advanced: William Finnegan, "A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique," in Joseph Hanlon, *Bretton Woods and the Misuse of Power in Mozambique*, unpublished paper, 24 January 1997.

12 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Picking up the Pieces," in *The Washington Post*, 26 April 1996, p. A26.

reconstruction in Bosnia.[13] Other important cases are Vietnam, Mozambique, Eritrea, Uganda, Georgia, and Central America. In the course of the broad ongoing discussion of the World Bank role in post-conflict reconstruction and in individual country cases, whether focusing on the African Great Lakes Highlands, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, or Bosnia, the question of how conflict prevention and development financing are related has also arisen. More specifically, how can post-conflict and other development operations be designed with a specific aim of helping to prevent a recurrence of conflict? And are there effective ways to foresee conflict, and to design development operations to deter, or prevent conflict?

At the broadest level, the call is for the World Bank agenda to "integrate concern for conflict into development operations." The central question, then, is how to do this in the most effective manner, beyond the central goal of the institutions and the countries that support them, of supporting economic and social progress. It is worth recalling that this central goal is itself seen as the prime route to a more peaceful and equitable world.

There is a compelling logic in the argument that conflict prevention is vastly preferable to post-conflict reconstruction, and that the causes, "the roots of conflicts" lie close to the socioeconomic matters that are the business of the development community. These debates are briefly sketched earlier in this chapter. The question of what this means in operational terms, however, is much hazier. This is one of the most complex and significant issues now under discussion in and around the development institutions. It raises in specific terms the question of why conflicts arise: what social, economic, institutional, and leadership profiles can hinder, or accentuate tendencies to instability, violence and conflict?

These questions are the topic of numerous research efforts and policy and program action in many countries. The discussion below highlights five areas that present significant operational problems for the development financing institutions, and also offer an illustration of some facets of institutional arrangements.

(1) *Inequality and distributional policies.* The relationships among four separate topics are the subject of much analysis and debate at present: inequalities within societies, economic performance, political development and level of democracy in government, and general levels of violence and instability. The evidence so far accumulated does not tell a clear or straightforward story, and indeed in many respects the multiple factors at work are over-determined, with intricate causality.[14]

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13 See World Bank Website for references (www.worldbank.org). An example of a recent publication is Nat Colletta, Marcus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda*, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 331 (Washington, DC, 1996).

14 Robert Klitgaard and Johannes Fedderke, "Social Integration and Disintegration: An Exploratory Analysis of Cross-Country Data," in *World Development*, 23 (1995) 3, pp. 357-369. This essay

Nonetheless, it is increasingly clear that the ancient axiom that social divisions produce violence and revolution has a broad applicability. The causal links are more difficult to pin down, however. In simple, perhaps simplistic terms, the pressures or tendencies to populism are greater where large crowds or significant groups of voters see the gulf between them and a wealthy elite as excessive. Populist policies, in turn, can drive up government spending and deficits, thus dampening economic growth and deterring investment. High unemployment, as is now the case in South Africa and Zimbabwe, is clearly related to high crime rates. High crime rates are a deterrent to investment also. Slow growth makes a move toward better income distribution yet more difficult.[15]

The conviction, and evidence, that high inequality is a danger to long-term stability reinforces the strong emphasis that the development institutions place on poverty alleviation policies and efforts to introduce distributional issues across the development agenda. It calls for special attention and care where issues reflect scarce resources of vital concern to people, notably land and water. These concerns around inequality and actions to address it have a wide array of applications, from land reform schemes that aim to protect rights of small holders (even, as in the case of Mauritania and Senegal, refugees from conflicts), water policies that are built on a careful appreciation of the real potential for national and international conflict around water resource issues, design of irrigation policies and schemes to favor greater equality, and environmental policies that reflect the costs and benefits of natural resource protection to communities directly affected.

(2) *Economic Reform and Conflict.* Many commentators link economic reform to conflict, and focus specifically on the social pain that, in their view, is inflicted by "structural adjustment" policies. Often the central issue is the specific "conditionality" that is negotiated with the international community and with the international financial institutions. Some of the turmoil in Africa and in the former USSR countries, bread riots in Egypt and Zambia, and tensions in parts of Latin America exploded around specific reform measures, notably where urban food prices or other visible prices like bus fares increase steeply. In recent years, major efforts to anticipate the social impact of reforms, and where possible to plan mitigating measures have become the norm. Perhaps the most elaborate case is offered by the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc in West Africa. Leading up to the

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reviews much of the statistical work on the interactions of various social indicators and highlights the many limitations on use of such data, as well as a number of "preliminary and provocative" conclusions. For an incisive and provocative analysis of causes of civil conflict the work of Paul Collier is exemplary; see particularly Collier and Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War."

15 See Amartya Sen's works for a thoughtful discussion of the complexities of the issues, for example, *Inequality Reexamined* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

decision, a central concern was how destabilizing the move would be, and what prospects for violence were. A long series of specific measures, ranging from special procurement of essential pharmaceutical products, monitoring of food stocks, temporary subsidies of essential commodities, and special community social funds formed part of the reform plan.

The structural adjustment debate falls outside the scope of this paper, except insofar as macroeconomic reforms are seen as the culprit (or a scapegoat) for social instability and violence. Early "shock treatment" economic reform programs, many termed "structural adjustment" took too little account of two critical dimensions: what direct impact the reform measures would have both on middle classes and on the poor; and of how the reforms would be perceived. More recently, virtually every reform program is crafted with social considerations in the foreground, and include specific safety net provisions. There is much mythology in perceptions of how structural adjustment programs actually work, and the governments concerned, and their international partners, have a major task ahead in explaining the facts of the case much more clearly and effectively.

To summarize some important arguments briefly. "Crash," "Shock Therapy" and "structural" reforms are generally a response to economic crisis, often of vast proportions where the direction is rapidly downward toward worsening crisis and social disintegration. Failure to reform, to restore some balance and offer new and real hope for growth, can be explosive and profoundly destabilizing. This "counter-factual" – what would have happened without reform – needs critical attention. Secondly, most reform programs must contend with the dilemma of managing "vocal minorities" who may suffer real and acute pain but whose voice is disproportionate both to their size and population share and poverty level (parastatal workers laid off, for example, or students whose stipends are cut). The interests of the "silent majority" (for example rural farmers who stand to receive higher prices for cotton, informal sector entrepreneurs with new trade opportunities, for example) are rarely heard and considered with the same vigor as present and vocal groups. Communication about the intent and specific dimensions of reforms has often been poorly handled. There are many cases where large parts of civil society had little sense of the desperate economic plight that occasioned reform, of the medium term promise of better growth, and of the specific instruments used.

Economic reforms need to be disaggregated into different component parts and social impacts assessed and acted upon as appropriate. The villain of a "structural adjustment" program is rarely a tight package but is an assembly of different components that range from straightforward and imperative stabilization measures (curtailing yawning budget deficits for example) through more elaborate reform measures that alter the role that the state plays and balance between public and

private sectors (privatization or changes in education systems, for example). A distinction needs to be drawn between macroeconomic policy instruments and reforms at the sector level that blend policy, institutional, and investment measures. The traditional line between stabilization and adjustment is difficult to draw in crisis situations, but the line between a reform of structure beyond the macroeconomic domain, extending into areas like social welfare, education, and agriculture, is still more difficult. Lumping an ambitious reform program touching multiple sectors and extending over a medium term time frame as "structural adjustment" often obscures more than it clarifies.

Economic reforms need to be introduced with a thoughtful and careful assessment of their social and political impact, much more careful than has sometimes been the case when the urgent need to act to stem crisis has tended to drive out vitally important elements. Further, economic reform rarely if ever proceeds exactly as expected and the social impact has proved particularly difficult to predict with precision. For these reasons, specific care in managing the social dimensions is now seen as a central element in both design and implementation of reforms, whose importance should never be downplayed. Practical, visible social indicators of social impact are an essential part of the information that reformers need. These are clear lessons of past experience and are an essential part of the agenda now.

That said, the myths around the nefarious aspects of economic reforms also need to be dissected and dispelled to allow a thoughtful consideration of the pros and cons of reform action. The international community is not prepared to finance the consequences of bad policies, and the experience of country after country offers compelling evidence that the costs of delayed reform for the welfare of the majority are very high.

(3) *Social Assessment.* A third area for action and reflection turns around the role of social assessment in reviewing development policies, programs, and specific project design. The consensus is now that development programs, at a broad national sectoral level, and in the case of specific investment program design, can benefit materially if thoughtful social analysis forms part of planning, design, and implementation. It is important to bring to bear the rich knowledge and experience of the full range of social science disciplines: regional development strategies afford a good example of how better appreciation of social and ethnic issues can help ensure that actions "do no harm" or enrich the potential synergies of strategies and programs. In Mali, better analysis of realities and perceptions dividing northern and southern regions might have averted tensions that erupted in the north in recent years, and some of the tensions involving university students might have been averted if better knowledge of student attitudes and social situations had been known earlier. In Malawi, the attitudes of rural communities toward development priorities, and the

differing approaches of men and women, hitherto virtually unexplored, materially enriched recent development programs and may well contribute to lower social tensions in the future.

The question of ethnic issues in conjunction with development finance operations merits special care, though the "taboo" that existed on discussing the topic directly no longer applies in many countries.[16] Careful reflection on ethnic issues in poverty strategies cannot be avoided in many societies. Likewise, there is a growing appreciation that attention to gender issues across the board is vitally important. The techniques in these fields have progressed well beyond the "do no harm" objectives of earlier efforts, and offer a rich field of examples of techniques for analysis and cases of both success and failure. If done well, the quality of interventions at every stage can be improved. Poorly handled or ignored, the problems that arise can sabotage promising actions and accentuate underlying social tensions.

(4) *Participation and Transparent Policies.* The call for participation in policy design and implementation follows from goals of enhancing social justice and stability. It has also come to be seen as an essential ingredient in ensuring effectiveness and efficiency of development interventions. Again, at the simplest level, not asking or considering the views and insights of affected populations is a recipe for disastrous errors, and there are all too many cases of policies designed from above that have accentuated conflict. A methodical scheme in Mutara, Rwanda to organize cattle farmers into group farms laid out in perfect rectangles led people to seek a curse on the World Bank from the Bishop of the region.[17] While the scheme had too little real impact to lay at its door the heightening of tensions in Rwanda, it can be seen as a missed opportunity to identify and work to resolve underlying social tensions with the people concerned.

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16 William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," World Bank, Working Paper, September 1986 represents a systematic effort to analyze the relationship between ethnic divisions in societies and growth performance. It highlights both ethnic composition of societies and specific incidents of ethnic violence and tensions. A central conclusion is that ethnic fragmentation is indeed correlated with poor economic performance, as is violence. The major avenue for progress lies in building stronger government institutions to assure rule of law and effective transmission of information. Collier and Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil Wars," reach somewhat different conclusions, suggesting that societies most prone to violence are not those with most ethnic fragmentation, nor the least, but those in between. Robert Klitgaard, *Adjusting to Reality: Beyond State versus Market in Economic Development* (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1991) devotes a chapter on Poverty and Ethnic Groups in Developing Countries, and another to specific policies that give promise of reducing ethnic inequalities and thus tensions.

17 The Mutara Agricultural and Livestock Development Project, financed by an IDA Credit to the Government of Rwanda, was designed in the early 1970s, and aimed at introducing group ranching through cooperatives of livestock owners. World Bank internal evaluation documents focused on the limited social analysis as a factor in disappointing project results.

Active, direct, and multifaceted involvement of people in development interventions that affect them is a sine qua non for effective action. This argument is prominent in de Tocqueville's commentary on American democracy in the eighteenth century[18] and still applies today. Robert Putnam's work on civic associations has been very influential in highlighting the critical importance of civil society in successful development at national and community level.[19] This broad goal of enhancing participation also has a wide array of practical applications, from effective and genuine strategies to communicate effectively (explaining and listening) about issues of concern, survey instruments that test ideas and interventions underway, efforts to reinforce the fabric of society through efforts to promote civic organizations, and attention to using community institutions well and moving effectively to decentralization of authority.

This discussion leaves aside the debate about whether a higher degree of democracy enhances prospects for peace as well as prosperity. As Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder comment in a 1995 Foreign Affairs article, "The idea that democracies never fight against each other has become an axiom for many scholars." They go on to conclude that the evidence is less conclusive than generally thought, and note certain types of conflicts that indeed characterize democratic states, and highlight the dangers of "turbulent transition."[20] The World Bank, in keeping with its apolitical mandate, cannot enter the debate directly, but clearly sees facets of the issue through the lens of closely related issues like decentralization, participation, and availability of information.

(5) *Understanding Population Dynamics and Gender Issues.* In looking to the socioeconomic issues that most directly affect welfare, the intertwined issues of fertility, family size, life expectancy, and relationships between the sexes has pride of place. It affects every individual and, at the level of society, determines the social dynamic. Population policies, together with education, are among the public policy issues with the longest time horizon but in addressing issues of social welfare and stability few are more important. Likewise, evidence now available paints an increasingly clear picture of the multiple interrelationships among the various indicators of female welfare and both economic and social welfare more broadly. The clearest instance, with a large body of research to back assertions, is the correlation between education of girls and a host of indicators from children's school performance, nutrition (up to and including head circumference), childbearing, salary

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18 Alexis de Tocqueville, *A Democracy in America*, translated by Henry Reeve (London: Saunders and Otley, 1835).

19 Robert D. Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy World: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

20 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," in *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (May/June 1995) 3, pp. 79-97.

and employment performance of women, and agricultural productivity. Such evidence led the World Bank's then Chief Economist Lawrence Summers (now Deputy Secretary of the US Department of the Treasury) to argue in many public forums that there is no single better investment than investing in education of girls. This is an illustration of the social science research that gives ever increasing weight to the importance of gender roles in development and social progress.

Many poor countries, especially in Africa, face two related phenomenons with enormous and largely unexplored implications for future stability: much higher proportions of adolescents, and higher proportions of dependent children than human societies have ever experienced, the result of rapid population growth in recent decades. To illustrate, the proportion of the population 15 years old and under in the United States is around 22%, in Europe around 19%, in Asia 32%, and in Africa upwards of 45%. Samuel Huntington puts strong emphasis on demographic factors in his analysis of potential sources of conflict and specifically sounds a warning bell on the volatile nature of societies when the share of adolescents (15-19 years old) exceeds 20% of the total population.[21] A sharp focus on action to benefit, educate and employ productively the new generations needs to form part of development strategies.

The role of women in societies also has extraordinary long term implications, although the direct association with stability and peace involves a long causal chain. But there is powerful evidence that the best investment that can be made in a society is in educating girls, and a failure to address these issues, even in times of economic stringency or crisis, can have dire long term consequences.

IV. Post-Conflict Reconstruction – The Role of the World Bank[22]

The very name of the World Bank recalls its original objective of post-conflict reconstruction. Its official title, IBRD, stands for the "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development." Although the initial mandate of providing the financing of post-World War II reconstruction in Europe was largely subsumed by the US-sponsored Marshall Plan, and the World Bank moved toward a broader mandate of supporting development in less prosperous countries, the post-conflict

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21 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

22 The discussion in this chapter focuses on the World Bank itself. However, in the World Bank response to post-conflict crises and in the framing and debate on post-conflict challenges, there are marked similarities with other development finance institutions, particularly the regional development banks which have tended to operate in a similar governance framework. The International Monetary Fund faces similar issues as to its role in some situations, especially where it is called upon to judge the stability of an economy and thus its readiness to absorb investment funds.

role has remained important in many situations. Time and time again the World Bank has played a central role in mobilizing the large volume of finance that is needed to rebuild after the destruction of war.[23]

The "classic" World Bank role in post-conflict countries bears striking similarities to the operational response after an earthquake and typhoon: urgent, accelerated programs of investment focused largely on the physical destruction, and thus an infrastructure focus. The special characteristic of such programs was that speed was of the essence. Some special measures were (and remain) needed to take account of the gaps in basic information that characterize a crisis situation, a higher degree of uncertainty, say on cost estimates, and above all weaknesses in institutions and a situation of flux where institutional arrangements may be subject to change. The traditional World Bank procedures and actions in such cases thus aimed at an accelerated and simplified process of preparation, appraisal, and implementation.

The traditional role of the World Bank was predicated on intervention at the stage when there was a solid peace. The tendency, exemplified perhaps in the case of Vietnam, was to await a clear consensus that peace was secured, and the warring parties and the great powers that had supported them agreed that the conflict was at an end. This resulted in some situations of a long hiatus between a peace agreement and the full start of project support and large scale financing by development finance institutions. The World Bank was meticulous also in avoiding the impression of intervention in ongoing conflict, and could be called to task by its member states for even the appearance of actions that could favor one side over another.

This picture has changed and is likely to undergo still further changes in the future. The reasons lie in the combined and related changes in the political environment that surrounds conflicts in the post-1989 world, and their nature. Another factor is changes in the ties between countries in conflict and the richer countries that have served as the traditional support of the contending parties. Conflicts, further, have broadened, and the distinction between peace and war, spatially and in time, is fraught with ambiguity. Added to this is the powerful importance of new communications systems and the media as they interplay with conflict situations. The graphic and immediate images of suffering that are now available to large parts of the world population suggest a call for action, sooner not later. Another change is the multitude of actors who are involved in many situations as outside partners: business, international institutions, and Non-Governmental Organizations. Many or all of these groups call attention to needs and work to aid victims of conflict; they exhibit an ever increasing interest in ensuring that the immediate, humanitarian support they provide

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23 See paper by Stephen Holtzman, *Post Conflict Reconstruction*, work in progress paper, Social Policy and Resettlement Division (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996).

will lead to lasting, sustainable support that will bridge the gulf between misery and a good quality of life.

In this new environment, the World Bank has been called on to play both its traditional role, of financing reconstruction. It also confronts a growing set of new roles, crafted to meet the needs of emerging situations and the broader challenge of the increasing numbers of conflict situations and rising needs for humanitarian and peacekeeping support on the international community.

The traditional, and perhaps first motive for a call to the World Bank to intervene has been to provide or help mobilize the staggering sums of money that are required to rebuild infrastructure and "jump-start" an economy after the destruction of war. Financing is critically needed for reconstruction, and the World Bank is well placed both to finance investments directly and to help mobilize and coordinate aid. There are three difficulties that can arise:

(1) The amounts of money required for reconstruction after a war far exceed the "norms" of financing that are traditionally allocated for countries, based on needs, equity, poverty, or demonstrated performance. This applies to the World Bank but also to most other development institutions. Special consideration and treatment are needed to mobilize and orchestrate the financing packages that reconstruction calls for.

(2) When a country had fallen into arrears in payment to the international financial institutions, the policies of these institutions do not allow new financing, and at a certain stage, without exception, disbursements for ongoing operations are suspended. This is the case now in Liberia, Zaire and Sudan, for example. Special international efforts are needed to meet the amounts of arrears so that operations can resume. Examples of such efforts include the countries of former Yugoslavia. To date, the most elaborate examples of a concerted international effort, spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and implemented over a period of years, are the debt workout plans for Peru and Zambia. In both cases the programs allowed development finance operations to resume after protracted period of suspension because of arrears. These and other instances show that even seemingly intractable problems can be resolved and offer some indications of the type of financing mechanisms that are available. They demonstrate that solutions are feasible but also highlight the intricate arrangements that need to be worked out.

(3) When a new country is in the process of joining the World Bank, special arrangements are required before a normal borrowing relationship can be established. Examples of such arrangements are the West Bank Trust Fund, where the World Bank has operated effectively as trustee of special international funds made available for development, and initial operations in Eritrea, where

agreements with the Ethiopian Government and various international partners allowed the World Bank to begin operations, to the stage of formal credit approval and implementation, well before the formalities of Eritrea's membership in the IMF and the World Bank were concluded.

In all these cases, the problems have been addressed and solid solutions crafted that allowed the World Bank to play the role expected of it. In the past, though, a drawback has been the absence of a clear policy and operational framework covering post-conflict challenges. This meant that a case-by case approach has been followed, with solutions were hammered out step by step. This in turn has meant considerable uncertainty along the way on when and how the solutions would emerge.

Beyond the financing role, there are at least four other areas where the World Bank has become involved in post-conflict situations. Perhaps most significant is the support that the World Bank can lend in *Strategic and Policy Planning.* The World Bank, with its goldmine of information, networks and experience in economic and social development issues, can play a central role in strategic thinking as leaders and outside partners turn to the task of reconstruction and development. The Bank can provide rapid, objective analysis of socioeconomic issues and options and define the economic and social tools that can guide decision-making. Specialists across disciplines, with the objectivity and "outsider" status afforded by an international institution, can mobilize vast worldwide resources of experiences, good and bad, across economic issues and sectors. The capacity to mobilize, rapidly, interdisciplinary teams of specialists and to harness networks of people with experience of virtually any problem, and access to a vast array of partners, public and private, international and national, business and not-for profit in focus can fill a vast void in a country emerging from crisis and seeking to trace the path forward.

Countries in a post-conflict situation need both to build new *Aid Partnerships* and to coordinate large numbers of actors, many accustomed to operating with considerable autonomy in the country during times of crisis. The World Bank has experience, expertise and a "known" role in helping to build the complex partnerships that are needed to finance and support the mammoth efforts involved in restarting an economy. The Consultative Group and Aid Consortium mechanisms offer excellent precedents for the aid partnerships needed in post-conflict situations. These are flexible partnerships, organized to fit the needs of the specific country, which meet as needed under the chairmanship of the World Bank, often jointly with the country concerned, and involving the most active bilateral and multilateral institutions. The formula of meetings allows all parties to have a comprehensive picture of the development strategy and financing needs of the country, to pose questions, and to share information about the respective aid activities in the country. These aid coordination mechanisms can also be used as a continuing information sharing mechanism and a

framework within which specific sectoral or other special coordination mechanisms can be organized.[24]

Countries emerging from conflicts face a multitude of problems, many of which are characteristic of post-conflict situations. Clear technical and policy guidance, including raw information on what other countries have done, is hard to come by. The World Bank has thus come to play an increasingly important role in providing *Policy and Technical Support on Post Conflict Issues*. As experience with post-conflict programs grows, the World Bank has the capacity to offer, in usable, operational form, specific experience from elsewhere in the world that can help policy makers in the throes of post-conflict challenges, whether the issue is design of programs for demobilization of soldiers, privatization of a munitions industry, costs and priorities within a nationwide demining campaign, a social action program that can serve war-battered communities, or building a nongovernmental coalition to support child-victims of war.[25]

A characteristic of post-conflict situations is policy vacuums in many sectors and large holes in analytic work. The World Bank has vast and deep-rooted experience and expertise in these areas and thus can provide substantial support with *socio-economic data and tools for analysis*. The massive evidence that is now available or can be gathered relatively quickly about social development and social consequences of policy change may well serve in situations of conflict to help forge an earlier and stronger peace. Bringing data on social costs of wars, in graphic yet objective forms, may in some instances contribute to the impetus for peace and help shape the consensus and agreements formed. This was the objective of World Bank efforts in Angola to highlight the impact and implications of the dramatic slide in social indicators, and the immense costs of rebuilding, and thus urge civic and Government leaders to push social and economic objectives high up the list as they worked for peace and reconciliation.

This catalogue of evolving roles carries no implication whatsoever that the World Bank is optimally or uniquely placed to carry out these functions. A common characteristic of recent post-conflict situations is the varying roles that different actors

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24 The country concerned decides on the aid coordination mechanism that best suits its needs. Apart from Consultative Groups and Consortia, the United Nations Development Program organizes Round Table mechanisms with a similar purpose and structure for many countries and some countries, for example South Africa, have opted to organize meetings and continuing mechanisms directly.

25 An example of such practical advice is reflected in a document published by the World Bank, *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies*, Report IDP-130 (Washington, DC: Africa Regional Office, 1993). This work arose from a specific request by the Government of Chad for advice on how it might support demobilization programs; a task force at staff level gathered a wide array of information on the topic and found first that such information was sparse, and second that there was active demand for it.

play, both over different time periods, and from situation to situation. In the immediate post-conflict situation, for example, national governments and regional associations, together or in parallel with the United Nations, are likely to be key actors. In situations where massive population movements are at issue, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees assumes a central role. In the emergency phase, the extraordinary dedication, nimbleness, and organizational skills of some of the humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations play critical roles as a neutral, people-focused vehicle for action. National government peacekeeping efforts may give way to aid-focused actions, as for example the Scandinavian support for Southern African countries emerging from conflict has laid a foundation for grounded and effective development support. The United Nations Development Program bridges the United Nations agency roles, from Peacekeeping to the specialized agencies like UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the FAO.

The World Bank nonetheless offers special advantages. It is an institution uniquely placed in terms of global experience and information, and with a powerful mandate to support the long-term development programs that are urgently needed after wars end. The central challenges now are to enhance the capacity of the World Bank and its partners to make the most effective use of the strategic advantages, and to enhance the elaborate partnerships that are needed, between the country and its outside partners, and among the outside partners.[26]

The World Bank's essential apolitical mandate presents some longstanding and significant questions in looking to its future role in conflict and post-conflict situations. This role carries both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages can be boiled down as neutrality and professionalism and ability to draw on literally global resources. The disadvantages represent the reverse side, arising from the need to avoid direct involvement in crucial issues that plainly have a political character, like assuring security, rebuilding police forces and military, and building new political institutions. As the World Bank moves in any situation of conflict, it approaches the issues from a socioeconomic perspective, which means quite specifically that it abjures a role in political judgments and issues. The World Bank's Articles of Agreement, agreed upon in 1944, set this objective as a central feature of the institution's character, and it drives the effort to ensure fairness and equal access. This effort also explains the central role that economic language and data occupy in documents of the World Bank and in its approach to problems. Issues tend to be couched in economic and social terms and terminology, for good and longstanding

26 The World Bank Website (www.worldbank.org) has a briefing on War to Peace Transition Issues that includes references to a growing body of World Bank publications and working papers on these topics.

reasons. It is very clear that the World Bank's member countries have no wish for the institution to assume the role of a world policeman in any way, shape, or form.

The long standing, persistent efforts of the World Bank's leaders to ensure the apolitical character of the institution should not obscure the fact that there is a clear understanding within the institution that there are many intersections of economics and politics. World Bank staff discussions with member governments and the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors on military expenditure levels are one example: these discussions occur with increasing frequency, even though special efforts are made to avoid treading in specifically political issues by defining the issue in terms of distinctions and tradeoffs between development and non-development expenditures. Analyses of public expenditure provide a solid and often highly detailed framework within which discussions of quantitative and qualitative tradeoffs take place. For example, it might highlight the relative costs between a tank or gun ship, a new airport or road, and social investment in schools or clinics. More fundamentally, there is a clear understanding that the basic objectives that drive Bank operations, enhancing social equity and broad-based social capital, have an essentially political character.

The international community has focused on the management of post-conflict reconstruction, and specifically on the roles that different international institutions should play, in a wide array of settings over the past five years. The G-7 Meeting at Halifax in June 1995 specifically considered these issues, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and heads of a number of Specialized Agencies of the UN have led efforts to define more precisely the optimal institutional arrangements to respond to post-conflict challenges. In this context, the role of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other development finance institutions has come under specific scrutiny. At the Annual Meetings in Washington of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in September 1995, the President of the World Bank made an unprecedented commitment that the World Bank would work toward a stepped up engagement in post-conflict situations, in concert with its partners. Innumerable task forces, studies, and international conferences have reflected on various dimensions of the issue since then.

Describing or interpreting this rich mosaic of efforts to redefine the task and partnerships for post-conflict reconstruction falls well beyond the scope of this chapter. One effort with which I was associated personally offers an illustration of the nature of the various deliberations. Following from an August 1995 meeting among the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, a series of meetings among these actors aimed to find better ways for these institutions to collaborate in post-conflict situations. Angola was taken as a starting point. The conclusions of this exercise took the form, in the first instance, of specific collaboration and operational

improvements in the Angola case. The parties concerned also drew some broader conclusions about implications for future cases.

A central conclusion was that, far more than the individuals concerned had earlier appreciated. Information sources within each of the respective institutions were largely untapped by the others, yet stood to enhance materially the effectiveness of action involving each institution, individually and collectively. Specific information on UN Peacekeeping plans, food aid provision, and programs for refugee integration proved useful in addressing implementation issues for ongoing investment programs supported by the World Bank and design of several future programs that was underway: to support a social action program (so that it might dovetail with planned refugee resettlement), training of demobilized soldiers, and consideration of financing of demining operations, for example. The dramatic issues arising from macroeconomic difficulties and practical issues around budget constraints, hitherto seen as the exclusive domain of the IMF and the World Bank, proved directly useful for the UN Department of Political Affairs, as did information on the rapid and dramatic deterioration of social indicators in Angola.

It was also surprising that practical measures to enhance information sharing both at headquarters and in Angola were relatively easy to identify and set in motion. In some cases, the issues entailed confidential, or working information and thus special coordination measures. In many others, the problem was to find ready filtering channels to make timely and effective use of essentially public information.

The common understanding of facts and issues for Angola's peacekeeping and economic development imperatives by the UN Department of Political Affairs, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund materially helped all three institutions in both planning for and follow-up of a key aid coordination meeting, the September 1995 Brussels Round Table Meeting. It also served as an excellent foundation for preparing for a visit to Washington in December 1995 by the President of Angola.

The key role of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Angola, in advancing the peace process, was discussed and important potential linkages highlighted among peacemaking (actual negotiation of an agreement and immediate follow-up), peacekeeping (quartering and demobilization processes) and reconciliation and development.

Angola's economic development challenges, including establishing a sound macroeconomic framework in the first instance, and moving aggressively to rebuild enfeebled public sector institutions, emerged clearly as priority issues for peacemaking and peacekeeping as well as for longer-term economic development. The perils of postulating that peace came first and development thereafter emerged starkly from discussions. Some outside partners had tended to compartmentalize the issues,

essentially relegating development issues including economic reform to a post-conflict situation. The meetings suggested strongly that the economic and social challenges facing Angola belonged front and center on the peace table and that the costs of peacemaking and peacekeeping could not be disengaged from economic management because of their fiscal implications.

The Angola case highlighted powerful potential synergies among the roles of the institutions involved. The wide scope of the issues each agency was handling and their complex interactions emerged at every turn, as did specific ideas for better collaboration and swifter and more effective action. Perhaps the richest outcome was the clear appreciation among all parties concerned that the assumed model of a steady succession from peace discussions, to peace treaty, to peacekeeping and demobilization to refugee integration and resettlement and emergency rebuilding to long-term development applied poorly. Virtually all these stages occurred simultaneously in the Angola case (and still are today) and had important linkages in all directions. The specific nature of the Angola conflict, where peace and war coexist even within a single region, where the "front" has been diffused throughout the country, and where cautious optimism about actions or agreements gives way to gloom as new problems emerge, underscores these relationships. While each world conflict has its own profile and peculiarities, the Angolan situation has many elements in common with other modern conflicts. The lessons on managing institutional roles would appear to have quite broad applicability.

In all the discussions to date of institutional roles there is one black hole where little light has yet been shed on appropriate or effective intervention: the case of failed states. The famous article by Robert Kaplan on "The Coming Anarchy" has provoked interesting debate on both causes and consequences of this phenomenon, though we are still far short of effective answers to the problem.[27] Short of a proconsul role by the international community or even recolonization in some form, it is difficult to see how international institutions can address these issues, beyond the grinding and long-term route of improving the lot of the people in the countries concerned.

