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Gianni Bonvicini/Maurizio Cremasco/Reinhardt Rummel/Peter Schmidt (Eds.)

A Renewed Partnership for Europe

Tackling European Security Challenges by EU-NATO Interaction



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In Cooperation with the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome



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This book is only a part of a rather complex and innovative initiative launched jointly by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) of Ebenhausen.

When the two institutes put forward the research proposal on "The Interaction of the EU (at that time still the EC) and NATO: Adapting Transatlantic Cooperation to the New Security Challenges in Europe" to the Volkswagen Stiftung for funding at the beginning of 1993, four goals were in the minds of the proponents:

- To create a research context in which scholars on security and military matters could interact with colleagues with expertise in European integration. Traditionally, these two categories of scholars have been kept separate, but as the nature of security in Europe is changing, "integrationists" and "strategists" will have to cooperate increasingly in order to deal with some of the key problems of Europe's security.
- To develop an even closer cooperation than in the past between the research communities of a Southern European country (Italy) and a Central European country (Germany), and to link two different security perceptions at a time in which the traditional East-West stratification of European security is being replaced by a set of multifaceted security challenges in a geographic arc ranging from the Baltics across the Balkans to the Mediterranean basin.
- To provide parallel research for a few years on the political and institutional process of transformation underway in European-American relations – a transformation that goes beyond the strictly military aspects of transatlantic cooperation and involves a complex interplay between NATO and the European Union as a whole (and not just the WEU).
- To train young scholars of Eastern Europe in the new thinking of transatlantic security and in an understanding of the new European security needs. This was meant to familiarize them with the philosophy and structure of Western and pan-European security cooperation.

The last goal was of special importance. In the two years of research activity, four scholars-in-residence from Eastern Europe were offered the unique opportunity to work closely with Western colleagues and to do research together. Sergei Medvedev from Moscow (1993-94) and Roxana Iorga from Bucharest (1994-95) stayed at the IAI in Rome; István Szönyi from Budapest (1993-94) and Oleg Strekal from Kiev (1994-95) stayed at the SWP in Ebenhausen. All four poduced two papers each and, above all, became part of the international research community through their participation in two international conferences (Rome,

21-22 January 1994, Ebenhausen, 14-15 October 1994) and their involvement in the six meetings of the Project Working Group.

In additon to the scholars-in-residence, several other scholars of OSCE countries were invited to spend two weeks at the two institutes to finalize individual contributions on the perception of security in their country of origin. Some of those contributions are contained in this book; others have been printed in the journal of the IAI, *The International Spectator*, or/and in the SWP's series of monographs.

It is clear from the foregoing that the book is only one part of the whole exercise. It contains those papers that address the central subject of the project, that is, the progressive but still uncertain construction of a system of interaction between NATO and the EU. The attempt to develop this instrument further is analysed in the light of the specific challenges to European security (Part One) and the status and potential of existing European and Atlantic security institutions (Part Two). A conclusive chapter by the four research directors attempts to illustrate some specific problems and strategies for the future development of the transatlantic relationship in the new European security scenario.

We would like to thank the Volkswagen Stiftung for having fully accepted the four aims of the research proposal und provided us with the necessary funding. Thanks also to our research assistants, Roland Stieda and Cornelia Riess at SWP, Ettore Greco at the IAI and to the English editor of the book, Gabriele Tonne of the IAI.

The Editors

PART ONE
Specific Challenges to European Security

1. Nature and Classification of New Security Challenges in Europe

Ettore Greco

This chapter provides an overview of the challenges to European security. The first section is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of the current geo-political scenario in Europe which are affecting the overall security structure of the continent, with particular regard to the emerging pattern of distribution of power among the states, the growing differentiation among the various areas and the roles of the major powers and of the existing institutions.

This is followed in the second section by a brief illustration of the new dimensions of the nuclear issue with regard to the system of deterrence and the potential for proliferation. The third section examines the evolution of the security situation in Eastern Europe. The focus is on those transition problems which are relevant for the security of the former socialist countries and for their integration in the Western institutional framework and on some problems concerning inter-state relations which have or may have far-reaching repercussions on the European security environment.

An analysis of the phenomenon of a rising nationalism and ethnic conflicts and its disruptive potential in Europe is carried out in the fourth section. The fifth section sketches a general picture of the current trends in migration patterns within Europe and their possible security implications. Concluding remarks based on the analysis of the mentioned topics wind up the chapter.

I. The Evolving Security Structure in Europe

The collapse of the Eastern bloc brought about fundamental changes in the security structure of Europe. Several models of international relations, often drawn from past periods of European history, have been used to illustrate these changes. However, the explanatory power of these models – their ability to render the new realities – is challenged by the apparent fluidity of the security environment in Eastern Europe as well as by the clash between contradictory factors operating throughout Europe, chief among them the drive towards interdependence and integration and simultaneously towards political fragmentation. "When so much is happening that is ambiguous in its direction and significance then the requirement is a matter not so much of a visionary design but of constant attention to the processes of change."[1]

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1 Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Studies and the New Europe," in: *European Security after the Cold War*, Adelphi Papers No. 284, International Institute for Security Studies (January 1994), London: Brassey's for the IISS, pp. 23-24.

1. The Growing Political Fragmentation and the Risk of a New Division of the Continent

The post-Cold War security structure of Europe is characterized by a greater diffusion of influence and power among states. This is a direct consequence of the end of the bipolar system and, in particular, of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the dominant power in the East. The multiplication of states which has resulted from these two major events has made the European security environment much more fragmented and its future evolution difficult to predict.

Political fragmentation does not necessarily mean greater instability. As a matter of fact, history has known several relatively stable systems of interstate relations not based on a division in opposing blocs. In the post-Cold War European constellation, however, the structural weaknesses and general precariousness of a number of new states in search of security guarantees have become major sources of tensions and conflicts both within the states and among them.

The disruptive effects of the collapse of multi-ethnic states are evident in the territory of former Yugoslavia and in several areas of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Even when political fragmentation has not resulted in armed conflicts, it has created the conditions for the emergence of security problems among the new political units. The new states inevitably tend to concentrate on self-defense, and this is often seen as a sign of aggressivity, generating insecurity in neighboring countries. As has been noted, if a country is in a more advanced stage of state formation than a neighbor with which it has hostile relations or pending disputes, this can easily result in the creation of "windows of opportunity and vulnerability."[2]

The existence of a number of weak states imperils European security in many ways. Not only does it work as a factor of regional instability, it also tends to exacerbate emerging transnational security challenges (the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of organized crime, migration, terrorism) or to hinder the implementation of effective cooperative strategies to deal with them.[3]

The political elites of many new states, especially in the FSU area, have cultivated an abstract idea of independence not supported by a policy creating the concrete conditions to ensure it. The strict connection between the safeguarding of independence and internal transformation has often been overlooked. Furthermore, in several cases the achievement of the independence has been accompanied by the re-emergence of disparities and contrasts among the various regions and ethnic groups within the borders of the new states. This growing

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2 See Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in: *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27-47.

3 See Gerhard Wettig, "A New Type of Challenge to European Security," in: *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1995, pp. 136-145.

differentation in various areas of Europe in turn makes it difficult to construct a security system which can ensure the implementation of the widely proclaimed concept of the indivisibility of European security.

Some authors have challenged the feasibility of such a concept by arguing that it does not have real cultural and historic foundations. According to Samuel P. Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations," the Cold War division of Europe is doomed to move eastwards, reproducing "the fault line between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam" which once had characterized the continent.[4] Yet, Huntington's theory can hardly provide a convincing explanation for most of the current conflicts in Europe as they manifestly emanate from the will to promote or impose an ethnic or national identity, rather than a civilizational one. Nation states remain by far the most important actors in European politics, while there is no evidence of the emergence of multinational civilizational blocs as truly political units. Furthermore, the "clash of civilization" thesis underestimates the possibility of the various cultural traditions finding a set of common values or principles on which to build a new political order in Europe.[5] In fact, as a result of the fall of the old ideological barriers and the stimulus given by some institutions – above all, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe –, a "common space" of agreed principles and commitments has started to emerge.[6]

Huntington's thesis is also contradicted by the currently prevailing tendency of practically all Eastern European countries, including those with a majoritarian orthodox culture, to attach great importance to the integration into the West or, at least, to the establishment of an all-European security system. This attitude is much more than a political orientation. It seems to spring from a widely shared conviction of belonging to a single European cultural and historic tradition. Although it is contested by a significant part of the intellectual elite in some countries, like Russia, even there it maintains a remarkable attractiveness.

The fact remains that profound differences exist in the security structures of the individual zones of Europe. Western Europe is an area of stability, benefitting from a considerable level of integration, a common institutional framework and proven conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms. In this area the risk of armed conflicts is negligible.

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4 "The Clash of Civilizations?," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 29-30.

5 For a detailed criticism of Huntington's theory see Richard E. Rubinstein and Jarle Crocher, "Challenging Huntington," in: *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 113-128.

6 The most recent examples are the *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 10 November 1994 and the *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* approved at the Budapest summit of the OSCE (5-6 December 1994).

Remarkable security asymmetries are evident, however, in the Eastern part of the continent, where three different areas can be identified. In the first area, which includes the four countries of the Visegrad Group and Slovenia, the process of internal reform has achieved significant results and the security challenges appear to be manageable. In particular, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are on the right track for gradual integration in the Western institutional framework, although it is still unclear how much time this integration will take. In the second area, the Balkans, the security situation is much more unstable. The risk of a spillover of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia to the other areas of the former Yugoslavia is very high. This may, in turn, precipitate an all-out Balkan conflagration. Even if international efforts manage to contain and stop the war, the re-establishment of a secure environment in the Balkan region would remain a very demanding task. Finally, as stressed above, the FSU area continues to be subject to strong drives towards further political fragmentation. A variety of ethnic conflicts, often involving boundaries, makes this third area disturbingly conflict-prone. It is also likely to remain so for some time to come.

2. The Need for Stabilizing Actors and the Risk of New Hegemonies

Although it entailed the risk of a highly destructive global conflict, the old bipolar system ensured a relatively stable security environment in Europe, through the dominant roles of the United States and the Soviet Union and its proven balancing mechanisms. Which actors and instruments are able and willing to provide security in post-Cold War Europe is much more controversial.

The Unites States will probably remain a key actor on the European scene, but it lacks the means to exercise the same equalizing and pacifying influence throughout the continent that it had on Western countries after the Second World War. Rather, there is some evidence that Washington is moving towards a partial disengagement from Europe.

In particular, the US has renounced playing a systematic leadership role in the security issues of the European continent. It has demonstrated a clear wish to concentrate only on those problems which involve direct American interests. It is emblematic, in this respect, that in 1991 Washington opted to leave the initiative on the Yugoslav crisis to the Europeans while developing an intense – and indeed successful – diplomatic action on the problem of the nuclear arms dispersed in the territory of the former Soviet Union.[7]

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7 This point is underlined by Marc Brenner, "Les Etats Unis et la crise yougoslave," in: *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 57, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 329-338. On the US role in Europe see Richard Holbrooke, "America, a European Power," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, 1995, pp. 38-51 and Sloan's chapter in this book.

The multiplication of crises and trouble spots has induced the US to place increasing emphasis on the need for a more active and substantial contribution by the European allies to crisis management activities. It seems clear that the Europeans will have to accept a greater burden for the promotion of European security if they want the continuing involvement of the US which they have repeatedly invoked. So far, however, they have made little progress towards an effective capacity of common action in foreign and security fields.

The role of Germany also appears crucial. It will certainly be an increasingly important actor for the stabilization or destabilization of the European regional order.[8] Indeed, given its geographic location and its close links with several Eastern countries, Germany is directly affected by many of their problems. Thus it has a keen interest in a stabilization of the security environment to the east of its borders. For the German government there are no viable alternatives to a growing involvement in the problems of Eastern Europe. To characterize this German attitude, a group of American scholars have spoken of a *Zwang nach Osten* as opposed to the much feared, but actually absent *Drang nach Osten*.[9]

Far from being attracted by the prospect of establishing its own hegemony on the East, Germany has so far shown a keen interest in a concerted Western effort to integrate the Eastern countries. Some analysts have also underlined Germany's deep-rooted attachment to the benefits deriving from its role as a strictly "civilian power."[10] The lack of an effective common Western policy towards the East may however induce Germany to become increasingly unilateralist, thus damaging the relationship with its allies and partners.[11] Paradoxically, a renationalization of German foreign policy could also result from its reluctance to take over new international responsibilities since this could prevent the development of a new European foreign policy culture.[12]

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8 This is in particular the view of William Wallace: see "Deutschland als europäische Führungsmacht," in: *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 23-29.

9 Ronald D. Asmus et al., "Building a New NATO," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September/October 1993, p. 34.

10 See, in particular, Uwe Nerlich, "L'Allemagne – un pays commes les autres?," in: *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 99-116; Arnulf Baring, "Wie neu ist unsere Lage?," in: *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 4, April 1995, pp. 12-21.

11 See on this point Jürgen Nötzold, "The Eastern Part of Europe? – Peripheral or Essential Component of European Integration?," in: *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1993, p. 330; Jan Zielonka, *Security in Central Europe*, Adelphi Papers No. 272 (Autumn 1992), London: Brassey's for the IISS, pp. 55-56.

12 The German President has placed the emphasis on the need for a new foreign policy culture in Germany: see Roman Herzog, "Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher Aussenpolitik," in: *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 4, April 1995, p. 10. The problem of "Germany's geopolitical maturation" is also addressed by Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," in: *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 82-103. See also Nerlich, "L'Allemagne," p. 109.

Should the current security uncertainties in some areas of Eastern Europe persist, the temptation of the most powerful countries to pursue policies aimed at establishing, or re-establishing, hegemonies and spheres of influences may increase. This temptation is stimulated, in particular, by the above mentioned phenomenon of the proliferation of weak states, whose uncertain situations are an objective source of concern for their surrounding environment.

A clear tendency to seek a new form of hegemony in the CIS area has recently emerged in Russia. The instability of the CIS area is perceived by Moscow as a serious threat to its security. It feels threatened both by the risk of spillover of some phenomena (ethnic conflicts, organized crime, refugees) into its territory – which is indeed already happening – and by the possible attempt by other powers to exploit the power vacuum created by the collapse of the FSU.[13]

The Western countries are currently facing the question of whether and to what extent this tendency can be accepted and accommodated in the new European security system. The question is indeed proving very thorny for three main reasons. First, a Russian involvement in some of the republics that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union appears unavoidable, given their strong dependence on Moscow's policies at the economic and security levels. Second, those countries themselves send contradictory signals about their attitude towards a reinforcement of links with Russia.[14] Third, Western countries often have a very limited capacity of influencing the situation of some of these countries which are tending to return under Moscow's control. In principle, Western countries are not against Russia playing a stabilizing role in the CIS area, but they are unwilling to give Moscow *carte blanche* to carry out actions which violate international rules. So far, however, the attempts to solve the problem through institutional means – in particular, those offered by the OSCE – have been unsuccessful.[15]

Under certain conditions the influence of an external power can contribute to the stability of an area. But whether this is the case of Russian policies in the CIS region remains questionable. In fact, Russia itself is still in search of a stable internal order. Until this goal is achieved, its actual capacity to project stability outside its territory will continue to be quite limited. Furthermore, although Russian involvement has had a stabilizing effect in some areas it could, in the

13 See Sergei Karaganov, "Russland und das 'nahe Ausland'," in: *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 10-16; Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad," in: *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 75-90.

14 On this point see Sherman W. Garnett, "The Integrationist Temptation," in: *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 35-44.

15 On this point see Michael R. Lucas, "Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Role of the CSCE," in: *Helsinki Monitor*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1994, pp. 5-37; Heather Hurlburt, "Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture," in: *Helsinki Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1995, pp. 5-20; several articles in: *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 11, 30 June 1995.

longer run, turn into a factor exacerbating political and ethnic rivalries and tensions. Indeed, one should not underestimate the persistent drives towards national sovereignty in the whole CIS region.[16]

3. The Role of International Institutions and Western Dilemmas

The fragmented configuration of the European security environment is a major obstacle to the construction of a political order encompassing the whole continent. The gradual enlargement of Western institutions can only be a partial response to this challenge. In fact, the need is felt for overarching institutional arrangements capable of providing a general framework in which the specific security needs of the various areas can be accommodated.[17] This, however, raises the problem of whether and to what extent institutions of cooperation can actually influence Europe's future security structure.

The thesis that institutions have a minimal influence on the international security system has been relaunched by John Mearsheimer.[18] He had previously predicted a decline in both the EC (now the EU) and NATO as an unavoidable consequence of the end of bipolarism.[19] Generally the neo-realist school has questioned the stabilizing effect of the European integration process and growing interdependence.[20] According to this widely discussed scenario, the end of the bipolar system could lead to a return to the old balance-of-power game. Some analysts have been confirmed in this conclusion by the discouraging experience of the international response to the Yugoslav crisis. The sharp contrasts between the Western countries over the ways to deal with the crisis – contrasts manifestly prompted by conflicting interests – have indicated that crises especially in Eastern Europe may easily become a major divisive factor within the West.

Indeed, Western countries look at the security situations in the East with mixed feelings. On the one hand, there is a widespread fear of becoming strategically embroiled in intractable ethnic and intra-regional conflicts. At the institutional level, this fear is reflected in the concern that an enlargement of existing Western cooperation arrangements eastwards could lead to their weakening or even threaten their survival. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness that complete dissociation from Eastern security problems is not feasible, as the

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16 See Garnett, "The Integrationist Temptation," pp. 36-37.

17 This problem is discussed by Uwe Nerlich, "Die NATO als Kernstück einer europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur," in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 17, 10 September 1994, pp. 499-508.

18 "The False Promise of International Institutions," in: *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/95, pp. 5-49.

19 "Back to the Future," in: *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56.

20 See Noel Malcom, "The Case against 'Europe'," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, March/April 1995, pp. 52-68.

instabilities in the East cannot be fully contained and inevitably have significant repercussions on Western countries. As has been noted, the threat during the Cold War of a general war in Europe, coupled with the isolation of Eastern Europe, paradoxically made West Europeans feel less exposed to developments in the East, and this contributed to nourishing a sense of security.[21]

The individual Western countries are not equally exposed to the crises in Eastern Europe. This factor complicates the efforts to develop a coordinated response to those crises considerably. Institutional inaction may indeed prompt the countries which feel more vulnerable to make unilateral moves. This, in turn, is destined to disrupt the climate of confidence within the Western institutions, as demonstrated by the row over Germany's readiness to recognize Croatia and Slovenia unilaterally.

As the experience of the Yugoslav conflict shows, Western countries are facing even more acute dilemmas with regard to military intervention options. The major Western powers have rightly been defined "reluctant interveners."[22] This is particularly true for current and potential crisis contingencies in Eastern Europe.

On the whole, however, the post-Cold War record of policies and the evolution of the institutions has been more promising than could have been expected from the neo-realists' perspective. Institutions did not experience the sharp decline the neo-realists had predicted; they have even shown a remarkable force of attraction on the former socialist countries and some – albeit still insufficient – capacity for adaptation. In any case, a traumatic event, such as the collapse of the West European and trans-Atlantic institutional framework, is highly unlikely. The West could, however, be threatened by a progressive erosion of its internal solidarity, which would undermine the effectiveness of its institutions, in particular their role as a pole of stability for the whole of Europe.

Even the Yugoslav experience should be evaluated in a more balanced way. In fact, Western countries have constantly sought to prevent their divergencies over the Yugoslav conflict from turning into irreparable splits in the alliance. More generally, activation of the cooperation mechanisms offered by the existing institutions has probably been instrumental in avoiding more competitive policies among Western countries. It must be added that the Western policy on some security issues that have emerged in the post-Cold War Europe – such as the crisis in the Baltic states, the management of the nuclear heritage of the former Soviet

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21 François Heisbourg, "L'Europe condamnée a l'insécurité," in: *Politique internationale*, No. 61, Fall 1993, pp. 286-287.

22 Lawrence Freedman, "The Politics of Military Intervention within Europe," in: Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *War and Peace: European Conflict Prevention*, Chaillot Papers No. 11, Paris: WEU Institute For Security Studies, 1993, p. 37.

Union or the security links to be established with Eastern countries – has proved to be rather consistent and effective.

The uncertainties surrounding the future evolution of the European security environment make the role of institutions particularly important: "Especially in post-Cold War Europe, where the strategic landscape is ill-defined and major powers are in the midst of reformulating their identities and interests, institutions will shape, and not just be shaped by, the distribution of power."[23] In this regard, a key function of the institutions is to avoid a renationalization of the security policies of the individual countries by inducing them to incorporate the requirements of international cooperation in their decision-making processes.[24]

II. The Nuclear Issue

1. The New Configuration of the Deterrence Problem

As a result of the dramatic changes in the geo-strategic environment, the importance of nuclear weapons has been radically reduced. In particular, the risk of a global nuclear confrontation has virtually disappeared. The implications, however, of this reduced role of nuclear weapons for European security are multifaceted.

Two major factors can put into question the relevance of nuclear deterrence in Europe. First, the decoupling between nuclear and conventional forces resulting from the marginalization of the former makes the use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional wars much less credible than in the past. As a result, the likelihood of conventional wars has grown. This poses the problem of a strengthening of policies and instruments other than nuclear deterrence – arms control regimes, CSBMs, etc. – which can help prevent conventional conflicts. Second, the lower likelihood of a global nuclear conflict has increased the risk of a war-fighting use – as opposed to a deterrent use – of nuclear weapons. This risk should be countered by policies aimed at reinforcing the nuclear taboo and at preventing nuclear proliferation.[25]

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23 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," in: *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 58-59.

24 The problem of "multilateralization vs. renationalization of security" is discussed, from an institutionalist perspective, by Marco Carnovale, "Vital and National Security Interests after the End of the Cold War," in: M. Carnovale (ed.), *European Security and International Institutions after the Cold War*, London: MacMillan, 1995, pp. 1-18. See also Michael Brenner (ed.), *Multilateralism and Western Strategy*, New York/London: St. Martin's Press, 1995.

25 Both risks are analyzed by Frédéric Bozo, "Le nucléaire entre marginalisation et banalisation," in: *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 195-204. For an analysis of the implications of nuclear marginalization see also Lawrence Freedman, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons," in: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 35-52.

Despite the declining strategic importance of nuclear weapons, there is still a need in Europe for a system of deterrence that only nuclear weapons can ensure. In particular, although NATO no longer needs nuclear weapons to avoid the risk of being defeated by a massive conventional attack, its nuclear forces mantain a stabilizing function. They can contribute significantly to preserving an overall military balance in Europe.

The main source of concern for Western countries, as well as for many Central and Eastern European countries, is the possibility of a new political upheaval in Moscow leading to an authoritarian and ultra-nationalist regime which may be tempted to use nuclear weapons as a means of intimidation and coercion against other states. Western nuclear forces can certainly be a crucial deterrent against this risk.

NATO continues to uphold the principle that the presence of US nuclear forces in Europe is essential to maintain the strategic link between the two sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, the effective and credible participation of the US in the deterrence system in Europe seems to require the maintenance of some US theater nuclear capabilities in Europe,[26] since the adoption of a "reconstitution strategy," based on the idea of a prompt redeployment of US nuclear forces in times of crisis,[27] would have the insuperable drawback of complicating crisis management efforts at both the diplomatic and military levels.

A possible alternative is the establishment of a new form of nuclear deterrence based on West European cooperation. This option is, however, rather irrealistic in the foreseeable future. France has repeatedly stressed its interest in systematic intra-European consultation on nuclear matters, but its proposals do not in fact go beyond the level of consultation.[28] Furthermore, the UK remains very reluctant to accept any nuclear arrangement that could weaken its strategic and political link with the US.[29] Finally, the other Western European countries show a pronounced preference for the US nuclear umbrella. They are sceptical of an extended deterrence based on the two national deterrences of the UK and France. Germany, in particular, has indicated that it is by no means eager to acquire a

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26 See on this point David S. Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," in: *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 97-120; Walter B. Slocombe, "The Continued Need for Extended Deterrence," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, pp. 157-172. For the opposite view see Ivo H. Daalder, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Why Zero is Better," in: *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January/February 1993, pp. 15-18.

27 For an illustration of this idea see Karl Kaiser, "From Nuclear Deterrence to Graduated Conflict Control," in: *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 6, November/December 1990, pp. 483-496.

28 See David S. Yost, "Nuclear Debates in France," in: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 113-139 (in particular, pp. 126-128).

29 See Nicholas K. J. Witney, "British Nuclear Policy after the Cold War," in: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 96-112 (in particular, pp. 105-107).

nuclear status, while at the same time it has reaffirmed its desire for nuclear protection provided by the US.

2. The Proliferation Challenge

During the Cold War, the nuclear non-proliferation regime remained highly stable in Europe (the nuclearization of the United Kingdom and France had no destabilizing effects). After the end of the bipolar system, however, the risk of its progressive erosion, or even collapse, has become far from negligible.

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this risk is associated mainly with the possibility of a chain reaction fuelled by the acquisition of nuclear status by one or more Soviet successor states other than Russia. In addition, it cannot be excluded that states involved in open conflicts or acute disputes would try to acquire nuclear weapons in the future as a means to protect their security. Some have stressed the possible linkage between growing political fragmentation and nuclear proliferation.[30]

Applying the neo-realist Waltzian arguments in favor of nuclear proliferation,[31] some analysts have argued that the West should adopt a policy aimed at ensuring a "well-managed proliferation"[32] or at establishing "a system of distributed deterrence."[33] This school of thought moves from the assumption that the drives towards horizontal nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era can be at best controlled, but not completely stopped. It has also been suggested that, in some circumstances, the availability of nuclear forces can play a useful role in reducing or eliminating the security dilemmas connected with the newly emerging ethnic or nationalistic rivalries.[34] This line of reasoning has been applied, in particular, to the case of Ukraine.[35]

However, the arguments against any enlargement of the nuclear club in Europe and elsewhere are, on balance, much more compelling. First, looking back at the history of East-West relations during the Cold War, it appears evident that strategic stability was ensured not so much by the existence of nuclear weapons per

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30 See, in particular, John Simpson, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the post-Cold War Era," in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1994, pp. 17-39.

31 The reference is to Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Papers No. 171, London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1981.

32 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 39.

33 Gordon Adams, Paul Taibl, "Share Technology for 'Safer Weaponsÿ," in: *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 48, No. 4, May 1992, pp. 38-40.

34 See Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma."

35 See John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 50-66; for the opposite view see Steven E. Miller, "The Case against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 67-80.

se, as by the fact that the nuclear factor operated in a bipolar system. In a non-bipolar environment, however, it is very doubtful that the spread of nuclear power would have a stabilizing effect. Furthermore, account should be taken of the fact that the period of transition in which the development of nuclear capabilities takes place very often entails a variety of dangers, especially if the proliferator state is surrounded by a hostile environment. Finally, the idea of "managed" nuclear proliferation is very controversial. Any increase in the number of nuclear powers entails the risk of seriously undermining the global non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Ukraine's final decision in November 1994 to accede to the NPT was the result of a careful Western strategy based on three pillars which could be fundamental in addressing similar cases in the future: the use of economic leverage, the effort to address Ukraine's security concerns and the development of cooperative denuclearization programs with Moscow.[36] The decision to extend the NPT's duration indefinitely taken at the treaty's Review and Extension Conference in May 1995 has further contributed to consolidating the nuclear non-proliferation regime in Europe.

Some progress has also been made in defusing the risk of an unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear material and of a flow of Russian nuclear scientists and missile engineers towards proliferator states. But especially the leakage of nuclear material from Russia remains one of the most serious threats to the non-proliferation regime. The recent multiplication of signs that Moscow continues to have considerable difficulty in ensuring full control over state apparata has rekindled the fear that some sections of the Russian military-industrial complex could engage in diversion of nuclear material. This could also happen during the dismantlement process of nuclear warheads foreseen by the disarmament agreements.[37] A distinct – though remote – threat is that nuclear material could fall into the hands of groups of terrorists or criminals.[38]

III. Security Challenges in the Former Socialist States

1. The Evolution of Transition Problems and of the Security Environment in Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans

Although the transition of the former socialist countries towards democracy and a market economy was widely considered as having disruptive potential, it has

36 See Sherman W. Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," in: *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 25, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 7-12.

37 See James Blaker, "Coping with the New 'Clear and Present Danger' from Russia," in: *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1995, pp. 13-16.

38 See Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism – Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?," in: *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1995, pp. 211-219.

progressed to date in a remarkably peaceful and smooth way in all the Central-Eastern European countries, with the exception of those involved in the Balkan conflict. It has to be underlined, in particular, that the high social costs (increasing unemployment and inflation rates, steadily declining living standards, growing income disparities) associated with the collapse of the old system and an ongoing painful transformation have not given rise to destructive social disorders or unmanageable political conflicts. Furthermore, the contrasts and disputes that have emerged among the countries of the area have not resulted in any major crisis situations. Indeed, most of them appear to be solvable at the bilateral level or through the available instruments. This seems to justify a certain degree of optimism about the future course of the transition in the Central-Eastern European area. There remain a number of potential factors, however, which could slow or even reverse this process, thus hindering the strengthening of cooperative links with Western institutions.

The most remarkable level of political and institutional stability as well as economic transformation has been reached in the countries of the so-called Visegrad group (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) and in Slovenia. Yet, there are some worrying phenomena which could jeopardize the results achieved or impede further progress in this direction:

- Though, the repeated changes in government and the dramatic modifications of the party system can be seen, in retrospect, as an essential part of the democratization process, nevertheless in all countries under consideration a truly reliable institutional equilibrium, that is a solid system of checks and balances, has still to be constructed.

  A clear example of these difficulties is provided by the institutional situation in Poland, where the parliament, the government and the president tend to act as three competing centers of power with a pronounced tendency to block each other's moves.[39] Indeed, Poland is a typical case of a country which, notwithstanding the remarkable economic results, presents a certain degree of unpredictability due to the uncertainties related to the evolution of its political and institutional systems.[40]
- In some countries of this group there are evident signs of alienation from political life and of a decreasing confidence in political institutions.[41] These

39 See Jakup Karpinski, "The Constitutional Mosaic," in: *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 11 August 1995, pp. 4-9.

40 This contradiction is analyzed by Alexander Smolar, "Pologne: La 'drôle' de transition," in: *Politique internationale*, No. 67, Spring 1995, pp. 193-202.

41 See Gerhard Mangott, *Chart- and Table-Guide to Statement 'Political Consolidation Still Lying Ahead?'*, paper presented to the Conference on "From Europe Agreements to Accession," Lodz, 20-21 October 1994.

phenomena are relatively small, however, and are not substantially larger than similar trends in the West.

- An additional factor is the emergence of nationalistic movements. Yet, they remain, on the whole, far less important and influential in the Central-Eastern European countries than in other Eastern countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, not to speak of the former Yugoslav republics. Their expansion has been successfully contained. Indeed, they seem to be substantially marginalized today.[42] The recent electoral successes of the ex-communists in Hungary and Poland, as in other Eastern countries (Lithuania, Bulgaria) certainly do not reflect the desire of a return to the old system, but merely of a slower pace for economic and social transformation. Whether this attitude can hinder the establishment of truly market economies in the longer run is unclear.[43]

In the field of foreign and security policies, there seems to be rather a stable pro-Western orientation in all the countries under examination. Indeed, no credible alternative has so far emerged to this basic orientation. However, enthusiastic pro-Western integrationism has been losing ground and mistrust towards the idea of supranational integration seems to be on rise. In all countries the most recent polls have shown, for example, that public opinion is divided over the prospect of NATO membership. The polls have also revealed an increasing dissatisfaction with EU policies. A growing – albeit still minority – portion of the population sees the link with the West as an unacceptable relinquishment of national interests.

Integration in the West, nevertheless, remains the top priority for all current governments of the Central-Eastern European countries. In particular, the new leftist governments in Poland and Hungary have continued the pro-Western policy of their predecessors. Their programs call for the country's integration in Western Europe and for its membership in both the EU and NATO.

None of the elements of friction among the countries under consideration has developed into grave threats to their security. In particular, the separation process between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which seemed to have a highly destabilizing potential, took place without major crises. The concerns regarding the still pending dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the Gabcikovo dam were eased by the joint decision to submit it to the International Court of Justice. More importantly, on 19 March 1995, in the context of the Stability Pact, the two

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42 See several articles in *RFE/RL Research Report,* Vol. 3, No. 16, 22 April 1994.

43 For a balanced assessment of the significance of the electoral successes of the ex-communists see Georges Mink, Jean-Charles Szurek, "Europe centrale: La revanche des néo-communistes," in: *Politique internationale*, No. 67, Spring 1995, pp. 157-168; Wojciech Gebicki and Anna Marta Gebicka, "Central Europe: A Shift to the Left?," in: *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 126-138.

countries signed a neighborhood agreement including provisions on minority rights.

The problem of Hungarian minorities abroad continues to be important.[44] It has to be stressed, however, that a number of factors can prevent this issue from turning into a cause of major crisis. First, there has been no sign up to now that the Hungarian government wants to embark on a truly revisionist course. Second and more fundamentally, Hungary lacks the capabilities to act in this direction especially as it would have to face a strong reaction from the international community. Third, neither the Hungarian public nor the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighboring countries are developing threatening revisionist tendencies.

The situation in other Eastern countries, namely Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, is significantly different in three main respects. First, the democratization process presents many more shortcomings. In fact, a number of authoritarian practices and obstacles to a sound system of checks and balances remain. Second, these countries lag far behind in the process of economic liberalization. Third, they are much more exposed to possible repercussions from the Balkan conflict. This is particularly true of Bulgaria and Albania in case of a spillover of the conflict in Macedonia. However, it should also be noted that all three countries place the highest priority on strengthening their links with the West.

The immediate security problem for the entire Balkan area is that of stopping – or at least containing – the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and preventing a further enlargement of the war. Until a comprehensive and stable political settlement is reached, especially for the conflict in Bosnia, the negative impact of the disintegration process of Yugoslavia will continue to be felt throughout the region. Even if one looks beyond the current warfare, however, it is doubtful that the successor states to Yugoslavia will be able to create new forms of cooperation among themselves. Instead, the instability of the area of the former Yugoslavia is likely to continue to affect the security situations of all countries in the Balkan region and to remain one of their greatest causes for concern in the foreseeable future.

2. The Russian Predicament and the FSU Area

The evolution of Russia clearly remains the single most important factor for the future of European security. As has been noted, "stability in Russia is not in itself a guarantee of stability elsewhere. But there is little doubt that, were Russia to degenerate into violent disorder, economic breakdown or environmental

44 It is discussed in detail in other chapters of this book. See the studies of István Szönyi, "Hungary as a Security Risk: No. Major Concerns," chapter 4 and Roxana Iorga, "Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks," chapter 5.

catastrophe, it would have extremely serious adverse consequences for Central and Eastern Europe, too."[45]

Three general points concerning the future of Russia have to be stressed. First, although some signs of stabilization have emerged since 1993, there remains a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability about Russia's evolution. Some analysts go so far as to consider Russia's fall into a state of anarchy as a realistic scenario.[46] Indeed, this fear has recently rekindled following the disastrous performance of the Russian army during the war in Chechnya. Second, Russia's foreign and security policies appear strongly influenced by domestic developments. In fact, the future foreign policy orientation of Russia will depend heavily on the outcome of the ongoing political struggle in the country. Third, the experience of the last few years has shown that Russia's internal situation can hardly be influenced from outside. These three elements conspire to exacerbate Western dilemmas concerning the most effective policy to be adopted towards Russia.

The democratization process continues to come up against many obstacles. This is hardly surprising, given the lack of a tradition of civil society and the rule of law. As a result of the December 1993 referendum strongly wanted by President Yeltsin, Russia has acquired a new constitutional basis. However, the overall system of checks and balances, which the constitution shifted in favor of the Presidency, remains fragile and subject to the impact of the ongoing political struggle.[47]

Another area of major uncertainty is represented by the civilian-military relations. The experience of the war in Chechnya has demonstrated the absence of effective civilian control over the military and major shortcomings in the chain of command of the armed forces. As the armed forces are internally divided, their reliability, especially if they are called to intervene in domestic unrest, is doubtful at best.[48] Furthermore, the continuous deterioration of the army prevents it from playing a stabilizing role and makes it receptive to the messages of extremist

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45 Peter Frank, "Stability and Instability in Eastern Europe," in: *European Security after the Cold War*, Adelphi Papers No. 285, February 1994, London: Brassey's for the IISS. The widely shared idea that the evolution of Russia will be a decisive factor in shaping the security landscape in Europe is contested by Jean-Marie Guehenno in "Sécurité européenne: L'impossible status quo," in: *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 25-31.

46 See Allen Lynch, "The Crisis of the State in Russia," in: *The International Spectator*, Vol. 30, No. 2, April-June 1995, pp. 21-33; Charles H. Fairbanks, "A Tired Anarchy," in: *The National Interest*, No. 39, Spring 1995, pp. 15-25.

47 See Vera Tolz, "The Shifting Sands of Stabilization," in: *Transition*, 15 February 1995, pp. 5-8.

48 See Stephen J. Blank, Earl H. Tilford, *Russia's Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment*, Carlisle barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1995.

political movements, as demonstrated by Zhirinovsky's large following among the military.[49]

In the economic field, the basic conditions for a successful reform process have improved. Remarkable progress has been made, in particular, in the privatization process. The opposition to the reformist course appears to have weakened substantially. Indeed, a broad national consensus has emerged on the fundamental goals of the reform, although there remain radically different views about its pace and ways of implementation. But these positive elements have not resulted in an economic recovery so far. According to most experts, the success in the privatization process nothwithstanding, the enterprise system continues to suffer from most of the traditional shortcomings and antiquated methods.[50]

A substantial revision of the country's foreign policy began in mid-1992. This change – epitomized by the new approach of Foreign Minister Kozyrev – has been characterized by greater assertiveness and a stronger insistence on Russia's role as a great power with particular responsibility in the FSU area. This has been reflected in a shift away from the strongly pro-Western attitude adopted after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Though the Russian leadership continues to attach great importance to maintaining benign relations with the West but it is clearly less ready to compromise on its interests.[51]

The new assertiveness towards the "near abroad" seems to reflect the need to face the multi-faceted security challenges arising along the country's borders more than a truly neo-imperialist tendency. On the one hand, there is a growing emphasis on the necessity to respond actively to those challenges, trying to contain their disruptive effects. On the other hand, a strategy of reintegration can entail unsustainable costs as demonstrated, for instance, by the failure to establish a ruble zone. Russia is clearly promoting an enhancement of the CIS and the recognition of its role at the international level.[52] But the kind of relations with the FSU states, which it will finally establish within the CIS, context is highly uncertain.

Russia's military activities in the near abroad are a source of growing concern for many countries, including those of the West. When escalating they could have a

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49 See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, March/April 1995, pp. 86-98; Laure Mandeville, "Armée russe: Menace ou recours?," in: *Politique internationale*, No. 67, Spring 1995, pp. 47-64.

50 For a general assessment of the evolution of Russia's economy see Peter Rutland, "A Twisted Path Toward a Market Economy," in: *Transition*, 15 February 1995, pp. 12-18; Philip Hanson, "The Future of Russian Economic Reform," in: *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 28-45.

51 For a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of Russia's current foreign policy see Renée de Nevers, *Russia's Strategic Renovation*, Adelphi Papers No. 289, July 1994, London: Brassey's for the IISS.

52 Russia's reluctance to embark on a neo-integrationist policy is stressed by Leon Aron, "A Different Dance: From Tango to Minuet," in: *The National Interest*, No. 39, Spring 1995, pp. 27-37.

highly destabilizing potential inside and outside the CIS with negative impacts on Russia's stability in the longer run. Suffice it to recall, in this regard, the lesson of Russia's intervention in Afghanistan.[53] In general, the evolution of the situation in Central Asia is relevant to European security above all for the repercussions it can have on Russia's foreign policy, as well as on its internal equilibrium.

The fear of a collapse of the Russian Federation itself has re-emerged after the eruption of the war in Chechnya. However, a process of disintegration similar to the one which led to the end of the Soviet Union seems unlikely. Not only do the republics of the Russian Federation depend heavily on Moscow for their economic needs, but they also lack any previous experience of state-building.[54] Even the republics of the North Caucasus have not shown any will to build an alliance aimed at obtaining full independence from Moscow.[55]

Russia's relations with the Baltic states constitute a special case. This is indeed an area in which Western action can have – and indeed has had – substantial influence. Both US diplomatic efforts and those of international institutions – especially the CSCE (now OSCE) – have made a remarkable contribution to the stabilization of the Baltic area. The greatest success was certainly the completion of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the three republics in August 1994. The impressive results which the Baltic states have obtained in the economic field allows them to rapidly strengthen their cooperation links with the Western institutions. There remains, however, the very sensitive issue of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in the three republics. Given its intrinsic complexity as well as its high emotional significance, it is unlikely that it will be completely solved in the near future. Rather, it seems destined to remain a constant source of friction with Russia which will require unflagging attention on the part of Western countries.[56]

The other major source of concern is Russia's relations with Ukraine.[57] Although they have improved remarkably since Leonid Kuchma became Ukrainian President in July 1994, there is a persistent risk of renewed tensions

53 On Russian peacekeeping, see Michael R. Lucas, "Russia and Peacekeeping in the former USSR," in: *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1995, pp. 146-156; Roy Allison, *Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States*, Chaillot Papers No. 18, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, November 1994; A. Raevsky and I. N. Vorob'ev, *Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations*, UNIDIR Research Papers No. 8, New York and Geneva: UNIDIR, 1994.

54 This point is stressed by Hannes Adomeit, "Russia: Partner or Risk Factor in European Security?," in: *European Security after the Cold War*, p. 22.

55 Nina Bachkatova and Andrew Wilson, "Fallout from Chechnya," in *The World Today*, Vol. 51, No. 5, May 1995, p. 95.

56 For a comprehensive outlook on the security problems in the Baltic region see Peter van Ham (ed.), *The Baltic States: Security and Defense after Independence*, Chaillot Papers No. 19, June 1995, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies. See also Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 5, September/October 1994, pp. 72-85.

57 See by Oleg Strekal, "Independent Ukraine: The Search for Security," chapter 3.

between the two countries with possible repercussions not only in the FSU area but also in Central Europe. So far the relations between Ukrainians and Russians living in Ukraine have remained relatively quiet. However, a further deterioration of the economic and social situation in Ukraine could give rise to conflicts among the various regions and ethnic groups and this could, in turn, provoke Russian involvement.[58] An important factor of stability is Moscow's refusal to support Crimea's claim for independence from Ukraine. This attitude has contributed to reducing the disruptive potential of Crimean separatism.[59] To finally solve this problem, however, a concerted response from the two countries would be needed, which is hardly achievable today. Finally, the Sochi agreement signed in June 1995 has paved the way for a stable solution of the controversy on the Black Sea fleet, but, given its vagueness on some crucial issues, future tensions on the question cannot be excluded.[60]

IV. The Rise of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflicts

According to rather a widely held interpretation, rising nationalism in the Eastern part of Europe has to be regarded as an historically unavoidable development resulting from the political and cultural vacuum left by the fall of the socialist regimes. According to this point of view it derives from an "emancipatory thrust" of societies whose national identies were suppressed for decades. Nationalism represents the only ideological resource for the development of modern civil societies at the disposal of Eastern countries. The scholars who hold this view prefer to speak of "national awakening" or "national rebirth," a phenomenon, which would be very similar to the historical movements leading to the formation of nation-states in Western Europe during the nineteenth century: "As experienced by the Western part of the continent in an earlier phase in history, the countries of Eastern Europe must go through the development of nationalism before they can work towards goals which lie further afield."[61] This view certainly contains undeniable elements of truth, but it risks oversimplifying a phenomenon, which presents different features in the various countries and geopolitical situations.

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58 The fundamental weaknesses of Ukrainian state are analyzed in Gerhard Simon, "Problems Facing the Formation of the Ukrainian State," in: *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1994, pp. 61-67. See also Gert Weisskirchen, "The Ukraine at the Crossroads," in *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 45 No. 4, 1994, pp. 325-335.

59 See Chrystyna Lapychak, "Crackdown on Crimean Separatism," in: *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 8, 26 May 1995, pp. 2-5.

60 See Istina Markus, "Black Sea Fleet Dispute Apparently Over," in: *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 13, 28 July 1995, pp. 30-34.

61 Gerhard Wettig, "Shifts Concerning the National Problems in Europe," in: *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1993, p. 70. See also Nötzold, "The Eastern Part of Europe," pp. 327-328.

Many authors, in fact, do not share such a benevolent interpretation of the current rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe; rather, they insist on the elements of ethnicism and tribalism present in such a phenomenon. Referring to its disintegrating effects, Pierre Hassner has used the term "neo-medievalism."[62] Far from being a natural phase in the process of the formation of new nation-states, the nationalistic tendencies in the East are even regarded as an aspect of a more general crisis of the traditional nation-state concept.

Two elements make nationalism a major factor of instability in Eastern Europe. First, it manifests itself in areas in which many ethnic groups live in the same state and in which, therefore, the basic principle of nationalism – the congruence between nation and state – can only be established after bloody and prolonged ethnic conflicts. Second, the concept of the nation-state which prevails in some parts of Europe is based more on ethnic elements than on political or constitutional values. In fact, "official nationalism" is generally weaker than a more ethnically characterized form of nationalism.[63] There is clearly, a complex interaction between these two elements. As a result, governments can, for instance, appeal to patriotism and mount propaganda campaigns against alleged external threats with the goal of counterbalacing the ethnicist drives.

Generally speaking, the phenomenon of nationalism has its highest disrupting potential in those countries or regions which lack a democratic tradition and in which there remain major obstacles to the emergence of a modern civil society. This is the case in many areas of the FSU.

Ultra-nationalistic political parties with strong xenophobic attitudes have been gaining ground in some Eastern European countries. Although they have failed to win a majority of the votes so far, they have, in some cases, become central political actors. A further growth of their political and electoral weight could hinder democratic development, jeopardize domestic stability and compromise relations with neighbors and Western countries. On the economic plane, these parties oppose a rapid transformation to a market economy, favor a strong role of governmental bodies in economic activities – advocating a third way between capitalism and communism – and warn against the risks associated with opining up to the international market and to foreign capital and enterprises. In some countries they have shown a propensity for building alliances with the former communists.

Another major source of instability connected with the disintegration of the multi-ethnic political units is irredentism. In some cases, the sense of solidarity

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62 "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism," in: *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 49-65.

63 For this distinction see James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, London: MacMillan, 1993, chapter 10.

with minorities living abroad is stimulating expansionist tendencies and territorial claims in the countries of origin. This is particularly true in the case of the Russians and the Serbs which had benefitted from a hegemonic position over their neighbor peoples in the past. The possibility of a similar phenomenon developing in countries such as Hungary and Albania appears remote, but it cannot be completely ruled out. For their part, the new states in which large minorities live feel their political integrity threatened. This could induce them to adopt repressive policies towards those minorities, triggering a spiral of actions and reactions, which would be extremely difficult to stop.

Some analysts see nationalism as a phenomenon which, far from being confined to the Eastern countries, is spreading throughout the European continent. Some new forms of regionalism in the Western countries present evident elements of ethnicism and have a tendency to produce secessionist movements. Given the greater solidity of their political and institutional systems, however, Western countries appear to be in a far better position to contain these drives.

V. The Migration Issue

The liberalization process in Eastern Europe has produced a remarkable increase in the migratory flows both between East and West and among Eastern countries themselves. The number of refugees escaping civil wars and ethnic persecution has also grown exponentially in the last few years.

Refugees are the most worrying component of the new migration since their presence may more easily have destabilizing effects in destination countries. Massive flows of immigrants, especially if they grow over a short time span, often generate a sense of insecurity in the host population and provoke xenophobic reactions. These may be exploited or stirred up by nationalistic and extremist forces, thus influencing domestic politics. Indeed, in many countries there have been increasing tensions between autochtonous peoples and foreigners.

Yet, the fear, widely voiced after the fall of the Berlin Wall, of a mass exodus from the eastern to the western part of the continent has not materialized. Among Western countries, only Germany has experienced an inflow of migrants of large proportions. However, many migrants are illegal workers who tend to remain in the host countries for short periods. Thus, a migratory flow back – from West to East – has been developing.[64] More generally, some signs indicate that the phenomenon of migration in Europe may be on the decline. It must be added that the growing integration of Central-Eastern European countries into the cooperative mechanisms of Western institutions may facilitate control of migratory

64 See John Salt, *Migration and Population Change in Europe*, UNIDIR Research Papers, No. 19, New York: United Nations, 1993.

flows along the East-West axis. This does not apply, however, to the FSU countries, whose cooperation with the West in this field is likely to remain very poor.

The FSU still has the highest potential for migratory flows which could destabilize European security. The worsening of living conditions in many FSU states – including Russia – has given rise to a large economic migration. Ethnic tensions and conflicts have also provoked multi-directional population movements within the FSU which could spread to other areas of Europe.

Russians are by far the most widely affected ethnic group. In many areas of the FSU they are suffering from cultural and political discrimination. A large number has emigrated from Central Asia and the Caucusus, where tensions or open conflicts with other ethnic groups have multiplied since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conditions of Russians are also precarious in other FSU areas such as Moldova and Crimea, as well as in some areas of the Russian Federation where they constitute a minority. Large-scale migration of the Russian population in the Baltic states is less likely, given their relatively high standard of living and the recent improvements in interethnic relations. In Ukraine a further aggravation of the already precarious state of the economy and the institutional system could lead to an exacerbation of the current ethnic tensions and their transformation into open conflicts could thus provoke a mass migration by the Russians. Most of these population movements would certainly have a highly negative impact on the relations among provinces within the Russian Federation, as well as between Moscow and the neighboring republics and would complicate the search for a stable security system in the whole area.[65]

In Central Eastern Europe the risk of mass migration fuelled by ethnic conflict appears much lower. It concerns mainly the Hungarians living in Slovakia, Serbia and Romania. The unresolved tensions between Hungary and Romania have already prompted a large number of Hungarians to leave Romania. But the main concern of Visegrad countries is that they are increasingly becoming countries of transit for Ukranians, Belarussians, Russians and other CIS citizens seeking to reach Western Europe. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the Czech Republic which is being choosen by more and more emigrants also as a final destination because of its relatively good economic conditions.[66]

On the one hand, this migration is facilitated by the fact that such countries as Ukraine and Belarus lack efficient border controls. On the other hand, the countries of Central Eastern Europe were unprepared to cope with the migration

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65 On migration in the FSU region see *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 26, 1 July 1994. On the political implications see Wendy Slater, "Le problème de l'immigration en Russie," *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 59, No. 3, Fall 1994, pp. 749-758.

66 See Tom Warner, "Migration to the Middle Ground," in: *Transition*, Vol. 1, No. 12, 14 July 1995, pp. 26-32.

issue; only recently have they begun to construct the needed legal and institutional instruments.[67] Romania and Bulgaria are experiencing a similar phenomenon. The capacity of both countries to ensure border controls is even weaker. Their situation is also complicated by their proximity to the areas of conflict or crisis in the Balkans.[68]

Indeed, the problem of asylum seekers has its most dramatic dimensions in the former Yugoslavia. Both in Bosnia and Croatia ethnic cleansing and deportation have been used massively in an effort to change the ethnic maps of many regions. The exodus of thousands of people each time the conflict intensifies is not only a humanitarian tragedy; it aggravates the risk of a progressive enlargement of the conflict. In those areas where the ethnic equilibrium is most precarious, such as Kosovo or Macedonia, the mass influx of refugees may become the trigger of armed conflicts.

VI. Towards Fragmentation or Integration?

With the end of the bipolar system, the security structure of Europe has entered a phase of rapid transformation, the outcome of which is highly uncertain. A central challenge is the trend towards growing political fragmentation and resulting insecurity. The major powers certainly have a key role to play in the effort to cope with this problem, but it is essential that their influence be regulated through appropriate mechanisms of cooperation capable of preventing the consolidation of separated spheres of influences or, worse, opposing security blocs. To this end the gradual eastward enlargement of the Western institutions should be accompanied by the search for more solid and efficient pan-European arrangements.

More generally, one should not underestimate the importance of the cooperation regimes established within the West and at the pan-European level. They provide some key conditions for ensuring the stability of the continent. A strengthening of their role can only be obtained, however, through their further adjustment to the new geopolitical realities.

Political fragmentation is often provoked by nationalist or ethnic drives. Only in a restricted area of Europe has nationalism actually helped the state-building process. In most cases – especially in multi-ethnic areas – it has a destabilizing effect as it builds upon an ethnic or tribal characterization but credible nation-building processes are absent. Most of the emerging security challenges, including the new flows of migration with their disruptive potential, are connected with the rise of nationalism and the multiplication of ethnic conflicts. It has become increasingly clear that the available institutions lack a consistent approach

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67 See several articles in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 24, 17 June 1994.

68 See several articles in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 25, 24 June 1994.

towards the new challenges associated with the collapse of states and ethnic conflicts. On the one hand, the containment of secessionist and centrifugal forces seems necessary for ensuring stability in international relations. On the other hand, denying the right to secession can in some cases become not only morally untenable, but also practically counterproductive. Finding a solution for this dilemma is the most demanding task the international community which it will probably not be able to avoid in the coming decades.

Finally, there is the need to maintain a credible nuclear balance in Europe and, at the same time, to ensure the implementation of the nuclear disarmament agreements. Both elements are essential for avoiding a possible erosion of non-proliferation regime after successful management of the problem of the nuclear weapons dispersed in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

2. Security Risks in Russia and the CIS: A Case Study

Sergei Medvedev

I. Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, European security is challenged from a number of regions which include Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean. The greatest uncertainties, however, and the principal security risk, derive from the transformations in the former Soviet Union (FSU). A number of factors like the enormous landmass, the population of roughly 300 million people comprising 150 nationalities, the gargantuan and obsolete economy, the large army and military-industrial complex, the stockpile of nuclear and conventional weapons, the conflicts inherent in society and ethnic relations, and finally, the historical tradition of Russia's influence on European stability, make "the Soviet legacy" a paramount security concern, which will have a strong influence on the future configuration of the Euro-Atlantic security system.

This fact became evident once again in the wake of the unexpected and threatening developments in Russia in late 1993: the attempted coup in Moscow on 3-5 October, which resulted in skirmishes in the Russian capital, and the parliamentary elections on 12 December, in which the electorate favored ultra-nationalist parties of the extreme right and extreme left.

This article aims to outline the main security risks in the FSU. It is hardly possible to give a detailed picture of the situation in such a study. Thus this chapter will have a "risk-seeking" point of view and concentrate on the most important "bottlenecks" and major shortcomings in the political, ethnic, economic and military spheres which could become a matter of concern for the West in the future. Therefore this will not be an account of recent developments, but rather an attempt to provide a conceptual framework for assessing the new trends and security risks that will emerge in the FSU.

The first part of the case study deals with security risks in Russia and the CIS. These are divided into four groups of security risks:

- *political instability* and the inherent weakness of political regimes in Russia and the CIS states;
- *disintegration* in the FSU. The reasons and principal forms of disintegration are examined first. Analysis then turns to disintegration and separatism in Russia, and finally to ethnic conflicts in the CIS area;
- *economic crisis*; and finally
- the *military sphere*, including the military-industrial complex.


North Sea
Sweden
Norway
Barents Sea
D.
Finland
G.
Baltic Sea
E.
K.
Lit.
La.
Poland
S.
H.
Belarus
Russia
R.
Ukraine
M.
B.
Black Sea
Turkey
Caspian Sea
Ga.
A.
Az.
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgystan
Tajikistan
A. = Armenia
Az. = Azerbaijan
B. = Bulgaria
D. = Denmark
E. = Estonia
G. = Germany
Ga. = Georgia
H. = Hungary
K. = Kaliningrad
La. = Latvia
Lit. = Lithuania
M = Moldova
R = Romania
S. = Slovakia

The second part of the chapter is composed of two sets: five Russian and four Commonwealth-scenarios and an examination of the security implications of each scenario. The paper ends with a forecast of the most likely combination of scenarios for the next few years.

II. Current Trends and Security Risks in Russia and the CIS

1. Political Risks in Russia

The uncertainty and fragility of the post-Soviet political environment are symbolized by the inherent weakness of the political regime in Russia. This became evident once again in late 1993, with Boris Yeltsin's dissolution of the old parliament in September, the attempted military coup in Moscow in October claiming at least 150 lives and leaving hundreds wounded, and the hasty elections to the new parliament in December in which the majority of Russian voters rejected the incumbent leaders and economic reform and turned to communist and fascist parties.[1]

These events clearly demonstrate that after two and a half years of proclaimed sovereignty, Russia has not yet developed its statehood. There are at least four major deficiencies preventing the current or future Russian leadership from an effective (or even satisfactory) exercise of state power:

- weakness of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government and their continuous struggle for power;
- separatist trends in the provinces and the development of alternative mechanisms of power;
- weakness of the system of political parties, most of which lack identities and constituencies; and a
- lack of a social base for the current regime.

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1 The results of the 12 December 1993 elections are as follows:
Anti-reform parties:
(1) Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (a flat-earth, neo-fascist, populist party led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy): 23.2%; (2) Communist Party of Russia (electoral home for nostalgic party hacks and old faithfuls, led by Gennady Zyuganov): 11.89%; (3) Agrarian Party (voice of the "red barons" of Russia's collective farms and the rural poor): 9%.
Pro-reform parties:
(4) Russia's Choice (mainstream economic reform party led by Yegor Gaidar): 15.74%; (5) Yabloko (the "Apple" coalition of market reformers led by economist and politician Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, a potential coalition partner for Russia's Choice): 8%; (6) Party of Russian Unity and Consensus: 6.5% and the (7) Democratic Party of Russia: 6% (both minor parties supporting the reform, but at a slower pace).
Issue parties:
(8) Women of Russia (the fight-for-your-rights party of Russia's overworked and underpaid women, led by Alevtina Fedulova): 7%.
Sources: *Financial Times* (*FT*), 14 December 1993; *International Herald Tribune* (*IHT*), 21 December 1993; *The Economist*, 18 December 1993.

The weakness of the legislative, executive and judicial branches

The artificial implantation in Russia of the principle of the division of powers has contributed to the fragmentation of authority; and instead of providing "checks and balances," the opposing branches have consistently been seeking to destroy each other. This culminated in open confrontation in September-October 1993, when President Yeltsin dismissed the Russian legislature, and parliamentary leaders attempted a coup. Elections to the new parliament (the Federal Assembly) and the adoption of the new constitution on 12 December 1993 have not necessarily laid the basis for a stable Western-like constitutional process, and the future of all three powers is still far from clear.[2]

The *executive*, composed of the President, the president's apparatus, and the cabinet of ministers, seems to have come out the winner in the political battle of late 1993. Boris Yeltsin achieved his stated objective of winning popular approval for the new constitution which gives him extensive powers while severely restricting parliament. He now has the constitutional strength he sought, and the incumbent prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, has already shown some of the political skills required to manage a weak and fractious parliament. Yet this new constitutional advantage is not necessarily that important in Russian politics. It is political leverage, popular support, and the cohesion of authority that matter, and the current executive clearly lacks all three. The president is now in a weaker position than ever: one exit poll carried out on 12 December 1993 found that only 39 per cent of voters would vote for Mr. Yeltsin as president, but 52 per cent would vote for "someone else."[3]

What is more, the new parliament is likely to be even less cooperative than the old Supreme Soviet since the president's new opponents are not as isolated or as easy to defeat as the defenders of the old congress.[4] Any temptation on Mr. Yeltsin's part, moreover, to override the new opposition could – even if successful – prove extremely dangerous, given Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's impressive vote count among the military. Another attempt to dissolve the parliament by decree would probably raise the spectre of civil war.

Furthermore, though Mr. Yeltsin has given himself the right to dissolve the *Duma* and call new elections if it rejects his candidate for prime minister three times, this right does not apply in the first year of the new parliament's life. This may well force the president to avoid conflict (as he already did during the election

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2 The new Russian constitution was approved by 58.4% of those who cast ballots. The turnout was 58.2 million people, or 54.8% of Russia's 106 million registered voters. *IHT*, 21 December 1993.

3 *The Economist*, 18 December 1993.

4 Dimitri Simes, "Bad Choices, Bad Advice, and Now a Different Russia," in: *IHT*, 16 December 1993.

campaign) by nominating a cabinet with the broadest possible base, drawing ministers directly from the neo-fascist and communist parties or choosing persons reflecting those positions. Thus the current contradictions within the government – in which, to cite Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, "a third is building communism, a third is building capitalism, and a third are looking after their personal affairs"[5] – are destined to continue, preventing the executive from pursuing consistent policies. The government will be severely split between a small and embattled minority of reformers and a conservative majority, composed of cadres from the former nomenklatura. Moreover, though the executive now has the right to control the central bank of Russia, it will most likely stay in the hands of its present anti-reformist chairman, Viktor Gerashchenko.[6]

The elections on 12 December 1993 for the legislative power now vested in the Federal Assembly and the *Duma* revealed a deeply divided nation, tired of political struggle in Moscow and beset by the economic hardships caused by reform. The vote was mainly one of protest, with few constructive elements. It is therefore highly probable that the new legislature will employ "obstructionist tactics" from the outset, renewing the power struggle at the top and furthering political instability.

In these parliamentary elections Russia's Choice has picked up enough seats in individual races to make it the largest single party in the *Duma*, the lower house, but it is greatly outnumbered by opponents of political and economic reforms.[7] As a matter of fact, neither pro- nor anti-reform parties are likely to have a majority in parliament as there will be about 140 independent deputies, fence-sitters of various sorts. However, the anti-reformers form the largest single bloc. The threat from the far right and the old left may finally compel the reformers to coalesce, but it will probably also strengthen the gradualists. Indeed, some reformers are already backtracking.[8]

The composition of parliament is a second problem since it does not follow party lines. The members of the 178-strong Federation Council, or upper house, were elected to represent their regions or republics more on the basis of their local status than on that of their political affiliation. The same, though to a slightly lesser extent, applies to those members of the lower house elected on the

5 *FT*, 15 December 1993.

6 The upper house, the Federation Council, is made up of two representatives from each of the 89 Subjects of Federation. In the lower house, the 450-seat Duma, half of the deputies who represent constituencies are elected on a proportional basis in party lists, and the other half on a first-past-the-post basis.

7 According to Itar-Tass projections on 20 December, Russia's Choice would wind up with 103 seats, the Liberal-Democratic Party with 66, the communists with 62, and the Agrarian Party with 49. Four other parties would split 99 seats, and non-aligned independent candidates would get 70 seats. *IHT*, 21 December 1993.

8 *IHT*, 20 December 1993.

first-past-the-post system. Thus the phenomenon already evident in the previous Supreme Soviet is likely be to reproduced (called *boloto*), a swamp where deputies wallow this way and that, possibly hardening in opposition to a president and a government ignoring its wishes.[9]

The third problem is that the real winners in the 1993 elections might prove to be regional politicians elected individually in local districts, since they now have a podium and a vehicle for pressing federal authority. This is especially true of the upper house, the Federation Council, which is full of representatives of the former nomenklatura.[10] They will be decisive in defining the balance of forces in the future, but their political preferences still remain an open question. They probably do not have any clear preferences at all, except for winning regional concessions from Moscow in exchange for weak and conditional support for the president. This will further complicate the power struggle in Moscow, obscuring the prospects for national consensus and constructive cooperation between the executive and the legislative.

Due to this problem it is hard for President Yeltsin to have the parliament pass a coherent program of liberal economic reform as it was for him to be successful in the old one which he dissolved in October 1993. The new constitution does not give the legislature much power, but the parliament still has the last word on the budget, and it can still make its voice heard in other economic areas. This may foreshadow a stalemate for reform and, insofar as economic reform is the centerpiece of Russian politics, a continued political stalemate in general.

According to the new constitution, the *judicial* branch is represented by the Constitutional Court (which resolves cases arising from the constitution, state treaties and disputes between the Subjects of the Federation), the Supreme Court (the highest judicial body for civil, criminal and administrative law), and the Supreme Arbitration Court (which deals with economic disputes). In the desired system of checks and balances a special role is assigned to the Constitutional Court. For the moment, however, this body is non-existent, as the old Constitutional Court was banned by President Yeltsin for the entire transitional period between the dissolution of the old parliament and the inauguration of the new one.

Even, however, with the new Constitutional Court in place, there would still be strong doubts about its ability to act as an independent arbiter and mediator. The post-Soviet experience shows that a truly independent judiciary is not at all rooted

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9 John Lloyd, "Bitter Harvest of Disunity," in: *FT*, 14 December 1993.

10 Many of them are Boris Yeltsin's personal foes: Aman Tuleev, leader of Kemerovo; Eduard Rossel, the former governor of Yekaterinburg; Vasily Starodubtsev, one of the leaders, and Anatoly Lukyanov, the master-mind of the failed August 1991 coup; Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, the millionaire president of Kalmykia, to cite just a few (*FT*, 15 December 1993).

in the Russian political culture: the old Constitutional Court and its chairman Valeriy Zorkin were the object of political manipulation throughout the entire period of its existence, and in 1993 both sided with the parliament and the communist and nationalist opposition. It is difficult to imagine that the new Constitutional Court will manage to walk the fine line between the executive and the legislative. Most likely, the Court will again be compelled to take sides in the political struggle, thus shattering any hope for the establishment of an effective system of checks and balances.

Another key actor in the power game waiting on the sidelines is *the army and security forces*. Though President Yeltsin dismissed the Security Ministry – the heir to the KGB – by special decree in late December 1993, its hard core, composed of the former KGB cadres, networks of agents, etc., is definitely still intact. At the same time the poor performance of Interior Ministry forces, including the riot police, during the attempted coup in October 1993, and the apparent unwillingness of the Army to take sides in the conflict until the very last minute, demonstrated at least three things. First, that "power ministries" are not reliable partners for any of the political forces. Second, that the political preferences of the army are far from clear and that the army is becoming increasingly divided along political lines. Third, the army is apprehensive of the power struggle at the top, which risks splitting the country. Under certain circumstances this could compel the army to act on its own initiative to prevent such a development. This was confirmed during the December elections, when the army showed clear signs of discontent, allegedly voting strongly for the nationalist Liberal Democrats.[11]

Separatist trends and the development of alternative mechanisms of power

The situation is further complicated by the fact that regional political elites have gained leverage in federal politics, whereas the center still does not have reliable instruments for controlling the regions; federative relations in Russia risk becoming a one-way street. Though the new constitution proclaiming Russia a federation received support, the low voter turnout makes the result much less than a ringing endorsement.[12] In a number of regions and republics, even the 50 per cent quorum for voter turnout was not achieved. This federative weakness will be a future point of conflict with those areas that are claiming sovereignty under their own constitutions.