V. The World Bank Role: Some Specific Issues

The member governments of the World Bank have considered a specific policy framework for addressing post-conflict situations on a number of occasions during

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27 Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," in *The Atlantic Monthly*, (February 1994), and *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996). Work on the issue of failed states is also reflected in I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

1996 and 1997.[28] Some topics of concern are quite specific to the World Bank (essentially operational questions about financing instruments and organizational mechanisms). Thus, for example, the question of how active the Bank should be during a conflict situation and in the immediate aftermath is a perennial issue: should resources be invested, for example, in a country like Zaire even when fighting persists and the prospects for social and economic development projects are dim? A "watching brief" policy is the central conclusion, though clearly what such a role would constitute needs to be defined in each situation. Broadly, the imperative is for well adapted, transparent, clear and flexible operating procedures to allow programs to operate and to evolve in dynamic post-conflict situations. A strong and pragmatic policy that promotes decentralized decision-making is clearly required. The broad objective has been to clarify emerging practice and provide a more explicit direction for the future, taking into account the interrelationships among the economic, social and political domains in countries emerging from war.

The policy framework also addresses broader issues about institutional roles and priorities in the post-conflict reconstruction area more generally, notably the relationship of the World Bank with other partner institutions, within the United Nations system and nongovernmental organizations. Here, the central question is about complementarity of roles, and specifically how the field knowledge and understanding that the humanitarian aid institutions amass during their intensive operations can translate into better design of succeeding development programs. The need for joint work and partnership, for example between refugee reintegration programs and social investment and emergency fund operations, merits a high priority. Sharing knowledge and joint training and operations are highlighted as important operational approaches.

The post-conflict reconstruction policies aim to address some of the specific issues that have arisen in recent cases such as Mozambique, the West Bank/Gaza, Central America, Eritrea, Rwanda, Georgia, and Mozambique. The discussions around the policies have focused particularly on issues of financing. The extraordinary financing needs of countries emerging from war call for unusual aid mobilization and coordination mechanisms. There is a need for special attention to investment risks, institutional and procedural flexibility, and clear progress benchmarks to allow participants and partners to judge performance and results as programs proceed. The need for exceptional financing mechanisms, such as for example a special post-conflict fund has been considered; broadly, the emerging consensus has focused on the need for a case-by-case solution to financing, as has been the practice in the past. The policy framework discussions have also addressed the problem of arrears, as several countries emerging from war have accumulated large arrears to financial

28 World Bank, "Post Conflict Reconstruction: A Framework Policy Paper," draft, February 1997.

institutions. An outline mechanism to ensure special bridging finance until more durable agreements to finance arrears can be worked out.

A central focus of the policy discussions has been the need for stronger and clearer coordination mechanisms to tie humanitarian better to development assistance. Specific questions include: how best to phase out of food aid and help promote the development of effective food security arrangements; practical ways to ensure early attention to lasting institutional issues such as community maintenance training and financing for water programs; heightened, concerted programs for accelerated training, perhaps even in refugee camps, for needed skills; defining and launching clear social investment strategies that allow early action and results as soon as communities are ready to launch programs; practical ways to ensure early and pragmatic attention to environmental issues in program design and management; and early, intense, and sustained attention to education and training with clear articulation among the many individual activities typically involved.

In sum, the World Bank has played a dynamic and important role in a widening range of post-conflict situations, from its inception but never so intensively or broadly as in the 1990s. There is a broad consensus that the Bank can and should play this role wherever the countries involved and their partners require. To do so in the complex post-conflict situation of today calls for greater speed and nimbleness than normal operating procedures, designed for different challenges, allow. Further, the Bank is called on to address issues earlier than has been the case in the past, when the expectation was that the Bank would not begin or resume operations until peace was well established. Current discussions suggest an earlier involvement, to offer a strong bridge between humanitarian and development operations, even to the point of involvement in providing information and options at the peace discussion stage, cooperation with agencies taking the lead during emergency and humanitarian operations (notably UNHCR and World Food Program and non-governmental agencies like Medicins sans Frontiers and Oxfam) and financing operations critically required for peace but obviously arising from war, like demining and demobilization of soldiers. These issues clearly have special sensitivity, and the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, representing the shareholding countries, expect to play an active role in defining the parameters of intervention on a case by case basis, but the essential expectation is for broader, earlier and more integrated action and support for international efforts to build and keep peace in war-torn societies.

VI. Governance Dimensions

This sketch of long term development issues represents a summary and highly selective treatment of areas where social welfare and development strategies are most

directly tied to action to further peace and stability. They illustrate how numerous are the interactions and possible areas for intervention, and how much uncertainty remains on critical issues of cause and effect where social dynamics are concerned. The central question that can be posed is: what strategic direction, and what priority actions stand the best chance of helping to reinforce social peace and welfare and, hopefully, at the same time, prevent violence and conflict? There are plainly no ready answers, no formulas, and few pitfalls that are not well known. However, two issues and areas for action stand out above others: attention to building an effective and just state, and aggressive and creative action to bring education levels to the highest standard a society can support with the resources available to it.

On issue after issue, attention turns to the questions of *how* (far more than *whether* or even *when*) lofty and worthy goals can be achieved. The role that the state plays: both how broadly its mandate is defined and how it is organized to deliver, leads in turn to a focus on institutions and capacity, and on implementation, as opposed to vision, conception, and design. It is striking that George Soros has focused so sharply on institutional issues in his recent commentary on "The Capitalist Threat."[29]

In a wide variety of situations the path from discussion of stability and inequality leads to a discussion of the importance of rule of law and to assurance of a solid regulatory framework and transparent information systems. In several specific country situations where reintegration strategies and protection goals are the primary objectives, UNHCR staff highlights the development of judicial and legal institutions as a central policy issue. Likewise, in post-transition South Africa, in Chad, in northern Mali, in Colombia, legal institutions are seen as a primary avenue to managing and resolving tensions within societies. Reforms in regulatory systems and in information systems lie at the heart of what has come to be known as "second generation" reforms, those that succeed the "stroke of the pen" initial macroeconomic measures that set an economy back on a stable and growth path.[30]

The basic need for sound institutions emerges in virtually every field. The conclusions highlighted in William Easterly and Ross Levine's analysis of ethnic inequalities, illustrate the significance that institutional reform has come to assume. The primary if not only instrument for lessening negative repercussions of ethnic tensions in a sound legal system with clear protections offered for rights of minorities. In analysis after analysis, the issues return to the question of institutions and their capacity to work effectively to resolve differences within society, to gather, use and convey information, to support individual and market efforts.

Institutional development and capacity building underlie a large part of development efforts, and are interwoven in every facet of development work, whether it is a

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29 George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," in *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1997, pp. 45-58.

30 For an example of such a treatment see Klitgaard, *Adjusting to Reality.*

president convening a cabinet conference to review strategic options (as Mali's President, for example, has done on several occasions), a civil service reform effort, aimed at introducing better incentive systems, a tax systems reform, a program to encourage health workers to live closer to rural clients, or teacher training efforts. This said, much more can and needs to be done to translate the stated objectives of making institutions work better into lasting results. This constitutes both the best hope for linking knowledge and ideas on how to enhance social welfare and help promote more stable societies where conflicts are resolved fairly and peacefully, into real results. There are examples of societies that have achieved at least part of this ideal. The case of Asian societies like Taiwan and Malaysia, where national strategies have for decades accentuated the dual role of social capital and public institutions as a foundation for rapid growth is a case in point. The success of societies like Botswana and Mauritius also owe much to their development of capacity. Examples of failure, sadly, are much more numerous, with Zaire's institutional bankruptcy the most immediate and telling illustration of the consequences of weak institutions.

Governance may be the most discussed issue in the development field in the mid-1990s, and one of the most poorly understood. This can be traced in large measure to the tendency to bundle so many issues together into a single term. Different groups have adopted the word "governance," which has an ancient derivation and etymology, to refer to several different phenomena on the contemporary scene. Thus the term "governance" has taken on a character of code where the same word is used to connote several different if related phenomenons.

To take a few examples, some bilateral development agencies and nongovernmental organizations tend to use the term to refer to what they see as the essential step of reforms to guarantee electoral systems that will result in effective opposition and democratic alternance. The system's ability to "throw the rascals out" is seen as key. Some Non-Governmental Organizations use the term to refer to the specific issue of human rights, particularly as it is manifested in violence against minority groups or political opposition. Because freedom of information is viewed by many as an essential corollary of good government, press freedom is cited by some as a central governance issue. In other quarters governance is used quite specifically to refer to corruption (or its absence). Finally, in the broadest use of the term (and that most often employed within the World Bank), it refers to effective government, transparent, with effective participation, and ensuring clear rules of the game.

These facets of governance certainly pose quite separate questions and problems. Each topic has separate importance. There are nonetheless elements that each governance facet shares with others, and in important respects all come together in reflecting broad choices about the role of the state and the authority and legitimacy it enjoys to exercise power.

Looking specifically to the World Bank, the central importance of institutional issues is increasingly recognized. Support for institutional development and many facets of "good governance" have long been an integral part of World Bank supported development programs but they will take on increasing importance in the future. Many specific efforts have been made to learn lessons of experience. These include the Wapenhans report on experience with project implementation under the Bank-financed portfolio, a special task force that concentrated on technical assistance performance and its role in transfer of skills and institutional development, reviews of civil service reforms, and a new initiative, launched in conjunction with all the governors for the World Bank of the African countries, to make African capacity-building the central focus of the World Bank country partnership. The focus of the *1997 World Development Report* on the Role of the State exemplifies the significance attached to such issues.

The specific challenge that lies ahead is to translate the governance agenda into action at many levels. There is a host of mechanisms and tools through which this can be accomplished. These include in pride of place resource allocation and management mechanisms (government budgets are perhaps the clearest and strongest links between policy and implementation). Programs that support the strengthening of legal and judicial systems, including effective and fair police systems, deserve high priority. Decentralization programs, which bring administration closer to the governed, and stronger efforts to make civic organizations a living part of public life and management have special importance.

In closing, it is appropriate to lay stress on education, as the issue where in important respect all these issues unite. This is true for development, where no more important and productive investment can be made than education, and building of human capital. It also applies to the more specific issue of conflict prevention and building more stable and just societies: social capital, an educated population, offers the best route in that direction. More specifically, the avenue of education also offers exciting opportunities for enhancing broad understanding and skills in civic responsibility and conflict resolution, through schools and universities and other training programs which aim to develop a range of skills in conflict and dispute resolution. The World Bank and its partners take inspiration from and support a wide range of such activities in countries across the world.

8. Military Tools and CSBMs in Conflict Prevention in the Post-Soviet Area

Dmitri Trenin

Diplomacy and economic and financial incentives or sanctions may be insufficient to prevent a violent conflict. International actors have to consider using military tools to forestall an eruption of violence, to stop it after it has broken out, or to ensure that the conflict, when stopped, does not degenerate back into violence. This paper examines the military tools for preventing a violent conflict from occurring, stopping it after it has occurred, and ensuring that there is no relapse to violence. Whenever possible, the paper will draw from the experience of the Baltic States and Georgia since their independence in 1991. The paper begins with an overview of the current European military security problems, briefly characterizes the potential for military conflict in the Baltics and in Georgia, and continues with a detailed discussion of military tools in conflict prevention, management and resolution. The use of military force for conflict prevention and management purposes is discussed along with such conceptually different measures as arms control and confidence and security building.

I. New Tasks for European Military Security

Military force can be used in several ways to prevent a conflict. One is deterrence, the ability to persuade a potential adversary of the likely negative costs to gains ratio when embarking on a certain course of action, especially one employing violent means. A second is the traditional deployment of a substantial force and demonstrating the resolve to use it – through holding military exercises, potential aggressors can be cooled off and the peace can be kept intact. Deterrence worked throughout the Cold War at both the nuclear and conventional levels, this was perhaps due to the availability of nuclear weapons. In other cases, however, deterrence sometimes failed, and the parallel concentration of forces contributed to the escalation of conflict all the way to war. Deterrence can be built into the system, as between the US and the USSR, or it can be practiced as a one-time warning signal, for example sending a naval ship or threatening to dispatch reinforcements or even "volunteers" to an area of potential conflict.

This is all part of standard military strategy, and for the purposes of this paper will not be discussed any further. The new security system in Europe is going to rest on mutual reassurance, rather than deterrence. This means that, in practice, in the absence of opposing military blocs, arms control agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the various confidence and security

building measures, such as the Open Sky treaty, and evolving partnerships such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the special arrangements between NATO and Russia, will ensure an unprecedented degree of transparency. Not only will a surprise attack by conventional forces be ruled out (this is already the case), but, for the first time in European history, states will proceed to develop their militaries in a way not necessarily linked to the capabilities of their neighbors and former rivals on the continent.[1]

In the post-Cold War environment the standard military tools of conflict prevention include, amongst others, confidence building measures, preventive deployment, arms control, military-to-military contacts, multilateral exercises, joint peacekeeping and multinational military units.

The applicability of these tools may vary widely, depending on the type and nature of the conflict one has set oneself to prevent. From the mid-1970s, and the Helsinki process, conflict prevention in Europe was approached in multilateral negotiations for the first time. Until the end of the Cold War, at the turn of the decade, the conflict to be prevented was an outbreak of a major war on the continent. In the early 1990s the emphasis was dramatically shifted to meet the new challenges, of inter-ethnic conflicts, regional separatism, and disputes over minority rights. Today the main body of conflict prevention measures still deal with the traditional inter-state conflicts, but most of the recent additions are intra-state.

The central issue in Europe presently is the expansion of the security community established after the end of the Second World War. For a growing number of states, first in Western, and now in Central Europe, war has ceased to be an instrument of policy in their reciprocal relations. The relations between the West and Russia, while burdened by many difficulties, do not give ground to believe that a resumption of genuine military confrontation is probable in the foreseeable future. In the long run, these relations are likely to become essentially demilitarized to the same extent as Western Europe.

Thus, the only remaining potential for conventional inter-state conflicts are possible local collisions between the European countries not yet absorbed into the security community. By contrast, the potential for intra-state violence is much greater.

Another salient feature of the post-Cold War European security landscape is that it is threatened with fragmentation. In the absence of a single overriding threat of an East-West confrontation, with which all countries had to live, European security has

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1 This apparently contradicts the situation betweenNATO and Russia, and even more so within Russia,in the light of the Alliance's enlargement. Clearly, we aredealing here with a psychological lag, which has created a parallel reality of its own. The difference is,however, than unlike the Cold War situation, the likelihood of a major military conflict in Europe isvirtually discarded by nearly all the advocates and opponents ofenlargement, which allows one to treat the emerging Russian-Western pseudoconfrontation as a phantom or a farce.

become far more incoherent. While some of the former front-line states, such as Germany, face virtually no military threats, in certain other regions, peripheral to the Cold War geography, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus, war has become a reality. From the very beginning these wars were successfully contained. The war in the former Yugoslavia raged for years without spilling over into any of the neighboring countries. The Caucasus is more inter-connected as a region, but apart from Russia, all other states in the area (Iran, Turkey, Ukraine) managed to stay away from the conflicts raging there.

Some of the countries already belong to a security community, NATO or the European Union, others are in the process of joining, while others, in particular the Baltic States, feel a security vacuum. Efforts must, therefore, now be made to focus on regional, sub-regional and intra-state levels of military security more than before.

The various new regions which emerged out of the territory of the former Soviet Union, require special attention, in no small measure due to the fact that they are still closely linked to Russia, which has said that its most vital interests are present there.

II. A Brief Characterization of Actual and Potential Conflicts Involving the Baltic States and Georgia

As regards the two post-Soviet areas, i.e. the Baltic States and Georgia, the actual or potential types of conflict there include:

1. Ethnically-Driven Separatism

This is highly visible above all in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where in 1992-1993 ethnically driven separatism resulted in large-scale violence. Other potential "hot spots" in Georgia include Armenian-populated Javakhetia and the Azeri-populated areas in the east. While ethnically Georgian, and ostensibly recognizing the government in Tbilisi, Ajaria under its ruler Abashidze has had de-facto autonomy since 1991. Any attempt to impose centralized control on these parts of Georgia is likely to lead to violence.

By contrast, there is little evidence of ethnic separatism in the Baltic States. The ethnic Poles in the Vilnius district are content to continue under Lithuanian rule, and revisionist forces in Poland are clearly a fringe group. The ethnic Russian population of north-east Estonia, where they form a majority, has failed to respond to nationalist appeals to establish local autonomy as an interim step to joining Russia. Neither Warsaw, nor Moscow, has at any time suggested that it would consider the possibility of such annexations.

2. The Refugee Problem and Conflict over Minority Rights

The wars in Abkhazia and Ossetia have led to widespread ethnic cleansing. In South Ossetia mixed villages have been "purified." At one time, 50,000 Ossetians fled across the border to North Ossetia, a republic within the Russian Federation. Over 200,000 Georgians, making up two-fifths of Abkhazia's population before 1992, were chased from most of Abkhazia. Despite the 1994 agreement providing for a return of these refugees, few were allowed back by the Abkhaz authorities, fearful that this would steal the fruits of their 1993 military victory. Georgia's patience with the Russian peacekeepers deployed to the cease-fire line to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict under a CIS mandate, has worn thin. Tbilissi demands that they either assume a police function to protect the returnees, or withdraw. The refugee problem stands out as a major destabilizing factor. There is a possibility that the refugees, driven to desperation, might attempt to force their way through to Abkhazia. Where the Georgians remain in Abkhazia, namely in the Gali district, the problem of protecting their rights remains acute.

The situation of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States is very different, of course, from the plight of the peoples of the Caucasus. In terms of economic well-being, Baltic Russians are generally better off than their "compatriots" in the Russian Federation. Their naturalization, however, is proceeding extremely slowly, mainly due to local elitist fears that the Russians, this time acting from the inside, might gain undue influence over these small nations. On the other hand, without being citizens, Baltic Russians have been given property rights without being required to serve in the armed forces. As a result, one may notice a tendency in Latvia that while political power remains firmly in the hands of ethnic Latvians, economic power concentrates in Russian hands. In Estonia, some 120,000 people, 10% of the total population, have had to apply for Russian citizenship in order to be able to travel abroad.

In both these cases, failure to embrace the Russian ethnic element into a broader community has far-reaching implications. Thus, the issue of civil rights for non-citizens in the Baltic States, especially in Estonia and Latvia, is perhaps the most serious domestic problem those nations face. As long as these mainly Slav communities are not fully integrated into new non-ethnically based societies of the Baltic countries, there will be potential for conflict. The emergence of new citizenship-based consolidated nations, even if successful, will take a long time.

3. Domestic Civil Strife

This type of conflict differs from the above chiefly because it lacks an ethnic component. Conflicts such as Georgians vs. Georgians – or, for that matter, Tajiks vs. Tajiks – are not about "self-determination," but about control of the whole state by a

clan, or a political ideology. For a period of time, between 1991 and 1994, Georgia came dangerously close to becoming a failed state (while Tajikistan has actually become one). Although the situation has markedly stabilized since then, a new fragmentation of the country on political, clan or regional lines, cannot be entirely ruled out – yet. Historically, before its accession to the Russian Empire, Georgia had a long record of inter-regional rivalry, and the process of nation-building was hampered by the divide-and-rule policies of St. Petersburg. The Mengrels and Kartlians, the two main groups within the Georgian nation, are still far from enjoying perfect harmony: Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's first president, was a Mengrel. Tbilissi's control over the Ajarians, the descendants of Islamic Georgians, has been nominal ever since 1991. This scenario is absolutely improbable in any of the Baltic States, where the titular ethnic groups enjoy a high degree of homogeneity and where Western norms of political behavior have long taken root. Thus, political culture itself militates against settling accounts by means of raw force.

4. International Conflict in the Region

There is some potential for inter-state conflicts in both regions. As far as Georgia is concerned, it has some reason to fear all its neighbors as Abkhazia and Chechnya ensure that there can be no insulated conflicts in this part of the world.

The sources for such hypothetical conflict in the Baltic States include:

- Border disputes between Russia and the two Baltic States, Estonia and Latvia, and latent Lithuanian claims to Kaliningrad. Disputes over the boundaries of maritime economic zones between the individual Baltic States and between them and Russia. For example: Estonia and Latvia were engaged in a dispute over fishing rights in the Gulf of Riga, while Latvia and Lithuania quarreled over oil drilling rights off their coasts. Russia also has a similar problem with Lithuania. Problems with Russian military transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad, resolved in 1994, threatened to return if a political confrontation following Poland's entry into NATO and Lithuania's desire to join the Alliance. In the worst scenario, Kaliningrad might become a latter-day version of West Berlin, an isolated garrison deep within the enemy territory.
- The expansion of the conflict over minority rights in the Baltic States. In the hypothetical case of a political confrontation between the West and a revisionist Russia the latter might attempt to use the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States as a means of fomenting political instability in the region and thus "checking Western expansion" toward Russian borders.

The most important consideration is the prevention of a conflict involving Russia and the Baltic States. The first priority is to ensure the Balts' integration into "the West" proceeds in a non-confrontational way. In practice, this means their accession to Western institutions that would avoid a confrontation with Russia. Unlike NATO, enlarging the European Union to include the Baltic States appears to combine implied security guarantees from the West with a prospect of very close economic cooperation with Russia, which is the other indispensable pillar of Baltic security. No other amount of confidence building, arms control, etc. can prevent the escalation of tensions that will logically lead to conflict. Thus, the best conflict-prevention measure is finding a formula for non-confrontational integration of the Baltic States into European security arrangements. This would require a firm commitment of accession to the EU within a certain time-frame, very active military and political interaction with NATO within the PfP, and exploitation of the full potential of regionalism around the Baltic Sea Rim, including Russia. This is one of the most topical and pressing international tasks in Europe at the turn of the century.

The following section discusses the military tools of conflict prevention in more detail.

III. Military Tools for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Military tools can be used to preclude violence, but also to contain it and progressively demilitarize the situation. Thus, besides conflict prevention in the narrow sense of this word, the present paper will address the use of military force for the purposes of conflict management and dispute resolution.

1. Conflict Prevention

To prevent a political conflict – whether inter-ethnic or domestic in origin – from becoming violent, there are two kinds of military tools. Some of them can be characterized as short-term measures, and others as long-term. The mission of the former is, by providing timely information about the intentions of one side, to dispel suspicions and calm down fears on the opposite side. The long-term tools are used to build confidence on both sides that the military situation is stable and will not change abruptly. These tools are genetically related to traditional means of preparation for war and war-fighting (compare for example early warning/intelligence, or preventive deployment/preventive attack, or yet compellence/peace-enforcement), but there is much more to it than a changed objective.

As far as short-term measures are concerned, military early warning is essential. Military observers attached to the various fact-finding missions, such as the OSCE's, dispatched to the areas of potential conflict, collect relevant military information and use their expertise to detect preparations for forceful action, and report to the Organization. Military intelligence satellites of some of the world's major countries are capable of detecting troop movements and preparations for attack.

Military transparency with respect to Russia's military activity in Kaliningrad region and the Leningrad military district, on the one hand, and concerning Baltic-NATO/Western cooperation, on the other, might help to put many fears and suspicions to rest. While a demilitarized zone, such as between Russia and the Baltic States, may be difficult to agree upon, progressive reduction of military activity and an increase in multilateral exercises involving the Balts, the Russians and the West (NATO and Scandinavian countries), and joint projects, could have a more lasting effect.

When, however, there are sufficient reasons to believe that a national crisis threatens to erupt violently, military forces can be ordered to the area of potential conflict, along one or both sides of an international border, to dissuade any potential transgressor and reassure the local population. A demilitarized zone could be established before, instead of after, a conflict.[2] Preventive deployment of such forces requires, however, that they are:

- politically neutral (in the sense of being impartial toward the sides in a conflict)
- well-disciplined and well-trained for their specific role (capable of combining peacekeeping with readiness to apply force in a combat situation)
- mobile, capable of rapid deployment to the area and re-deployment within it (which means having armored fighting vehicles, transport aircraft and helicopters, both transport and armed).

Such a force obviously needs very solid intelligence, logistics and analytical support. Needless to say, it is not easy to make such forces available. In his 1992 Report "Agenda for Peace," then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed creating a standby UN peacekeeping force composed of troops earmarked for the purpose by the member states. The mere existence of a ready reserve should have acted as a deterrence. Creating such an instrument, however, has proven too difficult in both financial and organizational terms. Another problem appears to be that in many cases (e.g., in Africa) what is needed for conflict prevention is an international police force, rather than a UN army.[3]

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2 "Peacekeeping between the Battle Lines," in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 13 March 1993, p. 25.

3 Christoph Bertram, "Soldaten als Lückenbüßer," in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 November 1996, p. 12.

So far, preventive deployment has been successfully practiced by the United States in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. This is, of course, a well-known and widely celebrated fact. In the Ajarian case, Russian forces were deployed in this strategically important part of Georgia and a very special relationship was established between the Russian military and Aslan Abashidze, Ajaria's ruler since 1991. However, it is unclear whether or not this can be considered a typical case of preventive deployment and to what extent these factors were primary in helping Ajaria to remain unscathed throughout the whole post-Soviet turmoil.[4] These two examples illustrate two different kinds of preventive deployment, i.e. along the international border to preclude its penetration, and inside a country or territory. Moreover, one is a case of multilateral action, and another unilateral. It is, nevertheless, doubtless that preventive deployment could be a very strong instrument of preventive diplomacy.[5]

In other cases, a directly opposite measure (let us call it "preventive troop withdrawal") can have a similar soothing result. Withdrawal of foreign military forces whose continued presence can become a cause of conflict, can defuse a situation. The departure of Russian forces from Lithuania in 1993, and Estonia and Latvia in 1994, removed a major source of tensions in the area. After Moscow had lost the war in Chechnya, the continued presence of two Russian brigades, less than 3,000 men, who remained after the bulk of Russian forces had been withdrawn from the breakaway republic by October 1996, became a major irritant.[6] Effectively becoming hostages in an intensely hostile environment, the Russian forces could be a constant target of provocation capable of re-launching the war. The decision to withdraw them completely, implemented in January 1997, was thus a major conflict-prevention move.

A mere commitment to withdrawal is, in and of itself, not sufficient, a time-table is also required. Under a different set of circumstances, a hasty withdrawal can be destabilizing. The departure of Soviet/Russian forces from South Ossetia in late 1991

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4 Ever since Ajaria was wrestled by Russia from Turkey in 1878, it has been a Russian military stronghold. The Russian Federation assumed jurisdiction over the former Soviet forces deployed in the tiny republic, which forms part of Georgia, in the spring of 1992. The Russian-Georgian treaty of 1994, unratified to this day, provides for a Russian military base in Batumi, Ajaria's capital city. Another agreement leaves the responsibility for guarding Georgia's border with Turkey to Russia. By means of this forward positioning, the Russians believe they have been able to prevent a hypothetical Turkish politico-military involvement in the Transcaucasus. By means of an informal relationship with Russian military commanders, Aslan Abashidze has been able to prevent a hypothetical move by Tbilisi to dislodge him and to bring the republic under centralized control, and thus to keep his very profitable position as chief of a borderland fiefdom.

5 Akakii Mikadze, "Polkovnik sredi generalov," in *Moskovskie novosti* (26 March – 2 April 1995) 21, p. 11.

6 At the height of the Chechen war, the Russian military in the republic numbered around 60,000. It is more difficult to assess the strength of the Chechen forces. From about 15,000 at the beginning of the hostilities, they shrank to 2,000-3,000 active fighters from the summer of 1995. These guerrillas, however, could rely on the support of the bulk of the Chechen population, which stood at 600,000.

did little to prevent a conflict there, for this effectively thrust the small province into a real security vacuum. The first evacuation of Chechnya in late 1991-early 1992 left large amounts of arms and ammunition in the hands of the Chechens.

Long-Term Measures and Cooperative Security Arrangements

The principal objective of the long-term measures has been increasing transparency and improving predictability of the parties involved. Even as early as 1975 the Final Act of the Helsinki summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe laid down certain confidence-building measures, such as advance notice of military maneuvers and major troop movements, and exchange of observers at exercises. Confidence and security building measures, or CSBMs, are meant to provide enough confidence to the participating sides that there is no forceful action being contemplated, or prepared against any of them. In this, military transparency, i.e. transparency of capabilities and intentions, is a key factor. Exchange of relevant information, especially when accompanied by adequate and intrusive verification procedures; from observation to on-site inspection, are its most valuable tools.

In 1986, in Stockholm, agreement was reached on annual exchanges of plans of military activity, and for the first time, inspections. In 1990 in Vienna, transparency reached such areas as the structure of forces, their deployment, as well as weapons and their procurement, and defense budgets. Special attention was paid to preventing dangerous incidents, e.g. created by unnotified aircraft activity.

The 1990 Paris Charter for a new Europe was adopted alongside the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the cornerstone of the current security regime on the continent. The confidence building measures contained in the 1992 Vienna and Helsinki documents amplified this arms control instrument. Arms control is indeed a central element of confidence building. For arms control to be effective, every arrangement has to be verifiable with on-site inspections being provided for.

Maintaining a military balance at the lowest possible level is an important prerequisite for preventing conflict. During the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, no serious effort was made to put constraints on the nations which had disputes with each other. As a result, all real or potential antagonists managed to procure all the weaponry and ammunition they needed to wage war.

Arms control in situations of internal conflicts has its peculiarities. Typically, there is some international authority which supervises the parties' adherence to their commitments to disengage and disarm. In situations where a third party acts as an arbiter, however, it is essential that it acts in good faith. Russia's actions in September 1993 in Abkhazia stand out as a prime example of a breach of faith on behalf of a third

party.[7] Ideally, arms control arrangements must cover the region as a whole. Thus, adaptation of the CFE Treaty logically calls for inclusion of the three Baltic States, currently outside the scope of this agreement.

Although it is fair to say that the traditional problem of European security has all but disappeared, and the political likelihood of an outbreak of a major war in Europe has decreased to a historical minimum, and the forces of various countries have become numerically limited and more defense-oriented, the process of NATO's eastward enlargement has reawakened old suspicions in Russia. To alleviate these concerns, and minimize the military implications of admission of new members to the Alliance, the CFE Treaty will be further modernized.

The problems which later arose with the CFE treaty, primarily as a result of the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, were tackled by reapportioning the Soviet quota among the successor states in 1992, and through temporarily revising the flank limitations in 1996. New quotas were meant to provide military balance, in particular between the countries locked in a confrontation, such as Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tackling the flank limitations issue meant taking account of the Russian logistical and strategic problems arising out of the post-Cold War developments (such as massive troop withdrawal, and emergence of new hotbeds of tension in the Caucasus area), while at the same time reassuring Russia's neighbors, above all Turkey, Norway, Finland and the Baltic States, that Russian troop concentrations close to their borders above the initially agreed limits did not constitute a threat.

Transparency can be further strengthened by exchange of information on defense planning. The 1994 Vienna document on information exchange set forth various measures to promote this goal. These included annual exchanges of information on the armed forces, major defense systems and defense budgets (for the previous year, and for five years ahead, with break-downs following the UN pattern).

Agreement among the various states on the norms of behavior in the military field is of long-term importance. The OSCE Code of Conduct, adopted at the Budapest summit in 1994, for the first time laid down principles for the use of force in peacetime and in internal conflicts. These include democratic civilian control of the armed forces, to ensure, through the use of national democratic procedures, that a country's defense potential was commensurate with its defense needs; adequate use of

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7 In July 1993, Russia negotiated a truce between Georgia and Abkhazia, with its own troops in the region – a leftover of the Soviet garrison – cast in the role of peacekeepers. According to the terms of the trilateral accords, all heavy weapons were placed in the custody of those Russian forces. The Russians, however, soon allowed the Abkhazians to have their weapons back. The Abkhaz military superiority thus created was instrumental in securing their victory in September, 1993. The Georgian reaction to this Russian behavior was a fundamental loss of faith in Moscow, which will be extremely difficult to restore.

force, and preventing damage to civilians. Use of force against national and ethnic minorities was specifically banned. Deployment of foreign forces was only acceptable on the basis of voluntary agreements.