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11 Though early reports claimed that much of the army vote went to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, later estimates set the number between 18 per cent in the Black Sea Fleet and 43 per cent among Russian troops in Tajikistan (*Segodnya*, 17 December 1993).

12 See footnote 2.

Finally, weakened authorities are being flanked by alternative, "vertical" power structures going from Moscow through regional centers to local areas. This process is especially alarming because of the rapid vertical development of criminal and other illegal networks penetrating the post-Soviet state system.

Thus, there is neither any kind of balance of forces nor consensus or even domination of a single force on the Russian political scene, but a growing power vacuum, with a fragmentation and dissolution of authority and weak institutions vainly struggling against each other. Instability is built into such a political regime. Even though President Yeltsin managed to have his new constitution approved by parliament, the "trench warfare" in the higher echelons of power with periodic show-downs with opposing forces is going to continue.

The weakness of the political party system

Another shortcoming of the Russian political system is the weakness of the political parties. Of the thirteen parties registered for the December 1993 elections, only eight passed the 5 per cent barrier to get into parliament. Most of these parties are relatively new and barely organized. In most constituencies, there were numerous candidates, but very few of them advertised a party affiliation. In addition, voters appear to have been unaware of or uninfluenced by such affiliations.

The majority of parties have been formed on the basis of a vague proximity of opinions, and as a rule, have consolidated around certain political figures. Party activity is generally limited to Moscow, St. Petersburg and several other major cities and is increasingly being restricted by growing regional separatism. Indeed, all parties are handicapped by their small size, scarce financing, lack of state support, limited intellectual potential, lack of prominent leaders, and weakness of party structures.[13] They have not had the time to become sound political forces and actually remain "protoparties;" the last elections have done little to change this situation. As a result, the entire political spectrum in Russia cannot adequately express the vast variety of interests of the populace and the existing social trends. Neither the current political system nor the majority of political parties and movements possess a stable social base. The gap between the sharpening power struggle at the top and the growing political passivity of the population is both striking and dangerous.

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13 The only exception is probably the Russian Communist Party, which boasts a strong organization, discipline and a steady number of faithful supporters (around 10% of the electorate) among the poorest – particularly the "lumpen"-part of the population. On the other side of the political spectrum, the mainstream democratic Russia's Choice, though clearly lacking organization and ideology, has a sound social base in the emergent middle class in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where it received 35 to 50% of the vote.

In this sense, contemporary Russian politics are isolated and self-sustaining, a sort of trade for several thousand politicians in Moscow who are gradually becoming alienated from their constituencies. Instead of providing a framework into which conflicting interests can be channelled and settled in a constructive way, the present political system in Russia is fast becoming a destabilizing factor itself. This means that in the future, the West may face major security challenges from Russia, possibly started by a radical reshuffling of all current political trends, parties, and coalitions. The diminishing popularity of President Yeltsin and most reformers and the striking absence of any centrist force in current Russian politics make it even more probable. New leaders, unknown to the West may come to the forefront and start to revise Russian security policy.

2. Political Risks in the CIS Countries

The political situation in the CIS states and their relations with Russia are marked by a key contradiction: it was the Soviet state system that broke up in December 1991, not the country. This created a dangerous security environment, in which present political structures (both CIS and Russian) do not correspond to the economic, political, military and psychological interlinkage inherited from the past. Although independent, the majority of republics are still incapable of an effective exercise of essential state functions. There is still a long way to go before sound political systems and stable popular governments can be established.

Ukraine and Belarus'

The political situation in the Slavic republics of the CIS, Ukraine, and Belarus', is similar to that in Russia. The former nomenklatura has, nevertheless, a majority in parliament and among local authorities, but it is increasingly losing its political capacity. The anti-nomenklatura "democratic" opposition is split even before coming into power. As a result, moderate reformist, centrist forces are gathering momentum and the political scene is dominated by state leaders, while the public profile of political parties remains low. On the part of the population, the growing social discontent is accompanied by political passivity.

Unlike in Russia, however, anti-nomenklatura and "democratic" forces in Ukraine (*Rukh*) and Belarus' (The Byelorussian Popular Front) are nationalistic and trying to assert their national identity by means of a cultural, linguistic and political separation from Russia at high economic costs. The catastrophic state of the Ukrainian economy – in 1993 Ukraine suffered from an inflation beyond 40 per cent a month and a threefold drop in industrial production – has made people realize the real cost of independence. This means that episodes of confrontation will be repeated. But in the short- and medium-term Ukraine will probably

oscillate between being attracted and repelled by Russia while staying in the "Moskvocentric" orbit. As far as present trends are concerned, the political situation in Ukraine and Belarus' therefore does not pose an immediate threat to European security.

Moldova

In Moldova, the post-Soviet political system is also a neo-nomenklatura regime with authoritarian features, while the anti-nomenklatura Popular Front that urged forced unification with Romania has lost its appeal. Future developments will be determined mostly by the course of the settlement of separationist trends in the strategically important Transdniester region[14] and in the rebellious Gagauz Republic in the South of Moldova. A political compromise with Transdniester will save the country's unity, but force Moldova to stay in the CIS milieu. Should armed conflict recommence, the unification of Moldova and Romania, or actually "Greater Romania's" absorption of Moldova, will emerge as the only alternative.

The "Transdniester question" therefore constitutes a serious security challenge for the West as well, since it is an area of conflict on ex-USSR territory most proximate to the Western security zone. Possible conflict could involve Romania, thus creating a dangerous link Russia-Ukraine-Transdniester-Moldova-Romania which could become a "bridge" for instability and crisis, provoking conflicts in Central Europe. Any change in the territorial or administrative *status quo* in this "arc of instability" stretching from Moldova to Serbia and Kosovo, could thus prove to be even more dangerous for European security than the current Balkan crisis. Still, however, Transdniester seems to be one of the very few, if not the only place in the FSU, where international institutions could effectively intervene – a fact which should give the region an even higher rank on the Western security agenda.

The Transcaucasian Region

In the Transcaucasian region, in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, the price of revolutionary changes has been high. With the "national-democratic" forces in office, the existent ethnic tensions have quickly developed into full-fledged military conflicts: in Nagorny-Karabakh, partly in Nakhichevan, in South Ossetiya and in Abkhazia. Internal stability has been destroyed, overshadowing the prospects for economic and institutional reform. The ousting of the "democratic" president Abulfaz Elchibei and the return of Gaidar Aliev's nomenklatura regime in Azerbaijan is a sign of the times.

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14 Transdniester accounts for 37% of the industrial potential of Moldova and produces 83% of the electric power (*Izvestiya*, 5 June 1992).

While democratic procedures have been formally introduced, the political life in the three Transcaucasian nations is actually determined by the balance of forces between armed units. This became especially clear in Georgia when Eduard Shevardnadze found himself captive to paramilitary criminal groups and – with Georgia's accession to the CIS in November 1993 – to Russian troops. With armed conflicts flaring all over the region, the army and law enforcement authorities emerge as key actors on the political scene. The militant psychology of national mobilization prevails in all three states, contributing to authoritarian trends in domestic politics and a further deepening of conflicts.

The conflict potential in this area should be a major security concern for the West, since the risk is much higher than just that of a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan or between Georgia and the separatist province of Abkhazia. The situation in the Transcaucasian region threatens the European security system on two fronts: in the east in so far as Russia is already deeply involved, to the South in as far as Turkey, a NATO member and EU associate, is on the verge of a more-than-just-humanitarian engagement, and with Iran appearing seriously concerned about these developments. Indeed, a system of territorial trade-offs, involving Azerbaijan, Nagorny-Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Armenia, Turkey, and Iran, has been discussed secretly for some time. If any territorial re-division takes place, this will have serious security repercussions on the wider area, probably including the Middle East and the Gulf.

The Central Asian Republics

In the Central Asian republics of the CIS, the break-up of the Soviet Union has only removed the ideological veil that covered the traditional Oriental hierarchical power structure. Given the ethnic tensions in the region, which are further complicated by tribal and clannish contradictions, the only guarantee of political stability seems to be the conservation of neo-nomenklatura regimes of two basic kinds: a "soft" authoritarian regime, inclined to economic reforms, with a relatively free press and multi-party democracy (Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan), and a "hard" authoritarian regime, with heavy censorship on press, a token opposition, and obscure prospects for economic reform (Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan). The fall of these regimes will inevitably lead to civil war and armed ethnic conflicts of the Afghan type, as clearly shown by upheaval in Tajikistan.

As a result, the overall security environment in Central Asia is extremely dangerous and conflict-prone. Due to the complicated ethnic structure of the Central Asian states and the artificial nature of borders between them, local conflicts in any of the republics can easily spread to become the hotbed of

instability for the entire region. Lack of arable land and water and over-population will permanently give rise to conflicts. From this point of view, the rich and fertile Ferghana Valley, where the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meet and where three bloody ethnic conflicts have already raged in recent years is a typical example of the kind of instability which has to be expected for the future as well. Another example is the conflict potential in Northern Kazakhstan, an area with an overwhelming Russian population, where the recent gains of nationalist political forces in the Russian elections (and the fact that Mr. Zhirinovskiy was born in this area) immediately provoked an upsurge in ethnic separatism and claims of reunification with greater Russia.[15]

The civil wars in Tajikistan and the neighboring Afghanistan,[16] moreover, are having a deep impact on all states of the region. They mark the beginning of a dangerous conflict period, from which no one, not even Russia, will be immune. The means resorted to in this war (extreme cruelty, mass murder of civilians, disregard for the neutrality of certain parties etc.) point to the limits of peace-keeping or peace-making interventions. Even a massive military operation, like the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, might, in fact, prove ineffective.

In general, feudal, over-populated and ethnically mixed Central Asia is the place where the danger of a Hobbesian "war of all against all" is the clearest and most present. If such a war were unleashed, it would have a deep negative impact on Russia and the CIS, and its repercussions – like mass migration involving mostly ethnic Russians, arms proliferation, a military build-up in Russia, changes in Russian security and foreign policies, etc. – would certainly affect European security. Quite to the contrary, the Islamic presence in Central Asia (with the exception of Tajikistan) does not pose an immediate threat to security for Russia or Europe. Most countries in the region appear to be more inclined towards the "lay model" represented by Turkey or the "Islamic capitalism" of the Gulf than to the fundamentalist ways of Iran. This is supported by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Central Asian Muslims are Sunnites.

3. Disintegration in the Post-Soviet Area: Causes and Consequences

Disintegration which resulted from the break-up of the centralized power system has emerged as a principal security risk in the FSU. It threatens both interstate relations, sometimes even up to the level of military confrontation, and the

15 *FT*, 20 December 1993.

16 4.2 million Tajiks and 1.8 million Uzbeks live in Afghanistan, where the entire Afghan population is ethnically and linguistically akin to the Tajiks. See: Sergei I. Bruk, *Narody SSSR v strane i za rubezhom* (Peoples of the USSR in the country and abroad), Moscow: Nauka, 1991, pp. 25-26.

domestic legitimacy and stability of post-Soviet regimes since real local power is possessed by regional political elites.

Local elites are generally made up of a varying mix of the following six components:

- the traditional clan or tribal system members;
- the former party functionaries who still make up a sort of common cadre network;
- heads of major industrial and agricultural enterprises;
- influential representatives of the private sector, connected with the old nomenklatura;
- local heads of armed and security forces;
- the representatives of the central republican authority.

From a regional point of view, the territory of the FSU is divided into a number of areas with well-established, emerging or latent centers of power. According to some calculations, there may be over 300 actual or potential local elites in the territory of the former USSR.

Local elites have emerged in a number of specific territories: in areas with either historic or ethnic specificities (the Chechnya, Turkic and Finno-Ugric lands of the Volga region in Russia), or local peculiarities in language, mentality, habits and ways (Galitia in Ukraine, Menghrelia in Georgia, etc.); in wider traditional territories (Western Ukraine, Western Georgia, the Ferghan region in Uzbekistan); in economic regions rich in natural resources (Komi and Yakut-Sakha Republics, Kuznetsk and Vorkuta coal fields, etc.); and in large cities, administrative and industrial centers (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Dnepropetrovsk, etc.). Many of the local elites are or may be seeking autonomy, and some may feed instability and provoke regional conflicts.

Russia

The new ambitions of local elites in Russia emerged in the wake of the abortive August 1991 coup, which was accompanied by declarations of sovereignty in a number of republics like Tatarstan, Chechnya, Bashkortostan, etc., and by a sharpening of ethnic territorial disputes. Even Russian-populated regions started to seek greater economic and political autonomy. This regionalization is aggravated by a visible usurpation of authority in local areas.[17] The functions of state power are assumed by local political, social, ethnic, military and sometimes even criminal groups – a trend for which the politically-charged Cossack is a good example.

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17 See: "Strategiya dlya Rossii" (A Strategy for Russia: Report of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy), in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 19 August 1992.

There are at least four main areas or "belts" of actual or possible instability in the Russian Federation:[18]

- *The North Caucasian area.* The situation in this area can be described in terms of long-term instability and a gradual moving away from Moscow. Given the ethnic, religious and economic contradictions in the area, the most probable scenario for the North Caucasus is one of occasional outbreaks of conflict all over the area, but no long-term "trench warfare" between the several major opposing forces. The security risks for Russia are relatively high: conflicts are bound to produce mass migration and terrorism; arms proliferation, which is already intense in the region, will continue; this means that Russia will probably have to keep a large military contingent in or near the area.
- *The Volga belt.* The key security risks in the Volga belt (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Chuvashia, Mariy-El) are connected with the separatist policies of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which have large resources of oil and gas and a tangible industrial potential (military, chemical, electronic industries, etc.). Though internal tensions are relatively low in the Volga belt, "Volga separatism" is potentially the most dangerous form of separatism in Russia: it involves the essential nucleus of Russia formed in the sixteenth century, and it arouses bitter popular resentment since this form of separatism is seen as a threat to the very existence of the Russian state. The secession of the Volga republics from Russia could disrupt major transport and power lines running East-West and North-South. Any reaction (or over-reaction) from Moscow could create a dangerous security environment.[19]
- *The Transbaikal belt.* The only real candidate for self-determination and probable secession from Russia in the Transbaikal belt is the area of Tuva, where the titular ethnic group accounts for two-thirds of the population, and most Russians are being forced to leave. Tuva's possible separation is hardly going to have a major destabilizing effect on the situation in Russia. However, the process of self-determination in this part of the Russian Federation could be tempting for China or for national minorities seeking self-determination in the bordering provinces of China (mainly in Tibet). Therefore, developments in the Transbaikal belt are risky in view of Russian-Chinese relations and general stability in the Far East.
- *The Northern belt.* Destabilization in the Northern belt is provoked mainly by the "natural resource separatism" of the wealthier regions: Yakut-Sakha, Komi, the Yamalo-Nenets District. The biggest security risk in this area is connected with Yakut-Sakha. Though full separation of this republic is unlikely, greater

18 See Alexander Salmin, "*Dezintegratsia Rossii?*" (Disintegration of Russia?), Report of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 10 December 1992.

19 Salmin, "Disintegration of Russia."

economic independence of Yakut-Sakha would nevertheless deal a heavy blow to Russia's economy and finances. The Northern belt could also contribute to the possible disintegration of Russia by loosening the financial, tax and economic links and by promoting Siberian and Far Eastern regional separatism. If this occurs, security risks will run high. A territorial change of such scale would completely ruin the fragile geopolitical balance in the Far East. China and Japan would be largely tempted (or even compelled) to come into play. Japan, for example, could see this as a unique opportunity to get back its part of the Kuril chain. This, in turn, would provoke friction within the G-7 and the strategic alliance of industrial democracies.

Disintegration in Russia will probably continue due to Moscow's growing inability to keep the situation under control. Recent parliamentary elections and the adoption of the new Russian constitution endorsing a single federation are not likely to ease the tension: regional leaders have obtained a greater say in Russian politics and many of them interpret the clauses of the new constitution as non-binding, given the low voter turnout in their regions.[20] Even more important is that there is still no distinct division of competences and powers between Moscow and the subjects of Federation.

Provided the current trends continue, decentralization may well proceed until it finally determines the optimum-sized economic and territorial units most viable in a crisis environment. In the meantime, however, since the ethnic and territorial movements in Russia are disunited, they lack the "critical mass" to lead to a break-up of Russia. Thus, it would be more correct to speak of progressing decentralization and regional differentiation, than of a virtual disintegration of Russia.

In the years to come, the West will probably be dealing with a single Russia; still, decentralization could bring about security challenges. Russia could become a substantially weakened and unstable country, with internal regional contradictions casting a shadow on its domestic prospects, its foreign and security policies, and its economic performance. Such a "state-of-war" psychological mood would be favorable to further authoritarian and chauvinist trends and fascist-like demagogy. Regional fragmentation could trigger dangerous temptations in many countries and ethnic groups outside Russia, as well. First, the ex-USSR states could try to get direct access to natural resources as leverage to upgrade their political positions and to exert greater strategic influence, thus weakening Moscow. Second, the

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20 As already mentioned, in a significant number of regions and republics, the 50% quorum was not reached at all. These Subjects of Federation include Chechnya (no voting was allowed); Tatarstan (13% turnout); and the Sverdlovsk region (where Mr. Eduard Rossel, the former governor, had attempted to change the region into the Urals Republic and where fewer than 50% voted on the Russian constitution), as well as the Ingushetiya, Udmurtiya and Komi republics, Kemerovo and Khabarovsk territories, Chelyabinsk and Perm regions and others. (*FT*, 14 December 1993).

countries bordering on Russia or the FSU area could perceive some of Russia's provinces as parts of their "spheres of interest." As in the case of Japan, there could also be territorial motives. Third, separatist movements in Russia could prove an inspiring example for national minorities notably in the countries of Eastern Europe.

The CIS Area

Disintegration in the CIS area is driven by the ethnic conflicts kindled by the break-up of the centralized power structure. After emancipation from authoritarian rule, national and local elites, most of which lack any tradition in independence and statehood, have begun to define their specific interests and independence. Conflict-bearing factors also include the intricate ethnic and demographic situation; the decomposition of the Soviet army, with large units, like the 14th Russian Army in Pridnestrovye, stationed at the heart of areas of conflict; the proliferation of arms all over the former Soviet territory; the disruption of economic links, leaving many areas without a supply of vital products and making them seek economic security by military means; and the involvement of third parties (*mojahed* units from Pakistan and Afghanistan in Tajikistan, mercenaries from the Middle East in Karabakh, etc.).

Ethnic conflicts on the territory of the FSU can be divided into several main types:[21]

- *Riots and pogroms:* Examples were the pogroms of Meskheti Turks in Ferghana (Uzbekistan) in 1989, of Uzbeks in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and of Armenians in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 1990, and a number of other cases. These disorders are normally triggered by demographic and economic problems, especially unemployment, which means that should the social and economic crisis worsen, riots and pogroms could take place virtually anywhere, including major cities, though places with a high concentration of refugees will be most explosive (in turn producing a large number of refugees and migrants). There is actually little possibility of predicting or preventing such conflicts unless a general state of emergency is introduced in certain areas.
- *Conflicts between a native ethnic group and the non-native population on newly independent territories.* In such conflicts, the rights of the non-native (mostly Russian-speaking) populations are generally at stake (the Baltic states, Moldova, some autonomous republics of Russia, etc.).
  In the FSU, some 70 million people live outside their ethno-historical regions. A substantial part of them can potentially become subject to discrimination or

21 See Emil Pain, "Etnopoliticheskiye konflikty" (Ethno-political conflicts), in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 15 April 1992.

even a Bosnian-type "ethnic cleansing." In particular, this concerns 25 million Russians who are often treated as "occupants." The status of Russians in the new independent states has already become an issue of federal Russian politics, since the passivity of the government was challenged by the chauvinism and imperialist campaigns of the nationalist opposition, in particular during Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's election campaign.

The major risk is that, yielding to public pressure, Moscow may become increasingly imperialistic, using "diplomacy of force" to protect compatriots. Russia's actions could range from economic sanctions (e.g., against Ukraine or Tatarstan) to military intervention (e.g. in Central Asia or Tuva). The challenge for the West is considerable. In certain cases (the Baltic states, Transdniester) it could step in effectively, offering its good offices, human rights mechanisms and mediation. If the West fails to do so, Russia will become more suspicious of the outside world and in the years to come, and could well become a country haunted by a "Weimar syndrome."

- *Conflicts as a delayed consequence of Stalinist deportation in 1937-1941.* Such conflicts appear in places where nations were forced to settle (as in the case of the Meskheti pogroms in Ferghana), or on their return to their land of origin (e.g., the return of the Crimean Tartars to the Crimea). Such conflicts constitute relatively low security risks, as they concern minor ethnic groups. Yet, they will contribute to the general instability on the southern periphery of the FSU.
- *Open armed conflicts between local political elites within one republic.* This kind of conflict is taking place in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. The security challenges involved are extremely high. In the years to come, the West will have to deal with a number of regimes (especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and possibly also in Moldova), preoccupied with an internal power struggle and locked between dictatorship and internal instability. Russia will probably have to secure its military presence on its southern rim, which will require a certain military build-up.
- *Conflicts concerning the status of ethnic groups.* This kind of conflict usually involves upgrading the status of a certain region to a specific autonomy or possibly to independence: South Ossetiya and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transdniester and Gagauzia in Moldova, and Chechnya and Tatarstan in Russia are examples. As shown by the former Yugoslavia, such conflicts tend to evolve into major military confrontations. The greatest risk is the involvement of "third parties" (e.g. Russia in Transdniester and Abkhazia), resulting in the internationalization of the conflict. Another danger is that the drive towards autonomy of the ethnic minorities in the CIS area can provoke a "domino effect" of separatism in other regions, most notably in Eastern Europe. There is greater scope for Western action in dealing with this type of ethnic conflict,

in that there are more or less recognized international legal procedures for achieving the self-determination of nations and ensuring minority rights.

- *Conflicts concerning disputed territories*: This is the kind of dispute raging between the Inghushis and the Ossetiyans over the Prigorodny District of Vladikavkaz, since most internal frontiers in the USSR were rather arbitrary and did not correspond to the actual settlement of ethnic groups. Some calculations estimate that there are about 70 potentially disputed territories in the FSU, including the possibility of conflict between Moscow and Kiev over the Crimea or between Moscow and Alma-Ata over the Russian-populated North Kazakhstan. Particularly troublesome for the West is the fact that there are a number of potentially disputed territories in the Western part of the FSU – the Kaliningrad region of Russia (formerly East Prussia), the Vilnius region of Lithuania, parts of Western Belarus' and Western Ukraine, South Bessarabia, North Bukovina, etc. – and that possible contenders include East European states like Poland, Hungary and Romania.
- *Interstate conflicts:* So far an interstate military conflict developed only between Armenia and Azerbaijan. With Armenians now controlling the entire territory of Nagorny-Karabakh, it is virtually over. If "interstate conflict," however, is taken in its broader sense including economic and political tension, then the entire post-Soviet political environment is penetrated by such conflicts, real or latent. The most dangerous is the one between Russia and Ukraine, which is exacerbated by such issues as the division of the Black Sea fleet, the nuclear status of Ukraine and the supply of Russian oil and gas to Ukraine.

  A further escalation of interstate conflicts will inevitably lead to strong tension in the FSU and could result in the total break-up of the CIS in a strong militarization of post-Soviet politics, and even interstate wars, leaving thousands of casualties and millions of refugees. Given the possible scope of the warfare, and the territories and the masses of people involved, any Western engagement, including military intervention, would most probably prove ineffective, leaving only the option to isolate the conflict area.

As paradoxical as it may sound, ethnic conflicts in a certain sense have become a political instrument in the post-Soviet environment. With the breakdown of the centralized power structure, thus invalidating the old rules of the political game, ethnic conflicts provide a means to establish the new subjects of political power and to determine a new balance of forces on the post-Soviet scene, producing conflicts as a transitory (and highly dangerous) form of post-Soviet political life.

This leads to the conclusion that, while attempting to prevent ethnic conflicts in the FSU and to eradicate their underlying causes by diplomatic, economic and security means, the West will also have to get used to living with conflicts that seem to be unavoidable in the very near future. The art of conflict prevention must

be complemented by the more sophisticated art of preventing conflicts from escalating and of minimizing effects like refugee waves to the West, the risk of nuclear terrorism, as well as of "conventional" terrorism. A desperate social and psychological atmosphere in the areas of ethnic conflict may even give birth to fanaticism akin to that of Irish, Palestinian, or Tamil militants. By a combination of these crisis factors single conflict areas (in the South of Central Asia, the North Caucasus, the Transcaucasian region, etc.) could fuse into one enormous conflict zone, transforming an entire territory of the former USSR into a permanent hotbed of instability, a sort of geopolitical "black hole" sucking in neighboring regions including the Far East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Middle East, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The probability of this scenario, however, is relatively low.

4. Economic and Social Risks

Failure of Industrial Production

In 1992 alone the sharp reduction in demand led to a 25-28 per cent decrease in industrial production in Russia and a fall in the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 65 per cent of its 1989 level. Most strongly affected by this trend were promising and technologically advanced sectors that were to be Russia's "bridges" to the world economy. Even the vital oil sector was no exception.[22]

This trend will have serious long-term social and political implications since the Soviet Union had a heavily industrialized economy, with tens of millions of people vitally dependent on the industrial sector. Mass unemployment is therefore a danger, though the situation at the moment is rather characterized by under-employment, with a number of major industrial enterprises working at half-capacity, triggering social unrest in declining production areas in Russia and Ukraine, like in mining.

Decline in industrial production is also promoting regional separatism. In order to deal with the crisis, large enterprises are reorienting their production to local needs, becoming vital regional centers. This breakdown of economic ties is contributing to political instability and accelerating disintegration in Russia and other CIS states.

Economic austerity has also brought greater dependence on oil as a staple product, with the main oil-producing regions (Chechnya, Tatarstan, Tyumen) showing greater proclivity to separatism. Oil has indeed been a major conflict-bearing factor in interstate relations on former Soviet territory, since budget and trade deficits due to oil imports are compelling certain states to look

22 *Izvestiya*, 5 March 1993.

for new partners outside the CIS: Ukraine, for instance, has been seeking contacts with Iran.

Finally, the current decline in industrial production is causing dangerous structural changes in Russia's economic profile. Eliminating processing industries, as reformers originally proposed, would sink the country to a much lower economic level, at which it would have to compete with Third World countries. At the same time, Russia's unique strategic location at the heart of Eurasia, its historic identity, and its military and nuclear potential, would all pose its decline to a predominantly resource-producing area as an immense security threat to the Euro-Atlantic system.

Failure of the Financial System

Alone in 1992, inflation in Russia reached 1,300 per cent, while consumer prices increased 25-fold and incomes rose by only 7.4 times.[23] The "Chicago School-style" monetary reform has failed completely: in 1992, when the Gaidar government was supposed to keep a tight money policy, Russia's central bank printed money equal to 40 per cent of GDP.[24]

The current mood in Russia – even among the reformers in the Cabinet – provides virtually no hope for balancing the budget. After the parliamentary elections in December 1993, which showed that the population is unwilling to accept the cost of even the slightest attempt at financial stabilization, it has become quite clear that the government is going to have to abandon its financial goals in 1994 and spend more on subsidies to inefficient industries and agriculture, since the collapse of the financial system is causing serious political and social risks. With the raging inflation, the overwhelming majority of people in Russia have witnessed a drastic decline in their living standards. While social programs, including health care, housing and pensions, have themselves suffered major set-backs. Used to living with modest but firm social guarantees, people now see no support from the state and are becoming largely disillusioned.

Another result of the collapse of the rouble is the shrinking of the rouble zone, and the introduction of national currencies by most of the CIS countries, furthering disintegration and growing inter-state tension within the CIS.

With a weak rouble, any Russian government will be faced with the same dilemma: either it will have to cut back further on social programs, thus worsening the population's living standards, to balance the budget and draw financial resources for investment and restructuring, or it will have to resort to inflationary stimulation of the economy (which seems the more likely). Both choices mean a

23 *Financial Izvestiya (FI)*, 13 February 1993.

24 *FI*, 12 March 1993.

Latin American type of transition, accompanied by either authoritarianism or high political and social instability caused by hyperinflation.

Failure of Foreign Trade

The collapse of the rouble has brought Russia to the point where it can no longer afford to import all goods needed. In 1992, imports fell to 40 per cent of the 1990 level.[25] Since domestic industry and agriculture are increasingly incapable of producing even sufficient basic goods, living standards are suffering. At the same time, due to this breakdown of their trade ties with the FSU, some sectors in Eastern European economies (e.g., Polish and Hungarian agriculture) are now over-producing, putting additional economic and social pressure on Eastern Europe – and the market of the European Union.

Russia's export performance is no better. Its net exports declined nearly 50 per cent in 1992,[26] mainly due to the severing of Russia's economic ties with the other CIS states. But exports to the West did not undergo any improvement either, partly as they came up against protectionist barriers.

Apart from the evident economic and social costs, further decline in Russia's foreign trade will create a more conservative political environment in Russia, with its foreign and security policies becoming more aggressive and/or isolationist. Under these circumstances, Russia might reverse its current foreign policy orientation and seek strategic deals with alternative partners such as China or India. At the same time, in striving for new markets, it could start to pursue an expansionist policy within the CIS, regarding it as the "natural" sphere of its economic interests. In general, the failure to involve Russia in the Western trade circuit could contribute to the emergence of a hostile and imperialistic Russia or to the development of a Russian alliance with the West's traditional rivals.

Failure of the First Round of Economic Reforms

The economic policies of the Gaidar government in 1992 and the successing Chernomyrdin cabinet in 1993 were mostly reactive to crises. None of the goals put forward by reformers have been achieved. Liberalization of prices did not lead to price stabilization. Industrial production has collapsed. The only element of reform providing some hope is the privatization program.

This "postponement" of reform in Russia, however, constitutes a major security risk, since the country and its CIS neighbors, which are highly dependent on the pace of the Russian reform, could simply get stuck midway between socialism and

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25 *The Economist*, 1 May 1993.

26 *Ibid.*

a market economy. In this case, they would get the worst of both worlds: factory managers who care little about efficiency since they would be bailed out by the government and banks as in the previous system of state-regulated management, and a population suffering from the inflation, unemployment and social insecurity inherent in the crippled market. This situation will result in social and political instability and will destroy the fragile system of cooperation between Russia and the West.

Failure of the First Western Aid Package

Less than $2 billion of the headline-seizing $24 billion in assistance, which the West promised Russia in 1992, has actually been disbursed. The glamorized 1992 Western assistance package was futile at best, having had even a negative impact since the resulting disillusionment among Russian elites has been used by the hard-line nationalist opposition in Russia to stress the futility of all cooperation with the West.

Unfortunately, the second Western aid package for a total of $43 billion, agreed upon in Tokyo in April 1993, seems to be of exactly the same nature: offering no new cash, no new investment, no money for restructuring and covering the social costs of reform. Though aid to Russia has become a prime-time issue in political debate both in the country and in the West, it will continue to be ineffective unless economics prevails over politics, while the suspicion of the Russian public will grow.

Moreover, Western aid delivered through international lending institutions is heavily conditioned by unrealistic targets, such as bringing inflation down to 5 per cent a month. If these criteria are not met, credits to the already shaky Russian enterprises will be choked, devastating the industrial heartland and causing mass unemployment. Intended as a lubricant, Western aid has, to some extent, become an irritant, as shown by the results of the last elections. The "insensitivity" of the IMF and the World Bank to Russia's problems[27] has become a point of Western criticism.

This economic chaos results in the dramatic growth of social inequality, provoking increasingly negative public reaction. Processes of marginalization are gaining momentum, surfacing in various forms of anti-social behavior: the dramatic growth of criminality, suicides, prostitution, and unprecedented corruption at all levels. Finally, social atomization, with extreme individualism, hostility and fear, and social apathy, are prevailing among the Russian population, obscuring the prospects for the emergence of a civil society, yet favoring the development of populist, radical, chauvinist and fascist trends.

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27 *FT*, 17 December 1993.

5. Military and Strategic Risks

Although the break-up of the Soviet army – along with the radical reduction of nuclear and conventional arms – was supposed to remove the Soviet military threat and enhance European security, this has not come about. The uncontrolled fragmentation of the Soviet military structure can create a security environment as dangerous as that which existed during the days of the Cold War. The post-Soviet military threat is no less substantial than the Soviet military threat, as the "debris" of the crumbled military structure includes:

- a number of national armies (including that of Russia), decaying and far less controlled than the Soviet army;
- groups of forces, armed formations and Red Army bases located outside the Russian territory in often hostile environments;
- disillusioned officers' corps with a dramatically lowered social status and divided along national and political lines;
- a growing number of paramilitary units and mercenary groups;
- the nuclear potential, the control of which has become an issue of heated intra-CIS debate;
- stocks of conventional arms that are now spreading throughout the ex-Soviet territory and are being sold to the Third World;
- the decaying military-industrial complex, employing millions of people and representing one of the major political forces on the post-Soviet scene;
- the arms trade, which is trying to adapt to the new security and economic environment and is much less controlled than in the Soviet days.

National Armies

The formal establishment of national armies in all ex-USSR states marked the beginning of a long transitory period in which armies are seeking to define their identity and place in domestic affairs,[28] while national security identities and military and strategic doctrines are missing. Even the CIS lacks a security identity, as the May 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security by no means forms a military alliance. This leaves a dangerous vacuum in particular in those post-Soviet states still having nuclear capabilities in which the West cannot be sure of future security arrangements.

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28 Russia's new military doctrine, approved by the president and made public in November 1993, still leaves many doubts and raises serious concerns, especially where it defines external security challenges to Russia ("enlargement of military blocs and alliances at the cost of Russia's security interests"). See: *Osnovnye polozheniya voennoi doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Guidelines of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation), in: *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Special Issue, 19 November 1993.

This situation is aggravated by the loss of centralized control over the stock of Soviet conventional arms due to the Russian leadership's decision to divide the military assets of the FSU. This has resulted in uncontrolled proliferation in unstable regions and states, both in CIS territory and beyond.

Obscure prospects for military reform in Russia and the sorry state of the Russian army add to this strategic uncertainty. The need for military reform is overshadowed by economic and social crisis and the continuing power struggle in the Russian political establishment. In reforming the army, any Russian leadership will have to come to grips with the huge deficit in financial and material resources.[29] Yet the personnel problem is equally urgent. At present the army suffers from low morale, depletion of the officer corps, internal ethnic tensions, and the growing shortage and declining quality of conscripts.[30] Added to this is the decaying social profile of the army, with a large part of the armed forces (notably the officers' corps) becoming increasingly marginalized.

From the point of view of European security, such armed forces pose a lesser threat in terms of major organized warfare. As ethnic tensions and low-intensity conflicts mount, however, such an army, lacking command, control, communications and discipline, can be regarded as a threat, since the risks of unwarranted participation of separate units in local conflicts (in Moldova, the Baltic states, the Kaliningrad area or even the Balkans), arms proliferation or nuclear blackmail are considerable.

The political stand of the Army is still an open question. Participation of the elite divisions in suppressing the attempted coup in Moscow in October 1993 and the substantial personnel losses seem to have further embittered the army and alienated it from current leaders. Also conspicuous was the hesitation of top-ranking officers to get involved on Mr Yeltsin's side. Moreover, the political preferences of the military leadership are not those of the entire army. Quite to the contrary, there is a growing gap between the generals in Moscow and local commanders and widespread mistrust against officers and General Grachev, who are regarded as incompetent and corrupt. As a result, political differentiation is beginning to prevail in the army, and political organizations and movements are emerging. Most of these are of a nationalist and pro-Soviet orientation. At the grass-root level, the armed forces are becoming politically charged, with some officers' assemblies getting out of their commanders' control.[31]

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29 See Mostvarona, "The Revision of Russian Military Policy and the Military Industrial Complex," in: *The International Spectator*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1993, p. 108.

30 See *Voyennaya mysl*, Special edition, July 1992, p. 47.

31 See Nina Bachkatov, "Une armée deboussolée et divisee," in: *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 1993, p. 16.

If dragged into politics, the Russian army will pose considerable security challenges. The following scenarios can be envisaged:

- The army takes power to replace discredited politicians and to prevent the break-up of Russia following the next show-down of political forces in Moscow or an institutional coup;
- The army is used by either the president or the opposition as an instrument to impose authoritarian rule in Russia;
- The army splits between the presidential party and the opposition, possibly provoking civil war;
- Overwhelmed by political unrest and social problems, army units act locally, completely breaking with Moscow, taking full possession of the arms at their disposal and forming alliances with local authorities in separatist regions. This would result in the growing disintegration of Russia and the possible emergence of a system of war lords on its territory.

Groups of Forces and Red Army Bases Located Outside Russian Territory

Another element posing a security threat are groups of forces, armed formations and Red Army bases located outside the Russian territory. First the future of the troops and the schedule of their withdrawal to the homeland are still unclear. There are no facilities or housing, no special programs to accommodate them in Russia. A second problem is the status of Russian troops in areas of ethnic conflict (Central Asia, Transcaucasian region, Moldova), in particular since 1993, when imperialistic trend towards neighboring areas gained momentum in Russian politics and these troops started to act in a more assertive manner. Currently Russian troops are a major force upholding pro-Moscow regimes in Georgia and Tajikistan. While this has contributed to relative stabilization in Georgia, in Tajikistan the armed conflict will recommence with renewed vigour when the high mountain passes open in the spring (especially if the conflict spreads to the territory of Gorny Badakhshan), reviving the spectre of the Afghan war in the eighties.

In the Baltic states, Russia is linking troop withdrawal to assurances of the civil rights of the Russian-speaking population. Its stance has become even more rigid after the nationalists' landslide victory in the December 1993 elections in Russia. So far, this situation has raised security concerns not only in the Baltic states, but also in Germany, Poland, Sweden and Finland. There is no fear of a direct military threat from Russia, but rather an increased feeling of insecurity in the region.

The economic and political changes under way have rendered autonomous another key element of the Soviet military structure: the military-industrial complex. Deeply affected by recent developments, the military-industrial complex has turned into an independent economic, social and political force forming the most effective lobby in the post-Soviet political system (the "Civic Union").

Economically, the military-industrial complex has suffered considerably from the conversion imposed since the late eighties, because these were made in a chaotic and voluntarily manner, sometimes ruining advanced production lines, jeopardizing the existence of entire industrial areas and creating discontent among the military and industrial executives and workers. Furthermore, the military-industrial complex has been the most vulnerable to the break in economic ties within the FSU, as its production was distributed to a far greater extent among the regions of the country than that of the civilian industries. Finally, budget constraints and economic austerity have caused a drastic reduction in military orders. The lack of financial resources and economic incentives for conversion (due to the reduced demand for durable goods) throws doubt upon the possibility of integrating the military sector into the nascent market economy.[32]

Another danger is the irretrievable loss of much of the FSU's technological and scientific potential, which was concentrated in the military-industrial sector. Companies are cancelling a large part of their R&D programs. If this devastating process continues (along with the massive brain drain of Russian scientists and engineers to other countries, including military regimes in Asia), Russia will degenerate into a Third World economy, with unpredictable consequences in the social, political, and security spheres.

The political future of the military-industrial complex is far from certain. Most likely it will not come to power directly, but remain a major force behind Russian politics. It will probably preserve enough leverage to influence decision-making in Moscow and the provinces to "correct" and sometimes formulate the political, economic and military course of the government. It will strive to slow down the pace of economic reforms and to preserve state planning as much as possible. In foreign policy, it will give free rein to its traditional distrust of the West and favor the restoration of a "strong Russia," thus contributing to the emergence of imperialist and militarist trends within the Russian leadership.

32 Mostvarona, "Revision of Russian Military Policy," pp. 114-120.

The break-up of the centralized military structure and planning has also resulted in the "liberalization" of the arms trade on the former Soviet territory, which is much less "discriminating" in terms of clients and procedure. At the state level, support for and expansion of weapons exports have been declared top priorities.[33] While encouraging the arms trade in general, Russian authorities claim to have tightened regulations on the export of arms, technology, licenses and sensitive materials. In the current atmosphere of crisis and corruption, however, control is largely nominal.[34] The state trade monopoly is eroding and agencies specializing in the arms trade are proliferating all over the territory of the former USSR; control over final destinations of arms exports has become dangerously loose.

III. Alternative Scenarios

1. Russian Scenarios

1.1 Continuation of Present Trends

In this scenario, the political stalemate in the high echelons of power will continue, parties will maintain their low profile, and there will be no political force or positive ideology capable of consolidating the society and winning the upper hand in the power struggle. Even though President Yeltsin has managed to have the constitution adopted, "trench warfare" with the opposition will continue. The Russian leadership will not enjoy much popular support or have a stable social base; a strategic perspective or prominent new leaders are not likely to appear soon; the policies of the Kremlin will be ambiguous, hesitant, and formulated behind the scenes – far away from democratic procedures.

Thus, regional separatism will further gain momentum, not leading to full political and economic separation of autonomous republics and provinces, but rather to a situation of "dual power" in which nominal rights will be vested in Moscow while real authority is concentrated in the provinces.

Economic reform will proceed unevenly, greatly complicated by cabinet struggles, regional separatism and claims from decaying industries. There will be some progress in privatizations, but monetary mechanisms will hardly start working. Russia will balance on the brink of hyperinflation. Social differentiation will grow, accompanied by growing marginalization and social tensions. Mass unemployment, however, can probably be avoided or compensated by greater social dynamism.

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33 See President Yeltsin's interview in *Izvestiya*, 22 February 1992.

34 Mostvarona, "Revision of Russian Military Policy."

Russia's foreign policy will take on a lower profile than in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Cooperation with the West will be limited by domestic problems. In fact, the West may gradually become "bored" with Russia's insurmountable problems and lose interest in the country. Only the most urgent issues will stay on the agenda: control of the army, nuclear facilities, etc. In conflicts in the FSU, some of which will concern the status of the Russian-speaking population, Russia will use political leverage and economic sanctions and may occasionally resort to military force while trying to win the moral support of the West and the endorsement of international institutions such as the UN and the OSCE for its actions.

All this means that the current unstable balance will continue in almost all spheres and immobility will prevail. Given the extreme tensions and instability in Russia today, this statement may come as a surprise. Yet over the last three years, Russia as well as some other post-Soviet states have shown an astounding degree of adaptability to crisis. As has occurred many times throughout its history (the Tartar yoke, the interregnum of the early 17th century, the reforms of Peter the Great, the Civil War of 1918-1922, World War II), the economic and social shock is being absorbed by the populace without any visible political change due to a rather shapeless social structure and the age-old tradition of tolerance.

This leads to an ambiguous forecast: Russia will not collapse, but no positive solution will appear in the foreseeable future either. Slow decay and painful transformations will go hand in hand. This process can be called a crisis development of the state comparable to some Latin American countries, with an unstable political regime, populist tendencies, and hyperinflation. As a result, it may take at least a decade or two before Russia emerges as a democratic country with a market economy, and as a reliable security partner.

This scenario is not the worst in terms of security, but it does not promise stability and predictability either. In the years to come, Russia will remain a suspended, yet constant security threat on Europe's edge: a nuclear power and major military force with unclear intentions, complicated domestic policies and foreign and security policies influenced by multiple interest groups; a country producing scores of refugees and migrants that will raise justified security concerns in the CIS states and Eastern Europe and will be unable to cooperate with the West on security issues. In a certain sense, this scenario is the most challenging for the West, as it will require an extremely flexible strategy and security policy and adaptation to living with a permanently unstable political regime in Russia.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point Scale: 8 points

The seeds of this scenario, also known as "corporative capitalism," are contained in the new constitution carefully tailored by President Yeltsin. The president is both head of state and chief executive, with the power to nominate all senior officials and judges. The rights of the new legislature are largely suspended. Given the traditions of Russian history, the fragility of democratic mechanisms, and Boris Yeltsin's clearly authoritarian inclinations, this may mark the beginning of a fundamental breach in the delicate balance of powers, the total decline of the legislative branch, and, finally, a gradual shift towards a harsh authoritarian or even totalitarian regime. If such a regime is established, it could even sacrifice reforms to stay in power.

However, a "tzar Boris" authoritarian scenario is hardly feasible, as this runs counter to the interests of the ruling political elite: authoritarianism will transform into oligarchy.[35] The regime, representing state bureaucracy, the military, state military industry and resources industries, will have strong connections with trade and financial capital as well as with clandestine criminal activities. Corruption and state bribes will flourish. Such an oligarchy, lasting 15 to 20 years, would be a slow and crippled variant of a capitalist transformation, hampered by obsolete post-totalitarian political institutions and underdeveloped infrastructure. Once again, this brings to mind the "Latin American way."[36] Surprisingly enough, this scenario suits well both the current regime in Moscow and a part of the opposition, which could be effectively integrated into the ruling elite. Ideologists of the opposition (like Sergei Kurginyan) have long been speaking of the "corporative state" and "stock-market socialism" ruled by big capital.

Such authoritarian/oligarchic trends will inevitably be projected into the foreign policy and security spheres. Rather than leading to open aggressiveness on Russia's part, such trends are likely to result in isolationism and a more suspicious attitude towards the outside world. Institutional links with the West will probably be restricted. The security profile of authoritarian Russia will be quite similar to that of China: a nuclear power at the heart of Eurasia, with regional and global ambitions.

The probability of this scenario is slightly lower than a continuation of present trends. Whatever political regime takes shape in Moscow, it will face the problems of disintegration, regional separatism and low manageability of the country.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 6-7 points

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35 Alexei Pushkov, "Trouble to Come if Yeltsin Can't Build Consensus," in: *IHT*, 3 December 1993.

36 Leonid Batkin, "*Uroki oktyabrya*" (The Lessons of October), in: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 41, 13 October 1993.

1.3 The "Red and Brown" Alternative and/or a Military Coup

This scenario implies the violent (or possibly institutional) ascent to power of a "united opposition" (extreme right and extreme left), in conditions of rising popular discontent with government policies with also the strong support of or even a dominant role for the armed forces. The driving force of the coup could be the lumpen part of the working class, a part of the peasantry and the old nomenklatura, supported by representatives of the military-industrial complex and the security establishment. Recent parliamentary elections in Russia clearly indicate that such a possibility exists and that its social base is widening.

In such a scenario economic reforms would be abandoned, while a state-dominated economic and administrative system and curbs on democracy would be introduced. Internal opposition against such a general drift towards totalitarianism would be oppressed.

Since "national-patriots" view global developments as a continuation of Russia's confrontation with a hostile international environment, they favor retention of a strong nuclear potential (which implies revision of START-I and START-II). Breaking links with the West, which, in their view, wants to destroy Russian statehood, enslave Russia and turn it into a Western colony for the production of raw materials, they will instead renew military opposition to "Western imperialism." The nationalists' foreign policy agenda envisions as well a *rapprochement* with China on an ideological basis, though it is highly doubtful that Peking would welcome such a development.

In the December 1993 elections, channelling popular resentment against reform into a parliamentary form, these forces enjoyed varied support, from 10-15 per cent in Moscow and St. Petersburg, to 30-40 per cent in Siberia and the Russian Far East, to as much as 50-60 per cent in the conservative rural belt around Moscow.[37] Three things, however, must be taken into consideration. First, the elections were mostly a protest vote and therefore do not indicate sound popular support for the nationalists' slogans (as these parties had hardly any program at all). The number of real faithfuls is probably no more than 15 per cent of the populace. Second, the opposition is split and will hardly be capable of coordinated action on the national level. Third, the opposition will still be lacking political leverage on the national level: it does not have a clear-cut majority in the legislature and will not have a strong say in the government unless its representatives abandon their radicalism. Russia's political future will be dominated by the center, with both left and right radicals having marginal influence. At the same time, staying on the margins of political life could be the very goal of the opposition: it will not have to take responsibility for the hard economic choices and the unavoidable further

37 *FT*, 15 December 1993.

decline of living standards, while it will be able to criticize the government in parliament and to consolidate its social base. This is especially true of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who will remain a political critic on the sidelines but not a government figure. Instead of tarnishing his image with responsibility for the hard times ahead, he will use his power base in the *Duma* to launch a bid for the presidential election, which must be held by 12 June 1996.

This means that the "red and brown" threat owns little probability in the coming months, though it could gain momentum probably by 1995-1996, provided the government proves incapable of coping with the economic and social crisis. Instead of "saving" Russia, the coming to power of the opposition would result in the country's renewed international isolation, more acute internal conflicts and perhaps civil wars and military conflicts with neighboring states. However, such a regime would have to concentrate on suppressing internal opposition rather than on contemplating external expansion and would most probably have a short life-span.

From the security point of view, this is a distressing scenario, returning the Euro-Atlantic system to the times of the Cold War with the front line of military-political confrontation this time not in Western Europe, but on Russia's Western frontiers. This will bring about a much more hostile military posture in Russia including the return of the troops that were withdrawn beyond the Urals in the early 1980s to the European part of Russia and deployment of Western forces in Central and Eastern Europe, along with firm security guarantees to the states of the region.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 3 points

1.4 Economic Collapse, Social Chaos, Complete Disintegration of Russia

The short-term probability of this scenario is extremely low; but this does not mean that it cannot emerge in the longer run. As a matter of fact, most of the scenarios mentioned can develop into this one. If events in Russia take such a chaotic turn, they will inevitably provoke similar developments in other ex-USSR states, including Ukraine. The entire FSU could turn into a geopolitical "black hole" with instability spreading to all neighboring regions, including Europe.

In this case, the security risks for the West will be as high, if not higher, than those of the previous scenario. A nationalist regime can be deterred by military means, but it is much more difficult to prevent the spread of instability. A massive military and institutional re-arrangement of the Euro-Atlantic system, possibly including the erection of a new iron Curtain between Europe and the FSU area would be the most realistic option. Strategies of containment and roll-back will be implemented once again, though this time directed at instability.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 2 points

1.5 The Break-up of Russia into Separate Regions

This scenario is totally different from the others, as it implies a radical change of rules in the post-Soviet political game. Regionalization could contribute to the development of a totally new political system in Russia with the regions becoming the long-awaited "third force" able to fill the power vacuum and to slow down conflict-bearing trends. Assuming that self-determination of regions will proceed in a non-conflictual manner, in a number of years a new political structure could take shape in Russia, based on the principle of division of the major state functions in a sort of a three-tier structure: with a unitarian security level with a strong monocentric vertical structure; a federative economic level based on a horizontal network of administrative centers; and a polycentric level of social, political, regional, administrative, ethnic and cultural relations following a confederative concept.

This model is attractive in that it provides some kind of reliable security framework which would be acceptable to the West, as well. Yet, it might take a number of years before such a structure emerges, thus evoking a turbulent and risky period in which the conflicting interests of the provinces and the center would have to be harmonized. Therefore, immediate security risks in the "regional scenario" would be rather high.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 3 points

2. Commonwealth Scenarios

2.1 Dissolution of the CIS under Conditions of Relative Stability

This scenario could become reality if changes in the CIS regimes or general disappointment in the effectiveness of the CIS were to drive a number of countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Turkmenistan) to gradually reduce their level of participation in the Commonwealth and re-orient their foreign policies towards other countries. Most probably, however, dissolution of the CIS could not take place unless Russia were to cause it.

The security implications of this scenario are relatively low. So far, the CIS has failed to provide a security framework for post-Soviet states, and dissolution of this loose structure would not change much in security terms. The only risk under these circumstances is a "multipolarization" of post-Soviet foreign and security policies. As their membership in the OSCE is largely nominal, a number of countries, like the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan, would be seeking their security identities outside the Euro-Atlantic security framework and the West would lose leverage in these regions. In this case, the only possible link with these unstable coun-

tries could be Turkey. Yet, Turkey itself could be tempted by such an opportunity since the nationalist opposition is already promoting a pan-Turkic ideology. Such a development could endanger the unity of NATO, and weaken the Euro-Atlantic security system on the southern rim.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 3 points

2.2 Radical Transformation of the CIS through Russian Imperialism

These events could be prompted either by the imperialist ambitions of an authoritarian regime in Moscow (see scenario two), or, what is more likely, by the establishment of an openly imperialistic hard-line regime in Russia (see scenario three).

The new regime could attempt to restore the Soviet Union, first of all, by some sort of annexation of territories in which the population has expressed the wish to join Russia (South Ossetiya, Abkhazia, Transdniester, North Kazakhstan, etc.). The consequences of changing the present borders within the CIS are quite evident: complete disintegration of the Commonwealth, dramatic deterioration of Russia's relations with neighboring countries, militarization and the establishment of authoritarian regimes in most post-Soviet countries. A restoration of the Soviet Union is hardly possible especially in the west of the FSU like in the Baltic states and Moldova, but "Greater Russia" could prove to be a viable option, especially since imperialist trends started to gain momentum in Russia in late 1993.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 4 points

2.3 Economic Collapse and Civil Wars on the Territory of the FSU

As the entire post-Soviet area, including the Baltic states, is vitally dependent on the course of events in Russia, this scenario is mostly contingent on the proviso of an economic collapse and chaos in Russia. In the event of such developments, the entire post-Soviet area would turn into a geopolitical "black hole," "sucking in" neighboring regions, including Europe. In this situation, security risks for the West would be the highest, demanding a massive military and institutional rearrangement of the Euro-Atlantic system and the development of mechanisms to contain instability.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 2 points

2.4 A Freeze on the CIS and the Emergence of Alternative Mechanisms of Integration

This is an extrapolation of the first Russian scenario assuming the continuation of current trends and therefore close to current developments. While much of the real political cooperation takes place on a bilateral basis, the Commonwealth only exists in a "suspended" form. In addition to the non-binding and non-working Collective Security Agreement of May 1992 a series of bilateral security/military and friendship/cooperation agreements have been concluded, the most recent one being between Russia and hitherto irredentist Georgia. Many economic and political links in the post-Soviet area have been restored at the grass-root local level by means of treaties between separate regions, districts and enterprises.

The most likely tendency will be the preservation of a low-profile CIS as a symbol and possibly as an instrument for slowing disintegration, while alternative bilateral and "grass-root" mechanisms of cooperation or even re-integration emerge. Once again, this scenario would be strongly stimulated by neo-imperialist trends in Russia. Using the stick and the carrot – low oil prices, or simply writing off debts (Ukraine), direct subsidies (Kyrgyzstan), indirect support to Russian minorities (Moldova, Kazakhstan), military support for shaky regimes (Georgia), direct intervention to rebuff the "Islamic threat" (Tajikistan), etc. – Russia would pursue its own "Monroe Doctrine" and gradually move to restore what it claims to be its natural sphere of interests.

Assessment of probability on a 10-point scale: 8 points

IV. The Forecast

Actual developments in the FSU will be much more complicated than described in the scenarios above. However, one can try to envisage the most likely combination of scenarios for the next few years.

For Russia, this will be a combination of scenario 1 (continuation of present trends) and scenario 2 (authoritarian/oligarchic regime, corporative capitalism). Although a strong presidency has been established and Boris Yeltsin has been granted authoritarian powers, this regime will be challenged by its growing inefficiency and by the independence of Russia's provinces. There will be certain authoritarian trends, but no instruments to implement them, and Russia will continue along the same lines of slow decay, painful transformation, and what was previously called "crisis development" of the Latin American type. Most likely, a situation of "dual power" – with an authoritarian/oligarchic regime in Moscow compromised with independent elites in the provinces – will be preserved, in which neither will challenge the other's authority. Meanwhile, a crippled

corporative market will emerge, accompanied by high inflation and latent social unrest. It will take at least two decades to complete these transformations.

As for the CIS, scenario 4 (freezing of the CIS and the emergence of alternative mechanisms of integration) is the most likely one. Exactly as in Russia, painful transformations will continue without real institutional progress or any political force able to break the inter-state stalemate. Occasional economic, political and low-intensity military crises including ethnic conflicts will take place, striking a new balance of forces on the post-Soviet scene. Meanwhile, bilateral and local cooperation will continue, weaving a delicate network of new economic and political links. The post-Soviet area will emerge as a complex and highly dynamic system of old animosities, fragile new links, and temporary bargains, in which Russia is bound to play a dominant role and to ensure its presence by economic, diplomatic and military means.

In 10 to 15 years, a more stable configuration strongly influenced by Russia (though not necessarily a Soviet Union, or a Russian Empire) will emerge on the territory of the CIS. Until then, the security environment in the FSU, Europe, and the wider Euro-Atlantic milieu will be overshadowed by uncertainty and unpredictability, which seems to be the main security challenge for the West.

3. Independent Ukraine: The Search for Security

Oleg Strekal

I. Ukrainian Independence

After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, Ukrainian politicians and political analysts shared the conviction that the country, lacking allies, would have to co-exist and cooperate with an unstable international environment. Several factors were identified as causing the instability of the external environment: i) the appearance of new independent states with unspecified national interests, unstable political systems and a lack of experience for civilized conflict-resolution; ii) the political chaos in Russia and the unclear fate of democratic reforms there; iii) the high potential for territorial disputes, as interstate borders between many countries were defined arbitrarily; iv) the economic crisis in the region which could serve as a trigger for ethnic and social conflicts.[1]

Ukraine was seen by its leadership as a stable island in a sea of instability. Ukrainian leaders felt that the decisive advantages of their country included the absence of ethnic conflicts, effective civil control over the military and a good potential for economic reforms. The results of the referendum, held in December 1991 (96 per cent of voters supported Ukrainian independence at that time), were considered a sign of national identity and of public support for the country's political system.

These advantages, as well as a significant intellectual and industrial potential and the country's natural resources, persuaded political leaders that Ukraine's role was to be a stabilizing factor in the region as, above all, a balance to Russia's "imperial ambitions."[2] Ukrainian politicians argued that Ukraine could be a lever exerting a civilizing influence on Russia. "Western politicians have to recognize that Ukraine is their reliable partner in preventing disturbances coming from Russia," said Vyacheslav Chornovil, head of the *Ruch*, Ukraine's largest democratic party, in a February 1993 speech delivered to the Center for Security and International Studies in Washington.[3]

Speaking of Ukraine's ability to restrain a potential Russian "imperial syndrome," some representatives of the Ukrainian military speculated that "under a

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1 Alexander Goncharenko (ed.), *Ukraine's National Security: History and Current Trends*, Kiev: Ukrainian Institute of World Economy and International Affairs, 1993, pp. 68-81.

2 Sergiy Pyrozhkov, "The National Interests of Ukraine," in: *Viche*, No. 11, 1992, pp. 15-17.

3 Cited in *Khreshchatyk*, 10 March 1993, p. 3.



E. = Estonia; K = Kaliningrad; La. = Latvia; Lit. = Lithuania
Ma. = F.Y.R. of Macedonia; M. = Moldova; N = Norway;

geostrategical aspect a neutral and militarily powerful Ukraine could serve as a zone of military security for its Western neighbors against threats from the East."[4]

As became clear at the beginning of 1994, however, all concepts for Ukraine as a regional stabilizer were unrealistic. With a collapsing economy and a separatist conflict in Crimea, Ukraine has lost its capabilities for pacifying the region and has become part of the belt of instability lying along the Russian border from the Transdniester region to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

There are several reasons for this development. First of all, national consensus on independence and a Ukrainian road to statehood have disappeared. Ukraine has lost the advantage it had during the early period of sovereignty when the idea of independence was the main pacifier of social tensions, and the main pillar for nation- and state-building. The main reason for this failure has been the "ideological approach" to state-building and ignorance of the economic aspects of independence. As Ivan Pliyschch, the former Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament put it in August 1993, "We paid too much attention to the formal aspects of building the state. We were late with the social and economic improvement of social life, although that is the major aspect which will decide the fate of Ukraine."[5] The controversies between Ukraine and Russia concerning Ukraine's independence have been deepened by domestic controversy over this issue. The results of the parliamentary elections (March-April 1994) revealed the deep division between eastern and western Ukraine. The eastern part of the country voted for communists and for close ties with Russia. In Western Ukraine the electorate supported national democrats and their idea to westernize the country.

The second reason for the growing instability in Ukraine is linked to security. It has gradually become clear that the national security instruments which were being created during the first two years of Ukraine's independence, including the armed forces, military cooperation with neighbor states, participation in international security structures, and security guarantees from the nuclear states, have not developed into comprehensive security concept and, moreover, do not meet the most acute Ukrainian need to lessen Ukraine's dependence on Russia and to diminish the potential Russian threat.

The third reason is that the most dangerous threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity and state sovereignty have emerged not from the outside but from within the country. Internal developments, such as economic crises and separatist movements in the Crimean Republic have endangered Ukraine's national security much more than external threats.

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4 See the proceedings of the international conference "European Security: The Central-European Component," Kiev, June/July 1993, pp. 15-16.

5 *Uriadovy Kurier*, 26 August 1993, p. 2.

The new Ukrainian leadership which came into power in the first half of 1994 after the parliamentary and presidential elections has started to implement a more assertive national security policy. The policy's underlying idea is to eliminate Western-oriented euphoria and to develop closer ties with the Russian Federation. Although the new Ukrainian leaders do not question the idea of Ukraine's independence, it remains to be seen whether an independent status can be maintained while establishing closer ties to Russia.

Consequently, Ukraine's place and role in the European security system again appears to be an open question. Unlike in previous years Ukraine is currently looking eastward for solutions to its security problems. The country's search for common security within the framework of the CIS will heavily influence the future of the European security system.

II. Ukraine's Security Challenges

Security challenges to Ukraine can be divided into several interconnected groups: political and regional instability, which could both cause the disintegration of the country; economic crisis, which spawns severe social unrest and could lead to the collapse of the very idea of the country's independence; and the possibility of ethnic rivalries on Ukrainian soil. This article will also deal with military and military-related challenges to Ukraine's security resulting from Ukraine's lack of sufficient power.

1. Political Instability

Political stability in Ukraine is influenced by several closely related factors. The major ones are:

- the process of reforming the former Soviet institutional structures of state power on the basis of democratic principles;
- coordination among the various branches of power in Ukraine;
- the formation of local and national political and economic elites;
- the creation of a civil society based on private property and the development of relations between this civil society and the state.

Developments in these fields have been complicated by the absence of a comprehensive system for governing an independent state as a result of the former subordination of Ukrainian state institutions to the Soviet government in Moscow. In fact, the lack of functioning institutions with which to run the state has both contributed to failures in Ukrainian internal policies and to delays in the process of democratic reform.

The process of democratic reform has nevertheless been successful to some extent. Legislative power in the country is vested in the democratically elected

parliament. The Ukrainian president, elected by the whole nation, represents the executive branch of state power. Reforms of the judicial branch are currently under way. During the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine, however, witnessed competition between the system of local Soviets and presidential representatives in the regions, complicating the system of governance as a whole. On the national level, these disputes were reflected in the discussions concerning the new Ukrainian constitution with the leaders of parliament supporting a version of the constitution limiting presidential power and making the president a figurehead rather than the chief of the Ukrainian executive. Parliament also discussed a law on local administration, by which the Soviets would become the only institutions of local governance, while the presidential administrations would be closed.[6]

Since August 1994 the new Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has introduced his specific concept of the principles of Ukraine's state administration by decree.[7] According to these decrees, the heads of the local Soviets are subordinated to the president of Ukraine in their executive activities. In addition, President Kuchma strengthened his control over the cabinet of ministers.[8] The broadening of presidential responsibilities has limited the powers of the Ukrainian parliament and contributed to intensive disputes between the two branches of government, in the course of which President Kuchma made it clear that he is ready to dissolve parliament if its members continue to seek additional powers instead of concentrating on legislative work. As a result, coordination of the executive and legislative powers has become difficult and controversial. The president and parliament compete with each other over the division of powers at the local level and over control of the cabinet of ministers.

Leonid Kuchma's election as Ukraine's president also marked a new stage in the process of the formation of local and national political and economic elites. The presidential elections reflected the lack of political leaders and public forces capable of managing the state properly. The low professional level and political inexperience of both presidential candidates and the new presidential administration demonstrated the inadequacy of Ukraine's national leaders for the task of nation- and state-building. Furthermore, Kuchma's victory caused a change in the national political elites and triggered a struggle between the high-ranking representatives of the former communist *nomenklatura* and Kuchma's supporters, generally local political leaders or representatives of the technical intelligentsia.

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6 "The Parliament discusses the division of powers," in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 4 February 1994, p. 3.

7 *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Daily Report*, No. 150, 9 August 1994, p. 3.

8 See the presidential decrees in: *Kyivska Pravda*, 11 August 1994, p. 1.

This struggle appears to be most acute in the economic sphere, in which disputes for control over state property, foreign trade and finance continue. In order to overcome the opposition of the representatives of the former Ukrainian government, President Kuchma put many of them under criminal investigation for corruption and blackmarketeering. And to bring order into the system of state governance, he has created special investigative groups directly subordinate to him. Moreover, President Kuchma has come out against penal immunity for members of parliament, as many former and current deputies are suspected of using their immunity to escape legal responsibility for economic wrongdoings.

Although the creation of a civil society has been proclaimed the pivotal goal of Ukrainian democratic reforms, current developments seem to be missing the target. The state continues to be reluctant to support the new independent civil institutions and does not accept any criticism from their side. The lack of transparency in the activities of the Ukrainian state administration is contributing to keeping Ukrainian society out of national policy-making, thus strengthening the probability of political radicalism and extremism on the part of a neglected society and its leaders.

2. Regional Instability

The problem of regional instability in Ukraine is manifested above all in the problems of social instability and secessionist tendencies. The main reasons for these social tensions are well known: more than 80 per cent of the Ukrainian population lives in poverty; about 40 per cent of a workforce of 25 million people is unemployed or under-employed; the system of social welfare does not cover the basic needs, not even of the workers of the main branches of industry, who have become potentially radical groups. So far, these shortcomings have led mainly to demonstrations and strikes without causing major social conflicts. But the situation has become more unstable since the formerly chaotic social protest movement has now formulated its own political goals.

Consequently, the second most important aspect of Ukraine's internal stability are secessionist movements within the region. This aspect is of even greater importance today. Social discontent and protest have increasingly strengthened those political forces which call for secession from the rule of the central government. The power of these moves toward regional independence or self-governance will be crucial for the fate of Ukraine's statehood and will to a large extent determine the probability of full-scale social conflicts.