As a confidence-building measure, military-to-military contacts are very important, for they reduce the error of misperception, minimize the chance of misunderstanding, especially in crisis, and therefore prevent accidental conflict escalation. It is, for example, highly desirable that Russian and the Baltic military representatives find ways to cooperate even though this is perhaps not so easy, given the heritage of mutual distrust.

This could be achieved on both a multilateral and a bilateral basis. Multilateral cooperation can be practiced through joint exercises undertaken within the Partnership for Peace Program. Peacekeeping, search and rescue operations, or disaster relief, such as clearing environmental damage, could be the appropriate fields of joint engagement. A joint air traffic control and surveillance system to include the countries of the Baltic Rim would be tremendously beneficial to the purposes of confidence building. Bilateral contacts, already established between the border guards, could be progressively expanded and intensified.

The new states of Central Asia, a region which, due to the potential disputes over territory, minority rights, water resources, etc., is a bigger powder keg than either the Caucasus or even the Balkans, have realized the value of pooling their defense efforts as a tool of conflict-prevention. With UN approval, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are in the process of establishing a joint peacekeeping battalion. In addition, Kazakhstan and Kygyzstan have moved closer on a broad range of security and defense issues. For all the apparent differences between the two regions, the Central Asians parallel some of the steps the Balts are taking. This pattern of cooperation for conflict-prevention is conspicuously absent in the Caucasus, although the idea of a Common Caucasian Home was revived in 1996 by Georgian President Shevardnadze.

The 1990 Vienna document on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) calls for various forms of military-to-military contacts. They include exchanges of visits by military delegations and senior officers, and establishing contacts among military headquarters, in the form of exchanging liaison teams and ensuring permanent communication. The outreach program of the NATO Defense College in Rome includes, for example, regular OSCE courses for partner countries, as well as integrated courses with staff-level officers and civilians from NATO and partner countries studying together and building ties. The US-German George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen has been specializing on security studies and issues such as democratic control over the armed forces.

The value of military-to-military contacts, however, should not be overestimated. Even those officers who have established excellent professional and personal ties with their colleagues from another nation's military will usually fight against former friends, if ordered. Both World War I and the Cold War testify to that. Equally, ex-comrades from the same army, sharing much experience, could turn into bitter enemies in an internal conflict, as the break-up of Yugoslavia and of the Soviet Union, as the wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya suggest.

The Partnership for Peace Program represents the most comprehensive agenda, to date, of building military-to-military contacts across the former line of division in Europe. Partner countries have established their permanent presence not only at the NATO headquarters in Brussels, but also at SHAPE in Mons. Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the depth of these new contacts is the permanent presence at SHAPE of a Russian three-star general and his staff. Part of the IFOR chain of command, they are housed in the building known as Live Oak, where the Allies used to engage, during the Cold War, in contingency planning with respect to West Berlin.

IFOR/SFOR is the best-known example of joint peacekeeping. Exercises are one thing, but interacting in a real situation leads to a much higher degree of cooperation. Not only does it inspire confidence, but it builds mutual trust. Habits of cooperation are progressively internalized, and technical means of communication are dramatically improved. Training for mutual peacekeeping, when their armed forces are still fledgling, can be a powerful means to ensure that the Newly Independent States, or the countries which have regained independence, will avoid military conflict between themselves. Of this, the Baltic battalion appears to be a prime example.

Controlling the arms trade is another, if not the only, prevention measure. Uncontrolled arms transfers are potentially destabilizing. The principle of non-export of arms to areas of potential conflict or to the so-called rogue states is well understood, even if there are differences within the community of nations, especially with regard to the definition of a rogue states. With the 1996 entry into force of the Wassenaar arrangement which has replaced COCOM, there is more transparency and more room for consultation regarding arms transfers.

2. Conflict Management

Russia's post-Soviet experience with the use of military tools in conflicts that arose out of the disintegration of the USSR offer some useful lessons which can be summarized as follows:

- Military tools do not equal political solutions. The relative success of Russia in stopping conflicts in Moldova and South Ossetia in 1992 led to the "freezing" of those conflicts for years. The motto: "Send peacekeepers and forget," while

giving momentary relief to decision-makers in Moscow, was only postponing those problems to a future date.

- Opting for quick military solutions by supporting one side in conflicts, such as Tajikistan or Abkhazia, usually fails to produce viable political solutions. After December, 1992, the Tajik civil war entered a latent stage, and the Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation has, since September 1993, become a permanent destabilizing factor in the Caucasus as a whole.
- Failure to identify policy goals and appropriate strategies leads to inconsistent and contradictory policies which, instead of providing stability, further complicate conflicts. For a weak Russia, an attempt to apply the imperial divide and rule formula has turned Moscow into a place where the conflicting parties compete for influence on Russian actions.
- An open-ended commitment to support one side in a domestic conflict leads to a quagmire of involvement (viz. Tajikistan). Rather than helping to bring such a conflict to a close, this strategy presents the intervening party with a dilemma: escalate its presence or withdraw and cut its losses.
- The use of peace operations to further the national interest of the country undertaking such operations can only be limited. Russia made a great effort to remain the sole peacekeeper in the post-Soviet conflicts and thus to consolidate an exclusive military presence in many parts of the former USSR. This stretched Russia's resources, but did not lead to political control or a real increase in influence (viz. Georgia/Abkhazia, Moldova/Transdniestria). The parties to the conflict where disappointed and, in an attempt to apply pressure on Moscow, introduced the prospect of inviting other countries, such as the Ukraine, to act as peacekeepers in Abkhazia, Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh.
- Multilateralism is strongly preferable for all kinds of peace operations. Even without the umbrella of an alliance or an international body, a coalition is a more effective way of dealing with contemporary conflicts. The CIS has not become an effective instrument of multilateralism. Its only operation, in Tajikistan, has turned into a Russian campaign. The operation in Abkhazia is a CIS affair in name only.
- The troops used for conflict prevention/management/resolution must be specially trained and be kept under particularly close political and military control. As it happened, especially in 1992-1993, the Russian forces in the areas of conflict, from Moldova to Tajikistan, often contributed to the problems. They were left without clear orders and became involved in hostilities. At one end this led to undue influence of the military on Russian foreign policy-making, at the other it contributed to a rapid degradation of the Russian forces themselves.

The Russian experience is not totally negative. Moscow has been sponsoring, or co-chairing, peace talks between the parties to various conflicts, but its current weakness, including the unprecedented crisis within the Russian military, has put severe limits on her freedom of action, be that for reconstituting itself as a "Great Power" or for projecting stability beyond her new borders.

Once the conflict has broken out, stopping it becomes the first priority. Stabilizing the situation through stopping the conflict by securing all parties' consent requires an appropriate agreement and the prompt dispatch of a peacekeeping force to ensure that the agreement does hold. Peacekeeping includes monitoring a cease-fire, disengaging the warring parties and creating a buffer zone between them, and progressive consolidation of the truce. One instrument of this is establishing a joint military commission to deal with the issues. Once hostilities have broken out, the role of the military is dramatically increased. Military-to-military contacts then become essential in ensuring that there is no resumption of violence.

The main mission of the Russian (officially CIS) forces in Abkhazia is described as "prevention of a second round of violent conflict."[8] They are tasked to ensure demilitarization of a security zone on both sides of the cease-fire line along the Inguri River, and police the limitations on heavy armaments within a wider zone, thus preventing surprise attack by either side. A typical mission for any such force is preventing violence linked to refugees' attempting to return to their homes. When the Russian military command apparently sided with Georgian returnees in September 1994 it almost led to an open clash between the peacemakers and the Abkhaz forces, which was called off only when the Russians backed down. Potential for desperate attempts by refugees to force their way through remains high: at the present rate of refugee acceptance, it would take 50 years for those expelled from Abkhazia to return.[9]

The Russian government is convinced that should the peacekeeping force withdraw, the conflict will inevitably resume and spread into the Russian Federation itself.[10] It is, however, equally believed that if the peacekeepers were to attempt policing throughout Abkhazia, or large parts thereof, there would be armed resistance from the Abkhaz side, which the Russians will be both unable and unwilling to suppress. The key restraining factor is the less than overwhelming strength of the

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8 Lt. General Vasili Yakushev, interviewed by *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 October 1996, p. 3; *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 December 1995.

9 *Segodnya*, 24 August 1995, p. 2. In the comparable situation in the Ingush-Ossetian conflict, the refugees will have to wait for 30 years. See *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 25 August 1995.

10 Georgian President Edward Shevardnadze accused Generals Mikhail Kolesnikov and Vladinir Semyonov, until late 1996 Chief of the Russian General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, respectively, of supplying the Abkhaz with weapons and helping them with operational war planning. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 15 April 1997.

Russian forces (2,500 men at the beginning of the operation, reduced later to 1,500) and, more importantly, the growing weakness of Russia's political position in the Caucasus region as a whole, highlighted by the defeat it suffered in Chechnya. The continuing instability in much of the Northern Caucasus, especially in Dagestan and Ingushetia, and the uncertainties about Chechnya's future role in the region, project an image of a Russian political and military impotence in the face of developments largely beyond Moscow's control.

Thus, the size of a military force and the credibility of the delegating authority's policy (or cohesion, in case of an alliance) are extremely important factors bearing on the effectiveness of the use of force.

An interesting phenomenon of the post-Soviet scene is joint peacekeeping by the conflicting parties. As the experience of the last several years demonstrates, in intra-state conflict management, peacekeeping activities involving former adversaries, and a third party, namely, Russia, can be reasonably effective. This has been practiced in South Ossetia, since June 1992. Elsewhere, this has been tried in Moldova since 1992 and, from August 1996 till the withdrawal of the Russian forces in January 1997, in Chechnya (in the form of a Joint Kommandantura in Grozny). In all these cases, there has to date been no return to violence.

In the Transcaucasus, as well as in Moldova and Tajikistan, the conduct of operations which are designated as peacekeeping, or peacemaking, are mainly the responsibility of the Russian Federation that has deployed its troops to the zones of conflict. In all these cases of third party peacekeeping, there is a role for international organizations which are to monitor the peacekeepers to ensure that the basic principles of the organization are honored.

Since December 1992, the CSCE (now OSCE) has been maintaining a mission in Georgia with the objective of assisting in negotiations between the sides, aimed at achieving a peaceful resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts by political means. The primary goal of the mission is to keep the military side of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict under reliable control. With the consent of the parties, the OSCE mission has been monitoring the Joint Peacekeeping Force established in Tskhinvali the South Ossetian capital under the 1992 Sochi accord. The mission succeeded in establishing and supporting contact with the military command of the Georgian, Ossetian and Russian forces in the area. Its mandate included collecting information on the military situation, reporting breaches of the existing cease-fire and bringing the attention of the political consequences of these or any other military actions to the commanders on the spot. Four times a week, the mission monitors the activities of the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian posts, and conducts inspections of weapons storage areas. It is reported that the participating sides in policing the Ossetian truce are sufficiently open and even amenable to OSCE

criticism of their actions. The OSCE monitors are also helping to remove civil quarrels among populations in mixed settlement areas. The mission was also to play an active role in the work of the Joint Control Commission whose task was to develop specific proposals for resolving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. The mission acted as an intermediary in achieving consensus between the two sides on the text of the Memorandum on Security and Confidence-Building Measures signed in Moscow in May 1996, the first important political step toward settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia.

There are no similar provisions regarding the activity of the OSCE mission in Abkhazia, where the OSCE concentrates on the issues of human rights and return of refugees. In the military-related sphere it is the United Nations which takes the lead.

Absence of international observers can have dramatic consequences. The failure of the international community to dispatch UN observers to Abkhazia in 1993 facilitated the breach of the cease-fire there with tragic consequences for many thousands of civilians who lost their lives or became refugees.

Such breaches of cease-fire become possible when weapons control by the principal peacekeeping party becomes lax. The above-mentioned breach of faith by the Russian military authorities in Abkhazia, which, as the guarantor of the Sochi cease-fire agreement, was to have had the custody of the conflicting sides' heavy weaponry, gave the Abkhaz side a decisive material advantage over the Georgian forces, and largely contributed to their military victory in September 1993.

Stopping arms exports to crisis areas (i.e. where violence has already broken out) is an important measure to prevent resumption of violence. Under the very specific conditions of the break-up of the USSR and the division of Soviet military assets, the Russian government transferred their shares of ex-Soviet weaponry to Moldova and Georgia early in 1992. Within months this emboldened the forces within each state to proceed to military solutions of the Transdniestria and Abkhazia problems. This resulted in bloody conflicts which, at the very least, could have been reduced had those transfers been delayed until political settlements were negotiated.

The Russian military authorities, ostensibly without knowledge of the country's top political leadership, supplied large amounts of heavy weapons and ammunition to Armenia in 1993-1996. There is little doubt that part of that weaponry was used on the Karabakh battlefield. On the other hand, as the Russian forces were leaving Azerbaijan in 1993, they left behind huge stocks of Soviet arms which had been prepositioned for fighting a Third World War. Arms transfers within the CIS have so far remained clearly outside the effective export control by the Russian government. The principles enunciated in the official export control guidelines apparently do not apply to the post-Soviet Commonwealth.

When Russia saw a need to act to stop arms supplies to the "hot spots," it did so for its own reasons. The December 1994 decision to impose a blockade on Abkhazia was primarily designed to insulate the Chechen battlefield. (Similarly, the land border with Azerbaijan was closed by Russia.) By the same token, restrictions on the movement of people between Abkhazia and Russia where tightened in June 1995. This had more to do with the Budyonnovsk hostage taking by the Chechens than with the Georgian-Abkhazian situation. The fact that the Russians allowed the CIS summit meeting in January 1996 to pass a resolution imposing economic sanctions on Abkhazia had a largely symbolic value, and changed little on the ground.

Even if governments act in a responsible way and do not break sanctions there is a problem of illicit weapons transfers to crisis areas. To halt these transfers, embargoes need to be enforced: boundaries of the crisis area sealed off, and a blockade imposed. This usually necessitates the engagement of border guards, coast guard and air defense forces.

When a conflict has been stopped, but not resolved, the presence of a peace-keeping force could be viewed as an instrument of de-facto division of a country. This is a major charge leveled by the Georgians against the Russian peacemakers along the Inguri river. This illustrates the limitations of what it is achievable with the exclusive use of military tools.

Peace-Enforcement

In situations where one, or both, sides are unwilling to reach a cease-fire agreement, and the war continues, with a heavy toll of civilian casualties and suffering, imposing a settlement by means of an outside intervention may become the only effective way to stop bloodshed. Peace-enforcement may also be a powerful instrument in the implementation of a cease-fire agreement.

Taking the Dayton agreement as a model, the purposes of the use of the military under these circumstances would include:

- establishing a durable cessation of hostilities; ensuring by means of use of force, if necessary, all parties' compliance with the truce, and
- establishing lasting security and arms control measures.[11]

Besides guaranteeing that no party to the conflict can project forces, or fire beyond its own lines, there is a further requirement that a safe and secure environment be created for all persons living in the area of conflict.

A rapidly mounted intervention of this nature often requires a leader capable of the appropriate decisiveness. Historical precedents exist. Since 1960, France assumed the

11 See, for example, J. P. Mackie, "Into a Balkan Quagmire? Take a Closer Look," in *International Herald Tribune*, 9 March 1993, p. 4.

role of guarantor of political stability in its former African colonies south of the Sahara. The United States traditionally intervened in Central America and the Caribbean. Russia, since 1992, has been active around the former Soviet Union. The principal political difference between these traditional interventions and modern peace-enforcement lies in the existence of an international mandating authority and the multilateral character of operations.

Unlike peacekeepers, a peace enforcing contingent is armed and equipped for high-intensity combat operations. It is normally equipped with heavy weapons and has rules of engagement allowing their use. Attack helicopters and armored fighting vehicles have become indispensable for disarming warring sides. Russian troops in Abkhazia, for example, include artillery units and helicopters for this purpose. Nominally, they operate under a CIS mandate and in the presence of UN observers.

A no fly zone is relatively easy to implement, but it only reduces the scale of combat, which, in inter-ethnic conflicts, is usually fought without an "aerial dimension."

On the other hand, efforts to impose a "no artillery zone"[12] involve a real possibility for the enforcer to become actively engaged on the battlefield. The IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina always had the option of using force whenever its demands were not satisfied within a specified time frame. In reality, the use of force was never necessary, for all the sides chose to comply rather than to face retribution.

Peace-enforcement coming after an agreement between the warring parties and following a clear set of rules must be distinguished from what may be called intervention "for peace," which is basically just another kind of intervention. Helping one side to prevail or to fight off an attack by its enemies can also lead to the de-facto cessation of hostilities. In 1992, the Russian General Lebed used force to make the Moldovan government stop its offensive against Transdniestrian separatists, who had received Russian military support. In 1993, the Russian military virtually secured victory for the Abkhaz forces which managed to drive the Georgians from Abkhazia. Unfortunately, in neither case was this followed by a resolution of the dispute. In comparison, NATO aerial bombardments of Bosnian-Serb positions in August, 1995, effectively broke the fighting will of the Serbs and led them to the negotiating table at Dayton, where a peace settlement was finally agreed.

Force can also be used in a non-combat environment as a demonstration to ensure overwhelming superiority of a favored side in a conflict, and thus persuade its opponent to accept its defeat. This was the case in October/November 1993 when Russian forces supported President Shevardnadze of Georgia in ousting President Gamsakhurdia. The Russian army units deployed in Georgia constituted an

12 See for example Georgian President Shevardnadze's letter to President Yeltsin, in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 13 January 1996, p. 3.

operational tactical force, and the Black Sea Fleet sent a naval task force to the Georgian port of Poti. The effect was so impressive that the mission was accomplished virtually without a shot being fired by or at the Russians.

In most situations, the transition from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement is anything but easy. Since 1995, the Russian forces in Abkhazia are being subjected to ever mounting pressure from the Georgian government and parliament to change their mandate to include securing the return of Georgian refugees and their subsequent protection.[13] As the Abkhaz vehemently oppose this, the Russians, even if they agreed with the Georgians, would have to consider engaging the Abkhaz militarily, thereby not only risking both parties full-scale involvement in the conflict, but very probably provoking a strong pro-Abkhaz "sympathy backlash" among several ethnic groups in Russia's own Northern Caucasus region. In the scenario of a peacekeeping failure in Abkhazia, the Russians will be unlikely to take sides and engage in what might be termed peace-enforcement. And actual withdrawal, could usher in a new bout of war.

Peace-enforcement should be handled in a different manner to the way in which the war in Chenchnya was handled. This began as an attempt by Moscow to regain, by force, control over a separatist-minded province, which was similar to Chisinea's actions against Transdniestria or Tbilissi's against Abkhazia. This turned into a war of national liberation for the Chechens. In this sense, it appears to have much in common with the Algerian war of 1954-1962.

3. Conflict Resolution

Peace-enforcement can only be meaningful if it is followed by a substantial and sustainable attempt to achieve a political settlement. This is the fundamental difference between Dayton and any post-Soviet situation. Military and civilian components of an accord must be closely interlinked, otherwise the dynamic of conflict is not broken, and the cease-fire will just become a breathing space between different phases of war.

The final resolution of a conflict requires certain military measures. None of the violent conflicts in the former Soviet Union have reached that stage yet. Therefore, any discussions about this are necessarily theoretical, or based on other examples, such as Zimbabwe. The general outline, however, is more or less clear. It comprises the formulation of the military's functions in the confidence building – to return of refugees – to economic rehabilitation process. It takes time, however, before former adversaries regain enough confidence to accept each other as good neighbors or partners in common nation and state-building. In the latter case, there is a difficult

13 Vladislav Ardzinba, as interviewed by *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 November 1995.

problem of building post-conflict armed forces. At this time, for example, no one can foresee the integration of the Georgian and Abkhaz armies. The Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba is adamant that Abkhazia should keep its own military forces.[14] What should the military security arrangements be between Tbilissi and Sukhumi, and Tbilissi and Tskhinvali, to ensure that the military element is integrated into the new relationship, and not undermining it? This is a question which depends on a fundamental decision on the status issue.

IV. In Lieu of Conclusion

Conflict prevention is a highly complex task. Not all violent conflicts will be prevented, or managed. Somalia, Liberia and the Great Lakes of Africa stand out as warnings to all enthusiasts of "intervention for peace." Armies, navies and air forces are not designed to prevent conflicts, nor can they be fully adapted to suit vastly different sets of requirements. Their use for conflict prevention can, therefore, only be limited.

It follows, then, that military tools of conflict prevention should always be used in combination with non-military ones. There is no reason to believe that they can only be used as a tool "of last resort." In fact, a near recourse to military means could do more for conflict prevention than the traditional "escalation" approach, which calls for carefully dosing out any application of force. At times, the military may play a prime role, but their main mission is supportive, i.e. creating the right conditions for a political settlement, its implementation, and the final resolution of the dispute. While there are situations in which conflicts can be prevented without recourse to military means, no conflict can be prevented, managed or especially resolved by military means alone. Thus, what is required is a "grand strategy" of conflict prevention, involving close coordination and "fine-tuning" in using the various tools available to statesmen.

14 Ibid.

9. Non-Governmental Organizations as Conflict Prevention Actors in Georgia[1]

Neil MacFarlane

> Peace in the largest sense cannot be accomplished by the United Nations or by Governments alone. Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public at large must all be involved.
>
> *Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Agenda for Peace*

In this paper, I examine the role of Non-Governmental Organizations in conflict prevention in Europe. The fundamental purpose of the paper is to assess the direct and indirect contribution of such organizations in the area of conflict prevention. I examine in particular whether there are any specific areas in which such organizations are likely to be more successful than, for example, government negotiators or mediators from inter-governmental organizations, and what obstacles they encounter in their efforts to contribute to peacebuilding. In addition, the paper covers relations between Non-Governmental Organizations, local governments, and Inter-Governmental Organizations.

I begin with a brief account of theory underlying the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in conflict prevention, and a discussion of the areas in which NGO activity is most likely to be effective. I go on to take a look at the NGO experience in Georgia as a case study that may (or may not) illuminate the analytical discussion. This leads to a consideration of the effect of attributes of the Georgian society and polity on NGO activity and effectiveness and to a number of concluding remarks on NGO experience in conflict prevention elsewhere in the former Soviet space, and notably in the Baltic countries.

By NGOs, I mean organizations composed of private citizens coming together in pursuit of a common purpose, and independent from government.[2] By conflict prevention, I mean efforts in situations of tension between states, political groups or communities to prevent the translation of this tension into active conflict or to prevent the resumption of conflict where it has been suspended but not resolved (intra-

1 I am grateful to many individuals, and notably Rachel Clogg, Greg Hansen, Toby Lanzer, and Lacha Tchantouridze for information they provided to supplement this analysis, and especially to Elizabeth Winship for her constructive and insightful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

2 Independence is, of course, seldom absolute. Many local NGOs in Georgia have leading members who are also government officials, or who are associated personally with leading members of government. Some receive funding from government. Others receive funding from inter-governmental organizations. And numerous international NGO activities in Georgia are largely funded by official aid budgets.

conflict conflict prevention). This usually involves information acquisition and publicity (early warning), education, informal negotiation and mediation. However, it may also involve activity to mitigate the root causes of conflict – e.g. to eliminate economic disparities and to defuse enemy images. In the former area, NGO-mounted humanitarian assistance may also serve as a confidence building measure.

The empirical observations on Georgian NGOs and on international NGO activity are the product of several years of close cooperation with several of them and numerous interviews with NGO personnel between 1992 and 1997. There are few citations since there is very little literature.[3]

I. NGOs and Conflict Prevention

Why should NGOs be relevant to a discussion of conflict prevention? There are very general and quite specific aspects to this question. At the most general level, the NGO role is part and parcel of the broader concepts of democratization and democratic governance and their relation to the incidence of conflict. This is dealt with, to some extent, in the paper by Renée de Nevers, and so I shall say little about it. It seems relevant to note, however, that the proliferation of NGOs is part and parcel of the pluralist conception of the rooting of democratic governance within a society. To the extent that citizens aggregate on the basis of common interests into effective organizations for the promotion of the latter, this limits the power and flexibility of government, not least in the area of conflict. If one accepts the proposition that people in general want to get on with their lives and do not want their activities to be disrupted by conflict, societies with broad and effective pluralist participation are less war-prone than are less participatory political systems. This is one basic aspect of the "democratic peace argument" currently so popular in academic and policy discourse on conflict in the post-Cold War era. In addition to their direct effect on public policy, NGOs have an important indirect effect in increasing the awareness of the public at large of the nature and significance of policy issues before government. Multiple independent sources of information enrich the market place of ideas, to borrow Jack Snyder's formulation; the consequent

3 I suspect that the issue is most fully, although still tangentially, dealt with in S. Neil MacFarlane, Larry Minear and Stephen Shenfield, *Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping* (Providence, RI: Watson Institute, 1995). It is curious, given the amount of resources devoted to NGO conflict prevention activities and the importance attributed to such activities by scholars and many international organizations and funders, that there is to my knowledge no systematic collection and collation of data on what they do, and almost no analysis and evaluation of their programs in the scholarly literature. Some progress has been made here with regard to international NGOs (e.g. R. Elias and J. Turpin, eds., *Rethinking Peace* [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994]), but almost nothing is available on the activities of local NGOs or on the inter-relationship between the two groups.

enhancement of the quality of political participation also constrains government flexibility.

More specifically, NGOs in theory have several attributes that may contribute substantially to efforts to prevent conflict in war-prone societies. Not least is the fact that they are non-governmental. Their activities in negotiation and communication consequently do not carry the baggage of government status. In situations where government may be perceived as less than impartial, for example, independent associations may enjoy greater legitimacy and trust. This is particularly true where, as in the case of Georgia, significant tension exists between various levels of government. Moreover, information acquired and disseminated by Non-Governmental Organizations may have greater veracity, as it does not emanate from government(s).

Second, they are, by definition, parts of the community, and, as such, closer to it, better-informed as to what is going on within it, who the relevant interlocutors are, what the specific nature of grievances are, and often, for reasons of personal and professional ties, better able to convey information and options for conflict avoidance than are governments. In addition, they are often made up of people of stature within communities. This may be particularly important in new democracies or democratizing states, where the government's own ties to the society at large through, for example, political parties, are underdeveloped.

Third, in many instances, they are organized to promote certain functional concerns (e.g. human rights, the rights of women) or professional ones (e.g. medical, journalist, and legal associations). That is to say, their association is defined not by ethno-social commonalities, but by characteristics that cross communal lines. Such functionally based organizations are more likely to benefit from an array of cross-communal ties than are ethnic associations. In polities with poorly developed party structures, they may be the *only* organizations possessing such linkages. As such, they provide a natural forum for communication across communal lines.

At this stage, it is useful to differentiate between indigenous and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), both of which are, in the abstract, relevant to a discussion of conflict prevention. The above discussion has focused on indigenous NGOs. The activities of international ones are germane in at least four ways. First, in conditions where local organizations are weak and vulnerable to government interference, as is often the case in democratizing or pre-democratic societies, international groups may fill the gap in non-governmental activity. For example, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have played an important data acquisition and information dissemination role in many states where local organizations lack the experience, organizational and financial capacity, freedom of maneuver, and often the will to assess human rights violations properly. The broad support and prestige that these organizations possess in the international community

gives them a degree of access to information that is often denied to local organizations, and allows them to accept a level of risk that might well be too high for indigenous analogues.

Second, international organizations can and do act to strengthen the capacities of local NGOs through training, equipment provision, and financial support on the reasonable presumption that their own presence cannot be permanent and that it is, consequently, necessary to foster the development of local organizations with similar interests and adequate capabilities. INGOs also assist in acculturating indigenous authorities to the concept of non-governmental activism. Third, in situations of severe inter-communal tension and substantial bitterness, it is often very difficult for indigenous NGOs to operate across the lines of conflict. In this respect too, international NGOs can substitute temporarily for local ones in sustaining and fostering intercommunal linkages, not least through providing neutral venues for such interaction between like-minded people from communities in conflict. Fourth, INGOs operating in particular areas may assist in conflict prevention through provision of early warning to their home governments or to international organizations, and may mobilize support to pressure their home governments and international organizations to take a more active diplomatic role in the area in question, for good or ill.[4]

It is also plausible in the abstract that NGOs may have a negative role in conflict prevention. At the local level, NGOs may in fact not embrace society as a whole, but may instead serve to consolidate particular conflicting identities within it. In this respect, they become part of the problem, not the solution. A good example from Georgia of this phenomenon is the so-called *Mkhedrioni* (White Horsemen), a society devoted to the promotion of ethnic Georgian culture and values which became a major paramilitary force in post-independence Georgia, participating in atrocities in Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as organizing a substantial criminal network in the country that reached eventually to high levels of the Georgian government.

Second, even when the intentions of local organizations are pure, they may lack the technical and political skills necessary to perform effectively. NGOs active in conflict prevention in democratizing societies are often made up of inexperienced and unprofessional people whose good intentions do not make up for their lack of background and skills. At best, this produces ineffectuality. At worst, their ill-conceived efforts may put them in danger and may exacerbate the very conflicts they are attempting to prevent.

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4 For a superb annotated bibliography of research addressing many of these points, and also dealing more broadly with the many roles of non-governmental organizations, see Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 227-240.

With regard to both local and international NGOs, the more actors involved in a process of conflict prevention, the greater the problems of communication and coordination among them. This may complicate the process of conflict prevention considerably. Moreover, particularly in resource-scarce environments, NGOs may spend more time competing among themselves for recognition and financial support than they do actually addressing the real problems of conflict-prevention before them. Finally, in conditions where NGOs are heavily dependent on particular sources of finance for their operations, their activities in the field of conflict prevention may come to reflect the preferences of the funder. Where these are detrimental to the process of conflict prevention, so too may be the activities of the dependent organization.

II. The Case of Georgia

What does the record of international and indigenous NGO activity in Georgia suggest with regard to the actual – rather than theoretical – value of NGOs in the area of conflict prevention? Before answering this question, some background is perhaps useful. In the first place, it may seem odd to ask this question when conflict in Georgia has so clearly *not* been prevented by anyone's actions. The post-independence history of Georgia has been dominated by two ethnically rooted civil wars – one involving South Ossetia which lasted from late 1990 until mid-1992, and the second in Abkhazia, which lasted from August 1992 to October 1993.

In neither case are active hostilities occurring now. However, the termination of hostilities in both cases was the result of the attainment of the insurgents' principal objectives and of Russian mediation of cease-fires. Both cease-fires are policed by Russian peace-keepers. In neither instance has the cessation of hostilities been followed by a political resolution of the conflict in question. Negotiations on Abkhazia are stalled. Those on South Ossetia are showing some signs of progress, but this is a result of the growing flexibility of the position of the Georgian government, and, with some qualification, their Osset counterparts, as well as the efforts of Russian and OSCE mediation. Non-Governmental Organizations have played no real role in any of this. This applies at both the national and international levels.

That said, several unsuccessful efforts of Non-Governmental Organizations to prevent these conflicts do merit scrutiny (see below). In addition, Non-Governmental Organizations are active in the effort to prevent resumption of hostilities in both cases, as well as to create a social basis for conflict resolution.[5] And of course, these

5 One could cite here the impressive efforts of International Alert to create and sustain a nongovernmental dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz in neutral venues, and the analogous efforts of VERTIC with respect to South Ossetia.

are not the only fault lines in Georgian politics that carry a potential for escalation to civil violence. The Abkhaz and the Ossets are two of the smallest territorially compact ethnic minorities in Georgia, at about 1% and 3% of the total population respectively. In contrast, Armenians and Azeris each constitute about 5-8% of Georgia's population. There is significant potential for conflict between both communities and the Georgian majority and between the two communities themselves.

1. The Major Indigenous and International Players

Georgia has witnessed a rapid expansion of indigenous NGO activity since independence in 1990-1 and, more particularly, since the deposition of Zviad Gamsakhurdia at the end of 1991. As elsewhere in the Transcaucasus, the NGO presence in Georgian society in the Soviet era was insubstantial. During the era of *perestroika*, far more organizational activity was focused on party building and the politics of sovereignty than on the creation of non-governmental associations. This is not to say that independent organizations failed to emerge at this time. In fact, many did. But, not surprisingly, given the political context of the time, they tended to be focused on ethno-national revival (e.g. *Mkhedrioni*) rather than on issues of social peace.

The result was that in 1992, there were few established NGOs, except for holdovers from the Soviet era (professional associations, the Red Cross, etc.), which were in fact quasi-governmental. These were in significant measure discredited by their association with the prior regime; moreover, they suffered from the phlegmatism and inability to adapt characteristic of Soviet social organizations faced with fundamentally new socio-political conditions. Finally, they had little background or experience in the areas of conflict prevention, since the government in the Soviet era retained a monopoly on action in such areas, while in the Soviet era there was little open incidence of inter-communal tension. Few international NGOs were active in the pre-crisis phase, for reasons of resource allocation as well as lack of information. Indeed, their involvement in Georgia came later than it did in many other former Soviet states, because of the unwillingness of the international community to embrace the avowedly ethno-chauvinist government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Superficial examination indicates the emergence of a fairly large number of Non-Governmental Organizations dealing with issues relating to conflict prevention in Georgia (see table 1, p. 250).

These fall into two categories – those dealing directly with conflict prevention (e.g. White Scarf, the International Center for Conflict and Negotiation, and the Abkhaz Center for Humanitarian Programs) and those involved in broader civil-society and/or research activities with a conflict prevention dimension (e.g. the Young Lawyer's Association and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development).

Table 1 – NGOs Active in Conflict Prevention Activities in Georgia

The Committee against Human Torture	Monitoring and information dissemination on human rights abuses.
Women's Committee for the Defense of the Helsinki Agreement in Georgia	Monitoring human rights abuses, dissemination, relief for vulnerable groups.
Women's International "White Scarf Movement"	Mass action against violence and in favor of peace.
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly – Georgian National Committee	Transcaucasian dialogue on regional conflict, unofficial contacts across lines of conflict, early warning.
United Nations of Youth Net (Georgia)	Education in UN Principles, involving Georgian youth in the global "peacebuilding" process, dissemination of UN materials, promotion of non-violence.
Society "Amirani"	Education on causes of civil conflicts, organization of popular action in conflict resolution.
The Young Lawyers Association of Georgia	Constitution-building, advice on legislation, educational reform, promotion of research on legal and constitutional issues, promotion of reform in law enforcement.
International Center for Conflict and Negotiation	Research and training in conflict prevention and conflict management, informal dialogue across lines of conflict.
International Society "Women of Georgia for Peace"	Peacebuilding, democratization, women and conflict, relief for refugees and IDPs.
Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development	Research and dissemination on democratic development, and conflict prevention, advice to international organizations operating in Georgia, organization of seminars on peace, democracy, and regional security.
Caucasian House	Preservation of and encouragement of respect for the cultures of the Caucasus, encouragement of regional dialogue across communal lines.
Georgian Orthodox Church	Confidence building through humanitarian assistance and income generation in southern Georgia.
Georgian Red Cross	Assistance to vulnerable groups.
Center for Humanitarian Programs – Abkhazia	Confidence building through medical programming, education on conflict resolution, rehabilitation of children affected by stress-related disorders, organization of Georgian-Abkhaz children's camp.

Source: *Directory: Georgian Non-Governmental Organizations Involved in Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, and Confidence-Building Related Activities* (Tbilisi: United Nations Volunteers, 1995).

This flowering of activity is partly a result of a government attitude towards NGOs that is much more open than that of, for example, Azerbaijan. Registration procedures were comparatively loose and transparent. NGOs benefit from preferential tax status. There appears to be little government effort to restrict the emergence of such organizations. More broadly, under Shevardnadze, there has been little effort to impose censorship, and little ideological pressure on the activities of local NGOs.

At the international level, numerous NGOs are either supporting and building the capacity of local NGOs, or are independently active in the area of conflict prevention. In the first category, the MacArthur Foundation, for example, is the principal funder of the International Center for Conflict and Negotiation, while the Soros Foundation has played an important role in establishing and sustaining the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development,[6] as well as providing some support to the programs of the Center for Humanitarian Programs. The International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC) has assisted in the management and coordination of Georgian Orthodox Church confidence building activities in southern Georgia. The Helsinki Citizens' Assembly provides administrative and financial support for the activities of its local chapter, as well as for related activities such as those of the Caucasian House. Several German *Stiftungen* and other European funding bodies have supported specific activities of a number of these groups. One example is the relationship between the *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development. The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) has assisted in the organization of medical programs with a confidence-building component such as the transfer of Georgian and Abkhaz female war victims to Yerevan for medical treatment.

In the second category, a number of organizations, including the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, the Harvard Negotiations Project, International Alert, VERTIC and the University of Maryland Center for Conflict Resolution are active in creating opportunities for activists from all sides in Georgia's conflicts to meet in neutral venues to build confidence and identify common ground. Many INGOs have engaged in fact-finding missions to the Republic of Georgia, focusing on a wide array of issues relating to conflict prevention. Among these are research on the human rights situation in Georgia[7], analysis of the roots and development of Georgia's conflicts,[8]

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6 The activities of this organization are also supported by an American quasi-non-governmental humanitarian organization – the National Endowment for Democracy.

7 See, for example, Egbert G. Ch. Wesselink, *Minorities in the Republic of Georgia: A Pax Christi Netherlands Report* (Utrecht, 1992); Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, *Georgia: Torture and Gross Violations of Due Process in Georgia* (New York, 1994); *Report of a UNPO Coordinated Human Rights Mission to Abkhazia and Georgia* (The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, July 1994).

and violations of the law of war.[9] VERTIC, operating from a permanent office in Tbilisi that opened in March 1995, has mounted an ongoing program of research into conflict and conflict prevention in Georgia (with particular reference to South Ossetia)[10], in addition to its substantial program in practical confidence-building and support for democratization and civil society.[11] International Alert, in cooperation with its local partner, the International Center for Conflict and Negotiation, has mounted a program in Georgia since 1993, focusing on local NGO capacity building, conflict resolution training, fact-finding and early warning. Their activities accelerated in 1996 with the organization of a series of confidence building meetings between Georgian and Abkhaz NGOs, private citizens, and political figures. This has been supplemented by training activities in Abkhazia involving Abkhaz NGOs.[12]

In addition, a number of international NGO humanitarian assistance providers have a confidence building aspect to their activities. For example, Médecins sans Frontières (France) is active in all three *de facto* jurisdictions in Georgia, in part as a result of a desire to ensure that no party to Georgia's conflicts feels discriminated against in the field of humanitarian action. The International Rescue Committee has lobbied extensively for an expansion of humanitarian action in Abkhazia in part for similar reasons. Finally, the Open Society Institute is active in the promotion of NGO activity in the "human dimension," which, although it does not directly involve conflict prevention, none the less has implications for the mitigation and resolution of conflict.

2. NGOs Effectiveness in Conflict Prevention

Despite all of this activity, there is little evidence of any significant immediate impact by these organizations in the areas of conflict prevention or resolution. As already noted, and obviously, the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were not prevented. It is reasonable to conclude on this basis that conflict prevention activities of NGOs in the pre-conflict phases were irrelevant. There are many reasons for this.

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8 See Martha Cullberg Weston et al., *Georgia on Our Minds: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission to the Republic of Georgia* (Psychologists against Nuclear Weapons and the Arms Race – Sweden, July 1994).

9 *Georgia/Abkhazia: Violation of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict* (New York: Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 1995).

10 See, for example, Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski, "The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict," in *Confidence-Building Matters*, 6 (London: VERTIC, 1996).

11 For an outline of the organizations broad range of activities in Georgia and elsewhere in the South Caucasus, see *Working for Peace in the Caucasus* (London: VERTIC, n.d.).

12 See International Alert, *Working towards Conflict Resolution in the Former Soviet Union* (London: International Alert, 1997).

The international players were not present during this phase. Most of the local players did not exist.

The major instance in which a local NGO attempted to prevent conflict during this period was an abject failure. This involved the "White Scarf" movement. The movement is based on an ancient Caucasian tradition whereby women opposed to a particular bit of violence would drop a white scarf between the male protagonists. This would – ideally – cause them to cease their violence and accept mediation. In September 1993, the newly created movement sent several hundred activists to the front line from Tbilisi by train to re-enact this historical tradition in the hope of ending the hostilities between Georgian government forces and the military formations of the Abkhaz government around Sukhumi. As it turned out, the front was moving so rapidly that the train got caught up in the violence and retreated in haste. No one at the front paid any attention. The train returned to Tbilisi; the individuals involved were lucky to escape with their lives. The idealism of the participants was no protection against flying lead.

More generally, this failure was a result of conditions in Georgia as a whole during 1990-93. Disorganization in government, economic collapse, the collapse of the rule of law, the Soviet legacy of weakness in civil society, the influence of extreme forms of ethno-national chauvinism on all sides, and Georgia's isolation from international society all created infertile ground for NGO activity, particularly in areas so closely related to issues of national identity and personal security.

The more interesting question is whether – as conditions in Georgia have stabilized since 1993 – this activity has prevented the emergence of new conflicts, the potential for which is considerable. For evidentiary reasons, answering this question is difficult. Concerning Azeri-Armenian tensions in southern Georgia, we cannot really know whether conflict would have occurred in the absence of NGO activities. Moreover, NGOs are not the only conflict preventers in the equation. The OSCE and the UN have also been involved. Neither the Azerbaijani nor the Armenian government wants its relations with Georgia to be complicated by the activities of their co-ethnics within Georgia, not least because both are heavily dependent on Georgian infrastructure to mitigate the effects of their own conflict. It is probable, therefore, that they play a restraining role in relations between the Azeri and Armenian minorities in Georgia. The same is true for their attitudes towards minority-majority relations between Armenians and Georgians and Azeris and Georgians. At this particular historical juncture, both governments have an interest in quiet relations between their co-ethnics and the Georgian majority. The Georgians – preoccupied for the moment with civil conflict elsewhere – share an interest in quiet on these fronts. In these circumstances, not only can we not know whether conflict would have occurred without NGO involvement, but we cannot know what the impact of NGOs

as opposed to other actors has been, to the extent that conflict prevention activities have mattered.

One encounters the same sorts of methodological problems in assessing the role of NGOs in preventing any resumption of hostilities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. None of the principal actors has any particular interest in such resumption. In fact, in the Abkhaz case, perhaps the most obvious instance of conflict prevention after 1993 was undertaken by the Georgian government rather than by NGOs, when it halted a bus convoy of Georgian nationalist militants heading for Abkhazia to "liberate" it in January, 1995.[13] Again, moreover, there is considerable involvement by international organizations (the OSCE and the UN) and by other national governments (Russia) in restraining the parties. For these reasons, non-resumption is over-determined.

Despite these difficulties, it seems likely that the international and indigenous NGO role in conflict prevention has been negligible. How do we account for this less than impressive record? In addition to the above listing of conditions in Georgian politics and society less than conducive to NGO success, seven other general factors are relevant in answering this question with regard to local NGOs. Most have to do with capacity, and reflect the rather immature level of development of civil society in Georgia.[14] In the first place, as already mentioned in the first section, the people forming NGOs had little understanding of civil society and the role of Non-Governmental Organizations within it. More specifically, effective conflict prevention requires at least the beginnings of an understanding of the theory of conflict prevention, as well as of the psychology of inter-group relations and mediation. Nor did the principals of NGOs have any real idea of organization, budgeting, and personnel and financial management. All of this intellectual and managerial capital had to be acquired on the run.

Conditions for such learning were not propitious. There was no surplus capital within society to support the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations. At the outset, there was simply no money for simple essentials like office space, desks and

13 In January 1995, a convoy of several hundred armed supporters of former Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani left central Georgia by bus for Abkhazia. Shevardnadze sent the Security Services to stop the convoy and to arrest those involved, including Kitovani himself.

14 I do not mean here to diminish the significant progress made by the government of Georgia, and by Georgian society as a whole in the direction of democracy. The Georgian record is very impressive, particularly when compared to its neighbors. To take but one example, all three Caucasian republics have had internationally monitored national elections within the past two years (Azerbaijan at the parliamentary level, and Armenia and Georgia at both parliamentary and executive levels). Significant problems have been found in the electoral processes of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Georgian election of 1995 – like that in October 1992 – was certified as "free and fair." There were obviously problems in the runup to and the conduct of both Georgian elections. Nonetheless, they were impressive in the extent to which democratic norms were followed. They were all the more impressive, since the country remained divided by two suspended civil wars.

phones, leave aside the accoutrements of Western NGO activity – the copier, the computer, and the fax.

As time passed, and international organizations and NGOs developed Georgia country programming, such resources gradually emerged from foreign sources. This, however, occasioned a rather desperate and unseemly competition for resources, not only because of the general shortage of funds for their activities, but because the funds themselves were the only source of hard currency available to people in such organizations. As one former UN official working closely with NGOs in this area observed, "the problem is that many personnel in Georgian NGOs see their activities not so much in terms of volunteer activity for the social good, but as a means of sustenance." In the desperate conditions of Georgia, access to foreign currency was a ticket to survival.

Consequently, particular NGOs sought to monopolize foreign sources of funding for themselves by undercutting the similar claims of other organizations.[15] There was a certain irony in the conflict that often characterized relations among organizations that claimed to be devoted to conflict prevention. The jealousy and paranoia in the NGO community that these activities engendered did little to promote cooperation among NGOs or a rational division of labor among them. And of course, all of this meant that much of the energy of NGOs was *not* devoted to what they claimed was their major purpose. These factors also inhibited the development of effective communication among them and coordination of their activities.[16] There was in fact no systematic co-ordination of local NGO activities,[17] and no sustained effort at establishing a rational division of labor among them.

Instead, there was a form of NGO "imperialism" in some instances, where single NGOs, irrespective of their personnel and financial capacities, attempted to occupy the entire terrain from marketisation through democratization, to conflict management and resolution. This is, of course, not peculiar to Georgia. NGOs – like enterprises – seek to maximize available resources. Where new activities promising further resources emerge, the natural tendency is to move towards them. However, the consequent absence of a division of labor was inefficient, and the monopolistic

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15 A classic example, though one not drawn specifically from the area of conflict prevention, is the existence of two separate Georgian Scout organizations each vying for recognition from the umbrella international organization and challenging its counterpart's claim to legitimacy as a scouting organization.

16 A report of an NGO workshop held in April 1995 pointed to a lack of information about each other's activities as a major impediment to NGO effectiveness in peacebuilding. See "Georgian NGOs and the Peacebuilding Process" (Tbilisi: UNV, April 1995), p. 8. As Elizabeth Winship pointed out in the commentary on this paper, cooperation and coordination of local NGO activity is also inhibited by the prior political orientations (e.g. Zviadist, anti-Zviadist) of their members.

17 The United Nations Volunteers representative in Tbilisi organized several meetings among NGOs to discuss coordination and exchange information in 1995. There is little evidence, however, that this had had any measurable effect on NGO activities.

tendencies of key groups that established themselves early in the process created serious barriers to entry for latecomers. This was exacerbated by the tendency of INGOs, foundations, and other international actors to seek out known commodities as local partners.

A second problem related to funding lay in the fact that the purposes of funders were not necessarily consistent with the objective of mounting coherent and coordinated conflict prevention activities. In some instances, the program priorities of the funder did not lie in the area of conflict prevention; consequently, the NGO had to orient its activity in other directions.[18] In many instances, funding is short term and focused on particular programs, making it difficult for the grantee to build sustained and coherent programming or, for that matter, to develop administrative infrastructure.

An additional difficulty emanated from competition for the limited pool of personnel that NGOs drew upon. As already noted, the number of persons with managerial and substantive expertise in the NGO sector was low to begin with. The subset that possessed English, German, or other Western European language skills was even smaller, and these tended to be attractive targets for recruitment by incoming foreign NGOs and Inter-Governmental Organizations.[19]

Effective efforts aimed at conflict prevention, at least between Georgian, Abkhaz, and Osset NGOs were further inhibited by serious logistical problems. Few inter-communal linkages of this type existed prior to independence, because of the general underdevelopment of civil society under communist rule. Consequently, such links had to be developed after war had occurred. This was extremely difficult since telephone communication with insurgent areas was extremely difficult or impossible.[20] It was equally difficult to arrange face-to-face meetings, given that the communities were divided by lines of conflict and by security zones manned by peacekeepers. As shall be discussed below, most inter-communal encounters took place outside the country under the auspices of international NGOs. Finally, such links were difficult to establish in conditions where – for much of the period under consideration – there was little real will on the part of the communities involved to communicate seriously on their relations. Groups involved tended to be small and

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18 In one instance, an NGO seriously interested in education and training on mediation and conflict resolution received a grant from a major American foundation which insisted that the funding be used to promote indigenous research activities. Since the local NGO had no other potential source of revenue, it took the money and has essentially reoriented its activities away from its original function.

19 This problem was even more obvious in the movement of government personnel. In one instance, two senior and very able members of the staff of the principal governmental agency dealing with conflict prevention – the State Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic Minorities – were recruited away by UN agencies. They left principally because they needed the hard currency.

20 When I last checked (April 1995), there were no phone lines open between central Georgia and Abkhazia, although infrequent connections were possible via Moscow.

they were working against the tide of a popular opinion that was hostile to such contact, viewing it as a form of betrayal. The personal security of those involved is, consequently, a serious consideration.[21]

Even were such encounters easier than they are, it is not clear just what impact they might have had. One obvious characteristic of NGOs on all sides in Georgia is their isolation from society at large. They tend to be small and their staffs and leadership are composed of people with little independent stature in society at large. Their dissemination capacities are limited for financial reasons. There is no tradition in Georgia of the population looking to NGOs for information and leadership on social and political issues. And the NGOs have few resources – personal and financial – at their disposal to foster such a tradition.

As noted in Section II, to some extent international NGOs can compensate for these weaknesses typical of the indigenous NGO *problématique* in democratizing states. And, as was seen above, there is substantial and growing INGO involvement in the Georgian case. There is some reason to expect that their performance in the realm of conflict prevention might well be more effective. They are better financed. They possess greater professional resources and experience. As parties external to the society in question, they may be perceived to be more impartial. They frequently bring substantial prestige to the table. They can provide neutral venues for contact between communities in conflict, and both International Alert and VERTIC have had considerable success in bringing together youth and professional groups from the Georgian, Osset, and Abkhaz communities to address conflict-related issues.

Yet, at the risk of being depressingly consistent, international NGOs also share their own set of weaknesses that impede effective conflict prevention. For most, Georgia was a very small component of their overall activities. For many, their engagement was sporadic rather than sustained.[22] The extreme examples are those of organizations that send someone along to write a report on the situation, publish the report, and then disappear from the face of the local map. This is not a recipe for effective program development.

Moreover, although INGOs may be superior to their local counterparts in resources and general expertise in the area of conflict prevention, they are inferior in their knowledge of the local context. No INGO had any experience in Georgia prior to 1991. Many arrived in Georgia with their own institutional biases, and this clearly affected their perspective on local realities.[23] Very few of their personnel have

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21 Both Georgian and Abkhaz participants in internationally sponsored dialogues have been seriously threatened as a result of their activities.

22 This was not true of International Alert and VERTIC.

23 Although I do not wish to enter a discussion of the merits and demerits of the Abkhaz and Georgian government positions on the 1992-1993 war, a reading of the UNPO report on human rights in Abkhazia and Georgia (cited in footnote 7) does suggest greater receptivity to Abkhaz

language competence in Georgian, leave aside minority languages. They also lacked expertise in the socio-political aspects of the situation in Georgia. Their lack of experience in the region has occasionally created significant problems in their activities. An American NGO, for example, recently organized a meeting between Abkhaz and Georgians in Washington without informing the two sides of who their counterparts were. The result was that when one side found out who had come on the other side, they simply refused to participate.

Another effect of unfamiliarity with the terrain was that many INGOs working in the country tended to be isolated from the host society, their contacts limited to others in the international community, and to the local NGOs. In this context, one might argue that the local-international relationship was symbiotic. The locals depended on the INGOs for finance. The INGOs depended on the locals for interpretation, information, and access. In practice, however, this interdependence has often had perverse results, given the competitive environment in which local NGOs operated.

An example suffices to illustrate the point. In one instance that I am aware of, a European quasi-NGO has a local office in Tbilisi. The local office cooperates closely with one Georgian NGO. Another Georgian NGO became involved in a project partly sponsored by the European organization. This was vehemently resisted by the latter's local representative, who went so far as to claim that the director of this other local NGO had been associated with the KGB. This was deemed by the European superior of the local employee to be sufficient reason not to cooperate with the other local NGO. Knowing the individuals concerned and their circle of acquaintances quite well, I am aware of no evidence to suggest that this accusation was true. Even if true, its significance escapes me, since thousands if not hundreds of thousands of Georgians – including, of course, Georgia's president[24] – had some kind of connection with the security organs. That is the way that totalitarian society worked. The point is that the European concerned, having no independent knowledge of the region and no independent channels of communication, was dependent for information on an individual with an apparent vested interest in undermining the competition. The local representative, moreover, was presumably taking advantage of Western stereotypes, knowing that, in Western eyes, such an association was de-legitimizing. This may be an illustration of the more general proposition that the

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than to Georgian interpretation of various aspects of the conflict. Given that the purpose of the organization is to enhance global awareness of the situations of peoples lacking formal interstate representation, this is not surprising.

24 Ronald Suny notes Eduard Shevardnadze's roots in the security services in "Transcaucasia: Cultural Cohesion and Ethnic Revival in a Multiethnic Society," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 230.

problem of Western stereotyping is as important an issue in the activities of international NGOs as is unreliability of sources.

The final problem to be mentioned is that of coordination. As with local NGOs, there were to my knowledge few systematic attempts to coordinate the activities of INGOs in the conflict prevention field. Activities of representatives in the field tended to be determined by the pre-occupations of their home offices rather than on the basis of information exchange between INGOs in the field. The result was a fair amount of overlap. This problem was particularly evident in the human rights field – where various Helsinki Commissions, UNPO, Human Rights Watch were all tilling the field with little apparent awareness of the parallel activities of their counterparts – and in the facilitation of dialogue among conflicting parties. In this area, at various times, two centers of the University of Maryland, the Carter Center, International Alert, VERTIC, UNPO, the Harvard Negotiation Project, and the Helsinki Citizens Assembly have all sought a piece of the action. Although I have not participated in these ventures myself, there again appears to be little inter-institutional effort at delineation of responsibility or areas of activity between them. Not surprisingly, the accounts I have heard and read seem rather repetitive; they lack synergy, and they are not cumulative.

Similar problems of coordination exist in IGO-NGO relations. On the positive side, many of the problems associated with the fact that NGOs often arrive earlier into a conflict situation than IGOs and peacekeepers – and notably difficulties of working out relations between the two types of actor subsequent to IGO arrival – did not emerge significantly in the Georgian case. By and large, IGOs and peacekeepers arrived first.

The problem instead was one of coordinating the activities of NGOs with the already existing roles of international organizations, and notably the UN, the OSCE, and the CIS in the realm of conflict prevention and resolution. Here, the record is somewhat mixed, and is complicated by the difficulties the various units of international organizations had in coordinating relations among themselves. As already noted, the UNV have been active in establishing contact with local NGOs and in encouraging collaboration among them. The OSCE has always welcomed contact and exchange of information with both local and International Non-Governmental Organizations. The major UN agencies (UNHCR, UNDHA, UNOMIG), by contrast, to my knowledge until recently displayed little interest in the conflict-prevention and peacebuilding activities of local and international NGOs, apparently viewing them as at best irrelevant and at worst, an annoying complication.

This is indicated, for example, by the resignation of the UNV coordinator in 1995, when he met substantial resistance from the UN head of mission to his program for building capacity and linkages among community organizations in South Ossetia,

Abkhazia, and the rest of Georgia in the hope of generating grass roots peacebuilding momentum.[25] Regarding the attitude of the UN head of mission, he observed: "He just didn't understand the role of NGOs in peacebuilding and feared the possibilities." It is noteworthy, however, that the UN "family's" response to such activities was uneven. Although he found little sympathy in the UN office in Tbilisi for his activities, he found UNOMIG (both at headquarters and in the field) to be very supportive of community-based conflict resolution activities. Elsewhere, in specific areas, such as the issue of return of internally displaced persons into Abkhazia in 1994, there were deep disagreements between UN agencies (in this instance the UNHCR) and NGOs on issues of implementation.[26]

Matters were not helped in this regard by the existence of severe problems of coordination both within and among Inter-Governmental Organizations themselves. To take one example, the UN and the OSCE have had serious difficulty in operationalizing plans for cooperation in the human rights sector with a confidence building dimension in Abkhazia.[27] Relations among IGOs in Georgia (the UN, the EU, the OSCE) display a depressing degree of attentiveness to turf at the expense of the problems that the agencies are purportedly in the field to resolve. Moreover, IGOs operating in the area of political settlement display great sensitivity to the possibility that parallel negotiating tracks may complicate their own diplomatic endeavors.

All of this said, the INGO community has had, and is having, some constructive impact on matters related to conflict prevention. The research done on the conflicts, on the political situation in Georgia, and on human rights has been a valuable addition to our knowledge of a hitherto obscure and insufficiently studied region. The dissemination of results has done much to increase foreign public and governmental awareness of conflict-related issues in Georgia. This in turn has affected the policies of other states towards Georgia in a positive manner. And these changes in policy have elicited some positive response in Georgia itself.

Once again, an example illustrates the point. In 1994-5, the British Helsinki Commission reported allegations of torture of incarcerated opposition members by Georgian police officials in connection with a number of "terrorist" trials then in process, and questioned the fairness of the trials themselves. This was picked up by the US Congress Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Georgian Government realized that this could damage the critical relationship with the United States. Consequently, although rejecting the specific accusations made by the com-

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25 Communication to the author.

26 See MacFarlane, Minear, and Shenfield, *Armed Conflict in Georgia.*

27 For elaboration of this point, see S. Neil MacFarlane, "On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars," in Rip Smith and Thomas Weiss, eds., *Tempering Collaboration: UN Task-Sharing with Regional and Nongovernmental Organisations for Security and Services* (forthcoming 1998).

mission, the government accepted that violations of human rights by its personnel did occur and invited the United States mount programs of assistance in the human rights area for Georgian police and prison officials, as well as requesting that the OSCE monitor the appeals of the defendants concerned.[28] Once again, I do not want to comment one way or another on the veracity of the British Helsinki Commission report or the Georgian response, except to say that there appears to have been abuse of the human rights of imprisoned members of the "zviadist" opposition from 1992-1995. The point is that the activity of this INGO focused international attention on the judicial process in Georgia and this in turn produced a positive response to the concerns on the part of the government. That is the way it is supposed to work.

Parenthetically, the flexibility and generally constructive tone of this government response is quite typical of Georgian government relations with the NGO and INGO communities. To my knowledge, the government has cooperated reasonably consistently in the fact-finding activities of NGOs, as is evident in the substantial number of reports on Georgia produced by the latter on the basis of research with the support of the authorities. There appears to have been little effort to impede the research even of those organizations, such as UNPO and *Pax Christi*, that could reasonably be expected to produce results uncongenial to the government. Finally, the government has posed no obstacles in the way of local and international NGOs seeking to involve Georgians, Abkhaz, and Ossets in informal dialogues on confidence-building and conflict resolution. The contrast with Azerbaijan, for example, is impressive.

To return to INGO effectiveness, a second positive impact lies in capacity-building. It is true that local NGOs remain deficient in many key respects, as just discussed. However, they are slowly growing and multiplying. In time, they will no doubt develop the experience necessary for effective action, including in the area of conflict prevention. That they are getting anywhere is largely the result of INGO support and that of inter-governmental organizations.

In short, although the effectiveness of NGOs and INGOs in preventing conflict in an immediate sense is not particularly impressive, they have played an important information acquisition and dissemination role, and, moreover, they are, haltingly and with great difficulty, laying the basis for an operating civil society. To the extent that the expansion and deepening of civil society impose constraints on conflictual behavior, they are together having a significant long term effect on conflict prevention. Finally, it is perhaps unfair in assessing effectiveness to focus exclusively on outputs. To the extent that success can be measured, for example, in terms of the

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28 See US Congress.Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Commission Hearing to Focus on Human Rights and Democratization in Georgia, *Testimony of Ambassador Tedo Japaridze* (28 March 1995).

establishment of channels of communication that did not exist before or in terms of the insertion of new ideas into stale discussions between the parties,[29] or in terms of giving contending parties the confidence to resume official contacts,[30] then here too NGOs and INGOs have altered the situation positively.

Finally, these are early days. The last four years have been a period of learning for both NGOs and INGOs. Their activities and difficulties as outlined above display growing pains that one might expect. Many of the problems identified here are increasingly recognized and efforts are afoot to mitigate them. One could cite as an example Elizabeth Winship's account of efforts by international funders and NGOs to set up a NGO center for local NGOs that would provide centralized access to facilities, as well as enhancing mutual consultation and co-ordination, both of the NGOs and of those who support their activities.

III. Conclusion

What does the Georgian case tell us about the broader issue of conflict prevention in Europe? First, and perhaps unfortunately, although serious conflict is most likely in multi-ethnic societies undergoing complex transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and from the command economy to the market, these are societies in which NGOs are least equipped to play a constructive role in conflict prevention. At the local level, they lack experience, professionalism, roots in society, standing in the political culture, and resources for their activities. The dearth of resources, in combination with parlous economic conditions in society at large cause NGOs to expend considerable effort in the quest for cash and in competition with others for it, to the detriment of their programs and of coordination of their activities. INGOs in the meantime are hampered by their lack of experience of operation in these societies, their lack of language skills and specific regional knowledge, and by their consequent dependence on local collaborators.

On a more positive note, a number of the problems highlighted in this paper could be mitigated without much difficulty, assuming that appropriate levels of cooperation could be achieved among the players. For example, many of the problems associated with overlapping INGO activities could be avoided were there more developed mechanisms for exchange of information on projects and on grants to local NGOs. The level of competition between local NGOs for funding could be reduced by

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29 For example, there is some reason to believe that NGOs – both local and foreign – were instrumental in reinserting the idea of federalism into Georgian discourse on political settlement with Abkhazia.

30 There is some evidence in this connection that participation in International Alert's 1996 meetings in Moscow had an impact on the Abkhaz decision towards the end of the year to embark on formal bilateral talks later in the same year.

coordination of grants among international funders. INGO vulnerabilities associated with dependence on local personnel largely result from unfamiliarity with the local terrain. More sustained effort in orientation and training of non-local personnel selected to work in Georgia could reduce this vulnerability. The use of Central European personnel who are more familiar with the problems of functioning in transitional societies might also help. Such improvements, however, rest largely on the willingness of INGOs to surrender a degree of autonomy in cooperative endeavor.