Secessionist tendencies are enhanced by several factors:

- The society is alienated by the varying attitudes towards the idea of independence and the manner in which this concept has been and may be developed.

This division is primarily political rather than ethnic. Ukraine lacks an adequate concept of state and territorial order. There are two competing approaches to this matter: a federal one represented by some regional leaders in eastern Ukraine; and a unitarian one, represented by the central government and the national-democratic opposition. This approach is supported largely in the western part of the country.

- Different perceptions of Russia's role in Ukrainian affairs have divided the society into pro- and anti-Russian camps. The line of division between these camps coincides with the geographical border between eastern and western Ukraine. In the political sphere, the forces in parliament that support closer ties with Russia outnumber the nationalists who see the future of Ukraine primarily with the West. Also apart from these controversies, dependence on Russia, both political and economic, is considered by various political forces as a trigger for probable internal clashes.
- The shifts toward local economic independence and self-governance could lead to the regions' economic and, later, political self-isolation. The concept of regional rights, if implemented, would favor the economically developed regions, such as Donbass, while putting the rural *oblasts* (provinces) at a financial disadvantage.

These factors affect different parts of the country to different degrees.

(1) Western Ukraine

In western Ukraine, where the most active supporters of Ukraine's independence and a unitarian state system are located, the Russian-oriented politics of the central government and the "non-patriotic" trends in the east, have caused the emergence of political radicalism and ultra-radicalism. This takes different forms, from actions of civil disobedience to the mobilization of groups of fighters for the struggle against "traitors to the nation." Political radicalism has strengthened as western Ukraine has lost its influence in formulating the country's internal and external policies. While the probability of conflict between western and eastern Ukraine remains extremely low, political radicalism and extremism could provoke a reaction of radical pro-Russian groups in different parts of Ukraine and could speed up the process of regional disintegration.

(2) Eastern and Southern Ukraine

Eastern and southern Ukraine, the most important economic regions in the country, are examples of the unsolved problem of regional self-determination. Here ideas of a federal status for Ukraine and of close economic-political coopera-

tion with the CIS and, above all, Russia are supported by the majority of the population. Moreover, the region tries to achieve its political goals through economic and political pressure on the central government. For example, the leaders of the Donetsk-Pridneprovie Economic Union, after taking control of a significant part of state-owned property, aimed their efforts at the creation of federal land in their region. But the economic and political interests of this area are likely to be oriented toward the east.

(3) Crimea

Crimea is a specific issue of Ukraine's regional policy. The policy of the Crimean leadership, aimed at Crimea's separation as an autonomous republic from Ukraine, turned the area into a flash point. Today, as in the spring of 1992, when the Crimean parliament adopted the "separatist" version of the Crimean constitution, the main topic of the Ukrainian-Crimean dispute is the question of its administrative status as an autonomous republic.

Ukraine's position concerning Crimea was clarified in a decree issued by the Ukrainian parliament on 24 February 1994.[9] This document reiterates that Crimea is a part of Ukraine with numerous special rights in the economic, social, and cultural spheres, but that the Crimean constitution must not contradict the Ukrainian constitution. Therefore the new Crimean constitution has to be considered as illegal as it changes the borders of Ukraine without the consent of the entire nation. The document also stresses that Crimea does not possess state sovereignty and cannot enter into political relations with foreign countries; that Crimean citizenship cannot be separated from Ukrainian citizenship; and lastly, that the Crimean republic cannot have its own military forces or financial and monetary systems.

However, in glaring disregard of Ukrainian decrees, President Yuriy Meshkov continues to prepare changes in Crimea's status and to set up a system of administration for an independent Crimean state.[10] A Crimean state bank and customs services are being set up, and relations undertaken with foreign capitals. Although President Meshkov has not raised the question of joining Russia since taking office, he is interested in establishing close political, economic and military ties with the Russian Federation to be legally confirmed by a political-military pact.[11] In Meshkov's view, Crimea should join the CIS as an independent and equal partner instead of becoming a Russian province. President Meshkov would like to

9 See the text of the parliamentary decree in: *Golos Ukrainy* (GU), 1 March 1994, p. 2.

10 See the interview with Evgeny Saburov, the Vice Prime Minister of the Crimean government, in: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 4 March 1994, p. 2.

11 "Would America Pacify Us?," in: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 1 April 1994, p. 1.

decide on military issues as well. He has created the Crimean Council for Defense and ordered local conscripts to serve only on the territory of the peninsula.[12]

In support of his position, in May 1994 the Crimean parliament once again adopted the "separatist" variant of the Crimean constitution which had been voted down by the Ukrainian legislature in the spring of 1992. Moreover, at the end of June 1994 the Crimean parliament issued a decree which introduced the supremacy of Crimean laws over Ukrainian laws on the peninsula's territory.[13] To emphasize the gravity of this political step, members of parliament in Simferopol warned the central authorities that they would hold a referendum on Crimea's status in the event of any negative reaction from the Ukrainian capital.

The Crimean conflict has been complicated by the political struggle between President Meshkov and the Crimean parliament. After the parliament rejected the president's right to issue orders without parliamentary approval and threatened to topple the current Crimean government, President Meshkov dissolved the institution by decree in September 1994. These controversies between the legislative and executive branches of power in Crimea could become disruptive, since both parties have stated that they will not hesitate to use all means available to defend their positions. This situation makes things even less manageable for the central government in Kiev, as it has no clear idea with whom to deal on the peninsula. But at the same time, the split in the Crimean leadership may be to the Ukraine government's advantage as it is weakening its political competitors.

The current situation in Ukraine is thus characterized by four different types of regional developments. The most disruptive are, of course, in Crimea.[14] Eastern and southern Ukraine are of less concern because they still support the idea of a federal system. Although local leaders are still looking for a political dialogue with Kiev, they could, however, choose more radical methods if their demands for a federal system are ignored by the central leadership and rejected by Ukrainian nationalists. The position of central Ukraine is ambiguous and unclear. Although politically indifferent, it is granting economic preferences, especially in food supplies, to Russia. Western Ukraine strongly supports the concept of a unitarian state system, but excessively radical steps in this direction could hurt Ukraine's integrity rather than defend it.

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12 Press conference of the Ukrainian President and the Minister of Defense, Ukrainian Television – Channel 1, 23 March 1994.

13 The News Program, in: *Radio Ukraine World Service*, 3 July 1994.

14 One could argue, however, that the intentions of the Crimean leadership to develop Crimean relations with Ukraine on the basis of an agreement could be seen as a model for a future federal system in the country.

3. The Economic Dimension

The economic crisis in Ukraine has long been treated by the country's leadership as an issue of primarily external politics. Economic dependence on Russia and Russian economic and political blackmail were felt to be the main reasons for Ukraine's economic decline. The only way of escaping from Russian influence was by establishing alternative cooperative links and by replacing Russian oil and gas deliveries with deliveries from Iran and Central Asia.

But these goals have not been achieved. Quite to the contrary, oil and gas deliveries from Russia contributed to the increase in the budget deficit, Ukraine's key economic problem.[15] The debt to Russia constituted most of Ukraine's 1994 budget deficit: in the first quarter of 1994 alone, Ukraine owed Russia $900 million for oil and gas. To cover this debt, the Ukrainian government decided to sell to the Russian state company Gasprom equity shares in Ukrainian national oil and gas pipelines, the only valuable asset of Ukraine's state infrastructure. The debt has also been "covered" by political concessions to Russia. For instance, Kiev has softened its position on the problem of the location of the Black Sea Fleet, and has started to negotiate the issue of Ukraine's participation in the protection of the external borders of the CIS.

The economic decline is fuelling disintegrationist sentiments in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, thus endangering Ukrainian stability from within. In addition, Ukraine will probably have to yield a significant part of its independence to Russia: as long as Ukraine consumes Russian resources without paying for them, another kind of payment must be found, and one solution could be Ukraine's acknowledgment of Russian predominance in the region and its adhesion to Russian policies in external affairs.

As a result, some Western experts feel that economic instability has a broader security dimension, as it could tempt Russia to use Ukraine's difficulties to gain control over the country. Indeed, "reforms will involve high social and economic costs ... An imperial Russia might try to exploit the resultant social unrest." At the same time, others feel that, by leading Ukraine toward economic disaster, its leaders are even playing into the hands of those political forces in Russia that have never accepted Ukrainian independence.[16] Such a pessimistic view has also been outlined by the US Central Intelligence Agency: "The Ukrainian populace would swiftly divide along ethnic and geographical lines, with the Russian minority in the country's eastern region pressing for secession and the Ukrainian majority in the

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15 "The Birth and Possible Death of a Country," in: *The Economist*, 7 May 1994, pp. 3-18.

16 For the first view, see: Sam Nunn, "Ukraine's Go-Slow Leaders Hurt Their Own Cause," in: *The International Herald Tribune* (IHT), 5 January 1994. The second aspect is mentioned by Ian Brzezinski in his article "Don't Push Kiev, Help It," in: *IHT*, 5 January 1994.

Western region seeking not only to remain independent, but also to prevent the eastern territory from returning to Moscow's control."[17]

Only at a rather late stage has the Ukrainian leadership come to identify these factors as two internal economic dimensions to national security, as government officials felt that the possible consequences of the economic crisis and a further lowering of living standards could lead to civil disobedience, social protests and upheaval. This has forced them to give up the liberal model of economic reform and to opt for the so-called social-oriented market economy which in practice means prolonging state control over the economy and society. This change is also due to the second dimension of economic security, the ineffective structure of industry, the breakdown of cooperative links with former partners, and a drastic fall in industrial production. Only since October 1993 have these problems of economic and democratic reform moved to the top of Ukraine's national security agenda.[18] Yet, even after these threats were eventually defined, the Ukrainian leadership appeared to be incapable of coming up with appropriate responses. Economic and political reforms continue to represent an unwelcome task for the Ukrainian government.

As a result, the Ukrainian leadership did not connect the issue of reforms with the possible disintegration of the country for a long time. For instance, the fact that Crimea was dependent on Ukraine for energy and water supplies, industrial products, etc. was considered by Kiev as the best possible restraining factor to enforce Crimean political obedience.[19] The central government in Kiev felt secure of having a strong position against any Crimean challenge. It counted on financial allocations to the Crimean budget, liberalization of the economic environment on the peninsula, and the Crimean republic's economic dependence on the central Ukrainian government as significant obstacles to the development of separatism. However, recent events in Crimea have not followed this kind of logic. In fact, economic dependence (Crimea imports 75 per cent of its industrial goods, 80 per cent of its water and 85 per cent of its energy from Ukraine) has only made the Crimean situation more difficult.[20]

If the Ukrainian leadership continues to delay market reform and to argue that economic dependence will moderate any separatist movement in the country, it will be misinterpreting the real economic challenge, which can be described as the growing resolve of regional elites to implement their own economic policies independently of the central government. Various power-centers could appear in

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17 "Dire US Forecast for Ukraine Conflict," in: *IHT*, 26 January 1994, p. 1.

18 Parliamentary hearings on national security strategy, in: *GU*, 12 October 1993, pp. 2-3.

19 See the interview with Mykola Mychalchenko, political advisor to President Kravchuk, in: *Kyivska Pravda*, 25 February 1994, p. 1.

20 "Neuer Konfliktstoff für Moskau und Kiev," in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 January 1994, p. 3.

Ukraine, endangering the management of the country's economy, especially in terms of planning, tax revenues, and providing the population with the necessary social guarantees.

4. Ethnic Rivalries

One of the most serious challenges to Ukraine is the possibility of ethnic conflicts on its soil. The events in Crimea and the consequent weakness shown by the Ukrainian government could serve as a trigger for similar developments in other Ukrainian regions.

It is unlikely that such conflicts will take place in eastern Ukraine where ethnic tensions and separatist forces are without influence.[21] The most unstable regions in terms of separatism are some western and southwestern parts of the country:[22] Zakarpattya has a very active *Rusin* movement struggling for ethnic autonomy of a so-called *Rusin* nation; and, the Romanian national minority (about 200,000) in Bukovyna and Bessarabia is becoming increasingly disappointed with Kiev's policies.[23] Tensions within the Romanian minority in Ukraine are being fuelled by the territorial claims toward Ukraine expressed by nationalistic forces in Romania (especially in the Romanian parliament).[24]

As previous experience has shown, the Ukrainian leadership lacks the ability to manage ethnic tensions. Ukrainian officials' continuing disregard for the Romanians and the *Rusins* could result in ethnic conflict in these parts of the country.

Another source of ethnic trouble is located on the Crimean peninsula and concerns the Crimean Tatars. This native Crimean nation lost its statehood in the 18th century after the peninsula was occupied by the Russian empire. As native inhabitants of Crimea, the Tatar people were deported by Stalin to Central Asia in 1944. The members of this nation have only recently started to come back home. More than 260,000 settlers have relocated in Crimea, and between 100,000 and 200,000 more Tatars are expected to return in the near future.[25]

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21 Public and political concerns in Eastern Ukraine are primarily centered around the questions of the Russian language as a second state language, easing communications with relatives in Russia, and closer cultural and economic relations with the Russian Federation. The local political groupings do not raise the question of secession from Ukraine.

22 See the interview with Member of Parliament Volodymyr Yavorivsky, in: *Nezavisimost*, 2 March 1994, p. 3.

23 Dmytro Vydrin, "The concept for the security strategy," in: *Rozbudova Derzhavy*, No. 5, 1993, pp. 40-41.

24 "... While opposition's chief claims Bessarabia, North Bukovyna," in: *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 116, 1994, p. 6.

25 "Crimean Tatars' Mejlis Has a Meeting Today," in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 12 February 1994, p. 3.

The Tatars' homecoming is causing difficulties for Russians (about 70 per cent of the population) and Ukrainians (about 20 per cent of the population) in Crimea. These difficulties are in part psychological, as Tatars consider themselves the only masters of Crimea and expect other nations to acknowledge this. They also form a large Muslim enclave in the Russian and Ukrainian Slav society.

The psychological problems generated by the Crimean Tatars overlap with social and economic problems for all. Agricultural enterprises must provide families of Crimean Tatars with land, thereby lowering the shares of their personnel in the privatised enterprises; Tatar settlers increase competition on labor markets; and, housing construction for settlers is financed at the expense of local housing funds.

At the same time, the Tatar settlers are experiencing acute psychological and social discomfort. Local authorities often ignore their social and economic needs, and about 75 per cent of them still do not have housing, jobs or any social guarantees. In 1993, financial aid from the Ukrainian government covered only 1 per cent of the Crimean Tatars' needs.[26]

The Tatars' difficult relations with both local authorities and the local population have been complicated by the confrontation with the Crimean President, Yuriy Meshkov, who is in conflict with the interests of the Tatars, represented by the Mejlis (parliament) in three major issues.

First, the Crimean President does not recognize the legitimacy of the Mejlis. In his opinion, Crimea cannot have two institutions of representative power, the Crimean parliament and the Mejlis.[27] Second, he opposes the Mejlis' initiative to create a two-chamber parliament in Crimea, one house of which would have representatives from the native Crimean nations, i.e., Crimean Tatars, Karajims and Crymchaks. President Meshkov has indicated he would hesitate to provide national minorities, which constitute 10 to 12 per cent of the Crimean population, with such privileges. Finally, the Crimean President has ignored the Tatars' warnings to avoid seriously changing the Crimean status, and he has not staged consultations on key issues of Crimean policy.

Political tensions between the Tatars and the presidential administration have been worsened by Kiev's tactic of using the Tatar problem to bring the Crimean leadership under control by referring to the conflict between Simferopol and the Mejlis as a challenge to the country's territorial integrity. At the same time the central government in Kiev closely cooperates with the leadership of the Crimean Tatars, who – due to this political support – favors Ukrainian territorial integrity.

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26 "Crimean Tatars: The Hand of Kiev on the Peninsula," in: *Ukraina Moloda*, 11 March 1994, p. 7.

27 "Policy of Yuriy Meshkov Provokes Confrontation," in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 4 February 1994, p. 3.

In tactical terms, the alliance between the Ukrainian and the Tatar leaderships has brought some advantages to both sides, but this approach could also create major troubles for Kiev in the years to come. One possibility is that, disappointed by ineffective Ukrainian policies, the Crimean Tatars could begin to act separately without consulting Kiev or Ukrainian nationalist parties. As confrontation with the Crimean president has become more likely, the Mejlis has taken a first step in this direction by discussing whether or not to recognize the Crimean Tatar nation's demands as a struggle for national liberation, which would grant the Tatars' radical resistance a certain legitimacy, which could then include mass disobedience and the use of force.[28] Yet, even the political goals of Crimean Tatars, who are looking both for the restoration of their statehood on the peninsula and for a Crimean president of Crimean-Tatar origin, could lead, in regard to social unrest, to a major conflict between the Tatars and the Slav majority of the Crimean population.

5. Military Challenges

The existence of a direct military threat to Ukraine was recognized by both the central government in Kiev and by the political opposition. Indeed, it could be argued that the government started to speak about military threats to Ukraine after prodding from the opposition. There are therefore only differences of nuance between the government's and the opposition's views concerning the probability of a military intervention and the scale of a possible military conflict. While government leaders put the emphasis on local clashes, opposition leaders point out the possibility of a full-scale military conflict.[29]

Fear of military attack spurred Ukraine to start to build its own army on the second day of independence, an army which continues to be the second largest in Europe. In addition to the armed forces, Ukraine also keeps border troops, a national guard, civil defense troops and special police forces trained to act as paratroopers.[30] In addition, Ukraine started to create its own Black Sea navy, with combat capabilities allegedly comparable to those of the Russian fleet in this region.

In the fall of 1993, however, the parliamentary Commission on Defense and National Security publicly expressed doubts concerning the Ukrainian army's

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28 "Mr. Bagrov Lost the Elections," in: *Kyivska Pravda*, 1 February 1994, p. 1.

29 See the interview with President Kravchuk, in: *Izvestya*, 4 June 1994, pp. 1-2.

30 Ukraine inherited a powerful military arsenal from the Soviet Union: 19 military divisions with about 6,500 tanks, 7,500 armoured vehicles, 3,300 artillery systems, 1,080 combat aircraft. In addition to a regular army, Ukraine plans for the beginning of 1996 to include 60,000 servicemen in the National Guard and 40,000 servicemen in the Border Guard. See: Amt für Studien und Übungen der Bundeswehr, *Die Ukraine im Spannungsfeld zwischen nationaler Selbstbestimmung und sicherheitpolitischem Risiko*, Bergisch Gladbach, 1992, p. 22.

defense capabilities.[31] The head of the parliamentary commission, Valentyn Lemish, listed several grounds for these doubts:

- Military units have not been equipped with new weapons and material; weapons and material at their disposal are becoming obsolete. Only 4 per cent of military jets, for instance, are ready for action;
- Shortages in oil and gasoline have caused the postponement of military exercises throughout Ukraine;[32]
- Lack of training fields for air defense and air forces makes these troops unfit for battle;
- The military budget does not cover the costs of the acquisition of new weaponry for the research and development of new weapons systems;[33]
- Some steps aimed at restructuring the army (i.e. the reorganization of the Kiev Military District, the unification of the air force and the air defense forces) have weakened its defense capability.[34]

Ukraine still maintains the structure of troop deployment inherited from the Soviet Union.[35] In keeping with Soviet military concepts, the most advanced troops are still concentrated along the western borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although it recognizes that Ukraine's probable enemy is now to be found on its eastern border.[36] No adequate system of air defense has been created along the Ukrainian-Russian border.[37] Moreover, the Ukrainian air force continues to use a "friend or foe" identification system that is similar to the one used by Russian forces. The lack of any system for the protection of the border with Russia (especially weak is the protection of the sea borders in the Azov and Black Seas) also means that there are no comprehensive early-warning systems against probable attack from the east.[38]

According to Ukrainian military doctrine, the armed forces have the task of fighting against any state or coalitions of states, and against air and space strikes,

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31 Valentyn Lemish, "Defense and Democracy," in: *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 6 October 1993, p. 2.

32 In 1993 Ukrainian officials discussed the idea of selling several strategic bombers to Russia since Ukraine could not afford their upkeep.

33 On the other hand, the army lacks the theory and strategy for its functioning. The first conference on the army's strategy, tasks and methods of actions was held in March 1994, more than two years after the armed forces were organized. *Ukrainian Television-Channel 7*, 11 March 1994.

34 Lemish, "Defense and Democracy."

35 It must be pointed out that, while Ukrainian military leaders intend to create highly mobile troops capable of moving anywhere in Ukraine, those plans have not been implemented because of a lack of financing and appropriate military concepts for such troops.

36 Arkady Moshes, "Three Armies, Three Reforms," in: *Novoe Vremya*, No. 19, 1993, p. 19.

37 Concerning the need for such a system, see David Twining, "The Concept of Ukraine's Defense," in: *Viysko Ukrainy*, No. 5, 1993, p. 15.

38 Author's conversations with members of the Ukrainian State Committee for the Protection of Borders, December 1993.

attacks of ground forces and invasion from the sea.[39] These all-inclusive tasks represent the major problem for troop training, as the enemy is undefined.[40] Moreover, this comprehensive, all-purpose strategic concept is conducive to a squandering of financial and material resources for the unrealistic purpose of preparing responses to all imaginable threats.[41] While its military doctrine, as well as numerous statements by Ukrainian politicians, make it clear that Russia conceivably poses the major military challenge to Ukraine, Ukrainian military units nevertheless are not trained to meet an attack launched by this potential aggressor.[42]

The strategic doctrine of the Ukrainian armed forces does not recognize the fact that a conflict with the Russian army would mean dealing with a military force that possesses chemical, biological, high-precision, and even nuclear weapons – although the military doctrine of the Russian Federation does not exclude Russia's right to launch preventive nuclear strikes. Russian military strategy toward the "near abroad" is based on the use of rapid reaction forces (airborne troops). Ukraine, on the other hand, lacks mobile units for an adequate response.

Finally, the fact that the majority of Ukraine's officer corps is made up of ethnic Russians means that such an army could not be relied upon to fight against any kind of "Russian imperialism." Though Ukraine does not have to fear losing political control of its army, its defense capabilities are endangered by the demoralization and decline of discipline within the armed forces. Indeed, there has been an increase in crime within the army and in crimes against civilians committed by servicemen. Weapons are being sold to criminals and paramilitary forces, and military facilities are being used for commercial speculation.

The main reasons for this situation have been, and remain to be, the effects of political controversies within Ukraine and the lack of appropriate tasks for the armed forces. During the first two years of the country's independence, the armed forces were oriented toward countering a possible military threat from Russia. As a result, Ukraine had approximately 700,000 men under arms at the end of 1993, even though it was incapable of providing them with social protection, adequate living standards, and modern weapons.

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39 The text of Military Doctrine of Ukraine, in: *Narodna Armia,* 26 October 1993, p. 2.

40 One could argue that the armed forces could theoretically be trained to respond to any kind of aggression. In reality, however, the Ukrainian army is weakened by organizational, material, and financial difficulties and may be able to deal with such comprehensive tasks only in the more or less distant future.

41 Grigoriy Kostenko, "The Doctrine of National Security," in: *Narodna Armia*, 11 January 1993, p. 2.

42 "Nuclear by a Whim of History: Ukraine's New Military Doctrine," in: *International Defense Review*, No. 2, 1994, p. 6.

The new Ukrainian political leadership which came to power in the first half of 1994 intends to replace the guarded attitude toward Russia with military cooperation with the Russian Federation. This shift in policy has led to a re-modelling of the whole doctrine of the Ukrainian army and has strengthened the feeling of purposelessness among the servicemen. If the political disorientation of the army were to continue, the then furthered demoralization and even eventual disintegration of military units would transform the armed forces into an uncontrolled institution in both political and military terms. Such a development would destabilize Ukrainian society and leave the country without a defense against military attack.

III. Ukraine's Relations with Russia

1. Problems of Independence

Since independence, Ukraine has been unable to keep its internal problems as an issue of domestic policy;[43] Russia has always been involved. The most prominent examples of Russia's involvement are well known: Russian businessmen financed the pro-Russian separatist organizations in Ukraine; Russian military commanders took unilateral steps in dividing the Black Sea Fleet; and the former Russian parliament adopted a decree declaring Sevastopol a Russian city. But there have also been Ukrainian-Russian disputes over oil and gas deliveries, controversies concerning the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine, etc. Some political observers and politicians have speculated that the intensification of disputes might even lead to a major military clash between Ukraine and Russia.[44]

Ukrainian-Russian relations have been dominated by mutual mistrust for a long time. Each country regards the other as a threat to its security. While Ukrainian fears have been a more or less permanent feature of the country's policy and have existed since the country became independent, Russian worries are quite new. In "Strategy for Russia," a document prepared by the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow,[45] it is stated that the situation in Ukraine represents the most serious challenge to the security and stability of Russia, as a collapse of the economy and internal conflicts in Ukraine would pose the threat of mass migration, technical catastrophe and the risk of losing control over nuclear and conventional weapons.

One of the most acute problems in relations between the two countries is the conflict in Crimea, since Crimea is seen as an object of territorial dispute between them. Although the Russian president has declared several times that Russia

43 "Ukraine Signs Trade Agreement with EU," in: *The Guardian*, 24 March 1994, p. 3.

44 See the interview with President Kravchuk, in: *Izvestya,* 4 June 1994, pp. 1-2.

45 "Strategy for Russia," in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 27 May 1994, p. 4.

respects Ukraine's territorial integrity, the Ukrainian leadership continues to doubt these statements and is pushing for Russia's formal confirmation of its respect for Ukraine's integrity by signing a bilateral agreement on peaceful relations and cooperation.

So far, the Russian government has only assumed the legal obligation to respect Ukrainian borders "within the framework of the CIS." Many representatives of Russia's political elite, within both the executive and the legislature, do not recognize Crimea as a part of Ukraine. In their opinion, Crimean independence from Ukraine is desirable as it would mean re-establishment of Russian control over the peninsula. Konstantin Zatulin, the head of the Committee on CIS Relations in the Russian State Duma, has stated "Crimea remains an open question for Russia."[46]

Another reason for the Ukrainian leadership's suspicions of Russia's intentions toward Ukraine is related to the Russian doctrine of "special powers" in the "near abroad." Since Russia wants to protect the interests of ethnic Russians in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Kiev fears that the Russian leadership will not ignore the pro-Russian sentiments in the different parts of Ukraine and the demands of the Crimean separatist leaders who have been looking to Russia for assistance for a long time.[47]

Thus, active Russian involvement in Ukrainian domestic issues has generally been perceived in Ukraine as provocative and as an intervention in Ukrainian internal affairs. Indeed, the Ukrainian government threatened to postpone nuclear disarmament if Russia demonstrated aggressiveness in its policy on Ukraine or concerning the Crimea.[48]

Under current circumstances, however, the Russian threat appears to be overestimated. The Russian leadership has announced that it intends to treat Ukraine's domestic conflicts as Ukrainian internal problems and that it continues to recognize Ukrainian independence and territorial integrity. Moreover, Moscow has made it clear to the pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine that it would not support any separatist steps on their part. In addition, Russian and Ukrainian delegations have achieved some progress in the process of dividing the Black Sea Fleet, a development which proved to be decisive at the time of the Crimean crisis.

It should also be remembered that Russia has tried to neutralize disruptive political debates with constructive economic developments, i.e. in trade, banking, the tourist industry, etc.[49] Finally, both Ukraine and Russia are implementing the

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46 Cited in: *Visti z Ukrainy*, 6 April 1994, p. 2.

47 "We've Got Problems with Meshkov," in: *Kievskiy Vestnik*, 22 January 1994, p. 2.

48 "Clinton Should Look beyond Ukraine's Woes," in: *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), 3 March 1994, p. 4.

49 "Russia to Build up Ties to Crimea," in: *The Financial Times* (FT), 31 March 1994, p. 2.

trilateral agreement with the United States concerning the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from Ukrainian territory, signed in Moscow in January 1994.

In other words, Russia seems to be behaving much more like Ukraine's supporter than its competitor, at least at present. This does not mean, however, that the Russian position is fully supportive of Ukraine. While Russian leaders are interested in the general stability of their neighbor country, they would not hesitate to use Ukrainian difficulties as a lever to keep Ukraine within the sphere of Russian influence and to exploit all possibilities to promote Russia's national interests.

For instance, the Russian military intends to keep control over the whole Black Sea Fleet, or, as recent events have shown, at least 80-85 per cent of it. Russia is also trying to legitimize its military presence in Crimea. These interests are implemented very actively. The combat training of the Black Sea Fleet, including military exercises at sea, is organized without any previous consultations with Ukraine. Russia has also pressed Ukraine to negotiate the leasing of military facilities in Crimea to the Russian navy.

2. Positive and Negative Aspects of Closer Integration

In evaluating the Russian challenges to Ukraine's independence, indirect threats to Ukrainian sovereignty must not be overlooked. In fact, Russia is not likely to pose a direct military threat to Ukraine in as much as it intends to restore the former Russian empire. The current Ukrainian-Russian disputes concerning the Black Sea Fleet, the economy, or Crimea all seem solvable. The real challenge to Ukraine's independence lies in the prospect of closer integration with the Russian Federation.

Leonid Kuchma's election as president of Ukraine was seen by many observers and politicians as an obvious shift away from the country's course towards independence and as a first step towards reintegration with Russia.[50] President Kuchma, however, has stated that he respects the idea of Ukrainian independence and is going to protect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and intends to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.[51] Kuchma favors integration with Russia primarily in the economic sphere. He sees Russia as a source of energy as well as a potential partner for industrial cooperation and as the largest market for Ukrainian goods which are not competitive on Western markets.[52] Different forms of cooperation with Russia, including ties between citizens, enterprises or even regions, should not, in Kuchma's view, diminish Ukrainian statehood. Nor should

50 "Ukraine Has to be Russia's Ally," in: *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 January 1994, p. 3.

51 "The Commentators at the Round Table," in: *Radio Liberty Program*, 15 July 1994.

52 See *Post-Postup*, 24 July 1994, p. 2.

cooperation between the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces, border guards and security services be seen as having a negative effect on Ukraine's independence.

Although President Kuchma does not aim to give up Ukraine's independence as such, he intends to change the strategy for strengthening and preserving this independence. These changes are supposed to involve external issues above all. Kuchma presented his concept for Ukrainian foreign policy in his inaugural speech in late July 1994. The new President pointed out that Ukraine belongs to the Eurasian economic and cultural sphere and that its vital interests are permanently concentrated on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The reluctance of the previous leadership to promote Ukrainian interests within the CIS was characterized by President Kuchma as a serious political mistake. He believes that Ukraine is capable of becoming a powerful leader of Eurasian economic integration while protecting its national interests and influencing the political developments within the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this respect, the most important task for Ukrainian CIS-policies is the normalization of Ukrainian-Russian relations and the transformation of these relations into a strategic partnership.[53]

Nevertheless, the possibility of an unequal partnership between Ukraine and Russia, following the former Soviet scheme of "older and younger brothers," remains very real. Certain processes within Ukraine itself might facilitate an evolution of the situation in this direction. The decisive preconditions for a deepening of the dependence on Russia are to be found in the political, economic, social, and security spheres of Ukrainian life.

(1) In the Political Sphere

The current political situation in Ukraine has several characteristic features. First, the national-democratic forces, which introduced the idea of independence into Ukrainian political debate and had a strong influence on the first Ukrainian president, have lost their significance and the ability to influence the political leadership of the country. The role of those forces has been marginalized to a mere observer status. Thus the strong "get out-of-Russia" drive which was cultivated by the national-democrats within the Ukrainian power structure is seriously weakened.

Another important change within the Ukrainian political sphere is that the president, the prime minister and most members of parliament currently share the view that Ukraine could not manage its internal difficulties without Russian assistance.

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53 Speech by Leonid Kuchma, in: *Democratychna Ukraina*, 21 July 1994, p. 1.

Finally, the Ukrainian leadership's lower expectations concerning Western aid and assistance constitute the third basic change in Ukrainian political affairs. The process of "moving away" from the West has not been caused only by empty Western promises to help Ukraine. It is also in part the result of the current Ukrainian ruling elite's views regarding the economy and land as private property, which no longer reflect Western values. The Ukrainian leadership has become more sensitive and even suspicious of relations with the West, since Western economic expansion has been interpreted as leading possibly to Ukraine's status as a deindustrialized source of cheap natural resources for the West rather than as an equal partner. [54]

(2) In the Economic and Social Spheres

The attempts by the former Ukrainian leadership to lessen the country's dependence on Russia through alternative sources of energy and new ties to industrial enterprises in other countries proved to be unsuccessful. On the contrary, the broken links with Russia contributed to the general decline in Ukraine's economy and living standards. While speculating about the necessity of new economic ties with the West, the Ukrainian government has continued to use the oil and gas supplied by Russia without being able to pay for them. As mentioned, the Ukrainian oil and gas debt to Russia is the main cause of the enormous budget deficit and the hyperinflation in the country.

The government's intentions to protect internal markets by banning food exports to Russia and by introducing customs barriers for trade with Russia and the CIS caused dissatisfaction among Ukrainian businessmen and the general public. Furthermore, the suspension of contacts between the Ukrainian and the Russian military-industrial complex seriously hurt the defense capabilities of Ukraine, whose army lacks modern weapons.

The drastic economic and social decline in Ukraine makes the standard of living of neighboring Russia appear five to ten times higher than that of Ukraine. It is not surprising that the country's population has doubts about the value of independent statehood.

Considering the above mentioned weaknesses and popular sentiments in Ukraine, one might argue that integration with Russia could lead to the development of relations between the two countries resembling the former model of "elder and younger brother," that is, it could renew Ukraine's dependence on Russia as well as its subordination to Russian policies. The West would increasingly recognize that Russia has an advantage in dealing with Ukraine, a state which is not about to be reformed according to the Western value system.

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54 *Ibid.*

(3) In the Security Sphere

In the security sphere, Ukrainian neutrality and its non-bloc status are still an unsolved problem. In seeking to strengthen Ukrainian national security, the leaders of the country are not thinking of the creation of a military bloc on the basis of the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. There is, however, no further agreement on Ukraine's future policy since one group of proponents rejects neutrality in favor of Western collective security structures while the other advocates collective security within the CIS. So far, these disputes have not seriously influenced the official Ukrainian position. Yet, it is becoming clear that the principle of common defense (or some elements of it) is increasingly attracting the attention of Ukrainian leaders, especially in the armed forces. In fact, they appreciate that Ukraine already possesses some elements of a common defense with Russia: the two countries share an air-defense system and an early warning system against ballistic missile attack; they have joint control (Ukraine the administrative, Russia the operational) over the strategic nuclear forces on Ukrainian soil; the Black Sea Fleet is currently under joint Ukrainian-Russian command, etc.[55]

It remains to be seen, however, whether there will be a military threat to Ukraine serious enough to push Ukrainian leaders to seek Russian assistance. So far, no real military threats to Ukraine exist, but the future policies of Romania towards North Bessarabia and Bukovina or Turkey's attitude towards Crimea and Crimean Tatars could threaten Ukraine's security even in military terms. The search for common defense with Russia would then become a necessity for Ukraine. It should be pointed out that the principle of common defense is likely to constitute the main factor in the political deterrence of an enemy, rather than a real military coalition in the battlefield.

IV. Institutional Ties to the West

Ukraine was initially eager to participate in European institutions and considered them effective instruments with which to guarantee the country's security. But after several months of euphoria about the capabilities of the OSCE and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Ukraine started to evaluate its participation in such structures more realistically, finding that political consultations, which constitute the basic framework for OSCE and NACC activities, did not meet its urgent security needs.

Consequently, direct relations with the EU and NATO, have become more important for Ukraine. These two institutions are perceived as the most powerful in

55 Interview with the Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament, Olexander Moroz, in: *Kievskie Vedomosti*, 19 July 1994, p. 3.

the security field, since Ukraine found international institutions in which both it and Russia have equal rights as inappropriate for solving its disputes with the Russian Federation. Ukraine was looking for structures in which the authority and strength of its members would diminish Russian influence on Ukraine. The European Union and NATO seemed to be capable of meeting these Ukrainian expectations.

1. Ukraine and NATO

Ukraine, unlike other Eastern European countries, did not make any official statements concerning its intention to join NATO in 1991 and 1992. As was stressed by Ukrainian leaders, the country intended to develop close contacts with all institutions and organizations in the international security field. Moreover, parliament's decision to maintain Ukraine's non-bloc and neutral status made it impossible to join any security alliance.[56] At the same time, Ukrainian politicians were sceptical about the idea of NATO membership and the chance of obtaining security guarantees from the Atlantic Alliance.

The first contacts between Ukraine and NATO happened in 1992. During the meetings with NATO officials, the Ukrainian side clarified its position on key issues of international security, nuclear disarmament and arms reduction. Cooperation in the arms control sphere was the most intensive. Inspection teams from all NATO countries visited Ukrainian facilities to control the process of conventional arms reduction. NATO officers observed military exercises of Ukrainian troops and visited military bases, the Ministry of Defense, etc.[57]

Ukraine was interested in cooperation with NATO for several reasons. The Ukrainian leadership counted on NATO's assistance in drawing up its military doctrine, establishing civilian control over the military, and organizing conversion of the defense industry. The history of the peaceful development of NATO countries was also important. Ukraine hoped to learn from NATO countries how to proceed with the privatization and demonopolization of industries, how to create a multi-party system and how to establish friendly relations with neighboring states.

Suggestions to join NATO were originally articulated by the leaders of opposition parties. Vitaliy Zhuravskiy, head of the Christian Democratic Party, proposed that Ukraine move under NATO's nuclear umbrella and argued that this would be more comfortable for it than any coalition with the Kremlin. Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of *Ruch*, the most popular democratic party, argued that Ukraine should join NATO in order to obtain adequate security guarantees.

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56 For more details, see Oleg Strekal, "Die Ukraine und die NATO," in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1993, pp. 84-86.

57 *Kievsky Vestnik*, 5 November 1993, p. 2.

Later, government leaders also started to advocate closer ties with NATO. In October 1993, President Kravchuk stressed the growing role of the Atlantic Alliance in the CSCE region and made it clear that Ukraine would also seek NATO membership once East-European countries had joined this organization.[58] Ivan Plyushch, the former Speaker of Ukraine's parliament, even stated that mere cooperation with the Alliance would not satisfy Ukraine's need for security guarantees; only membership could ensure NATO's commitment.[59]

The idea of joining NATO has become popular in Ukraine. In January 1994 opinion polls showed that 51 per cent of the respondents wanted Ukraine to be a NATO member. Only 21 per cent of those questioned said that NATO membership is not important for Ukraine.[60]

Ukraine's positive attitude towards the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was founded on three considerations. The first was based on the assumption that political-military cooperation with NATO through the PfP would break down the barriers which had separated Ukraine from the rest of the continent. To overcome those obstacles, the basic principle of the PfP was seen as ensuring security for one through security for all.[61]

Second, another Ukraine was concerned to receive additional security guarantees for undergoing denuclearization. The Ukraine's need for such guarantees had not been satisfied by the West and only partially by the trilateral agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. Thus, both Ukraine and the West considered the PfP as an opportunity to provide Ukraine with some additional security guarantees against potential Russian expansionism. This was reaffirmed by US President Clinton during his visit to Kiev in January 1994.[62]

In late March 1994 the official delegation from NATO, led by the Assistant General Secretary for Political Affairs, Gebhardt Moltke, visited Kiev to negotiate the details of joint Ukraine-NATO activities within the PfP. Alliance officials confirmed again that in case Ukrainian territorial integrity is endangered, NATO will consult with both sides of the conflict, applying political pressure on the aggressor to stop the intervention. [63]

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58 Statement by President Kravchuk in: *Uryadovy Kurier*, 26 October 1993, p. 3.

59 The statement by Plyushch is cited in: *Pravda Ukrainy*, 5 November 1993, p. 2.

60 *Kievskie Vedomosti*, 21 January 1994, p. 3.

61 "Ukrainian Defense Minister on Partnership for Peace," in: *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 102, 31 May 1994, p. 3.

62 Ann Devroy/Tom Williams, "Ukraine to Sign Pact to Get Rid Of Its Arsenal," in: *IHT*, 13 January 1994, p. 2.

63 See the report on Moltke's press conference, in: *Robitnycha Gazeta*, 30 March 1994, p. 1.

Although Alliance officials welcomed Ukraine's adhesion to the PfP, they strongly emphasized that the country's full nuclear disarmament is the main condition for further development of relations between Ukraine and NATO.[64]

The third specific element in Ukraine-NATO relations emerged as a result of Ukrainian reluctance to be part of the Russian-controlled security zone. Ukraine's position between Russia and NATO has been of special concern to the country's leadership as it is feared that Ukrainian dependence on Russia could increase if there were no counterbalance to Russian influence.[65] Thus relations with the Atlantic Alliance have been perceived as a necessary lever against Russian ambitions in the "near abroad." In this connection, Ukraine feels that the PfP initiative serves as an instrument for NATO's expansion eastward and reaffirms Ukraine's perspective to become a member of NATO in the future.[66] Moreover, as the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, General Vitaliy Radetzky, put it, Ukraine could give up its neutral status in the future, amending its constitution and military doctrine to allow it to establish adequate security guarantees within a "16 + 1" formula, that is, NATO plus Ukraine.[67]

2. Ukraine and the EU

One of the priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy has been the establishment of close ties with the European Community/Union. Cooperation with the EU was considered crucial in reforming Ukraine's economy. Ties with the EU and a later EU membership were supposed to also serve as political confirmation of Ukraine's European position and its inclusion in European affairs.[68]

In 1991 and 1992, during the initial period of Ukraine-EC relations, ties between the two parties were rather formal. Ukraine had announced neither its intentions to join the Community nor its interest in participating in the drafting of the Community's security policy. This period was also characterized by a lack of contacts with the WEU.

Several major obstacles along Ukraine's road to the EU had to be overcome. First, Ukraine's unpredictable nuclear disarmament policy made the EU extremely cautious and forced it to put political pressure on Ukraine rather than facilitate political cooperation. Second, all economic and financial aid from the EU seemed

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64 See the communiqué of the North Atlantic Assembly in Istanbul on 9 June 1994, in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 17, p. D507.

65 Lothar Rühl, "NATO-Initiative stößt auf Widerstand," in: *Die Welt*, 26 January 1994, p. 4.

66 *Izvestya*, 15 January 1994, p. 2.

67 Report on the press conference of General Radetzky, in: *Kievskie Vedomosti*, 2 June 1994, p. 2.

68 For a detailed analysis of this problem see Peter Van Ham, "Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western policy," in: *Chaillot Paper*, No. 13, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, February 1994, pp. 45-50.

to be ineffective because of the lack of economic reform. Third, Ukraine's tensions with Russia were seen as endangering the Community's relations to Moscow.[69]

Following the first round of discussions with the European Commission concerning a political-economic agreement, Ukraine adopted a more active pro-Union policy in March 1993. During its negotiations with the EU it asked to include a reference to its future association with the EU as well as for a preferential economic regime and strengthened financial cooperation.[70] Real progress, however, was only achieved in early 1994 after the signing of the trilateral agreement on Ukrainian nuclear disarmament. By ratifying this agreement, Ukraine diminished Western fears that it could become a nuclear threat for Europe and reduced political tensions with Russia. But the improvement in Ukraine's relations with the EU was also facilitated by changes in EU policies aimed at paying more attention to the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union (FSU).

At the same time, political and economic instability in Ukraine forced the EU to deal with Ukraine more carefully. "The economic crisis in Ukraine and the tensions with Russia affect us directly," said German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in his speech at the Institut Français de Relations Internationales (Paris) in March 1994. "This could have far-reaching consequences. . . . We must act together to ensure Ukraine is brought rapidly within our European cooperative system."[71] Indeed, the policy of the EU is concentrated on "strengthening the hands of moderates in the republic as they struggle to prevent the disintegration of the economy and the rise of nationalism."[72] As a result, Ukraine was the first CIS country to enter into a partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU in March 1994, characterized by the Ukrainian government as "an historical step on the way to our final goal EU membership."[73]

The agreement covers both political questions (respect for democracy and human rights, organized political dialogue) and economic relations (trade, investment, services, capital movements, competition, intellectual property, economic cooperation, certain social provisions, and sea transport). The agreement also contains a most-favored-nation clause under which the European Union will treat Ukraine on an equal footing with its other GATT partners. Respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity was incorporated into the agreement and is considered an important principle by the EU.[74] Though the agreement also includes a provision

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69 Van Ham, "Ukraine, Russia and European Security."

70 *Agence Europe*, No. 6194, 19 March 1994, p. 4.

71 "Bonn and Paris Plan EU Ostpolitik," in: *FT*, 25 March 1994, p. 2.

72 "Ukraine Signs Trade Agreement with EU," in: *The Guardian*, 24 March 1994, p. 2.

73 Cited in *Khreshchatyk*, 5 April 1994, p. 4.

74 *Agence Europe*, No. 6197, 24 March 1994, p. 7.

for cooperation in international policy and security, these prospects were generally weakened in early May 1994, when the Union offered close links between the WEU, the six East European countries and the Baltic states, excluding Ukraine and the other CIS states. As Jonathan Eyal, director of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (London) put it, "The political message is much more important than the practical one at this stage. Basically, it is now accepted that this is where Europe ends."[75]

These words reflect the salient aspects of the Western approach to Ukraine. In Western political and diplomatic rhetoric concerning European security, Ukraine is treated as a European state which influences the situation in the region, but Ukraine has never been considered a possible member of either NATO or the EU. Western politicians have made it clear that before entering the Western club, Ukraine must solve its controversies with Russia. But Ukraine, in turn, hopes to solve its "Russian problem" by entering the Western sphere of interest. This has probably been the main point of misunderstanding between Ukraine and its Western partners.

V. Conclusion: Looking for an "Older Brother"?

The security problems of modern Ukraine are centered around two interrelated issues. The first is constituted by the challenges to Ukraine's internal stability and territorial integrity and the conditions under which these challenges could develop into major conflicts on Ukraine's soil. The second concerns the challenges to Ukraine's independence.

Current economic, political and social difficulties in Ukraine should be seen against the background of the collapse of Ukraine as a state, first formed by Soviet ideology and then by an ideology of independence, both of which failed to recognize the diverse interests within society and to propose a workable concept for social integration and welfare and the development of economic prosperity. Therefore, the shaping of a national identity came up against difficulties, especially as regards creating a political nation including all the ethnic groups and nationalities living in the country.

Economic and social decline and the inability of the central government to improve the domestic situation led to the emergence of regional identities, based on territorial or industrial interests in some cases and on ethnic groupings in others. As the formation of these local identities was motivated by survival and self-sufficiency, relations between these regions and the central authorities are controversial if not hostile. Means of the central government to maintain control over regional developments are limited: giving direct financial subsidies to certain

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75 "EU Offers 9 Eastern Nations a Step to Security Link-Up," in: *IHT*, 7/8 May 1994, p. 2.

regions and enterprises; granting additional privileges to the more "powerful" territories; strengthening the system of state administration.

In fact, the current leadership in Kiev is doing exactly that. Although these measures may preserve some kind of fragile stability, they definitely cannot bridge the gap between the national and the regional levels. Nor can they solve the following crucial problems:

- The lack of an adequate system of state administration which takes account of the regional features of the Ukrainian territories and integrates the diverging regional interests at a national level. The state system in its present configuration only facilitates the creation of local centers of power at the expense of national cohesiveness and administrative manageability.
- The lack of a comprehensive outline of the practical steps needed to reform Ukraine's economy, and the absence of a political and social basis for the implementation of market reform. The major actors on whom the fate of reform depends, that is, the ruling political elite, the managers of state enterprises (more than 90 per cent of all property in Ukraine still belongs to the state), and the majority of the population are not interested in reforming the economy according to market principles.
- The need for reforms within society itself, especially in terms of transition to a new social stratification and the creation of a civil society in the country. Paternalistic relations between the state and its citizens hamper the development of a new social structure, and complicate the process of defining and protecting the basic interests of different social groups and the process of reaching consensus among these groups.

The disintegration of the Ukraine happens in the political, economic, and social sphere. A combination of all three might well lead to conflicts which could endanger the stability and territorial integrity of the country.

The emergence of such conflicts, however, will presumably depend on an additional decisive aspect: ethnic differences. In this regard, there are two possible trouble spots on Ukrainian soil. The first zone with a disruptive potential is Crimea, with the political and social behavior of the Crimean Tatars being of greatest concern. In this context, the constitutional crisis between Kiev and Simferopol may be seen as an additional factor furthering unrest. The second source of probable ethnic tension is the 200,000-strong Romanian national minority in North Bukovyna and Bessarabia. In addition, the Romanian minority is becoming increasingly disappointed with Kiev's policies. At the same time tensions between the Romanian minority in Ukraine and Kiev are fuelled by the territorial claims put forward by nationalist forces in Romania. Presumably, the main threat to Ukraine's internal stability is thus the possibility of ethnic conflicts breaking out in some part of the country.

In contrast, the well known scenario of a major East-West conflict in Ukraine does not seem realistic. Yet in evaluating Russia's role in Ukrainian affairs, it is Moscow's indirect challenges to Kiev that are most important: in fact, Russia is not likely to pose a direct military threat to Ukraine with the intention of restoring the "Russian empire." The current Ukrainian-Russian disputes concerning the Black Sea Fleet, the economy, or Crimea all seem to be solvable. The real challenge to Ukraine's independence lies in the prospect of closer integration with the Russian Federation, an objective that is now being pursued by both countries.

A Draft Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia, which is to be ratified during 1995, is a good illustration of this challenge. The document, though only by stating political intentions, is a first step toward the goals of developing collective defense with Russia, working out a closely coordinated economic and foreign policy, and introducing dual citizenship. Given current Russian behavior concerning the division of the Black Sea Fleet, control over nuclear forces, and various scenarios described by Russian military officials for a Russian-led military union, there is reason to believe that Ukraine could be subordinated to Russian interests in defense. Economically, Ukraine faces probable disadvantages in competition with Russia. The Ukrainian delay in market reform is leading to sluggishness in business activities, banking, trade, etc. In the long run this could transform Ukraine into a source of cheap labour and cheap property for Russian investors, which would make it extremely difficult (if possible at all) to maintain and strengthen the principles of equality between the partner states in the framework of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation. Because of its internal weakness Ukraine runs the risk of becoming Russia's "little brother" by following its initiative and accepting its dominance.

In view of the foregoing, Ukraine's place in the European security system remains an open question. Some points, however, are already clear. Some Western initiatives like the WEU's offer of associate membership to Eastern European and Baltic states and the Partnership for Peace as a (self-)selective process for NATO membership as well as the country's own eastward orientation seem to have already defined Ukraine's place as being more or less within the security arrangements of the CIS. The inclusion of Ukraine in a Russian-dominated security zone could well mean that the future European security architecture will consist of two major pillars, an expanded NATO and a strengthened CIS, and that its stability will depend on the relations between the two "blocs."

Ukraine's foreign and security policies both have the same flaw: since independence, the country has been looking for security guarantees from the West and from Russia, while its domestic situation continues to deteriorate. What the country is actually seeking is a powerful guarantor for its independence. The problem, however, is that instead of confusing the West with demands for security

guarantees or for EU or NATO membership, and instead of going too far in cooperating with Russia, Ukraine must take responsibility for its internal difficulties and come up with an appropriate strategy to overcome them. This will, of course, require Russian and Western assistance. It must stop looking for a protector, before a foreign assistant becomes the master of its domestic affairs.

4. Hungary as a Security Risk: No Major Concerns

István Szönyi

I. Hungarian Security – Any Challenges?


The region to the east of NATO's core area is occasionally seen as a single, complex security challenge.[1] Of the various aspects of the security challenges facing the region, one major, if not central factor is the potential for ethnic conflict. Yet, while the Balkan states or the former Soviet Union spring to mind, the Visegrad area is rarely included. Indeed, the Czech Republic and Poland are now confident of keeping their ethnic problems under control, but Hungary, with its geopolitical setting and Hungarian minorities in neighboring states, has a certain potential for such problems.

To analyze these potential challenges, overlapping aspects of security will have to be considered. For analytical purposes, they will be assessed separately from two distinct perspectives: an "inside" perspective centering on Hungary's domestic situation and the internal factors that could become a security challenge for the region by destabilizing Budapest's domestic foreign policy foundations; and, an "outside" perspective focussing on Hungary's neighbors and the external factors, such as the Hungarian minorities abroad, that could pose challenges to Hungary's security.

The first part of the paper will therefore describe the political stability of Hungary in its transition toward a market economy. Rather than a detailed economic analysis, this will be an evaluation of the stability of Hungary's political system and domestic party structure. The second part will address the military aspects of security from an "outside" perspective. To start with, the focus will be on Russia and the possibilities of a serious Russian military threat to Hungary. An assessment of the potential for military conflicts between Hungary and its close neighbors follows. The third part deals with the issue of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia. The conclusion will attempt to determine to what extent Hungary is or could become a security challenge for Western Europe.

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1 The 1994 French White Paper takes this view. It emphasizes that the issue of minorities and borders has burst vigorously onto the European political scene and that these problems could even lead to war. This threat is evoked above all by the Hungarian minorities (and other minorities in Albania and Russia). *Livre blanc sur la défense 1994*, Paris: Union Générale d'Editions, 1994, pp. 29-31.



A. = Albania; B. = Bosnia - Herzegovina; D. = Denmark
E. = Estonia; K = Kalingrad; La. = Latvia; Lit. = Lithuania
Ma. = F.Y.R. of Macedonia; M. = Moldova; N. = Netherlands
S. = Switzerland

Hungary's stability has been proven in several ways since 1989 and was again confirmed by the 1994 parliamentary elections which brought about the second democratic change of power. The autonomy of the economic, political and cultural spheres has been strengthened,[2] and Hungary's political structure, a political system of six major conservative, liberal and social-democratic parties, has been stabilized. Only parties which were already in Parliament managed to return; no other parties even came close to the 5 per cent cut-off limit. Thus, the parties sitting in Parliament are once again the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD), the Alliance of Young Democrats (AYD), the Smallholders' Party, the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP). The coalition of HDF, CDPP and the Smallholders' Party has been replaced by a new coalition of HSP and AFD.

Furthermore, extremist politicians and their movements, which were the major concern of EU ambassadors when they visited Prime Minister József Antall in 1993, lost considerable ground.[3] The extremist platform of István Csurka, the former deputy chairman of the HDF, had caused much international concern. But Csurka was expelled from the HDF by its president, the late József Antall, in 1993, and with the turn in the economy, has been forced to the sidelines of the political scene. Though he founded his own party, the Party of Hungarian Life and Justice, he only obtained about 1.5 per cent of the vote and failed to gain a seat in Parliament in 1994. All extremist parties fared badly (the communist successor party succeeded in winning only about 3 per cent of the vote), and the elections clearly demonstrated that the voters no longer accept parties that are outside of the framework of the 1990 consensus on the fundamental principles of political and cultural pluralism, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, a social market economy and an orientation towards the EU.[4]

Indeed the minority policy platforms of Hungary's major parties – the AFDP, the HDF and the HSP – also confirm these principles. Thus, there is a certain consensus among the above mentioned parties about the purposes and methods of minority policy; yet still the parties' platforms remain to be perhaps the most sensitive issue concerning domestic stability. According to the minority policy expert of the Socialist Party, the issue of Hungarian minorities in neighboring states will remain a central element of the policy of any Hungarian government.[5] But this does not mean that Budapest's minority policy will become a confrontational element of the country's foreign policy, or worse, that it will

2 Mihaly Bihari, "Politikai rendszer és pártrendszer," *Magyarosrszág politikai évkönyve*, 1994, p. 38.

3 *Népszabadság* (Ng), 5 June 1993.

4 István Schlett, "Tanulni nem szégyen," in: *Ng*, 14 May 1994.

5 Csaba Tabajdi, "Fordulat kell a magyar kisebbségi politikában," in: *Ng*, 11 April 1994.

develop a violent dimension. Hungarian foreign policy will be able to contribute to improving the situation of these Hungarian minorities only if Hungary avoids tensions with its neighbors and receives wide-ranging support for its policy from international organizations.[6] Accordingly, the Socialists emphasize the need to improve the economic situation of the minorities by promoting their social organizations, entrepreneurial undertakings and trade relations with neighboring countries, particularly the border areas.[7]

Similarly, the Alliance of Free Democrats feels that tense relations with neighboring countries would be detrimental to the effective protection of minorities. Equal priority should therefore be given to the improvement of bilateral relations and the promotion of minority rights. Improving the economic situation of the Hungarian minorities is the fulcrum of the Alliance's minority policy.[8] For the HDF as well, the main purpose of minority policy is to put the minorities on the road to prosperity in their homeland and to let them contribute in this way to the (re-)integration of the Central European region.

Thus, all previous or current Hungarian governments are offering partnership to the neighboring countries as well as to the minorities concerned.[9] Still, the Socialists criticize that the biggest foreign policy failure of previous governments was their minority policy which prevented an improvement of Hungary's relations with Slovakia and Romania.[10] Although it would be going too far to say that the HDF policy was confrontational (there are indications to the contrary), their policy indeed tended to withhold cooperation or at least to keep it at a minimum level.

Consequently, the parties' positions still differ with regard to the bilateral treaties Hungary is negotiating with Slovakia and Romania, in particular on the inclusion of Hungarian border guarantees in exchange for guarantees of minority rights by the two neighboring countries. While the Socialists are ready to offer such border guarantees, the AFD maintains that on several occasions Hungary has publicly declared that under international law it does not and cannot have any territorial claims, whereas the protection of minority rights, which is merely an established principle of international law, has to be reasserted.[11] The HDF on its part, though reaffirming Hungary's adherence to the Helsinki Document, and the Charter of Paris, kept reminding the other Hungarian parties that any unilateral concession made by Hungary on the issue of minorities (like the inclusion of a

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6 László Kovács, "Tisztázni a félreértéseket," in: *Ng*, 8 April 1994.

7 Schlett, "Tanulni nem szégyen," see footnote 4.

8 István Szent-Ivanyi, "Kisebbségi politika: erkölcsi és alkotmányos felelösség," in: *Ng*, 18 April 1994.

9 Géza Entz, "Elöre vagy vissza," in: *Ng*, 2 May 1994.

10 László Kovács, quoted in: *Ng*, 30 December 1993.

11 *Ng*, 14 June 1994.

border clause in bilateral treaties) would not improve relations with neighboring countries while worsening the situation of the Hungarian minorities there.[12]

Overall, the Hungarian public opposes any over-emphasis or misuse of these minority issues. The 1994 elections provided convincing proof of this. The HDF, the senior governing party in power from 1990 to 1994, was sensitive to the issue of Hungarian minorities,[13] but won only about 12 per cent of the vote. In contrast, the Socialists, who argued that the issue of Hungarian minorities should not be given higher priority than economic and social reform within Hungary,[14] gained about 53 per cent. The new coalition government has readjusted its foreign policy agenda accordingly.[15]

Even though Hungary has not witnessed a rapid improvement in its economic situation, the support for democracy and market reforms seems to have stabilized. At the same time, the tendency to embark on a nationalist course has waned, at least within all major parties.

III. Military Aspects of Security

1. Russia

There is a fundamental uneasiness among the Hungarian political elite toward Russia as a possible military threat. Official statements show ambiguity towards Russia's foreign policy. For instance, the late prime minister, Jószef Antall, hinted in a speech to his party at the danger of revived Russian expansionism, referring to certain forces – particularly in the Russian army – that are interested in destabilizing the region. In Antall's view, once the Russian bear awakens from its sleep, it might again move into the region between the Baltic and Central Europe.[16] In a letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Antall later repeated this view in a less outspoken way by stressing the importance of a new Atlantic (security) system to counterbalance possible hegemonic aspirations housed by any European country.[17]

Antall's worries appear to be shared by the former foreign minister, Geza Jeszenszky. Among the dangers which might possibly threaten the security in the region, he listed a worsening of the situation in Russia.[18] In his opinion, NATO can only avoid the necessity of defending the countries of East Central Europe by

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12 András Kelemen, in: *Uj Magyarország*, 9 September 1993.
13 Entz, "Elöre vagy vissza."
14 Tabajdi, "Fordulat magyar kisebbségi politikaban."
15 Tabajdi, quoted in: *Ng*, 16 June 1994.
16 Speech by Antall, quoted in: *Népszabadsag*, 27 April 1993.
17 *Ng*, 24 September 1993.
18 *Ibid.*, 27 September 1993.

immediately demonstrating its willingness to accept them into its alliance. High-ranking officials within the foreign ministry have reiterated this view,[19] adding that only through NATO-membership will Hungary feel safe from Russia. Despite the suspicions just mentioned, the Russian threat is no longer considered to be or likely to become a major problem.[20] In drawing an analogy between Finland and Hungary, former Foreign Minister Jeszenszky even considers a Russian military attack against Hungary as highly unlikely.[21]

Several points help to underline that assessment. First of all, Russia's new political leadership, supported by a large majority within the Russian armed forces, is generally trying to establish a policy of cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and with the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Only the strong showing of Zhirinovskiy's extreme right wing party aroused considerable anxiety in both Central and Western Europe, particularly since Zhirinovskiy spoke of restoring the Russian empire within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union.[22] He even went so far as to allude to the idea of recreating an empire incorporating countries like Poland, Finland, Afghanistan, etc. Nevertheless, Zhirinovskiy revised his earlier statements after the elections, stating that Russia had no intention of changing its borders, and that it will not use military force against the successor states of the former Soviet Union. (It is his personal opinion that some of those states will ask for readmission into "Russia").[23] Neither should the popular support received by Zhirinovskiy cause alarm. Although his party scored well on a percentage basis (it received 24% of the votes), only three of its candidates won a mandate for the Russian parliament.[24] Thus, it would not be justified to interpret Zhirinovskiy's success as a Russian turn toward fascism;[25] on the contrary, the adoption of the new constitution has shown support for Yeltsin in spite of the discontent caused by the economic reforms. Gorbachev is probably right in arguing that the Russian people did vote against any program of re-occupying Poland and Finland, extending Russian borders to the warm seas, or transforming Ukraine and the Caucasus into Russian protectorates.

Secondly, although its strategic and nuclear capabilities still make it the outstanding military power of the region, the Russian army has been deteriorating in quality. In an important move, Russia decided to abolish the joint command of

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19 István Gyarmati, head of the Department of Security Policy and European Cooperation, as quoted in: *Magyar Narancs*, 17 June 1993.

20 *Ibid.*

21 As quoted in: *Ng*, 18 May 1993.

22 *International Herald Tribune* (IHT), 14 December 1993.

23 *Le Monde*, 16 December 1993.

24 *Le Figaro*, 16 December 1993.

25 *Libération*, 16 December 1993.

the Commonwealth of Independent States on 15 June 1993.[26] The Russian army's morale is low. Its logistic capabilities are declining.[27] Russian military spending in 1992 was down 84 per cent from that of the Soviet Union in 1985.[28] Arms purchases decreased about 67 per cent as compared to 1991. The officer corps has shrunk by over 50 per cent, while only about 16 per cent of the draft pool actually has to serve in the army. Beside shortages in troops, officers and arms, there are also serious shortages in fuel and spare parts.[29] The army is plagued by corruption and occasionally suffers from disrupted lines of command, partly as a result of the fact that the main preoccupation of some regional military commanders is the "welfare" of their troops. According to the minister of defense, Grachev, the main difficulties the Russian army has to cope with are its grave social problems.

Thirdly, Russia is withdrawing its troops from the Baltic countries and moving some of them to "hot-spots" in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.[30] After its withdrawal from the Baltic countries, Russia will only have 210 servicemen remaining in Estonia to dismantle the nuclear submarine base at Paldiski and 300 men in Latvia at the radar installation at Skrunda.[31] These are facts that will make it extremely difficult for Moscow to restore the former Soviet Union (even partially), let alone embark on further expansion westward, even if more radical and expansionist tendencies were to gain the upper hand in the country.[32]

Russia's main security risks, fourthly, will arise in Transcaucasia and Central Asia as a result of the ethnic conflicts and separatist movements and the civil wars there close to its borders.[33] About nine million ethnic Russians[34] further complicate the situation for Moscow in these areas of the "near abroad." A self-assigned Russian peace-keeping or conflict-managing role can only work where resistance is weak, as in Georgia, or where there is consent, as in Tajikistan. In a nationally conscious environment like the Baltic countries or Ukraine, such a role would be impossible for Russia.

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26 "Russia's Armed Forces," in: *The Economist*, 28 August 1993.

27 Pavel Felgengauer, military journalist of the Russian daily *Segodnya*, quoted in *Ng*, 6 June 1994.

28 *IHT*, 30 November 1993.

29 John W. R. Leppingwell, "The Russian Army's Uncertain Future," in: *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), 17 December 1993.

30 *The Financial Times*, 2 December 1993.

31 *Ibid.*, 1 September 1994.

32 Christoph Royen, "The Visegrad Triangle and the Western CIS. Potential Conflict Constellations," in: John R. Lamp (ed.), *East European Security Reconsidered*, (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), pp. 93-113.

33 *The Financial Times*, 2 December 1993.

34 The last census was conducted in 1989. Since then, the Russian population in these areas has tended to diminish. Of the 25 million Russians in the "near abroad" alone, 12 million live in Ukraine.

Russia certainly has military interests in the CIS region, but this does not amount to a readiness to forge a strong CIS by military intervention. Indeed, the CIS agreement and the underlying CIS conception, as underwritten by Russia, Belarus' and Ukraine, was instrumental in channelling the changes which led to the dissolution, not the re-establishment, of the Soviet Union. In addition, there is an evident reluctance in Russia to undertake any military intervention abroad.[35] Russia's military interests are restricted to maintaining bases in Belarus', Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Apart from these, Russian troops are concentrated on the southern periphery of the CIS – Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan[36] – a peace-keeping role for which Russia has been partly successful in obtaining international acceptance.[37]

All these factors more or less ensure that any Russian expansionism will not be primarily westward. Moreover, even this potential threat would certainly not be directed specifically against Hungary. Hungarian fears based on the invasion of 1956 are therefore groundless. If a Russian threat were to arise (which does not seem likely at the moment), it would certainly allow for an ample warning period. This situation might change as Russia strengthens its say in Ukraine and thus expands its political influence further to the west.