There are in the former Soviet Union varying degrees of economic and political transition. And there are also varying degrees of international experience and involvement. One might expect that the extent to which NGO conflict prevention activities are effective may vary positively with movement along these other axes. It stands to reason, for example, that NGOs would have greater capacity for constructive activity in conflict prevention in the Baltics. Civil society is better established there. The Baltic Republics suffered less in the post-Soviet transition from communism and material imperatives are somewhat less pressing. Communities are more consolidated. Links between NGOs and authority structures are more developed, and the authority structures are more stable and legitimate. The spirit of tolerance in intercommunal relations has not been shattered by prolonged and brutal civil conflict. Finally, there is far more sustained international involvement. In short, although for reasons previously discussed it is hard to establish what the significance of NGO related activities in the realm of conflict prevention has been, it is more than plausible that there is scope for more effective performance in the Baltics than there is in Georgia. Ironically, of course, the very factors enhancing NGO capacity in conflict prevention in the Baltics make their role less urgent.

10. Testing Regional Cooperation and Security in the Baltic Sea Rim

Renatas Norkus

This study attempts to analyze regional cooperation and its influence on the state of security on the Baltic Sea Rim. Geographically, the area refers to the Northern European sub-region comprising the nine littoral states of the Baltic Sea – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden – but also Norway and Iceland in as much as they participate in existing regional institutions. The role of Euro-Atlantic inter-governmental structures with regard to the Baltic Sea region is also analyzed as well as that of the United States. The first section is devoted to the introductory discussion of some features and peculiarities of Baltic Sea regionalism. Regional security and cooperation dimensions are dealt with in the second section, which gives particular attention to the issues present in the Baltic security agenda and then looks at the question of how security concerns of the countries involved are reflected in the context of both regional and wider European cooperation. Finally, the third section offers some evaluation of advantages and limitations that Baltic Sea regional cooperation encompasses as a tool aimed at enhancing security in the region.

I. Features of the Baltic Sea Regionalism

A regional formation around the Baltic Sea was hardly possible due to the security pattern of the Cold War. In the environment primarily marked with balance of power and spheres of influence regional cooperation around the Baltics was circumscribed and limited. Some states in the area arranged themselves in alliances, some were arranged in buffer zones, and others were denied the right to independence. The driving idea for the general security political dynamics in Northern Europe has been the notion of a "Nordic Balance." The concept defined Norwegian and Danish membership in NATO, Swedish neutrality and the special Finnish security relationship with the Soviet Union as a system of regional balance. In case any part of that balance would have been changed this would immediately have resulted in balancing countermeasures concerning the other parts. Thus the Nordic countries were divided up into "half-friends, neutrals, and half-foes"[1] of the major antagonists.

As bipolarity shrunk early in 1990s being replaced by the emerging post-Cold War pluralism, a number of region-building initiatives took the Baltic Sea as their geographical applications. Such ideas as *Mare Balticum*, the new *Hanse*, the Euro-

1 Wendell H. Kadunce, "Baltic – Nordic Relations. Implications for Baltic Security," Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien No. 9 (Köln, 1995), p. 7.

Baltic Region, the Baltic Sea Region, just to name a few, have been promoted. Several specific features of the new regionalism around the Baltics have to be discussed.

The Baltic Sea project is the result of an enlargement of the exclusive Nordic cooperation.[2] Europeans had developed a perception of Norden as something different from and, in many respects, better than the rest of Europe. On the one hand, due to the "Nordic Balance" security arrangement the Nordic countries had a lower level of tension than Central Europe; consequently, they represented a model of the enlightened, anti-militaristic society offering a third way between communism and capitalism.[3] On the other hand, however, Norden depended on Europe for its identity, which remained divided, highly armed, and marked by a certain level of tension. With the end of the east-west conflict Norden lost much of its mobilizing force and faced the risk of marginalization. The need to redefine Norden became essential and a Baltic Sea cooperation pact provided one solution. The idea was to create a European identity for Norden that included the Baltic Rim countries, including Poland, Germany and Russia.

What factors, current or future, apart from geographic proximity, drive Baltic regionalism? It is said that "a region exists when one can claim some sort of homogeneity to be present."[4] Some of the important features in regional collective identities tend to be religion, language and historical traditions.

In terms of religion, around the Baltic Sea there is Protestantism in the Nordic countries, Estonia, northern Latvia and northern Germany; Catholicism in Poland, Lithuania, southern Latvia and southern Germany; and Orthodox Christianity in the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad areas of Russia. Around the shores of the Baltic people speak non-Indoeuropean languages (Finnish and Estonian) as well as languages in several Indoeuropean families: Germanic (German, Danish, Swedish), Slavic (Polish and Russian), and Baltic (Latvian and Lithuanian). The lingua franca – if one exists – between persons from different countries may be English, German, Russian or even Scandinavian (Swedish, Danish or Norwegian), depending on what countries they come from, what generation they belong to and what level of education they have. The political history of the Baltics consists of a series of long and short term empires. Some of those have been predominantly Baltic: the German

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2 Nordic cooperation refers to the community of Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – defined by their membership in the Nordic Council (for more specific discussion on the Council see section 2).

3 Ole Waever, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War," in *International Affairs*, 68 (January 1992) 1, p. 96.

4 Carl-Einar Stalvant, "The Baltic Sea Area: An International Resource Region and a Test Case for Regionalism?," in P. Joenneimi, ed., *Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1993), p. 59.

Order and the Swedish empire, whereas others have had their main axis of expansion in other directions: the Polish-Lithuanian, Russian and modern German empires. Most of them are seen as "merely historic." The most recent empires, however, often define fears of recurrence: Polish fears of Germany are entrenched; fears of Russian imperialism are strong in Poland and the Baltic States.

A conclusion seems to be that the Baltic Sea region does have a future, not because it is real from an historic perspective and a common identity, but because it seems to reflect the *new* political dynamism of Europe. The new organizing principle of the Baltic Sea region today is characterized by integration and interdependence occurring in a considerably less polarized international climate.

Another driving idea behind the new Baltic Sea regionalism is that it was not initiated by establishing traditional political institutions, but rather by a series of overlapping local networks centered on a whole range of diverse activities. Such decentralized cooperation, could not effectively be initiated by the states, yet it could hardly emerge as a natural unit. Rather, the region was nudged into existence by the cultural elite: "The intellectuals start out creating the image of what is 'natural'. And when it is in place and we all take it to be natural to cooperate in a Baltic frame, all kinds of business, political and cultural cooperation will naturally take this pattern, and the Baltic Sea region will be very real as a network and an identity."[5] Basically, it meant that Baltic Sea regional cooperation was initially mainly about culture and infrastructure, later also adopting economics and politics.

But what about security? If most of the region's potential existed in the form of non-state level cooperation it would be hard to see how security – being a subject of exclusively inter-governmental interactions, indeed, the *raison d'être* for the *raison d'état* of a state – could be considered. Depending on what dimensions of security – traditional military, economic, environmental or social – we look at, security problems may be seen as obstacles to cooperation, as common challenges calling for cooperation, or as problems where cooperation is irrelevant. The following part of the chapter will take a more concrete look at these matters in relation to the Baltic Sea region.

II. Security and Cooperation Dimensions in the Region

Much of the regionalism around the Baltic Sea is situated at the border between the public and the private: cooperation between universities, chambers of commerce, firms, cities, parliaments, where the emphasis on the technical, de-politicized nature

5 Ole Waever, "Nordic Scenario III – Norden Rearticulated," in Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Hakan Wiberg, ed., *Four Papers on Norden in a Changing Europe*, Working Papers 7 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1991), pp. 49 and 55.

of cooperation prevails. It would be impossible to list all different activities undertaken in this context; they range from invention of the *Ars Baltica*, an initiative which aims, through exhibitions and symposia, film festivals and musical performances, to get the "Baltic Sea people" together, to cooperation between political parties. There is a frequent recourse to the *Hanse*[6] whose emphasis on cooperation, trade and networking now appears to be a useful analogy-point in fostering region-building of a "state-less" character. Thus the sub-state actors in the Baltic region have become the subjects of cooperation in their own right.

There is also a concurrent growth in cooperation among states around the Baltic. Contrary to what some scholars have attempted to hint at,[7] the evolving pattern of Baltic cooperation does not provide a reason for the declining importance of states. Inter-governmental cooperation in the region remains active, and necessary, in a number of fields. Security, and its multidimensional nature in this context, remains highly functional in the Baltic Sea geopolitical environment. A glance at the major issues which are reflected in the security agenda of the Baltic Sea region deserves a more structured comment before the question of institutional development is approached.

1. The Baltic Security Agenda

Four major issues which seem to be present in the Baltic security agenda can be identified: the future security architecture for Europe in general, and for the Baltic Sea region in particular; Russia's policies towards the region and, specifically, its relations with the Baltic States; the traditional military aspects of security; and the non-military security concerns.[8] All these items are closely linked and reflect both the specificity of local or sub-regional security concerns and the broader European 'pot-pourri' of current security policies.

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6 The *Hanse* Union which predates the era of the territorial state, was the cooperation of merchant men and towns around the Baltic Sea in the middle ages.

7 See Pertti Joenniemi, "Regions as Actors: Reflecting upon the New in International Politics," in Kaisa Lahteenmaki, ed., *Dimensions of Conflict and Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Rim*, Research Report No. 58 (Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1994); Ole Waever, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War;" also Pertti Joenniemi, "Regionality in the Theory of International Relations," in *Regionalism. Concepts and Approaches at the Turn of the Century*, Romanian Institute of International Studies (IRSI) and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), (Bucharest 1995), pp. 11-24.

8 The four issues are drawn from Marcia Maibach, "The Baltic Security Agenda and Emerging Framework of Cooperation," in Axel Krohn, ed., *The Baltic Sea Region. National and International Security Perspectives* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), p. 264.

Roughly six years after the end of the Cold War a new European security order that encompasses more than the West European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the European Union (EU) has still not emerged. Europe remains divided into an area of "assured security" and an area outside these security structures. The Baltic Sea region remains part of this overall European security dynamic. Three states are members of the NATO collective defense system. Finland and Sweden, former neutral states, have declared themselves militarily non-aligned, and both joined the European Union (EU) in January 1995. New actors – such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – are seeking satisfactory security arrangements and integration with the West. Russia's constructive input and its reactions towards the transitional process of European security is both desirable and important. Its policy to that end, however, remains ambiguous, given efforts and undertakings to organize the Russia-dominated security arrangement of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The current political discussion in all countries of the region basically centers around the enlargement of the EU and NATO. Poland and the three Baltic States are the possible candidates for membership of both organizations which are widely considered as pillars of political, economic, and military security and stability in Europe. Given the history of all four states, their aspirations and commitments to stabilize and ensure their national security through integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures are more than obvious. The pace and logic of these countries' rapprochement with EU has to date been uneventful: all four have signed Europe Agreements and are taking further steps to harmonize their internal structures, procedures and policies in line with the pre-accession strategy requirements; all four have attained the Associated Partner status of the WEU and participate in various meetings of the WEU Council, without a right to vote. Official talks about new EU membership is expected to start after six months after the end of the EU Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC). There is an understanding that the inclusion in the EU of the Baltic countries would be a comparatively light burden for the present member states, as the small and fast-changing economies are easier to prepare than those of most other Eastern European states. In this context, the case of Poland may eventually be seen as more problematic. All in all, early membership of the European Union would add clarity to all four countries' international position and strengthen their security. Even if it would not bring formal security guarantees, (unless they become full members of the WEU) it is fairly clear that what happens to one member state is the concern of all.

To date it is only NATO who can provide credible security. Furthermore, it seems likely that the Atlantic Alliance will maintain its role as the "prime actor" in the

future. The very idea of NATO enlargement has been generally more or less accepted by the 16 allies. The *Study on NATO Enlargement* that was developed and presented in September 1995 deals with the questions "why" and "how" and clarifies the steps that could lead to membership of the Alliance. Basically, the latter document reiterates and explores the very essence of the article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Yet the actual process of enlargement has been marked with ambiguity since the "who" and "when" have still not been clearly defined. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and newly established Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) serve as means to develop the necessary interoperability between NATO and its partners, among whom the Baltic States and Poland (along with the Czech Republic and Hungary) as a result of the July 1997 NATO Madrid Summit, has been invited to start accession negotiations; whereas the three Baltic States have been occasionally referred to as being "not yet ready" for membership in the Alliance.[9] While the three governments have not renounced their aim to join the Alliance as soon as possible, they increasingly emphasize the need for an enhanced and well articulated framework for Baltic state security. A number of components for such a framework is being worked out and will most likely include an enhanced cooperation within the PfP program, the US launched "Baltic Action Plan"[10] which will likely result in signing of "Baltic Charter" among the US and three Baltic countries, and increased regional dialogue with Nordic countries. All of this is being aimed at easing the Baltics' eventual entry into NATO and the EU, not as alternatives to membership.

The decision of Sweden and Finland to join the EU had a considerable impact on their security policies. The current security policy of the two states contains elements of change as well as continuity. In the beginning of 1990s Finland and Sweden described their security status as militarily non-aligned and no longer as neutral. With EU membership, both countries accepted the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and see themselves as active participants in its formulation. However, this did not lead to full membership in the WEU; both received observer status in the WEU and the NACC but actively participate in the PfP program. At the same time their military security policies continue to place emphasis on a strong and credible national defense.[11] In the years to come Finland and Sweden will have to

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9 "Perry Tells Baltics: You're Not Ready," in *International Herald Tribune*, 28-29 September 1996, p. 2.

10 See John Henley, "NATO Treads Fine Line in Baltics," in *The Guardian*, 11 October 1996.

11 For overviews of Swedish and Finnish security policies see Ulf Bjereld, "Sweden's Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War – From Neutrality to Freedom of Action," in Lutger Lindahl and Gunnar Sjostedt, ed., *New Thinking in International Relations: Swedish Perspectives*, The Yearbook of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs 1994-1995 (Stockholm 1995), pp. 183-194; Max Jakobson, "Finland: A Nation that Dwells Alone," in *The Washington Quarterly*, 19 (Autumn 1996) 4, pp. 37-58; also: Jyrki Kakonen, "What Happened to Neutrality: Finnish and Swedish Foreign Policies after the Cold War," in Kaisa Lahteenmaki,

decide how they will adapt to the European security institutions. The ongoing process of the internal restructuring of NATO and its eastward expansion is already affecting their political priorities: for the first time Finnish and Swedish units operate under NATO command in the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina – the first and very important step towards closer security integration with the West. If their political interests and the international situation change, both states might pragmatically decide to abandon non-alignment and adopt a new security paradigm.

Russia's Policy towards the Region

It is a fundamental historical observation that the development and security of the Baltic Sea region is determined to a decisive degree by Russia. It is involved in the region, but consequently the quality of this involvement is dependent on whether or not the establishment of democracy and a market economy in Russia is successful, and whether a resurgence of hegemonic tendencies in Russia's Baltic Sea policy can be prevented.

One could argue that Russia's Baltic security perceptions associated have changed fundamentally when compared to those of the Soviet Union. This has been illustrated, for instance, by the fact that Sweden's and Finland's membership in the EU did not provoke any visible negative reaction on the part of Moscow. This observation presents an interesting point keeping in mind that since 1995 Russia has had a 1,300 kilometre direct border with the EU, which may be extended in the future. At the same time, Russia is the only Baltic Sea coastal state without the prospect of accession to the EU.

It is believed that, in contrast to the Soviet Union period, the focus of Russia's security interests are gradually shifting from West-North towards East-South, most of the security concerns in the Baltic Sea region remain, in one way or another, linked to Russia.

Firstly, *the rigid opposition to NATO enlargement* is consistent with Russian policy to the Baltic Sea region. Despite all the rhetoric about non-confrontational relationships, and even strategic partnerships, with the West, Russia perceives eventual NATO enlargement as an unfavorable change to its security environment. It, therefore, strongly opposes the integration of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, particularly the Baltic States. Russia claims that enlargement would isolate, encircle, and separate it from the West. Yet another logic is easily detectable, namely Russia wants to prevent the CEE countries from becoming members of the Alliance, primarily because if it were to happen they could no longer be seen as a

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ed., *Dimensions of Conflict and Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Rim*, Research Report No. 58 (Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1994), pp. 143-160.

zone of special Russian interest. The latter approach, especially with regard to the Baltics, coupled with the preparation of "adequate responsive measures,"[12] is to some extent aimed at sending a message to convince the West that preserving some uncertainty with respect to the security status of the three Baltic States would be a less destabilizing pattern than drawing a dividing line along their frontiers with Russia. It seems increasingly evident, however, that unless and until the majority of Russian political elite is reconciled to the consequences of the breakup of the USSR and the downfall of the regime which once dominated the others, the existence of the *old* Cold War division line continues to trigger the old Russian game of pressures and influences. Hence the reason for NATO and EU enlargement which, if carefully managed, has the best chance to help Russia in finding its new role in the future European security architecture.

Secondly, the Russian policy towards, and its relationship with, the Baltic sates and each of the three remains a security concern in the region. The crucial question is still in the air: *to what extent is Moscow's insistence on considering the "near abroad" as Russia's sphere of influence being applied to the Baltic States?* Although there have been a number of confusing signals, the overall official approach is to treat the Baltic States differently to the CIS members. In principle, this means that all Russian ideas about organizing the post-Soviet geopolitical space are not being addressed to the three Baltic States. At the same time there are grounds to believe that Russia's perception has not yet reached the stage where these countries are considered the "far abroad," i.e. – real one. Their domestic political, economic and defense related developments remain highly sensitive issues for Moscow. What in general terms has been expressed by the notion of "vital interests" and suggestions about the means to be used for protecting these interests, vary within a very broad spectrum. One of the difficult elements of the Russian-Baltic relationship is the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia[13] (Lithuania has a considerably small Russian minority, thus the problem does not exist there). Moscow's assessment that this part of the population is subject to discrimination has been repeatedly expressed in an exaggerated and provocative way, pointing to notions such as "ethnic cleansing,"[14] and "local variant of apartheid."[15] There is a widespread (and almost

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12 "Russia Threatens Balts over NATO Expansion," in *The Baltic Independent*, 8-14 September 1995; A draft of a new Russian military doctrine was made public; it called for moving Russian troops into Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and deploying tactical nuclear weapons on Russia's border with Poland and Norway if NATO membership should be extended to the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic; see "Clinton Told to Oppose Russia's Policy of Threats," in *The Baltic Independent*, 8-14 December 1995.

13 In Lithuania non-titular ethnic groups comprise approximately 20% of population; 8% being Russians. respective figures are 38 and 30% for Estonia and 48 and 34% for Latvia.

14 See *Newsweek*, 14 (February 1994) 7, p. 56

15 See *Krasnaja Zvezda*, 26 June 1993, p. 1

always overdramatised) feeling in Russia that "compatriots" have to be protected by Moscow, with the means which might range from political pressures (as was the case with the direct or indirect linkage with Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltics) to economic sanctions and even coercive military actions. Thus, Russia's attitude represents a paradoxical combination of what are apparently mutually exclusive elements. On the one hand, the loss of the Baltics has been politically accepted and is being increasingly assessed as irreversible on the psychological level. On the other hand, however, there is a feeling of deep involvement which might eventually acquire the most unpredictable form in case the military logic begins to prevail over the political one, or the latter moves away from cooperation and becomes confrontational. Thus, despite all the reasoning about a low probability of any armed conflict with or around the Baltic States, such a conflict is considered not completely unthinkable.[16]

To briefly summarize: Russian security thinking about the Baltic Sea area is characterized by a peculiar mixture of two strategic concepts: a certain cooperative interaction with the external environment, on the one hand, and emphasizing traditional power policy with efficient protection of Russia's security interests in the North-West, on the other. Practically all the rationales developed along this second line do not differ from the traditional arguments inherited from the era of global bipolar confrontation. One can argue that this is precisely where the dilemma associated with Russia's qualitative involvement in the Baltic Sea regional cooperation lies.

Military Security Concerns

The overall military situation in the Baltic Sea area has only been marginally affected by the positive disarmament and arms control processes in Europe. Nordic countries still find Russian forces where they have always been: right up to the eastern border of Norway and Finland, from Murmansk on the Barents Sea to St. Petersburg on the Baltic Sea. This fact constitutes the difference between the situation in Northern Europe and the one in the continental Central Europe where fundamental changes in the military landscape have occurred.

One concern is the continuing, and even increasing, importance of the Kola peninsula in Russian military planning. The Kola peninsula will remain Russia's most important home base for strategic submarines and, in addition, of great importance for Russian air defense. The Northern Military District will, therefore, remain an important location for troops and weaponry in the future, as Russia rebuilds and reforms its armed forces.[17] Norway has a common land border of almost 200

16 Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia," in Krohn, *The Baltic Sea Region*, p. 178.

17 *Security in a Changing World: Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy*, report by the Council of State to the Parliament, 6 June, 1995, p. 43.

kilometre with Russia and an unclear maritime border which is roughly ten times as long. Even if the Russian troop concentrations close to the Norwegian border are not directed against Norway, they are nonetheless stationed in these locations and might, in changing circumstances, be regarded as a threat.[18] And finally, the situation in the vicinity of the Baltic States, marked by the existing military imbalance of the overwhelming nature and huge military potential of a single state, is a security concern in itself.[19] The Baltic States are worried about the largely unchanged nature and scope of an excessive military potential in Russia's Pskov and Kaliningrad regions, which they believe are inharmonious with politico-military realities of the Baltic region.

The stability of the Baltic Sea region is affected by the future of the Kaliningrad district – the territory which after the restoration of the independence of the Baltic States became the westernmost enclave of Russia, surrounded by the current and prospective EU members. The future of it is open, and interests all the Baltic Sea states. Politically, none of the international actors in the Baltic Sea area seem interested in the Kaliningrad region or even in undermining its *status quo*. Economically, on the contrary, maintaining the *status quo* would mean a disaster for the province which has been kept in complete isolation for almost half a century. For Russia, the major challenge lies in opening the region up to the outside world while preventing it from being transformed into an arena of competing political interests. Russia still stresses the military and strategic importance of Kaliningrad. The region hosts a part of the Russian Baltic Sea Military Fleet (BSMF) where Russia can locate its nuclear arsenal or exert pressure on neighboring countries by blockading of their harbors. The 30,000 strong 11th army, reorganized on the principle of mobile defense, a group of border troops as well as a regiment of the Russian Interior Forces[20] are also located in Kaliningrad district. Such a concentration exacerbates the already formidable problems of supply and reinforcement – raising the need for regulation of military transit, both in the air and on the ground.[21] It would be unfortunate if some sort of international cooperation formula could not be found to help Russia develop a policy of its reducing military presence in Kaliningrad in the future.

Another military security concern in the region is related to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty to which the Baltic States and the countries that were militarily non-aligned during the Cold War, namely Finland and Sweden are not

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18 For more detailed information see *The Military Balance 1994-1995 in Northern Europe*, published by Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo 1995.

19 Renatas Norkus, "Preventing Conflict in the Baltic States: A Success Story that Will Hold?," in this volume.

20 *Discussion Paper on Kaliningrad District*, unpublished paper prepared by the Lithuanian MFA, 29 October 1996.

21 Renatas Norkus, "Preventing Conflict in the Baltic States."

members. The problems encountered in implementing of the CFE treaty have been caused by the flank rules, which lay down a joint ceiling on the armament levels of Russia's Northern and North Caucasus Military Districts. Russia has been demanding an amendment of the flank rules and the relaxation of restrictions in view of its security needs on its southern flank. Finally, it succeeded in reaching an agreement with other parties to the treaty that has effectively changed the previous flank-related requirements. According to the introduced changes the Russian Pskov Oblast, bordering on Estonia and Latvia, was exempted from the flank limits and permitted a deployment of 600 armored combat vehicles as opposed to the previous ceilings of 180. One has to note that, although presumably intended to favor Russia's interests in the North Caucasus, the amendments to the CFE treaty also have increased the military imbalance in the Baltic area.

After what has been said, one may conclude that there is no visible military threat in the Baltic Sea region, but nonetheless the military concentration is high. It is important for a stable security situation in the region, therefore, that regional arms control is made the subject of multilateral talks and negotiations.

Non-military Security Issues

Environmental and non-military nuclear risks, instabilities due to social and economic disparities, migration, and international crime are all transnational problems that play a role in structuring enhanced security in the region. The state of the environment around the Baltics is of common concern: there used to be high levels of sea and rivers pollution, in particular from Poland and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The presence of nuclear power plants in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania which do not exactly satisfy current safety requirements have contributed to the problem of nuclear safety in the region. In addition, the disastrous environmental heritage of current and former Soviet/Russian military bases has created a growing problem in the region. In particular, the Arctic sub-region has the highest concentration of civilian and military nuclear installations. The problems of nuclear dumping, the poor quality of the nuclear installations, nuclear testing, and the growing number of old, decommissioned submarines of the Russian North Fleet are being dealt with in the Arctic area.[22]

Another challenge is related to economic and social disparity in the region. The end of the Cold War has not removed all borders between East and West. The Baltic Sea area testifies to this: stable democracies on the Western coasts contrast with reforming countries on the Eastern coasts. The gulf between the living standards and

22 Olav Schram Stokke, "Environmental Cooperation as a Driving Force in the Barents Region," in Olav Schram Stokke and Ole Tunander, eds., *The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe* (London: Sage 1994), p. 146.

income levels of these two sub-regions remains enormous. This impedes balanced economic development in the region as a whole and produces a substantial gap in prosperity marked by a destabilizing tendency. The effects of the long division also continue in the region's infrastructure, which requires tremendous modernization in key fields such as transport, communication and energy.[23] Should the process of democratic and economic transformation on the Eastern Baltic coast, and especially in Russia, go wrong, a possible repercussion would be uncontrolled mass migration into the Western countries.

An additional concern is the organized crime, since the Baltic Sea region is increasingly being used as a transit area for smuggling refugees, weapons, and drugs to Western Europe. Hence the growing international cooperation in police work, coastal and frontier guards, and customs control reflecting the importance that is attached to such fears.

All these issues are pressing concerns for the states of the Baltic Sea region, requiring ideally a common response and joint actions within the region and – most obviously – beyond it.

2. Instruments of Baltic Sea Cooperation

The Baltic security agenda outlined above has been reflected in various forms of cooperation within the region. The ongoing region-building developments in the Baltic Sea area, however, should be viewed from two perspectives. One is an "out-side-in" perspective. In other words, a relevant question is to what extent the EU, OSCE, NATO, and the WEU – being the important external actors – effect the patterns of cooperation in the region? On the other hand, the institutional cooperation framework, where only the Baltic littoral states are members, is being developed like-wise, thus suggesting an "inside-out" perspective of the Baltic regional cooperation. (see table 1 and 2, pp. 276). I will begin with looking upon the latter arrangements, and then proceed to the elaboration of an "outside-in" approach.

"Inside-Out" Approach

The oldest arrangement in the region remains the *Nordic Council*, founded in 1952 by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Although security and even foreign policy matters were never an issue in the Council during the Cold War, it contributed to the stability of the Norden by cooperating in non-military affairs. The old Nordic cooperation focused largely on internal Nordic affairs such as the labor

23 Hans-Dieter Lucas, "Prospects for Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region," in *Aussenpolitik*, 46 (1995) 1, p. 24.

Table 1 – The Inter-Governmental Multilateral Security Structures in the Baltic Sea Region

	EU	WEU	NATO	NACC	PfP	OSCE
Denmark	X	Observer	X	X	X	X
Estonia	Europe Agreement	Associate Partner		X	X	X
Finland	X	Observer		Observer	X	X
Germany	X	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland		Associate Member	X	X	X	X
Latvia	Europe Agreement	Associate Partner		X	X	X
Lithuania	Europe Agreement	Associate Partner		X	X	X
Norway		Associate Member	X	X	X	X
Poland	Europe Agreement	Associate Partner		X	X	X
Russia				X	X	X
Sweden	X	Observer		Observer	X	X
(USA)			X	X	X	X

X = Member
EU = European Union
WEU = Western European Union
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NACC = North Atlantic Cooperation Council
PfP = Partnership for Peace
OSCE = Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Source: Marcia Maibach, "The Baltic Security Agenda and Emerging Framework of Cooperation," in Krohn, *The Baltic Sea Region*, pp. 273-274.

Table 2 – The Inter-Governmental Multilateral Regional Arrangements in the Baltic Sea Region

	CBSS	Baltic Round Table	Nordic Council	Baltic Council	Barents Euro-Arctic Council	HELCOM
Denmark	X		X		X	X
Estonia	X	X		X		X
Finland	X		X		X	X
Germany	X				Observer	X
Iceland	X		X		X	
Latvia	X	X		X		X
Lithuania	X	X		X		X
Norway	X		X		X	
Poland	X	X			Observer	X
Russia	X	Observer			X	X
Sweden	X		X		X	X
(USA)					Observer	
(EU)	X				X	X

X = Member
CBSS = Council of Baltic Sea States
HELCOM = Helsinki Commission

Source: Marcia Maibach, "The Baltic Security Agenda and Emerging Framework of Cooperation," in Krohn, *The Baltic Sea Region*, pp. 273-274.

markets, economics, and the passport union. Since the end of the Cold War the direction of Nordic cooperation has gradually been changing. The main and most visible change has been the elevation of Nordic cooperation to the highest political level and maximizing it with regard to the EU. Since 1992, a rotating Nordic chairmanship similar to the EU's has been established. The new Nordic cooperation seems to be much more about the external side. Consequently, there has been an increase, almost a quantum leap, in Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation. The Nordic Council has broken the cold war taboo of what was against making foreign policy by arranging debates on a number of very sensitive issues – e.g.,

Russia's problems regarding pollution, nuclear safety, and arms control.[24] A common stand on these and other issues have now committed the Nordic countries to common action – an absolutely new feature which was absent previously. In this regard, a special Nordic policy line – often termed "sovereignty support" – has been developed towards the Baltic States.

The Nordics have observed the EU distinction between foreign and security policy on the one hand and defense policy on the other.[25] Though no formal common Nordic defense policy debate is on the agenda, cooperation in the military field, however, is increasing. Apart from Nordic links regarding military procurement, which have a long history, another area where the Nordic countries have cooperated more intensively than ever is peacekeeping. Joint Nordic battalions have been put together and participate in the peace-support operations in Macedonia and Bosnia.

In short, it seems that today the Nordic cooperation has increasingly assumed features of governmental cooperation *vis-à-vis* their external environment. Moreover, the Nordic states seem to emphasize European rather than Nordic dimension of cooperation and the Nordic Council formulates not exclusively Nordic policy, but the one which is part of the overall Western policy, and is pursued along similar lines as the EU-CFSP. At the same time, the Council operates within the broader context of the Baltic Sea region and, because of its long experience in cooperation, is viewed as a natural and important partner for other institutional arrangements in the region.

One of these is the *Baltic Council* – the arrangement which comprises the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic Council is the youngest institution in the region, founded in June 1994. It constitutes the organizational umbrella for the Baltic Council of Ministers – the institution for inter-governmental collaboration – and the Baltic Assembly – the forum for members of three Baltic parliaments. The Council enables the three states to cooperate on practically all issues of common concern such as information, crime prevention, social affairs, science and education, border control, customs, transport, economic interaction. Moreover, defense and peacekeeping as well as foreign affairs are on the agenda.