2. Closer Neighborhood

Slovakia

Bilateral relations with three of Hungary's closest neighbors – Slovakia, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia[38] – are of importance from a security point of view.

Slovakia is considered first, as the government of prime minister Vladimir Meciar has evoked the danger of an alleged Hungarian military threat against his country. Meciar has repeatedly claimed that Hungary has conducted massive

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35 American Ambassador Thomas Pickering, quoted in: *FT*, 22 August 1994.

36 *Ng*, 12 June 1993.

37 John Maresca, "Russia's Emerging European Policy," in: *WSJ*, 6 September 1994.

38 The Hungarian army is 100,000 strong (with 26,000 civilians and 74,000 soldiers, of which 54,000 are conscripts); the Slovakian army has 46,700 men; the Romanian army 200,000.

Country	tanks	artillery	aircraft	helicopters	pieces of artillery
Hungary	1,357	835	1,040	810	1,431
Romania	180	39,108	2,875	1,375	4,009
Czech + Slovakia	1,475	486,430	220	120	3,208
Rump Yugoslavia	1,435	3,414	1,150	402	345

(figures from the end of 1992)

Source: "Defense: Central Europe in Evolution," *WEU Assembly Report*, 5 November 1992; Alfred A. Reisch, "The Hungarian Army in Transition," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, 5 March 1993, in: *Ng*, 26 February 1993.

military manoeuvres in border areas, endangering Slovakian sovereignty, and reiterated his allegations when Russian MiG-29 aircrafts were delivered to Hungary. In Meciar's opinion, such steps will trigger an arms race between Slovakia and Hungary.[39] After the re-burial of the late regent of Hungary, István Horthy, a Slovak newspaper close to Meciar even published a military analysis on the possibility of an armed conflict between Slovakia and Hungary.[40]

The military relations between the two countries, however, sharply contrast with these allegations. At a meeting of the two defense ministers in June 1993, Imrich Andrejcak, the Slovak minister of defense, suggested that Slovakia service the Hungarian air force and invited Hungarian air defense forces to conduct exercises in the Tatra mountains. At a meeting with the NATO commander in Europe, General Shalikashvili, he even stated that Slovakia did not object to Hungary's procurement of MiG-29s. He saw no danger of an arms race between the two countries and considered these aircraft within the limits of the CFE regulations and part of a long overdue modernization.[41] This attitude was confirmed by Slovakia, when it dismantled 134 tanks, 124 armoured transport vehicles and 178 pieces of artillery in the first half of 1993 in accordance with the CFE treaty.[42]

The former Hungarian minister of defense, Lajos Für, also saw no prospect of an arms race between the two countries.[43] For his part, he proposed regular meetings between the military leaders of the two countries, the exchange of information on troop movements, and the mutual inspection of manoeuvres in border areas. Für made clear that propaganda claiming proof of a general mobilization in Hungary or of troop concentrations in border areas would not influence the security relations of the two countries.[44]

In October 1993 the two defense ministers signed a cooperation agreement which calls for immediate consultation in case problems arise.[45] Both countries will disregard accidental violations of their air-space by aircraft during training flights in certain areas. According to the Slovak defense minister, military experts of the two countries are also preparing an open-skies agreement.[46]

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39 *Ng*, 25 October 1993. Meciar has also threatened to close oil pipelines reaching the Czech republic through Slovak territory (*Ng*, 31 July 1993).

40 *Ibid.*, 4 October 1993.

41 *Ibid.*, 24 June 1993.

42 *Ibid.*, 21 July 1993.

43 *Ibid.*, 22 October 1993.

44 *Ibid.*, 24 April 1993.

45 *Ibid.*, 5 October 1993.

46 *Ibid.*, 25 July 1994.

Romania

Military relations between Hungary and Romania are generally good, and there appears to be no prospect of any military confrontation between the two countries. The relations between the two defense ministries are reportedly excellent. Though there are no provisions for surprise inspections, an open-skies agreement between Romania and Hungary allows for four flights a year over a 1200 km route.[47]

According to Hungarian military experts, the Romanian army does not pose a threat to Hungary. As has been confirmed by several international sources,[48] the level of Romanian army supplies is very low and most of the Romanian army's technical equipment is outdated. For example, a considerable part of its tank force consists of obsolete T-34s. It is not surprising that discontent in the Romanian officer corps has increased recently. However, the army avoids playing a political role.[49]

The new Hungarian government is keen on furthering the existing good military relations with Romania. At a meeting between Romanian Defense Minister Gherghe Tinca and his Hungarian counterpart, György Keleti, several proposals were put forward: an exchange of officers in military training, cooperation in defense procurement, exchanges of information on the reorganization of the Hungarian army, and the holding of Hungarian air defense and air force exercises in Romania.[50]

Former Yugoslavia

Relations with the former Yugoslavia are a more serious matter, especially as some border incidents have been reported. In the early stages of the Yugoslav conflict, several minor violations of the Hungarian border occurred: shots fired across the border from former Yugoslav territories, airspace violations, and even a minor bombing incident, when a cluster bomb was dropped on the border town of Barcs on 27 October 1991. Fortunately, the bomb did not explode and nobody was hurt.

The likelihood of an organized attack on Hungary, however, has never been high, even if there may have been some political and military leaders who felt tempted to drag Hungary into the Yugoslav conflict.[51] Although there were threats

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48 The state secretary for political affairs of the defense ministry, Laszlo Szendrei, quoted in *Uj Magyarorszag,* 21 April 1993.

48 Jeffrey Simon, "Central Europe: 'Return to Europe' or Descent to Chaos," in: *Strategic Review*, Winter 1993, p. 22; Daniel N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective," in: *ibid.*, p. 32.

49 *Magyar Hirlap*, 27 February 1993.

50 *Ng*, 1 August 1994.

51 Major General Janos Kovàcs, head of the Military Intelligence Office of the Army's General Staff until 28 February 1993, in: *Magyar Nemzet*, 1 March 1993.

of an attack against Hungary (or, for that matter, Austria and Italy) by some radical Serb politicians at the beginning of the conflict, it is hard to see how any political capital or military advantage could be gained in this way. Most of these Serbian statements originated from extremist political forces which demanded revenge for the sanctions applied against Serbia. They were never taken seriously in Belgrade.

Thus there is only an indirect threat against Hungary coming from the former Yugoslavia which is directed against the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. At one stage, Serb radicals like Seselj and Arkan and their respective followers declared that they would force the Hungarian minority to leave Vojvodina once they came into power.[52] But any such steps are opposed by the political majority in former Yugoslavia, Milošević's Socialists and the democratic opposition led by Vuk Draskovic. As Belgrade has a firm grip on the Vojvodina, where there are no secessionist tendencies, its main concerns remain to be Bosnia, the Serb Krajina in Croatia, and Kosovo.

Also according to the Hungarian government, the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina is not exposed to any immediate danger.[53] Moreover, responsible Hungarian diplomats and high-ranking military officers are not prepared to resort to military force should atrocities be committed against the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. They flatly exclude the possibility that Hungary would let itself be drawn into any sort of armed conflict over the issue of the Hungarian minority. This assessment is shared by Hungarian military intelligence and is confirmed by testimony given before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament. The worst scenario envisaged would be an opening of the borders to refugees. Although the chance of minor, "decentralized" incidents cannot be ruled out entirely as the war in former Yugoslavia drags on, Hungary is unlikely to be exposed to the threat of a centrally-planned military aggression from former Yugoslavia.

But even if that were the case, Hungary is confident of being able to stop any major attack from the south until international help arrives and of being able to stop smaller incursions alone.[54] Although the Serbian army is strong and could threaten Hungary militarily, NATO officials, including the secretary general, have repeatedly given assurances to Hungary that NATO would not remain indifferent should Hungary be threatened by an attack.

Reflecting the Hungarian point of view NATO, however, does not see that Hungary is seriously exposed to any military threat from the Yugoslav region.

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52 See for instance an interview with András A'goston, the Hungarian leader in Vojvodina, in: *Ng*, 25 May 1993.

53 *Ng*, 3 June 1993.

54 *Uj Magyarorszag*, 21 April 1993.

Since the tensions in the northern regions of former Yugoslavia have eased, the likelihood of an attack by the Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) against one of its neighbors has become smaller.[55] As Belgrade now also officially enforces the embargo against Karadzic, the threat of a coordinated attack on Hungary has decreased even further.[56]

There are at least two reasons for Serbia to refrain from an attack against Hungary. First of all, the use of military force would be counterproductive for Serbia as troops would have to be deployed at a second front. Second, from an economic viewpoint improved bilateral trade relations are much more in Belgrade's interest since the population's ability to bear the burden of war has already been stretched to the limit.

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia is the country with which Hungary has come the closest to a security challenge. To reinforce the Hungarian border guards 28 new "action squadrons" have been set up to counter any violations of the border by irregular forces in the south. A Hungarian military aircraft once pursued a military aircraft coming from former Yugoslavia back to the Yugoslav airspace. There were also reports of Hungary seeking guarantees from NATO in connection with the implementation of the UN embargo. From the beginning, Hungarian politicians denied the use of its airspace to NATO aircraft if it came to peace-enforcement referring to the security of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina as well as eventual provocations in reprisal against Hungary.

If the use of military force is understood to mean not only military operations (even if on a small scale), but also the demonstration of a country's readiness and capability to defend itself, then, of course, the use of military force has played a role with respect to the Yugoslav crisis. Nevertheless, the possibility of a serious confrontation was never very likely, and this likelihood has declined even further as the conflict has dragged on.

IV. Minority Issues

This section analyzes the issue of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. Hungarian foreign policy has to pursue a dual goal: to contribute to the improvement of the situation of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries,

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55 *Ng*, 3 June 1993.

56 Still Hungary tries to modernize its armed forces – efforts which include the procurement of MiG-29 aircraft, the modernization of the friend-or-foe identifying system and of the air traffic control system, and the procurement of anti-tank and anti-armour weapons (which, to some extent, even include the delivery of military spare parts from Russia and Germany, although these deliveries do not serve modernization purposes but rather the sheer upkeep of the armed forces' combat readiness). These efforts are motivated by the evident weaknesses of the armed forces, not by any specific security challenge.

and to cultivate relations with these countries. As most ethnic Hungarians are to be found in Slovakia (about 600,000) and Romania (about 1.8 million), the main focus of the following section will be on these two countries.[57]

1. The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia

The issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia gained international attention when Slovakia applied for membership to the Council of Europe. The controversies that emerged between Hungary and Slovakia centered around several cultural/ethnic issues such as:

- Slovakia's official admission of original Hungarian versions of names (first and family names);
- the use of street signs written in Hungarian as well as Slovak;
- the establishment of a full-scale school system with Hungarian as the language of instruction;
- the revocation of the post-Second World War decree on the collective guilt of the Hungarians in Slovakia;
- the redrawing of the boundaries of administrative districts in Slovakia.[58]

In all these cases the Hungarian government supported the demands made by the Hungarian minority parties in Slovakia. It did so particularly when proposals concerning the new Slovak constitution, put forward by representatives of the Hungarian minority, were rejected by the Slovak parliament.[59] In claiming that the demands by the four Hungarian parties in Slovakia were based entirely on international standards, and by forwarding them to the Council of Europe, the Hungarian government supported the position of Miklos Duray, the president of the Hungarian "Coexistence Party" in Slovakia.[60]

Controversies remained particularly in the months following Slovakia's admission to the Council. Any compromises in the near future seemed to be blocked when Slovak Prime Minister Meciar accused the Hungarian minority of undermining Slovak interests by refusing to declare its support publicly for Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe.[61] When a new, more permissive law on ethnic names was partially revoked by the Slovakian parliament, and street signs in Hungarian were removed from public places, controversies intensified. In addition, the school issue and the question of the borders of new administrative districts remained far from settled.

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57 George Schöpflin, "Hungary and its Neighbours," in: *Chaillot Papers*, No. 7, May 1993, p. 37.

58 See, for instance, the speech by the Hungarian ambassador in Strasbourg, quoted in *Ng*, 21 June 1993.

59 Deputy State Secretary Ivan Baba, in: *Ng*, 8 July 1993.

60 *Ng*, 22 June 1993.

61 *Ibid.*

The Hungarian minority in Slovakia nevertheless has official political representation. There are four Hungarian parties on the Slovak political scene and ethnic Hungarians have succeeded in sending two of them to the Slovak parliament. Moreover, the Hungarians in Slovakia do not wish to rejoin Hungary.[62] Since most politicians among the Hungarian minority have realized that they would be the first to suffer the consequences of any revival of nationalist tendencies in Hungary or among their minority,[63] they continually emphasize that they do not seek to win even autonomous status. Even Miklos Duray, president of the "Coexistence Party" and widely considered a radical, has underlined that the aspirations of the Hungarian minority in Romania do not include territorial autonomy.

Minority politicians would clearly prefer a reform of the local government system aimed at granting local authorities greater powers.[64] Therefore, the much publicized meeting of mayors and other representatives of the Hungarian minority in January 1994 successfully aimed at easing Slovakian fears about Hungarian separatism and Hungarian aspirations of territorial autonomy.[65] Subsequently Budapest's relations with Slovakia could be improved again, in particular after the Slovak foreign minister had pledged that Slovakia would put into effect the recommendations of the Council of Europe. To this end, President Meciar asked the Council for experts to prepare the revision of the administrative districts in Slovakia.[66]

Yet Slovak-Hungarian relations are not restricted to the minority issue, as there is a clear reluctance on both sides to subordinate other matters to the solution of this problem. Quite to the contrary, the good quality of bilateral relations is attested to by several agreements which were concluded in spite of the dispute over the new Slovak dam on the Danube.[67] Recent steps include close cooperation between border guards, an agreement to open new border crossings, and a joint committee to deal with minority issues.

According to the former Slovak minister of foreign affairs, Jószef Moravcik, the politically sensitive problem of the dam has been appropriately dealt with by having it referred to the International Court in the Hague.[68] Similar statements have come from the Hungarian defense ministry, which has also been eager to stress that the controversy regarding the dam has no military implications

62 Schöpflin, "Hungary and its Neighbours," p. 24.

63 Karoly Toth, vice president of the Hungarian Civic Party in Slovakia, quoted in: *Ng*, 21 June 1993.

64 *Ng*, 31 December 1993.

65 *Ibid.*, 11 January 1994.

66 *Ibid.*, 11 October 1993.

67 Deputy State Secretary Ivan Baba, in: *Ibid.*, 8 February 1993.

68 *Ibid.*, 27 May 1993.

whatsoever.[69] Further confirmation is offered by the fact that a bilateral agreement, aimed to strengthen Hungarian-Slovakian cooperation in the fields of industry and energy, has been signed recently.

In conclusion, the only issue that has the potential to become a future security challenge is that of the Hungarian minority, particularly if Prime Minister Meciar or the Slovak National Party, which is close to him, were tempted to stir public discontent by exploiting ethnic issues.[70] However, such a move by Meciar would be rather unwise – at least at present – since his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia lacks coherence and would be further divided by any such step. Other political actors (such as the Christian Democratic Party or the Party of the Democratic Left) are probably even less inclined to promote this matter aggressively. Such a move would not yield much domestic support and would threaten the international reputation of the Slovakian government.[71] Even if they were inclined to do so, however, it would not automatically trigger an armed conflict involving Slovakia and Hungary.

2. The Hungarian Minoriy in Romania

As in the case of Slovakia the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania was highlighted by the country's application for membership in the Council of Europe. Since then, the minority problem has caused considerable delay in the signing of a basic treaty between Hungary and Romania. According to Hungarian government officials the border question is more or less settled by international treaties, while the international legal framework for minority rights is weaker.[72] The negotiations have been stalled by controversy over two articles: while Budapest did not want to guarantee the border without the inclusion of an article on minority protection, Bucharest declared a Hungarian border guarantee an absolute prerequisite for the inclusion of an article on minority protection. Harmonization of these two positions still seems to be quite difficult, although there has been some progress in reformulating the two articles.

There is, then, a stalemate, not an outright controversy. Most importantly, there is no territorial dispute. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry, as well as Geza Jeszenszky, have repeatedly emphasized that Hungary does not have any territorial demands vis-à-vis Romania, referring to the peace treaties of 1920 and 1947, the

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69 Rudolf Joo, in: *Ng*, 6 September 1993.

70 Schöpflin, "Hungary and its Neighbours," p. 25.

71 If Slovakia's goal is the full integration of the country into the main European political, economic, and security structures (as confirmed by József Moravcik, in: *Ng*, 27 May 1993), then it can hardly afford a serious set-back in terms of its international political reliability.

72 *Le Monde*, 10 December 1993.

Helsinki principles, and the Paris Charter, as sufficient guarantees. This means that Hungary will not engage in any attempt to change its borders.[73]

What is more, the Romanian Foreign Minister Theodor Melescanu stressed that his government's position is fully supported by the Hungarian minority, which opposes secession.[74] Neither in Transylvania, which is close to the Hungarian border, and where the scattered Hungarian minority accounts for about 28 per cent of the population, nor in counties such as Hargitha and Covasna, located well within Romania, where the Hungarians constitute a 70-85 per cent majority, is there a secessionist movement.

The problem of the Hungarian minority is not at the center of Romanian politics. In the 1989 uprising leading to the fall of the Ceausescu regime it was the reformist priest Laszlo Tökes, an ethnic Hungarian, who initiated the resistance to the regime and who was protected by an inter-ethnic group in Timisiora (Temesvar). There were clashes between unarmed Romanians and Hungarians after the end of the Ceausescu regime (e.g. the Marosvasarhely/Tirgu Mures clashes in March 1990 or a student demonstration in June 1990), but the overall political situation has calmed down since then.

Thus the minority problem is of secondary importance. There have been repeated verbal attacks against ethnic Hungarians by some lesser political actors such as the Vatra Romanesca, and its party wings, the National Union Party of Romania and the Greater Romania Party. But as an opinion poll shows, only two per cent of the population consider "the relationship with the Hungarians" a central political problem for Romania.[75]

The Hungarian minority in Romania nevertheless has a series of complaints.[76] Although the government proceeded to set up a Council on National Minorities, the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFR) abandoned it out of protest, claiming that the Council was no more than a propaganda device of the Romanian government.

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73 Geza Jeszenszky, quoted in: *Ng*, 15 September 1993; Tamas Katona, quoted in: *Ng*, 30 June 1993.

74 See the interview with the Romanian foreign minister, in: *Ng*, 14 September 1993. The Kolozsvar (Cluj) declaration of the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania states that the Hungarian minority does not want to secede from the country or choose the way of emigration because it considers Romania its homeland. *MTI, Magyar Dokumentacio*, October 1992.

75 *Ng*, 10 April 1993.

76 These include the issue of people being sentenced to imprisonment for political reasons, the need for a minority law and a new law on education, the strict governmental control of television, the loss of leading political positions by the Hungarian minority (such as the removal of the Hungarian governors of the two largely Hungarian-populated counties of Covasna and Hargitha), problems of education and the nationalization of the property of churches and citizens. The Hungarian minority also criticizes certain articles of the Romanian constitution.

The Hungarian minority is, however, represented in both houses of parliament by the HDFR. Given the HDFR's readiness for cooperation, Theodor Melescanu, the Romanian foreign minister, has pledged to include it in the negotiations on the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, in particular since the Hungarian minority in Romania rejects any lecturing or interference by the Hungarian government. Even if the HDFR expects the support of the Hungarian government in certain cases (e.g. in international fora or in the preparation of the basic treaty between Romania and Hungary) the party reserves the right to work out and implement its own policy.[77] The Romanian government in Bucharest remains its major partner in the negotiations in which it tries to achieve its aims.

The domestic controversies between these two partners largely concern the question of a genuinely democratic political system in Romania. According to the Romanian government, the situation of the minorities will improve with the development of democracy in the country.[78] For their part, the representatives of the Hungarian minority stress that no development in democracy can be expected without a major improvement in the minorities' situation.

Another aspect of the problem is the HDFR's aspirations for autonomy. At the party's January 1993 congress, the phrasing of the demand for autonomy was somewhat watered down.[79] In the end, however, the HDFR has not renounced its demand for autonomy: the party still insists on a guarantee of cultural autonomy for the Hungarian minority, although the call for territorial autonomy has been replaced by a less controversial demand for elements of autonomy in local government.

But even this demand has met with the resistance of all opposition parties cooperating under the umbrella of the Democratic Convention.[80] This is a grave handicap for the HDFR, since it not only antagonizes the Romanian government, but also, at least to some extent, burdens its relations with the democratic opposition parties. These tensions are also affecting the internal coherence of the HDFR, which is held together essentially by the single issue of Hungarian minority rights. Unfortunately, it is exactly the issue uniting the HDFR which makes the party extremely vulnerable to political attacks by Romanian extremists and nationalists.

It must be stressed once again, however, that the issue of the Hungarian national minority is not at the center of political controversy in Romania. This could change if the Romanian government under President Iliescu were tempted

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77 See, for instance, Bela Marko, President of the HDFR, in: *Ng*, 5 November 1993.

78 Theodor Melescanu, in: *Ng*, 10 July 1993.

79 In the new party program, territorial autonomy was defined as local and regional self-government (or administration); *MTI, Magyar Dokumentacio*, January 1993.

80 See Bela Marko, in: *Ng*, 24 July 1993.

to use the minority problem to divert public attention from the desperate economic situation in Romania. Only recently, Iliescu praised the Vatra Romanesca, a movement which, together with its party wings mentioned earlier, is notorious for its anti-Hungarianism. Yet while describing it as the main promoter of national pride in Romania, Iliescu – in the very same speech – stressed the party's role in contributing to a growing political and ethnic tolerance within Romania.[81] Given the small support for the Vatra Romanesca, such a statement must be seen as purely rhetorical. Armed conflict between Romanians and Hungarians in Romania is highly unlikely, and even less so is an armed conflict between Hungary and Romania.

3. Summary

According to the US Atlantic Council, one of the aims of American foreign policy should be to prevent the oppression of Hungarian minorities to avoid the emergence of major crises like those in the Yugoslav area.[82] Despite this comparison, the levels of tensions related to the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries are nowhere near those reached in the former Yugoslavia. Firstly, there are no territorial disputes involving Hungary and its neighbors. Secondly, all ethnic Hungarian organizations have repeatedly stressed that they will refrain from any acts of violence. Thirdly, in both Slovakia and Romania, strong political voices are speaking out against the abuse of the minority issue on the domestic political scene. Finally, the minority issue is not monopolized by any of the major political actors in the countries.

Certainly, there are disputes concerning the minority issue. They have not led to violence, but the ethnic question is still used by the major parties to attract votes from nationalistic groups within the population. There has been no sign so far, however, that the public at large, in either Romania or Slovakia, could be tempted to resort to violence against the Hungarian minorities.

Some examples may serve to support this argument. In Slovakia, the Slovak National Party, known for its anti-Hungarian tendencies, lost a vote of confidence in the Slovakian parliament together with its senior partner, the Meciar-led Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, in March 1994. Moreover, Jan Slota, its president, who had been warning of the danger of "magyarization" in the south of Slovakia, claimed only 5.4 per cent of the popular vote in the September 1994 elections following the lost vote of confidence.

The situation is similar in Romania. There is an inclination on the part of the ruling Party of Social Democracy (PSD) to use the minority issue to ensure its

81 *Ng*, 13 September 1993.

82 Bennett Kovrig of the Atlantic Council, quoted in: *Ng*, 18 June 1994.

position in the political system and to gain votes among nationalists. This was underscored when the PSD agreed to include Gheorghe Funar's nationalist Romanian National Union Party in its government coalition.[83] Yet this coalition has not made nationalism the official policy of the Romanian government for two reasons: First, the inclusion of the Romanian National Union Party in the government coalition was heavily criticized not only by the Hungarian minority and public opinion in general, but also by a group of opposition parties including the Democratic Convention, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party and the Democratic Party.[84] According to the editor-in-chief of *Evenimentul Zilei*, the Romanian daily newspaper with the highest circulation, the elevation to the governing coalition of a marginal group of extreme nationalists was largely responsible for thwarting better relations between Romania and Hungary.[85] Second, according to Foreign Minister Theodor Melescanu, the first priority of Romanian foreign policy is to complete successfully negotiations on the Hungarian-Romanian treaty. Romania has facilitated these negotiations by recently ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights.[86]

The real questions of the minority issue, which can be reduced to very specific problems concerning the everyday life of ethnic minority groups, are being dealt with through quiet diplomacy by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). There is no danger that these questions will lead to violence. For example, a major issue in the talks between the HCNM and his Romanian partner was a new law on minorities dealing in greater detail with the respective articles of the Romanian constitution. As the need for such a law has now been agreed upon, the main problems still to be solved lie in the specific phrasing of the various articles of the bill.[87]

Similar problems were mentioned in an exchange of letters between the HCNM and the Slovak foreign minister.[88] They include the new administrative division of Slovakia, the university of Nitra, ethnic roundtable discussions to be initiated by president Kovac, the new law on names and surnames, and the Mixed Slovak-Hungarian Expert Commission for the Evaluation of the Situation of the Slovak Minority in Hungary and the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia.

In view of these various initiatives, the situation of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia is more one of peaceful cooperation than one close to the outbreak of violence. The negotiations between neighboring governments and

83 See, for instance, *Ng*, 3 June 1994.

84 See, *Ng*, 22 August 1994.

85 Ion Cristoiu's comments are quoted in: *Ng*, 1 August 1994.

86 *Ibid.*

87 Letter from the HCNM to the foreign minister of Romania, *CSCE Communication*, Prague, 21 September 1993.

88 *CSCE Communication* No. 308, Prague, 25 November 1993.

Budapest may sometimes be confrontational, but they appear to be heading toward a successful political conclusion; they certainly do not constitute a security challenge to the region.

V. Challenges for Western Europe

Before drawing a conclusion, it may be helpful to consider some worst case scenarios. This means analyzing various clusters of security aspects which could destabilize the region.

One particularly bad scenario would be a situation in which irresponsible political leaders try to gain ground among voters by starting a spiral of accusations against Hungarian minorities that, in turn, could lead to conflict. But such leaders could not expect to obtain the support of a large segment of voters in any of the countries concerned today. The former Yugoslavia is the place where this has come the closest to occurring. Yet as even the atrocities on the battlefields of the former Yugoslavia are somehow related to political calculations, a scenario in which the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina would be drawn into the conflict, bringing Hungary with it, would rely on too many assumptions. It would, in fact, be wrong to regard the crisis in Vojvodina as analogous to those in areas of the former Yugoslavia, Transylvania or southern Slovakia. In the latter cases, the Hungarian minority does not constitute a considerable part of the regional population or is scattered throughout the region.

A worst case scenario triggered by the military is implausible: one would have to think, for instance, in terms of a Romanian annexation of Moldova (or at least parts of it). In this case, members of the Hungarian minority might feel tempted to evade the draft, which could cause tensions between the minority and the military. Again, such a scenario depends on too many imponderables. In sum, there are no realistic arguments to support the assumption of a worst case scenario.

Therefore, it is quite unlikely that Hungary will be confronted in the near future with a serious security challenge from any of the areas mentioned above. It follows that in its regional setting Hungary does not challenge the stability of Western Europe. Yet this does not mean that Western Europe is not confronted by any challenges from the region: any instabilities emerging in Eastern Europe would have an increasingly strong impact on the security of European NATO members. Problems could include an influx of refugees fleeing conflict, economic hardship and ethnic persecution, causing an outburst of unrest in West European cities, and furthering the growth of political extremism. Such crisis situations would also draw already scarce resources away from the task of overcoming the divisions of the Cold War, as Western economic (and political) investments in Eastern Europe

might be lost.[89] One may add that tensions in the eastern half of Europe would damage the progress of European integration.[90]

Regional conflicts spreading insecurity and instability across Europe could provoke just the kind of international conflict that is considered a thing of the past. Accordingly, if left to fester, ethno-national disputes might engulf all aspects of inter-state relations.[91] Any conflict resulting from ethnic and/or religious disputes could threaten the validity of generally accepted rules, norms and standards, and could thus threaten the very foundation of a cooperative European security structure. If Western Europe were to prove incapable of dealing with that kind of crisis, such a development could draw NATO members into new, confrontational alliances, thus triggering a rebirth of power politics in Europe.[92]

With regard to Hungary, such assumptions seem to be wide of the mark. If France and Germany "have more to lose by fighting each other than by getting along,"[93] this also applies to Hungary and its neighbors. Moreover, the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts will earn much greater international support.[94] The security system sought by Hungary and its neighbors is like that of Western Europe – it can best be described by pointing out that military power does not play a disrupting role in the relations of Western European states.

Hungary, then, does not confront Western Europe with any major security challenges, especially since its geopolitical location makes it only of peripheral importance to Western Europe. This ought to facilitate the further enlargement of the EU and of NATO.

There will certainly be pressure for such an enlargement: first, the countries situated along the borders of the (enlarged) EU area will not want to have to act as a "cordon sanitaire" between what was the East and what was the West during the Cold War; second, possibilities for closer trade relations between Western countries and non-EU members in the East will develop. Moreover, even the countries at the geographic center of the old EU will eventually conclude that the

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89 General James P. McCarthy, USAF (ret.), "Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe: New Opportunities for NATO," in: *Strategic Review*, Winter 1993, p. 55; Geoffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?," in: *Orbis*, Winter 1993, p. 23.

90 Daniel N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective," in: *Strategic Review*, Winter 1993, p. 26.

91 Manfred Wörner, "A Vigorous Alliance – A Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe," in: *NATO Review*, December 1992, p. 3; John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role – Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping," in: *NATO Review*, June 1993, p. 16; Ronald D. Asmus/Richard L. Kugler/F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," in: *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993, p. 28; Schöpflin, "Hungary and its Neighbours," pp. 1, 33.

92 Johan Jorgen Holst, "European and Atlantic Security in a Period of Ambiguity," in: *The World Today*, December 1992, p. 220; Lawrence Freedman, "The Need for NATO – A Constitutional Alliance," in: *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1991, p. 10; Rolf Falter, "Bosnia: Let's Hear the Low Countries," in: *IHT*, 13 September 1993.

93 A French government official, quoted by *Time*, 16 August 1993.

94 Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security," in: *Orbis*, Winter 1993, p. 38.

future of further European integration cannot be secure for long without further enlargement.[95] All these considerations point towards enlargement.

The recent difficulties encountered by the EU with regard to the European Monetary System, the Social Chapter, the discussions on EU-WEU-NATO relations, and also the narrow margins of the Maastricht referenda, have demonstrated the possibility of new dividing lines among member states. Inevitably such tensions indicate problems which are not restricted to the EU area and which in the long run require all-European solutions. An enlargement will cause the emergence of additional tensions and dividing lines, but at the same time it will offer the only chance for removing the basic causes of those tensions. However, the prospect of a wider Europe without such tensions still looks like a utopia.

A major aspect of new cooperation in Europe will be the question of security policy. There are at least three reasons for this: first, security policy is at the very center of a new all-European structure;[96] second, any EU-enlargement eastward will inevitably raise the question of a parallel NATO membership or a possible substitute;[97] third, Hungary, as a prospective member of the EU, will influence the future development of European security not by being a security challenge itself, but by requesting present EU member states to construct a new all-European security framework.

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95 In the view of French politician Philippe Seguin, for instance, the process of European integration cannot be kept on track for long without the economic recovery of Central and Eastern Europe; in: *Le Figaro*, 2 December 1993.

96 See, for instance, Michael Brenner, "Multilateralism and European Security," in: *Survival*, Summer 1993, p. 144. See also Helmut Kohl's comment: "It is a primary goal of the European Union to develop a common security and foreign policy," in: *IHT*, 14 January 1994.

97 If there were EU members covered by WEU but not by NATO guarantees, this could lead to a situation in which the US and the Alliance could be dragged into a crisis in a region in which they have no security obligations. Trevor Taylor, "West European Security and Defense Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond," in: *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1994, p. 3.

5. Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks

Roxana Iorga

I. Introduction

There is little doubt that the revolutionary events which radically changed the European strategic landscape at the end of the 1980s have had a significant impact on the way post-communist Romania perceives its new security requirements. As in the case of all former Warsaw Pact (WP) members, the loss of the security guarantee provided by the Soviet Union has been the most evident factor in the new situation.

The disintegration of the Soviet empire brought to the fore national issues which had been forcibly buried under the sands of the common communist ideology and the common identity of purpose and goals imposed by the Soviet power. Romania, which had been "different" and "eccentric" within the WP,[1] felt isolated both before and after the fall of Ceausescu: before because Bucharest was still strongly tied to the old political and ideological system while the winds of change were blowing in the rest of Europe and in the Soviet Union itself; after because the countries of Central Eastern Europe tended to consider Romania a "Balkan" country and were unwilling to allow Bucharest to participate in their political and economic framework of cooperation.

Membership in the CSCE alone was not sufficient for Romania to fulfil its security requirements. Only after the recent agreements with NATO, WEU and the European Union does Romania feel that it has finally broken away from a (security) isolation which was considered increasingly detrimental as old national and ethnic issues re-emerged.

This chapter aims to provide an assessment of the prominence and influence of those external and domestic elements which currently shape Romania's policies and which will continue to do so in the near future. It analyzes the issues most likely to determine Romania's stability or instability: borders, minorities, the democratic political process and economic progress. The focus is on Romanian perceptions of these issues and on the likely response to Romanian policy not only from neighboring countries, but also from international organizations. The article will also look into potential future conflicts, thus preferring a risk-seeking approach to a demonstration of today's relative economic and political stability.

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1 Although there was a price to pay in terms of a rigid alignment with the foreign and military policy of the large neighbor to the east, Romania was able to pay less than the other WP members. Indeed, Bucharest struggled to maintain autonomy in its foreign policy and also, although to a lesser degree, in its security policy.



E. = Estonia; K = Kaliningrad; La. = Latvia; Lit. = Lithuania
Ma. = F.Y.R. of Macedonia; M. = Moldova; N = Norway

The article is divided into four main sections. The first section deals with Romania's past foreign and security policy, and Bucharest's attempt to maintain an autonomous position while remaining committed to the Soviet bloc. Such an analysis is important in order to understand the elements of continuity and discontinuity in Romania's present position. The second section discusses domestic issues, focussing both on the process of political and economic change and on scenarios of internal evolution which may eventually constitute a risk for the stability of the region and the security of Europe. The third section addresses the issues related to Romania's geostrategic location in the South-Eastern European region and particularly those issues related to borders and minorities. The fourth section is centered on the Romanian position vis-à-vis the European security system which appears to be emerging around the core of international security organizations. The concluding remarks will try to offer a perspective on Romanian foreign and security policy, taking into consideration possible scenarios regarding the evolution of the international and European scene.

II. Romania's Foreign and Security Policy from the Warsaw Pact to the End of the Cold War

1. Characteristics of Romania's Attitude of Defiance within the Warsaw Pact

Within the complex web of interstate and interparty political and economic relations and military commitments which constituted the Soviet-East European bloc, Romania was the only country that managed to express a relatively autonomous position in internal and external policies while remaining within the socialist camp.[2]

The identification of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) elite with the "nation"[3] confirmed Romania's testiness vis-à-vis Soviet policies which ran counter to national interests and, hence, would have undermined the internal strength of the RCP and the personal legitimacy of its leader. Negative aspects of direct and indirect Soviet interference in Romanian affairs were articulated publicly, fuelling the traditional anti-Soviet bias of the Romanian population. In challenging

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2 Roberto L. Farlow, "Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment," in: *Problems of Communism*, November/December 1971, pp. 54-63.

3 After Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej consolidated his power in 1957, the RCP was under the control of an elite which was relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic background, education, political experience and political values. For the most part, the group consisted of ethnic Romanians born and educated in Romania, who had never resided elsewhere for any significant length of time. Consequently, its members – particularly Ceausescu and his advisers – possessed a strong sense of national identity. In this regard, they differed from their former party opponents and predecessors in the leadership who had non-Romanian backgrounds, had lived for a long time in the Soviet Union, and had thus come to perceive themselves as representatives of Soviet interests in Romania.

Moscow's control of Eastern Europe, the Romanian leadership consciously exploited this popular feeling for its own purposes and was notably successful in doing so.[4]

Thus, while remaining faithful to the ideological principles of the Soviet system, Romania pursued a policy of cautious autonomy and disengagement from over-dependence on Soviet economic and military structures. The purpose was to obtain more freedom of action, not to seek total independence or to leave the Pact – two goals which, apart from being impossible to be achieved in the Cold War years, were far from the political objectives of the Communist Party ruling in Romania.

Paradoxically, however, when the Soviet Union loosened its clamp on its WP allies, thereby allowing for the development of national positions – albeit limited to economic policy – Romania showed itself as the "odd man out" once again. Instead of rejoicing in the opportunities offered by the new policy of *glasnost* and *perestroika* adopted by Gorbachev, Ceausescu announced that he would strengthen the armed forces to secure the Romanian road toward Communism against any outside interference.

2. Romania's Foreign Policy

The evolution of a "different" Romanian foreign policy can be traced back to 1958,[5] but its most dramatic manifestations occurred after Ceausescu succeeded Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965. In fact, the Romanian Communist Party (i) remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute; (ii) retained party contacts with the Albanian Labour Party; (iii) intensified its relations with the League of Yugoslav communists; (iv) openly supported Dubcek's leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; (v) repudiated the Brezhnev doctrine, and (vi) advocated the autonomy of the so-called Eurocommunist parties.

At the same time, the Romanian government (i) anticipated WP's recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany by establishing formal diplomatic ties in 1967; (ii) retained cordial relations with Israel after the 1967 war; (iii) condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and also, at least indirectly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; (iv) refused to sign a 1968 Warsaw Pact communiqué declaring that all Pact members intended to become members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; (v) established close economic relations with the West; (vi) defined itself as a Third World state; and (vii) took an "un-Soviet" position on a

4 Farlow, "Romanian Foreign Policy," pp. 54-63.

5 Elements of this "diversity" were: Romania's *rapprochement* with communist China, Albania and Yugoslavia and, at the same time, its efforts to improve relations with the West.

number of CSCE issues.[6] Finally, as a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Romania used its participation in the decision-making bodies to try to oppose Soviet hegemonic designs.

3. Romania's Security and Military Policy

In the framework of the East-West military confrontation and in terms of WP military posture requirements, the Soviet Union viewed Romania as an important but not indispensable ally. Romania did not border on any NATO member state and was geographically located in a theater of military operations that was unlikely to be central in the case of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, an advantage clearly not enjoyed by either East Germany or Poland.

In this context, Romania engineered the departure of Soviet troops from its territory and refused to allow their return. It also consistently and successfully resisted Soviet attempts to expand the scope of the WP and the defense responsibilities of its members on the basis of a narrow interpretation of the treaty, which confined the responsibilities of the signatories to the European continent. By adopting a similarly narrow interpretation of the WP, Romania kept its participation in Warsaw Pact military activities to an absolute minimum and did not allow WP military exercises to be conducted on its territory. In the early 1960s, it also ended the participation of its units in WP joint military manoeuvres beyond its borders.

Romania consistently advocated the elimination of both NATO and the WP. Furthermore, when WP forces invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Romania was the only member whose troops did not take part in the operation. Finally, from the meeting of the WP Political Consultative Committee in November 1978 onward, Bucharest openly resisted Soviet calls for an increase in Warsaw Pact defense expenditures.[7] After a public referendum on 23 November 1986 calling for reductions of the Romanian defense spending Bucharest even decided to reduce its military budget by 5 per cent.[8]

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6 At the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meetings in Belgrade (1977) and Madrid (1980-82) Romania's position on some issues was distinctly different from those of the USSR.

7 The question was how the Pact should respond to NATO's May 1978 approval of the Long-Term Defense Program. The program called for a real increase of 3% in the defense budgets of NATO members in order to modernize alliance forces. Moscow reacted by proposing a 3% increase in Pact military spending, together with intensified Pact control over the various national armies. Ceausescu, according to press reports, not only opposed Brezhnev on both these points but also took the unusual step of publicizing the proposal as well as his opposition to it in a speech in Bucharest upon his return from Moscow.

8 Hungary and Poland did the same thing in 1989.

Differences also existed in military affairs. Romania's military doctrine was strictly defensive and designed to repel any outside aggression. Romanian troops were not supposed to participate in military operations outside the country and were not trained to do so.[9]

Military doctrine postulated the concept of homeland defense only – that is, the defense of the Romanian population on its own territory – and Romania was felt to have the necessary forces for fighting the battle in the entire national territory until the defeat of the aggressor. National defense included political efforts and military actions involving the entire population.[10] But it was repeatedly pointed out that the Romanian defense doctrine relied heavily on diplomatic efforts to prevent the very outbreak of hostilities.

The most significant aspects setting apart Romanian policy, however, were command and control arrangements. Unlike other WP armed forces, Romanian forces were to remain under national command and control in wartime, engaging in allied combat operations only for the defense of their homeland.

Regarding military equipment, from 1968 on, Romania tried to reduce its dependence on Soviet bloc imports by diversifying its foreign sources of weaponry and by building up a small industry to manufacture weapons' systems uniquely suited to conform with its military posture. Eventually, it had the only arms industry within the WP which produced both Soviet and Western military equipment under license and was able to export both to the Soviet Union itself and to Third World countries.

The self-imposed limitations on the participation of Romanian armed forces in WP offensive operations contributed to Bucharest's minimal military profile in the alliance. However, as already stated, Romania's attitude of defiance was not such as to pose insurmountable problems to WP military planners: while the WP needed Romanian help to confront NATO's Southern Flank countries or Yugoslavia, none of those countries actually posed a real military threat to the Soviet Union.

4. The Role of the Economy

Political independence within the limits indicated above was possible because it was supported by relative economic independence. The availability of domestic energy resources allowed Bucharest to reject the Soviet "oil diktat." Furthermore, the Romanian industrialization program had reached a point of self-sustainment, putting Bucharest in a position to refuse the Soviet plan for a division of labor in

9 The veto against participation in military operations outside national boundaries was codified in the 1972 "Law Concerning the Organization of the National Defense."

10 The doctrine was defined as "people's war" or "struggle of the entire people."

the socialist camp in which Romania's status would have been that of "breadbasket and gas station" for the states of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

In the 1970s, however, Romania's domestic energy production began to fall and the country became a net importer of crude oil. Most oil imports came on a barter basis from Iran and Iraq, but when the Iran-Iraq conflict dried up this energy source, Romania had to purchase additional oil on the spot market with hard currency. For this reason, although it had been very careful not to rely solely on Soviet imports, Bucharest was forced to turn to Moscow for oil and natural gas in 1979, and thus, to revise somewhat its policy of autonomy and move closer to the Soviet Union and the CMEA.

In conclusion, Romania understood, on the one hand, that given the reality and proximity of Soviet power, there was no practical alternative to the Warsaw Pact which, incidentally, also served specific RCP political interests.[11] Nonetheless, Romania opted for an autonomous, national role which was made easier by its geostrategically favorable position and its relative economic self-sufficiency, at least during an initial period.[12]

On the other hand, Romania's attitude served at least one Soviet objective: it provided an indirect channel of communication with the outside world and particularly with the West.[13] It can be argued that this was one of the main reasons why the Soviet leaders tolerated less than full Romanian support.

The Western countries had also encouraged Romanian autonomy in the hope of breaking the unity of the Soviet bloc. Economic relations with the West brought considerable dividends to Romania in terms of trade and cooperation. The exchanges helped Romanian industrialization and the diversification of its markets, although these gains were achieved at the cost of a large trade deficit with the West. Besides economic benefits, the *rapprochement* with the West created a reservoir of Western political support for Romania's foreign policy.

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11 The WP – essentially a Soviet creation – formalized the dominance of Soviet power and codified the establishment of clearly defined political ties of subordination and precise military commitments. Romania's leadership, and the leadership of all WP countries, had common interests that found their logical fulfilment within the framework of the links and commitments of the Pact. They shared an important long-term strategic interest in the preservation of their power and identical security concerns and requirements such as the maintenance of the strong military posture regarding NATO and the prevention of destabilizing national "deviations" within the alliance. Furthermore, they were all aware that no real stability was possible in the region without the harmonization of their foreign and security policies with those of the Soviet Union.

12 See Giuseppe Scarpa de Masellis, "Autopsia di un regime. Il comunismo nazionale di Ceausescu," in: *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, No. 241, 1994, pp. 79-101.

13 John C. Campbell, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans," in: *Problems of Communism*, July/August 1974, pp. 1-15.

If for almost twenty years Romania's leaders were able to woo the West into granting Bucharest various kinds of preferential economic treatment, the new course in Soviet policy initiated by Gorbachev created serious problems for Romania's special position vis-à-vis the West. While the new regime in the Soviet Union projected an image of increasing openness and reform,[14] Romania remained tied to a rigid neo-stalinist orthodoxy. The West was therefore no longer interested in having a special relationship with Bucharest, especially since the unity of the bloc was disintegrating anyhow.

III. Post-Cold War Political and Economic Issues

An assessment of the stability (or instability) of the domestic situation in Romania requires thorough analysis of the internal factors which may influence its political and economic patterns. Undoubtedly, Romania's internal stability remains a key condition for enhancing its international credibility.

1. Domestic Politics

The case of post-communist Romania reveals an organic evolution of the party-system from what could be called a one and a half party system (May 1990) to a pure multiparty system (September 1992).[15] In fact, Romania has twelve to thirteen parties in its political spectrum and thus holds an intermediate position between Hungary (with five to six important parties) and Poland (with twenty parties represented in parliament). This must not be considered as excessive fragmentation but as a logical development following the demise of the communist regime. It is expected that the present picture will gradually change, giving way to splits, new political aggregations, and new alliances.

The transition process to a pluralistic regime now seems irreversible. Romania is a parliamentary democracy in which the role of parliament is paramount in the political life of the country. The constitution, however, does not clearly specify the role of the president, nor the scope of the president's actions.[16]

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14 M. Carnovale/W. C. Potter, *Continuity and Change in Soviet-East European Relations. Implications for the West*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p. 224.

15 The main parties on the political scene include: (i) the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PDSR), the ruling party, resulting from the pre-electoral situation and strongly forged by the interdependence of group interests; although too large and eclectic to be able to formulate a unitary conception, it continues to enjoy broad electoral support; (ii) the Democratic Convention of Romania (DCR), the main alliance of opposition parties and civic associations; (iii) extremist parties, such as the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), the Socialist Labor Party (SLP) and the Great Romania Party (GRP). See George Voicu, "Sistemul de partide in Romania postcomunista," in: *Sfera politicii*, No. 3, 1993, pp. 3-4.

16 James McGregor, "Presidency in East Central Europe," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1994.

Thus the Romanian president has gradually become a powerful and significant political actor, with great potential for independent action. This potential is opposed, on the one hand, by those within the governing party, who object to the president's tendency to rule the party single-handed, a tendency which leads to an excessive personalization of the party itself. On the other hand, it is contrasted by the opposition coalition, which even tried, though unsuccessfully, to suspend the president on the grounds that he had violated the constitution by encroaching upon the independence of the judiciary.[17] It can be argued, however, that during the period following the events of 1989, only the presidency was in a position to play an important role to further the balance of Romanian political life.

Since the September 1992 elections, a single-party minority (the Social Democratic Party of Romania) has governed the country. The lack of a majority in parliament weakens its position and forces the government to search for allies. Indeed, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the government, but also a lack of alternatives. A coalition with extreme leftist or nationalistic parties could discredit the country in the eyes of Western governments and creditors; yet, all efforts to seek the support and cooperation of the opposition parties have been in vain.[18] Although the present government has been able to survive the attempts of the opposition (the Democratic Convention) to overthrow it so far,[19] the continuation of this situation could, in the long run, become a clear factor of domestic instability.

It can, however, be argued that, no matter what political coalition is in charge in the future, no significant change is likely to occur in Romanian foreign policy. The different political scenarios that can be credibly drawn all lead to the same conclusion, that is, that international political and economic constraints and evident national interests would eventually force any future Romanian government to maintain the current course in its international relations – a course based on good relations with all neighbors, diplomatic solutions to controversies and the peaceful resolution of regional crises.

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17 The move was prompted by statements made by the President on the proposed bill to return homes nationalized by the communist regime to their previous owners. See Michael Shafir, "Romanian Politics in Turmoil," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 29, 1994, pp. 1-7.

18 A compromise between the government and opposition parties has consistently been blocked by groups from both sides because of unfulfilled expectations of more significant concessions in the sharing of government positions.

19 Relations among the various parties and civic associations composing the Democratic Convention of Romania (DOR), the main opposition alliance, are only in rare cases cordial and are often tense. An inability to stay united and an incapacity to impose discipline on its members are the reasons why all attempts at provoking a political crisis have been unsuccessful, as in the case of the recent non-confidence motion against the government and the initiative to impeach the President. Because of its actions, the opposition has probably jeopardized its chances of wider electoral support in the future; it appears to be a perpetual loser and an unlikely alternative to the present government. On the last non-confidence motion, see Shafir, "Romanian Politics in Turmoil," pp. 1-6.

Even the worst-case and totally unlikely scenario of a governing coalition between the extreme right and the extreme left would not escape the geostrategic and geopolitical realities that limit Bucharest's range of options in the foreign policy domain. In any scenario, therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the issues of borders and minorities involving relations with neighboring countries, could possibly undergo such a process of revision as to become an element of instability and conflict in the region, with the latter representing a significant risk for European security.

2. The Economic Factor

The economic changes appear almost as spectacular as the political changes. Economic decision-making processes have been transferred from the state bureaucracy to managers and executives in state-owned companies. The number of private and independent entrepreneurs has increased dramatically.

Still, however, the economic relationship with the West, particularly the prospects of international agreements for assistance, cooperation and foreign investment, has a significant impact on the domestic political and social situation. With indigenous capital virtually non-existent, Romania is heavily dependent on foreign financing and primarily on low-interest credit from international financial organizations. Faced with an acute lack of funds for state-owned companies, the Romanian government has been forced to accept negotiations with the IMF, Romania's main foreign creditor, and to agree to its conditions for the further pace of the transition to a market economy.[20]

This means that the current basic economic stability has been achieved through extremely painful monetary and economic measures which could trigger social turmoil and political instability. So far Romania's economic policy has negative repercussions on the standard of living of the Romanian population. Low earnings (the average monthly wage is about $75), unemployment (11 per cent) and inflation (5 per cent per month), together with a rise in retail prices (+38 per cent) are the main problems to be solved.[21] A further drop in living standards for the majority of the population would not only strengthen nationalist and chauvinist tendencies, particularly in regions where there is a strong ethnic minority presence,

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20 The severe economic reform package that the IMF drew up with Romania is aimed at paving the way both for an 18-month standby arrangement and for loans worth US $700 million. The deal includes Romania's adoption of tough fiscal and monetary policies aimed at drastically cutting its triple-digit inflation and at correcting the trade imbalance by means of total liberalization of exchange rates and cuts in imports. The government is adopting the following measures: (i) strict budget control, (ii) free interest and exchange rates, (iii) reduction of inflation trends, (iv) restructuring and privatization of the public sector, and (v) introduction of new tax policies.

21 *Handelsblatt*, 1 June 1995, p. 8.

but also increase Romania's migration trend, thus creating a security risk not only for the neighboring countries but also for the Western European countries which will be the receiving end of those migratory flows.

In conclusion, Romanian foreign policy might be less affected by possible changes in government than by economic problems. The prospect of a future Romanian foreign policy adopting a hard stand vis-à-vis its neighbors on border and minority issues, to the point of open conflict, appears unrealistic. A security risk could, however, stem, on the one hand, from a radical deterioration in the social and economic situation, leading to large migration flows and, on the other hand, from the possibility of ethnic minorities in Romania seeking improved living conditions either through more autonomous entities or by joining the country of their ethnicity.

IV. Romania's Security Challenges and Risks

1. Russia, the Still Important Neighbor

The East has always played a particular role in Romania's foreign policy. Romania's concern over the attitude of its large neighbor to the east, Russia, was the result of a very realistic appreciation of its political and military power, and was not based on a positive or negative assessment of the ideology constituting the legitimating framework of that power.

With the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Russia no longer borders Romania geographically, its place being taken by the Republics of Ukraine and Moldova. Geostrategically, however, Russia is still a country to be reckoned with, and Bucharest still considers its relations with Moscow as very important in matters of security. Thus, the conclusion of the Military Cooperation Agreement[22] should be viewed as a normal event,[23] which does not preclude a West-oriented foreign policy, recently characterized by Romania's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and by the signing of a partnership agreement with the WEU. This view was not, however, shared by all Romanian citizens at the time; some pointed out that it was not normal that Romania should strengthen its political and economic ties with Russia while it was openly opting for stronger ties with the West.[24]

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22 In April 1994, after numerous delays and only a few days before the visit to Bucharest of an official NATO delegation, the Russian Defense Minister, General Pavel S. Grachev, visited Romania with the intention of concluding the Military Cooperation Agreement.

23 Bucharest had already drawn up similar agreements with all neighboring countries and also with some NATO members.

24 The visit of General Grachev was followed by the trip to Moscow of Viktor Hrebencuic, Government General Secretary, in order to settle economic agreements which deal mainly with imports of Russian oil and gas and exports of Romanian furniture. In accordance with Russian

2. The Issue of Moldova

The present Republic of Moldova is a part of the old Bessarabia, to which the north of Bukovina and Transdniester were added in 1940. It is a part of Europe in which the interests of large powers have often clashed in the past. The same geo-strategic interests are still valid today: for Russia, Turkey, Romania and Ukraine, Moldova remains an important area mainly because it controls their access to a region considered strategically, militarily and economically vital.[25]

After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, relations between Romania and Moldova followed a gradualist and pragmatic path, with the governments of both countries forging economic and cultural links while remaining within the framework of two independent Romanian states.[26] Ethnic kinship between Romanians and most Moldovians had raised the expectation that the two countries would unite after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But the Romanian position on the Moldova issue does not call into question the borders established after World War II.[27] Bucharest is fully aware that the inviolability of frontiers is a principle that must be fully respected, particularly at a time when neo-nationalistic tendencies and ethnic claims are threatening European stability and security. Romania openly recognizes and fully respects Moldova's independence, while emphasizing the historical and cultural elements which link the two countries.[28] Romania has officially taken up the "two state theory" elaborated by the government in Kishinyov with the aim of creating a climate of growing international acceptance for the emergence of a "common cultural and intellectual area." This, in turn, is expected to be the premise for a possible process of reunification of the Romanian people "within their natural historical frontiers."

The Republic of Moldova, although recognizing the historical and cultural links with Romania, does not appear inclined at present to consider the possibility of

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estimates, the trade deficit between the two countries runs at around $4 billion. In: *Curierul National*, Vol. IV, No. 937, 1994, p. 3.

25 *North Atlantic Alliance Staff Report:* Visit to Moldova, International Secretariat, August 1993, AK 162, CC/CSCE (1993) 6, p. 12.

26 *Cotidian*, 27 August 1991, p. 3.

27 As President Ion Iliescu has openly stated, "the point of view that the international community should favor the return of all the territories to Romania on the basis of the illegitimacy of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact could be argued on a historical basis and considered juridically correct ... Nonetheless, we must also consider the new European realities and the international agreements on the new frontiers which were made after World War II. Otherwise, many other territories will be put into discussion. The issue can only be examined by taking the view of the European countries and the international institutions, that is, the inviolability of the frontiers agreed upon with the signing of the peace treaties ending WWII. This is the Romanian position on the problem." Interview with President Ion Iliescu, in: *Curierul National* (CN), Vol. IV, No. 942, 1994, p. 3.

28 President Ion Iliescu welcomed Moldovan independence as "a fodal point in the future evolution of this sister republic" and embraced the idea of a pan-Romanian "cultural confederation."

unification with Romania. Moldova seems politically more distant from Romania today than it was before its independence. The signals from the new government clearly point to a reassessment and reformulation of relations with Bucharest[29] and provide political and economic motives for the move toward re-entry into the traditional "Soviet" space. Indeed, Moldova joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 8 April 1994 and has signed a series of economic agreements with Russia.[30] The Moldovan decision to join the CIS was viewed by Romania as a further regrettable indication of a political pattern which may eventually affect bilateral relations between Bucharest and Kishinyov.

Moldova's political class is not interested in the unification issue. The old political and economic system views unification with Romania as a threat to its positions and privileges. Most of the Romanian population in Moldova, which also rejects unification with Romania, is cut off from its national culture, its history and the use of its mother tongue, and is tormented by feelings of inferiority.[31]

At the same time, the main aim of the leadership in Kishinyov is to prevent the disintegration of Moldova. The government has realized that Moldova can survive only as a multi-ethnic entity. Social cohesion and political stability would be jeopardized by unification with Romania, which is precisely the spectre raised by the pro-Russian radicals who advocate the secession of the Transdniester and Gagauz regions.[32] Unification would very probably lead to the loss of these regions

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29 President Mircea Snegur rejected a possible reunification with Romania and called for a reconciliation between the Moldovians and the Russian-speaking population which is seeking independence in the so-called Transdniestrian Republic. He also said that "the Russians and Moldovians had built a common house during their long history and they must continue to do so." With the non-unionist parties' victory in the general election of February 1994 it has become easier to predict a strengthening of Moldovan cultural and ethnic identity. On 5 April 1994, the new Parliament of Moldova approved a motion which barred Romanian as the official language of the republic. Before the Moldovan elections, President Snegur made a clear distinction between Moldovians and Romanians in the course of a conference in February 1994 significantly entitled, "Our Home – the Republic of Moldova," in: *Nine O'Clock*, 9 February 1994, p. 1.

30 In this respect, the IMF's advice to Moldova to rejoin the old economic space and its reluctance to help Romania at a time when it could have affected Moldova's decisions may have played a certain role. Indeed, it was estimated that a refusal by Moldova to join the CIS would have produced an economic loss of about 40 billion rubles in 1993 alone. Moreover, Moldova's heavy industry is located in Transdniester and its agriculture (the real source of wealth) is directed mainly toward the Russian market, covering 25% of its total requirements in fruits and vegetables, 40% in tobacco and 25% in wine, in: *Le Monde*, 26 February 1994, p. 4.

31 Anneli Ute Gabanyi, "Moldova between Russia, Romania and Ukraine," in: *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1993, pp. 98-108.

32 Vladimir Socor, "Five Countries Look at Ethnic Problems in Southern Moldova," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 32, 1994, p. 19-24.

because their populations would consider it a direct threat to their ethnic identity and reject it.[33]

To prevent the Transdniester from using the long-term unification issue as a pretext for self-determination (i.e. secession) in the very near future,[34] the Moldova government has agreed to authorize self-determination for the Transdniester region, should Moldova one day be united with Romania.[35] Moldova therefore appears interested in carving out a balanced political position between Bucharest and Moscow and in continuing to advocate a firm line concerning the country's independence.

Furthermore, it could be argued that Moldova has interpreted the military agreement of 29 April 1994 between the Defense Ministries of Romania and Russia as a sign that Bucharest has also decided to revert back to Russia's sphere of influence. Thus in Moldova's eyes the decision was less revolutionary than it might appear in the West. Although not explicitly stated during the Romanian-Russian discussions on the agreement, it nonetheless appeared clear that Romania did not consider the agreement itself as a factor capable of decreasing either Bucharest's interest in the future of Moldova or its concern for Russian foreign policy decisions which might eventually infringe upon Moldova's independence and sovereignty.

In any case, the possibility of reunification appears to have been pushed into a more distant future. Romania does not see it as a pressing issue. According to the official Romanian position, if and when the matter is eventually raised, Bucharest intends to "consult with the Romanians both in Moldova and in Romania, that is, with all Romanians."[36]

Closer relations between Bucharest and Kishinyov could be brought about by a change in Russian foreign policy, meaning a more relaxed attitude towards Moldova's external relations, or by positive development of relations between Russia and Ukraine and the eventual withdrawal from Moldova of the 14th Russian Army, whose deployment seems currently justified only in terms of a possible Russian-Ukrainian confrontation.

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33 The fear of being swallowed up in a sea of Romanians, the threat to the Russian language posed by Romanization, and concern about being controlled following reunification fostered great alarm in connection with the actions of the Kishinyov Government.

34 Transdniester is a highly effective lever enabling Russia to exert foreign policy influence on Romania, Ukraine and Moldova. In military terms, Transdniester is a very important strategic bridgehead for the Russian army. To find solutions leading to a Russian withdrawal of its forces would mean overcoming the main obstacle to a definitive political solution of Moldova's eastern conflict. Even though Russian withdrawal would be of little practical significance since most soldiers and officers would remain, its political relevance would be far-reaching.

35 *NAA Staff Report:* Visit to Moldova, p. 12.

36 Romanian Foreign Minister Theodor Melescanu, in: *Nine O'Clock*, 18-20 February 1994, p. 1.

The evolution of Moldovan foreign policy is also influencing relations between the Ukraine and Romania. The situation of the Romanian minority in Ukraine, which is subjected to considerable pressure to assimilate, as well as possible Romanian territorial claims against Kiev, complicate relations between the two countries. The issue of territorial claims is more speculative than real and its sole relevance derives from the possibility of politicians from both countries exploiting it for electoral purposes.

3. The Yugoslav "Factor"

As a result of its geographic location, Romania is directly exposed to the risks stemming from the conflict South of its borders. Without doubt, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is aggravating Romania's security requirements at a time of difficult and painful domestic transition. The main concern of Romanian diplomacy regards the possibility of a spillover of the Bosnian conflict into Kosovo, Macedonia or Vojvodina.

With regard to Vojvodina, any deterioration in the situation of the Hungarians living there may well have serious repercussions on Romania's Hungarian minority population. On the one hand, international concern and support might be used to further autonomist aims in Transylvania;[37] on the other hand, if things go very badly, refugees could flood the Banat, an area of Romania which has become politically sensitive since December 1989.[38]

Romania has been engaged in trying to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia since the summer of 1991. Bucharest places considerable importance on its active participation in the international attempt to reach a diplomatic solution to the crisis.[39] The importance of Romania's role is related to its geostrategic and geopolitical assets, which include its neutral position with regard to the outcome of the conflict itself, its good relations with all the Balkan countries, including the successor states of former Yugoslavia, and its in-depth understanding of the situation deriving from its knowledge of the Balkan region.[40]

Hence Romania feels that it is particularly suited to playing a mediating role. President Iliescu's meetings with the Presidents of Croatia, Turkey, Greece and

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37 The current demands of the Hungarian minority in Romania for territorial autonomy presuppose autonomy for the Hungarian minority in the former Yugoslav republics after the conflict. The Hungarians from Vojvodina have already put into writing a proposal aimed at regaining the autonomy of the regions where they live.

38 Ioan Mircea Pascu, "Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict," in: *The Search for Peace in Europe. Perspectives from NATO and Eastern Europe*, Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, 1994, pp. 233-245.

39 Interview with Theodor Melescanu, in: *Lumea*, No. 10, 1993.

40 William Perry, "Romanian Defense Minister Tinca Discusses Bosnia, NATO," in: *The Wireless File*, 20 July 1994.

Bosnia have confirmed Bucharest's intention to play such a role. Moreover, international recognition of this potential role was symbolized by the 24-hour visit paid to Romania by the co-chairmen of the Peace Conference on former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, on 4 February 1994. Romania's intention to mediate was further confirmed some days later (9 February) by the calling of a conference in Geneva with the participation of foreign ministers from seven countries neighboring on the former Yugoslavia. The main aim of the conference was to seek possible solutions to the crisis, to assess the options for a regional political-military system in a post-crisis setting, and to explore ways of overcoming the economic hardships due to the war and the UN embargo measures.

Bucharest believes that any solution of the crisis should be based on clear security measures for all former combatants, and on international commitments to ensure that the provisions of the political agreement are respected. This position brought up the question of the evident contradiction in Romanian foreign policy between its open support for the policy conducted by the UN and the EU, with the involvement of NATO, on the one hand, and its still very close relations with Serbia, on the other. Indeed, Romania has never lost an opportunity to recall its "good relations" with Serbia[41] and has maintained very close relations with it throughout the evolution of the crisis.[42] Nevertheless, Romania has tried to promote equal treatment for all the republics of former Yugoslavia.[43]

As a member of the UN, Romania has fully adhered to and applied the resolutions of the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, it has often spoken out against foreign military intervention in the conflict, and against the use of force in Bosnia. The Geneva Conference provided a further opportunity to stress the need

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41 In April 1994, for the second time since 1990, the President of Serbia made an official visit to Romania, "the best of its neighbors." The visit was part of the Romanian effort to boost the peace process, but it raised concern in the West, where Miloševic is seen as sharing the responsibility for the civil war in former Yugoslavia. Reuters release in: *Vocea Romaniei*, 11 April 1994, p. 1.

42 The impression is that Bucharest was treating Belgrade as though it were "more equal than the others." C. Chatelot, "La Roumanie envisage de signer un traité d'amitié avec la nouvelle Yugoslavie," in: *Le Monde*, 22 April 1994, p. 3. However, the Serbian offensive on Gorazde somewhat changed Romanian diplomacy toward Serbia. The signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between Romania and the new Yugoslav Federation (Serbia and Montenegro) was postponed for "technical reasons." At the same time, Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic cancelled his visit to Romania (planned for the end of April 1994) because of the escalating confrontation between Bosnian Serbs and NATO over the siege of the eastern Muslim enclave of Gorazde, in: *NOC*, No. 643, 21 April 1994, p. 1.

43 Romania was the first country to recognize Croatia and President Iliescu was one of the first leaders to visit independent Croatia in the spring of 1993. Almost one year later, after the visit of a Croatian parliamentary delegation headed by Stipe Mesici, Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman visited Romania (15-17 February 1994), his visit being the first made by a Croatian head of state to the country.

for an exclusively peaceful solution. Bucharest believes that military means provide limited leverage and are bound to increase tensions while reinforcing extremist tendencies. In this regard, Romania has firmly refrained from any military involvement in the conflict, not only to protect its special relationship with Belgrade, but also to avoid giving the impression to other neighboring countries of a link between such involvement and potential territorial claims in the region. As a result, Romanian participation in UN peace-keeping forces in Bosnia is out of the question, UN rules notwithstanding. Furthermore, Romania does not appear to possess ground units specially trained for this kind of mission,[44] but it could, upon request, provide some logistic support.