Looking from outside, though somewhat superficially, the Baltic States are seen as a unit and, therefore, they can achieve their common objectives only in coordination and cooperation. However, the trilateral cooperation has not been as smooth as

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24 In November 1992, Norway's Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg addressed the Nordic Council in Århus, Denmark, for its first general foreign policy debate; In 1993 Sweden's foreign affairs minister Margaretha af Ugglas did the same for the Nordic Council meeting in Aaland; in 1992 in Bornholm, the Nordic prime ministers have issued common policies on questions like the Russian military presence in the Baltic States. See Arne Olav Brundtland, "Nordic Security at the End of the Cold War: Old Legacies and New Challenges," in Don M. Snider and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., *Nordic Baltic Security. An International Perspective*, CSIS Report (Washington 1994), p. 25.

25 Ibid.

expected. From an inside perspective, the three countries have often seen each other as competitors rather than as partners. Nonetheless, the Baltic Council has agreed on a common free trade zone, a common visa regime, a common customs union, and a number of other projects. Cooperation in the military field is the area which so far may be regarded as the most successful. The Baltic States have created the joint peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT), they are developing joint air space control and sea surveillance systems, and most recently have put forward the plan of establishing the joint naval unit. In 1995, the Baltic Assembly recommended the Baltic governments begin deliberations with regard to establishing a Baltic defense union including mutual security guarantees. The initiative, however, was soon ruled out by the three presidents as a premature one and, if undertaken, risked sending the wrong signal both to the East and the West. Instead, in February 1995, the three ministers of defense signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of defense and military relations, which aimed at streamlining and intensifying contacts between the different levels of administration within the defense establishments. It is noteworthy that the Baltic Council also serves as a platform for the Baltic States' communication with the Nordic Council. To a large extent the Baltic Council was formed in response to the Nordic states' unwillingness to include the Baltic countries in their formal deliberations.[26] The *"5+3" formula* – first suggested by Norway as early as 1990 as an idea for a coordination meeting before the CSCE Paris Summit – has developed to become a highly functional and extensively used formula for sub-regional cooperation by the Nordic and Baltic countries. The formula allows for a flexible scope of activities to be included in the agenda. Political consultations – covering, among others, the issues of foreign, security, and defense policies – are being held frequently at the foreign, defense and even the prime ministers level. A constant focus of attention for all eight countries has been the process of Baltic integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the Nordic-Baltic cooperation and the Baltic-Russian relations.

The *Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS),* created following a German-Danish initiative in 1992, is the only sub-regional body in which all the governments of the Baltic Sea coastal states and the EU Commission cooperate.[27] Its primary aim is to promote cooperation in the field of democratic development and to coordinate economic and technical interaction, i.e. humanitarian matters, ecological issues, energy, culture, tourism, information, and education. The Council is not a formal

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26 Ibid., p. 24; for an evolution of Nordic-Baltic relations see Zaneta Ozolina, "The Nordic and the Baltic Countries: a Sub-Region in the Making?," in Atis Lejins and Daina Bleiere, eds., *The Baltic States: Search for Security* (Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), pp. 93-111.

27 The founding members of the CBSS were: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden, as well as European Community; the 11th state to join was Iceland (in 1995).

international organisation but rests on a political agreement; its institutional structure and working scheme are very loose.[28] The participating countries have had problems even agreeing on the establishment of a permanent secretariat. Currently the administrative workload is borne by the member state holding the annual presidency. The only exception was the establishment of a Commissioner for Human Rights and Democratic Institutions – an institutional innovation – which may be seen as representing a certain degree of centralized authority within the CBSS. It has been introduced with the intention that it does not duplicate the tasks of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

The first inter-governmental conference of the heads of government of all the Baltic littoral states only took place on 3-4 May 1996 in Visby (Sweden). They adopted the final document, the *Agenda for Action*, which called for improved economic cooperation and environmental protection and put particular emphasis on concerted action against organized crime in the region establishing, to this end, a task-force of personal representatives of the heads of government.[29] At the Visby Summit special attention was given to support for the Baltic States and Poland in their preparation for membership of the EU, as well as the encouragement for an early ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU. Indeed, the CBSS has become a particularly useful international forum for the Baltic States and Poland which serves to bring them closer to the EU. At the same time, it offers an opportunity to integrate Russia into regional cooperation, or at least link Russia to the EU.

The importance of the sub-national dimension of the CBSS should be mentioned. The Council extends its framework to the participation of sub-regions, especially those of Germany and Russia, given the size of the two countries. In the case of Germany, the *Länder* (federal states) of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Hamburg; also Russia's northwestern regions of St. Petersburg and Karelia, and Kaliningrad, are increasingly becoming their own subjects in the networks of education and training, environment, energy, communication, regional planning, etc. within the CBSS agenda.

In view of its loose structure and due to the lack of its own funds the CBSS cannot entirely direct the Baltic Sea cooperation. It also does not intend to duplicate the activities of other bodies. Due partly to the latter, the CBSS deliberately stays clear of security issues, at least on the official level. That is to say, security matters may be

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28 In institutional terms the CBSS consists of a Council of Foreign Ministers which convenes once a year, a committee of high-ranking officials which meets at regular intervals, and specialist working groups in the various fields subject to cooperation.

29 It is planned that the heads of state of the Baltic Rim states will meet on an annual basis. The next meeting will be held in the summer of 1997 in Denmark. See "A Baltic Region Emerges in Visby," in *Baltic Times*, 9-15 May 1996.

discussed but cannot generate operational political measures. The second reason involves the heterogeneous composition of the membership in the Council; some of the members are still sensitive with regard to the concept of non-alignment, while others are members of the Atlantic Alliance, or are trying to gain membership. Russia, however, objects to eventual NATO enlargement, but at the same time is itself perceived as a source of instability and a security concern by those aspiring to join NATO. This sensitive situation, with the sharply divergent views of the different member countries, does not allow the inclusion of security issues in the Baltic Council's agenda, requiring them to be tackled in other forums.

The establishment of the CBSS prompted the Norwegian initiative for the creation of a new regional entity around the Barents Sea. Set up by the Kirkenes Declaration in January 1993, the *Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR)* is designed along both national and local dimensions. Its Council (Barents Euro-Arctic Council – BEAC) consists of an inter-governmental Barents Council with Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and the EU being members; and an inter-regional Regional Council made up of a number of counties – namely, Norway's Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark, Sweden's Norrbottn, Finland's Lapland, and Russia's Murmansk and Archangelsk oblasts.[30] The BEAC is to foster cooperation in seven main areas: the environment, economic cooperation, science and technology, regional infrastructure, indigenous peoples, cultural relations and tourism. The region's potential for natural resources is also expected to attract Western interest in laying a foundation for cooperation and the non-marginalization of the Euro-Arctic region.

Yet another establishment, the *Helsinki Commission (HELCOM)* is dedicated to environmental protection of the Baltic Sea on the basis of the 1974 Baltic Sea Convention and 1992 Convention.[31] The aim of the Commission is not only to assess the pollution of the Baltic Sea, but also to establish countermeasures and improvements in order to avoid any environmental hazards in the area. To this end the Commission considers it necessary to intervene in economically or politically sensitive sectors such as industry, energy, transport, and agriculture. Its political goals

30 In addition to the member states and seven sub-national regions, the Russian autonomous republic of Karelia, the transnational community of the Sami people, take part in the Council; the US, Poland and Germany, as well as Canada, Japan, Britain, the Netherlands, and France are observers of the Council.

31 The new Helsinki convention of 1992 states that in cases where "a significantly adverse" transboundary impact is foreseen, the contracting parties are obliged to carry out consultations, whenever they are required by supranational regulations applicable to the country of origin; for more on this and on the HELCOM see Heidi Hautala, "Eco-Politics in the Shaping of the Baltic Sea Region," in Goran Baecklund, ed., *Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War. The Baltic Sea Region and the Barents Sea Region*, report from the Olof Palme International Center Seminar, Stockholm, 18-20 March 1994, pp. 124-138.

are extensively elaborated in the Baltic Sea Comprehensive Environmental Action Program of 1992 which identifies 132 ecological hot-spots in the Baltic Sea.

Mention should also be made of the *Baltic Round Table*, launched within the *Pact on Stability in Europe*, presented to the EU in 1993. The arrangement called for the three Baltic States and Poland, as well as Russia (which participated as an observer) to accomodate good-neighborly relations, minority and border issues bilaterally and multilaterally. In May 1995 the Stability Pact was handed over to the OSCE for monitoring and further development. The importance of this arrangement lies mainly in its preventive effects – stabilization of the domestic and external environment of potential EU member states.

"Outside-In" Approach

As "a small model of Europe," the Baltic Sea region is as an area where littoral states are becoming involved, at various levels, in a number of multilateral institutions. Consequently, those institutions – each to a greater or lesser extent – have been engaged in the region.

The *North Atlantic Alliance*, as an institution does not have an explicit policy with regard to the Baltic Sea region. One has to note, however, that at least three NATO members – Denmark, Germany, and Norway – represent a direct presence of the Alliance in the region; and at least two important allies, namely the US and the UK, maintain rather active political links with the region. This suggests a certain implicit importance of NATO's northern dimension which is being increasingly noticed by the non-NATO regional actors. NATO's defense posture – based both on the system of mutual deterrence in the former bipolar security environment and currently adapted to the new security environment – has been a stabilizing factor for the Baltic Sea region.[32] Security and stability in the Baltic Sea area are today, however, equally dependent on developing cooperative mechanisms and attitudes, including military cooperation, where NATO plays a large and important part.

The former NACC, currently developed into the EAPC, and, above it, the PfP program, although not designed specifically for the Baltic Sea Rim, have been fostering closer cooperation in the region. All the countries around the Baltic Sea have joined the PfP program, so the basis for regional projects is there. For instance, the establishment of the BALTBAT – the initiative led by the Baltic States – was supported by the Nordic countries, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Netherlands. Thus the project provided a platform for establishing a specific pattern of military cooperation between the three Baltic States themselves,

32 Volker Heise, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation," in Axel Krohn, ed., *The Baltic Sea Region*, p. 223.

but also among the countries of the Baltic region enlarged with the participation of some other NATO members, primarily UK and US. The value of such an emerged cooperation pattern is, therefore, more than just military. Similarly, trilateral cooperation has also been developed between Denmark, Germany and Poland, which has so far resulted in trilateral peacekeeping exercises.

Beyond the field of military exercises, the PfP encompasses aspects of transparency in national defense planning, and the objective of ensuring civilian control of armed forces. Moreover, the PfP Framework Document enumerates a number of commitments as a kind of prerequisite for participation in the program, e.g. respect for existing borders, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and respect for human rights. However difficult to measure, these aspects would have a positive impact on the security situation in the Baltic Sea region in general, particularly with regard to Russia.

Yet another advantage of the PfP is the possibility to consult with NATO if a PfP partner perceives a direct threat to its security.[33] In the Baltic, as well as in any other regional context, it in principle offers the consultation mechanism through the 16+1 or 16+n formula. Though such eventual consultations do not represent any commitment for NATO to take specific actions, they do provide a procedure for an activation of the Alliance's attention towards possible regional concerns.

Finally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the gradual NATO enlargement process will certainly expand the area of stability and reduce the conflict potential in the region, along with the transparent NATO – Russia relationship and the clearly articulated NATO policies towards those not-yet-members.

The contribution of the *Western European Union* to security and stability in the Baltic Sea region cannot, in the narrow sense, be seen as a "regional" activity. The WEU only partly fulfills a process of gradual integration of the Baltics into the Euro-Atlantic community. With the exception of Russia, all the Baltic littoral states are, in different ways, associated with the WEU. As either the Associate Partners, or Observers, or full members (Germany), they attend the Permanent Council, which is WEU's top decision-making body. In addition, Foreign and Defense Ministers meet as a rule twice a year, forming the Ministerial Council. However, the protection of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty is not extended to the Associate partners, or to the Observers. The WEU, on the other hand, does provide a forum where the eight littoral states can discuss their relationship problems with Russia.

Another important factor is that Poland and the Baltic States may associate themselves with operations for "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks

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33 See Partnership for Peace Invitation, reproduced in *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, October 1995), p. 266.

of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,"[34] as defined in the Petersberg Declaration. On the military side this includes participation in the planning, and implementation, of operations with military units as well as the exercising of command and control functions. These measures provide an additional common forum where the military forces of the four countries meet with the military of the WEU countries.

A sign of particular attention to the Baltic Sea region has been shown by the WEU Assembly – the Parliamentary body of the WEU – which prepared a report entitled "Security and Military Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area" in which a "Standing Force Baltic Sea," or "Hanse corps" was recommended. The tasks of such a force would be border control, monitoring of fishing and environmental regulations, shipping control and search and rescue. In a later phase, the Hanse corps would be entrusted with the implementation of Petersberg missions. Planning and coordination of the eventual operations of such a force would ideally take place in the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels.[35] These suggestions function, however, as only recommendations to the WEU Ministerial Council which then decides on the proposals. A certain echo to this initiative has been given by the three Baltic States which initiated the establishment of a trilateral Baltic naval unit. At the time of writing the time scale of implementation for this initiative remains uncertain.

The *European Union's* role in the Baltic Sea region can be divided into bilateral and multilateral action, that is the relations the Union maintains with individual countries of the region and the policy it is devising for the region as a whole.

The context of the enlargement debate that was outlined above is essential for understanding why the substantial part of the EU's dealings with the Baltic Sea is bilateral in nature. Firstly, the Union has made it clear that every potential member candidate will be looked at on its individual merits. Secondly, due to the impossibility of Russia to be a candidate for EU membership the Union has to maintain a policy of differentiation between Russia and the rest. Consequently, the Union's Baltic policy cannot be subsumed under a larger framework of the pre-accession strategy. Finally, there are different interests among the member states with regard to more active policies towards the countries in the region. While Germany might favor a close association with Poland, the Nordic members are more interested in firmer ties with the Baltic States. There are obvious differences about the degree of EU involvement with Russia. Furthermore a large Southern group of EU member states, has little, if any, interest in a specifically Baltic policy. Their support for an EU role in the region,

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34 Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, part II, para. 2.

35 See "Security and Military Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area," report submitted on behalf of the Defense Committee, 41st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1494 (Brussels, 16 November 1995).

therefore, is bound to be limited. Given these differences it is not surprising that the substance of EU Baltic policy lies in its bilateral expression. The EU's legal commitments to the non-EU Baltic Sea sub-region exist first and foremost in the European agreements the Union has signed with the Baltic States and Poland, in the Interim agreement with the Russian Federation on trade and cooperation, and in the cooperation with Norway and Iceland in the framework of the European Economic Area.

The EU's primary multilateral involvement with the Baltic Sea region, as previously mentioned, is the fact that the Union, represented by the Commission, is participating as a full member in the Council of the Baltic Sea States. What makes the European Commission's participation in the CBSS important is its role of administering aid to the CEE countries. Most of the Council's undertakings requiring financial support are in some way connected to the EU budget – with money coming from Phare/Tacis economic aid, the Democracy Program, Tempus, the Cross-Border Cooperation facility, the Copenhagen Co-financing Facility, as well as the loans of the European Investment Bank.[36] Thus, the Commission's participation in the CBSS is naturally an important link with a view to re-structuring the spending of this aid in a more "regional" manner. The EU supports "cross-border" projects along the Union's Eastern border. This has affected mainly Poland[37], but joint projects between the Nordic EU members and the three Baltic States have also benefited from this assistance. In terms of an integrated regional plan for the Baltics, the EU has, to date, not had a chance to invest resources in this problem. There is the perception, in some quarters of the Union, that specifying a further "problem region" in addition to already well-established Central and Eastern Europe and Mediterranean regions, would imply the mobilization of additional resources. This risk of competition for funds with, in particular, the Union's Mediterranean policy has certainly hindered the formulation of a coherent and official EU position on the Baltic Sea area.

While the issue of fund allocation and aid coordination remains sensitive, certain signs of an explicit European Union Baltic policy are gradually becoming visible. In October 1994 the Commission issued its "Orientations for a Union Approach towards the Baltic Sea Region." Since this paper was too all-encompassing in scope and too specific on policy tools, the Essen European Council was unable to agree on producing a response at the Summit.[38] A new attempt was initiated by the French

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36 Thomas Christiansen, "EU Perspectives on the Future of the Baltic Sea Region," in P. Joenniemi and C. E. Stalvant, eds., *Baltic Sea Politics: Achievements and Challenges* (Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1995).

37 For example, Poland received more than a quarter of 1994 Phare spending for its cross-border projects (mainly with Germany), see Thomas Christiansen, "EU Perspectives on the Future of the Baltic Sea Region."

38 See European Commission, *Orientations for a Union Approach towards the Baltic Sea Region* (Brussels, 1994).

Presidency which resulted in adopting the "Council conclusions on European Union policy towards the Baltic Sea region" in May 1995. Later, in June, the Cannes European Council further endorsed the matter in its conclusions.[39] The European Parliament, thereafter, passed a motion in July 1995 in response to the Commission's orientation paper, and on the basis of the Ugglas Report (prepared by the former Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas, now MEP for the European People's Party). The motion asked for a specifically Baltic approach to a wide range of policy-areas: economic growth, sustainable development, citizen's rights, security policy, regional and cross-border cooperation, cultural heritage.[40] Finally, at the request of the Madrid European Council, the Commission produced the "Baltic Sea Region Initiative" which was presented to the CBSS Summit in Visby in May 1996.[41] Among other things, the document encourages cooperation in the Baltic Sea region at each level – "State to State, Region to Region, and People to People" – and specifies further EU financial support for these activities.

It can be said that the Baltic Sea region is now establishing itself on the agenda of the European Union. Commission, Parliament and Council all recognize the need for a coherent approach to the region. While declarations on the importance of an EU role in the area are easily forthcoming, the setting of political priorities and the restructuring of aid implementation in the region, however, are much more difficult to obtain. Yet the greatest influence exerted by the EU on the non-member states of the Baltic Sea region is the question of enlargement. The economic, administrative and political implications of enlargement are huge, and the countries concerned are keen to demonstrate their capacity to reform sufficiently to qualify for membership. One has to accept, however, that Russia, though being an important member of the Baltic Sea community, will remain outside of the ambit of EU enlargement strategies. In this way, even if Poland and the Baltic States eventually become members, Russia's non-membership of the Union will prevent the Baltic from becoming a whole "internal" EU sea.

The *OSCE* is the only multilateral Euro-Asian-Atlantic organization in which all Baltic Sea states are involved. As individual actors, the states and governments of the region have a rather high profile in the OSCE. Despite considerable criticism towards the organization, the conflict prevention techniques it provides have been rather

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39 The text of the conclusions, inter alia, read: "The Council reaffirms the European Union's concern to contribute to political stability and prosperity in the Baltic Sea region. It awaits with interest the progress report on cooperation in the region." See Agence Europe, "Cannes European Council – Presidency Conclusions," 29 June 1995.

40 European Parliament, *Report on the Communication of the Commission to the Council on "Orientations for a Union approach towards the Baltic Sea Region"* (Brussels, 1995).

41 "Baltic Sea Regional Initiative," paper prepared by the European Commission for the CBSS Summit in Visby (Brussels, 10 April 1996).

impressively demonstrated in the Baltic Sea area, especially the Baltic States. The OSCE took an important role fostering the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics. Its long-term missions in Estonia and Latvia, the activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities helped in the elaboration of citizenship laws in both countries. There are indications and suggestions that the OSCE might be able to perform a stabilizing function in the Baltic Sea region in future extending beyond its existing activities. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) in Vienna has regional issues on its Program for Immediate Action,[42] allowing for subregional considerations and the creation of subregional bodies – so called regional tables – if concerned countries in a region regard this as a viable approach. Furthermore, the OSCE Budapest Summit meeting of December 1994 placed even stronger emphasis on regional security problems. Regional arms control is referred to in the resolution text on the further tasks of the FSC. In paragraph 4, where the FSC is given a mandate to develop a framework for a future arms control agenda, it says: "Specific arms control measures, including disarmament and confidence and security-building, may vary in order to address the particular security needs of individual States or regions."[43] Thus the mandate for further elaboration of eventual regional measures is in place.

In June 1993 the Baltic States submitted a proposal to the FSC on the establishment of a Baltic Regional Security Table. The proposal was very modest in many respects, due to the then sensitive issue over Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltics, and mainly oriented towards the future regional security dialogue within the then-CSCE. Nonetheless, it did not get a visible support and, moreover, was actively rejected by the Nordic countries. There might have been several reasons for such a generally negative reaction from the Nordics. Perhaps the main reason had to do with the general line of the foreign policy of the Nordics, namely that the Baltic Sea region should not be presented as isolated from the overall European integrative and cooperative processes; in such a Baltic Sea security arrangement Russia and Germany would have most likely played a dominant role, which would not have been in the interest of the Nordics. The national security interests of the eventual state-participants in the proposed Baltic Sea security table would have been too diverse, so that the common formula for regional security measures could hardly be agreed upon.

Another initiative regarding regional arms control measures was the Polish proposal on the Regional Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) presented to the FSC in March 1994. As the title suggests, the Polish draft document

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42 *The Challenges of Change*, CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, Helsinki Summit 1992, chapter V (Helsinki, 1992), pp. 35-42.

43 *Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era*, CSCE Budapest Document 1994 (Budapest 1994), p. 15.

was based on the 1992 Vienna Document standards, assuming that the area of application for the measures it contained would be limited to the territories, or part of states, who agreed to such additional CSBMs. The measures presented also included naval forces, as a new element, which have essential military significance for some of the regions in particular. It was perfectly certain that the Polish also had the Baltic Sea region in mind when working out this document.

All in all, it appeared that neither the Baltic proposal, being raised too early in a given political circumstances, nor the Polish initiative, received the appropriate support. On the other hand, however, the discussion of the issues clearly showed that if the regional security-building measures were to be developed within the OSCE, it was the Baltic Sea area where those could be applied. The prospect for any regional arrangement dealing with specific demands for cooperation in the context of the OSCE is open and it is up to the regional actors to agree upon it.

III. Assessing Regional Cooperation: Limited Means to Meet the Ends

The above discussion of security and cooperation dimensions in the Baltic region helps evaluate to what extent regional cooperation is instrumental in dealing with a broad range of potential sources of instability. When compared to South-eastern Europe the region seems to be rather stable, with no violent conflicts and prevailing political dialogue. At the same time, there is a need to answer the current security questions, both those pertinent to specific regional concerns, as well as those being dealt with by international security institutions.

The current regional arrangements, with the participation of the Baltic littoral states, basically cover non-military issues and aim at general political cooperation in specific fields. Arrangements such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council cannot act as conflict-solving bodies because of their loose structures and depoliticized nature. One gets the impression that the diplomatic arena of the Baltic Sea cooperation is intentionally kept free of too high a degree of institutionalization, whereas the institutional arena of this cooperation is intentionally kept free of politics. Even the inter-governmental side of cooperation is decisively depoliticized – these institutions, including the Nordic Council and the Baltic Council, are just that: councils of ministers with no aspiration to supranational government. Consequently, there have been attempts by some to label the region as a "community of asecurity,"[44] since most of the regional arrangements in the Baltic area do not deal specifically with security questions. Indeed, the chief concern for the Baltic Sea regional cooperation, is to generate new human contacts, provide identity,

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44 See Joanniemi, *Norden: A Community of Asecurity*, Working Papers No. 6 (Copenhagen: Peace Research Institute [COPRI], 1996).

achieve economic growth, and prevent ecological degradation. The Baltic Sea region is focusing upon common challenges calling for cooperation rather than dealing with security problems where cooperation seems difficult, irrelevant or hampering. In other words, in the context of Baltic Sea regionalism security is perceived as an end result rather than a factor conducive to the production of security.

The Baltic Sea regional arrangements, however, also include an implicit security dimension. With numerous and well articulated cooperation projects in areas such as infrastructure, environmental protection, economic development, cultural links, etc., regional cooperation performs a function of political confidence building among participating states. It links all states in the region, offers cooperation, can structure national interests, and thereby contributes to stability and predictability in the region and decreases the likelihood of potential conflict. It is in this context that the European Union, as discussed earlier, with the regional application of its functional integration instruments, has a profound influence in the strengthening of stability and prosperity in the Baltic Sea region.

By definition, the CBSS has the potential to deal with more traditional security issues if the members were to agree and redefine the political purpose of this regional arrangement. There have been several initiatives put forward aimed at directly strengthening the security and stability of the region. Those include a Baltic round table under the auspices of the OSCE and certain regional CSBMs, eventually paving the way for regional arms control. An academic analysis regarding the feasibility of a sub-regional security arrangement for the Baltic Sea area has also been conducted.[45] All pretend to "activate" a security, and thus conflict prevention, dimension of Baltic regional cooperation. These, however, do not seem to be seriously considered by the participating states. The defining dilemma is essentially the following:

It is precisely because Russia continues to be perceived by most states around the Baltic Sea as a potential threat to security in the region that there is an agenda to create a secure and stable Baltic Sea region. At the same time Russia cannot be left out of any arrangement, but cannot be included on equal terms either. In other words: Russia is both the uniting and separating force in the construction of a security framework for the Baltic Sea region.

It is this dilemma that is at the heart of the reason why the Baltic governments and the political elite favor the traditional security issues being handled in other arenas: NATO and the PfP, the OSCE and its adapting arms control regimes. It is impossible for the Baltic States to counteract Russia on their own. Political and diplomatic

45 Olav F. Knudsen and Iver B. Neumann, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area. An Exploratory Study*, NUPI Report No. 189, March 1995

cooperation continue to be awkward, military issues are even more so.[46] Therefore, it is believed that regional security can be dealt with only in an all-European framework with the active involvement of the US. For Poland and the Baltic States, regional security cooperation is clearly subordinated to Euro-Atlantic integration. Their first interest is to build up their national defense and to obtain credible security guarantees rather than to rely on the creation of new regional security structures, even if those would not include Russia. While the suggestion of the Rand Corporation of a Nordic-Baltic security zone, which would assign Finland and Sweden special responsibility for the Baltic States,[47] finds support in the US and UK, and is not objected by Russia, the Nordic and Baltic States strongly oppose it.

This raises the issue of the proper form of relationship between the US and the Baltic-Nordic region. The key requirement for its future security is seen a continued role for the United States and NATO in the region. In particular, emergence of a new substantial US-Baltic partnership would seem to represent a precondition for enhanced predictability in the Baltic relations with Russia.

IV. Conclusion

The asymmetric military relationship between Russia and the neighboring states, as well as unpredictable domestic developments in Russia, existing social and economic imbalances between the then East and West all contain elements of conflict in the Baltic Sea area. A regional security dialogue which would deal with "traditional" military security is lacking and has little prospect to be agreed upon early on. An extensive network exists, however, for transnational Baltic regional cooperation in the fields of economics, politics, and the environment. The security of the Baltic Sea region is enhanced through indirect cooperation and integration and through broad cooperation between parties which place military aspects in the background. Nevertheless, regional cooperation alone does not constitute a sufficient means to address the issues of security in the region. Therefore, the question of enlarging NATO, the EU and WEU must be answered before regional security arrangements benefiting political-military stability in the Baltic Sea Rim can be developed.

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46 More on this argument see Ingo Peters, "The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe," in Krohn, *The Baltic Sea Region*, pp. 230-231.

47 See Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," in *Survival*, 38 (1996) 2, pp. 121-142.

11. Strategies in Ethnic Conflict and a Regional Cooperation Scheme for the Caucasus

Gevork Ter-Gabrielian

The Caucasus is a jigsaw puzzle of Soviet successor states containing about forty ethnic groups, each with a population of more than 10,000,[1] and many smaller ones. In the post-Soviet era these states have found themselves in a precarious situation, plagued by problems arising from the massive changes they have undergone in the post Soviet era. Some of these problems have arisen from the collapse of the Soviet Union, while others are endemic in nature, arising from a large amount of ethnic groups being confined to a relatively small area in which each is trying to establish its own autonomy and rights and in some cases even sovereign independence. The successor states, in there own attempt to establish an identity and position in an increasingly competitive environment, have tried to oppress these ethnic movements through coercion and – when this approach has failed – through force. If the ethnic groups resist, then the likelihood of states sending in their armies increases and both sides face the danger of resorting to violence. In some of these cases conflicts have escalated into full-scale civil wars. In a few instances they have involved the neighboring states and have erupted into inter-state wars. Prime examples of resorting to violence and the resultant conflicts are Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Chechnya. In neighboring Turkey there is a similar conflict between the governmental army and the military movement of Kurds. In addition, each ethnic group with compact residence is a "security hostage" – a lever of influence, or a buffer zone, for one of the neighboring states. In a larger regional setting, the Caucasus is situated between Central Asia, the Middle East, the Northern Newly Independent States and the Mediterranean – a location where numerous inter-state and ethnic conflicts exist at various stages of escalation, protraction or resolution.

The Soviet successor states in the Caucasus have proved less inclined to respect the rights of minority ethnic groups than the federation of the USSR.[2] They have not provided the ethnic minorities with the opportunity of pursuing their aims in a legal constitutional way, which would, to some extent, have ameliorated their drive for independence. All sides are already tired of these conflicts which have proved to be irresolvable by force. Ethnic nationalism and the ideology one-nation one-state have

1 V. V. Naumkin, ed., *Central Asia and Transcaucasia* (London: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 24.

2 The USSR was both oppressing ethnic movements and balancing them by favoring cultural movements of indigenous groups to the political aspirations of stronger nations. With the collapse many smaller ethnic groups lost their "highest board of appeals" *vis-à-vis* the all-Union authorities, which were at least *de jure* safeguarding them from the injustices of the republican authorities.

proved to be extremely costly from the national security and national interest perspectives. It takes courage to recognize this state of affairs, to overcome the bias of xenophobic nationalist ideology, and to find a new solution that would overcome the memories of the past and historic hostilities and would be systematically beneficial for the whole of the Caucasus. It is already clear that these newly recognized states will not be able to develop an individual democratic system – either politically or economically – if they are locked in continuing ethnic wars. They will also not become wealthy enough in isolation from each other to be able to provide their ethnic groups with sufficient incentives to enhance their loyalties toward their home states.

This paper attempts to find a way out of this deadlock of ethnic conflict in the Caucasus. How can a compromise solution, applicable to the whole of the Caucasus, be developed? First, it will be argued that particular actors in ethnic conflict do not have much of a chance to find a working solution for long lasting peace in isolation from each other. This point has become increasingly clear in recent years. The reason for this state of affairs should, however, be examined in at least a cursory manner, by discussing strategies of actors and identifying the causes for the escalation of ethnic conflicts. Second, a scenario for a home grown regional solution for the Caucasus will be presented. The topic of regional cooperation as a means of resolving existing conflicts and preventing new ones is flourishing, especially for the Caucasus. The web of proposed and existing regional organizations, with different programs, agendas and frames of participants, is impressive. The scenario proposed in this paper is one possibility for developing a functional regional security organization, within a region where there are no particularly friendly relations between the various actors, where there is a general lack of trust and no vision for a common future.

One of the main assumptions underlying the understanding of ethnic conflict developed in this paper is the assumption that irrational ethnic hatred or historical memories are not the major motivating factors of ethnic conflict. In particular, ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus can be explained by the rational drives of their participants and/or leaders to maximize resources and power. Hatred and memories definitely complicate the picture and decrease the level of trust between the actors in conflict. However, if their motivations have at least a rational core, then a possibility of bargaining, compromise, and mutually beneficial solutions is not excluded. This approach becomes a basis for a proposition for the development of a regional security and cooperation scheme for conflict prevention in the Caucasus.