To fulfil its international obligations, Romania is helping to enforce the UN embargo on Serbia and is continuing to develop cooperation with both the OSCE missions and the neighboring countries, namely Bulgaria and Hungary, in order to comply fully with the embargo. Initially, there were technical shortcomings in enforcing the embargo and in preparing for some of the worst contingencies: oil spills, or flooding caused by the destruction of dams on the Danube. But observance of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council continues, despite the fact that it is costing Romania dearly, especially at a time of serious economic crisis when the need for foreign capitals is strongly felt.[45]

This fact has been recognized by the international institutions dealing with the Yugoslav crisis.[46] Thus, Romania, together with Russia and Ukraine, have made calls for international compensation for the losses suffered because of the UN sanctions. To date, these requests have not been considered. But Romania's request for a system of compensatory measures to be established in favor of the countries affected by the embargo is based on the conviction that sanctions will become a routine UN measure in the framework of crisis management efforts.[47]

4. Hungary

While the political dialogue and cooperation between Romania and Hungary could be better, it is fair to say that common interests and a growing self-restraint have recently led to improvements. The main source of potential disagreement and possible tension lies in the wording of two articles of the "Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness" discussed below.

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44 Pascu, "Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict," pp. 233-245.

45 UN sanctions on Belgrade have cost Romania's economy $2 billion in terms of direct losses and a further $5 billion in terms of indirect effects up to now.

46 In the report drawn up by its Defense Committee after a visit to Romania in October 1992, the WEU openly recognized the high technical costs of strict controls over the naval traffic on the Danube.

47 Interview with T. Melescanu, in: *Europa*, No. 171, 1994.

This impasse was reached during the first series of meetings in early 1992. Budapest did not want to insert an article dealing with a Hungarian guarantee on the current border unless an article on the protection of the Hungarian minority in Romania was included first; Bucharest did not want to include such an article unless the article on border guarantees was included first.[48]

This apparently simple issue was complicated by different interpretations of international treaties. As far as Hungary was concerned, the border problem had already been settled by international "treaties," such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, while the international legal framework for minorities' rights was still lacking.[49]

Bucharest wanted to obtain a clear and categorical commitment from the Hungarian government as to the unchangeability of the current frontiers. In the words of the Romanian Foreign Minister Theodor Melescanu, "Romania rules out the possibility of settling the question of the Hungarian minority through changes in frontiers."[50] Romania's position was adamant: if Budapest really has no claims, it should put a guarantee in writing.

In Hungary, the positions along the political spectrum were diversified. There were voices explicitly declaring that Budapest has no territorial claims, but there were also others which claimed that the Peace Treaty of Trianon is null and void and boasted about the "great Magyar nation." Such declarations encouraged elements in the Magyar minority in Romania in their drive toward autonomy, a drive which has accelerated since 1989. The idea is to set up the so-called Szekely region with an autonomous status as the first step in a comprehensive plan involving the integration of Transylvania into Hungary.

It is interesting to note that there were official statements dealing with Budapest's right to protect all Hungarian-speaking populations no matter where they are located.[51] Moreover, the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFR), as a representative of the Hungarian minority in Romania, stands for "self-determination on the grounds of the principle of community autonomy,"[52] which runs counter to the provisions of the Romanian constitution. Then again, Hungary's detailed demands on minority rights have been rejected by the

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48 See the contribution of István Szönyi, "Hungary as a Security Risk: No Major Concerns."

49 *Le Monde*, 10 December 1993, p. 3.

50 *Meridian*, 2 January 1993, p. 5.

51 The former Hungarian Prime Minister openly stated that he is the Premier of 15 million Hungarians, while the actual population of Hungary is little more than 10 million. See the 1991 World Bank estimate in *Keesing's Record of World Events 1993*, R111, Vol. 39, Reference Supplement. Hungarians living in Romania total 2,100,000. See also Karoly Kocsis, *Minoranze Ungheresi nel Bacino dei Carpazi*, Rome: Servizio Stampa dell'Ambasciata d'Ungheria, 1994, p. 11.

52 HDFR, Declaration regarding the National Question, in: *Cluj*, 25 October 1992.

Romanian government as being intrusive and constituting an infringement on sovereignty. The matter is made more complex by the fact that the Magyars in Transylvania are one of the largest national minorities in Europe. But it can be argued that the current situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania is bound to improve further with the strengthening of democracy and the enhancement of living standards for the entire population.

Recently, Romania and Hungary had a series of contacts at government and party levels aimed mainly at obtaining "direct information on Romanian political realities and on the way in which the representatives of the Romanian parties see the possibility of improving Romanian-Hungarian relations and the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania."[53] The new Hungarian government led by Gyula Horn appears more flexible regarding the issue, the Prime Minister having declared that he is ready to begin negotiations on a bilateral treaty with Romania without delay.[54] He stressed the fact that his government would take steps to recognize the current borders, while guaranteeing the rights of natural minorities.[55] In any case, the treaty is seen by the present Hungarian government as a means of improving relations between the two countries, yet only if it succeeds in eliminating all problems which constitute a potential source of conflict.[56]

Such a change in the relationship between Bucharest and Budapest would call into question the raison d'être of the extreme nationalist parties in Romania. On the one hand the more extremist faction of the HDFR, led by Bishop Tökes, views the gradually emerging détente between the two countries with apprehension, as it might entail reduced support for the Magyar minorities on the part of the new Hungarian government.[57] The Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), on the other hand, which has repeatedly advocated outlawing the HDFR for ostensibly endangering Romania's territorial integrity, feels that the improvement of relations between the two countries may well lead to a loss of its electoral support.[58]

However, issues like the discussion around the archeological excavations in Cluj (supported by the extreme nationalist mayor of the city) or the approval of the new

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53 *Nine O'Clock*, No. 613, 9 March 1994, p. 2.

54 An agreement has been reached between Hungary and Slovakia.

55 *Reuters*, 14 July 1994.

56 See the interview with the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kovács László in *Magyar Nemzet*, quoted by *CN*, 13 July 1994.

57 *Adevarul*, 1 June 1994, quoting an interview with the Bishop published in the Hungarian daily *Népszabadság*.

58 In this context, it should be pointed out that the importance of the PRNU stems from the dependence of the ruling Social Democratic Party in Romania on its support in the current legislature and the possibility of the PRNU joining the government. See Shafir, "Romanian Politics in Turmoil."

law on education[59] are examples of the still delicate balance in the domestic political situation.[60] Indeed, both issues may well be used by the extremist nationalist parties to foment tension between the Romanian government and the Hungarian ethnic minority, and thus possibly having negative repercussions on Romania-Hungary negotiations. Therefore, the main risk stemming from the minority issue is still that political circles from both sides may be tempted to misuse it to divert public discontent while exploiting it at the international level for specific foreign policy aims.

Romania and Hungary should try to settle common problems of mutual interest on the basis of current realities without being too tied to the past. Such a solution presupposes that the leaders of the two countries are able to take a historical decision and work seriously to reach a stable political agreement. There are psychoses and syndromes which can and must be removed; but there are also values that should be maintained and shared. Three conditions have been indicated as necessary for political reconciliation between Romania and Hungary:[61]

- recognition of frontiers,
- Hungarian moderation in addressing the issue of the Magyar minority in Romania,
- creation of a modern system of autonomy.[62]

In the military sphere, the importance of the early 1991 Open Skies agreement between Hungary and Romania lies more in its political symbolism than in its military implications. More recently, the situation has improved with the signing of a military cooperation agreement between the two military defense establishments on 11 March 1994.[63]

Both countries are fully aware that their integration into the Western political and economic system may largely depend on the status and quality of their bilateral relations.[64] It is thus expected that their drive toward the European and Euro-

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59 The debate over the new law on education approved in June 1994 is centered on the right to instruction in the mother tongue at all levels of public schooling, from primary school through to university and vocational schools, and a return of government financing for education in minority Church schools.

60 Michael Shafir, "Ethnic Tension Runs High in Romania," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 32, 19 August 1994, pp. 24-32.

61 Gyula Hegyi, *Romanul*, Vol. 9, No. 203, 7-13 March 1994, p. 5.

62 See Takacs Csaba, President of the HDFR, *Cronica Romana*, 2 August 1994.

63 In July 1994, during the meeting between the Hungarian and Romanian Defense Ministers, Gyorgy Keleti and Gheorge Tinca, the Romanian minister offered concrete proposals for future collaboration with the aim of building confidence. The proposals are part of NATO's PfP program and include, for example, (i) cooperation in producing military equipment, (ii) joint exercises to be conducted in both Romania and Hungary, and (iii) training for the Hungarian anti-air artillery on Romanian ranges. See *Evenimentul zilei*, 1 August 1994.

64 See the article by Theodor Melescanu, "Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game," in: *NATO Review*, October 1993, p. 18; and comments by Gal Zoltan, the President of the

Atlantic political, economic and security institutions (EU, NATO and WEU) will tend to defuse the issues related to borders and minorities and guide them towards a compromise solution.

V. Romania, the OSCE, NATO and the WEU

1. The OSCE

For Romania, membership in the CSCE/OSCE was the principal vehicle for expression of its foreign and security policy orientations; until participation in NATO's PfP and association with the WEU, the OSCE was – besides the Council of Europe – the only European institution in which Romania enjoyed membership and the only forum in which it could both make its voice heard and promote initiatives of specific relevance to Romania.[65] Thus, Romania supports its further development, consolidation and inter-connection with Western European and Euro-Atlantic structures with the aim of creating a collective security system. The country was backing the structural reform process of the CSCE, during its transformation into a regional organization (OSCE), and the increase of its operational capacity to enable it to deal with potential European crises.

The disappearance of the political and ideological antagonism between East and West allows all states of the OSCE area to share the same system of political, economic, moral and cultural values, without the intentional ambiguity that characterized them in CSCE documents prior to 1989. Although the OSCE might have an important role to play in the European political scene as the umbrella of a security and cooperation system, this possibility is somewhat overshadowed by the dominance of Euro-Atlantic and Western European institutions in discussions on the emerging European security system. Furthermore, Romania feels that it is hard to imagine true stability on the continent without a political stability which is founded on the elimination of economic differences. Romania therefore advocates that the OSCE pay greater attention to the economic situations of economically weak countries and to the means needed to support them.

2. NATO

Since Romania's signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1991 – a move that raised doubts in the West over the direction of Romanian foreign policy – relations between Bucharest and NATO have

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Hungarian Parliament, "... our interest is stability in the area ... For a durable peace, all the States in the region must solve their problems and join the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures," in: *Dimineata*, 15 July 1994.

65 For example, "*The European Architecture and the Increase of Security in Europe*," document presented at the first meeting of the CSCE Ministerial Council in Berlin, June 1991.

gradually intensified for the better,[66] Romania's interest in becoming a member of the Alliance is based on its geostrategic position and the security vacuum left by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. While Romania is ready to assume its share of costs and responsibilities, Bucharest is aware at the same time that NATO is not yet ready to enlarge, and evidently even less so to the southeast than to the east.[67]

NATO itself is going through a difficult period of readjustment and restructuring. Faced with explicit requests for membership from many former Warsaw Pact members, it decided to adopt a program, the Partnership for Peace, which, short of opening the door of the Alliance, has nevertheless been able to provide an interim solution to the Eastern quest for a concrete security guarantee.

Romania unreservedly backed the NATO initiative, and was the first to sign the PfP agreement.[68] This step was seen as a significant reaffirmation of the Western orientation of Romania's security policy. Earlier in the 1990s, it had seemed that the country was moving slowly towards a re-orientation of its international ties due to the so-called Visegrad complex, that is, the Romanian feeling of marginalization as a result of the political and security agreements reached by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1991.[69]

The PfP, however, was considered a way of avoiding this isolation of Romania.[70] It even represented a much better solution than direct NATO membership which could have been obtained only subsequent to that of Central-Eastern European states – an eventuality which Romania would have held to be discriminatory.[71] Instead, PfP constituted a means of preventing the development of competitive politics between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and those of Southeastern Europe. It not only provides another political forum for discussion, moreover it is seen as a mechanism for cooperation, in which every partner contributes to establishing the type, dimension and range of its relationship with the Alliance through individually agreed commitments. Another important issue is

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66 In 1991 and 1993, NATO's late Secretary-General Manfred Wörner visited Bucharest and the Romanian President visited NATO on 17 February 1993.

67 "I do not hide the fact that Romania is interested in becoming a fully-fledged member of NATO, whenever the Alliance considers its enlargement as feasible and timely ... By choosing this path, we are aware that sharing the precious fruit of security involves costs and responsibilities. My country has decided to share those burdens." Statement of Theodor Melescanu before the NACC, Brussels, 3 December 1993.

68 "Romania and Lithuania. First Countries to Join PfP," in: *Atlantic News*, No. 2592, 28 January 1994, p. 1.

69 Dan Ionescu, "Romania Adjusting to NATO's PfP Program," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 9, 4 March 1994, pp. 43-47.

70 "It did not discriminate against anybody, it did not sanction new lines of separation and it did not create a new geopolitical division in Europe," interview with Lt. Gen. Nicolae Spiroiu, in: *Cotidian*, 10 February 1994, p. 1.

71 *Ibid.*

the sharing of values and ideals that, in the end, may lead to a common doctrine and action.[72]

By joining the PfP, Romania has taken another major step toward achievement of its fundamental political goal, that is, integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, a goal which is supported by the majority of the political parties and by public opinion in the country. Romania intends to participate fully in the PfP, to join training programs, and to participate in joint peace-keeping missions. This involves important changes in military doctrine, military posture and the use of military forces, as well as a reorganization of the armed forces and the procurement process. The requirements of the PfP fit nicely into the process of doctrinal revision and operational and technical restructuring which had started in Romania even before its participation in the NATO program.[73] Thus the PfP matches the criteria and objectives of the work currently being carried out in the Romanian defense system.

Changes, however, involve costs, and the PfP is considered an expensive program. But even though Romania is still struggling with its economic problems, it feels the effort may eventually be beneficial for the country. In addition, Romania has recently been included in the American military assistance program, which may help to relieve part of the economic burden.[74]

3. The WEU

The decision of the WEU to initiate a formal discussion with the Central European countries was realized by means of the WEU's Forum of Consultation (9+8)[75] after a first meeting in Bonn between the WEU Council and the ministers for foreign affairs and defense of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states on 19 June 1992.

For the first time, Romania was considered in a political sense as a true Central European country. Its long-standing desire to be viewed as "a Central European state close to the Balkans" had been finally recognized.[76] Moreover, Romania offers special value for the WEU due to its political contacts to an area of war (former Yugoslavia) and an area of potential conflict (Moldova and Ukraine). Relations between Romania and the WEU were further upgraded on 9 May 1994,

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72 General Georg A. Joulwan, the Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, in: *NOC*, 8-10 April 1994, p. 2.

73 Lt. Gen. Dumitru Cioflina, "Doctrina militara de aparare a Romaniei. Principii si orientari pentru asigurarea apararii armate a tarii," in: *Gandirea militara romaneasca*, No. 4, 1993, pp. 18-25.

74 Together with Romania the following countries have been included in the program: Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Albania.

75 "WEU Ministerial Council. Petersberg-Bonn, 19 June 1992," in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1787, 23 June 1992.

76 Melescanu, "Security in Central Europe," pp. 12-18.

when the WEU Council meeting in Luxembourg attributed association status to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, thus giving them the right to participate in WEU meetings and discussions.[77] As associate partners, the nine Central and Eastern European states do not enjoy a formal security guarantee, but they may raise and discuss their security concerns and requirements in WEU institutional circles. Furthermore, they can contribute troops to the WEU for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.[78] Romania feels that strengthening cooperation with the WEU and eventually becoming a full member of the organization[79] is the best route toward becoming a member of the EU.

Within the framework of cooperation with the WEU, Romania has thus decided to participate, together with Bulgaria and Hungary, in the enforcement of the embargo against Serbia, which has been carried out through strict control of the naval traffic on the Danube. In this respect, relations with the WEU have gone beyond consultation to active cooperation. Indeed, Romania, like the other riparian states participating in the enforcement of the embargo, required the technical and logistic assistance of the WEU to perform its mission.[80]

VI. Conclusion

As a Central European country close to the Balkans, Romania occupies a particular geostrategic position. Together with Poland and Ukraine, it is a power to be reckoned with when considering matters related to the security, stability and crisis management of Eastern and Central Europe.

After the dissolution of the WP and the fall of the Ceausescu regime, Romania's first foreign and security policy steps were to redefine its relationship with neighboring countries, former allies in the WP, and new state entities which

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77 This, however, does not include the right to block consensus reached among full members.

78 "Kirchberg Declaration," in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1884, 9 May 1994.

79 In his address to the WEU Forum of Consultation meeting in Rome, 20 May 1993, the Romanian Foreign Minister, Theodor Melescanu, declared: "Romania is both looking forward to the benefits of affiliation and ready to take upon itself the obligations of full membership." Another sign of Bucharest's keen interest in the WEU is the establishment of a part of the building of Romania's Parliament as an information and documentation center on WEU activities, which is expected to start operations by June 1995.

80 The WEU openly recognized, in a report drawn up by its Defense Committee (following a visit to Romania in October 1992), the high technical costs of the strict controls over naval traffic on the Danube for Romania and all riparian countries involved in the embargo. On 20 May 1993, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the WEU and Romania, establishing the framework of the Assistance for Sanctions on the Danube. It includes all the details regarding rules of engagement, command and communications arrangements, assistance to the border police personnel provided by the WEU countries, the sharing of support facilities, potential risks, etc.

emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This has been done within the framework of a series of bilateral treaties.

Even though it no longer borders on Romania geographically, Russia is still very important for Romanian diplomacy. The shaping of Bucharest's foreign and security policy is affected to varying degrees by Moscow's attitudes and reactions. Bucharest feels that any eventual European security system has to take into due account Russia's political expectations and military weight. This is even more true when the political and ethnic issues at the Eastern Romanian border (Moldova/ Transdniester) and their possible developments are taken into account.

The recent general elections brought significant changes in the foreign policy orientation of the new Moldovan government, but these changes have not altered the Romanian attitude toward the issues still open between Bucharest and Kishinyov. Indeed, reunification may well be abandoned even as a long-term prospect, since the drawbacks outweigh the advantages of whatever type of reunification scenario is envisioned. Romania is fully aware that raising the issue now would produce negative repercussions throughout the East, particularly in the Transdniester and Gagauz regions. Closer relations could be brought about either by a change in Russian foreign policy concerning Moldova's external relations, by a positive trend in relations between Russia and Ukraine, or lastly, by the eventual withdrawal from Moldova of the 14th Russian Army, whose deployment seems currently justified only in terms of a possible Russian-Ukrainian confrontation.

Bucharest is following the war in Bosnia – just across its borders – with obvious concern and keen interest. Romania's good relations with all the countries in the Balkans confer upon it a unique position in the region. For this reason, Romania feels that it has the capacity to play a mediatory role. Romania's main concern regards the possibility of the Bosnian conflict spreading into Vojvodina. Although Romania is one of the eastern neighbors suffering because of the embargo imposed on Belgrade, it is ready and willing to continue to respect its international commitments while maintaining good relations with Serbia.

As far as relations with Hungary are concerned, the issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania is predominant. The solution of the minority issue will require Hungarian restraint and Romanian willingness to work towards a compromise solution and, at the same time, adequate financial resources to cope with the economic aspects of the Hungarian minority's political expectations. Solving the issue will be an important sign that both countries adhere to the set of principles and values underlying the Western political system. Moreover, it might eventually be considered the *sine qua non* condition for their final entry into European political, economic, and security institutions. Even if the claims of the Hungarian minority are fully met, the issue will not disappear, and it is likely to continue to influence relations between Romania and Hungary for some time to

come. Perhaps only the full integration of Romania and Hungary into the European Union will dilute the issue to the level of an academic debate.

The OSCE is the only European security institution in which Romania is a member with full rights. Yet Bucharest recognizes that the OSCE has evident limitations in the management of regional crises and in providing the kinds of security guarantees which membership in NATO and the WEU would automatically entail. This is one of the reasons (perhaps the most important) why the main goal of Romanian diplomacy is to obtain full membership in the European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security structures. Romania made a clear choice by being the first among the former WP members to join the PfP, by accepting association status in the WEU, and by signing the association agreement with the EU. It is seeking participation in these institutions not only in terms of unilateral benefits, but also in view of its own possible contributions to the stability and security of the Eastern and South-eastern European region. Problems might arise if NATO and the WEU were to become two competing organizations. While Bucharest would not like to be forced to choose between the two, the impression is that it would favor NATO, for the reason that NATO is perceived as the only security structure capable of providing a credible security guarantee. In any case, Romania wants its participation to go beyond the current arrangements, which are still viewed as an interim solution to its real security and political needs.

PART TWO
Atlantic and European Security Arrangements

6. Current State and Future Prospects of the Euro-Atlantic Security Order

William Wallace

I. Fundamental Changes?

How fundamental a change in the European order have we been living through since the summer of 1989? The position each of us takes on this question shapes our assessment of the current state of transatlantic institutions, of the nature of the challenges we face, and of the future prospects for those institutions. Most of us accept that the cumulative impact of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1993 amounts to a transformation of the European international system comparable to those of 1914-1919, of 1938-1941 or of 1945-1950: a geopolitical shift in the European landscape, altering the central focus of the region and the balance among its major states, as well as the boundaries of the regional system and its relations with external powers.

Some (like Michael Howard) would go further, comparing the revolutionary implications of post-1989 with the revolutionary transformation of Europe after 1789: the collapse of an established domestic as well as inter-state order, leading to a prolonged period of disorder and political instability out of which eventually emerged a very different regional (and global) system. On the other side there is a significant minority, particularly in Brussels, who sees the shift as significant but not fundamental: requiring some adjustment of West European policies and institutions, and also of Atlantic policies and institutions, but containable within the existing assumptions and *acquis* developed over the previous forty years.

Those who adhere to the first and second of the above perspectives should logically look for as fundamental a recasting of the institutions of European order in the early 1990s as took place between 1948 and 1952 (or, less happily, between 1938 and 1941, or 1789 and 1800 – neither of which however led to the successful establishment of an imposed regional order). The stable nineteenth century order which collapsed in 1914 was based upon a balance between the major powers within Europe: Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Prussia-Germany and (after its unification) Italy. The United States in the decades before the First World War saw its interests as focussed on the Western hemisphere and the Pacific, not on Europe; drawn into the general European conflict in 1917-1918, Congressional and public perceptions of America's interests forced peacetime withdrawal from commitment to the (Europe-centered) League of Nations system.

After the failure of the European states themselves to achieve a stable order in the following twenty years, the USA was again drawn in; and in the postwar years

reluctantly agreed to reverse the run-down of US forces and to maintain a conventional and strategic military commitment to Europe until its West European allies had successfully rebuilt their economies and their military capabilities. But this was American leadership, establishing a benevolent US hegemony over a war-devastated and politically-unstable Western Europe in the face of the clear and present danger of communist subversion and Red Army aggression. Now that the first fear is only a distant memory, and the second preoccupied 1 000 to 2 000 kilometers further east, the foundations on which Western security institutions for the Cold War era were built have been swept away – and it is time to rebuild from the ground up.

Institutional reconstruction is however possible only under conditions of evident crisis: most commonly after a major war, or a crisis close to war. The underlying contradiction of present-day West European politics, and even more of present-day American foreign policy debate, is that policy-makers recognize intellectually the immensity of the changes we are facing, but have to operate within constraints imposed by electorates who themselves feel no sense of crisis nor any transformation of their political or social worlds. Popular appreciation of the significance of the end of the Cold War, both in Western Europe and in North America, is coloured by the domestic preoccupations of affluent societies: calls for the diversion of expenditure from defense to welfare, investment or tax cuts, fears over employment and disappointment over income expectations.

All Western governments have therefore underplayed the radical implications of the changes under way, even though recognizing in private that sharper changes of policy and of institutions are necessary. The prevailing institutional consensus within the EU and NATO, in the spring of 1994, was compatible only with the third of the positions outlined above – despite the rhetoric of NATO meetings and European Councils about the fundamental transformation of East-West relations. This is partly explicable in terms of the extraordinarily peaceful way in which the Cold War ended; with regime changes across Central and Eastern Europe taking place with only minor outbreaks of violence, and with Soviet forces withdrawing voluntarily from the states west of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) border. The conflict in former Yugoslavia has so far been contained within those borders, with little direct impact beyond Yugoslavia's immediate neighbors. The conflicts in the Caucasus and central Asia remain – to Western eyes – distant and irrelevant, hardly meriting even the dispatch of television crews to record the reality of suffering, brutality and death for the half-shut eyes of Western viewers. Western Europe is, after all, more secure from threat in 1994 than any of its inhabitants, young or old, can remember; for them the old order has not collapsed, it has succeeded sufficiently well to be maintained on a more modest and economical, care and maintenance, basis.

Public and political perspectives across Eastern Europe are radically different – for self-evident reasons. For them the experience of 1989-1993 has been one of crisis, collapse and transformation: more painful in some countries than others, with a greater sense of domestic insecurity or external threat in some than others, but unquestionably representing for all a period of systemic change. From which has followed the intense frustration of central and east European governments with their western counterparts: expressing a sense of urgency which their western counterparts do not share, meeting an apparent Western self-preoccupation which seems to them unforgivable.

Logically the governments emerging from the former socialist bloc should ask not for absorption into existing western institutions but for the construction of new all-European institutions within which they would play from the outset an active part. But all the Europe Agreement countries are politically insecure, economically weak, and – with the exception of Poland – small. Nor do the six Europe Agreement countries, or even the "inner" four Visegrad states, perceive sufficient common interest among themselves as a group to think in terms of bargaining with the West on the terms of transition. They see themselves as moving from dependence on the East to incorporation into the West: leaving the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for the EU, and the Warsaw Pact for NATO.

In more settled circumstances Russia and Ukraine might carry sufficient weight to bargain for a more explicitly all-European institutional reordering. But economic and political confusion in both those countries has not made for clear or confident foreign policies, with the Ukrainian government in the first months of independence even looking to EC and NATO membership as mechanisms for safeguarding its independence from Russia – or, more bluntly, of transferring its unavoidable dependence from the unfriendly East to the supposedly-welcoming West. Disillusion with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has increased the pressures from the east to be given the promise of membership in the Western institutions – NATO and the EU – which appear to offer the best prospects of net gains in security and prosperity. Individual approaches to Western institutions, reluctantly coordinated only under Western pressure, have disguised from these competing applicants how far enlargement to incorporate them would in itself transform those institutions, or how far NATO has already been transformed by developments since 1989 and by its members' responses to those developments.

II. Don't Tell the Children: Political Transformation and Domestic Consent

In a period of uncertain transition from the hostile stability of the Cold War order to the hoped-for friendly stability of a wider European order the outlines of which

can so far be only dimly foreseen, it is rational to work through existing institutional frameworks to engineer and manage change – provided there is a clear understanding that the end of the process will involve substantial institutional reconstruction. It is not however evident that there is any such understanding among western governments, let alone any willingness among western governments to prepare opinion within their parliaments and publics for such reconstruction. The impression given is of continuity, of modest adjustment, and of eventual – but not immediate or early – enlargement. "Partnership" is a deliberately ambivalent term: implying something less than a full commitment, open to interpretation either as a preliminary to closer relations or as a substitute for closer relations. Partnership for Peace is a wonderfully appealing title for a deliberately imprecise relationship, in which peace is assumed and the potential threats unstated.

The argument of what follows is that this political stance in Western Europe and North America falls far short of the security and economic challenges facing the European region, and far short too of the institutional transformation which will be needed within the next decade if we are successfully to construct a stable wider European order. The comfortable but illusory idea that NATO can be maintained in any form recognizable to its founders, even enlarged, much beyond the year 2000 allows governments and publics to postpone confronting the question of how to construct an alternative European security order, instead of using the prolongation of NATO beyond the expiry of its original rationale as a limited period within which to prepare its eventual replacement. The illusion that the EU can respond to the demand for a doubling of membership – and a trebling of geographical area – within the next ten years without a radical recasting of its *acquis* and institutional balance allows its present member governments to postpone explaining these awkward changes to their domestic publics; but it is leading to a widening gap between the commitment to enlargement in principle and the willingness to make enlargement acceptable to potential entrants.

This paper is written in deliberately stark terms, in the belief that too much of the current debate on rebuilding European order avoids the underlying contradictions in Western policies, and that it also underplays the difficulties of absorbing the Europe Agreement countries into Western institutions within a timescale acceptable to those countries. We will not construct a stable post-Cold War order by pretending to our publics that it can be achieved painlessly, without raising taxes or transferring jobs and resources. The example of the unification of Germany already offers us a sober warning of what happens when governments prefer to tell their publics that change can be achieved without significant cost.

Largely unreported in national newspapers, some significant developments are indeed under way – in the further integration of national forces, in the provision of a basic structure for the WEU, in closer consultations between Britain and

France, France and NATO, alongside those already developing between Germany and France, and in the evolution of consultative processes with former Warsaw Pact countries. Franco-British defense discussions on nuclear cooperation were reportedly moving ahead well in the winter of 1993-1994, under conditions of strict secrecy. But the very abstruseness of these developments, and the impenetrability of their acronyms, operate to obscure their implications from most national politicians and almost all national publics. Defense ministries and foreign ministries pursue one set of policies, while finance ministries and trade (and agriculture) ministries pursue another, without public scrutiny of the contradictions and inconsistencies involved. Half-promises are being made about institutional enlargement without accompanying efforts to prepare parliaments – or Congress – to accept the principle of enlargement and the additional obligations it would bring, let alone to persuade voters to support the idea. West European and American agricultural interests battled to the end of the Uruguay Round without a whisper – in France, or in Kansas – that a successful transition to efficient agricultural production in Poland, Hungary, Romania or Ukraine would (unless rigourously excluded from Western markets) transform the balance of European agricultural supply and demand, and substantially affect the pattern of world agricultural trade.

Governments have to satisfy different audiences. From political necessity, they obscure longer-term choices under the pressures of shorter-term elections. The role of the intellectual, the policy adviser, however, is to clarify choices, to point out contradictions. The politician may feel impelled to pretend that the Emperor's new suit is remarkably fine; the policy institute can only justify its existence by pointing out when he is naked. The gap between domestic expectations and international negotiations has now grown sufficiently wide for the entire public debate about Europe's future institutional structure to be riddled with ambiguities and contradictions: about the depth and sustainability of America's foreign policy and security commitment; about the willingness of West European governments to sustain defense efforts, and to agree on an appropriate allocation of the burdens of military commitment and financial contributions among them; about the seriousness of the proclaimed commitment to a "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP); about the practicability of enlarging NATO, the EU or the WEU. In the sections which follow I intend only to sketch out some of the background to this current confusion.

III. *"The West" as a Cold War Construct: Are We Now Witnessing the Decline of "the West"?*

The whole idea of an "Atlantic Community" was a product of the ideological conflict between "East" and "West" which followed the Second World War: deliberately fostered by American policy-makers and their West European allies to strengthen the sense of solidarity against the communist threat. Ideas of a "Third Force" between the capitalist USA and the communist USSR were widely received within postwar Western Europe – even, briefly, within the British Labour Government – and were forcefully revived by President de Gaulle in the early 1960s; against which the Atlanticist idea of a coherent Western civilization was carefully cultivated. There were older traditions to build on, of the civilized West against the uncivilized East; in effect these were reinterpreted to exclude eastern Europe from Western civilization, and to include the USA within it. "Central" Europe disappeared from Europe's mental map; "Asia," in Adenauer's famous phrase, "now reached the Elbe." The immense impact of American culture on Western Europe in the postwar years contributed to this sense of a transatlantic link stronger than the ties which bound Britain to Bohemia,[1] or France to Poland; so did the immense impact on American culture of the great wave of intellectuals from central Europe which hit American universities in the 1930s, and remained a powerful force until the 1970s. The most desired destination for any West European student pursuing an advanced degree from the 1940s to the mid-1980s was not France, or Britain or Germany, but the United States. Supported by a network of scholarship schemes developed in the postwar years, successive generations of European elites were trained in the United States, returning to Western Europe with the underlying preconception that Washington was closer than Warsaw, Boston than Budapest.[2]

West Europeans in later years preferred to downplay the extent of American influence over West European integration. It was more comfortable to depict the reconstruction of Western Europe in terms of the idealists who envisioned the European Communities and the autonomous efforts of Western Europe's own political leaders. Opening of the archives is now reminding us how direct the American influence – and even the American financial input – was in promoting proposals for West European Union, and in supporting those who were prepared to promote a closer union against faint-hearts and inter-governmentalists.[3] In the

1 "A far away country about which we know little" (Chamberlain).

2 Louis Halle, *The Cold War as History*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1967; Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance*, London: Macmillan, 1978; Harlan B. van Cleveland (ed.), *The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966; William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London: Pinter, 1990.

3 See Richard Aldrich, "European Integration, Politcal Elites and the American Intelligence Connection," in Anne Deighton (ed.), *European Construction: National Decision-Makers and*

heated atmosphere of the postwar years, most West Europeans were willing disciples of the new Atlanticist religion. Forced to take sides between democracy and Communism, they embraced democracy; and with it embraced the idea of the USA as the citadel of democracy, inheritor of the European Enlightenment and leader of the West.[4]

It takes now a massive feat of imagination to conjure up the confrontational atmosphere of forty years ago, the sense of sharp ideological conflict between two opposed camps. Precisely because the attraction of authoritarian socialism has melted away, the idea of a monolithic West built upon shared values is less overwhelming. The differences between different models of social democracy, or market democracy, are now apparent. The costs and benefits – economic, social and political – of the different models are debated across the Atlantic and within Western Europe, against the background of hard-fought negotiations on competition rules and permissible levels of state intervention and subsidy.[5] And the states in transition to market democracy are offered a bewildering variety of advice on the model of capitalism to follow, on the proper role of the state and the balance between public and private systems of welfare.

Within the USA, too, the coherence of "Western civilization" has increasingly been questioned, together with the implication that North America and Western Europe are linked by common values which distinguish these two regions from the rest of the world. Increasing ethnic diversity, the shift of demographic balance from the Atlantic coast towards the Gulf and the Pacific, the passing of the generation of European exiles from American intellectual life, the increased importance of Asian markets, the re-emergence of old themes of American identity – of separation from the "Old World" and of fascination with the Pacific: all these have contributed to a weakening of the assumptions of the 1950s, '60s and '70s that the Atlantic Community was a community bound together by values which were inherently "Euro-Atlantic," which were understood in the same fashion on both sides of the Atlantic, and which formed the basis for an Alliance which represented an ideological expression more than a combination of national interests.

Thirty years ago the Atlantic Community was "the West": the focus for world trade, the central American strategic commitment. In the 1990s any definition of "the West" must also include at least some of the far "East." Japan and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Korea and Taiwan

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Postwar European Institution-Building, London: Macmillan, 1994; for information from US archives on the American transfer of financial support within the European Movement in 1949 from Duncan Sandys to Paul-Henri Spaak.

4 David Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction*, London: Longman, 1992; Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

5 See for example Michel Albert, *Capitalism against Capitalism?*, London: Whurr, 1993.

have become important players in the world economy and important components of the "Western" security system. Korea, like Mexico, is moving towards membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) excite American policy-makers as much as – if not more than – the reformulation of transatlantic partnership. The idea of a coherent Atlantic Community, born in the wartime Atlantic Charter and fostered through the postwar Atlantic Alliance, has disappeared. With Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey among America's favored allies, and with the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer open to portrayal in terms of pro-Western Israel and Soviet-sponsored Arab nations, the elision between "Western" and "Judaeo-Christian" civilization so often made over the past 25 years now carries exclusive connotations unhelpful in relations with the Muslim world.

The Cold War was in some ways a clash of civilizations. Attempts to portray the post-Cold War world in such starkly defined conflictual terms look more like attempts to prolong American intellectual and political hegemony than careful analyses of the fault-lines of an emerging regional and global order.[6] If the boundaries of the West are to be drawn on the old boundaries of Western Christendom, the Orthodox states of south-eastern Europe will be excluded from the Western camp, together with Muslim Turkey, Morocco and the countries around the southern Mediterranean. The substantial (and rising) Muslim population of Western Europe in this concept becomes an alien presence. Russia is defined out of Europe into Asia. The boundaries of the West can be moved eastwards a few hundred kilometers, to take back into the Western fold (the EU and NATO) Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and Slovenia, and perhaps also the Baltic states, Slovakia and Croatia, before re-erecting the defenses of the West against the barbarian hordes beyond. Such a redefinition is present as a half-conscious assumption in Christian Democratic circles. It would command widespread popular support within western Europe; it would delight opinion in Hungary, as well as a good many in the Czech Republic and Poland. But it would be disastrous as a basis for reordering European institutions, privileging some former socialist states and rebuffing others to the south and east.[7]

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6 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993. The concept of intellectual hegemony is taken from Gramsci via Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead*, New York: Basic Books, 1990.

7 This is not to deny the contemporary political and cultural significance of the historical fault line between the countries of the former Western Christendom and those of the Orthodox and Muslim worlds; rather to urge that it be treated as one of the many fault lines within Europe rather than as *the* defining border. Huntington's map of this "fault line between civilizations," after all, is taken from Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe* (1990) – though characteristically the thin dotted line of the original has been replaced by a thick solid line in Huntington's preferred image.

It would be wiser therefore to moderate our value-laden rhetoric, to accept that "the West" is a concept which needs treating with care, and that for both Western Europe and the United States the end of the Cold War era has reopened other cultural interconnections, requiring different mental maps. West Europeans need to recall the Muslim contribution to Western civilization, the importance of interactions across the Mediterranean, the role of Byzantium in European history, perhaps even the ethnic and religious balance of the Ottoman empire. Americans are giving more emphasis to their interaction with the Hispanic world and with East Asia. Neither of these shifts of emphasis denies the reality of closely shared assumptions – and of lively differences within those shared assumptions – across the Atlantic. But they do indicate that redefinition of the Atlantic relationship needs to take place within a much broader, global framework, in which the interests and assumptions of Europeans and Americans overlap but are not identical.

IV. Western Institutions, Western Assumptions

Institutions help to shape and direct policy. But to maintain their effectiveness they must also fit the international context within which they operate. NATO and the EC were designed to fit a divided Europe, contained within a US-led Atlantic framework. They were also designed to contain a rehabilitated but divided Germany, mistrusted by its neighbors and uncertain of its own appropriate role. The defense of Germany – the central front – was the central purpose of the Atlantic Alliance, the theater within which its forces were concentrated. The northern and southern "flanks" were secondary concerns: the Mediterranean more clearly dominated by American military power, as Britain withdrew from its Mediterranean commitments and France withdrew from the integrated alliance structure.

NATO in its original American conception was intended to provide an American security commitment until its devastated West European partners were economically robust enough to shoulder the burden of their own defense, within the framework of a transatlantic strategic nuclear guarantee. Between 1957 and 1963 the major players on both sides of the Atlantic therefore attempted to redefine the basis for Atlantic partnership. The USA saw the development of the European Economic Community (EEC) as the basis for the "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance, and exerted sustained pressure on British governments to apply for membership. Britain and France jostled for privileged places within the alliance: Britain to maintain its "special relationship" with the USA, France first by proposing a three-power *directoire*, then attempting to strike an alternative bargain with Federal Germany, and finally adopting a position of semi-detachment within

the Alliance. As German forces were built up, US conventional forces in Germany were run down: a process halted and then reversed by the Berlin crises of 1958-1961, which led to the commitment of substantial US troops to central Europe for a further 30 years. Germany once rearmed pressed for a more equal status in the alliance. President Kennedy's "Grand Design" envisaged an enlarged EEC, an Atlantic partnership within which West European governments would take on a much larger share of the military and financial burden of supporting Western objectives in the confrontation with the East, while nevertheless continuing to follow American political leadership.

The inability of the British, French and Germans to sort out an appropriate balance between their status and influence in these multilateral institutions – a failure for which all three governments must share responsibility – led to the collapse of this redefinition of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Faced with a stalemate between Gaullist France and the United States as alliance leader, with German leadership deeply ambivalent about Atlantic versus European priorities, and with British politics torn apart by divisions within both major parties on the issue, the Alliance managed to postpone most of the difficult questions the Kennedy administration had intended to raise, many of them successfully postponed until after the Berlin Wall came down.

In summary: the USA continued through the 1970s and 1980s to provide a disproportionate contribution to the maintenance of European and global security, allowing West European governments to underspend – or, "to live in luxury behind an American shield," as Flora Lewis once put it. Burden-sharing was a repeated issue in transatlantic relations – but discussed primarily in transatlantic terms, not in terms of an equitable share of defense commitments and contributions among the West Europeans themselves. In return for a disproportionate contribution to security, the USA maintained a disproportionate influence over security policy: a linkage which Henry Kissinger bluntly spelt out in his "Year of Europe" speech of April 1973. West Europeans complained about American unilateralism and policy inconsistencies, and developed their own consultative mechanisms for "European Political Cooperation" (EPC) to lessen their dependence on foreign policy consultations within NATO, but made little progress beyond diplomatic declarations over 20 years towards the declared aim of a common foreign policy. There were a number of parallel developments in closer defense cooperation among West European states, both within the NATO framework (standing forces, joint training) and outside (the Eurocorps); the WEU was revived, even enlarged, but given little real significance. The balance of influence among Germany, France and Britain remained unresolved, moderated by the continuing primacy of the United States. Each of these three leading European powers – who accounted between them for 75 per cent of European defense expenditure within the Atlantic Alliance –

maintained the internal contradictions of their national foreign and defense policies through to the collapse of the GDR regime and beyond.

NATO was a vehicle for American leadership of, and protection for, the West. American hegemony in NATO and over NATO, with its European allies playing a secondary role, is built into the structure of the Alliance. Access to an American security guarantee, not just to whatever less dependable promises West European governments might offer, is central to the attraction of NATO membership to former socialist states. But the American security guarantee, and the American military commitment, were linked to the Soviet threat and the Cold War system. It was linked also, less explicitly, to the containment of Germany within the Western system, a guarantee for all European states against the fear of a *Sonderweg* in pursuit of unification. But Germany is now united, peacefully and unthreateningly, re-emerging as the central power and the dominant economy within a wider Europe, round which any stable post-Cold War order must be built.

V. Institutional Adaptation, Political and Economic Transformation: Is Incrementalism Enough?

An optimistic interpretation of institutional adaptation over the past years would point to a number of creditable achievements. The EC/EU developed its PHARE program, rapidly expanding Commission staff, activities and expenditure on the former CMEA countries; this was followed up by the negotiations of Europe Agreements with the Visegrad states, Bulgaria and Romania, and by exploring closer relations with the Baltic states. The Council of Europe played a useful ancillary role in educating these new regimes in multilateral diplomacy and in the norms of Western democracy. NATO has developed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) into a valuable forum for consultation, providing the basis for future closer links. The OSCE, it is true, has failed to live up to the hopes of some of its members, but retains a moderately useful position in this network of overlapping organizations. The WEU has enlarged again, to become the explicit link between the EU and NATO and the consultative mechanism through which the smaller states of Central and Eastern Europe can talk to their Western counterparts without either the USA or Russia to dominate the discussions.

A more cynical interpretation would focus on the intense absorption with procedures and with consultations, to the detriment of policy-making and commitments. Organizational confusion and inter-organizational rivalry has been compounded by governmental incoherence and reluctance either to commit funds or to take decisions. The EU has offered the Europe Agreement states the minimum concessions possible, leaving a substantial trade surplus in favor of

Western Europe as economies in transition import investment goods and desired consumer products from the West but struggle to export the agricultural produce, textiles and steel with which they could compete on western markets in return. PHARE and related programs have offered a bonanza for western consultants, with more modest benefits for the recipient states. There is as yet little sign that the EU or its member states have begun to prepare for enlargement to include any Central or East European country; this fact was indicated in particular by the difficulties of adjusting the *acquis* even to accommodate the rich EFTA countries and their marginal (but highly subsidized) agricultural sectors as this was a necessary step before the EU can turn its attention to the eventual incorporation of Eastern Europe. Financial assistance has been disappointing, shaped by western preoccupation with budgetary deficits and popular resistance to additional taxation. The inertia of the EU negotiating process provides Ireland with financial transfers which are anticipated to rise within the next five years from 5 per cent to 7 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP), while member governments find it impossible to conceive of transferring a comparable sum to the six Europe Agreement countries as a group.

The NACC has offered continued activity for international officials, and the opportunity for constructive consultations among military officers and civilian officials from previously hostile countries; but it has not provided a new rationale for NATO. Partnership for Peace offers a further deliberately ambiguous message to the countries of Eastern Europe, made even more ambiguous by the Russian claim to some sort of special status within it, asserted during the manoeuvres which led to Russian acceptance of the "Partnership" in May 1994. US officials, and the American President, have continued to make brave speeches about the continuity of the American commitment and the continuing vitality of NATO. Others in Washington, however, insist that it is up to the West Europeans to "pay for" transition in Central and Eastern Europe; Congressional willingness to support a continuing commitment of ground troops in large numbers in Europe – let alone an enlargement of NATO which might commit ground troops to Eastern Europe – remains strongly in doubt. The OSCE and the Council of Europe are distracted by battles over their turf and territory. The WEU is making only slow progress towards building an effective organization, hampered by divergent national views on its role and relationship with the EU and NATO and by organizational jostling over territory, command and role with NATO. Within Western Europe the proposed NATO multilateral forces are competing for national attention and resources with the Eurocorps; while national defense budgets within the smaller West European states exhibit what Manfred Wörner, the late NATO Secretary General, has called "free-fall structural disarmament." Little even of these modest developments have been explained to national parliaments or publics, who remain

equally unaware of the developing contacts between military units and defense ministries across the old dividing line of the Cold War.

There has been substantial institutional adaptation since 1989, without any major institutional innovation (unless the NACC is seen in that light, or the strengthening of the WEU, or the ambiguous terminology of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty). The question is, has that adaptation been adequate to the challenges it faces, and does what has been achieved so far provide the basis for future successful institutional construction on a wider all-European basis?

Answers to that question will depend on the reader's perception of the nature of the current political and economic revolution in Europe, and on the reader's preferred final outcome. Here I have deliberately avoided considering the sad example of the Yugoslav conflict as a test of institutional adaptation to new security challenges, preferring to concentrate on the broader picture and the longer-term perspective. What institutional structure do we envisage will be needed to manage a stable European order in ten years' time – or in fifteen? What role do we think it is realistic to anticipate the USA will play in that institutional structure? How do we see it accommodating Russia and the CIS, and accommodating also the security concerns and the insecurity risks of the countries around the Mediterranean? From where do we see leadership and initiative coming within that institutional structure? How will it apportion rights – and security guarantees – and obligations? Which states will be the providers of security, and which the consumers – and the free riders?

VI. Points for Discussion

I offer here for discussion a number of points which are contained within the current debate, but which the current debate has so far done little to clarify. I suggest that failure to clarify them will only widen the gap between half-commitment and public consent, between rhetoric and reality, which we already face. Adaptation is a dynamic process; it is successful only if it leads towards a new and coherent formulation, rather than an unsatisfactory compromise among incoherent governments still influenced by outdated assumptions.

My first point is that the United States no longer has a domestic constituency for substantial military commitment to European security; certainly not for substantial commitment of conventional forces on the ground. Ex-socialist states pressing for NATO membership should appreciate this sea-change; the security guarantee which they are seeking may not be achievable within the terms they seek. Nor does the USA have a domestic constituency for substantial financial transfers to Eastern Europe – except to Russia and Ukraine in return for nuclear disarmament, and perhaps to Russia as a potential threat and possible global

partner. This was the message which President Clinton conveyed to his European audience in his Brussels Town Hall speech of 14 January 1994, in the context of the NATO Summit:

> "You [Europeans] have the most to gain from a Europe that is integrated in terms of security, in terms of economics, in terms of democracies. Ultimately, you will have to decide what sort of Europe you want, and how hard you are willing to work for it."[8]

This being the case – this is my second point – there is no longer the foundation for continuing American hegemony over European security and political institutions. The basis for continuing American leadership now lies in the unwillingness of any European state to accept that any other European state should assume that role, or to develop mechanisms within Europe for collective leadership capable of replacing the US role. European observers should note the gradual emergence of an American "Three Circles" doctrine, comparable to that which British policy-makers evolved at the end of the Second World War, in which global influence is to be maintained despite declining economic and military capacities through influence in different regional systems which interact through the central linking power: for Britain, the transatlantic special relationship, the Commonwealth and Empire, and the European commitment; for the United States the transatlantic link – and the influence which that provides over the evolution of the European Union – the Western hemisphere, and East Asia, institutionalized in their turn through an expanding NAFTA and a developing APEC. The British Three Circles doctrine proved to be a self-satisfying illusion; the American doctrine may well serve a similar role.

My third point is that construction of a new and stable European political and security order is impossible without accommodating the central position of Germany; or without the German government accepting that central role (and also persuading its public to accept it), and its partners not to see it as threatening. The history of European disorder over the past century has shown how difficult it has been to accommodate German interests and its neighbors' fears without bringing in external powers to provide the balance which the European region alone has failed to achieve. Germany is the "natural" hegemon of the European region, in terms of population, economic weight and geographical position; a stable European order cannot be built without recognizing that reality. Collective leadership was the American answer in its 1960s grand design, with France and Britain joining Federal Germany in a concert of powers itself contained within the integrated structure of the European Community. Collective leadership within a broader institutional framework, to which in time Spain, Italy and Poland should be added, is the necessary foundation for institutional advance.

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8 Speech at Brussels Town Hall, 9 January 1994, *Agence Europe*, 10 January 1994.

My fourth point is that the whole issue of burden-sharing must now be addressed within the European context. The artificial separation of military burden-sharing debates conducted across the Atlantic and EU budgetary wrangles conducted among the twelve or the fifteen can no longer hold in a post-Cold War order, in which the smaller members of the EU are cutting their defense budgets far faster than their larger partners and in which the transfer of substantial financial resources to Eastern Europe should be seen as part of the overall security contribution. There are some awkward issues here. The Netherlands is emerging as one of Western Europe's leading free riders, for example, alongside Denmark. On an equitable share of defense spending among WEU members Germany would now contribute almost twice as much as Britain, Italy almost as much as France. If differential financial contributions to the development of Eastern Europe were weighed in the same balance, Germany would be transformed into the major burden-carrier – and several of its neighbors would look like free riders.

Fifth, some indication must be given to potential applicants – and to confused or inattentive publics within the present member states – of the likely limits to the expansion of those West European institutions which are now under pressure to incorporate new members. Those states, too distant, too large and too complex in the problems they present to be envisaged as members of the integrated institutions which Western Europe has evolved – Ukraine, Russia, Turkey – should then be offered different forms of partnership and association, to act as a bridge between this wider European region and other regional orders. Those states which have no alternative to dependence on Central Europe – the countries of South-Eastern Europe – must either be brought in or provided with a stable and closely-associated sub-regional alternative. The EU has to take a more active approach to enlargement; it is no longer a club which others may join if they are willing to accept the rules, but the central institution within an evolving regional order.

The most difficult and delicate issue is of course the relationship with Russia Clear differences of interest and assumptions have been apparent in West European and American approaches to Russia in 1992-1994. American policy-makers still regard Russia as the West's most important partner – and rival – in Eastern Europe, to be granted a privileged place in East-West relations. West Europeans are, for obvious geopolitical, economic and cultural reasons, much more concerned about the smaller states in between. The mood of Russian policy-makers in 1993/94 – and even more of their voters, so far as Western observers could discern their attitudes – was of truculent insistence on the reassertion of a privileged position, in relations both with the West and with their near neighbors. It is not in the interest of Western Europe either to foster Russian hopes that

empire and status can be regained, or to allow expectations to grow that Russia will be given an established place in an expanded European institutional order.

My sixth and final point relates to the need for our governments to be honest with their own electorates. If the governments of Western Europe are serious about their rhetorical commitments to a common foreign and security policy, and to economic and security partnerships with Eastern Europe which will evolve into full membership, then they must also be serious about the costs involved, the painful sacrifices of national autonomy, and the difficult task of carrying their reluctant publics with them. One of the most demanding security challenges which faces Europe today is the challenge of convincing the affluent and aging voters of Western Europe (as also of North America) that there are security risks and dangers, and that policy and expenditure has to be altered to meet them.

We have to ask how much commitment and hard thinking yet lies behind all the rhetoric of NATO summits and of European Councils. Are any of the democratic governments of Western Europe serious about the declarations they agree to or the half-promises they give to impatient delegations from their neighbors to the East?

7. The WEU after Maastricht: Trends and Perspectives

Sergei Medvedev

I. Introduction

From the very outset, West European security cooperation has been ridden by controversy. Looking back today, its forty-odd year history could appear to be no more than a series of contradictions.

- Its principal body, the Western European Union, was set up to pursue collective self-defense with a security mandate broader than that of NATO, but it never tackled strictly security matters and dealt instead with marginal activities in economic and political spheres.
- The WEU eventually succeeded in most of these undertakings (contributing to restoration of confidence among West European nations, controlling the German Federal Republic in terms of armament policy, providing a link between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Communities, to cite just a few examples). Instead of being recognized in these capacities, however, the WEU was continuously forced out of the spheres in which it had been most successful and was replaced by other institutions: NATO, the Council of Europe, and the EEC.
- Despite this lack of recognition, the WEU was constantly called upon in times of crisis in West European and transatlantic relations (e.g., during the debate on Euro-missiles or the Strategic Defense Initiative).

To a certain extent, these controversies can be explained by the difference between name and substance. West European security cooperation was not addressing the issues of security in the strict sense (insofar as those were settled within the framework of NATO and US engagement in Europe, or by the whole Cold War order), but rather the political problems of West European integration and European-American partnership. It was security by name, not by nature; it did not follow the security logic, but the logic of institution-building.

Seen in terms of this "institutional logic," the WEU has had a fairly good record. It played an essential role in weaving a delicate web of West European integration and Euro-American partnership, and often took up tasks that were unsolvable in larger institutions (e.g., the *Saarfrage*). Thus the WEU has lived up to the provision of the Brussels Treaty contained in the preamble: "to promote the unity of Europe and impart impulses to its progressive integration"[1] – though it actually never went

1 The Treaty of Brussels as amended by the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty signed in Paris on 23 October 1954. Reprinted by the Western European Union, n. d.

beyond this limited commitment. The "reserve and support function" among bodies and organizations relating to Europe[2] has been the WEU's *raison d'être*. Contrary to widespread opinion, the WEU has developed an identity of its own: that of a political instrument in West European and transatlantic relations, with virtually no security role but a limited political capacity, especially in times of crisis.

Now, with ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and growing support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union, the WEU is bound to change – but how radical is this transformation going to be? Will the WEU preserve its old rationale of a "reserve and support" instrument, or will it forge a new identity, that of an independent defense institution, a possible base for the collective defense of Western Europe or even the collective security for all of Europe? The WEU has already ventured into the military field (e.g. in the Adriatic), and this drive seems irreversible, but whether a complete change of its identity is feasible and desirable still remains an open question.

II. The WEU in the Early Nineties: A "Historical" Overview

Today's history of Europe starts with German reunification in October 1990. Since that date, Europe's unity and security are no longer supposed to be decoupled and attributed to different institutions. Consequently, West European cooperation in foreign and security policy has entered a completely new phase. So far, the milestones of this new period have been the Maastricht Treaty endorsing the CFSP of the European Union, and the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU.

Debates in 1991 resembled those of the pre-1954 period, when the possibility of setting up the European Defense Community was discussed: the questions of EC development and the evolution of security and defense policies in Europe tended to intertwine. The first was addressed by the Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union, while the second was dealt with in the continuing process of NATO restructuring and by including security and defense issues in the debate on Political Union. Discussion was strongly influenced by the actuality of German reunification which brought about new concerns and new opportunities. In fact, if it had not been for German reunification, the last-minute inclusion of Title V ("Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy") in the Maastricht Treaty would hardly have been feasible.

The Treaty of Maastricht (as well as related parts of NATO's reform announced during the Rome Summit in November 1991) was largely made possible by the

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Meanwhile, nothing is said about European unification having to take place within this framework.

2 Peter Schmidt, "The WEU – A Union without Perspective?," in: *Aussenpolitik*, No. 4, 1986, p. 390.

Franco-German compromise reached in the course of 1991.[3] It implied some fundamental changes of philosophy in Paris and Bonn: the French side removed some of its reservations about "Europeanization" of its much-cherished national security policy and structures, and the German side, in exchange, agreed to gradual "Europeanization" of its no less cherished Deutschmark, the symbol of national economic success.[4]

Consequently, in the French view, the future European Union was to become the linchpin between the two major assets of Germany and France: the Deutschmark and France's security and defense structure, especially the *force de dissuasion*. This also lay the ground for the future common European defense.[5]

The Treaty on European Union which was signed at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 and came into effect on 1 November 1993, establishes CFSP as one of the main pillars of the Union. According to Article J.4, paragraph 1, "the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy." Paragraph 2 of this article lays down that "the Union requests the WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications."[6]

Addressing the question of how CFSP correlates with the obligations of certain EU states under the Washington Treaty, Article J.4 goes on to specify that CFSP "shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework" (Paragraph 4) and that it "shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU initiative and the Atlantic Alliance," a reference to the French-German Eurocorps and Belgian and Spanish plans to join these troops.[7]

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3 For the evolution of different proposals in the preparation of the NATO summit in Rome (November 1991) and the European Council summit in Maastricht (December 1991) see Peter Schmidt, "The Evolution of European Security Structures: Master Plan or Trial and Error?," in: David Haglund (ed.), *International Governance,* Boulder, Westview Press, 1993.

4 However, the "Europeanization" of the Deutschmark in favor of what someone in Bonn called "esperanto money" "is based on a much more detailed plan and timetable than the "Europeanization" of defense." (Peter Schmidt, *The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s*, Chaillot Paper No. 8, Paris: Western European Institute for Security Studies, 1993, p. 36).

5 Ibid. For this French concept, see François Mitterrand, *Reflexions sur la Politique Extérieure de la France,* Paris: Librairie Arthène Fayard, 1987, pp. 16-17; André Brigot, "Les intérêts de sécurité et leurs coûts," in: André Brigot/Walter Schütze/Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Défense, Désarmement et Politiques à l'Est*, Paris: Fondations pour les études de défense nationale, 1989, pp. 69-93; Alain Minc, *La Vengeance des Nations*, Paris: Grasset, 1990.

6 *Treaty on European Union*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992, p. 126.

7 See Article J.5 of the Maastricht Treaty.

Along with the Treaty on European Union, a separate declaration was adopted by those WEU member states being also members of the EU. It once again stressed the special mission of the WEU in regard of EU and NATO by using a dual formulation which reflected the heated European debate concerning the future status of the WEU. Compromising on the controversy of the Franco-German position (that the WEU should be an integrated part of EU) and the British-Italian one (that the WEU should become a "European pillar" of NATO), the declaration states that the "WEU will be developed as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."

Thus, the WEU states recognized the long-term goal of a "common defense policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defense, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance." The declaration, however, goes on to specify measures to develop "a close working relationship" of the WEU with the EU and NATO, the latter links being based "on the necessary transparency and complementarity."[8]

Summing up this intra-European debate, one has to admit that the Franco-German view of the WEU has finally prevailed: since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU has been regarded as an integral part ("an arm") of the EU rather than as the "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance or as "a bridge" between the EU and NATO.

Other aspects of the declaration relate to strengthening the WEU's operational role, and to the question of WEU enlargement, with different patterns of WEU membership or affiliation offered for member states of the EU and for other European member states of NATO.

Building on CFSP and the WEU-related articles of the Maastricht Treaty and on the WEU Maastricht declaration, the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU member states convening in Bonn on 19 June 1992 adopted the Petersberg Declaration. Parts II and III of this declaration significantly develop the Maastricht provisions on the WEU's operational role (in particular on setting up a WEU planning cell and on military units answerable to the WEU that will be organized "on a multinational and multi-service basis"), and on relations between the WEU and other European member states of EU or NATO.[9]

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8 "Declaration of the Member States of the Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance," *WEU related texts adopted at EC summit, Maastricht* – 10 December 1991, London: WEU Press and Information Section, 10 December 1991.

9 The latter provisions were implemented half a year later, at the Rome ministerial meeting on 20 November 1992, when a protocol on the accession of Greece to the WEU and a document on the associate membership in the WEU of Iceland, Norway and Turkey was signed; Denmark and Ireland were admitted as observers. Assembly Documents 1350, 1351 and 1351 Addendum.

Meanwhile, Part I of the Petersberg Declaration ("On WEU and European Security") added a new dimension to the WEU's international profile. Recognizing the importance of multilateral and international institutions like the CSCE/OSCE and the United Nations and the need to enhance its capabilities for conflict prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the WEU agreed to be prepared to support "implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE/OSCE or the United Nations Security Council," as it develops its operational capabilities (Part I, Paragraph 2).

Despite this significant institutional improvement after Maastricht, West European foreign policy and security mechanisms proved ill-prepared to deal with the war in the former Yugoslavia. This primarily concerns the EU, which has clearly failed to apply the CFSP procedures laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. For example, it only attempted crisis management and mediation after the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence in June 1991. It then organized a peace conference in the Hague, offered a plan for resettlement in Yugoslavia, appointed Lord Carrington as a mediator to broker cease-fires between Serbia and Croatia, and sent observers to monitor them. It also made a plea to engage the UN as early as August 1991. By the end of the year, the UN was already playing a leading role in crisis management (mostly through peace-keeping attempts), while the EU confined itself to seeking a political solution at the peace conference. This did not yield any practical results – mostly due to the unwillingness and actual inability of the Twelve to commit even a limited military force or to apply far-reaching economic sanctions. On the contrary, as the conference proceeded without any effect, the EU's international and security profile gradually diminished.

Most importantly, the Twelve were divided not only on such contentious issues as military intervention or dispatch of an interposition force, but also on: the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, with Germany going ahead on its own, and France upholding the bid of its "wartime ally" Serbia for a single Yugoslavia for a long time;[10] plans for the peace conference on Yugoslavia, supported by France and initially discarded by Britain; the resettlement of refugees, with Germany claiming that it was bearing a disproportionate share;[11] the question of economic

10 As late as summer 1992, French President Mitterrand was heard to reminisce during the G-7 summit in Munich: "I have not forgotten the historical ties between France and Serbia and the solidarity that bound them together in two world wars." (As qouted in Rudolph Chimelli, "Bosnien helfen, Serbien nicht verprellen," in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22/23 August 1992, p. 8). See also Josef Joffe, "The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 29-43.

11 In August 1992, Germany had taken up 275,000 refugees, while Britain and France had received around 1100 each. See *The Economist*, 1 August 1992, p. 11.

sanctions on the new Republic of Yugoslavia, with Germany alone favoring a much stricter regime. The total disregard of CFSP mechanisms culminated in May 1993, when France, Spain and Britain agreed with the United States and Russia on a "Joint Action Statement" – a peace program for Bosnia – without any consultation within the EU framework.

The WEU's record in the Yugoslav case was somewhat better, at least in terms of cohesion of member states in pursuing common activities. Reaction to the crisis was also retarded, however, and the WEU's undertakings have hardly had an impact on the course of the Yugoslav conflict. Though greater political will has been displayed in the WEU framework, the Western European Union suffered from the same major set-backs as the EU, mostly from the lack of political and military leverage.

It should be recalled that military options were considered in the WEU. In September 1991 an ad hoc group presented four options for intervention by the WEU: logistic underpinning to support the work of EC observers; escort and protection to ensure the safety of civilian monitors; a peace-keeping force to monitor the cease-fire; and, actual setting up of the cease-fire. Options ranged from 2-3000 to 20,000 military personnel (for the last option).[12] Despite elaborate coordination and planning, WEU actions were unrealistic, as they required the agreement of all parties concerned and an effective cease-fire.

At the June 1992 Bonn ministerial meetings, held in compliance with the Petersberg pledge (Part I.2) "to support the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures," the WEU started examining options to enforce the UN embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. At the 10 July WEU Council meeting in Helsinki, the ministers agreed on naval and air surveillance of the UN embargo. This was to be ensured by Belgian, French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and British ships, four maritime patrol aircraft, a support ship, and land-based helicopters.[13] On the same day, NATO decided upon an identical initiative. Divergencies on responsibility and command of the operation were solved after the joint meeting of the Atlantic Council and the WEU Council. The WEU ships were to monitor the Strait of Otranto, and NATO naval forces would cover the Southern Adriatic, opposite the Montenegro coast. Beside the definition of areas of responsibility, coordination between the WEU and NATO included operational methods, signals, air surveillance, and logistic support. The "Otranto" operation

12 See Assembly of the WEU, 37th Ordinary Session (Second Part), *Document 1294*, 27 November 1991, Report submitted on behalf of the Defense Committee by Mr De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, on the operational arrangements for the WEU in the Yugoslav crisis, p. 10.

13 Assembly of the Western European Union, 38th Ordinary Session (Second Part), *WEU: Information Report*, p. 31.

(which later became "Maritime Guard," and then "Sharp Guard" in June 1993) was coordinated and directed by Italy, which then had the WEU presidency.[14]

The blockade in the Adriatic was the first independent European defense operation. However, its security implications should not be overestimated, as this was nothing more than a military-related activity. Naval forces in the Adriatic were not authorized to stop and search ships, but only to interrogate their captains by radio. The mission involved monitoring, not enforcement of an embargo.[15] It was not until November 1992, when first NATO on 18 November, and then the WEU on 20 November (at the Council of Ministers meeting to which, for the first time, the presidency of the Twelve and the Secretary General of NATO had been invited) decided to start a stop-and-search naval operation in the Adriatic.

The WEU-NATO settlement on responsibilities and command of the Adriatic operation should not be overestimated either. This was an ad-hoc arrangement: Italy happened to hold the WEU presidency at the time, and thus provided the commander of the naval contingent. As it happened, Admiral Carlo Alberto Vandini, who was the natural choice, was also the commander of NATO's Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean, thus controlling both the NATO and the WEU forces. Such a coincidence is not likely to occur again.[16]

The WEU's operational activities also extended to include enforcement of the UN embargo on the Danube. Meeting in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993, the WEU Council decided to strengthen the embargo by a "police and custom operation" carried out together with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In its declaration, the Council underlined that this operation will be of a "non-military nature" and will be based on checking transports headed for Serbia in "coordinated control areas upstream and downstream of the Serbia border."[17] The WEU provided technical assistance and equipment to the Danube riparian states, as well as 10 fast patrol boats and the support of 250-300 men. Due to unexpectedly complex negotiations with the riparian countries, the WEU force became effective only in June 1993.