Ethnic conflict is understood here as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups, one of which possesses the actual state power, therefore it is referred to in this paper as state. State is the actor who possesses the legitimized monopoly on violence in the society. This legitimized monopoly is contested by ethnic groups. While types of ethnic conflicts are diverse, the focus of this paper is on the most

overtly violent one: the conflict of secession, so typical for the Caucasus region. In this conflict, an ethnic group wants to secede and create its own state from a part of the territory of the home state. The *irredenta* conflicts are structurally the same because whether or not the ethnic group creates an independent state or unites with another state, in both cases the home state loses a territory. Territory remains one of the major indices of the state power. In the cases where ethnic conflict is between the state and a group whose demand is not independence or the highest power of office (i.e., if there is no affiliation between an ethnic group and a territory), the theoretical probability of genocide increases, because a dispersed minority cannot mobilize fast and efficiently enough to counter non-democratic and hostile states' attacks. That is why the attention of the international community in general is focused on these cases. These cases are properly referred to as involving the problems of ethnic minorities.[3] One can say that an international global regime of protection of ethnic minorities against genocide is currently emerging. On the other hand, if there is an affiliation of a group with a territory, the probability of a violent war increases (because groups who "possess" land are able to mobilize, organize and resist to the state attempts to crash them). These cases are at the threshold to be taken seriously by the international community: whether or not the law of self-determination applies to ethnic groups is one of the central issues of the controversy which surrounds ethnic conflict,[4] and the political international organs, as the UN, are at the stage of developing mechanisms to intervene or mediate in this type of conflicts. This is the major type of conflict in the Caucasus.

Ironically, the eventual aim of all the actors in conflict is peace. Some of them, however, often conceptualize the eventual peace as the result of their victory, and pursue peace by violent means. Actors in ethnic conflict are states (those involved in conflict directly and those which have indirect interest in conflict, as for instance neighboring states, regional and global superpowers), ethnic groups, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental actors (international and domestic). The typical behavior of each one of these actors will be discussed below under a separate heading.

Because ethnic conflict is an asymmetric conflict[5] and involves power imbalance, states and inter-governmental organizations often regard the achievement of peace

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3 In this paper a terminological distinction is made between ethnic group and ethnic minority: the term ethnic group refers to groups with compact residence (so that they are actually a majority in their particular area of residence); the term ethnic minority refers to ethnic groups dispersed among a larger population of the dominant ethnicity.

4 Ch. Tomuschat, ed., *Modern Law of Self-Determination* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993).

5 Symmetric conflicts are those where the parties perceive each other as approximately equal and legitimate by status; both parties recognize that there is a conflict, and seek a solution to it through different means in the range from bargain to war. Asymmetric conflicts are those where

differently than non-governmental actors and ethnic groups. Strategies of confrontation sometimes used by states to bring an end to a developing conflict, even though used in order to achieve peace, often have the opposite result. Even if peace is achieved after a confrontational stage, it is likely that peace is achieved through the utilization of violent methods. The memory of violence suffered by ethnic groups continues to affect the relationships within and outside the polity. The conflict does not disappear, although it can switch to a latent form once again. But some time in the future it may surface.

The understanding of ethnic conflict as a contest for power maximization explains why ethnic conflicts escalate. It situates actors in ethnic conflict (states and non-states) in a theoretically equal setting, and therefore it reduces the state-centric bias which usually dominates the discussion in high politics, as well as avoids radicalism in offering solutions like giving right to state independence to all ethnic groups, which often happens when the humanitarian values are put forward.

The strategies of actors in ethnic conflicts are interdependent, i.e., one actor's move (or its expectation) determines the other actor's move. If the first actor's move is (or is expected to be) in the direction of increasing violence, the second actor's move is also likely to be in that direction. Some of these strategies will be briefly discussed and an inference will be made whether or not they contribute to the achievement of long-lasting peace and viable order. The resulting picture suggests that it is unlikely that any of the existing strategies, taken separately, work successfully in every case. This understanding has two implications. First, this explains why different strategies are used by the actors simultaneously and/or sequentially. Second, this explains the necessity of breaking status boundaries between state and non-state actors in the Caucasus, and developing new types of relationships between state and non-state actors, an aim continually stressed by several researchers, and recently realized to a limited degree by inter-governmental organizations.

I. State Strategies in Ethnic Conflict

The initial assumption is that the main responsibility for ethnic conflict must rest with the state in which it occurs. It is natural to expect the state to find ways of dealing with the ethnic demands of some of its constituents in order to prevent a challenge to the security of the state and the ruling group, or at least to find a non-violent solution if and when a secessionist movement starts. In most cases a state deals with ethnic

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parties or one of them do not recognize each other as equal and legitimate actors; they (or one of them) may not even agree that there is a conflict, and usually they do not agree what the conflict is about. In short, there are no common grounds in an asymmetric conflict: perceptions of actors are in an antagonistic contradiction. A. Rapoport, ed., *Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution* (Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), p. 40.

demands either by confronting them, or by accommodating them. The confrontational strategies of a state involve a diversity of methods including the policies of assimilation and acculturation, ethnic cleansing, the forced relocation or migration of the belligerent ethnic group, displacing the belligerent group and resettling another ethnic group in its place – and other means of changing the demographic composition of the area where an ethnic movement develops, particularly, the so-called "white genocide" (destruction of the cultural monuments of the ethnic group and the renaming of localities associated with the history of a particular group), and finally, genocide – the deliberate and systematic extermination of an ethnic group.

Nation-building is one of the means of attempting to assimilate an ethnic group into the larger society. Under an enlightened leadership of a neutral political elite, nation-building can have the aim of developing a state-national identity in order to unite all the citizens of a state beyond their ethnic identities, while involving some measure of assimilationist policies. This should be regarded as qualitatively different to "white genocide." However, when one looks at the setting of the Caucasus in its post-Soviet configuration, it becomes clear that here many important aspects of political civil society are lacking. As a result, any attempted assimilation, even of the mildest form, whether through cultural and educational means, or through the "objective" economic factors, for instance, favoring this or that language for communication in commercial transactions, generates a reply. Interdependence of actions of two sides in ethnic conflict often is not taken into account by states. Any, even mildest confrontational action of a state government in the Caucasus is likely to be perceived by the ethnic group as directly leading to the ethnic group's nightmare scenario. The "real" threat of genocide is not as problematic as the perceived threat, which can make an ethnic group embark upon a confrontational political course. Conversely, it is not so much the "real" threat of secession, as the perceived threat of an ethnic movement that gives a government an additional impetus in adopting a confrontational strategy. These factors of interdependence of actions of state versus ethnic groups, determined by their perception of the actions of each other, and the reciprocal exaggeration of threats, combine to construct a path for ethnic conflict. This is a typical scenario for conflict in the Caucasus. Even in cases where interethnic conflicts do not challenge the state directly the state may use confrontational strategies to attempt to stop the conflict between two ethnic groups.

State strategies of confrontation are directed toward resolution of conflict via the removal (by soft or violent means) of one of the parties to the conflict. States usually fail to notice, however, that their confrontational strategies help ethnic groups to build up strong belligerent identities. Not only some of these strategies are unjustifiable on ethical grounds and have resulted in the most horrible crimes against humanity. As practice demonstrates, they are also inefficient: usually the genocide

perpetrators fall short of perfection. They are unable either to annihilate the ethnic group absolutely, or to do that quickly and secretly. If the ethnic groups realize the danger in time, they confront the state attempts, and a civil war starts. If the genocide eventually succeeds, the residues of the crucified ethnic group, its generations and international community engage in attempts to achieve retribution. Similarly, cultural genocide does not absolutely remove the evidence about the ethnic group. They only add ambiguity to yly opinions about whether or not the ethnic group's claim to a certain territory with the remnants of cultural monuments is justified. In addition, suffering ethnic groups develop strong nationalist ideologies based on the idea of historical revanchism (sometimes referred to as "atavistic revanchism," because the members of the group do not have any personal reason to hate the members of another group: the hatred and enemy image are projected through the myths of past massacres). In the future stages of conflict, they may engage in violence against the groups whom they consider collectively (one may say, "primordially") guilty of their past sufferings, or even against other groups with whom they compete at the current stage. The conflict does not disappear, it remains highly politicized, it adds international dimensions, and it becomes even less manageable than it could be otherwise. The allegedly fastest and most effective way of resolving ethnic conflict envisioned by elites and leaders of authoritarian states and dictatorships in their endeavor of nation-building (according to which to build one's nation is to destroy the other's) does not work.

What can a state do to preclude this path of conflict escalation? Which accommodation strategies can the state utilize?

Accommodation is a comparatively rare state response to the demands of ethnic groups within its borders. The reason for this stems from the age of Enlightenment when statesmen and scholars assumed that multinational states were inherently weak. This led to the development of the ideology of one-nation one-state. Nationalists made this assumption based on the Hobbesian theory of realism and effective governance, and their response was to resort to strategies of confrontation. Effective governance would apparently require nationalist ideology which would provide a glue to fill up gaps in the fabric of general will or social contract. Liberals, on the other hand, coming from the same understanding of requirements of effective governance but pursuing liberal values, would theoretically entitle each nation to a right to statehood. The obvious difference was that according to the nationalists only strong nations could survive while weak nations would concede and eventually dissolve. Meanwhile according to the liberals, all nations, regardless of strength, were entitled to statehood. Even the classical liberal J.S. Mill did not believe in the viability of multinational states, doubting the possibility of achieving a liberal polity

in such a state.[6] The history of the USSR and former Yugoslavia supports the assumption that the type of pluralism where a territorial unit corresponds to an ethnic unit is only possible under tyrannical regimes. If a regime democratizes, chaotic associations between ethnic groups of higher status directed against federal authorities and against ethnic groups of lower status result in a tendency of the former to grasp the state power and impose a unitary rule, and of the latter to preserve the status quo in alliance with the existing system. As a result, any political conflict easily assumes an ethnic form with the perspective of an eventual breakdown of state.

There are some cases of ethnically plural societies, where governance is based on the principle of power sharing among several ethnic groups. Among these are Switzerland, Canada, Malaysia, Belgium and the Netherlands. Recently, Arendt Lijphart[7] argued that even India belonged to this type. He discusses four characteristics of consociational democracy: a grand coalition of political leaders that represent all the significant communities and allow elite cooperation to develop; veto power for all communities on legislation that affects their vital interests; a system of proportionality in parliament, civil service, and governmental agencies; and a high degree of segmental autonomy so that each community has a desirable degree of freedom to run its own internal affairs. Lijphart's argument is that during the first two decades of its independence India approximated these characteristics. When it deviated from this course, ethnic conflicts within India escalated.

Consociational arrangements are successful, according to their defenders, because they secure a balance of power within the divided society. They are more successful in small states where group elites can know each other personally and develop personal contacts and trust.[8] There is no dominant ethnic group which would possess the exclusive power of majority in consociations. They also provide a legal framework to de-politicize the emerging conflictual problems and to resolve them through legal means.[9]

A well-developed criticism concerning consociations also exists. First, there are very few consociations in the world, and some of them have recently collapsed (the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). These were ethnic federations[10] comprised

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6 S. Ryan, *Ethnic Conflicts and International Relations*, second edition (Aldershot/Brookfield USA/Singapore/Sidney: Dartmouth, 1995), p. 30.

7 A. Lijphart, "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation," in *American Political Science Review*, 90 (1996), p. 258.

8 O. Kimminich, "A 'Federal' Right of Self-Determination?," in Tomuschat, *Modern Law of Self-Determination*, p. 87.

9 Ryan, *Ethnic Conflicts and International Relations*, p. 45.

10 Ethnic federations are particular types of consociations where the boundaries between administrative unit (territory) and its identification with a particular ethnic group coincide. Ethnic federations collapse (the USSR), non-federation consociations end up in civil wars (Lebanon). The controversy around Northern Cyprus can be interpreted as one where Turkey

of quasi-nation-states, organized by the principle "one ethnic group one political unit" (constituent republic, autonomous republic, or cultural autonomy). The other two consociations have failed (Cyprus and Lebanon). These were consociations with mostly mixed population. In Cyprus the failure of consociation resulted in territorial polarization of two groups and division of territory, which was supported by the Turkish army. Another consociation, Canada, is at the verge of collapse, though through peaceful legal procedures. If India is a consociation, it is not spared of deep ethnic and religious conflicts. These incidents are interpreted as evidence that consociations on their own are ineffective in resolving ethnic conflicts. Each consociation is a unique case, a result of specific historical circumstances. It is impossible for such a unique experience to be repeated by another state.

Another argument against consociations says that they tend to freeze ethnic divisions, making them the basis of political life and structure. Political activity becomes more inflexible, it is channeled along the lines of involuntary association (ethnicity, religious affiliation, etc.) rather than free choice. It is an inferior form of democracy.[11] Consociations are also unwilling to adapt to changing circumstances and demographic patterns: the "frozen quota pitfall," actually, encourages conflict.[12]

The critics of direct consociationalism, or quota-consociationalism, suggest the creation of political parties on the basis of group identity and, as a second stage, free competition among these political parties for participation in governance.[13] This, however, may result in a final victory and establishment of unitary governance by the most powerful ethnic group. In this situation other groups will be in an even less favorable condition than ethnic groups in unitary states which enjoy special rights, because non-discrimination is a pillar of consociationalism, and therefore, if non-discrimination is promoted by a unitary government, it will result in tacit discrimination of all non-dominant ethnic groups. In other words, absence of special legislation makes indirect consociationalism a non-viable option.

Direct consociation can be also criticized as it results in inefficient government based on slow decision-making. However, other factors being equal, slow government is better than violent conflict.

Accommodation, if it is possible to achieve in a federation or consociation, is a solution. Cases of accommodation are rare, and there is no guarantee that accommodation in a society divided by ethnic conflict will result in a long-lasting peace.

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wants to establish an ethnic federation, while Greece and the Republic of Cyprus want to go back to a non-federal consociational arrangement.

11 A. Eide, "In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession," in Tomuschat, *Modern Law of Self-Determination*, p. 174.

12 Ryan, *Ethnic Conflicts and International Relations*, p. 45.

13 W. Kimlicka, ed., *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 16.

Moreover, state elites are reluctant to consider accommodation as an option because they believe that a federative arrangement would give ethnic groups an even more legitimate opportunity to break away. This happened in Czechoslovakia: before 1992, it was only nominally a federation. In the 1992 Constitution, it was re-named Czecho-Slovakia, and became a full-fledged federation comprised of two equal republics. In less than a year Slovakia seceded. This was the only case of a peaceful divorce in the post-Soviet region. All the other post-Soviet states, with the exception of Russia and Romania, have nominally discarded even the existing political autonomies, in the best case substituting them with a vague cultural autonomy.[14] This, in turn, has become a cause for ethnic conflict escalation. If states are not liberal by their ideology, if they are not economically secure and politically well-established democracies, they tend to reject the option of accommodation to the demands of ethnic groups.

This cursory discussion of state options in dealing with ethnicity and ethnic conflict demonstrates that states alone, especially the Newly Independent States in the Caucasus, are not likely to successfully resolve their ethnic conflicts. This has become increasingly clear in recent years. As a result, the international organizations have begun developing tools and instruments to help states to resolve ethnic conflicts.

II. International Organizations

1. The United Nations

In recent years first generation peacekeeping operations have been distinguished from the second generation operations according to whether they pursue a limited or an expanded purpose.[15] If they adhere to the classical principle of impartiality and of not imposing solutions on the sides, and if they have a limited mandate of strictly monitoring the cease-fire, the operations are grouped under the heading of "first generation." If they, however, have a mandate which allows them to enforce peace under specific circumstances, actively participate beyond the monitoring of cease-fires in seeking a substantial resolution to the conflict in the process of negotiations (peacemaking in the narrow sense), and in building new civil institutions in the society, the operations are in their "second generation." In short, the second generation missions combine peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding with peace-enforcement.

The UN's participation in any of these aspects of the peace process in an ethnic conflict is difficult because of the requirement of consent from the parties involved.

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14 Naumkin, *Central Asia and Transcaucasia.*

15 S. R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

Where two states are involved the consent of the parties is a matter of their agreement over whether or not they want the help of the international community in order to achieve an end to the conflict. In the case of an ethnic group and a state, the ethnic group does not possess necessary legitimacy or autonomy to necessitate consent. States do not feel obliged to invite international organizations to intervene in ethnic conflicts because these are traditionally considered to be an internal state problem. Today, however, with the proliferation of ethnic conflicts, the requirement of consent may be applied in a soft form: a state may be persuaded to accept the UN mission. There is, however, no case where a state would be persuaded to accept the UN military forces if it is involved in a secessionist conflict with an ethnic group which is not supported by another state. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), merely observes the cease-fire between the Georgian government and Abkhazian separatist forces. The UN Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER), arrived there only after all the legal problems of granting independence to Eritrea were already resolved. Both of these missions do not include UN military troops.

After the Gulf War – which can be seen as a clear precedent for preferring the doctrine of collective security against aggression to the consent doctrine – a probability exists that if the international community will consider a matter to be so worthy of intrusion, it will disregard the requirement of consent. This is one of the ideas underlying the words 'new world order.' In the case of ethnic conflict, however, the collective security doctrine in its conventional form does not work (unless the conflict involves a second state, as in the case of Cyprus), instead, the obstacle imposed by the norm of state sovereignty is overcome by a possibility for humanitarian intervention. Consent is not required for humanitarian intervention. However, the mandate of humanitarian intervention does not include peacemaking in the narrow sense. Humanitarian intervention aims to provide relief from suffering rather than finding a solution to the problem. Nevertheless, in several recent cases humanitarian intervention was combined with peace-enforcement and peacebuilding (in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and the former Yugoslavia). Peace-enforcement usually applies to operations aimed at disarming non-governmental military units.

The situations described above are all cases of entrenched and protracted conflicts. The moral is, therefore, that before a conflict deteriorates, bypassing the consent doctrine and peace-enforcement action are highly improbable. This is especially true for ethnic conflicts, because the requirement of an ethnic groups' consent is disregarded. Instead of ethnic groups, the government or the second interested state (Russia in the case of Abkhazia, Turkey in the case of Cyprus) provides consent. If the actual sides in the conflict do not come face-to-face with one another in order to sign an agreement, no real resolution is possible. This issue is one of the most

important issues in the UN peacemaking, because the selection of correct sides in the conflict determines whether the agreements signed on the paper will be implemented or not. Ethnic groups who demand secession usually possess sufficient power to ruin any agreement where they do not participate with equal status.

The UN is involved only in few ethnic conflicts which have resulted in major disasters. Economic, financial, and other technical difficulties aside, the UN's involvement requires clarification of the sides to a conflict, solutions to the issue of consent, and the implementation of agreed accords. All these factors undermine the UN's capability to influence the actual process of conflict at or before its violent stage. They make the UN missions involved in ethnic conflicts, as they exist today, especially suited to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Peace-making in the narrow sense (organizing negotiations and achieving results, especially before the violent stage) in ethnic conflict is so far almost absent from the UN's modus operandi.

2. Regional Organizations

In order to help the UN, and to at least partially share its burden of peacemaking, regional organizations have become increasingly active in conflict resolution, especially in Europe and Eurasia. Through the combination of several efforts at different levels, the UN and regional organizations try to create an international regime of conflict resolution. The most important European organizations in this respect are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU), and NATO. Of these, I will briefly discuss the OSCE.

The OSCE is especially important because it is the only organization which includes the states of Eurasia and which explicitly requires participating states to have some level of democratic governance. Other organizations may be based on an implicit assumption that this is the case (as with the Council of Europe), and strictly confine their membership to democracies. The OSCE documents, meanwhile, make the requirement of democracy and democracy-building an explicit prerequisite for member-states.

The adoption of this requirement, however, implies that in principle, recognition of new states is not discretionary. The result of this requirement was that the Newly Independent States declared that they were democratic, adopted the formal attributes of democracy, and preserved many or most of their autocratic traits. Even those states which did not adopt these principles and elected life-long presidents, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, remained full-fledged members of the OSCE. In principle, the requirement of democracy would not exclude a possibility of intervening in internal affairs of a state to push it in the direction of democratization, but hardly one can expect substantial diplomatic actions against Uzbekistan within the

framework of the OSCE merely because the regime there is not democratic. The approach of the OSCE is to adopt non-democratic states as full-fledged members and to try to reform their regime incrementally.[16] The second important principle which is designed to facilitate the influence of the OSCE community on its members is the principle of transparency: the member states are supposed and voluntarily oblige to allow for a presence of international observers and the free circulation of information concerning the issues of human rights violations and armaments production and distribution. The OSCE itself, however, does not offer sufficient incentives to the member-states to follow these rules. Its influence would be limited if it would not function in cooperation with other institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Union. These institutions use the recommendations of the OSCE to offer loans and to finance projects. A good record with the OSCE also facilitates the entrance of new states into the Partnership for Peace, NATO, and in the European organizations (first of all, Council of Europe).

The Central European states head in the direction of full-fledged members of other European institutions, whereas the states in Eurasia can realistically expect only guest status and financial aid.[17] Even Southern European states, such as Romania and Bulgaria, are denied full-fledged membership in the observable future. This weakens the incentive to abide by the OSCE rules. Finally, the OSCE and other European institutions have failed to prevent or resolve those conflicts which have reached a violent stage (Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Chechnya).

Besides adopting the international human rights law, the OSCE has adopted specific regional measures for ethnic conflict prevention, the most important one being creation of a position of High Commissioner on National Minorities (1992). Since the establishment of this office the High Commissioner has been active in efforts to cool some of the ethnic hot-spots in Slovakia, Romania, the Baltic States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Ukraine. Since these conflicts have not become violent, one may assume that the High Commissioner's preventive work, combined with the incentives in European partnership and financial help by other organizations, has been successful.

The OSCE approach, however, is to regard ethnic groups strictly as minorities. As it has been emphasized numerous times, the post of High Commissioner is *on* rather than *for* National Minorities. All the remedies sought by him are sought within the confines of the recognized states through advancing their legal systems and regulations. The High Commissioner's efforts have contributed to facilitating the

16 J. Salmon, "Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy Principle?," in Tomuschat, *Modern Law of Self-Determination*, p. 270.

17 They have a chance, however, to become members of the Council of Europe.

signing of binding treaties among the dyad and/or triad states some of which host a national minority of the other state.

The efforts of the OSCE and other European institutions are promising. However, they have obvious limitations. The OSCE has so far failed to create its peacekeeping forces or to cooperate with other regional institutions (NATO, CIS) to be able to organize military operations in the post-Soviet space.

III. International Non Governmental Organizations

The logic of inquiry leads to the next possible actor in the common enterprise of helping to resolve or prevent ethnic conflict – the International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO). Their role in ethnic conflict resolution and prevention is clearly increasing. Some of their activities, and the typical difficulties they face, are discussed below.

The international humanitarian and human rights organizations usually work in close cooperation with inter-governmental organizations. They perform an important role through collecting and distributing humanitarian aid to the populations in disaster areas, to refugees and to internally displaced persons (IDP). They monitor the human rights levels in the conflict areas, collect information on prisoners of war (POW), send fact-finding missions, and organize exchange missions. They cooperate with the national NGOs and objectively work on strengthening the civil society institutions, thereby indirectly decreasing the probability of further violent conflict. Although these measures contribute to the eventual resolution of conflict, usually they do not include attempts at peacemaking, that is at finding solutions to the conflict.[18] The very opportunity which INGOs receive from governments to work on humanitarian issues in a conflict is often conditioned upon governments' explicit requirement from them not to take sides and not to get involved in political matters, such as conflict resolution. There are, however, certain NGOs which try to pursue this aim. One can mention in this context the Center for Multi-Track Diplomacy, International Alert, the Quaker mediation, Jan Öberg's Conflict Mitigation Group,[19] and the Caux Peace-Making Center in Switzerland. Members of these organizations utilize their personal contacts with the elites of states and ethnic groups in conflict and try to propose their visions of conflict resolution. They simultaneously work at the grassroots level organizing conferences, seminars, simulations, and working directly in the field with those who are engaged in a violent conflict. These organizations have so far failed to achieve any visible success in direct involvement in

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18 J. Öberg, "Conflict Mitigation in Former Yugoslavia," in R. Elias and J. Turpin, eds., *Rethinking Peace* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

19 Öberg, *Conflict Mitigation in Former Yugoslavia*, p. 144.

conflict resolution at the level of elites. However, their work at the grassroots level, in cooperation with the specialized agencies and organs of the international organizations, have made an important contribution to the development of a comprehensive peace strategy. Helsinki Citizens Assembly, for instance, is the only NGO today where representatives of civil society groups from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh cooperate in their efforts to make the early warning system in the conflict zone a well-functioning mechanism for extinguishing possible provocative actions from each side. The Quakers have played a considerable role in bridging Georgian and Abkhazian communities and developing relations between the intellectuals, women, children, and elderly on both sides.

One of the difficulties these organizations face is caused by their ideological restrictions: their mission is based on the belief that peace is the highest fundamental value, and they try to disseminate this tenet among the populations in conflict. The result is that they sometimes are trapped by the necessity of justifying a peace which is perceived as unjust – and therefore, by extension, potentially violent – by this or that side. Their notion of impartiality does not allow them to consistently argue in favor, or against, the policies of either side. Without offering any guarantees, they ask ethnic groups and states to stop violence merely on the basis of the ideology of non-violence. Ethnic groups object on the grounds that if they concede and adopt a non-violent ideology, states would easily defeat them. States object on the grounds of their sovereign right to defend their polities against insurgencies and the threat of destruction by all possible means.

In order to achieve cooperation with both sides, INGOs are forced to balance the situation even in those cases where there is a considerable imbalance. For instance, there are more Azeri refugees in Azerbaijan than Armenian refugees in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, partly because some groups of Armenian refugees have left for Russia and other countries, and partly because of the demographic pattern (the ratio of Armenians to Azeris in the Transcaucasus is one to three). On the other hand, there are more Armenian prisoners of war in the Azeri jails than Azeri prisoners in the jails of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In order to remain impartial, public international organizations involved in the conflict organize exchange of exact amounts of prisoners from both sides, and provide humanitarian aid to an approximately similar amount of refugees from both sides. As a result, the Azeris complain that they received "less" aid than the Armenians, and the Armenians complain that they received "less" prisoners than the Azeris (because the Azeris received all of their prisoners, and the Armenians only part of them. The 'all-to-all' proposition is usually rejected by the side who possesses more POWs at the moment).

Another problem is the communication of these organizations with the power elites. They may enjoy an at least moderately positive attitude from inter-govern-

mental organizations, which allows them to develop cooperation with these actors (in practice, effective cooperation is hindered because of numerous causes, but it is at least possible, since these actors have no interests that are structurally opposed to each other). However, their efforts are likely to be overtly or covertly resisted by the governments who see their activities in light of intrusion in sovereign matters. Even if the governments are friendly, at least on an official level, INGOs face enormous difficulties in the field dealing with local bureaucracies. In addition, power structures and the ethnic population groups whom these organizations are supposed to help very often develop hostile attitudes toward the international personnel, eventually perceiving them as representatives of impersonal global forces who intrude in their lives and problems with the aims and agendas which, at the bottomline, coincide with those of the "oppressive" state and government. This attitude is especially widespread in the case of humanitarian organizations, because their activities are seen as directed toward soothing and pacifying the conflict without removing its real causes, a process which essentially contributes to bringing about the *status quo ante* – the condition which initiated the conflict in the first place, according to the opinion of the leaders of the ethnic groups.

Even worse, these organizations are under a constant threat of being accused of espionage, because their activities develop in times of war and/or emergency. They are frequently subject to kidnapping, hostage-taking, and other violent tactics employed by the local fighting groups, along with international journalists. This severely limits their ability to have a decisive influence over the process of conflict resolution, and the necessity to find a compromise with the governments and local populations corrupts the purity of their purposes.[20]

The role of Trans-National Corporations (TNC) in ethnic conflict is an intriguing one. A well-known example is the Royal Dutch Shell's infamous involvement in the conflict between the Ogoni and the Nigerian government.[21] As a result of this involvement, the company appeared to be helping the military (and therefore, lacking civilian legitimacy) government violate the group and individual rights of the ethnic group.

Another example of the involvement of TNCs in ethnic conflict is the Caspian Oil Pipeline Project, developed by a consortium of TNCs under the leadership of British Petroleum, Amoco, Shell etc. to export the Caspian oil.[22] A precondition for the implementation of this project is peace in Nagorno-Karabakh and stability in the

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20 Ibid.; F. Ch. Alger, "Self-Determination – Absolute Right or Social Poetry?," in Tomuschat, *Modern Law of Self-Determination.*

21 P. Lewis, "Nigeria's Deadly Oil War: Shell Defends its Record," in *The New York Times*, 13 February 1996, pp. A1, A4.

22 P. Goble, "Pipelines and Pipedreams: The Geo-Politics of the Transcaucasus," in *Caspian Crossroads Magazine*, 47 (1996) 3, p. 3-6.

Caucasus. The involvement of TNCs in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was supposed to provide an additional incentive to the sides to find a fast resolution to the conflict. The evidence, however, demonstrates that so far the TNCs have been unable to influence the stalemate. Moreover, some analysts conclude that the involvement of the Consortium actually hinders rather than facilitates the resolution.[23] First, this project threatens the geopolitical interests of Russia in the Transcaucasus. Russia does not want to merely participate in the Consortium, even with a significant share in the future profits (from 12 to 16%). Rather, Russia proposes its own route for the pipe-line, which would be through the Northern Caucasus to the Northern part of the Black Sea (Novorossiysk). In this way, Russia would be able to control the pipe-line. It has been suggested that the Russian decision to start the war in Chechnya was partly motivated by the desire to control the section of the pipe-line which goes through Chechnya. Insofar as the projects remain on paper, and the Consortium does not accept Russia's demands, Russia is interested in the protraction of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, in a regime of "stable instability."[24]

Turkey, whose oil companies are some of the most active participants in the Consortium, argues that the Black sea straits would not be able to bear the burden of oil transportation, primarily because of ecological and environmental reasons. It proposes another route, one which goes through the southern part of the Transcaucasus, through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to the Mediterranean.

Armenia realizes that the development of this project would result in Azerbaijan becoming an oil republic and gaining considerable power and influence. Armenia, therefore, might be interested in laying the pipeline through Armenia rather than Georgia, in order to become one of the full-fledged participants in the project. This possibility has not been studied seriously. This means that Armenia has additional reasons to block the final resolution to the Karabakh conflict until its position in the deal is reconsidered.

This discussion illustrates that NGOs play a limited role in conflict resolution. If non-profit organizations contribute to mitigation of at least some aspects of the conflict, the activities of TNCs may even become an obstacle in the development of the peace process.

IV. Ethnic Groups

It is now necessary to turn to ethnic groups as politicized organized groups without whom the conflict would be impossible. The way in which the interdependent nature of group versus state interactions, and misperceptions in the low-trust environment of

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., p.5.

the Newly Independent States, generates an escalatory path of conflict has already been introduced. The nature of the behavior of an ethnic group in conflict, and how they perceive and rationalize the conflict from their perspective, will be discussed here briefly.

Ethnic groups have two options: to comply with the pressure of states or to resist. If the pressure is too strong or sudden, they become resilient and more resistant. When they resist, they usually demand enhancement of their status. The final level of the enhancement of status is the achievement of independent statehood. There are very few cases of ethnic groups who achieve recognition of their right to statehood. Some ethnic groups declare self-proclaimed states (sometimes as a half-way solution toward eventual unification with the mother nation-state). Since the level of mobilization of ethnic groups in a violent conflict is high, their leadership is able to organize referendums and elections and to achieve the declaration of independence and creation of primary state institutions in a legitimate way (of course, this way is not legitimate from the perspective of states). Moreover, they find supporters among the parts of majority population which resides dispersed into the ethnic group, in order to legitimize their claim to statehood as a claim made by the whole region rather than only by one regional ethnicity.