Assessment of the performance of West European foreign policy and security mechanisms in the Yugoslav case can only lead to admission of their failure in crisis management in a vital security area. This failure was mostly due to the lack of political will (this was especially true for EC/CFSP) and of economic, political,

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14 *Atlantic News*, No. 2536, 18 June 1993, p. 1.

15 Between 16 July and 20 November 1992, a total of 3649 ships were monitored in the framework of the WEU operations, and 71 suspected violations of the embargo reported. (*WEU: Information Report*, p. 33.)

16 Wolfgang Schlör, "Summary of Discussion," in: Peter Schmidt (ed.), *The Western European Union in the 1990s: Searching for a Role*, Carlisle: US Army War College-Strategic Studies Institute, 1993, p. 4.

17 "Declaration on implementation of UN sanctions on the former Yugoslavia," in: *Atlantic News*, 7 April 1993, pp. 1-2. On the result of the controls see *Europe*, No. 6015, 5-6 July 1993, p. 3.

and military leverage (particularly in the case of the WEU). The crisis highlighted that the WEU does not dispose of adequate operational capabilities, most notably in planning, C^3, and logistics.

Another obstacle was the divergence of national interests among West European states. However, it was somewhat different in the EU-Twelve and WEU frameworks: while national "special interests" almost completely blocked CFSP mechanisms, they were not present to the same degree in the smaller and more "practical-minded" WEU caucus. The Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated that for the moment the WEU is a more cohesive institution than the EU.

Apart from the West European failure in security terms, the Yugoslav crisis has contributed to further institutional development of the European Union in the security field.[18] A number of significant gains can be cited:

- For the first time, the WEU has considered military options; an explicit offer was made for the United Nations to engage 15,000 soldiers under WEU command in peace-enforcement in Sarajevo. Though none of these options was put into effect, the very idea of deploying a WEU force in the crisis area prepared important psychological ground for future action. Also, the new French policy of accelerated development of the military dimension of Political Union gained momentum.
- For the first time NATO and WEU forces were engaged in the same area and with the same mission (operation in the Adriatic). Though the joint command arrangement was ad hoc, both institutions moved closer to working in the desired "interlocking mode." The Yugoslav war also showed that the military leverage and operational capabilities needed for crisis management are to be found primarily within NATO, and this added some clarity to the relations of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.
- For the first time, the WEU was involved in joint military-related activities with Central and East European countries (the Danube operation), and not just in general political dialogue in the Forum of Consultation. Positive experiences as well as unforeseen obstacles in such cooperation have put the WEU's "Eastern politics" on a more practical and realistic level.
- As in the Gulf mine-sweeping operation (also coordinated by the WEU as "Operation Cleansweep" in 1988), monitoring in the Adriatic provided an opportunity for limited German engagement: a destroyer in the NATO naval force, and three maritime patrol aircraft in the WEU force.[19]

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18 Christian Deubner, *Die EG und Jugoslawiens Bürgerkrieg*, Ebenhausen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, unpublished paper, October 1991, pp. 13-14.

19 Once again, the German government's interpretation of the *Grundgesetz* was a source of major confusion when Germany was actively promoting a military option (sending an interposition force to Yugoslavia), while being unable to contribute troops. Schmidt, *Special Franco-German Security Relationship*, pp. 29-30.

Against the background of general West European failure to manage the crisis in Yugoslavia, these improvements demonstrate that the "institutional logic" still prevails over the "security logic" in West European foreign policy and security cooperation. Later developments in 1993-1994 finally shifted the focus to NATO as virtually the only international organization capable of coherent action in the former Yugoslavia (although even this has proved to be insufficient to end the war). NATO's military dominance (especially vivid in the bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in early 1994) has made the WEU's security role seem negligible.

III. The Post-Maastricht Agenda: Shaping a Common Foreign and Security Policy

After the signing of the Maastricht agreement, West European cooperation in foreign and security policy entered a completely new phase. It became evident that by the early 1990s a substantial political *aquis* had been accumulated in this field, permitting CFSP and the WEU to rely more on their own institutional basis and to depend less on individual countries' or bilateral initiatives, as it had been the case in the past. As noted at the 39th Session of the WEU Assembly, the Western European Union is becoming a subject, not only an object in discussions on the future of European security.[20]

The Maastricht approach to security cooperation as a means of reaching Political Union, and the objective of an "eventual framing of a common defense policy," shaped a new political framework for the WEU. This framework will be largely defined by the kind of relationship between the WEU and the European Union. Most likely, the future of the WEU will be decided between 1996 (when the Maastricht Review Conference is scheduled to begin) and 1998, when the 50-year term expires, after which, according to Article 12 of the Brussels Treaty, individual states can secede from the WEU, and the nature of the organization can therefore be changed. It is conceivable that a decision will be made to dissolve the WEU as an independent body in favor of an organization responsible for the common defense of the European Union.[21] The probability of this happening is even higher if one considers that from the second half of 1994 until 1996 the European Union will have a sequence of determined, European-committed

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20 *European Security Policy: Reply to the 38th Annual Report of the Council.* Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur. Assembly of the WEU. 39th Ordinary Session (First Part), 24 May 1993. Doc. 1370. Paris, 1993, p. 17.

21 A report approved by the European Parliament in January 1993 stresses that the WEU could be included in the EU as early as 1996. (*Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the structure and strategy for the European Union with regard to its enlargement and the creation of a Europe-wide order.* Rapporteur: Mr. Klaus Hänsch/A3-0189/92, Doc. EN/RR/208537, 21 May 1992, p. 11).

presidencies: after Germany in 1994, France and Spain in 1995, and Italy in the first half of 1996 (when the Maastricht Review Conference will start).

In practical terms, after Maastricht, the WEU and the EU have been working towards a closer relationship with each other by synchronizing and harmonizing meetings and working methods: enhancing cooperation between the Council and Secretariat General of the WEU on the one hand and the Council of the Union and its General Secretariat on the other; ensuring that the Commission is regularly informed and consulted on WEU activities, etc. The question of a harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective presidencies is also being considered.[22]

The possible inclusion of the WEU in the broader framework of the European Union will be a substantial institutional gain, giving more economic and diplomatic leverage to foreign and security policies of the Union. For instance, security-related European actions (e.g. imposing an embargo) will receive adequate economic and financial support; diplomatic and security activities will be better coordinated, etc. It is, however, far from certain whether full integration of the WEU in the EU will improve operational capabilities and military leverage of a future joint West European action. Furthermore, decision-making on sensitive security issues is likely to be more complicated among the Twelve (and later the Fifteen) than in the WEU. This has already been proven by experience in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Finally, with full inclusion in the EU, the West European security organization will lose its unique balancing and compensatory role in intra-European and trans-Atlantic relations.

Once a part of the European Union, the WEU, or whatever body succeeds it, will be guided by the Maastricht provisions on CFSP (Title V of the Treaty). CFSP therefore serves as a potential political framework for West European security cooperation. It is noteworthy that, apart from the vague formulations of Title V, there is no legal basis or recognized procedure for the conduct of CFSP, not even a binding commitment for any of the EU member states. At present, the mechanism of CFSP is supposed to work much like EPC in the 1970s and early 1980s: on the basis of a few ground rules and procedures that make decisions morally binding.

Meanwhile, CFSP is potentially a step forward from EPC. There are at least three main differences between EPC and CFSP, as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty:

- No security issue is excluded from CFSP (e.g. the question of arms proliferation was a taboo for EPC, but can be addressed in the CFSP framework);

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22 See *Declaration of the Member States of Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance.* Part A: "The WEU's relations with the European Union," paragraph 3.

- While EPC provided for joint positions, CFSP is supposed to provide for joint actions by West Europeans (Article J.3 of the Maastricht Treaty);
- The Maastricht Treaty introduces qualified majority voting on foreign policy (but not yet on security) issues.

These features of CFSP have hardly started working. Immediately after Maastricht, the European Council asked the foreign ministers of EU member states to outline areas of joint action. This was sought in the Lisbon "Report on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view to identify areas open to joint action" (June 1992), in which the following pattern of regional choices was put forward: the EFTA countries, countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia), and the South (especially Middle East and Maghreb). Later on, a number of concrete joint actions were specified. But a proper structure is clearly lacking for the preparation and execution of joint actions such as the organization of aid to the Israeli-occupied territories or political-military action in Bosnia.[23]

There are certain problems with the qualified majority vote as well. First of all, it is not yet conceivable that a country would defer to a majority decision in sensitive foreign policy cases. Secondly, the *de facto* introduction of qualified majority voting on CFSP issues may require no less than an EU institutional reform: the present system of counting in the Council (and the European Parliament) is seen by many – especially the bigger countries – as being unfair, since smaller countries can outvote major actors. If the qualified majority vote is taken seriously, the question of vote quotas in accordance with the population of the country will inevitably arise.

Certainly, the main forces behind the CFSP, France and Germany, have grasped that this arrangement is too loose for effective action. Yet national reservations about diluting national sovereignty in foreign and security policies are still valid. Both countries, and certainly the UK, still see limited scope for ceding power to new EU machinery, such as the European Commission's Directorat General for Foreign and Security Policy (DG-1A) – and thus invalidating most efforts to get CFSP working.

The specific political framework for West European security cooperation is therefore still rather loose.[24] There is a certain institutional basis and a political *aquis* for EPC, but those are far from sufficient for joint action, to say nothing of shaping a common European defense. In the foreseeable future, the decisions on foreign and security policy will stay, as at present, on the intergovernmental level, and the WEU will remain an institution in which West Europeans can clarify their security positions. Should the EU develop towards more common decision-making,

23 Lionel Barber, "Concern at Weak EU Foreign Policy," in: *Financial Times*, 18 January 1994.

24 Schmidt, *WEU in the 1990s*, p. 21.

however, it would be possible to gradually transfer components of foreign and security policy to the Commission, giving European security (and, perhaps later, defense) policy the type of political framework which would ensure a decision-making process adequate to the task.[25]

IV. Enlargement of the WEU

In accordance with the decisions taken by the WEU member states in Maastricht on 10 December 1991, Part III of the Petersberg Declaration specifies the details of three patterns of relations between the WEU and the other European member states of the EU or NATO. Member states of the EU can become full members or observers in the WEU. Observers have restricted rights, especially as regards their participation in the meetings of the WEU Council; the status of observer is clearly seen as an intermediate stage to full membership.

Other European member states of the Atlantic Alliance can accept to become associate members of the WEU. Associate members are granted broader rights (e.g. they can participate in the meetings of the WEU Council, working groups and subsidiary bodies; they can be associated to the Planning Cell through a permanent liaison arrangement, etc.), but they cannot become parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, that is, full members of the WEU.[26]

At a meeting in Rome on 20 November 1992, the WEU ministers – in compliance with the conditions laid down in the Petersberg Declaration – signed a protocol of accession for Greece, admitted Denmark and Ireland as observers, and admitted Iceland, Norway and Turkey as associate members of the WEU though the de facto association of this last group of countries has been put on hold until the day the Hellenic Republic becomes a member of the WEU. In the meantime, they will be considered as active observers to the WEU.[27]

In other words, the WEU has adopted a somewhat discriminating approach to non-EU members of NATO which cannot become full parties to the modified Brussels Treaty. This is an important change from an earlier period in which WEU membership was formally open to all countries that recognized its main documents. This shift further limits the WEU's role as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and once again stresses the WEU's importance in shaping the Political Union of Europe.

In terms of the WEU's future role in the European security system, WEU enlargement raises three groups of problems. The first one is connected to a

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25 Dieter Mahncke, *Parameters of European Security*, Chaillot Papers No. 10, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1993, p. 40.

26 For the associate status of the Central European states see section VI of this chapter.

27 Assembly Documents 1351 and 1351 Addendum.

possible imbalance in the relations with Greece and Turkey. The decision of the WEU Council to restrict common defense to the EU area in application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty underlines the existing tension. Turkey, which was willing to become a full member of the WEU along with Greece, therefore feels subject to discrimination. This could influence Turkey's approach to European security, making it seek alternative security arrangements and rendering its politics in the Balkans, Middle East and Transcaucasian area more independent and less European.

Greece does not feel that its security has been enhanced either, since ratification by member states of its accession to the WEU has been suspended. Its independent stance on Macedonia, and the trade blockade on this new republic in early 1994, further complicated the problem and undermined the cohesion of West European policies in the Balkans. Under certain circumstances, the Greek policy could lead to a situation in which the WEU states find themselves dragged into the war in ex-Yugoslavia. Seen in geopolitical terms, the problems of Greece and Turkey could substantially weaken the WEU's political and operational capacity in reactions to Southern rim conflicts.

Another set of problems is connected with the admission of Denmark and Ireland as observers to the WEU. These two countries are known to have special views on European integration and security cooperation. Though their observer status does not give them a major say in the WEU's decision-making, the institution of an observer status, which will most likely be extended to formerly neutral states, can pose problems for European cohesion in the security sphere.

Finally, the enlargement of the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden) raises the problem of these countries' participation in security cooperation. It is already clear that their neutrality is no longer an issue, regardless of their relationship to the WEU or whatever EU security organization might succeed it. Furthermore, in the case of Finland, enlargement extended the area of West European security cooperation to the frontiers of Russia. All this has changed various parameters of European security. In this sense, enlargement of the WEU (which is, to a certain extent, inevitable) adds uncertainty rather than clarity to the future of West European security cooperation.

V. Strengthening the WEU's Operational Role

The most urgent and concrete task of West European security cooperation on the post-Maastricht agenda is enhancing its operational capacity with regard to the Maastricht decision "to develop the WEU as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." According to the terms of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty,

"the common foreign and security policy shall include... the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense."[28] Half a year later, the European stakes were raised in the June 1992 Petersberg Declaration. Part II, "On strengthening the WEU's operational role," is based on the experience that the WEU states have shown themselves ready to give their organization more comprehensive missions than those of NATO. It is stated that in the future the military forces of WEU members will come under the single command authority of the WEU. While the previous intention had been for WEU states to assign "military units" to WEU, the Petersberg Declaration specifies that these units will be composed of all branches of conventional armed forces and organized on a multinational and multi-service basis.

Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, those WEU forces can be used for all missions within the context of the UN Charter, including

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking

In Maastricht and Petersberg, the WEU has shown its willingness to expand its capacity both territorially (acting outside the treaty area when taking into consideration the consultation clause of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty) and militarily (the use of forces in the framework of the UN or the OSCE is expanded to include all forms of military action). For the time being, the WEU has thereby secured for itself a foundation for world-wide action without specific restrictions to certain types of missions or forms of legitimacy.[29] This has been repeatedly confirmed by WEU officials in recent years: the WEU sees itself not just as a "regional arrangement" as defined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, but also as an "appropriate international agency" (Article 48 of the UN Charter) through which the UN members act "to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security."[30]

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28 René Van Beveren suggests the following definition of a common defense policy with regard to Western Europe: "States have a common defense policy when an arrangement exists on the aims of the engagement of armed forces. Various measures in preparation for that engagement can be taken, ranging from studies by military staffs to the drawing up of detailed operational plans to meet different contingencies, but the engagement itself will be executed through ad hoc arrangements." (René Van Beveren, *Military Cooperation: What Structure for the Future?*, Chaillot Papers No. 6, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1993, p. 23.)

29 Schmidt, *WEU in the 1990s*, pp. 19-20. By contrast, NATO's room for manoeuvre according to the Oslo and Brussels Declarations remains formally restricted to peace-keeping missions in the framework of the OSCE or the UN.

30 For a comprehensive analysis of this problem, see Luisa Vierucci, *WEU: A Regional Partner of the United Nations?*, Chaillot Papers No. 12, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1993.

Appropriate structures and means for such widely-defined missions were also examined and specified in the Petersberg Declaration. First of all, this concerns the military units and headquarters of WEU member states that will be made answerable to the WEU. The process of earmarking such units from the whole spectrum of conventional armed forces started in 1992 and is still going on. Priority has been given to rapidly deployable air, naval, and ground forces, and headquarters from which the WEU operations can be commanded. A number of units have already been designated, including the Multinational Division (Central), consisting of Belgian, British, Dutch and German units, and the UK/Netherlands amphibious force.[31]

Another unit that could be employed by the WEU is the Eurocorps. Although it had already been initiated by France and Germany in 1991, it was only in October 1995 that it became fully operational. The 35,000 to 40,000-strong Eurocorps is headquartered in Strasbourg. It is made up mainly of armoured divisions provided by France and Germany; Belgium provides a mechanized division. A subsequent decision was taken for Spain to join the Eurocorps as well.

From the outset, the Eurocorps was supposed to be not only a Franco-German, but a European, and later, also Atlantic enterprise. In the Franco-German Memorandum of 30 November 1992 the two countries clearly stated that they consider the Eurocorps to form part of the units designated as "forces answerable to the WEU." This position was repeatedly confirmed by France, Germany, Belgium, and Spain and welcomed at the Rome Council of Ministers in May 1993.

However, there is only a general understanding that the Eurocorps is potentially the main unit which may be answerable to the WEU.[32] Moreover, while there are no formal links between the Eurocorps and WEU, there is a formal link between the Eurocorps and NATO. In the 21 January 1993 agreement on the Eurocorps between France, Germany and NATO's SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), France accepted that the Eurocorps could be deployed under NATO command for defense according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as for peace-keeping, peace-enforcement operations, and humanitarian actions in support of collective security institutions. Planning for such contingencies is to be undertaken on a case by case basis, but in all cases – including NATO employment under Article 5 – France reserves the right of decision on whether or not the Eurocorps is to be used (while the obligations of German forces assigned to NATO remain unchanged).[33]

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31 See the *WEU Council of Ministers Communiqué*, Rome, 19 May 1993, Paragraph 12.

32 Assembly of Western European Union, 38th ordinary session (First part), *WEU: The operational organization*. Report submitted on behalf of the Defense Committee by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, Doc. 1307, 13 May 1992, p. 10.

33 Mahncke, *Parameters of European Security*, p. 33.

Although the Eurocorps' relations to NATO are formally defined, this unit is bound to stay primarily in the European orbit and to serve as a political instrument for the realization of the vision of political union. It is sometimes recognized that "there are no direct military justifications to this new contingent."[34] In relation to the nature of possible military threats to Europe, the Eurocorps is too inflexible for rapid reaction. Its inadequacy in military terms is highlighted by contrast with the proposed ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which is under British command, and whose missions are planned by a planning staff at SHAPE. The ARRC sprang from the idea of responding to the recognizably diffuse new risks in Europe and beyond which must be addressed with more flexible forces. Hypothetically, ARRC and the Eurocorps could be complementary, but in fact a duplication in planning and administration is to some extent unavoidable. There are two planning staffs for two military organizations which share some units for similar or even the same missions.[35]

In terms of military planning, the WEU took a step forward by creating a military planning cell on 1 October 1992, but its capabilities are incomparable to those of NATO. The Military Planning Cell, located within the WEU Secretariat General in Brussels, started working on 1 April 1993 under the command of Lt. Gen. Marcello Caltabiano (Italian Air Force). It is responsible for:

- preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices;
- preparing recommendations for the necessary C^3 arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters;
- keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to WEU for specific operations.

The Military Planning Cell does not have the function of command in the proper sense. It is responsible only for nominating commanders and forming joint headquarters for any future military action of the WEU, and operates under the general guidance of the WEU Council. It is noteworthy, however, that this new body was called a "cell," and not a "staff," which would have been a more appropriate military term.

In the framework of the WEU's operational role, the declaration on the WEU appended to the Maastricht Treaty provides for "meetings of WEU chiefs of defense staff." Such meetings were already held on an ad hoc basis during the Gulf war in 1990-1991. Later, in the Petersberg Declaration, it was decided that the chiefs of defense staff would meet regularly twice a year prior to ordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers and on an ad hoc basis whenever necessary. Such

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34 Schmidt, *WEU in the 1990s*, p. 16.

35 *Ibid.*

meetings are more of a political instrument for consultations than a step towards joint planning or integrated command.

Another component of the post-Maastricht, post-Petersberg enhancement of the WEU's operational role was the creation of a WEU Satellite Center at Torrejon, near Madrid. The decision to set up the center was taken by the WEU Council of Ministers in Vianden (Luxembourg) in June 1991, and the center was inaugurated in April 1993. Three types of tasks are entrusted to the satellite center and the European space-based observation system:

- verification of arms control agreements;
- monitoring crises affecting European security;
- monitoring risks to the environment.

The tasks of the center during its first three-year experimental phase are to train experts from WEU states in interpreting satellite-derived imagery, particularly within the framework of the verification of arms control agreements and crisis monitoring. To a certain extent, the Torrejon Center has already grown into an independent intelligence capability, completely separate from NATO.

Yet command, control, communications and intelligence remain a problem for the WEU. The Military Planning Cell is not a permanent command structure, and even less so is the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff. If a commander is needed for an operation, the country holding the WEU presidency at the time is going to provide him. The prospect of a commander being chosen according to military or practical requirements is minimal at the moment.[36]

The weakness of WEU command arrangements has been evident in all instances of WEU military involvement: the mine-sweeping operations during the Gulf war and the blockade operation in the Adriatic. In the former, all command and control was provided by NATO staffs; in the latter, by coincidence, Italy happened to hold the WEU presidency at the time when an Italian admiral was also the commander of NATO's Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean.

It is evident that creating full-fledged, comprehensive command and control, to say nothing of an integrated military structure like that of NATO, is not on the WEU agenda. Despite the Maastricht vision of a "common defense," the organization of collective self-defense in Western Europe is neither necessary, nor feasible, at least for the time being. Furthermore, military planning is now based much less than before on concrete geographic areas and more on flexible planning of specific military capabilities,[37] which allows the WEU to potentially develop such independent planning capacity without engaging in major military integration.

There are at least two ways to achieve this. First, units can be placed under the command of a pilot nation (like in the Adriatic operation). Political consensus for

36 Schlör, "Summary of Discussion," p. 4.

37 Schmidt, *WEU in the 1990s*, p. 16.

such a solution might be difficult to achieve, but there are already a number of national headquarters (like the headquarters of the French army corps-level *force d'action rapide*) that are completely appropriate for the task. Another solution during a crisis situation could be the creation of an ad hoc command structure by the participating member states. If, for example, six states provided a brigade each, it would probably be necessary to create headquarters at both division and corps level. Each level of command would then have its own organic supporting units (such as artillery, engineers and combat helicopters) and logistic support.[38]

In all likelihood, the integrated military structure and major operational capabilities in Europe will remain within NATO. In the years to come, the WEU will not create an integrated military structure of its own and will not duplicate that of NATO. West Europeans will prefer to contribute to NATO's unique structure and functions by assigning their military forces on an ad hoc or permanent basis to the WEU. Such an option, based on necessary transparency and complementarity of the WEU and NATO, will prove most viable for the WEU in operational terms. For a credible WEU operational role, the establishment of an integral relationship with NATO is mandatory.[39]

In the years to come, West Europeans will continue to develop military instruments and operational capabilities of their own, but only to the extent that these do not come into open contradiction with those of NATO. Those instruments and capabilities will allow West Europeans to take up more responsibility in dealing with local crises and conflicts on the European periphery (e.g ex-Yugoslavia), or in the out-of-area zone (e.g. the Gulf). This possible military activity will be largely limited and will not lead to a WEU/EU-based collective security system or the collective self-defense of Western Europe.

Yet these military instruments will be sufficient for reaching political, institutional, and bureaucratic goals; thus creating another dimension of the Political Union. In developing the WEU's operational role, the "institutional logic" will again prevail over the "security logic."

VI. The WEU and Central Europe

After the revolutions of 1989-90, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact have become a regional priority for the WEU and for the common foreign and security policy of the EU. The "Report on the likely development of the CFSP with a view to identify areas open to joint action" (Lisbon, June 1992) specified Central and Eastern Europe (including Russia, the former Soviet republics, the Balkans and ex-Yugoslavia) as a geographic region of prime interest for the European Union.

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38 Van Beveren, *Military Cooperation*, pp. 29-30.

39 Schlör, "Summary of Discussion," p. 5.

This was a relatively new development in the foreign policy of Brussels. Until the early 1990s, the EC was more reserved in relations with its Eastern counterparts than NATO. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Eastern part of the European continent remained the only spot in the world which neither the EC nor EPC had discovered.[40] The EC, until the later years of the 1980s, had always rejected the desire of the COMECON to establish contractual relations. Likewise, EPC never opened a political dialogue with Eastern Europe. Western Europe's collective relations with the East were concentrated in the CSCE, where it worked mostly at reducing tension in East-West relations.

The Atlantic Alliance, on the contrary, had a better foundation for defining new links with Central and Eastern Europe. It was through the Harmel doctrine that detente was introduced as a cooperative element into the security policy of the West. NATO later could expand this function and formulated comprehensive liaison relationships with the former Warsaw Pact states. Under German and American pressure, this finally became the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).[41] The NACC managed in November and December 1991 to accommodate all the countries of Eastern Europe and the successor states of the Soviet Union which emerged at exactly this time. Moreover, it helped to have all Eastern states approve the implementation of the CFE-Treaty.

Similarly, West Europeans made their own efforts to formulate a concept of liaison with the former Warsaw Pact countries. This was sought in June 1992 in the Lisbon Report, and, on the practical level, through the formation of the Forum of Consultation of WEU states with eight Central European countries at the Bonn meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers. On 19 June 1992, after adopting the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU ministers held an extraordinary meeting with their colleagues from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania at which they agreed to intensify existing relations through dialogue, consultation and cooperation. According to the declaration adopted at this meeting, the focus of consultations would be the security architecture and stability in Europe, the future development of the CSCE, arms control and disarmament in particular, the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties and the 1992 Vienna document, and developments in Europe and neighboring regions. The mechanism of cooperation included:

- annual meetings of foreign and defense ministers;

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40 Reinhardt Rummel, "West European Cooperation in Foreign and Security Policy: Optimizing International Influence," in: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Philadelphia, January 1994, p. 8.

41 Schmidt, *WEU in the 1990s*, p. 17.

- a Forum for Consultation between the WEU Permanent Council and the ambassadors of the countries concerned which would meet at least twice a year at the seat of the WEU Council;
- an ad hoc troika at the level of senior officials to pursue consultations on security issues;
- cooperation of the WEU Assembly with parliaments of partner countries, with a view to future participation of legislators from Central European states in the work of the Assembly on a permanent basis;
- regular exchange of documents and information;
- cooperation between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and pertinent institutes in Central European countries.

The WEU Forum basically addresses the same topics as the NACC, i.e., with political and security-related issues, arms control, military planning, arms conversion, economic issues, participation of scientists from Central and Eastern Europe in research programs, etc. The WEU Forum actually follows NACC with some time lag, and duplication of activities can hardly be avoided. This situation has become even more complicated since NATO's adoption of the Partnership for Peace program at the January 1994 Brussels summit, joined by the majority of Central and Eastern European states, including Russia, in the following months.

There is, however, a basic difference between the two liaison concepts. While both the NACC and the Partnership for Peace program were conceived as steps towards a NATO-based system of cooperative security, embracing all former adversaries, the West European concept draws more on the long-term perspective of an expansion of the European Union than it aims at security. In the Brussels jargon, this kind of relationship is called "reinforced political dialogue" with "countries with a vocation for membership;" hence, the choice is only for Central European states. The WEU's liaison concept is therefore intended to fulfil a political task: to suggest to those states that, given the right circumstances, they too can become EU members in the long run.[42] This was once again proven in May and June 1994, when the WEU "consultation partners" in Central and Eastern Europe were granted an associate status within the WEU, which is seen as another step towards their membership in the European Union.

Such a discriminating approach, however, overlooks one major problem: the possible isolation of the CIS member states and, especially, Russia. The WEU liaison concept was somewhat influenced by the traditional French vision of a *cordon sanitaire*. One must not forget the French opposition to the Genscher-Baker plan to create the NACC and, as well, the reluctance of Paris to recognize all new republics in the former Soviet Union, though Genscher showed a readiness to

42 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

recognize them together with as many EC member states as possible.[43] Although this vision is neither official French policy (take, for instance, the "Balladur Plan"), nor a position of other EU states – Germany has quite different views on relations with the East, as does Italy – see the "Andreatta proposal" concerned with setting up a structure for cooperation with countries of Central and Eastern Europe –, it can quite unwittingly contribute to creating some kind of division. If this were to occur, losses from the deterioration of the security situation in Europe would most probably outweigh the institutional gains achieved by the EU through a "reinforced dialogue" with a selected number of states and possible enlargement.

VII. Conclusion: The WEU's Special Role in the Future European Security Architecture

During the Cold War, one used to say that the security system in Western Europe served three main goals: to keep America in, Russia out, and Germany under control. The Cold War has ended and the short, idealistic period that followed seems to be coming to an end as well. With the war in Yugoslavia, the violent conflicts following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the renationalization of foreign and security policies in the West, Europe is now entering the post-post-Cold War period, in which some of the old perceptions are becoming valid again.

The humorous definition of European security – Americans in, Russians out, Germans at bay – is, to some extent, one of these. It has become evident that the Atlantic Alliance and the US military presence in Europe continue to make an essential contribution to the security of the continent after the end of the Cold War. A substantial or even complete US withdrawal from Europe, which just two years ago was contemplated on both sides of the Atlantic, is now seen as a most undesirable development, and Europeans are concerned about preserving the American commitment.

The violent course of events in Eastern Europe, and particularly in the former USSR, raises grave security concerns in the West. As tension and instability in this area increase, the former "Soviet threat" is turning into the post-Soviet "instability threat," which also needs to be contained and minimized. "Keeping the Russians out" becomes "keeping instability out," and the instruments for such action might not differ too much from the ones used during the Cold War.

Finally, the old notion of "keeping Germany under control" continues to demand a policy of *Einbindung*, of anchoring Germany in the evolving institutional framework. This means in particular to avoid any steps towards a renationalization of foreign and security policies. These factors will rank high on the agenda of West

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43 *The Independent*, 5 January 1992; Schmidt, *Special Franco-German Security Relationship*, p. 3.

European security cooperation with the WEU playing an important role in tackling each of the three tasks.

1. The WEU vis-à-vis the United States

From its inception, the WEU has been playing, and will continue to play, a "double role" with respect to the United States. The WEU therefore treads a balancing line between two tendencies that have always existed in Western Europe: to consolidate Western Europe, and to shore up common European interests against the leading American power, on the one hand, and to attract the American commitment to defend Europe, to ensure the US presence and guarantees, on the other.

The WEU's history attests to this two-sided approach. Thus, early West European attempts at security cooperation formed the necessary political foundation for the creation of the Atlantic Alliance and for the consequent adhesion of European countries to NATO. Later, however, the WEU was often used to counterbalance the American influence, as in the early 1980s, after NATO's two-track decision and President Reagan's announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or in 1986, after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik.

Now, despite its clear West European affiliation, the WEU can be used for shaping both Europeanist and Atlanticist tendencies. On the one hand, the WEU could form a European caucus within the Atlantic Alliance, thus jeopardizing its effectiveness as a political institution. NATO would then lose its flexibility, because a non-negotiable European standpoint would be pitted against a US position, thus reinforcing American tendencies to sharply reduce or even end US engagement in Europe.[44] On the other hand, coordination of West European efforts might be necessary for restructuring the Atlantic Alliance, which would imply a stronger European role in burdensharing, much sought by the United States, and the creation of a European pillar for a renewed NATO. This "double role" of the WEU is also quite evident in the new concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) put forward by NATO in early 1994, envisaging closer operational interaction of Atlantic and West European military components.

2. The WEU vis-à-vis the Former Soviet Union

The WEU's role in checking the post-communist instability in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is much more limited. Actually, the WEU Forum of Consultation and its consequent associations with countries "with a vocation for membership" in the European Union have drawn a dividing line at the borders of the ex-USSR, and are in fact a civilized way of abstaining from meddling in the

44 Schlör, "Summary of Discussion," p. 5.

apparently insoluble ethnic, economic, and political problems of the former Soviet empire. In the years to come, the European Union will not have the necessary security instruments to meet the challenge of post-communist instability. This will result in a selective approach to the countries in the East and can objectively contribute to isolating the area of instability by erecting a *cordon sanitaire* in East Central Europe.

3. The WEU vis-à-vis Germany

West European security cooperation has a major role to play with regard to the security policy of the nation states of Western Europe. As at the time of the difficult post-Maastricht debate (which was further complicated by the negative outcome of the first Danish referendum in 1992, by the narrow ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in France and Britain, and, later, by the EU enlargement to EFTA countries in 1995), the WEU represents an abiding framework that can at least try to keep the renationalization of foreign and security policies in check.

Historically, this WEU role has been particularly important with respect to Germany. Controlling the Federal Republic in terms of armament policy and anchoring it in the institutional framework was the original mission of the WEU. Later on, with NATO in existence and armament control over Germany no longer vital, the WEU was still used to address the "German question." One of the motives behind the WEU's reactivation in the early 1980s was the fear of neutrality-pacifism in Germany after the NATO double-track decision. Likewise, concern over the role of the reunified Germany was one of the reasons for including security and defense questions in the Maastricht Treaty paragraphs defining the Political Union of Western Europe.

At present, the WEU can be used to counterbalance the renationalization of security policies of all major European powers, above all France and Germany. Both have undertaken a number of unilateral political manoeuvres in recent years which were incompatible with the shared goal of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. As regards France, one can enumerate the demand for a common initiative of the four nuclear powers to address nuclear proliferation problems in Eastern Europe; the support of Serbian claims for a single Yugoslavia at the early stages of the Balkan war; the emphasis on the special responsibility of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, etc. For Germany, one can cite the Genscher-Baker plan to create the NACC or headlong recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. The CFSP as well as the WEU have failed to anticipate or prevent these unilateral moves. Still their existence can impose certain (at least psychological) restrictions on individual countries' freedom of manoeuvre in the security field.

Another aspect of the WEU's future role can be identified by considering its relationship to NATO. Given the current trends, there will be no substantial competition between the WEU and NATO, a purely European or a purely Atlantic concept of security. The main reason for this is that Western Europe has not developed reliable and sufficient security instruments of its own, and is not likely to develop them in the foreseeable future. There is no integrated military command, and most important, not even an agreed procedure for common decision-making, even less so a firm consensus on major security issues (like the war in ex-Yugoslavia). Europeans will thus be limited in their capacity to act militarily by themselves outside the NATO framework. All this means that NATO remains the only alternative in security terms and that the WEU does not have a sufficient operational, political, or psychological capacity to challenge the Atlantic option.

Most likely, the relations of both institutions will move closer to the desired "transparency and complementarity" – as stated in the official documents – or amalgamation – the word much used in Brussels. This implies a number of steps, like synchronization of meetings, exchange of documentation, "double-hatting" of units and headquarters, and the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces. Since there is no permanent structure for interaction of both institutions, for the time being there will be more "ad-hocism," as in the Adriatic operation. Interaction will develop on a case-by-case basis.

It should be stressed once again: the WEU will not develop an independent operational capacity in the foreseeable future. At the same time, some minor cases are conceivable, where, on the basis of a general trans-Atlantic consensus, for political reasons it would be preferable to initiate a purely European engagement, that is, without American participation. (There would, however, probably be American political and possibly also logistical or intelligence support.)[45] In this event, European action would also be possible by utilizing European components of NATO staffs under the roof of the WEU.

A possible solution for reconciling the need for a European military component and operational soundness would be to create structures within NATO in which Europeans play a more dominant role. For instance, Germany proposed to place the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps planning staff not directly under SACEUR. Such European-dominated command structures could then be used on an ad hoc basis for West-European mandated operations.[46]

Such a non-conflicting relationship between the WEU and NATO will allow for the achievement of a number of goals:

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45 Mahncke, *Parameters of European Security*, p. 34.

46 Schlör, "Summary of Discussion," p. 5.

- Making the WEU compatible and in some instances subordinate to NATO will substantially strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and ensure the continuation of American guarantees to the European security.
- Creating a partially independent European component within the NATO framework which will add flexibility to the political and military capacity of the West in tackling new security challenges.
- Developing such a WEU-NATO relationship will enhance the European voice and the European alternative, which would naturally develop into "common defense" as Political Union comes about.

All WEU missions described above will remain somewhat complementary to its principal role: to create a single political actor in Europe. To be more precise, the main function of the WEU has been continuously widened over the last 45 years: the organization was first called into being to promote reconciliation between former adversaries, then trust, later cooperation, and finally integration of West Europeans in a Political Union.

On the eve of the Maastricht agreement, the Franco-German initiative of 14 October 1991 promoted the view that the inclusion of defense policy in the drive for Political Union would be conducive to integration. Since then, the French philosophy that the WEU should support a fully established Political Union with the capability to care for its own defense has gained wide recognition.[47] This implies that the formation and organization of armed forces in Europe has been basically decoupled from identifiable and concrete threats and risks. The proposed Political Union should have a common defense policy, not necessarily because of the lack of a pan-European security system, but rather because political logic requires that such a union has all instruments of state action at its disposal, including the use of armed forces.[48] "Institutional logic" in West European security cooperation/integration thus prevails over the "security logic."

The WEU is therefore regarded by many to be solely an intermediate step in the development of a comprehensive integrated Political Union. This is another reason why it will not acquire an independent defense capacity, and will at best be engaged on the sidelines, as complementary to NATO. However, the lack of a sound defense identity does not leave the WEU without a *raison d'être*. On the contrary, this might well be the basis for a "division of labor" between NATO and the WEU, in which each organization uses its own strength. For NATO, this is operational capability, integrated command, the experience of collective defense, and the beginnings of a collective security role (NACC, PfP). For the WEU, its main asset is institutionalism, a "reserve and support" function in a delicate web of

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47 For a description of this French philosophy, see Nicole Gnessotto, *European Defense: Why Not the Twelve?*, Chaillot Papers, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1991.

48 Schmidt, *WEU in the 1990s*, p. 15.

European/Atlantic institutions. Building on this, the WEU or a new security organization of the EU can play an indispensable role in the future European security system, though it is not likely to become its key actor.

8. Reform of the Alliance: Unfinished Business

István Szönyi

I. Introduction

With the sudden collapse of the bipolar international system, the unprecedented changes in the security environment brought the Alliance into a compelling situation. The single most obvious change was the disappearance of a direct Soviet threat and the appearance of regional crises as the major challenge to the Alliance. This double challenge made substantial reform of the Alliance essential. The following analyzis of NATO's difficult reform project is broken down into various sections. The first analyzes NATO's responsibilities under the new circumstances in the fields of nuclear weapons, traditional defense, peace-keeping and crisis management, reaching out to the East (through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace) and shifting responsibilities (with respect to the European security and defense identity). The second reviews the new force and command structure of the Alliance. This is followed by a section addressing the problem of whether there is an underlying political goal for maintaining the Alliance, and finally, by a section that examines US interests in maintaining the transatlantic security link, and more precisely the American military presence in Europe.

II. NATO's New Roles and Responsibilities

1. Nuclear Weapons

In the Alliance's old structure, nuclear weapons played a major role in shaping not only NATO's Cold War military strategy but also the political relationship especially between the US and the European member states. Looking at the changing role of nuclear weapons, therefore, provides good insight into the Alliance's new roles and responsibilities and its new political structure.

NATO's move away from "flexible response" with less reliance on nuclear weapons was already spelled out in the London Declaration.[1] NATO confirmed this reduced reliance on nuclear weapons later in the Alliance's new Strategic Concept,[2] defining the main purpose of nuclear forces as political, that is, preserve peace and prevent coercion. But this concept was not undisputed from the outset.

1 *London Declaration* on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5/6, July 1990, Point 20.

2 *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7/8 November 1991, Points 40 and 55.

Margaret Thatcher (while still prime minister) was of the opinion that the move towards a "reduced reliance" would undermine the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent. François Mitterrand underlined the traditional French view that this new approach could condemn Europe to prolonged conventional war.[3] While Mitterrand's was a bleak view, based on a worst case scenario, both remarks seem to point to the fact that the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France may not make much of a difference in the future: without the transatlantic link, these weapons appear to have no credibility. This is the case particularly for Britain since it has decided to cut its nuclear arsenal by 25 per cent when replacing its Polaris submarines with Vanguard class submarines carrying Trident missiles.[4] Moreover, it has rejected the Royal Air Force's (RAF) plans to replace its bombs with new air-launched nuclear missiles, meaning that the RAF will be stripped of nuclear arms as its out-going nuclear bombs will not be replaced.[5] According to estimates, Britain maintains on average 1.5 nuclear missile submarines on patrol while a credible deterrence would require an average of no less than 2.5.[6]

Considering its commitment to the construction of Europe and its current military strength France would have the option of extending nuclear deterrence to other European countries. But her doctrine of deterrence could degenerate into mere retaliation: the damages inflicted by a nuclear response to any aggression are unproportional and therefore unacceptable.[7] In addition, there are doubts concerning France's willingness to extend its shield of deterrence to other countries. Not least, when France will replace its five nuclear missile submarines with four Le Triomphant class nuclear missile submarines, it will no longer be able to maintain an average of 2.5 submarines on patrol either.[8]

In practical terms, the need for a strong transatlantic link in the nuclear field no longer seems to have a high priority anyway. There is even some doubt as to whether there is still a strategy in the true sense.[9] More precisely, the residual Allied nuclear strategy relying on nuclear forces as weapons of last resort has lost substantial credibility. It is credible only if sub-strategic nuclear forces committed to NATO continue to provide the necessary political and military link to American

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3 Quoted by Jonathan Stearns, *Security Reforms in Europe, 1989-1992*, unpublished paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, March 1993, pp. 22-23.

4 *The Times*, 17 November 1993.

5 *The Independent*, 16 November 1993; *The Financial Times (FT)*, 15 November 1993.

6 *Defense News*, 27 September; 3 October 1993.

7 *Le Figaro*, 25 October 1993.

8 *Defense News*, 27 September; 3 October 1993.

9 Jacques Baumel, "La France, l'OTAN et les Etats-Unis," in: *Le Monde*, 1 April 1993.

strategic nuclear forces, the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.[10] In fact, not only are the ground-launched nuclear systems to be eliminated, but the number of air-delivered weapons in NATO's European stockpile are to be reduced by roughly 80 per cent.[11] Most of the 700 sub-strategic air-delivered gravity-guided nuclear weapons of the US will be relocated from the European theater to storage in the US,[12] which means that the Alliance's nuclear cornerstone has been removed – at least to a certain extent – with no replacement in sight.

Nuclear weapons, however, still play an important role in the Alliance's discussion on enlargement. Some argue that they is a major argument against an early (or perhaps any) enlargement of the Alliance. Indeed, the inclusion of new members could dilute security guarantees and defense commitments possibly forcing Germany to give up its option of maintaining a non-nuclear status. Besides, an Eastern enlargement of the Alliance would have to entail an extension of US nuclear guarantees further to the East and closer to the Russian/CIS area. Yet the willingness of the US (and most other Western governments) to go that far cannot be taken for granted,[13] although there are signs that the Clinton administration is now ready to do so.

2. The Traditional Defense Role

The Alliance's traditional defense role was to prepare against a massive large-scale attack from the East. Taking into account the major changes in the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the London Declaration of July 1990 acknowledged that "we must profoundly alter the way we think about defense."[14] In November 1991 the Rome Declaration also stipulated that the military dimension of the Alliance was only part of a broader concept of security.[15] Consequently, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept issued just some days later also acknowledged that the monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which had been the central concern of the Alliance had disappeared.[16] It made the point, however, that the new security environment had not changed the basic purpose or security

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10 The meeting of NATO defense ministers in Taormina in October 1991 quoted by Armand De Decker, "The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons," Report to the Assembly of WEU, 19 May 1994, p. 12.

11 *Ibid.*

12 André Dumoulin, "La parole – la défense européenne," in: *La Cité*, 15 September 1994.

13 Mathias Jopp, *The Strategic Implications of European Integration*, Adelphi Paper 290, London: IISS, July 1994, p. 50.

14 *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, 5/6 July, 1990, Point 11.

15 *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7/8 November 1991, Point 5.

16 *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Point 6.

functions of the Alliance, but rather underlined their enduring validity,[17] since the NATO members still have to face residual threats or risks stemming from tensions in the Eastern part of Europe.[18] The conventional and nuclear capabilities in the former Soviet Union still have to be taken into account if stability in Europe is to be preserved,[19] along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and terrorism and sabotage.[20] This changed environment forces the Alliance to set its strategy into a broader approach to security, which causes NATO to portray itself as both an anchor of stability in a world of increasing disorder,[21] and a flexible organization capable of successfully adapting to a new security environment.

The problem, however, is that residual threats might lead to a residual NATO. This would leave NATO only the decent job of serving as an "insurance policy" against uncertainties in the strategic landscape[22] – a scenario which becomes even more likely since the "Soviet threat" which applied more or less equally to all members of the Alliance has been substituted by a potential Russian threat which does not apply equally to all members. Proof of this is the rapid defense cuts that have been made (both in terms of troops and resources) in some member countries. If the main element of Allied cohesion was the perception of a unitary Soviet threat, the perception of a not at all unitary potential Russian threat is much less likely to serve such a purpose.[23] This is one reason why the Alliance should look beyond its traditional role towards a role in regional crisis management.

3. Peace-keeping and Crisis Management

The new international situation calls for new missions to make the Alliance effective once more. Such a new function could be NATO's role as an instrument

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17 *Ibid.*, Point 15.

18 *Ibid.*, Point 10.

19 *Ibid.*, Point 11.

20 *Ibid.*, Point 13.

21 See for instance Manfred Wörner in: *NATO Press Service*, 26 April 1993.

22 J. S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, p. 95.

23 The lack of this element was much publicized in the US. In response to what they saw as a poor performance of NATO in Bosnia, some Republican senators came to the conclusion that "we are very close to the decline of NATO in a very serious way." They warned President Clinton that NATO was not producing sufficient returns for the "enormous yearly investment" of the US. Discontent is not confined to the Republicans, however. Democrat congressmen and congresswomen also warned that they could not detect any real role for US troops in Europe and that NATO had failed so far to discover its role in the new world order. US lawmakers are also irritated about funding NATO while bases are closed in their own districts, causing a rise of unemployment in the US. The sharp defense cutbacks in European NATO countries further complicate the issue. *Defense News*, 31 May-6 June 1993.

contributing to international peace-related efforts, notably in the framework of the UN. In its new Strategic Concept following the Rome Summit, NATO declared one of its fundamental tasks to be crisis management as well as conflict and crisis prevention,[24] yet only in cases affecting the security of its members. It added, however, that the Allies' security was inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.[25] Still the document could not dispell the suspicion that this new task had the potential to disrupt the cohesion of the Alliance.

In spite of these possible burdens for NATO the North Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial communiqué in Oslo in June 1992 declared NATO's readiness to support peace-keeping operations under the responsibility of the CSCE, on a case-by-case basis, by making available Alliance resources and expertise.[26] Half a year later, NATO was also given free rein to support peace-keeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council.[27] This, however, set the scene for a controversy between NATO and the UN: Any out-of-area operation would imply huge costs to be spread among UN members in case of a UN-mandated operation implying the desire of controlling NATO's operations.[28]

Nevertheless, NATO's new role goes beyond peace-keeping. In ex-Yugoslavia, for instance, NATO is not merely involved in peace-keeping, but has also imposed a naval blockade and a flight ban. That is why the task of peace-making has been included in the list of NATO's new tasks.[29]

It may be important to have a look at the conditions set by NATO for its contribution to peace-keeping. First, requests will be handled on a case-by-case basis; second, the implementation of operations will follow NATO procedures. But there are two more conditions: a good chance of success and a united command obviously exercised by NATO,[30] the latter of which is very likely to lead to controversies if NATO is not engaged in operations alone and has to rely on other organizations as well. Such a conflict already came up between NATO and the WEU over the command of the joint naval blockade in the Adriatic and is still a

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24 *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Points 20, 32.

25 *Ibid.*, Point 34.

26 *Communiqué of the Ministerial Conference of the North Atlantic Council*, Oslo, 4 June 1992. Item 11.

27 Communiqué issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 17 December 1992, Art. 4. For a detailed analysis of this development, see Peter Schmidt, "Partners and Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of European Security Policy: Taking Stock," in: Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the Midst of Change, Approaches to West European Security and Defense Cooperation*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992, pp. 187-228.

28 *The Guardian*, 25 September 1993.

29 See John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role – Opportunities and Constraints for Peace-keeping," in: *NATO Review*, June 1993, p. 16.

30 Wörner quoted in *International Herald Tribune (IHT)*, 11 May 1993.

touchy issue in NATO's relations with the UN.[31] Also, the UN's decision to take elements of a NATO headquarters "off the shelf" to establish the new command in Bosnia was not entirely a happy one.[32] As far as the chances of success are concerned, it is hardly possible to decide on them with certainty until the operation has been terminated. By setting these conditions – all of which can be controversial – the Alliance seems to be trying to minimize the adverse political risks for its member states of any peace-keeping (or even peace-making) operation. But even with these conditions, involvement in peace-keeping cannot avoid a potential for disrupting the cohesion of the Alliance.

This is one of the reasons why Manfred Wörner rejected the prospect of the Alliance becoming a "subcontractor" in UN peace-keeping operations,[33] though he is well aware that "unless NATO plays a role in crisis management and peace-keeping, its public support will sooner or later wither away."[34] Furthermore, NATO is simply "overqualified" for focussing on blue-helmet operations.[35] Even under UN auspices, NATO would consider engagement in Bosnia a combat situation; NATO would not paint its tanks white; NATO would maintain that any operation must be credible and effective and cannot be allowed to fail.[36]

After the UN operation in Somalia went awry, as it had become "a highly personalized battle which undermined the political process,"[37] the US administration set further tough conditions for future UN engagements:[38] The troops must be explicitly invited by all warring factions, who have to demonstrate their readiness to cooperate; other countries must agree to help pay the costs of the operation; there must be a clear strategy and timetable to withdraw US troops on time; together with the military operation, political arrangements have to be made to set up civilian structures which can sustain peace.

At the same time, the regions to which NATO might send troops are rather limited. NATO has no ambitions in Central Asia, for example.[39] According to Les

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31 The CSCE is less likely to cause similar problems, which partially explains why NATO agreed to accept commissions for peace-keeping contributions from the CSCE six months before reaching the same decision for the UN.

32 Marrack Goulding, UN undersecretary general for peace-keeping, "The Evolution of United Nations Peace-keeping," in: *International Affairs*, Autumn 1993, p. 463.

33 *Associated Press (AP)*, Italy, 10 May 1993.

34 *Ibid.*

35 Peter Schmidt, *The Western European Union in the 1990s – Searching for a Role between the Atlantic Alliance and European Union*, unpublished paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, August 1992, p. 13.

36 Interview with Willem van Eekelen, in: *IHT*, 27 September 1993.

37 President Clinton quoted by *AP*, 15 October 1993.

38 *The Guardian*, 27 September 1993. These conditions have been put forward in view of an engagement of US troops in Bosnia, but there is no reason why they should not be applied to any other major operation.

39 Wörner quoted by *Agence France Press*, 13 October 1993.

Aspin, the Alliance would also prefer to avoid involvement in border disputes or civil wars in Eastern Europe.[40] Fortunately, there are no major upheavals in sight in Eastern Europe calling for NATO peace-keeping or crisis management operations, since opposition would be expected as far as new missions are concerned (see, for instance, the rejection of Shevardnadze's call for NATO help).

The Yugoslav crisis is unlikely to serve as a pattern for future operations, as it was a major instance of NATO over-extension. The Alliance claimed a role when nations were far from agreeing on the role it was to play, the nature of the war and its meaning for the overall European security. NATO can be expected to try to avoid any over-extension in the future.[41] As a result, NATO's new role in peace-keeping seems to be directed where there are no major problems.

Crisis management may be no less of a problem for NATO than peace-keeping itself, though such a task is allegedly a traditional and important aspect of Alliance capabilities.[42] NATO's crisis management experience includes large-scale troop deployments, supplies, communications and close air support.[43] According to NATO's new concept of reinforcement, crisis management is thus seen in terms of troops, that is, relocation of forces to risk areas,[44] though the crises most likely to require management would be of low intensity, with scattered, sporadic and weakly coordinated fighting[45] – just the sort of crisis NATO would find problematic to handle. First of all, under such circumstances it would be difficult to define the winner or loser as standard definitions of victory do not apply to peace-support operations.[46] Second, these situations call for intelligence on such things as water supply, available foodstuffs for refugees, power stations, or technical problems in fuel-usage rates or testing and certification of blood supplies. In the framework of a multinational operation, even more emphasis would fall on such standard operating procedures. Third, peace-support operations are likely to involve militarily undefined and politically ambiguous half-measures, as well as fluctuating political bodies on the part of the war factions and still developing international organizations.[47] Apart from that, crisis management would require the capability

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40 *Le Figaro*, 8 December 1993.

41 Interviews at NATO headquarters, 13 October 1993.

42 Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role," p. 18.

43 Manfred Wörner, "A vigorous Alliance – A Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe," in: *NATO Review*, December 1992, pp. 7-8.

44 Gordon Ferguson, "NATO's New Concept of Reinforcement," in: *NATO Review*, October 1992, p. 33.

45 Andre Dumoulin, "Le Conseil de coopération nord-atlantique (CCNA)," in: *Defense Nationale*, July 1992, p. 113.

46 Peter Saracino, "ARRC at the Sharp End," in: *International Defense Review*, No. 5, 1994.

47 Nicole Gnesotto, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, Chaillot Papers 14 March 1994, p. 29.

and willingness of each nation to relocate forces,[48] which is least likely in the very crises most needy of management.

Finally, a main difficulty linked to NATO crisis management is the fact that domestic political considerations play a much more important role than in traditional defense. Thus these new NATO roles are more liable to emphasize policy divergences among Alliance members than to strengthen Alliance cohesion.

NATO's main test in the field of crisis management so far has been the crisis in former Yugoslavia.[49] An escalation of the Yugoslav conflict would have had immediate implications for at least three NATO members (Turkey, Greece and Italy). Still, this test cannot hide the serious difficulties NATO faced. First of all, the Alliance was very slow in addressing the crisis in former Yugoslavia. From September 1991 to August 1992, NATO produced only public statements on Yugoslavia.[50] Second, NATO's relations with the UN became controversial due to conflicting US statements. While Manfred Wörner stated that NATO will be moving into peace-keeping (and later peace-making in Europe) as the United Nations is overburdened and underfinanced, and while John Shalikashvili welcomed the time when the United Nations will look to NATO to carry out some tasks in Europe,[51] Bill Clinton is reported to have called for a strengthening of the UN and regional security groups to reduce the need for NATO involvement.[52] On another occasion, however, Clinton warned that the UN simply cannot be engaged in all the conflicts around the world.[53] Faced with criticism of the Alliance over

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48 Ferguson, "NATO's New Concept of Reinforcement," p. 33.

49 Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role," p. 19. NATO was involved in management of the Yugoslav crisis upon the grounds of the following UN resolutions: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 776, which sent personnel from the Alliance's Northern Army Group to contribute to the UNPROFOR II Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina – 75 NATO personnel formed part of UNPROFOR II Headquarters; UNSCR 713 and 757, which imposed an arms embargo on all republics of the former Yugoslavia and an economic embargo on the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) – the Alliance conducted maritime monitoring operations in support of the two operations; UNSCR 781, which established a no-fly zone over the region – NATO AWACS aircraft began monitoring operations in support of the operation; UNSCR 787, which called for an embargo on the former Yugoslavia – AWACS aircraft are used in maritime operations in the Adriatic to enforce the UN embargoes; UNSCR 816, which prohibits the overflight of Bosnian air space – NATO began an operation to implement the resolution; UNSCR 836, which provided the overall mandate of UNPROFOR – NATO undertook the provision of protective air cover in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.

50 General James P. McCarthy, USAF (ret.), "Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe: New Opportunities for NATO," in: *Strategic Review*, Winter 1993, p. 59.

51 *IHT*, 30 March 1993.

52 *Defense News*, 10-16 May 1993.

53 *Le Monde*, 29 September 1993.

policy failures in Bosnia, Wörner on his part simply tried to shrug off responsibility for Bosnia, blaming it on the United Nations.[54]

It cannot be argued, however, that NATO's contribution to crisis-management has been unsuccessful. The siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces was relieved because of the strong stance adopted by the Alliance.[55] In enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO aircraft shot down four (most likely Bosnian Serb) planes violating the zone. Yet problems of credibility keep cropping up for the Alliance in its relations with the UN. While the Alliance does not need any additional UN approval for air strikes in enforcing the no-fly zone, it does require UN's consent for air strikes against ground targets. This cumbersome procedure kept the Alliance from using air force to protect French UN troops under attack from Serbian artillery in mid-March 1994. Before the competent UN authorities approved the French request for close air support (more than three hours after the request was made), the Serbs had managed to withdraw and the mission had to be cancelled.[56] In another instance, UN commanders called for NATO air strikes and selected an empty and immobilized tank as the target. NATO officials therefore were concerned about the credibility of the Alliance and addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General requesting radical changes in the Alliance's mandate in Bosnia.[57]

The strains imposed by these events upon the cohesion of the Alliance are an even more serious problem. The row over Bosnian "safe areas" clearly illustrates this point. When the US, Russia, Britain, France and Spain came up with a plan to establish so-called safe areas (or enclaves) for Bosnian Muslims at the end of May 1993, sharp controversies arose among the Allies: German Defense Minister Volker Rühe complained that the plan would reward the Serbs and punish the Muslims;[58] Turkey criticized the plan as legitimizing Serbian territorial gains;[59] Italy and Germany complained that most of the European allies had not been consulted.[60] Later, NATO ministers were unable to find out how many soldiers would be needed for the plan, what their mandate would be or from which

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54 *Reuters* (Brussels), 27 May 1993. Moreover, General MacKenzie warned that the process of merging UN and NATO forces "will move agonizingly slow" and that "it is going to be a monumental problem" when you have NATO as a subcontractor to the UN for peace-keeping *(Defense News*, 7-13 June 1993).

55 *IHT*, 18 February 1994.

56 *IHT*, 15 March 1994.

57 *IHT*, 11 October 1994.

58 *The Times*, 27 May 1993.

59 *IHT*, 26 May 1993.

60 *IHT*, 27 May 1993.

countries they would come,[61] thus evoking the vagueness of the mission. Finally, NATO defense ministers failed to endorse the plan.[62]

This led to repeated American criticism of the Allies' inability to agree on a plan to resolve the Bosnian crisis, proving that "there is no role for US troops in Europe" and that the only role of American troops is to defend European Allies.[63] While President Clinton had asserted early on that any US military operation in former Yugoslavia would be conducted by the US under UN auspices, and coordinated by strict NATO command with Americans in key positions,[64] senior US officials later reiterated administration statements that deployment of US ground forces was not "in the cards."[65] Therefore it is not surprising that NATO's Secretary General was worried that contradictory US and European policies on Bosnia could damage the Alliance.[66]

III. Shifting Power? The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the WEU

1. The European Security and Defense Identity

NATO reform also has to consider European efforts to establish an "ever closer Union" including security and defense,[67] the urge to strengthen ESDI and to expand WEU and turn it into the defense policy instrument of the European Union, while the US is scaling down its leadership in security issues. This, in turn, could find NATO unable or unwilling to push through decisions. Such problems could prompt the public in NATO member countries to increasingly withhold their support for the Alliance's tasks.[68]

A major area of the shift in responsibilities is in NATO/WEU relations: The North Atlantic Council's Copenhagen communiqué admitted the responsibility of the European allies in deciding on the arrangements of a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and defense role, and called for transparency and complementarity between the WEU and the Alliance and for appropriate links and consultations between them.[69] NATO's Rome Declaration welcomed the reinforcement of the WEU both as the defense component of European inte-

61 *The Times*, 27 May 1993.

62 *IHT*, 27 May 1993.

63 *Defense News*, 31 May/6 June 1993.

64 *Le Monde*, 26 May 1993.

65 *IHT*, 26 May 1993.

66 *Reuters* (Brussels), 7 June 1993.

67 See, for example, Michael Brenner, "Multilateralism and European Security," in *Survival*, Summer 1993, and Peter Schmidt, "European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI): A Brief Analysis from a German Point of View," Ebenhausen, January 1995.

68 See Brenner, "Multilateralism and European Security."

69 Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991, Point 3.

gration and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.[70] The Strategic Concept stated that the European members of the Alliance would take on greater responsibility for the defense of Europe.[71] The Oslo communiqué reaffirmed NATO's support for strengthening the operational role of the WEU in a way that is complementary and fully compatible with the Alliance. It also emphasized that the primary responsibility of forces answerable to the WEU would remain NATO's collective defense under the Washington Treaty.[72] The Athens communiqué gave its support to the participation of the secretaries general in respective Council meetings and close, day-to-day contact between NATO and the WEU as a way of promoting transparency and complementarity between them.[73]

The January 1994 Alliance Summit brought a major breakthrough in NATO's relationship with the emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). President Clinton pledged American support for a European CFSP and for a refurbishing of the WEU. He later also confirmed that it was in the interest of the US to have a strong and united Europe, on all levels, whether economic, political or security.[74] The summit declaration thus gave full support to the development of an ESDI in the frameworks of CFSP and the WEU. ESDI is expected to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link, and to enable the European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense. The support for ESDI means support for the WEU as the defense component of the European Union. The Alliance even confirmed its readiness to make NATO's collective assets available for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their CFSP – even those in which NATO itself, i.e. the US, is not involved[75]. More specifically, the Alliance started to work on the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means of adapting the Alliance to its future tasks.[76]

2. The Case of the Adriatic

The Alliance and the WEU have found themselves side by side in one crisis management mission: the mission in the Adriatic. This first test of cooperation between the two organizations, however, started out as a duplication of effort and developed into institutional rivalry before agreement could be reached with

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70 *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, Point 7.

71 *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Point 37.

72 *Communiqué of the Ministerial Conference*, Oslo, Point 7.

73 Communiqué issued at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens, Greece, 10 June 1993, Art. 9.

74 *Atlantic News*, 3 June 1994.

75 *Remarks by the US President*, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January 1994.

76 *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government*, NATO Press Service, 11 January 1994.

respect to operational arrangements. The row emerged over the command and control of the operation between the two organizations. The Alliance's Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean established "Maritime Monitor," patrolling the coast of Montenegro, while WEU's Maritime Contingency Force set up "Sharp Vigilance," patrolling in the north of the Strait of Otranto.[77] While NATO claimed that the operation be run under a single NATO command, WEU insisted on a joint leadership keeping the operation under separate commands.[78] Both operations, however, were coordinated by NATO's Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe headquarters in Naples and supported by maritime-patrol aircraft and AWACS surveillance aircraft. Both used standard NATO procedures and communications. This in the end allowed an agreement to put the operation under a single NATO command[79] merging the two operations into Operation Sharp Guard, under which the two forces in December 1992 even exchanged their patrol areas. By mid-1994 the joint operation Sharp Guard included support by armed maritime-patrol and strike aircraft as well as joint logistic support.[80]

The case of this naval operation clearly illustrates the different motivations behind reforming NATO and reinforcing WEU: while NATO sources maintained that it was better to establish a single command as two fleets participated in one operation, the WEU secretary general was mainly worried about a marginalization of the WEU and insisted that the WEU should maintain some visibility in the operation.[81] As a result, there are two distinct interpretations of the current state of affairs. According to a first group it was unnecessary to refer the overall command arrangements to the supreme NATO headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) and its Adriatic Committee. Thus, a chance for the WEU was missed in particular since a majority of European ships was involved; yet, NATO authorities refused to accept the high visibility of a joint WEU/NATO command.[82] The other view holds that the circumstances of this WEU involvement are unique while new opportunities for the WEU will come up. This group maintains that the earlier lack of harmony should not be taken as a constant feature of the WEU/NATO relationship. Indeed, Italy held the WEU presidency at the time, thus providing the commander of the naval contingent who coincidentally happened to be the commander of NATO's naval forces in the Mediterranean and thus controlled

77 With the transition to enforcement of the embargo, NATO's and WEU's operations became Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence, respectively.

78 *The Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), 14 May 1993.

79 *AP*, Brussels, 9 June 1993.

80 Tim Ripley, "Isolating Yugoslavia," in: *International Defense Review*, No. 10, 1994.

81 *AP*, Brussels, 14 May 1993.

82 Gnesotto, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, p. 38.

both NATO and WEU forces at the same time.[83] Similar solutions may be found in the future. Yet it is widely accepted that the tensions in the current case were overcome because of the low risks involved in the operations. Is it certain that such rivalries will be as easily overcome or overcome at all in more serious contingencies?

Forming a background to these developments are Franco-American rivalries. For France, the construction of a Europe including a security and defense dimension has higher priority than the Atlantic Alliance. Yet Europe suffers from a lack from strategic military capabilities. Only NATO offers the logistic airlift and intelligence capabilities to carry out major operations.[84] France is therefore in need of close cooperation with NATO.[85] Accordingly, France was very attached to the Atlantic Alliance and particularly to the presence of American troops in Europe.[86] Considering the role France has assumed in the field of peace-keeping and considering NATO's new responsibilities in that field, France has reclaimed limited voting rights in NATO's supreme Military Committee without returning to NATO's integrated military command. Another French step toward tightening the relationship with NATO was the creation of the Eurocorps, since the agreement signed by the French and German Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe allows the Eurocorps to be put at the disposition of the Alliance.[87] Some French diplomats maintain that a further proof of French support for the Alliance is the new Strategic Concept which was the first NATO strategic doctrine signed by France.[88] The initiative on NATO's side to establish combined, joint and mobile headquarters, which can be detached from the Alliance's regular command structures in case of operations managed by the WEU, could also facilitate greater French participation in the work of the military side of the Alliance.[89]

A by-product of this increased French military involvement in NATO affairs has been a loss of importance of the Defense Planning Committee for NATO's new missions, since France's participation is mainly centered around the Military Committee.[90] In 1993 France indicated that its defense minister and the chief of staff would participate in NATO meetings in cases where French interests are concerned. But in April 1994, the French chief of staff was not authorized at the

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83 "Strategic Outreach Roundtable Paper and Conference Report with Dr. Peter Schmidt," *SSI Special Report*, Washington DC, 6 May 1993, p. 4.

84 Jacques Baumel, "La France et l'avenir de l'OTAN," in: *Le Figaro*, 15 December 1993.

85 Raymond Barre/François Ceyrac/Henri Froment-Meurice, "De l'espace à la puissance," in: *Le Monde*, 29 October 1993.

86 *FT*, 14 May 1993.

87 *NAC ministerial communiqué*, Brussels, 16 December 1993.

88 Interview at NATO headquarters, 15 October 1993.

89 Wörner quoted in *Le Monde*, 16 December 1993.

90 Interview at NATO headquarters, 13-14 October 1993.

last moment to participate in a meeting of the Military Committee. Neither did the French defense minister participate in the unofficial meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde in October 1993. In September 1994, however, he did take part in the unofficial meeting of NATO defense ministers in Seville.[91] There is certainly no question of France returning to the Alliance's integrated military structures. But greater French participation in NATO affairs also confirms that France is interested in keeping the US engaged in European security through the Alliance, albeit on a basis which gives Europe (and France) a much greater say than before. The question still pending of the Combined Joint Task Force's (CJTF) relationship with NATO military authorities in the event of a WEU action demonstrates the on-going struggle for power and influence.

IV. New Military Structures

1. Force and Command Structures

According to its newly accepted principles, NATO has engaged in a restructuring of its command and force arrangements with an emphasis on multinational military units. NATO expects a savings of about 20 per cent from this resulting reduction of both NATO military commands and personnel.[92] The number of major NATO commands has been reduced from three to two (that is to Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, suppressing the Channel Command), followed by a subsequent streamlining of the subordinate headquarters.[93] National priorities have played a major role in the restructuring at the major subordinate command level. With German insistence that no command boundaries should divide its territory any longer, Schleswig-Holstein was transferred from the Northern to the Central Command. This, in turn, caused Denmark to join the new Central Command run by a German from Brunssum, Holland, while Norway had to content itself, despite fears of undesirable British domination, with assignment to the British-led North-West Command (run from High Wycombe, UK).[94] As a result, only the major NATO commands became multinational units. The national independence of the Allied armed forces in

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91 *Le Monde*, 6 September 1994.

92 Defense Planning Committee Communiqué, *NATO Review*, June 1992, Point 10.

93 General Vigleik Eide, "The Military Dimension in the Transformed Alliance," in: *NATO Review*, August 1992, p. 23.

94 The old command center of the former Northern region, Kolsas, is still to be used by a subordinate command because of Norwegian sensitivity to the military importance of their country. See Jan Willem Honig "The 'Renationalization' of Western European Defense," in: *Security Studies*, Autumn 1992, p. 127.

peacetime remains mainly intact with the armed forces of each ally able to operate under their own independent operational command.[95]

2. The Position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR)

SACEUR's position is likely to spark controversies within the Alliance, considering the European members' frequent complaints of American dominance within the Alliance, a diminishing American military commitment in Europe, and much talk of the need for greater European responsibilities. According to one US diplomat, however, the Europeans did not have any objections to the recent appointment of a new SACEUR while the Americans do not see their leadership in the Alliance contested to the point of having to accept a European SACEUR. After all, 100,000 American troops is still a considerable US engagement in Europe, especially in light of West European defense cuts and in view of the important US force multipliers.[96]

European diplomats feel that, besides the position of the SACEUR, greater European responsibilities could be obtained by a much stronger representation at the headquarters levels.[97] If an American SACEUR is coupled with a declining American commitment, or is simply accepted by the Europeans as a matter of convenience parallelled by reduced NATO competences in European security issues, the position of the SACEUR could end up as a mere show-case, rather than as a symbol of Alliance cohesion.

3. Combined Joint Task Forces

A major new element of the Alliance's command and force structure is the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces generally, endorsed in January 1994 by the North Atlantic Summit meeting. Its attractiveness lies in its multiple purposes: first, they are intended to introduce flexibility into the Alliance's missions and are in line with the new requirements for flexible and timely responses; second, they are to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of Alliance military capabilities in European/WEU operations; third, they can facilitate the participation of NATO nations which are not currently within the Alliance's integrated force structures; and fourth, they help forces and staffs of non-NATO members which, in concert with the Partnership for Peace, have decided to join Alliance operations.[98]

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95 *Ibid.*, p. 125.

96 Interview at NATO headquarters, 14 October 1993.

97 *Ibid.*

98 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 June 1994; and Field Marshal

A report on CJTF was completed in April 1994. According to Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) military planners, CJTF headquarters could be established at NATO command sites. Equipped with their own command and control system, logistics support, and a staff of up to 1,800, each CJTF headquarters could be detached and rapidly set up beyond NATO's borders to command an army corps or similarly sized air and sea forces. However, not only further decisions but even in-depth discussions were blocked up to late 1994 by the lack of agreement, mainly between the US and France.[99] France was opposed to the CJTF's headquarters being so close to NATO's integrated command, whereas most Allied partners were in favor of using the existing NATO structures as an anchor for the new system.

4. Troop Reductions

As for reform of the force structures, the greatest reductions have taken place in the central region where active ground forces are to be cut by some 20-30 per cent: stationed forces have also been reduced, force dispositions redrawn and live training exercises scaled down.[100] In the Northern and Southern regions, but on a smaller scale, similar cuts are to be made, although a new Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean was inaugurated in April 1992. It joins the long-established Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Channel.[101] In addition, NATO's forces have been restructured into Main Defense, Reaction and Augmentation forces with emphasis for the majority of forces on lower readiness. The Reaction Forces (with ground, air and maritime components), which have relatively high readiness, will account for only a small portion of NATO's available forces – less than 10 per cent in the case of ground forces.[102] The Rapid Reaction Corps will be 100,000 strong in terms of troops, with national contingents integrated at the level of brigades. The air cover is completely American. The main defense forces will be at a troop level of 500,000, made up of seven armored corps with reinforcement provisions drawing on American reserves.[103]

This new force structure required a new concept of reinforcement, which the Allied defense ministers agreed to revise in December 1990. As a result, a new NATO concept of reinforcement was adopted in December 1991. It lays emphasis

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Sir Richard Vincent, "The Brussels Summit – A Military Perspective;" in: *NATO Review*, February 1994, pp. 7-11.

99 *Atlantic News*, 14 September 1994, and *Defense News*, 4-10 July 1994.

100 Eide, "Military Dimension in Transformed Alliance," p. 22.

101 Defense Planning Communiqué, Point 9.

102 Eide, "Military Dimension in Transformed Alliance," p. 22.

103 Paul-Marie de la Gorce, "Comment l'Alliance Atlantique tente d'adapter son système de sécurité," in: *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1993.

on the build-up of multinational forward presence, on the reversibility of the employment of NATO forces, and on the ability to respond to simultaneous crises in different areas.[104]

The greatest reductions, as already mentioned, have taken place in the Central region. Ten corps have been reduced to eight and the twenty-five active divisions have been cut to sixteen plus nine independent brigades.[105] One of the remaining eight corps is the Rapid Reaction Corps under British command, which is made up of two multinational divisions – one each from the Central and the Southern region – as well as of two British divisions.[106]

NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps seems to be an excellent instance of NATO's commitment to multinational forces, which is, however, not confined to this corps. In addition, NATO's shrinking ground forces have been realigned into five multinational army corps – a German-Danish, a German-Dutch-British corps, and two German-American corps. The US 1st Armored Division will form a corps together with the German 2nd corps (headquarters in Ulm), while the US Army's 5th corps (headquarters in Frankfurt) will cooperate with Germany's 5th Armored Division. An exchange of six officers from each side at the two headquarters complements this realignment.[107] This means that in Germany, for instance, there are no longer any national army corps.[108]

Simultaneously, Belgium is cutting its armed forces by half, from 87,000 to 40,000. At the same time, it has assigned 12,000 troops to the Eurocorps, which amounts to its whole army excluding the brigade assigned to NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps.[109] An important development in this respect is the Belgian-Dutch plan to integrate the navies of the two countries under the direction of a joint headquarters, which means that the headquarters of the Belgian Navy in Oostende would be closed. Part of the personnel would be transferred to the Dutch Navy's headquarters in Den Helder.

The Dutch on their part have established a German-Dutch army corps (made up of two brigades) under alternating command. This corps is installed in Münster and has become operational in 1995. For the Netherlands, this multinational interaction is a core issue since conscription will be eliminated by 1998, cutting

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104 Gordon Ferguson, "NATO's New Concept of Reinforcement," in: *NATO Review*, October 1992, p. 33.

105 Honig, "Renationalization of Western European Defense," p. 124.

106 The bulk of Multinational Division Center is made up of brigades provided by Germany, Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands, while Multinational Division South is made up mainly of Greek, Italian and Turkish contributions (*Defense News*, 30 March 1993).

107 *Defense News*, 24 May 1993.

108 *IHT*, 3 May 1993.

109 *Le Soir*, 28 June 1993.

troop strength from 125,000 to 70,000.[110] At the same time, the troop strength of the marines will be reduced from 22,000 to 17,500 by the year 2000.[111] In 1993 alone the defense budget of the Netherlands has been lowered by 7 per cent, followed by another cut of 3,3 per cent in 1994.[112] Both the Belgian and Dutch cases therefore point out that the small NATO countries are interested in NATO's multinational commitments as it is a way for them to maintain their military capabilities while reducing defense spending.

British defense spending is currently 16 per cent lower than in the mid-1980s. A further 12 per cent reduction is planned by 1996-97. Until 1993 forces have been cut from 320,000 a decade ago to 270,000, and are planned to be reduced to 230,000 in the late 1990s, primarily by cuts in the Royal Air Force (13,000) and the navy (7,000).[113] In this way, British defense spending will account for 3 per cent of GDP by 1996-97 with a decline from 1993's 23.5 bn pound to 22.79 bn pounds in 1996-97.[114]

The redrawing of the force structures has been parallelled by deep defense cuts, which have to a large extent been treasury-driven. Canada has decided to withdraw all its troops from Europe; President Clinton reduced US forces in Europe to 100,000, a force strength which could become even smaller. The Pentagon has to cut its budget by 88 bn dollars over the next four years, trying to build a strategy on a budget that has already been decided,[115] while at the same time, it has set itself the new task of counter-proliferation. This task implies programs of tracking mobile missile launchers, improving bomb penetration, developing detectors and suits against chemical and biological attacks, and developing theater missile defense systems.[116] Considering that these programs could call for enormous investments to be transferred from other defense programs, this task could impose a further strain on the American military presence in Europe, which in turn could bring the US very close to the threshold of a credible American commitment to NATO.[117] According to NATO officials, however, force numbers are not as important as the American political commitment and the US ability to rapidly redeploy forces in Europe. As a result, the more serious problem would be an

110 *Libération*, 28 May 1993.

111 *Le Monde*, 26 May 1994.

112 *NATO Brief*, March/April 1995, Table 2, p. 33.

113 *FT*, 3 December 1993; *The Guardian*, 15 July 1994.

114 *The Independent*, 1 December 1993.

115 *IHT*, 26 June 1993.

116 *FT*, 8 December 1993.

117 *Time*, 12 April 1993. The problem of credibility was very much the issue in the Pentagon's decision to transfer a large part of stocks in forward storages in Europe or to forward positioned ships. Below 65,000 troops, the American ability to contribute to NATO force structures could be seriously impaired. André Dumoulin, "La parole – la défense européenne," in: *La Cité*, 15 September 1994.

interpretation in some European countries that these force reductions are a sign of diminishing American interest in European security.[118]

Currently the main problem caused by these defense cuts and restructuring plans is the fact that force reductions at national levels occurred to a large extent in the same areas. This means that some NATO member states may have difficulties in respecting their commitments in terms of forces assigned to NATO's new force structure. As a result, already a second restructuring has been initiated, which includes a further reduction of 10-20 per cent in maritime forces as compared to 1991. The level of readiness is also being further reduced among the main defense forces, so that, for instance, in the case of maritime forces half of them will be available in three weeks. The same time framework applies to 10-20 per cent of land forces and 50 per cent of air forces.[119]

Defense spending has, however, stabilized in some Alliance member states. In the US, the Congress has approved a defense budget totalling 263.8 bn dollars, up 2.8 bn dollars from the preceding year.[120] In Germany, 1994 saw a modest increase in the military budget to 47.9 bn DM from 47.25 bn DM in 1993, increasing further to 48.4 bn DM by 1998.[121] Savings made by shortening the length of military service from twelve to ten months and by the planned reduction of the Bundeswehr to 340,000 will allow investments to rise from 22 to 30 per cent in the defense budget.[122] In France, although ground forces are likely to be reduced by more than 10,000 from the current level of 240,000, the French government plans to increase the defense budget by 0.5 per cent each year over the next six years. France's 1994 defense equipment budget (100.4 bn FFr) is already higher than that of its European allies.[123]

V. US Interests

American President Bill Clinton was elected mainly on the domestic political mandate of revitalizing the economy and reducing the budget deficit. This has led to a situation in which the US tries to establish a clear link between national interests and the strategic investments of US foreign policy thus risking its consensus on foreign policy priorities.[124]

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118 Interview at NATO headquarters, 13 October 1993.

119 Interview at NATO headquarters, 13 October 1993.

120 *Atlantic News*, 17 September 1994.

121 *WSJ*, 26 August 1994.

122 *FT*, 1 September 1994.

123 *FT*, 20 April 1994.

124 Charles L. Barry, "US Priorities and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership," in Charles L. Barry (ed.), *The Search for Peace in Europe*, National Defense University Press: Washington, 1993, p. 284.

European members of the Alliance have always been sensitive to signs of declining American interest in Europe. Thus declarations of Secretary of State Warren Christopher led to European concerns when he argued that the US was excessively Eurocentric at a time when Western Europe was no longer a dominant area of the world. He implied that the US could gain more from its Pacific relations.[125] Though Christopher later revised his earlier statements,[126] the question remains whether the US still has interests in Europe that are strong enough for it to insist on keeping the Alliance together. For most observers, it does. First of all, there are five million Americans living in Europe. Second, relations with the Pacific are much less prominent once Canada and Japan are removed from the equation. Direct US investment in Europe is 239 bn dollars, while it is only 78 bn dollars in the Pacific region with the exclusion of Canada.[127] The US currently has a trade surplus of about 16 bn dollars with the EU, with this trade accounting for about 24 per cent of total US imports and exports.[128] Moreover, while the US exports to Europe equal roughly those to East Asia (about 97 bn dollars), it has a balanced trade with Europe, but is running a 75 bn dollars trade deficit with East Asia. Roughly 60 per cent of all overseas profits of US companies derive from Western Europe, versus 17 per cent from East Asia. US firms have invested 225 bn dollars in Western Europe (half of all overseas investments) versus less than 60 bn dollars in East Asia and only 23 bn dollars in Japan, while West Europeans have invested 258 bn dollars in the US (65% of all foreign investments). The 97 bn dollars of exports to Europe amount to more than 2 million American jobs.[129]

There are certainly other interests as well. According to senior members of NATO's international staff, the US is still interested in counterbalancing Russia. It can also use its European bases as a springboard for out-of-area operations and ask for Allied support either in military or financial terms, which in turn broadens the legitimacy of such operations (internationally and domestically) and serves as a potential impetus for UN decisions. If a crisis were to break out, the US would immediately and automatically fall back on established familiar procedures within the Alliance framework multinational operations, with Europe as the only reliable partner.[130]

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125 *IHT*, 18 October 1993.

126 *IHT*, 24 November 1993.

127 *Ibid.*

128 Juan de Luis, "Economic Aspects," in: N. Gantz/J. Roper (eds.), *Towards a New Partnership,* WEU: Paris, 1993, p. 149.

129 Address by Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders in High Education at the Department of State, 18 April 1994.

130 Interviews with NATO officials on 13 and 14 October 1993.

Thus the US does have serious interests in Europe. But economic interests do not necessarily require an American military presence in Europe. Counterbalancing a potential Russian threat would require only a residual Alliance. Relying on European support for out-of-area operations would require Allied consent, which might be hard to be obtained for that kind of operation. If a sizable American military presence in Europe is essential for maintaining even a reformed Alliance, American interests in maintaining such a sizable military presence in Europe are becoming somewhat less compulsive than they were previously. President Clinton's pledge to keep 100,000 troops in Europe suggests, however, that these interests are still quite important.

A very strong US interest calling for maintaining a reduced but still significant defense presence in Europe is the US's wish for a united Europe. "That is why America supports Europe's own steps toward greater unity – the European Union, the Western European Union and the development of a European defense identity."[131] Clinton said that it was in the interest of the US to have a strong and united Europe, on all levels, whether it concerns the economy, politics or security. Reinforcing Europe's role in security matters thus does not mean to replace NATO but to ensure a more vigorous partnership and to avoid the impression that the US wanted to impose solutions on them.[132] At the same time, a more vigorous partnership helps the US to shift the burdens of contributing to European security and to call for European cooperation and support when protecting common US and European interests worldwide.[133] In sum, integrating and strengthening a broader, democratic Europe is a difficult challenge,[134] which still has to be based on a central role for NATO and a continued American security presence in Europe.

VI. Conclusion

So far, there are no formidable military challenges in sight which might be able to put NATO's full potential to the test. Neither NATO's new missions are challenges of this order, nor the residual potential of a Russian threat. One of NATO's main merits is that the Alliance maintains the "sound basis of an integrated collective defense" which is readily available should a new threat suddenly emerge.[135] But

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131 Remarks by the President in the Address to the National Assembly, The White House, 7 June 1994.

132 President Clinton quoted in *Atlantic News*, 3 June 1994.

133 Paul R. S. Gebhard, *The United States and European Security*, Adelphi Paper 286, London: IISS, 1994, pp. 36, 66.

134 President Clinton quoted in *IHT*, 8 June 1994.

135 Manfred Wörner, *European Security: Political Will Plus Military Might*, The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, December 1993.

there is much more to the Alliance than this due to its political potential, which serves as a major venue thus for its members to come to terms with each other in security related issues and provides an element of predictability in transatlantic relations by making Europe and North America aware of each other's concerns. The Alliance therefore serves as a familiar and disciplined way of coordinating policy.

NATO Allies have very privileged relations with each other. This can be seen not only in strictly Alliance-related issues but also in broader frameworks, for instance, during negotiations of the mandate of the Forum for Security Cooperation of the CSCE.[136] During the informal consultations in Vienna, differences concerning the Forum's mandate were evident among all participants, including NATO members, it was clear that if the members of the Alliance could work out suitable compromises and come up with a common position, they would promote the outcome of the mandate negotiations. To include non-NATO CSCE states in the development of eventual compromises, the Alliance established close relations between its NATO caucus in Vienna and all other CSCE member states. Indeed, they managed to come up with an acceptable solution which was presented by Norway.[137]

Providing a familiar and disciplined venue for policy coordination, this NATO framework, however, makes sense only as long as its members perceive to be in need of policy coordination. The main dilemma facing the Alliance is, therefore, the disappearance of a major and compelling unitary threat, which tempts the members of the Alliance to avoid addressing newly emerging issues to safeguard their relationship. The minimalist interpretation of the Partnership for Peace initiative points in this direction. According to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former American ambassador to the UN, the partnership initiative serves mainly to divert attention from the question of the future function of the Alliance,[138] which would gradually weaken NATO to a point where its competences and political functions could be compared to those of today's organizations for collective security.[139]

Which issues could therefore help to keep up NATO's impetus? In the past the engagement of the United States in European security has provided the essential

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136 There were four main areas of divergence: the tasks of the new negotiations (on implementation, administration and coordination of all arms control agreements already concluded, as well as on setting new priorities for future arms control and arms reduction negotiations), the structure of the Forum, the area of application of negotiated measures, and the question of regional arms control measures.

137 Niels Möller-Gulland, "The Forum for Security Cooperation and Related Security Issues," in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993, pp. 31-60.

138 Jeanne Kirkpatrick quoted in *Le Figaro*, 8-9 January 1994.

139 Jean Klein, "Organisation de la défense, mais aussi prévention des conflits," in: *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1993.

context for the European integration movement. As a result, also today the Alliance and European construction cannot be maintained without each other:[140] NATO cannot become solely a transatlantic link reduced to a mere back-up for the WEU; it will also have to have a role as an intra-European institution. The transatlantic link has to remain a transatlantic partnership with mutual contributions to the security concerns of both sides of the Atlantic. Consequently, the Alliance will have to address new issues and undertake new missions to maintain its ability to support the ambitions of further European integration and, via these new tasks, will safeguard its own political momentum.

140 William H. Taft, "An American Perspective on New European Security Challenges," in Charles L. Barry (ed.), *The Search for Security in Europe*, Fort Lesley: NDU Press, 1994, p. 269.

9. The Puzzle of "Partnership": Cooperation or Competition?

Oleg Strekal

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was launched as a major step to improve NATO's cooperation with non-member states to the east in the political and military realms. The program appeared to be a fundamental amendment of the Alliance's security and military policies. In an address given to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders in Higher Education at the Department of State on 18 April 1994, Stephen A. Oxman, assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, stressed the two historic decisions taken at the Alliance's January Summit to further NATO's transformation: "First, NATO made clear that it welcomes and expects expansion of the Alliance as part of an evolutionary process. In addition, it beckoned its former Warsaw Pact adversaries and others to immediately join a "Partnership for Peace," so as to begin the practical process of enhancing security in Europe."[1] The process of transformation mentioned by Mr. Oxman is to lead to the fulfilment of NATO's task to focus more on crisis management and peace-keeping, while preserving its functions of defending NATO territory from attack.

I. NATO's Offer: Goals and Methods of Implementation

The Partnership for Peace was conceived as a response to several challenges facing the Atlantic Alliance in early 1994.[2] Growing Eastern European claims for membership in NATO forced the Alliance to take some kind of action that would, on the one hand, encourage the involvement of the Eastern states in European security affairs and, on the other hand, not provoke negative reactions from Moscow. The need to solve this dilemma led to the compromise decision to launch the Partnership program as a starting point for NATO's evolutionary enlargement.[3]

Another factor decisive for NATO to respond in the form of the PfP was the dimming prospect of democracy in Russia. In late 1993 and early 1994, the West started to question Russia's willingness and ability to develop in a way that would not endanger the democratic transformation in Eastern Europe and in Russia

1 See the full text of Mr. Oxman's address in: *USIS, Information Bulletin, Embassy of the United States of America*, Brussels, 28 April 1994, pp. 1-4.

2 For more details see: "Dokumente zur Sicherheitspolitik des Westens. Die Tagungen der Bündnisgremien im Herbst und Winter 1993/1994," in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 10 February 1994, pp. D99-D136.

3 Holger H. Mey, "New Members – New Mission. The Real Issues behind the New NATO Debate," in: *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, April-June 1994, pp. 223-229.

itself. Some Russian steps such as the intention to use Russian troops stationed in the countries of the former Soviet Union as peace-keepers or to legitimate the right of the Russian Federation to intervene in the countries of the "near abroad" to protect Russian-speaking minorities, as well as Russian warnings against NATO expansion, raised doubts on the country's role in European affairs.

Finally, NATO had to continue the process of adapting to the new security environment in Europe. The shift in NATO strategy from collective defense to crisis management reflected the need to elaborate appropriate means for the implementation of such a new task. There had also been a serious call for the strengthening of NATO's internal cohesion in dealing with these new missions. As the war in Bosnia demonstrated, the lack of common interests and common approaches among the allies concerning conflict prevention left NATO incapable of carrying out peace-making and peace-enforcing duties in "out of area" conflicts. Thus, the Alliance's failure in Bosnia endangered the whole NATO concept of crisis management and threw doubt upon the Atlantic Alliance's ability to serve as a pillar in the future European security architecture.[4]

The PfP initiative, which was first discussed by the allies in October 1993, first of all seemed to be the natural response of an Alliance in the process of redefining its role and major functions. The PfP Framework Document states that the major goal of the Partnership is to facilitate cooperation and common action in establishing stability and security in Europe on the basis of such shared fundamental values as "the protection of the fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy."[5]

As has been underlined by Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, however, "the Partnership will not alter NATO's core mission of defense of the alliance. Nor will it interfere with NATO's integrated command structure, decision-making mechanisms or mutual capabilities in vital areas such as crisis management, humanitarian relief and peace-keeping."[6] This remark reflects the allies' concern that the new program should not destroy the core function of collective defense.

PfP's second goal is promotion of NATO's expansion to the countries of the Eastern part of the continent. Successful expansion eastward is felt to be dependent on the emergence and effective growth of democratic states in the East, which are committed to the preservation of their societies from coercion and

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4 See also Charles Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best. Future Security Arrangements for Europe," in: *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1993, pp. 5-50.

5 "Partnership for Peace Framework Document," *NATO Press Service, Press Communiqué*, M-1 (94) 2, 10 January 1994, p. 1.

6 Warren Christopher, "A Partnership for Peace Open to Former Warsaw Pact Members," in: *The International Herald Tribune* (IHT), 10 January 1994, p. 8.

intimidation, and to the maintenance of international law.[7] They must also respect the basic obligations of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and other subsequent documents from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE).[8] One could therefore argue that the allies have been more interested in preserving their commitments to collective defense than in expanding eastward, especially when expansion could cause problems for the current members.

Common activities should be directed at the following objectives listed in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document:

- facilitating transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
- maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to operations – subject to constitutional considerations – under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;
- developing cooperative military relations with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen the ability to undertake missions in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed upon;
- developing, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The partner states were asked to provide NATO with documents outlining the steps to be taken to achieve the goals of Partnership. These documents were to serve as a background for working out individual Partnership Programs for common activities and exercises for each single state. Other administrative and organizational procedures which were agreed upon included the establishment of liaison offices at NATO Headquarters, the setting up of the Partnership Coordinating Cell at Mons (Belgium), the introduction of the principle of financial burdensharing of joint exercises, etc. In particular, it was decided that a fund would be established to cover the starting costs of the Partnership. Although participating countries were expected to pay into this fund in advance, NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner suggested "that NATO should if necessary help with re-equipment costs."[9] According to some estimates, NATO members will be asked to come up with about $38 million per year for five years to cover the costs of the PfP

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7 See also James P. MacCarthy, "Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe. New Opportunities for NATO," in: *Strategic Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 54-60.

8 "Partnerschaft für den Frieden: Konzept, Resonanz, Programm," in: *Info-Brief*/Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, No. 92, 1994, pp. 1-17.

9 Cited in: *The Guardian*, 11 January 1994, p. 2.

programs; it is also expected that the contributions from Eastern Europe and the CIS will be met by international financial institutions.[10]

The Atlantic Alliance took two further decisive steps in promoting the Partnership: it promised to open up access to "certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability" to those countries which are going to participate in common military planning and military exercises and to "consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security."[11] Yet these obligations are rather formal as they do not include a pledge for mutual assistance;[12] the principles of collective defense and collective response to aggression have not been brought into the Partnership program.

It should be noted that the main spheres of common activity in the framework of Partnership overlap with those of the Forum of Consultation of the Western European Union (WEU). Thus, during the first stage of PfP implementation, the very identity and role of the Partnership for Peace were vague. The success of the initiative seems to be dependent on three interlocking factors:

- NATO's ability both to concrete further and amend the PfP's key functions and spheres of common action;
- the extent to which the Partners can "self-determine" what kind of Partnership is needed;
- changes in the international environment which could postpone/speed up implementation of the program.

II. The Functions of "Partnership"

There are contrasting interpretations of PfP goals, based on different perceptions of the future European security architecture and the role of the Atlantic Alliance within it. The idea of NATO's enlargement has led to the assumption that the security system in Europe is going to be NATO-centered. Yet the main obstacle to NATO's eastward expansion has been the reluctance to enlarge collective defense commitments in the face of Moscow's resistance.

Letting the OSCE take the lead in security affairs on the continent would entail transforming NATO into the "armed hand" of the OSCE, thereby depriving it of its role as a genuine defense alliance. But preserving NATO as a defense alliance which guarantees the continuation of cooperation and confidence among its members could mean postponing the process of creating an all-European security

10 "NATO Infrastructure Ill-Prepared for Partnership for Peace," in: *International Defense Review*, No. 3, 1994, p. 7.

11 "Partnership for Peace" Framework Document, p. 3.

12 David White, "NATO's Unequal Partnership for Peace," in: *The Financial Times* (FT), 11 January 1994, p. 2.

system or, at least, establishing a system in which zones with different levels of stability as well as different organizational principles for enhancing security naturally co-exist.[13]

Whatever the outcome, the PfP initiative can definitely serve as an instrument for the further development of European security models. In this view, the functions of Partnership can be defined as follows:

- strengthening of the process of NATO expansion eastward by making clear that the prospects for Alliance membership are real;
- preparation of the candidates for the duties and burdens of NATO membership;
- development of intensive military cooperation between NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty members to enhance European security regardless of the question of NATO membership;
- creation of an early warning framework to allow NATO to react rapidly in cooperation with its PfP partners to any military threat from the East.

Strengthening the Process of NATO Expansion

The first point states that the PfP has to facilitate NATO expansion to the democratic states in the East,[14] being a signal that the door would stay open for a favored group of Eastern European countries to join the alliance."[15] In particular, the January 1994 Summit in Brussels attempted to reassure the governments of Eastern Europe that the PfP initiative is neither a political concession to Russia nor allows Moscow to veto NATO's decisions.

Consequently, the PfP should not be seen as an attempt to postpone discussions regarding NATO enlargement or to involve Eastern Europeans in some kind of cooperation with NATO that has almost nothing to do with their real security concerns. To the contrary "the Partnership for Peace (...) should be seen as establishment of a process we believe will and should lead to expansion of NATO, but in ways that are practical, through an evolutionary process, and do not imply division of East and West," said W. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser.[16]

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13 Reimund Seidelmann, "NATO, WEU oder KSZE? Zur Neuordnung der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur in den 90er Jahren," in: Christian Deubner (ed.), *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in einem neuen Europa*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991, pp. 209-223.

14 Zalmay M. Khalilzad, "Extending the Western Alliance to East Central Europe. A New Strategy for NATO," *RAND Issue Paper IP-107*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1993, pp. 1-6.

15 John Palmer, "NATO Leaders Defy Russia on Expansion," in: *The Guardian*, 11 January 1994.

16 Cited in Daniel Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Clinton Sends Salesman," in: *IHT*, 5 January 1994, p. 1.

Although the list of probable candidates for membership has not been established, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary appear to have the most real chances. "The Poles, Czechs and Hungarians are European peoples with fast developing democracies and a strong claim to membership," British Prime Minister Major stated at the Summit.[17]

Nevertheless, Western governments do not want to extend security guarantees rapidly to Eastern European countries because they do not believe that their vital interests are currently affected there.[18] The main concern of the allies has been that "prematurely allowing countries to become members would weaken the Alliance, a consequence that would not be in the interest of new members."[19]

Another reason why the problem of NATO expansion has not been solved lies in the differing positions among the Alliance members. While the United States and Germany appear to be interested in promoting the idea of gradual NATO enlargement, Great Britain and France (although the latter does not take part in the Alliance's full military structure) have opposed the early admission of new candidates out of fears that this would undermine the internal cohesion of the Alliance and weaken their influence. "While appearing to offer those countries of the former Warsaw Pact which were pressing to join NATO a path towards eventual membership, NATO tried to avoid offending Russians by refusing immediate membership to anyone. It also avoided alarming public opinion within the West by extending hard security commitments."[20]

Preparation of Candidates for Burdens and Duties

The Alliance is not going to accept new members at the expense of its military readiness or political cohesion. Thus, the second function of the Partnership assumes that by offering the PfP, NATO is testing the Eastern European countries' willingness to cooperate actively and to demonstrate their ability to strengthen NATO's collective defense in case they should become members of the Alliance. Thus, the PfP initiative has been interpreted as a possibility of preparing for the obligations of membership. The allies have emphasized that NATO must deal with any expansion carefully, considering its resources and strategic options. "NATO's decisions on membership will be based on the realistic assessment of the needs of

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17 Andrew Marshal, "Options Left Open on Expansion Timetable," in: *The Independent*, 11 January 1994.

18 Allen Lynch, "After Empire: Russia and Its Western Neighbours," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 12, 25 March 1994, p. 15.

19 Michiel de Weger, "Ten Misunderstandings about PfP," in: *The Wall Street Journal Europe* (WSJ), 24 May 1994.

20 *Strategic Survey 1993-1994*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, May 1994, p. 116.

trans-Atlantic security and on each candidate's ability – as demonstrated through the Partnership for Peace – to take on the mutual defense responsibilities of the member states."[21] British Prime Minister Major similarly stated that admission depended on the success of the preparation period.[22]

This testing of the new candidates for Alliance membership, concerning their political willingness to join the Atlantic Alliance, their respect for democracy and the ability of their militaries to develop new structures in accordance with Western standards, makes the PfP governments fully responsible for the success or failure of the membership enterprise. As a result, one cannot avoid but see a second purpose of the PfP which is "to help to prepare a short list of applicants for full membership," hoping that "the partners will sort themselves out."[23]

The Partnership for Peace initiative was also seen by its initiators as a means of accustoming other countries – especially Russia – to the idea of NATO's enlargement. While preparing NATO's enlargement in terms of the partners' readiness for fulfilling NATO responsibilities, the PfP "enables us to do so in a way that gives us the time to reach out to Russia and to those other nations of the former Soviet Union, which have been almost ignored through this entire debate."[24]

Development of Intensive Military Cooperation

The third function finally concentrates on the military field, especially defense planning, command, control and communications, and weapons and equipment compatibility. This sphere of activity would be the "monopoly" of the PfP – a field in which only the Partnership could provide leadership. Moreover, concentration on defense issues serves the basic interests of NATO as a defense alliance.

Still, many PfP-critics detect a lack of real military cooperation within the PfP framework, while the PfP is preoccupied with peace-keeping missions, which have little to do with real military tasks. "At the moment, Partnership represents a manoeuvre designed to engage every European country outside NATO in a weak military exchange focusing on the marginal at the expense of the critical."[25] These experts feel that the Partnership for Peace should instead be aimed primarily at achieving compatibility between NATO's and the partners' weapons systems and military planning principles through the modernization of weapons arsenals, the

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21 Warren Christopher, "A Partnership for Peace."

22 White, "NATO's Unequal Partnership for Peace."

23 David Valhalla, "Allies Prepared to Grow by Stages," in: *The Guardian*, 11 January 1994.

24 See the remarks by US President Clinton during the North Atlantic Council Summit, cited in *The Information Bulletin*, The White House, Office for the Press Secretary, 10 January 1994, p. 2.

25 US Senator Dick Lugar, cited by Stephen Rosenfeld, "Useful Questions About the Partnership for Peace," in: *IHT*, 4 July 1994.

adjustment of command and control systems, and the synchronization of defense planning. "Without clear steps in this direction, these countries will be unable to allocate their limited defense resources to bring them closer into line with Western force structures ..."[26]

Full compatibility of the partners' armed forces with those of NATO should, however, not be seen as a final goal of the Partnership or the major condition for the new candidates' entry. The significant point is not whether full compatibility can be achieved by the end of the century, but whether the process of achieving full NATO membership has become irreversible. Cohesion in military planning and force structuring between Eastern European militaries and NATO forces could be achieved through bilateral military ties outside of the Partnership framework. The security dilemmas in Eastern Europe could also be solved, moreover, by simply stationing NATO forces in some Eastern European countries:[27] this would underscore the seriousness of the Alliance's intention to expand the security guarantees further to the East. Both options, however, would lack the possibility to balance the different security interests of the region by means of a multilateral approach.

Yet discussion of these points revealed the controversies in the West over the real need for such cooperation. As the sources of future challenges in Europe are perceived as being of an economic, social and ethnic nature, some experts argue that the responses to these challenges must be developed through economic and political cooperation rather than through military cooperation. "A new trans-Atlantic cooperation should provide the dimension of political and economic dialogue and coordination so painfully missing from the Partnership for Peace initiative," writes David Howell, chairman of Britain's House of Commons Select Committee of Foreign Affairs.[28] Similarly, other experts and politicians have argued that the PfP should be redesigned to deal with political, economic, and social issues, as its preoccupation with peace-keeping and peace-making has little to do with real military tasks, and, therefore, dilutes the centrality of NATO as a military alliance for European security rather than reaffirming it.[29]

Creation of an Early Warning Framework

Finally, the fourth point suggests that the PfP is suited to serve as an "early warning system" against military threats from the East: using the PfP as a framework for

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26 Bruce George, "NATO Should Offer The East More Than Partnerships," in: *WSJ*, 15 December 1993.

27 Friedberg Pflüger, "Take PfP One Step Further," in: *WSJ*, 6 July 1994.

28 David Howell, "An Atlantic Alliance under Strain," in: *WSJ*, 4 May 1994, p. 9.

29 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, "Europe Needs a Strong NATO, Not Utopian Gimmick," in: *IHT*, 24 January 1994, p. 8.

military cooperation could make it capable of becoming a "protective shield" against any Russian expansionism.

The concept of a protective shield has been specifically discussed in the United States, the only country capable of balancing Russian influence in European and world affairs. Most American officials have seen the Partnership as a means of working out whether the new security arrangements in Europe should include Russia or whether it should be developed to restrain the possible aggressiveness of this country.[30] As the US under-secretary of state put it, "if reform in Russia falters, if new threats arise, NATO will be able to work through the Partnership to protect regional stability through closer ties – including NATO membership – with the active participants."[31]

In this regard, the military aspects of cooperation with NATO become of the utmost importance. US Secretary of Defense Les Aspen emphasized that the Partnership provides some protection: If a threat appears, NATO will come and see what to do. This gives the relationship concrete operational dimensions."[32] Mr. Aspen also added that these dimensions include early warning of a threat through the on-going security dialogue at the political and military levels.

The first official revision of the PfP process was carried out during the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Istanbul, Turkey in early June 1994. In the Council's Communiqué the establishment of the Partnership for Peace has additionally been characterized as a complementary element within the broader framework of Alliance reforms, which include further changes in NATO's political and military structures, cooperation with the developing European security and defense identity, preparations for accession of new members in the future and intensification of the Alliance's activities in the fields of arms control and counter-proliferation. The NACC reaffirmed the Alliance's commitments to enhancing European stability and security through cooperation and stressed the significance of the PfP initiative in this regard. Representatives of NATO countries also welcomed organizational achievements within the PfP (i.e. the establishment of the Coordination Cell at Mons and liaison offices at NATO Headquarters in Brussels).[33]

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30 Michael Mihalka, "Squaring the Circle: NATO's Offer to the East," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 12, 25 March 1994, pp. 8-9.

31 *Reuters*, 8 February 1994.

32 See the interview with Les Aspen, in: *IHT*, 10 January 1994.

33 See the Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul, in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 17, 1994, pp. D505-D508.

At first Central and Eastern European countries accepted NATO's offer reluctantly, as the PfP did not set any clear timetable for membership.[34] They nevertheless accepted the initiative as it was better than nothing and as plans for future membership of at least some countries were still on the agenda. They also seem to recognize that the West would like them to be not mere "consumers of security," but equal contributors in strengthening the stability on the continent. In the words of the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu, "We were convinced from the very start that to become an effective member of NATO implies some time and effort. You can not convert overnight from a Warsaw Pact member into a NATO one."[35]

The leaders of the Visegrad countries share the idea that the Partnership for Peace should spell out more firmly its final goal, that is, membership in the Alliance for those who meet the established criteria. Representatives of the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian governments have not accepted Western arguments that the expansion of NATO would provoke Russian aggressiveness and would draw another dividing line across Europe. On the contrary, Eastern Europeans believe that only their membership in NATO would eliminate any Russian temptation to fill the "security vacuum" in the Eastern part of the continent, especially if the expanded Alliance were to implement a cooperative strategy towards the Russian Federation.[36] To this end, their membership in NATO has to be combined with the creation of a pan-European security system, in which Russia should be a full member, while they perceive Russia's intention to join the Partnership as a step to control and influence other partners in the program.

Eastern Europeans also assessed the PfP program as a compromise between NATO and Russia, confirming Russia's ability to influence and even veto the principal decisions of the Alliance. This assessment was based on, first, Russian warnings that the expansion of NATO would be seen as a hostile step and, second, the Western response in the form of the Partnership for Peace, which delayed the admission of the new members to NATO. Thus, the leaders of the progressing democracies in Eastern Europe claimed that an evolutionary approach to NATO's enlargement would mean giving priority to Moscow over the Eastern European

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34 Sidney E. Dean, "Partnerschaft oder Beruhigungspille?," in: *Europäische Sicherheit*, Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1994, pp. 396-397.

35 Cited in David Total, "US Says Others in East Want to Join Partnership," in: *IHT*, 17 January 1994, p. 1.

36 For the detailed arguments on this issue see Craig R. Whiten, "Can US Persuade Eastern Europe to be Patient on NATO," in: *IHT*, 5 January 1994, p. 2.

capitals and would lead to recognition that Eastern Europe remains within the legitimate sphere of Russian influence.[37]

The members of the Atlantic Alliance undertook serious diplomatic efforts to persuade the Central and Eastern European states that the West as a whole and particularly NATO continue to be committed to the idea of securing Central and Eastern Europe. President Bill Clinton sent General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Madeleine K. Albright, the chief US delegate to the United Nations, to Central and Eastern Europe before the January 1994 Summit in Brussels. The goal of the American representatives' visit was, first, to moderate claims for immediate NATO membership and, second, to promote the idea that the Partnership for Peace was not intended to permanently exclude the East Europeans from NATO.[38]

Immediately after the Brussels meeting of the Atlantic Council, President Clinton himself visited Prague to confirm the West's intention to protect the Central and Eastern European democracies in case of an attack. "The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how," he said at the joint news conference with the leaders of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.[39] The Alliance's readiness to include the new members was also confirmed by German Defense Minister Volker Rühe.[40]

Despite the significant degree of dissatisfaction with the PfP initiative caused by the lack of security guarantees, the Central and Eastern European states started to implement the program quite actively. Romania became the first former Warsaw Pact state to sign the Partnership document with the Alliance on 26 January 1994, announcing that it was looking for full membership soon.[41] Within two months another eleven states from Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic), the Baltics (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia), and the CIS (Ukraine, Moldova) joined the Partnership for Peace.

For some of the partners the major political motive behind this step was the prospect of future full membership. For others, like Moldova, it was the PfP provisions for consultations with NATO in case of external threats to the country's security. Some of the new Partnership-states also perceived the initiative as a lever to counterbalance Russian attempts to obtain political privileges from NATO at the expense of the partners' interests.

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37 For more detailed discussion on this issue see Simon Tisdall, "E. Europe Offered no Protection against Russia," in: *The Guardian*, 3 January 1994, p. 4.

38 Daniel Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Clinton Sends Salesman," in: *IHT*, 5 January 1994, p. 1.

39 See the report on President Clinton's press conference, in: *IHT*, 13 January 1994, p. 1.

40 Bruce Clark, "Rühe Raises Polish Hopes over NATO," in: *FT*, 19 July 1994, p. 2.

41 *Reuters*, 27 January 1994.

During the Istanbul meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 10 June 1994, the foreign ministers and the representatives of NACC member countries reviewed the implementation of the PfP program and elaborated a joint position toward the NATO initiative. The meeting welcomed the establishment of the PfP and expressed full support for its basic principles. In order to facilitate links between the PfP and the NACC, the final statement called for the creation of the NACC Ad Hoc Group with the Political-Military Steering Committee on PfP. The Ad Hoc Group was supposed to coordinate the participation of NACC members in joint training and planning in the field of peace-keeping which is to be carried out within the PfP framework. It has been stressed that although the PfP is designed also to perform peace-keeping and defense-related activities that are similar to those under way in the NACC framework, the new NATO program will have greater importance since PfP cooperation is based on individual Partnership programs with the Alliance.[42]

Poland: Seeking NATO Membership

The case of Poland is unique for two reasons: First, this country has appeared to be the most active in expressing its claims for full NATO membership. As was stated in the country's Program Document for the Partnership for Peace, Poland is looking for full membership in the Alliance, and the Polish government considers the PfP as a step that will bring the country closer to this goal.[43] Second, Polish government officials were the first among their Eastern European counterparts to warn that Russia should not be isolated from the process of creating a new security system in Europe. As Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechovski stated during his official visit to Bonn in January 1994, "there could be no European security without the inclusion of a functioning democratic Russia. A democratic and strong Russia would be the strongest guarantee for peace and stability in Europe."[44] Other statements by Polish officials concerning the inclusion of Russia in the process of redesigning European security arrangements referred to the general goals of the Partnership, particularly stressing that another Berlin Wall further to the east must be avoided. Moreover, Polish officials tried to persuade other Central and East Europeans that NATO membership is not the end-point in creating a European security architecture.

A few months after the official presentation of the PfP, Poland appeared to be the most active NATO partner in the framework of the initiative. The Polish

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42 The Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul, p. 3.

43 See Polish Program Document, cited in Martin Lambeck, "Geheimpapier: Polen und die NATO," in: *Die Welt*, 19 May 1994, p. 2.

44 See the statement by A. Olechovski, in: *FT*, 4 January 1994, p. 2.

government was the first Eastern European government to give NATO its plans for developing military cooperation under the Partnership for Peace, primarily the improvement of military equipment, procedural compatibility and air-defense ties with NATO.[45] At the same time, the Polish government had persuaded "the Western powers to make up for the lack of explicit political guarantees within the Partnership with specific concessions on trade and economic cooperation."[46]

Although Poland appreciates the possibilities for direct military cooperation with NATO offered by the PfP, government officials also mention a second motive besides pure defense questions for desiring NATO membership. In the words of former Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "the key reason we want to be in NATO is to secure our own democracies. We need to keep down in our country the very kind of nationalists Yeltsin's contending with, the same kind that have destroyed Yugoslavia."[47]

Nevertheless, each of Poland's ten divisions has been asked to be prepared to send at least three teams to NATO's different flanks for training.[48] Poland has also been interested in obtaining NATO's authorization for the production of the "friend or foe" air defense systems compatible with those of the Alliance. This is only one aspect of the broad approach to increase the compatibility of Polish forces with those of NATO "in equipment, communication, command structure, training, strategy and tactics."[49] Poland also promised to create a 1,000 person force for peace-keeping missions.[50]

To facilitate military cooperation with all PfP partners and especially Poland, US President Bill Clinton asked Congress for $100 million for 1995, of which one fourth was supposed to go to Poland.[51] In July 1994 the US Senate approved the resolution concerning facilitation of transfers of surplus Western defense equipment to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in order to make their arsenals compatible with those of NATO.[52]

Poland has also been active in various military exercises with NATO forces. The Polish navy took part in the exercises near Travemünde in September 1994 and participated in the "Chinese eye" NATO manoeuvre one month later. A British Army unit held a first bilateral military exercise in Poland in May 1994 – the first

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45 *WSJ*, 26 April 1994, p. 3.

46 See the statement by Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak: "Poland 'More Secure' with Partnership," in: *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No. 9, 14 January 1994, p. 3.

47 Cited in Michael Kramer, "The Case for a Bigger NATO," in: *The Times*, 10 January 1994, p. 14.

48 Brooks Tinier, "NATO Hopefuls Map Strategy," in: *Defense News*, 21-22 March 1994, p. 5.

49 Elizabeth Pond, "Possibilities for Progress," in: *WSJ*, 10 March 1994, p. 4.

50 Pflüger, "Take PfP One Step Further."

51 George Graham, "Clinton Offers Poles Funds to Adapt to NATO," in: *FT*, 8 July 1994, p. 2.

52 Clark, "Rühe Raises Polish Hopes over NATO."

British military training operations in a former Warsaw Pact country.[53] As soon as Poland signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document, the United States invited it to join the NATO manoeuvres there.[54]

During their visit to Warsaw in early July 1994, both the US President and the Secretary of State reiterated to Polish officials that the existence of a powerful, democratic, and independent Poland remains a core interest of the United States and reassured the Poles that Russia would not be allowed to veto Polish membership in NATO. As for Polish participation in the PfP, it was characterized by American officials as a key element in shaping the security system on the continent.[55]

Some Polish officials are confident that NATO would defend their country in case of military aggression. For Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski namely stated that "there is an increased realization that the security of Central and Western Europe is interdependent. Western investment in Poland is already billions of dollars and it's growing every month. There are tens of thousands of Westerners here to be evacuated in a time of crisis. So today if there was a real threat ... certainly the West would have to be concerned."[56]

During his speech before the Polish parliament on 7 July 1994, President Bill Clinton especially applauded Poland's leading role in the PfP program, stressing that within two months the country would host the first Partnership military exercises. President Clinton reaffirmed that Poland will receive $25 million from the United States for implementation of the Partnership for Peace initiative. "We are working together with you, particularly through the PfP, because the United States believes that, when the enlargement of NATO takes place, democratic Poland will become a member of the Alliance."[57]

IV. The Russian Challenge

Russia was the twenty-first country to join the Partnership for Peace program. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signed the PfP agreement in Brussels on 22 June 1994, putting an end to more than six months of negotiations, which resulted in an additional declaration. Calling for an enhanced dialogue between

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53 Bruce Clark, "UK Troops to Exercise in Poland," in: *FT*, 16 May 1994, p. 2.

54 David Total, "US Proposes Poland to Host Joint NATO Manoeuvres," in: *IHT*, 8 January 1994, p. 1.

55 "Clinton in Warschau: Die Völker Europas müssen die Gewißheit haben, daß die Grenzen sicher sind," in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 July 1994, p. 2.

56 Cited in Frederich Chemise and Daniel Michaels, "Nervous Poland, Adrift in Geopolitical Sea, Reaches out to Russia," in: *WSJ*, 1 July 1994, p. 8.

57 See the speech of President Clinton before the Polish parliament, in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 17, 1994, pp. D521-D524.

the Atlantic Alliance and Russia, the latter was also recognized as a major European, international and nuclear power, which has a responsibility for security on the European continent and the weight to influence security in the international environment.

The ratification ceremony in Brussels reflected the mutual political concessions made by Russia and NATO: Russia emphasized that there would be no future significant obstacles in its cooperation with the West; the Alliance for its part agreed to develop a long-term cooperation with the Russian Federation outside the PfP framework and to treat the country as an equal partner. "NATO and Russia share a great responsibility for Europe's future," stated Alliance Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino.[58]

These concessions, however, only concealed fundamental problems in the relations between Russia and NATO, which were far from being solved by the PfP ratification. Disputes concerning a possible admittance of new members to the Atlantic Alliance had started in 1993. From the very beginning of the Partnership-idea, Russia had strongly opposed the NATO-accession of some Eastern European countries, arguing that such a step would directly endanger Russian national interests and undermine the position of President Yeltsin.[59]

Just before the Partnership for Peace initiative was officially presented at the NATO Summit, President Yeltsin's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov said that "an eastward enlargement of NATO would enrage the Russian military and oblige Moscow to contemplate creating its own political-military organization."[60] In February 1994, after the PfP initiative had been introduced, President Yeltsin told parliament in a State of the Nation address that expanding NATO while isolating Russia would pose a threat to Europe. "Russia is against widening NATO by admitting more countries of the European continent without Russia. This is the path towards new threats for Europe and the world."[61] To overcome these threats, Russia presented its own pan-European security plan involving security guarantees from both Russia and the West to the former members of the Soviet bloc. According to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, security cooperation in Europe should be concentrated primarily within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.[62]

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58 Cited in "Moscow and West Pledge Era of Trust," in: *The Guardian*, 23 June 1994, p. 2.

59 Only for a short period did it seem as if Russia had moderated its opposition. Russia seemed to have moderated its opposition to NATO's expansion when President Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa issued in late August 1993 a joint declaration stating that a decision to join NATO "taken by sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including Russia," ITAR-TASS, 25 May 1993.

60 "Moscow Warns against Widening NATO," in: *FT*, 7 January 1994, p. 1.

61 *Reuters*, 24 February 1994.

62 *WSJ*, 24 February 1994.

Russian government officials' perceptions of any NATO expansion as a security threat to the Russian Federation gave rise to general Russian suspicions concerning the PfP program. Russia attempted the following approaches in dealing with the NATO initiative:

- Demands of a special status:

When the Russian government decided to join the Partnership for Peace in early March 1994, it simultaneously asked for a special status. The main goal of this concept was to establish Russia as a world superpower and to demonstrate that the interests of this powerful state cannot be ignored. According to NATO assessments of the Russian request, Russia therefore has a specific interest in the spheres that are not covered by the PfP, that is, special political consultations on major Alliance decisions within a "16 + 1" formula.[63] As the Alliance rebuffed the Russian demands for special status within the Partnership, stressing that the PfP program was based on the principle of equality among all partners, Russia delayed signing the Partnership agreement at the end of March 1994.[64]

A second delay occurred in mid-April due to NATO's unilateral military action in Bosnia. Russian officials complained that they had not been consulted before the Alliance's air strikes on the positions of the Bosnian Serbs. As a result, Russia reaffirmed its position and asked NATO to work out an additional agreement "that will exclude unilateral actions, particularly military ones, in areas where we (Russia and NATO) clearly have to cooperate."[65]

Again the idea of a special status was reiterated when Russia tried to link the signing of the PfP with the acceptance of Moscow as an equal partner in the Group of Seven (G-7) in April 1994. "If they invite us to be the partners in the political and military spheres on equal terms with the leading countries of the world, it would be logical to foresee that the same approach apply to economics," said President Yeltsin's press secretary Kostikov at a press conference in the Kremlin.[66]

- NATO as a "Military Arm" of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):

The main principles of the Russian concept for European security were illustrated by President Yeltsin during his visit to Germany at the beginning of May 1994. Mr. Yeltsin suggested that the CSCE could serve as an umbrella institution under which the activities of NATO, the WEU, and the European Union (EU) should be coordinated. Zones of greater and lesser security in Europe should not be

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63 *The Atlantic News*, No. 2607, 18 March 1994, p. 1.

64 This delay was also spurred by a strong opposition in the Russian parliament which described the program as an American effort to interfere in traditionally Russian spheres of influence.

65 Statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev cited in Helena Womack, "Russians Prepare to Make NATO Pay," in: *The Independent*, 18 April 1994, p. 3.

66 "Russia Seeks to Tie NATO Partnership to Joining the G-7," in: *IHT*, 9-10 April 1994, p. 1.

accepted since "a new united Europe cannot be an exclusive club for the chosen. Equally, the solution of the security problems cannot be a privilege for the chosen."[67]

This Russian pan-European security concept was presented again more specifically, when Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev visited Brussels on 24-25 May 1994 to discuss the problem of Russia's participation in the PfP initiative at NATO Headquarters.[68] Upon this arrival, Grachev told his NATO counterparts that Russia would join the PfP without any conditions. But, he underlined, the PfP "is not a comprehensive answer to the realities of this new period, just a first step to strategic security. ... Russia is interested in broader cooperation than PfP, the cooperation that is equal to its weight."[69] In his view, such a broader consultative mechanism with NATO should include issues like disarmament, conversion of military industry, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or international terrorism. General Grachev criticized the PfP for being concentrated primarily on military activities, while real cooperation should serve a whole spectrum of interests involving vital issues in the political, economic and social realms.[70] From the Russian point of view, a new collective security system in Europe therefore should be based on the following principles:

- creation of a Eurasian security system in which the CSCE, rather than NATO, plays a leading role;
- subordination of all security institutions, including NATO, the WEU, and the CIS, to the CSCE;
- delegation of political and diplomatic leadership to the CSCE, and delegation of military leadership to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.
- establishment of a consultation mechanism between Russia and NATO "on the whole range of European and world security issues."[71]

General Grachev therefore also stressed the need to continue the process of consolidating the CIS states, including a military integration of the former Soviet

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67 Cited in Steve Crawshaw, "Yeltsin Calls for Blanket Security for All Europe," in: *The Independent*, 12 May 1994, p. 1.

68 A week before Grachev's visit to Belgium, NATO ambassadors agreed that they could promise Russia some kind of dialogue that would reflect Russia's importance for European security. Such a dialogue, however, could only be developed in addition to the Partnership for Peace, not instead of it. The NATO ambassadors also stressed that Russia would not have a veto right in Alliance decision-making nor the right to define the fate of the Eastern European states unilaterally.

69 Cited in Marc Rogers, "NATO Unsure Despite 'No Conditions' Claim," in: *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 4 June 1994.

70 "Ansprache des russischen Verteidigungsministers, Pavel Gratschow, am 25. Mai 1994," in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 17, 1994, pp. D500-D502.

71 Bruce Clark, "Old Enemies Make Tricky Friends," in: *FT*, 9 June 1994, p. 7.

republics, which was characterized as a vital step for the stability of Europe as a whole.[72]

- Special bilateral relations between Russia and NATO:

NATO foreign affairs ministers did not accept the Russian plan for major institutional changes in Europe, especially the idea of subordinating the Alliance to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). Alliance officials confirmed in particular that NATO's relations with Eastern European countries would continue to be developed without any kind of Russian veto. They regarded a NATO-Russian cooperation within the PfP framework to be fully compatible with the process of Alliance enlargement.[73]

Though representatives of NATO countries thus responded negatively to these Russian ideas, at the NACC meeting in Istanbul the foreign ministers of NATO countries stated that they wanted the Alliance to have broader relations with Russia, given its weight and role in international relations. "Russia will remain the most powerful nation in Europe; its active participation in building a new security architecture in Europe is vital," NATO Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino told NACC meeting participants.[74] Russia insisted that it is looking for a strategic Partnership with NATO, which should include all security issues, not only the military aspect emphasized by the PfP.

This compromise between Russia and NATO caused major concern in Eastern Europe, where governments worried that the Alliance's close cooperation with Russia outside the PfP framework would marginalize the role of the smaller states of the region. In addition, while Russia accepted an equal footing with other partners within the Partnership for Peace program, it did not give up its demands for special powers within the CIS. These Russian claims caused complaints from some of the former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine and Moldova, which had already joined the PfP.

In December 1994, immediately after President Clinton's announcement of a new American initiative setting a more precise schedule for future Eastern and Central European membership in NATO, the Russian foreign minister refused to sign the document on cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO within the PfP framework. Almost simultaneously the bloodshed in Chechnya began. Attacks by government troops against the civilian population in this Caucasian republic caught the awareness of the international community. This

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72 Although the collective security system within the CIS, predicated on the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, is not to be confrontational towards European security, General Grachev did not exclude the possibility of the emergence of a military bloc based on the CIS, in: *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 49, No. 17, 1994, p. D503.

72 *Atlantic News*, 11 June 1994.

74 *FT*, 10 June 1994.

threw doubts on the ability of the Russian leadership to lead the Russian Federation toward democratic goals in domestic as well as international affairs.

Thus the PfP ratification process predominantly demonstrated the problems still remaining in the NATO-Russian relationship. On the one hand, the Alliance rejected both Russia's designs to influence the NATO decision-making process as well as Russian suggestions for a new security architecture in Europe, according to which NATO should be subordinated to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Russia, on the other hand, though it did not officially withdraw its demand for legitimization of its peace-keeping status in the "near abroad" by the United Nations and the OSCE, started to act unilaterally.

V. The Broader Context

The Partnership for Peace program and the East-West cooperation pursued within it should also be analyzed in the broader framework, which includes the different forms of political, economic, and military integration of Eastern European countries into the Western community of states.

The overall strategy of Western expansion to the East has been carried out along several main lines. First, Western European states and institutions have pressed Eastern European countries to solve their security problems and to diminish existing tensions before becoming full members of Western institutions. This approach reflects the common Western concern that the new members could – if incorporated into the Western system prematurely – bring their old conflicts and disputes with them, overburdening the West and negatively influencing cohesion among Western countries and institutions. Second, in offering membership to candidates from the East, Western institutions have established a selection process for candidates, testing their ability to become equal economic partners to Western countries contributing to the political and economic stability and welfare of the West. Third, in the military dimension Western actors want to make sure that the armed forces of new eastern members of Western institutions (especially NATO and WEU) are capable of fulfilling the obligations of collective defense. Moreover, military cooperation with Eastern European states is supposed to serve as a framework for monitoring military developments in the region and as an instrument facilitating the elaboration of adequate Western responses to military-related challenges from the Eastern part of the continent.

Despite these integrationist efforts, the West appears to be ill-prepared to extend its sphere of responsibilities eastward beyond certain geographic limits and to propose comprehensive security arrangements to cover the whole continent. Western Europe was supposed to export security and stability to other European countries through involvement of Eastern European states in all-European

institutions, primarily the EU and NATO. In their joint article, "Welcome to our Eastern cousins," German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd underlined that there are three fundamental reasons for this expansion of the EU and NATO: security, prosperity and shared values. The British and German foreign ministers stressed that the security guarantees the Eastern Europeans were looking for "must grow out of a sense of shared values, common interests and a common destiny."[75] And yet, the regionalization of European security seems to be the reverse side of Western integration.

Where, then, does the PfP initiative fit into the framework of the Western expansion to the East, given the dimensions of the integration policy mentioned above? Apparently, the PfP represents a unique attempt to launch military cooperation between the former adversaries, allowing Western Europe to respond rapidly to any military troubles in the region and to guarantee US involvement in the process. The activities within the Partnership for Peace appear to be complementary to both NATO and the WEU, adding new elements of military cooperation, especially in defense planning, combat training and weapons systems compatibility to the political-military initiatives set up by these institutions.

NATO's obligation to consult with every PfP participant on security matters provides the Atlantic Alliance with an instrument for direct involvement in conflict prevention and for appropriate adaptation of the Alliance's policy and forces to the emerging challenges.[76] The PfP also gives NATO a chance to coordinate military reforms in Central and Eastern Europe by heightening the efficiency of the partners' individual programs and by furthering the cooperation between the partners' militaries.

Yet development of the PfP program has once again signalled to NATO that, in any future European security system, military ties to the East should be associated with efforts aimed at restructuring the economies and creating democratic political institutions and civil societies in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. This high-

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75 *The Times*, 26 April 1994.

76 Some experts argue in this regard that the major advantage of the PfP is the possibility for partners to consult with NATO unilaterally, on the basis of the "16 + 1" formula, avoiding the larger consultative fora (i.e. NACC or the OSCE). "This ability to consult unilaterally with the Alliance, in itself, underscores NATO's concern for the security of the specific partner. Moreover, as partners develop a deeper relationship with NATO through their individual programs, they will become ever more entwined with Alliance affairs." (William Johnsen/ Thomas-Durell Young, *Partnership for Peace: Discerning Fact from Fiction*, paper published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College [Carlisle Barracks, PA], 15 August 1994, p. 13.) The need in some sensitive cases to limit the overall consultative approach to bilateral relationships represents a serious dilemma for the European security system, which will be based on the principle of *collective security*. That kind of unilateralism could postpone the development of transparency in relations among Eastern European states and could lead to – instead of collective security – *arbitrational security*, in which a third party, *a judge*, is always needed to solve a dispute.

lights the need to combine all dimensions of East-West cooperation (political, economic, military, societal, etc.) into one comprehensive integrated approach. As German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has pointed out, the Partnership for Peace has to help East European countries integrate into the European Union as well as the Atlantic Alliance.[77]

For NATO itself, however, the Partnership for Peace has demonstrated the lack of political cohesion among the allies regarding the way in which the Alliance should expand to the East. While the need of a comprehensive approach of all security institutions is well accepted, the member states' differing positions on the question have only triggered a process of negotiations among the allies aimed at reaching consensus on the expansion, but hardly any agreement on the cooperative strategy that should be adopted toward the East.

VI. Inclusiveness and/or Selectivity?

The PfP initiative has been characterized by many Eastern European governments as a first step toward the creation of a pan-European security system. The Partnership should also facilitate NATO's adaptation to the changing security environment, where the Alliance could serve as a basic element of a common, European security structure.

At the same time, however, the PfP – taken as a gateway to NATO membership – provokes competition among Eastern European and CIS countries concerning an early NATO integration, thus contributing to the emergence of a two-centered European security structure, with NATO and the CIS as its major pillars. Within this framework, even broader competition between the two "security camps" would be likely to develop. This means that the PfP above all has to serve as a "communication bridge" for harmonizing military developments within and between the two security blocs.

The role that the PfP is going to play in the future of European security therefore seems to depend on the development of the two competing principles of the Partnership's purpose. The first principle can be defined as *inclusiveness*, since the PfP initiative intends to include all countries willing to cooperate with NATO without establishing new dividing lines in Europe. Thus, the Partnership program can be considered the best confirmation of the fact that European security can be achieved only through the common efforts of all European states, while NATO has to prove that it is no longer a closed club.

The second major principle may be called *selectivity*, because the Partnership has been created as a venue for membership of only a few countries via self-selection among the participants in terms of their readiness to cooperate with

77 "Kohl Extols Merits of Partnership Pact," in: *IHT*, 14 January 1994, p. 1.

NATO. This is stressed in the PfP Framework Document, which states that the success or failure of cooperation with NATO depends primarily on the willingness of the countries' governments to collaborate with the Alliance, as well as by the PfP's bilateral ties between the Atlantic Alliance and each participant. Both points tend to prevent real transparency and cooperation among the Eastern European states.

The relationship between these two core principles of PfP functioning will be decisive for achievement of the program's goal, by either encouraging cooperation or provoking competition among the partners. Although NATO has meant to forestall the "renationalization" of defense policies, likewise "the slow approach toward expansion eastward and the failure rapidly to integrate Eastern European states into the NATO collective security system could leave some of these countries little choice other than to nationalize their defense structures ..."[78]

As became clear in mid-1994, the combination of the principles of inclusiveness and selectivity accentuates the heterogeneity within the sphere of PfP activities. Different regional structures have emerged within the PfP, comprising groups of states with non-compatible goals regarding participation in the program like the European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden), the Visegrad states, which have the most concrete chances for NATO membership, and the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Implementation of the Partnership for Peace seems to deepen the gap at least between the last two groups, offering prospects for membership to one, yet promising next to nothing to the other. For example, while cooperation between NATO and Poland concentrates on the development of full military compatibility, the proposal made to CIS states merely aims at a possible collaboration in peace-keeping exercises. This approach reflects predominantly NATO's concerns with Russia's reaction to the prospect of the integration of new members into the Alliance and with the NATO-Moscow strategic partnership. Thus acknowledging Russia's leading role in international affairs, the Atlantic Alliance has indirectly recognized Russia's claims on a zone of specific interests in the CIS, with the "strategic partners" sharing common responsibilities for the fate of Europe by enhancing stability in their regions.

In this regard, Russian policy in its "near abroad" becomes important, as does the Alliance's attitudes toward Russian behavior in the FSU region. Although NATO has not given Russia any special right to intervene in peace-keeping operations on the territories of PfP participants, the Alliance has not opposed Russian attempts to create a collective security system on the basis of the CIS Tashkent Collective Security Treaty. Lacking the political will and appropriate

78 *Ibid.*

resources to face future instability on FSU territory, NATO has made Russia *de facto* responsible for developments in the CIS.