In the Caucasus there have been at least three cases of self-proclaimed states after the collapse of the USSR: the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Republic of Chechnya, and the Republic of Abkhazia.[25] It is interesting to mention that Chechnya started as an exemplary majoritarian unitary democracy – through a referendum for independence, where the overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence, and through the election of General Dzhokhar Dudayev as President. They also elected a Parliament, and created other state institutions, including a military force.[26] Gradually, however, the contradictions between Dudayev and the Parliament surfaced, and eventually Dudayev dissolved the Parliament by force in 1994. The Russian attack on Grozny in the late 1994 proved once more that the conflicts of secession between a state and an ethnic group are irresolvable by force: the result of this bitter 21 month-long-war was from 20,000 to 40,000 dead on both sides. However, after Yeltsin's re-election and the appointment of General Lebed[27] as a senior negotiator responsible for achieving peace in Chechnya, the sides negotiated

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25 There were news reports about the attempts of other ethnic entities, such as Ajaris, Talyshis, and Lezgins, to organize political communities as well; some of these attempts were crushed by military force (as the Talyshi movement in the Southern part of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1994).

26 It is most often the military structure which becomes, independently of its origins, the core institution of a self-proclaimed state.

27 It is noteworthy that the same prominent military and political figure in Russia brought about peace in another regional conflict with a self-proclaimed state, namely the peace between Moldova and the Transdnestrian Republic.

a settlement which actually resulted in a clear possibility for Chechnya to secede. The most important point of the settlement was that the Russian troops withdrew from Chechnya, and a five-year-long cease-fire started. At the end of this period, another referendum will be conducted in Chechnya, region by region, and if the majority of the population vote for independence, Chechnya is free to go. Another self-proclaimed state, or states, exist in the proximity of the Transcaucasian borders – those of the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The PKK movement in Turkey, led by Abdullah Ojalan, is not even recognized, while the de facto autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq is sponsored, at least on the surface, by the US.

Ethnic groups often use the strategy of guerrilla warfare against the state armies. This allows them to resist the state for decades. In addition, they use international terrorism to focus the attention of the international community on their cause. They can use methods of genocide and ethnic cleansing in areas of mixed or majority population if they believe that these territories can eventually be preserved by them for their own state (the Bosnian Serbs). They can also occupy territories outside the borders of their self-proclaimed state in order to use those territories as a bargaining chip (the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh). These factors, multiplied by the efforts of state propaganda machines to create an abhorrent image of ethnic groups, have contributed to viewing them as irrational adherents to the values of xenophobic nationalism, and resulted in their additional isolation. It is understandable, however, that their use of violent strategies is determined, to a certain extent, by the very isolation in which they find themselves. With few exceptions, they mostly do not have access to global communication systems. Having access to communication systems would allow them to influence the behavior of their home states through providing early warning to the international community. This would reduce the probability of state violence and increase the probability of success for non-violent methods of resistance to state violence. Politicized ethnic groups are not members of international organizations.[28] Until recently their leaders were rarely officially invited to express their views in an international forum, or to communicate with the leaders of other states. Ethnic groups have not developed networks of personal connections with the elites of other nations, unless these nations represent the same ethnicity. The only official communication with ethnic groups is usually possible through state channels. If the groups are in conflict with the state, the state largely blocks access to these channels. As a result, violence (such as terrorist action) becomes one of the only possible means of communication, however symbolic. Simply put, in order for their statehood to be recognized, ethnic groups start to behave as cruelly as they

28 There are few exceptions: PLO is represented in some inter-governmental organizations, and some ethnic groups are represented in the non-governmental international organizations of non-recognized nations.

perceive the recognized states are behaving. Ethnic groups learn violence from states, and destroy the supposed legitimacy of state violence.

International organizations, or third party states, become involved in these conflicts if a conflict has resulted in the involvement of another state, and therefore its issue of self-determination is or may be substituted by the issue of territorial dispute. It is due to the involvement of Russia in Abkhazia that the UN had a legitimate reason to satisfy Shevardnadze's request to send a mission to Georgia. Due to the involvement of Armenia in the Karabakh conflict the OSCE Minsk group was created. By contrast, the PKK in Turkey has not yet been able to achieve the participation of the international community in the peacemaking efforts at a level other than mere declarations and warnings to Turkey to follow the Human Rights Law, in spite of the 20,000 dead in the 12 years of conflict with the Turkish authorities.[29]

Recently, ethnic groups (also in self-proclaimed states) started to establish contacts with each other.[30] The third states are mostly reluctant to host conferences or representations of non-recognized entities. The leaders of ethnic groups, however, succeed in establishing their unofficial embassies in some liberal states.

An additional difficulty of making alliances and developing a common front for ethnic groups is that their interests are often in direct contradiction to one other. Both Northern Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh are self-proclaimed states, and certainly their leadership could have common problems to discuss. However, Northern Cyprus is a Turkish group, and Nagorno-Karabakh is in a conflict with the state which represents the same ethnicity – the Azeri Turks. Therefore, instead of creating a common front, these entities would work against each other provided an opportunity should arise. In another example, the Chechens are Muslims in a conflict with the Christians, and Nagorno-Karabakh is a Christian entity in a conflict with the Muslims. Again, cooperation is too difficult to develop. The Chechens are structurally in the same situation as the Bosnian Serbs: both fight for their independence, but culturally they are opposed to one another. Russia is an ally of one and the foe of the other. If there is no cultural inconsistency between the groups, there are other intervening reasons hindering cooperation. Self-proclaimed states have an inclination to adopt a state-centric approach to international issues so they can gain the international community's acceptance through their behavior. They also realize that their acceptance would be a complicated process running in contradiction with the tendencies to stabilize the number of existing states. If too many states apply for recognition, the chance for individual states to be accepted in the club is reduced.

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29 L. Bezanis, "The Kurds: Divided and Homeless," in *OMRI Analytical Brief*, (5 September 1996) 324.

30 Particularly, through the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).

Therefore, the self-proclaimed states tend to over-emphasize the exclusive characteristics of their case in order to make them sound more fit for recognition, and thereby under-emphasize similarities between their case and other cases. They demonstrate a tendency to ideologically denigrate the efforts of other self-proclaimed states or ethnic groups. Their efforts to convince their adversaries (states) that they are capable of independence distracts their friends, because the only means they possess for the achievement of their aims is the demonstration of power, and violence is the most straightforward means of demonstrating power. This makes the external policy of ethnic groups inconsistent and floating, while internally they are seemingly able to secure a system of governance in the form of a viable polity. Externally they exist in an even purer *state of nature* than states, because states at least have status and can develop bilateral relations, whereas ethnic groups do not have any external status.

However, even the behavior of politicized ethnic groups can be rationalized within the framework of the theory of marginal utility[31], which states that if somebody has a million dollars and afterwards receives a hundred dollars, the utility of the sum of a hundred dollars is subjectively less than the utility of the same hundred dollars in a condition of not previously having one million dollars. Ethnic groups are often not populous, and the life of every member of the community is therefore considered more valuable than the life of the members of the major communities. On the other hand, ethnic groups adhere to group values rather than to individual values, they pursue a group cause, therefore their members are more capable of a voluntary self-sacrifice for the group cause than the members of the majority community. In our example, they believe that if they lose a hundred dollars, they lose more than the same hundred dollars lost by a member of a major community, if they gain a hundred dollars, they believe that they gain more than the same hundred dollars gained by a member of the major community. Therefore they are prepared to take more risks than the members of the major community for gains which would be considered relatively moderate from the perspective of the members of the major community, but they are simultaneously reluctant to accept compromise solutions which would be viewed as justifiable from the perspective of the major community.

Major strategies directed toward achieving peace in ethnic conflict, either by means of force, coercion or negotiations, have several deficiencies. One deficiency, however, is universal: ethnic groups are still largely excluded from international relations. Often they cannot be directly addressed by the appeals of international organizations. Most of them do not have a status to participate in conflict resolution

31 S. Plous, *The Psychology of Judgment and Decision-Making* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), p. 80.

where the issue is their fate, and even less to formally, officially, and overtly participate in the world or regional processes at large.

V. The Causes of Failures

On the basis of the discussion above, some of the major causes of failures in ethnic conflict resolution and prevention are identified below (in no particular order).

Non-recognition and concealment of conflict at the latent stage, where there is no overt violence, is one of the causes of failures. The Chechen Republic was declared even before the collapse of the USSR in 1991. However, the Russian authorities did not make any significant reconciliation efforts until the large-scale military attack in late 1994.

States choose the path of confrontation instead of trying to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups. Confrontational strategies lead to an escalation of conflict, because ethnic groups react by increased mobilization and adopt violence as a means of competing with the state.

States do not request help from international organizations. They try to cope with the conflict alone because of the possible damage to their respectability and sovereignty if other actors will be involved in the conflict resolution and, moreover, if they, by any chance, succeed.

International organizations intervene only after the conflict becomes extremely violent, deteriorates, and a pretext appears (victims of conflict) to provide humanitarian relief, or they become involved if the dangers from the spillover effect mean that other states may become involved in the conflict. This delay is an additional hindrance to conflict resolution. In this respect, the first-generation UN operations are most remarkable. Usually they develop along the following path: the UN issues one or more resolutions with a call for a cease-fire and the beginning of negotiations. The conflicting sides continue to fight until they are exhausted or nearly exhausted. Then they (the state authorities) accept the call and after the violence has ended peacekeeping forces arrive to monitor the preservation of the cease-fire. The cease-fire may continue indefinitely without any legal resolution.

If there is another state involved (the irredenta cases), international organizations are able to intervene earlier and with a more powerful mandate, however, in these cases a *consistent pattern of replacing the demands of the ethnic group with the demands of the second state* exists. It was due to Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus conflict that the UN missions were dispatched relatively quickly. But today Cyprus and Greece claim that any final decision on the conflict would be illegitimate because it would be dictated by Turkey's influence rather than the pure self-determination of the Turkish population of the island. Azerbaijan claims that it is actually Armenia

who wages the war rather than the forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, therefore the decision depends on Armenia rather than on the leadership of Karabakh. The same pattern is obvious in the case of Bosnian Serbs and Croats: during the Dayton negotiations, these groups were not officially represented. The representatives of Serbia and Croatia were playing a dual representation role – for their states and for their respective ethnic communities.

Until recently, peacekeeping remained the major aim of international organizations. They tended to contain the ethnic conflict rather than to become actively involved in peacemaking and society building. Even though certain efforts are made to overcome this outdated approach, international organizations of the traditional type still do not possess sufficient mechanisms to locate the representatives of states and ethnic groups within the framework of the peace process.

States in ethnic conflict, rather than any other body, are in most cases the ultimate supervisors of the implementation of their own obligations toward their ethnic groups.[32] Ethnic groups doubt that after the conflict is over states will implement a fair arrangement, they therefore block the possibility of any final arrangement, and the conflict continues as a low-intensity protracted conflict.

Hasty recognition of non-viable entities becomes another cause of ethnic conflicts and hinders the possibility of resolving them. As the experience of the chain of recognition of the former USSR and Yugoslav republics demonstrates, the recognition of new states without solid preparatory work results in ethnic conflict.

Non-recognition of the status of ethnic groups, apparent in almost all strategies except for the strategies of accommodation of individual states, becomes a major obstacle to the possibility of resolving ethnic conflicts. International organizations are reluctant to suggest that the state enhance the status of their ethnic groups. Instead, they prefer to require that states comply with human rights and the treatment of minorities dictated by international standards. However, without the ultimate security of being recognized at least with an autonomous status, ethnic groups with compact residence do not consider these measures sufficient.

Individual states become more involved in the conflict than international organizations, thereby pushing the resolution toward scenarios beneficial for themselves rather than toward scenarios which would result in a long-lasting peace. International organizations recognize the right of certain states, especially regional powers, to have special interests in an ethnic conflict in another state. For instance, Russia plays a prominent role of a peace-maker in the conflicts in Georgia and Karabakh. However, it is in Russia's interests to postpone any long-lasting resolution to these conflicts in order to preserve its influence over these states.

32 K. Tomasevski, "The Right to Peace after the Cold War," in Elias and Turpin, *Rethinking Peace*, pp. 234-245.

Belief in irrational substance of ethnic nationalism justifies coercion and force in ethnic conflict resolution and undermines the necessity to elaborate legal procedures. The propaganda of this belief contributes to further justification of the non-intervention doctrine, on the one hand, and of state's having *carte-blanche* to suppress the ethnic insurgency, on the other. The myth of the violent nature of the Chechen people and of the terrorist nature of the Kurd people have contributed to the fact that so far international organizations have not tried to intervene in these conflicts except in the form of appeals and a few human rights monitoring missions. As recent research demonstrates,[33] violence, including ethnic violence, has no irrational psychological causes, and is usually motivated by the underlying interests of the aggressors or of the organizers among the groups of aggressors.

There are also secondary causes which restrain the capabilities of peace-makers rather than directly contribute to failures, such as material and financial constraints, the gap between an achieved accord and its implementation, protraction and establishment of a tradition of conflict (which is sometimes referred to as "entrapment"), and the low speed of collective decision-making in international organizations, especially in less-than-emergency situations.

Some of these causes could probably be removed through the development of non-traditional means of conflict resolution, such as preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, multi-track diplomacy, peacebuilding, peace-enforcement, and others. Preventing ethnic conflict from occurring will not become easier, neither will resolving the ongoing ones, unless some of the causes are removed through necessary changes in conceptualization, normative support, and practice of ethnic conflict resolution. For this, a combined systematic effort of international organizations, states, non-governmental actors, and ethnic groups is necessary. Such an effort will result in the development of a comprehensive peace strategy in ethnic conflict resolution. The major rejoinder to this argument, however, remains valid: the very possibility for ethnic groups to legally have access to international dimensions may drive states fearing secession to more violent practices. Therefore, a combined peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategy being proposed must obviate the need of ethnic groups to struggle for state independence. The proposal must provide an institutional framework for the states to have guarantees that ethnic groups would not secede and for the ethnic groups to have guarantees that their sovereign rights to their culture, land, and development would not be violated by their home states. The concluding section to this essay, will present a scenario of how such a change could be organized in a region where ethnic conflicts are intense.

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33 L. Kriesberg, "Sociological Statement on War and Violence," in Elias and Turpin, *Rethinking Peace*, pp. 69-72.

This proposal is based on the analysis above. It can help overcome the most difficult controversy in ethnic conflict in the Caucasus, which is reflected in international law as the contradiction between external[34] self-determination versus the integrity and inviolability of state's territory. The necessity to create a new state arises because the ethnic group feels insecure within the old one. But if the ethnic group has access to international channels and participates in international processes, this insecurity will decrease. Therefore, the first methodological proposition should be to provide ethnic groups with a form of international recognition beyond the guarantees offered by a particular state.

The second methodological suggestion which underlies this proposal is that ethnic conflicts must be dealt with in a systematic manner. Because they are interconnected and the probability of their mutual influence is high,[35] the most suitable frameworks for peacemaking are well-defined geopolitical regional systems rather than particular states where conflicts develop.[36] The Caucasus is definitely one such region. While all the attempts for its regional unification have historically failed, and while, due to a variety of reasons demonstrated in the first part of this essay, states and ethnic groups frequently have practical interest in emphasizing the differences of their special cases rather than commonalties, the overall understanding that the Caucasus is a holistic region, and should be dealt with accordingly, grows both inside the region and outside it. This despite the fact that all those who accept this idea have different visions concerning its utilization for the purposes of regional cooperation.

A systematic approach to ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus will also provide the necessary comparative perspective, which will help realize that in many respects ethnic conflicts for secession resemble one another. This approach will help overcome the isolation of a state and its ethnic group *vis-à-vis* each other – the isolation, which is one of the sources of violence, because it is in isolation that violence appears to actors as a means to achieve aims, and it is in silence that violence appears to actors a message to attract attention.

In the Caucasus, satisfying the two requirements of preserving the configuration of states and providing the ethnic groups with guarantees which they would trust, means

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34 External self-determination is creation of new state. Internal self-determination is changing of the regime type of an existing state, for instance, changing an autocracy to a democracy.

35 J. A. Vasquez, "Factors Related to the Contagion and Diffusion of International Violence," in M. I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (London/New York: Routledge, 1992).

36 This understanding is reflected in a recent appointment by the UN Secretary-General of a High Commissioner for the Great Lakes region in Sub-Saharan Africa (rather than for any particular "state" in the region).

developing a new type of regional international organization, where states will be represented along with ethnic groups.

This is a challenging proposition, because the international community is decisively against the creation of new international organizations and consistently works for the enhancement of the efficiency of the existing ones.[37] The Eastern and Central European states have a good chance to be incorporated in the European integration process. This perspective provides them with the incentive to accommodate at least some of the demands of their ethnic groups. In addition, they are more prosperous, and their ethnic groups have an incentive to accept the rules of the game rather than to engage in a costly conflict. For the states on the European periphery, however, this chance is remote. It does not provide an incentive to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups. Therefore, if the existing international institutional arrangements for Eastern and Central Europe may be considered sufficient, this is not the case for the Caucasus.

Take, for instance, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: One of the reasons that it remains unresolved is that the ethnic group (a self-proclaimed state) seeks very strong security guarantees. It does not believe in the assertions of the Azeri authorities that Azerbaijan and Armenia could conclude an agreement and Karabakh would be secured if it would step back from its independence demand and disarm. The Azeri leadership failed to recognize Karabakh as a side in the conflict for a very long time. It abolished the autonomous status which Karabakh enjoyed during the Soviet times, and declared Azerbaijan a unitary state. Since Armenia was helping the Armenians in Karabakh, Azerbaijan declared the Karabakh movement an aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan. However, the new Azeri President Heidar Aliev took the first step toward recognizing the reality, and a common working document on the cease-fire was signed by three sides: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh, under pressure from Russia. That is why the cease-fire has held for almost three years, despite the failure to achieve a comprehensive peace. Heidar Aliev has, however, been reluctant to go one step further to recognize the Karabakh authorities as a side in negotiations over the status of this enclave, since this would be an indirect recognition of justifiability of their aspirations for independence.

The OSCE, which mediates in this conflict, is an organization of sovereign states. These states do not agree to accept full participation of the Karabakh authorities in the negotiations over the destiny of this enclave. Unlike the case of the Aaland islands, where both the home state (Finland) and the contending state (Sweden) agreed to a special status for the inhabitants of the islands, Azerbaijan is extremely inflexible and considers all possible arrangements of this type as threats to its

37 *Ethnic Conflicts: Old Challenges, New Dimension*, The Atlantic Council of the United States, US Atlantic Council Policy Paper (Washington, DC, 1995).

territorial integrity. The framework of the OSCE appears insufficient[38] to persuade Azerbaijan to partly concede to the demands of the Karabakh Armenians and to agree to a special arrangement.

It may be argued that deficiencies of democratic governance of the Caucasian states, combined with the fact that the Caucasus is surrounded by states which are not known as champions of democracy (Iran and Turkey), makes it less likely that these states, merged in a regional organization, will benefit from exchanging experiences and learning from each other in terms of their enhancement of democracy. There is, however, an important catch in this superficial interpretation of democracy. Ethnic conflicts are such a tremendous factor in the Caucasus that the level of democracy in every state there, and even in those which do not have a violent conflict inside (such as Armenia or Iran), is determined by their capability to deal with these conflicts, resolve them, and prevent the new ones from occurring. In this respect, the fact that Georgia has already achieved a level of common understanding with Abkhazia that the solution to their conflict lies somewhere along the lines of "federation – confederation," is a democratic advance. Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh could learn a lot from this experience and their conflict could also leap toward its final resolution. In addition, Iran, being a fundamentalist country, at the same time has developed extremely valuable experience in dealing with its ethnic groups over centuries. While violence has not been excluded from its practices, especially after the Islamic Revolution, the co-habitation of various and numerically significant ethnic groups in that state is not a result of force and persecution of dissent, but rather a result of combining and balancing the threat of force with accommodating some ethnic demands. Iran could probably teach the Caucasian states about how to deal with their ethnic groups, and this understanding leads directly to the necessity of reconsidering what is usually included in the traditional concept of democracy, according to which, to take the examples at hand, Turkey is assumed to be more democratic than Iran, but the former is in a constant war with its major minorities, while the latter is not.

Some additional dangers may arise if a new organization is proposed. One of them is that the organization will be a facade for one of the states (in this case, most likely Russia), to enforce its will on all the other actors. The organization would, therefore, lack sufficient legitimacy internationally and would not be able to resolve the problems it would be supposed to resolve. In other words, it would become another CIS. In the scheme discussed below, at least some part of this danger can be

38 This is reflected in the fact that eventually a group smaller than the Minsk group of states, the United States, France, and Russia, undertook the task of boosting negotiations one step further. At the moment of writing, however (October 1997), the outcome of this latest initiative is unclear.

overcome through the careful use of the principle of balancing the interests of all the actors. In particular, if the organization also represents the members of the Russian Federation in the Caucasus (Dagestan, its ethnic groups, Ingushetia, Adygea, – see the map), these actors would have a chance to balance Russian influence. As of today, all the similar proposals represent the hidden interests of this or that side. For instance, Russia is interested in an organization with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as members and the ethno-territorial groups of Georgia and Azerbaijan, with the exclusion of its own ethno-territorial groups. Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other hand, are interested in being represented as unitary actors, while members of the Russian Federation should have, according to this scenario, separate representation. In the scenario below, *all the actors in the Caucasus are represented.* This would make it difficult to use the organization for the particular interest of any one actor, and not for the benefit of all or of a coalition of actors.

If a new type of regional international organization is created, such that by the very intent of the organization independent state governments are represented with an equal status with the leadership of ethnic groups, some of these difficulties would be overcome. Such an organization, an "Organization of the Caucasian Nations,"[39] could be composed of a Security Council and a General Assembly. The Security Council would be composed of five or six major states in the region, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and possibly Iran, as permanent members, and of one or two ethnic groups as rotating members. Each nation and ethnic group would be equally represented in the General Assembly, regardless of its possessing or not possessing a recognized political configuration (cultural or political autonomy, status of federative unit or independent statehood). Ethnic groups would have the opportunity to express their grievances against states within the borders of which they are included and to seek common systematic solutions to their problems. Ethnic groups would increase their bargaining power: they would be able to make coalitions both among themselves and with the states. At the same time, this arrangement would placate their strive to independent statehood, since they would be fully recognized decision-making sides in a respectful organization, within the framework of which they propose and implement solutions to their problems. The Security Council would initiate acts, and the General Assembly ratify them. Ethnic groups currently members of the Security Council would have special opportunities to

39 The title and final configuration of such an organization are secondary, and the proposition to call it "Organization of Caucasian Nations" and, in general, to follow the UN scheme is only a working proposition. Everything can and should be modified insofar as the organization itself pursues the aims of collective security and resolving and preventing ethnic conflict in the Caucasus. Several different titles and programs have been proposed by the local actors, and the author of this project has no ambition or expectation that this is the best one. I have tried, however, to choose the terms which sound most relevant to the task at hand and most neutral given the situation of entangled conflicts in the Caucasus.

greatly influence decisions of the states. States would be less embarrassed being represented equally with ethnic groups, since they would not be alone *vis-à-vis* their ethnic groups. They would be in a multilateral environment, where every state is represented equally with every minority within or outside that state in the Caucasian region. Such an organization would complement rather than alter the existing international arrangements, and eventually it would develop an institution of cooperation for all the nations in the region, acting as a conflict prevention mechanism.

The major obstacle to this scenario is that the state leaders of the region think that by such a concession they would compromise the sovereignty of their states, and as a result they would lose power. In fact, such an arrangement would require concessions from all sides: ethnic groups would cease their movement for independent statehood in exchange for the opportunity to become recognized as sovereign members of the Organization, with a relatively stable population and internal territorial borders assigned to them. Any attempt by a state to alter the recognized borders of an ethnic group's residence would be precluded by the system of collective security which would work within the framework of the Organization. The Organization would provide the necessary level of transparency to monitor the ethnic processes in every state. It would become a major tool of preventive diplomacy and an early warning system, being an open channel of communication with the outside world for the ethnic groups, and a mechanism for participation of all ethnic groups in the regional political and economic processes.

An organization of this type is possible since there are common interests which all the actors in the Caucasus share. Besides the negative interest – to bring an end to violence, a system of positive interests also exists – to develop industry, trade, and cooperation.

Such a solution would help to finalize certain trends in international law. It is necessary, for instance, to recognize the rights of ethnic groups to self-determination, which means at least a recognition of sovereignty of ethnic groups concerning the aspects of their culture, history, territory, education, and the like. In the cases where these aspects of their sovereignty become politicized, their limited political sovereignty ought to be recognized. But sovereignty would not coincide with formal state independence, unless the group is threatened by genocide. Ethnic groups want recognition of their status as relatively independent cultural and political entities. They would receive such a recognition through participation in organizations like the one proposed here. States are concerned with their territorial integrity. In exchange for recognition of their ethnic groups with the exact territorial boundaries, states would receive a guarantee that external borders among the existing states would remain intact. The Organization would provide an international environment and collectively worked out principles to decide the particulars of interactions of ethnic

groups with states where they are included, such as an ethnic group's participation in the state governance in exchange for taxation and for the obligation to provide members of ethnic groups for conscription purposes.

The creation of an Organization of this type would become plausible if the international community and civil organizations within the states would put pressure on the states in the region to adopt such an arrangement. The international organizations such as OSCE could regard this Organization as another tool in their multi-track diplomacy efforts and could provide their guidance, consultation, and surveillance to secure that the Organization develops in order to serve its declared purposes and to balance the interests of different actors in the region, rather than as an umbrella for a regional superpower to exclude alternatives to its hegemony. This possibility could be avoided through the inclusion in the Organization of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, who would balance each other's influence.

This organization, as a collective decision-making body, would make decision-making in the region less efficient. This would mean, however, the enhancement of the overall sovereignty of the region concerning its relations with other states and international actors. Giving up a part of their sovereignty individually, the states would enhance the level of their "collective sovereignty." This Organization could become an epicenter of stabilization in the region, another example of non-hegemonic integration comparable with the European Union, which would influence even the remote conflictual processes in other global regions.[40]

As the discussion of the strategies of states, ethnic groups, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental actors demonstrates, explicit success in ethnic conflict prevention and resolution is a rare event. Even the best strategies are likely to succeed only if they are applied in combination, rather than in isolation. In order to help the international community in its conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, the assumption that there is no need for a new type of international organization, and that there is no need to provide a legal loophole for ethnic groups striving for self-determination, must be revised. By combining the efforts of governmental and non-governmental actors it is possible to modify these assumptions so that, perhaps, through development of new types of international organizations, fewer ethnic groups demand secession.

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40 A legitimate question arises: what are the internal capacities of the societies in the Caucasus to overcome their differences and rivalries and develop such an organization? Admittedly, this question is mainly left out from this proposal. This proposal is only a first step with an aim to put the idea into circulation. There are, however, some public figures in the Caucasus who work on determining the capacities and on substantiating an all-Caucasian security network.

States alone rarely have incentives to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups. The existing patterns of accommodation of individual states depend on the goodwill of the governments and the institutional setting (type of regime). States must be provided with new incentives to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups, and such incentives are easier to find in the external influence of international organizations and powerful international actors than inside the states, if the latter have not yet developed domestic liberal democratic regimes and healthy and wealthy economies. However, in the case of the Newly Independent States of the Caucasus, the existing system of international organizations seems insufficient due to a variety of reasons.[41] Therefore, a new regional international organization could be initiated which would address the very key issue which is perhaps the main motivation of ethnic conflict in the Caucasus – the issue of the status of ethnic groups.

Ethnic groups' demands to enhance their status are not merely a result of irrational proliferation of the ideology of xenophobic nationalism, rather they are a reaction to the inability and inflexibility of the nation-states' framework to guarantee the fair distribution of power and rights among all the significant group actors within the states.

Inter-governmental organizations are largely able to intervene in ethnic conflicts after they become violent. A comprehensive peace strategy requires the development of mechanisms which would prevent the escalation of ethnic conflicts, provide solutions to the existing ones, and in general develop an international regional public space for addressing the issues of major importance to ethnic groups and their respective states. An example of one possible regional arrangement is an organization where states and ethnic groups are represented with equal status. The context of surrounding states with their own ethnic groups, also represented in such an organization, would become a valuable lever for providing corrections to the tactics states and ethnic groups adopt *vis-a-vis* each other in international isolation.

This approach requires the cooperation of substate actors with inter-governmental organizations, to a certain extent at the expense of the narrowly defined interests of individual states. If, however, such a cooperation develops successfully, the overall sovereignty and viability of the resulting international arrangement, and of the Caucasus as a whole, would increase rather than decrease. By thoroughly dividing functions and powers among inter-governmental organizations, states and ethnic groups – while resolving or preventing ethnic conflicts – long-lasting arrangements

41 One of the reasons not discussed in this paper is that since these organizations are selective, they tend to divide societies in the Caucasus rather than unite them. For instance, NATO enlargement seems to indirectly lead to a counter-block Russia-Armenia, from which Georgia and Azerbaijan are excluded. If they are, however, all-encompassing, as UN, OSCE, or potentially Council of Europe for the states of the Caucasus, then the standards states have to satisfy to be accepted in them tend to be lowered to the least common denominator.

can result. Dynamism in reacting to changing circumstances could contribute to the increase in regional stability. Therefore the effective (as opposed to declarative) power of all the actors, including states, would actually increase rather than decrease.

Ethnic groups must be recognized as legitimate actors at the international level. For this, it is more realistic to give their representatives an opportunity to directly express their concerns in the international fora rather than to require that their home states satisfy their demands and negotiate compromises with them in isolation, insofar as their home states are not well-functioning liberal democracies. Such an opportunity could become a major impetus to further developing democratic processes, also within the states, and learning from each other in that process. The international recognition of ethnic groups within the states as cultural and political entities – with exact territory which cannot be altered without mutual consent of the ethnic group and the state – can become a major principle which would prevent ethnic conflicts from deteriorating and reaching the level of war.

Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BALTBAT	Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BEAR	Barents Euro-Arctic Region
BSMF	Baltic Sea Military Fleet
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFA	African Financial Community
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CID	Citizenship and Immigration Department
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COCOM	Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CP	Conflict Prevention
CPC	Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSIS	Center for Strategic International Studies
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
EC	European Community
ECP	Estonian Communist Party
ELIAMEP	Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
FSC	OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GSSR	Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HELCOM	Helsinki Commission
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGC	Inter-Governmental Conference
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOCC	International Orthodox Christian Charities
IRSI	Romanian Institute of International Studies
KGB	Committe of State Security
LCP	Lithuanian Communist Party
LDK	Democratic League Kosovo
LDLP	Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party
MD	Military District
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMRI	Open Media Research Institute
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PKK	Kurdish Workers' Party
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
POW	Prisoners of War
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
RMO	Regional Multilateral Organizations
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSR	Socialist Soviet Republic
TLE	Treaty-Limited Equipment
TNC	Trans-National Corporations
UK	United Kingdom
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOVER	United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
US	United States
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
VERTIC	Verification Technology Information Center
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Program
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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
A Renewed Partnership for Europe

Tackling European Security Challenges by EU-NATO Interaction


The end of the Cold War has lifted the "Iron Curtain" that divided Europe for 45 years. However, in its place new challenges have arisen that call on the continent to re-examine its security commitments and its relationship with the United States. In a four part analysis the book delves into the nature and scope of these challenges, and identifies strategies to tackle the conflicts and crises that a new Europe may present.

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