For its part, Russia has already proposed setting up a CIS military structure similar to NATO on the territory of the former Soviet Union. As President Yeltsin put it, "no one and nothing can relieve Russia of its political and moral responsibility for the fate of the countries and peoples which for centuries went together with the Russian state."[79] In accordance with this Russian concept for a leading role within the CIS, the representatives of the Staff for the Coordination of Military Cooperation within the Commonwealth came up with a scenario for military/political-military union, including the creation of common defense forces. The supreme political institutions of such a union would be the Council for Collective Security, the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Council of Defense Ministers. Following this scheme, Russia is supposed to bring the former Soviet republics into a completely new security organization.[80]

As a result, the implementation process of the Partnership for Peace program reflects the creation of two security groupings in Europe. While the European Union and NATO gradually incorporate Eastern Europe, Russia will try to form a cluster of CIS states around itself. Within this process the PfP has caused competition among the East European states for entry into NATO and has facilitated division within the CIS over affiliation with one or the other security groupings.

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79 See President Yeltsin's speech to the annual Kremlin gathering of graduates of military academies, cited in David Hears, "Yeltsin Supports Security Plan," in: *The Guardian*, 29 June 1994, p. 3.

80 "Being Alone, Nobody Could Build the Defense," in: *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6 July 1994, p. 3.

10. The EU and the Stabilization of the CEEC: Evolving Political Relations and Economic Agreements

Roxana Iorga

I. Introduction

The collapse of the totalitarian communist systems in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union generated enthusiasm and hope, both in the East and the West. Yet the changes also generated a wide range of new risks capable of endangering European security: economic crises leading to social revolt and political destabilization; increased interstate tensions ensuing from ethnic issues; and, disintegration of federal states, as in the case of Yugoslavia.[1] As a result, the dialogue between the European Community/Union and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) has been expanded to cover not only economic and political issues but also security problems, all in context of the CEEC's aspiration to be included in the Western security system.

This chapter analyzes the evolution of relations between the European Union (EU) and CEEC, mainly from a political perspective, although security aspects are not totally excluded. The analysis focuses on the six Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) which currently seem to be furthest along the road to democratization and a market economy and have the closest relations with the EU. Reference to Russia will be made only where specifically relevant.

The first part of the paper touches on economic developments between the EC/EU and CEEC and the use of economic instruments for political aims, outlining both the negative and positive aspects of EC/EU policy. The second part analyzes developments in the political dialogue from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty through the Europe Agreements to the Copenhagen European Council. It also assesses the impact of the EU enlargement to three EFTA countries and, finally, examines EU security policy towards the CEEC, including the Balladur plan and the WEU position regarding relations between the EU and CEEC. This is followed by a section presenting CEEC perceptions on the effectiveness of EU offers and the implications for future EU and CEEC relations with Russia. The concluding remarks offer various scenarios for the potential evolution of EU-CEEC relations.

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1 Falk Bomsdorf et al., *Confronting Insecurity in Eastern Europe: Challenges for the European Community*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Chatham House, December 1992, p. 81.

Until 1989, the CEEC had much stronger economic reasons to tighten their relations with the EC than vice-versa. There was a significant need for trade concessions, especially since agricultural produce was excluded from the EC market by the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the CEEC technology had fallen behind the standards of the West. But any attempts by individual CEEC states to take up economic contacts with the EC before 1989 had been blocked by Moscow, which was interested in institutionalizing a EC-relationship with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). At the same time, the EC had a number of reasons for caution about establishing formal links with the CMEA: (i) it did not want to support Soviet domination over East European countries by legitimizing the CMEA; (ii) international agreements signed by the CMEA were not automatically binding for its member states; (iii) comprehensive EC-CMEA relations would have produced complications as CMEA trade was not subject to market forces, but governed by centrally established and controlled plans.

The coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev signalled a new era in the Soviet Union's relations with Western Europe. In addition, the process of economic reforms and democratization which started in Poland and Hungary in the late eighties represented a strong political incentive[2] for the EC to cultivate, and possibly expand, its relations with these countries in the hope of luring them out of the Soviet orbit – a policy that had been adopted towards Romania in the seventies. A Joint Declaration on Mutual Recognition was signed by the COMECON and the European Communities in 1988,[3] and was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations with the EC by all European members of the CMEA (including the USSR).

After 1989, the EC reacted to the changes in the East by gradually offering more concrete responses to CEEC demands. These were aimed at increasing the attractiveness of certain political choices (i.e., introduction of a democratic system) through the use of economic instruments, the only ones able to promote domestic stability. The EC initially responded with an assortment of low-key actions rather than a well-developed and coherent strategy. With time, the Twelve developed two approaches towards the CEEC: one concentrating on various forms of aid (food, financial aid and training assistance);[4] and another emphasizing the establishment

2 Concerning the effectiveness of incentives see Gabriel Munuera, *Preventing Armed Conflict in Europe: Lessons from Recent Experience*, Chaillot Papers, No. 15/16, June 1994, p. 85.

3 Keesing's Record of World Events 1988, Vol. XXIV, London: Longman Group (UK) 1989, p. 36003, paragraph 25.

4 On food aid, see the Polish case, described in Werner Ungerer, "The Development of the EC and its Relationship to Central and Eastern Europe," in: *Aussenpolitik*, III/1990, pp. 225-236;

of a longer-term trade regime, while economic and political cooperation measures were added later.[5] Thus, economic relations between the EC and the CEEC gradually evolved from a simple aid policy to an extensive and institutionalized cooperation. Aid continued through the G-24 framework, however, with the Community providing not only guidance and coordination but also the lion's share of funding.

The first step in the latter approach was the creation of the "Pologne, Hongrie: activité pour la restructuration économique" (PHARE) program and the coordination of international support by the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Both were aimed at facilitating the East European countries' gradual entry into the market system; consolidating the democratic structures in those countries; and avoiding the "renationalization" of their economies by supporting the development of inter-regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. These policies, which were gradually extended to all Eastern European countries, however, were limited in their scope and timeframe.[6]

The long-term aim of the EC was obviously to establish enduring ties with the post-communist countries in the field of trade and economic cooperation. In the initial phase of this process, however, the EC's behavior more closely followed the "standard procedure" adopted towards countries with which new relations had been established, than a special policy taking into consideration the radical political and economic changes in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe.[7] Nevertheless, the "first generation" trade and cooperation agreements were considered an innovative step in relations between the EU and the CEEC.[8] They regulated trade between the Community and individual CEEC on the principle of reciprocity with respect to market liberalization and lifted specific quantitative restrictions on imports from the CEEC. Above all, the agreements implied that the EC no longer regarded its Eastern neighbors as only commercial partners. In fact, the principle of "political conditionality" was introduced into EC relations with the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

However, the agreements were considered inadequate in meeting the political challenges of the new situation. The Community therefore continued its assess-

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Concerning financial assistance, see, for example, the EC policy on aid to former communist states discussed in Brussels on 29 March 1994, in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, 30 April 1994.

5 Heinz Kramer, "The EC's Response to the 'New Eastern Europe'," in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 1993, pp. 213-245; John Pinder, "1992 and Beyond: The European Community and Eastern Europe," in: *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, 1990, pp. 175-176.

6 Ungerer, "The Development of the EC," pp. 225-236.

7 Kramer, "The EC's Response," pp. 213-245.

8 Eight bilateral agreements were concluded between September 1988 and March 1991, including one with the Soviet Union. In 1992, similar agreements were concluded with the Baltic republics, Slovenia and Albania. All agreements have a common format.

ment of the most appropriate forms of association with the Eastern countries pursuing the path of economic and political reform,[9] and prepared a "second generation" of contractual relations.

The new association agreements, called "Europe Agreements,"[10] have become the foundation of an orderly and long-term relationship between the EC/EU and the states of Eastern Europe. Drawn up along the same lines as the first generation of agreements, the Europe Agreements provide for: (i) a free trade area for "non-sensitive" products to be established within ten years; (ii) special arrangements, such as an asymmetrical opening of Western and Eastern markets, which implies a slower pace for import liberalization in Eastern European countries; (iii) extension of the scope of the Agreements to include trade in services, the flow of capital, and economic, political, scientific, environmental and cultural cooperation; and (iv) recognition of the CEEC's aspiration to become full members of the EC/EU.

Unlike the aid measures established in the PHARE and G-24 frameworks, the economic and political conditionality of the Europe Agreements calls not only for a firm commitment to reform but also for concrete steps towards the gradual development of a market system compatible with that of the EU.[11] Thus the Europe Agreements were designed to be asymmetrically in favor of the CEEC: the latter would grow by exporting to the EC/EU and the EC/EU would wait for at least ten years to enjoy duty-free access to Central and Eastern Europe.

It can be argued that the political significance of the Agreements is greater than their economic value. Since access to EU markets of the CEEC's most competitive products (which are also "sensitive" in the framework of internal EU trade) is still restricted, the short-term prospects for West-East European trade are not very encouraging. Further economic restrictions should, however, be lifted by 1997.

EC/EU initiatives have been aimed at making it the leading external political actor supporting economic transformation in the CEEC. But there are those in the West who think that the EC/EU should not become directly involved in the CEEC's internal and international policy choices, and that its policies should maintain the "aseptic" nature of economic policies.[12]

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9 The Strasbourg European Council, 8-9 December 1989.

10 The legal basis for these agreements is Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, which allows the Community to reach agreements with a third party State or an International Organization to create an association characterized by mutual rights and duties, by common action and particular procedures.

11 The Copenhagen European Council proposed accelerated and new actions in priority fields (approximation of law, market access, financial assistance) under the heading of Cooperation with the "Associated Countries Geared to the Objective of Membership." See *Europe Documents*, No. 1844/45, 24 June 1993, pp. 11-12.

12 The positive use of economic instruments, calling for careful financial planning and, above all, the mobilization of additional resources, should prevent the emergence of new problems and conflicts. It is essential that Europe avoids rechannelling to the East the (already scarce and

1. The Evolution of Political Dialogue

The Maastricht Treaty (9-10 December 1991). The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which established the contractual basis for Europe's political unification, is bound to orient the CEEC's process of integration into the EU.[13]

In this sense, the inclusion of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of procedures for "common positions" and "joint actions" in those areas "in which the Member States have important interests in common"[14] can be considered as one important step. Furthermore, during the negotiations on Political Union and on Economic and Monetary Union, Germany indicated that "political and economic relations and cooperation with the CEEC" was to be considered a priority area for CFSP.[15] These steps have raised expectations that political considerations will eventually overcome the economic obstacles for integration into the EU. As a result, from the signing of the Treaty to the current period, the EU has taken several steps to forge political links with CEEC.

Lisbon European Council (26-27 June 1992). The report on the likely development of the CFSP approved by the European Council in Lisbon reaffirmed the commitments made in Maastricht. More precisely than before, the Twelve planned to intensify their political dialogue and economic cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe "in order to prepare them to join the Union later, as they hope to do."[16] The following areas were identified in the report as being of interest to the EU for the implementation of joint actions:

- Central and Eastern Europe (Russia and the former Soviet Republics; other countries in Central and Eastern Europe including the Balkans; former Yugoslavia);
- Maghreb and the Middle East.

Also set down in the report was the EU's preference to, "fully support the processes aimed at consolidating democratic institutions in the CEEC, thereby guaranteeing the rule of law and respect for human rights." This report appeared

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declining) resources originally allocated to developing countries. Gianni Bonvicini/Stefano Silvestri, "The New Arc of Crisis and the EC," in: *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1992, pp. 31-45. At the same time, the CEEC's development depends not only on EC/EU backing through improved market access or economic, technical and financial support, but also on the implementation of reforms.

13 Mathias Jopp, "The Strategic Implications of the European Integration," in: *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Reports*, No. 35, October 1994.

14 *Maastricht Treaty*, J.1.3.

15 See *Europe Documents*, No. 1738, 17 October 1991.

16 Lisbon European Council: Desire to Ratify Maastricht, Enlargement, Yugoslavia, Foreign and Security Policy, in: *Atlantic News*, No. 2438, 30 June 1992.

bold and timid at the same time: bold when asserting the leading responsibilities of the EU, timid when specifying the necessary commitments. Some argue that it has generated more expectations than responses.[17]

The Europe Agreements. The Europe Agreements (EA) are to provide an appropriate framework for bilateral political dialogue between parties, explicitly extended beyond the subject of economic association. This is to be carried out first through permanent consultations between the presidents of the Council, the EU Commission and the associated countries and, second, through political dialogue within the Parliamentary Committee for Association. Thus, the new democracies in Europe are gradually being made more familiar with the foreign policy cooperation of EC member states on issues of common interest within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC).

The preamble of the agreements states that they are supposed to provide a framework for the gradual integration of East European countries into the Community if these countries fulfil the "necessary conditions." The latter are set down in the EC Treaties as:

- the capacity to assume the obligations of membership (the *acquis communautaire*);
- the stability of institutions in the country concerned, guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights;
- the existence of a functioning market economy;
- the candidate's capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.[18]

Political dialogue within the Association Council (a body containing representatives of the EU, the EU Commission and government members from the partner countries),[19] however, has not been extended to all the countries and was initially limited in scope by the sluggishness of the process. Moreover, the political dialogue is often regarded by candidate countries as more of a one-way information channel than a real forum for consultation. For their part, EU member states are somewhat surprised by the passivity or reluctance of CEEC to use fully the new diplomatic and intergovernmental instruments created for the preparatory phase of their accession to the Union.

Copenhagen European Council (21-22 June 1993). The European Council in Copenhagen decided to adopt an extensive system of multilateral political consultations with the CEEC aimed at preparing their future EU membership. Thus, as

17 Bomsdorf et al., *Confronting Insecurity in Eastern Europe*, p. 87.

18 *Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, Report by the Commission to the European Council, Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, p. 3. The EU should also be able to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of its integration.

19 The Association Council has the power to take and implement decisions on current problems and to settle disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the agreements.

associated countries, the CEEC will enter into a "structured relationship with the Institutions of the Union," characterized by: (i) regular meetings between the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission, and their counterparts in the associated countries, (ii) meetings of all the Heads of State and Government to discuss specific predetermined issues, (iii) meetings with the Troika.[20]

Consequently, the decisions taken by the European Council were intended not only to establish a simple, preferential relationship between the EU and the CEEC, but also to facilitate the CEEC's convergence towards the EU. Yet the different stages of political and economic development of the CEEC are destined to create problems in shaping the multilateral dialogue. These differences are likely to become even deeper and to influence national policy-making.

The December 1993 Hurd and Andreatta Initiative. The initiative by British and Italian foreign ministers, Douglas Hurd and Beniamino Andreatta, was intended to develop concrete links between the Eastern associates and two of the intergovernmental pillars of Maastricht: CFSP and Justice/Home Affairs. The idea behind the initiative was to intensify regionalism within the political dialogue rather than strengthen bilateral ties between individual CEEC and the EU, as was the wish of many Central and Eastern European countries.[21] It provided for separate meetings on CFSP issues[22] and increased the number of meetings between EU and CEEC political representatives, making it possible for CEEC to be associated to EU positions and common actions related to CFSP. The CEEC could not, however, participate in the decision-making process, which remained an exclusive EU prerogative.[23]

Essen European Council (9-10 December 1994). Central and Eastern Europe became the key issue of this summit. Though not giving a timetable for entry, the Council: (i) drew up a work program to prepare the East for the EU single market (especially concerning the harmonization of laws); (ii) stepped up financial aid; and (iii) admitted Eastern states to regular ministerial meetings. It was agreed that substantive talks on extension eastwards would have to wait until after the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference, at which the EU's institutional framework is to be reviewed. The possibility of an accession *en bloc* was specifically ruled out and it was stressed that membership negotiations would be carried out on a case by case basis. Aware of the fact that enlargement made reform of regional and agricultural

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20 See European Council of Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, *Europe Documents*, No. 1844/45, 24 June 1993.

21 Joint UK/Italian letter on EU relations with Central and Eastern Europe, 17 December 1993. See also Andrea Bonanni Andreatta/Hurd: "I sei Paesi dell'Est nell'Unione Europea," in: *Corriere della Sera*, 21 December 1993.

22 Jopp, "The Strategic Implications of European Integration."

23 Giancarlo Chevallard, "La sfida dell'integrazione: le relazioni tra i paesi centro-europei e l'Unione Europea," in: *IAI Documents*, No. 9402, 21 June 1994.

policies essential, the summit participants endorsed a modest aid and advisory program for aspirant-countries and asked the Commission to prepare a study dealing with the impact of further enlargement on the agricultural budget.

2. Democratic Stabilization via Conditionality and Membership

The EC/EU's policy instruments are primarily economic. That is, the foreign policy objectives of the Twelve are generally achieved as political side-effects of economic measures. This is not to say that Community activities toward CEEC have no direct political impact. The most important political consequences of Western assistance to CEEC can be seen in these countries' fundamental political choices concerning the course of their transformation process: there is no real alternative to pluralist democracy and a liberal market economy if they wish to enjoy the benefits of Western assistance and aid.

On the one hand, the conditionality formula set down in the Europe Agreements may create problems for their implementation. On the other hand, it may provide CEEC governments with a welcome justification towards their electorate for certain unpopular measures and related hardships during the transformation process.

This is why central European governments place special emphasis on future EU membership. They maintain that the best route to the enduring stabilization of their emerging democracies is through integration into the EU. It could be argued, however, that even an early enlargement would not be a total guarantee against political instability in the region: an enlarged EU of approximately 25 member states, with no fundamental changes in its institutional system, hardly appears workable; neither an EU membership may be able to contain the dangers of ethnic and nationalist disputes.

Even though a set date has not been indicated, there are forces within the Union that are currently pushing for an acceleration of the enlargement process. When taking over the EU presidency in July 1994, Germany declared that one of the priority items on its agenda was the acceleration of the integration drive towards the East. The German position is not unique among the Twelve, but it is certainly the most favorable and outspoken. There are evident economic reasons for this policy (to strengthen established trade links for German industry), but these are underpinned by sound political motivations. The most important is to include the CEEC in the framework of a European security system, so as to defuse potential controversies and conflicts in central Europe, and to extend the German security border further to the east.

3. The European Stability Pact (26-27 May 1994)

The EU launched the European Stability Pact (ESP),[24] or Balladur Plan, as another way for dealing with security problems in the CEEC. The proposal was mainly a result of the European institutions' ineffectiveness in handling the Yugoslav crisis and was intended as a preventive diplomacy instrument for dealing with minority and border problems in the East prior to the CEEC's integration into Western European political and security structures.

Pursuant to the Pact, the development of good neighborly relations between Eastern countries is one of the important overall conditions which has to be met before they can enter the EU. The Pact also addresses questions of regional and functional cooperation, including problems of migration. On the whole, the project seems to be aimed more at furthering cooperation among the CEEC than at concluding bilateral treaties between them. It is worth noting that the EU presidency has declared its willingness to mobilize EU economic and financial means to achieve the Pact's objectives.

The ESP has many shortcomings and several aspects were strongly criticized in both Central and Western Europe:

- making later EU membership conditional on the signing of the ESP;
- the Pact's guarantees;
- the provision for major powers, such as the US, to be involved only at a later stage;
- the relationship between the Pact and the CSCE principles;
- its intention to establish some sort of *droit de regard* for the EU with respect to events in Central and Eastern Europe.

It could be argued that in some respects the Pact is nothing new, as some countries in Central and Eastern Europe have already negotiated or are concluding bilateral agreements.

4. The EU Enlargement to EFTA Countries and Its Impact on EU-CEEC Relationship

Three EFTA countries have become full EU members in 1995,[25] being integrated into the common EU trade policy vis-à-vis third countries, including the CEEC. This means substantial changes in their trade and investments with the CEEC. EFTA countries have a long tradition of economic relations with the CEEC. After 1989, EFTA tried to act as a stepping stone for the CEEC's economic ties to the

24 Stability Pact in Europe, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1887, 31 May 1994. See Per un Patto di Stabilità in Europa. Una proposta della Francia al vertice di Copenhagen, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1846, 26 June 1994.

25 Alexis Galinos, "Central Europe and the EU: Prospects for Closer Integration," in: *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 29, 22 July 1994, pp. 19-25.

EU by opening via association its markets and granting favorable trade conditions in sectors such as agriculture, textiles, fishing, and some industrial products – a preferential treatment which is technically very difficult to grant in a border-free European Union. Thus, EFTA countries are bringing their strong and well-established trade and economic links with the CEEC with them into the EU, thereby substantially increasing the percentage of the overall EU trade with these countries.[26]

EU enlargement to EFTA countries could also improve the prospects for the CEEC's own full EU membership. In the economic and financial area this is due to the fact that the former EFTA countries with their high per capita income will strengthen the economic power base of the EU. At least the contributions of the new net payers will ease conflicts over the distribution of the EU's regional aid, thus enhancing the Union's ability to support economic developments as a stabilizing factor in neighboring regions to the east as well as to the south.

Equally important is their political influence. All new EU members have well established trade relations with the CEEC due to their EFTA past and will work toward increasingly integrated economic and institutional relations with the CEEC, in particular Austria as a direct CEEC neighbor. Still, however, the expectations of the Central and Eastern European countries might be too high. It is very likely that the EU response will be hesitant, mainly because of the difficulty in defining a stronger European identity in the Maastricht revision process up to the 1996 intergovernmental conference.

5. WEU Relations with the EU and the CEEC

The increasing pace of reforms in the CEEC and the prospect of EU enlargement have also posed a challenge for the WEU. Several stages can be distinguished in the evolution of the WEU-CEEC relationship.[27] The first was the establishment of bilateral links. This was followed by the beginning of a multilateral dialogue in the framework of the Forum of Consultation (9+8), and finally by the offer of an Associate Partner status in 9 May 1994.

The Petersberg Declaration. The main aim of the first stage of the WEU's approach to Central Europe was to establish mutually beneficial bilateral informative contacts. The positive results of this approach underlined the need to expand it and to make it more attune to the developments taking place on both sides. It was felt that a qualitative improvement was necessary. In fact, the

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26 Gianni Bonvicini/Patrizia Prode, "The Impact of Enlargement on the EU's External Economic and Security Policy," in: *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1995.

27 The countries concerned were: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

November 1991 Council meeting in Bonn decided to invite the foreign and defense ministers of the CEEC to participate in a special meeting with the members of the Council.

The aim of this second stage of the WEU's approach was to develop a pragmatic and cooperative security relationship with the CEEC – one step below the threshold of membership and the granting of formal security guarantees[28] – while avoiding a repetition of NATO's NACC initiatives.[29] In order to give this relationship an appropriate framework, in June 1992 the WEU by its Petersberg Declaration created a *Forum of Consultation (9+8)*[30], and granted the CEEC permanent observer status in the WEU Assembly, thus offering the means for a regular and structured debate on issues of common concern. Still, however, relations with the EU remained the criterion for the development of the CEEC's relations to the WEU.

The Kirchberg Decision. Given the dissatisfaction of many CEEC with the low degree of cooperation in the WEU Forum and challenged by NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative,[31] the WEU tried to improve its CEEC-relations. It considered an "enhanced status" for consultation partners (a measure favored by Great Britain), however, this lacked linkage with the security guarantees of the Brussels Treaty[32] and differed from a full associate member status.[33] It was, in any case, clear that the WEU intended to involve the CEEC more deeply in its structures, a move which was close to the CEEC's basic interests.[34]

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28 It should be noted that the WEU was not considering the offer of full membership before the CEEC become full members of the EU.

29 "Le point de vue de l'UEO sur la sécurité des pays d'europe centrale et orientale," in: *La lettre de l'Assemblée*, No. 18, June 1994. In fact, the dissimilarities between the WEU/CEEC relationship and the NACC are that the two have different geographical extensions and that the WEU is open to contacts with other countries such as Russia without this necessarily leading to a form of institutionalized multilateral relations.

30 The Forum of Consultation was established between the WEU Permanent Council and the Ambassadors of the Central European countries. Meeting twice a year at the WEU Council's location, the Forum would provide an opportunity to monitor the implementation of the measures adopted and, where appropriate, to make proposals to extend cooperation. See the declaration issued by the enlarged WEU Council meeting, Petersberg, 19 June 1992, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1787, 23 June 1992.

31 See *Partnership for Peace: Invitation*, issued by the heads of state and government at the NACC meeting, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, and the PfP framework annexed to it.

32 NATO still represents the main security reference for the CEEC and provides the essential political and military links between Europe and the United States.

33 The new structure of WEU has four levels: (i) full members, (ii) observers, (iii) associate members, (iv) associate partners. See *Atlantic News*, No. 2621, 11 May 1994.

34 Jopp, "Strategic Implications of European Integration," p. 53.

The decision to grant Central European countries the status of WEU associate partners was taken at the Kirchberg WEU Council.[35] In consideration of the CEEC-EU political dialogue, this "historic step"[36] can be seen as a part of the overall effort to reassure the CEEC about their future participation in the Western political and security system. With this initiative, the WEU put itself in the forefront of the EU enlargement process.

The activities of this "Council of 24" follow the internal logic of European integration. They underline the political solidarity between Western Europe and the CEEC and try to maintain a substantial degree of transparency, so that they cannot be perceived as being directed against any non-member countries such as Russia or the Ukraine.

As a concrete step toward the CEEC's future membership, WEU Associate Partner status complements the cooperation now being conducted through the EU's Pact on Stability in Europe. At present, the network of relations between WEU and Associate Partners needs to be fully activated and contributions from Central Europe are eagerly awaited.[37]

IV. CEEC's Perceptions

1. The Use of EU Economic Instruments

At first sight, the Community's economic instruments – money (ECU diplomacy) and market access[38] – look very progressive and generous. Yet the Community's generosity masks hesitation concerning the deepening of its relationship with the CEEC.

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35 Associate status gives the CEEC the right to participate in WEU meetings and decision making, but not the power to block a consensus reached among the full members. Associate members do not enjoy a formal security guarantee, but by participating in WEU's institutional life can raise and discuss their security concerns and requirements. In addition, they appear ready and willing to participate in peace-keeping and humanitarian missions, and to contribute troops to the WEU. See Kirchberg Declaration, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1884, 9 May 1994.

36 German Defense Minister Volker Rühe described the extension of associate partnership as such; see *The Guardian*, 10 May 1994.

37 Arnaud Jacomet, "WEU's Approach to Central and Eastern Europe," in: *West-Ost Journal*, Vienna: Jupiter Verlag, 1994 taken from Willem F. van Eekelen, "Associate Partnership: WEU's Contribution to Stability and Security in Europe," ibid.

38 The instruments used by the EU in its economic relations with third countries have been dubbed MMD, that is, money (otherwise defined as ECU diplomacy), market access and dialogue. See Barbara Lippert, "The Europe Agreements: Beyond Eurocratic Language," in: *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, 1994, pp. 109-127.

EC/EU-diplomacy played a significant role in economic reconstruction, especially through the PHARE program. But the CEEC severely criticized PHARE. On the one hand, the program provided mainly financial assistance; on the other, the uneven distribution of those funds resulted in different levels of development within the Central and Eastern European areas.

The CEEC requested a qualitative change in the European Union's system of non-reimbursable assistance. They called for an increase in the share of investment support in the overall assistance package and, above all, more investment of PHARE funds in technical assistance.

In response to the CEEC's criticism, a special program for assisting the setting up of the Europe Agreements (the European General Technical Assistance Program; EUROGTAP) was created under the auspices of PHARE. Its main priority is the development of infrastructural links with the EU within the trans-European networks, including those for transport and telecommunications.

These PHARE programs, as limited as they are in their scope and time-frame,[39] appear to be capable of supporting CEEC regional cooperation. Some programs provide the same type of assistance to all CEEC,[40] others (like "cross-border cooperation"[41]) are tailored to specific requirements in the following domains: energy, transport, nuclear security, drug trafficking, environment and telecommunications. But the CEEC fear that regional cooperation among them could compromise their prospects for short-term integration into the Western structure.

The Europe Agreements as an Economic Instrument

By signing the Europe Agreements (EAs), the CEEC wished not only to resolve problems related to the exchange of goods, services, labour and capital, but also to identify a political path which would eventually contribute to their integration in the EU. Although benefiting from the asymmetries inherent in the EAs in terms of trade with the EU, they complain that the EAs, due to trade restrictions couched in "Eurocratic" language, have no real, positive impact on the transition under way in the CEEC.[42] Therefore, the CEEC are stressing the need to exploit the potentialities of the EAs fully by interpreting them more dynamically, and by asking the EU to review its trade, aid and competition policy and the negative

39 The latest proposals offer multi-annual programs. See *Financial Times* (FT), 28 July 1994, p. 2.

40 These involve modernization of the customs and statistics systems, public administration reform, standardization of statistical systems and statistical terminology, etc.

41 This program excludes Romania as it is the only CEEC that does not have a direct border with an EU member state.

42 Lippert, "The Europe Agreements," pp. 109-127.

consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy for the six associate EU member states.

In terms of economic power, many CEEC consider EU market access for their products more important than the financial cooperation offered by the Europe Agreements. In fact, both the expectations and the disappointment of the associated countries center around the openness of the Community market. Basically, the EAs do not allow the CEEC to make significant gains as they still face barriers in penetrating the EU market, and as their exports to the EU are still limited by the EAs' antidumping structures and the regulated nature of EU agricultural trade.[43]

The CEEC's demands have been focused particularly on the so-called sensitive sectors of agriculture, steel, textiles, footwear, clothing and chemicals. These are exactly the sectors in which the CEEC have a clear competitive advantage.[44] As a result, a very important source of trade has been lost so far. This limitation on the CEEC's export potential shows repercussions on welfare gains, especially in the East European countries, where the range of export-competitive products is quite narrow.

For most CEEC it is of particular concern that the EAs do not provide for free trade in agriculture.[45] This fact becomes even more significant if one considers that the CEEC's economies, especially in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, depend heavily on agriculture. In the 1993 "battle" over certain livestock and meat exports to the EC/EU, some of the associated countries felt that measures taken by the EC/EU as safeguards against hoof and mouth disease were excessively protectionist.[46] The Visegrad countries considered the EU measures unfair as they would be the losers in any prolonged trade conflict.

The CEEC realize that much of the EU's reluctance is a product of strong political pressure from agricultural and other lobbies in certain Western European countries.[47] Because they see the resulting political and economic constraints as part of the EU's decision making process, to which they have to become familiar, the CEEC would like the Union to grant more help to their economies and

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43 Alan Winters, "Should Eastern Europe Feel Privileged with its Limited Market Access to the European Community?," in: *Transition: The Newsletter About Reforming Economies*, Vol. 4, No. 8, October-November 1993, p. 11 (published by the World Bank's Policy Research Department).

44 See Barbara Lippert, "Adaptation Process Inside the EU: CFSP." Paper presented at the TEPSA Conference *From Europe Agreements to Accession*, held in Lodz, 20-21 October 1994.

45 The EU allows imports of meat, fruit, dairy products and vegetables to rise by only 10 per cent per year over a five year period.

46 *Agence Europe*, No. 5972, 1 May 1993. Commission decisions were taken on 7 April 1993 and 30 April 1993.

47 Jim Rollo/Alasdair Smith, "The Political Economy of Eastern Europe's Trade with the European Community: Why so Sensitive?," in: *Economic Policy*, No. 16, April 1993, pp. 141-181.

administrations to adjust to the technical and legal obligations of future membership. To this end, the assistance programs should be transformed into a special pre-accession fund based on a financial protocol.[48]

The *Copenhagen Declaration* of the Conference on Economic Development in Central and Eastern Europe[49] responded to some of the CEEC's requests. In the CEEC's opinion, however, the EU goals of assisting the associated countries in their reform process and subordinating further cooperation with those countries to the cardinal goal of EU membership will be best served if the conditions for cooperation are defined during the process of membership negotiations, and assistance is reoriented towards facilitating the countries' accession to the Union. This process should also allow them to participate more actively in various community programs and to benefit from the resources earmarked for implementation of those programs. In the CEEC's opinion, this would be the best way for the EU to support the transformation process of the CEEC economies and to achieve full compliance with European standards. It would be useful if this process were to take the form of a pre-accession strategy containing a package of actions able to prepare the CEEC's accession to the European Union.

2. The Political Dialogue with the EU

The EU's Association Council serves as the forum for political dialogue between the EU and the CEEC. Though the EAs do not give the partner countries any role in preparing, making or implementing Union decisions, the associated countries do have observer status with regard to the EU decision-making process. Thus, the CEEC feel that more attention should be given to the opportunities offered by this institution, in particular concerning issues shaping EU policies that will ultimately have a political and/or economic influence on them.

In response to their concerns, the Copenhagen summit decided to establish a multilateral structure – alongside the bilateral structures created by the EAs – aimed at strengthening the political dialogue between the EU and the CEEC. Thus, in the final communiqué, the Commission underlined that, "more generally, bilateral political dialogues should be supplemented and eventually replaced by a structural multilateral dialogue, involving countries which have decided to cooperate closely among themselves."[50]

The CEEC also emphasized the need to extend the multilateral dialogue between the EU and associate states by establishing institutional mechanisms that would allow for a dynamic linkage of the associate states to the on-going process of

48 Lippert, "Adaptation Process Inside the EU."

49 See Copenhagen Declaration, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1830, 21 April 1993.

50 Towards Closer Cooperation, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1814, 9 December 1992.

the EU's regional policies. The CEEC believe that such a multilateral political dialogue in an institutional framework could be an additional means to achieve full membership and could make pursuit of the EU's political activities more effective.

This is particularly important, since the specific trade arrangements established by the European Agreements vary according to the economic imbalances among CEEC, thus strengthening, "elements of possible political rivalry among them" that could affect their trade relations.[51]

At the moment, the EU therefore seems to prefer the group-to-group dialogue. This means that the EU encourages regional cooperation among the CEEC. But regionalism in Central and Eastern Europe has taken on a different dimension with respect to that of the EU's CFSP framework. Different regional groupings seem to be emerging on the basis of shared interests and the common aim of furthering their position in the accession game.

The CEEC have come up with the following proposals to improve the current situation: (i) to change the nature of the dialogue from an exchange of information to consultative meetings in order to harmonize positions; (ii) to allow CEEC representatives to participate in the preparation of EU Council and Political Committee meetings to be held with the associated countries; (iii) to establish a regular dialogue between the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Permanent Representatives of the CEEC in Brussels.

The *Essen Council* was seen by the CEEC as a historic moment, as for the first time they participated in a European Council. Even though they reacted differently to the failure to establish a timetable for accession,[52] they concurred on the need to increase cooperation among themselves to improve political and economic stability along the EU's eastern border.[53]

3. The Security Issue

The WEU's role and its relation with the EU are still being defined and clarified, a process which will presumably be concluded with the revision of the Maastricht Treaty during the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference. Although the CEEC realize that the EU does not yet have a common security and defense policy, and

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51 For example, the Romanian and Bulgarian delegations tried hard during the negotiation process to obtain from the Community the same concessions as the Visegrad countries in sensitive sectors. The quote is taken from Otto G. Mayer, "EC: Challenge from the East," in: *Intereconomics*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1992, p. 101.

52 Hungary claimed that the 2000 deadline was ambitious but realistic; the Czech Republic declared that it would advance domestic reforms and ask for an early entry; Romania was anxious that the applicants should remain united rather than play for national advantages and Poland felt that a timetable for entry would accelerate reforms in the country.

53 Christopher Parkes, "Hungarians and Czechs Set their Eyes on 2000," in: *FT*, 12 December 1994, p. 2.

that the WEU's military capabilities require improvement, they nevertheless saw the WEU offer of associate partnership as a chance for greater participation in European affairs. They perceived it as a symbolic but concrete step towards deeper involvement in the decision-making process and the security structure of the European Union.

As for the European Stability Pact (ESP), the CEEC's reactions ranged from Hungary's substantial agreement to the more reticent attitude of Poland and the Czech Republic (which objected that the EU is trying to impose via its stability Pact a standard of minority rights that it does not itself apply). Other countries, primarily Romania and Slovakia, insisted that the Pact should not be restricted exclusively to the settlement of minority and border questions. Instead of creating a new structure, the ESP should concentrate on "a discussion framework allowing the CEEC, on a fully voluntary basis, to settle the problems that may arise between them."[54] Moreover, the CEEC intended to bring questions of regional cooperation and of the strengthening of democratic institutions into the ESP framework.[55]

V. Russia between the EU and the CEEC

Although no longer a superpower, Russia is still regarded by the European countries as a political and military power to be reckoned with. Still, initially, the EC's programs and activities did not involve the successor states of the former Soviet Union – not even Russia – in a framework comparable to the one established for the CEEC.[56] One could argue that the main reasons were: (i) the more chaotic development of the Russian domestic situation; (ii) the slower and more uncertain pace towards a market economy in Russia; (iii) the magnitude of the task of assisting the transformation of the Russian economy.[57]

It is easy to predict that Moscow will evaluate EU enlargement towards the CEEC mainly in terms of how and to what extent it will eventually affect its security. In this context, two scenarios may be envisaged.

In the first, Russia will perceive the enlargement as an attempt to isolate or marginalize it from the construction of a European political and security system, viewing this as a serious threat and responding with political pressure or military intimidation. In this case, the CEEC bordering on Russia could possibly insist on a security guarantee when entering the Union. This could be accomplished by granting them full membership in the WEU.

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54 Alain Juppé, French Prime Minister, quoted in: *Atlantic News*, No. 2569, 10 November 1993, p. 2.

55 Florence Benoit-Rohmer/Hilde Hardeman, "The Pact on Stability in Europe. A Joint Action of the Twelve in the Framework of their CFSP," in: *Helsinki Monitor*, No. 4, 1994, pp. 38-51.

56 See Russia's EU Agreement, in: *RFE/RL Research-Report*, 24 June 1993.

57 Kramer, "The EC's Response," pp. 213-245.

In the second scenario, Moscow will consider the enlargement as an acceptable process, which could even be economically advantageous for Russia in the long run. In this case, the question of WEU security guarantees would become less relevant and Russia would not create major obstacles to establishing friendly political and economic relations with the enlarged Union.

To prevent the first scenario from becoming reality, the EU should develop and pursue a coherent policy towards Russia while continuing its political dialogue with the CEEC. In fact, the partnership and cooperation agreement concluded with Russia can be considered a first response by the EU to Russia's need for greater access to international financial organizations and world markets.

So far, Russia has remained remarkably indifferent to the prospect of EU enlargement to the CEEC. Even more surprisingly, there was no Russian reaction when these countries were granted associate partnership in the WEU. This could be either because NATO enlargement is perceived as the only real and more imminent threat thus remaining Moscow's major concern and the principal target of its efforts, or because the issue will be raised at a later stage, when the CEEC become full members of the EU (thus posing the issue of their WEU membership) and the EU's CFSP becomes more than an acronym.[58]

Obviously, EU extension eastwards cannot be totally neutral. It can, however, be perceived by Russia as less threatening than the expansion of NATO. It is imperative that the EU therefore conducts a well-balanced political and economic policy towards the CEEC as well as Russia.[59]

VI. Conclusion

During the period following the collapse of the communist regimes in the East, both the CEEC and the EU took reciprocal interest in an explicit project for integration. The CEEC, particularly, pressed for EU enlargement at an earlier date than the EU was ready to consider.

The CEEC constantly sought closer cooperation with and eventual membership in the EU as a way of bringing their political systems, economies and standards of living up to Western European levels. This was pursued individually rather than in a concerted way worked out by the CEEC as a group. The approach ended up fuelling competition among the CEEC, which, to some extent, resulted in a slower response on the part of the EU.

At the same time, it can be argued that EU policy lacked clarity about the logic of enlargement, its short-term requirements and long-term goals. In particular, the

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58 See Vladimir Baranovsky, "A Russian Perspective on Future European Security Arrangements," chapter 11.

59 *Atlantic News*, No. 2610, 30 March 1994.

EU signals were mixed concerning the immediate to steps be taken to facilitate its economic relationship with the CEEC in view of their eventual integration into the Union.[60]

Union members are fully aware that a politically stable and economically rich Europe bordered by an arc of crisis in the East would be problematic.[61] They recognize that European stability can be preserved only through the creation of a political, economic and security structure extending over the entire continent. Moreover, European integration needs the implementation of a policy that takes due account of Russia's legitimate political and security interests and helps its economy to move to an open market system. But construction of such a structure calls for a move beyond the EC/EU's traditional attitudes and policies toward the East in political and economic terms.

In view of enlargement, the EU must be careful not to give the impression that it uses different measures in dealing with different EA-countries. EU/CEEC relationships should therefore aim at familiarizing the candidate countries with the EU *acquis* and the meaning of the CFSP on an equal basis.

A relationship based on a coherent political and economic approach, which has the EAs as its logical framework, appears to be the only one capable of conducting the EU's gradual enlargement to CEEC over the next decade. Enlargement is an ambitious goal. Because of the additional economic costs and complications in the decision-making processes, the EU will have to adjust its economy and its political structure while parallely proceeding toward the integration of the new members.

Given the economic problems involved in enlargement, the tendency seems to be towards more rapid progress in the security field. In fact, greater CEEC participation in WEU activities, closer consultations and further cooperation on security questions are considered instrumental in enhancing stability in Europe.[62] In this context, the European Stability Pact is considered a useful instrument for addressing the ethnic and minority issues in Central and Eastern Europe.

The future EU-CEEC relationship and eventual EU enlargement, however, cannot be based solely on institutional solutions. They must be built progressively on a shared vision of reciprocal benefits. But such a political and economic vision can only be forged if there is a strong political will and if short-term economic selfishness and nationalism is put aside.

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60 "Europe needs to know how to get where it's going and what to do in the meantime." See Richard E. Baldwin, *Towards an Integrated Europe*, London: Center for Economic Policy Research, 1994.

61 Jopp, "Strategic Implications of European Integration," p. 60.

62 Noordwijk Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, in: *Europe Documents*, No. 1910, 14 November 1994.

11. A Russian Perspective on Future European Security Arrangements

Vladimir Baranovsky

I. Introduction

This chapter addresses Russia's perceptions of and attitudes toward the network of multilateral institutions operating in Western Europe (NATO, EC/EU and WEU). The aim is to assess the overall dynamics of this interaction, rather than to present a detailed policy-oriented account. Special emphasis is placed on the issue of transatlantic relations whenever it seems appropriate.

The chapter proceeds from the assumption that the international system in Europe has already undergone a fundamental change, but that its transformation is far from complete. While the Cold War bipolar structure has disappeared, its substitute is still in the making.

Retrospectively, the dismantlement of the "old order" seems to have occurred almost spontaneously: it collapsed rather than being destroyed. The establishment of a "new order," however, requires deliberate efforts and persistence. All international actors, states as well as multilateral institutions, face an urgent need to reassess their interests and roles. They will have to adapt themselves to the new realities; at the same time, this process of adaptation will decisively affect the emerging "architecture" of Europe. Establishing an appropriate correlation between the elements of continuity on the one hand, and the elements of new patterns on the other, represents a formidable challenge both to analysts and to decision-makers.

For Russia, the challenge is twofold. Russia not only faces an international environment with volatile parameters, but, more importantly, the country is engaged in a painful search for its identity. Previous values, beliefs, structures, institutions, links, economic mechanisms and behavioral patterns have either been destroyed or discredited, while new ones are either non-existent or just beginning to emerge. Under such conditions, uncertainty and incoherence in relations with the outside world are inevitable.

More specifically, the internal Russian debate on the country's national interests in a transformed environment is still in its initial stages. The approaches under discussion range across a rather broad spectrum; they are based on different assessments of international developments as well as on conflicting views regarding the normative values to be assigned to Russia's foreign policy. When defining the "great lines" of the debate, one should keep in mind that any definite prediction as to its outcome is still not possible.

The very notion of "national interests," has become a serious issue in the power struggle among the new political groups in Russia. This "domestic factor" is certainly not unique to Russia; however, it is more likely to result in a distorted picture due to its unstructured civil society and lack of both established rules of political dialogue and of any traditions of elaborating a non-partisan foreign policy.

Finally, it should be noted that the foreign policy-making process in Russia remains highly controversial and unstructured. It often produces confusion not only with respect to the overall strategy pursued by the country in the international arena, but also to specific decisions. Various spontaneous and discrete signals and actions on the issue of NATO's extension eastward and of Russia's participation in the PfP are indicative in this regard.

II. The Soviet Legacy

The considerations which in the past determined Moscow's perception of and attitude toward the multilateral institutions operating in Europe are worth recalling. At least some of these considerations (and probably not the most insignificant ones) are far from having become irrelevant.

In the Soviet era, Moscow's ideologically tinged perceptions of transatlantic relations were never particularly sophisticated. These relations were interpreted as being a marginal aspect of international developments with the "fundamental antagonism between socialism and capitalism" considered to be the main characteristic of world politics. According to this logic, disagreements and contradictions within the West, whatever their substance, scope and institutional form might be, would always remain a secondary factor of the West's basically hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union and the "socialist world."

It is true that ideology *per se* was not the only source of Moscow's actual policy, or even the dominant one. But the logic of "political realism," highlighting the interests of the state and oriented towards maximizing the role of the USSR in the international arena (while tacitly pushing ideological considerations into the background), did not necessarily lead to a more differentiated perception of the West. Moscow's superpower mentality predisposed it to regard interaction with the United States as its highest foreign policy priority, be it within an overall hostile international pattern – during the Cold War – or on the basis of a more cooperative orientation – during the reduction of tensions of *détente* and at the beginning of the Gorbachev era.

Within this pragmatic, *Realpolitik* approach it was possible to discern two different lines of Soviet thinking and practical behavior with respect to the multilateral institutions operating in Western Europe. The first approach proceeded from the assumption that those institutions were fundamentally under the control of the

United States. Since Washington was perceived as the main opponent, Moscow was only consistent in its traditional hostility towards NATO as the main instrument at the disposal of the United States. According to that logic, the EC and the WEU, though differing in terms of their composition and functional orientation, were nevertheless operating within the "global imperialist strategy" designed by the United States. This view was responsible for the deep-rooted Soviet suspicions with respect to West European integration, as well as for the lack of understanding of its internal dynamics.

The alternative approach was to differentiate between the US-led NATO and the West European structures. Within that line of thinking, the allies of Washington were seen as having economic, political and security interests of their own, which were more compatible with those of Moscow. Therefore, the latter should look for a *rapprochement* with the West Europeans in order to try to separate them from the United States; in any case, by playing on the differences between the Atlantic allies Moscow might score additional points in the superpower competition and in the international arena in general.

Yet the debate between the "Americanists" and the "Europeanists" within the Soviet foreign policy community could hardly be characterized as dramatic – either in its scope or insofar as practical consequences were concerned. In the final analysis, the primacy of relations with the US was not questioned even in the period of the first stirrings of Soviet European policy. Furthermore, Moscow found itself disappointed in its hopes of alienating the West Europeans from their "Big Brother." A particular disappointment was the failure of the Soviet campaign against the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Europe. In quite a number of cases, dealing with Washington directly was easier than dealing with several smaller countries – not only because the bilateral relationship was often more productive (as it was during the INF negotiations), but also because the USSR's status as a superpower provided the basis for a kind of common language in its relations with the United States and also made Moscow feel superior to Washington's allies.

Moreover, notwithstanding its doubts about the ability of the EC or WEU to operate independently, Moscow tended to perceive these institutions as potentially threatening its interests even outside the basic "Soviet-American equation." Though the EC was eventually recognized by Moscow as being moved by centripetal trends rather than by conspiratorial plans, it represented a powerful economic and political center in Europe which increasingly might compete with Soviet influence on the continent. In the worst-case scenario, it could become a pole of attraction to the Warsaw Pact/COMECON clients, thus opening the way to the creation of a Europe "from Brest to Brest," or "from Portugal to Poland," to which the Soviet Union would be denied access .

The debates on "European defence" and the latent potential of the WEU were matters of special Soviet concern. Any developments in this field were perceived by Moscow as being clearly oriented towards the emergence of a new military bloc, which – whatever its relations with the US or NATO – would become an additional security threat to the Soviet Union.

III. Readjustment

The "new political thinking" of Mikhail Gorbachev brought some substantial changes into this basic scheme. An overcoming of the Cold War pattern of adversarial East-West relations would have the effect to minimize the confrontation between the military alliances and, hopefully, to reduce their respective roles. But though the elimination of the bloc structure in Europe was still declared a valid goal, its realization was postponed to an uncertain future. Meanwhile, it was recognized that the military alliances, jointly and separately, might play a constructive role in creating greater stability on the continent. For example, they might be used as vehicles to launch an effective dialogue on the vital problems of security and arms reductions; or they might set up joint bodies for verification of arms control agreements, etc. In fact, this meant that in the eyes of Moscow, NATO was legitimized as an international actor and perceived as a possible cooperative partner. A similar, though apparently less dramatic, evolution took place with respect to Moscow's perception of the EC, which became to be treated as "a political entity."

These changing Soviet attitudes towards Western multilateral structures stemmed first of all from a comprehensive reassessment of the international situation and from the abandonment of aims and goals that had proved unrealistic. The process, however, had also another dimension: establishing constructive relations with NATO and the EC was perceived as a means of legitimizing Soviet-led institutions in Eastern Europe. Though the slogan of the "Common European House" always remained a vague concept rather than a specific political project, the future of the continent was seen in terms of broad East-West cooperative interaction, with NATO and the Warsaw Pact assuming joint responsibility in the military-security field, and the EC and COMECON turning into pillars of economic cooperation.

This vision was in fact based on a bipolar concept of the international system in Europe. It is true that the parameters of that system were to be radically modified: the negative interaction between two parts of the continent were to be replaced by cooperation. But the division of Europe, so eloquently criticized in public statements, was implicitly considered to be the fundamental element of any future international order on the continent.

It should be noted, however, that Moscow's expected gains (the increase of institutional legitimacy within its sphere of influence and the creation of a less threatening environment in general) also minimized some of its traditional concerns, namely, over the US presence in Europe and over West European defence cooperation. The traditional temptation to try to reduce the role of Washington was abandoned after it had become clear that such an approach would be ineffective with regard to the West Europeans; the subsequent *rapprochement* with the US made it easier to accept the latter as a legitimate participant in the developments on the continent. As for military-related cooperation in Western Europe (which had been a matter of obsession in the past), it became a non-issue for Moscow: one could hardly detect any official or quasi-official reaction to the on-going developments in that field, be it the debates on EC common foreign and security policy, the revival of the WEU, or the establishment of the Franco-German brigade.

Nevertheless, the fundamental opposition to NATO continued to prevail, even when the Soviet-sponsored structures in the eastern part of the continent started to fall apart. Moscow, to its credit, did not try to attribute the collapse of its "outer empire" to Western intrigues. But Moscow's insistence on Germany's withdrawal from NATO as a precondition for unification as well as on the clause of "non-participation in hostile alliances" when negotiating new treaties with the East European countries, were all desperate attempts by the Soviet leadership to preserve a kind of equilibrium between parts of an equation, that were no longer equal.

The disappearance of the Soviet zone of influence pre-empted testing the feasibility of a cooperative bipolar system in Europe; the subsequent dismantlement of the Soviet Union itself apparently changed all the basic parameters of the problem. Paradoxically, some of them re-emerged later in the Russian debate over Moscow's policy toward Western institutions – implying either a certain intrinsic continuity between the new Russia with the old USSR, or the structural continuity of the problem itself, or, most probably, both.

IV. Renewal versus Continuity

Emerging from the ruins of the Soviet Union, Russia had a unique chance to divorce itself from the legacy of the past and to set up a new foreign policy agenda. In some respects such a reorientation did take place. In the framework of the present discussion, the most significant change concerned the attitude towards the West, which ceased to be perceived as the main enemy. Having renounced not only ideological and political belligerence but also the traditional messianism (which had continued throughout the Soviet period including the Gorbachev era),

Moscow did liberate itself from some of the most burdensome constraints on its international behavior.

This turn was sharp and did not lack the excessive enthusiasm of the newly converted. For a time, the foes of yesterday became today's most trusted friends. Their institutional arrangements were no longer considered a threat but rather seen as a formidable example of the successful multilateral management of international affairs. They were not to be undermined, as had been the aim in the past, but supported or at least treated with due respect.

In a sense, this new pattern of Russia's perception of the West was a mirror reflection of the old Soviet one. What used to be black became white, and vice versa. But the nuances within the new white picture now seemed as unimportant as they had been within the old black one.

Moreover, the sensitivity of Russia towards the issue of transatlantic relations almost disappeared. On the assumption of the beneficial impact of NATO and other Western institutions on international life, these organizations' internal turbulence and difficult search for identity in the new environment were either not seen at all in Moscow, or were considered insignificant. Russia did not care about minor quarrels in the family which it wanted to join.

To a certain extent, this lack of attention regarding the issue of transatlantic relations did represent a break with tradition. The case of Paris becoming more NATO-oriented illustrates this: in the past, Moscow certainly would have perceived such a development as negative, whereas in post-Soviet Russia it only gave rise to neutral and dispassionate comments. A similar restraint – approaching indifference and hardly conceivable in the "old times" – was demonstrated both with respect to the new agenda of the WEU and to the creation of the Eurocorps.

There is an obvious explanation as to why Moscow's perception of the transatlantic relations became less articulated than in the past. They were, in fact, overshadowed by a vision of a broader "super-transatlantic" relationship in which Russia would become a legitimate participant alongside with the Western countries. In this vision, the relations between Russia and Western multilateral institutions were roughly described by two possible scenarios.

The more romantic one assumed that Western security institutions – above all NATO – had lost not only their adversary but also their *raison d'être*, and would not survive the end of the Cold War. They would gradually become irrelevant and finally be supplanted by some new, broader association of states in which all the participants could combine their efforts to create a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

The other scenario did not assume the demise of existing Western institutions but emphasized that they should become less Western and more open to the former communist states, including Russia. This logic was not without a certain

consistency, its simplistic form notwithstanding: since Russia had made a decisive choice in favor of democracy, a free-market economy and a cooperative foreign policy, it should be granted free access to Western institutions, the members of which would certainly be pleased by Moscow's generosity and benevolence. Though an option of joining NATO or the EC was never formulated as a practical policy aim in official Russian statements (except for the well-known typing mistake in the message of Boris Yeltsin to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which produced so much confusion), it was considered and discussed in Moscow as quite a realistic perspective.

Subsequent developments in Russia and outside dispelled the illusions about the character of relations with the West. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze whether the initial expectations had been doomed to failure from the very beginning or whether the failure resulted from a maladroitly conducted policy. But it is obvious that a new *entente cordiale* has not emerged to replace the old confrontation.

The return to confrontation would certainly not be welcomed by the majority of the Russian elites insofar as both neo-communist traditionalism and extreme nationalism are still marginal phenomena. But among many the suspicion is deepening that, behind the encouraging and supportive rhetoric of the West, there is a strong desire to downgrade Russia or to retain it at the position of a second-rank power. More importantly, domestic assessments of the interests of Russia in the new international arena have become much more differentiated and specific compared to those during the honeymoon with the West.

This evolution has affected Moscow's perceptions of, and its attitude toward, Western institutions in two ways:

(1) On the one hand, the public debate has become clearly marked by a kind of irritation and even distrust with respect to NATO. Though not yet presented as an incarnation of evil, as it was in Soviet times, NATO's activities are increasingly described in critical terms. NATO is reproached time and again for continuing as a military alliance, for aspiring to be the exclusive security structure in Europe, for expanding its area of responsibility and for seeking to increase its membership, for not subordinating its activities to UN direction, and for disregarding the national interests of Russia.

Such arguments, contrary to official or quasi-official allegations that they reflect popular opinion, are developed mainly within the Russian foreign policy community. The "man in the street" seems little concerned with these questions, by and large being rather allergic to anything recalling the stereotypes of Soviet propaganda.

It should be noted that the other Western multilateral structures have been much less affected by this wave of critical reassessment. In this respect, they are

definitely overshadowed by NATO, as was the case in Soviet times, though they are no longer treated as NATO's subordinate bodies.

In some respects, however, the overall perceptions which are reflected in the mass media and which have already become a kind of intellectual framework for thinking about NATO are a paradoxical reminder of the old patterns. Unlike in the past, they are not exclusively or predominantly confrontational; but the re-emergence of traditional feelings of distrust and circumspection are evident, indicating Russian attitudes which range from vigilance to eventual counteraction. The scale of the campaign might well result in the rebirth of something similar to an enemy image, either as a justification for a certain policy line or even as its driving force.

(2) On the other hand, on the level of practical policy, Moscow's attitude is becoming more pragmatic, more subject to specific considerations of national interest as they are perceived by the foreign policy community. Russia's relations with Western institutions no longer seem to be regarded as a value *per se*; instead, the possible scope, forms and concrete parameters of these relations are increasingly assessed in terms of their usefulness or harmfulness to other goals and policy aims considered to have higher priority for the country.

Methodologically, there is no need to over-dramatize this shift. In a sense, it only represents the demise of the new ideological dogmas which replaced the old ones. Moreover, the previous policy line based on uncritical enthusiasm for NATO and other Western institutions was inevitably vulnerable to criticism directed against the overall evolution of Russia in this direction. Rejecting the extremes of such a policy would allegedly mean saving its substance (unless, it should be added, the substance itself is radically affected as well, which is hardly a possible scenario for today's Russia).

The problem does not lie in the methodology but in Moscow's concrete assessments of Western institutions. Whether and how these institutions fit into Russia's international agenda is a key question in defining its attitude towards NATO and other organizations.

V. Russia's Priorities

The functional approach towards Western multilateral institutions implies that they should be considered against the background of the broader priorities facing Russia. The list of these priorities, as mentioned before, could be a matter of controversy and differing interpretations; however, the following points probably cover the major issues considered as relevant to Russia's interaction with the outside world by most domestic political actors:

- *at home:* preserving the territorial integrity of the state, ensuring its economic and political viability;
- *in the "near abroad":* organizing the post-Soviet geopolitical space in accordance with Russia's interests and concerns;
- *among the former Soviet Union's neighbors:* preventing the emergence of an unfriendly environment around the former Soviet Union (FSU);
- *in the pan-European sphere:* providing Russia with a recognized international status.

Moscow's assessments of the possible role of NATO and other Western institutions in each of these areas will be crucial determinants of its attitude towards those institutions. Thus, a more comprehensive survey merits our attention.

1. The First Circle: Domestic Concerns

The overall disappointment in Russia regarding the aid provided by the West has been beneficial for defining future expectations in more realistic terms. The reverse side of the coin is that Moscow has become much more sceptical in assessing the positive impact of Western institutions on the domestic situation.

Among the political forces committed to domestic reform, Russia's *rapprochement* with Western institutions is still seen as providing an additional stimulus for the development of democracy. Indeed, some politicians therefore continue to consider even Russia's eventual membership in NATO as a positive prospect. But in general, this argument has certainly lost much of its attraction and will most probably be irrelevant if weighed against other considerations.

Moreover, in terms of its impact on the domestic situation, NATO has become a negative rather than a positive factor. The majority of the Russian political establishment seems to consider the possibility of a closer association with NATO as an irritating factor which would provide the conservative nationalist opposition with strong arguments and which for this reason should be avoided.

The Russian political establishment's ambivalent feelings about multilateral institutions are well illustrated by its current attitude towards the Council of Europe. On the one hand, membership in this institution is viewed as an important political gain which would attest to the quality of the changes in Russia. On the other hand, it is feared that the failure to satisfy the Council's high standards regarding human rights and democracy would leave Moscow vulnerable to severe criticism in the West, criticism that might seriously damage Russia's prestige and cause it to reconsider the very idea of becoming internationally accountable.

Two particular concerns of the Russian establishment should be mentioned in this context. One is the negative reaction which could be expected from the multilateral institutions to domestic use of force by Russia to preserve the territorial

integrity of the country or to avoid internal chaos. The other is related to the overall erosion of democratic order and the gradual decline into authoritarianism or even into a police state.

Both of these concerns will most probably provide strong impetus for Moscow to give priority to the UN and to the CSCE over other multilateral institutions. Within those structures, in which Russia is a full-fledged participant and which do not challenge the sovereignty of states, Moscow can more effectively forestall any outside attempts to interfere in its domestic affairs. This consideration also seems to define the limits of Russia's support for reforms in the CSCE or in the UN. With respect to the CSCE, Moscow would probably be very cautious about modifying the consensus principle or increasing the ability to adopt binding decisions. With respect to the UN, it can be predicted that Russia will stress the role of the Security Council and oppose any attempts to downgrade the status of its permanent members.

Regarding domestic economic interests, the European Union is seen by far as the most important partner, who could open its markets to Russian-manufactured goods and exert an indirect influence on Russia's market reforms. Aiming at cooperative relations with the EU, Russia prefers not to pay attention to those aspects of its evolution which might otherwise become matters of concern for Moscow. Significantly (and in clear contradiction with other perceived priorities), Moscow has never expressed any objections either to an eventual EU extension eastwards or to its merger with the WEU.

2. The Second Circle: The "Near Abroad"

The organization of the post-Soviet geopolitical space has rightly become the highest priority of Russia's foreign policy. In this area, relations with Western institutions are important for Russia in two respects. Firstly, the question is whether these relations will be assessed by Moscow as being helpful or counterproductive in resolving the concrete problems which Russia faces in the "near abroad" (i.e., conflict management, protection of the Russian-speaking diaspora, the status of frontiers, economic interdependence). Secondly, the attitude of these institutions to Russia's role in the "near abroad" is becoming a crucial criterion for Moscow.

Moscow has been, and most probably will continue to be, active in seeking to persuade the multilateral institutions to address the issue of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics, especially in the Baltic states. The CSCE, (now OSCE) where this activity was focussed, is generally considered to have been rather responsive to Moscow's demands. The record of the Council of Europe is seen as more disappointing. Due to their functional orientations, NATO, WEU

and, to an even lesser extent, the EU, can play only marginal roles, if any, thus remaining, in the eyes of Moscow, only insignificant potential partners with respect to a highly sensitive issue.

The CSCE has also been important for Russia downplaying the issue of frontiers between the former Soviet republics. Any potential territorial claims which might be directed at Russia, for instance, by Estonia and Latvia, are effectively neutralized by the Helsinki Final Act criteria. However, since the prevailing political mood in Russia still hardly accepts the "loss" of huge territories, Russian attitudes towards the international endorsement of the frontiers inherited from the Soviet Union is ambivalent to say the least. While officially supporting the territorial *status quo*, Russia would probably react strongly to any attempts by the other post-Soviet states to get reliable guarantees from Western institutions, and would react even more strongly to any positive Western response. Any test of this hypothesis by NATO or by the WEU might lead to a serious confrontation with Russia.

The possibility of involving international institutions in conflict management on the territory of the former Soviet Union has been a matter of serious debate in Russia during the past three years. It should be noted, however, that at the initial stage of this debate the idea of inviting peace-keepers or peace-makers from NATO or WEU to certain conflict areas in the FSU was raised as an exotic but not unacceptable option, probably only because its unrealistic character was quite obvious.

The reluctance of the West to get involved in what have turned into protracted and bloody conflicts was met in Russia with mixed feelings of comprehension, relief and irritation. Comprehension, because Western hesitation over the high price to be paid for any involvement was regarded as quite legitimate; relief, since the presence of Western troops in what used to be the Soviet Union might produce a psychological shock and become politically explosive; and irritation, because "dirty jobs" in the conflict areas would be left to the Russian army.

The involvement of the OSCE, on the other hand, is viewed as an essential instrument for legitimizing Russia's conflict management role in the FSU. Its involvement, however, is interpreted by Moscow in a restrictive way. Seeking a CSCE/OSCE mandate for peace-keeping operations within the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia has demonstrated a conspicuous reluctance to abide by rules which might eventually be imposed on itself. According to this logic, CSCE/OSCE observers would monitor the compliance of the opposing parties with an agreement, but not the activities of Russian peace-keepers.

Moreover, Russia's general support for the political role of the OSCE in managing the conflicts in the FSU is not without some caveats. In Moldova, the OSCE mission has repeatedly complained about attempts to exclude it from the

negotiations among the parties to the conflict in the Transdniester region. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia's mediation role has turned into an open competition with the efforts of the OSCE Minsk group, in particular over the status of peace-keeping forces to be deployed in the area. In Abkhazia, the role of Russia after its spectacular "reconciliation" with Georgia has clearly overshadowed the modest presence of the OSCE.

Apparently, Russia still considers legitimization by the OSCE as an important element of its conflict management efforts in the FSU, but not a *sine qua non*. More significant considerations are the "multilateral coverage" provided by the CIS, on the one hand, and the growing *de facto* recognition by the international community of Russia's stabilizing role in the post-Soviet space, on the other.

By and large, Moscow has been successful in both respects. The CIS partners, recognizing the economic preponderance of Russia and expecting it to be an external stabilizer of their turbulent domestic developments, are increasingly receptive to the arguments presented by Moscow. Russia has also been able to prevent or to neutralize any serious objections which might be raised by the Western countries. In fact, though not daring to grant Moscow the official intra-CIS peace-enforcement mandate it is seeking, these countries seem to have *de facto* recognized Russia in this capacity, provided its behavior remains within tolerable limits.

Indeed, Russia's stakes in the post-Soviet conflicts are unique and cannot be overlooked, nor can its potential ability be underestimated to reduce the scope of these conflicts, or at least to minimize their spillover effects. In a broader sense, Moscow's view of the FSU, or at least the CIS, as its zone of vital interests may hardly be considered as only a kind of post-colonial syndrome and rejected as unjustified. There are such obvious factors as the deep, almost all-embracing, interdependence of the post-Soviet states and the overwhelming economic, demographic and territorial predominance of Russia in the area which must be taken into consideration. Similarly Russia's concerns over the possible role of the Chinese and Islamic factors should not be written off as pure fantasy.

However, Russia's interpretation of its vital interests increasingly proceeds from the traditional "zero sum game" approach. As a result, Russia's policy within the FSU is not only becoming more assertive but is also acquiring an exclusionist character. There is reason to believe that Moscow aims to create, or to re-create, a sphere of influence in which access will be denied, or at least significantly limited to other international actors. In this respect, the debate on the relevance of an alleged new "Monroe doctrine" for the post-Soviet area seems noteworthy.

Any suspicion that the Western countries, operating either individually or through their multilateral structures seek to challenge Russia's influence within the CIS zone elicits increasing nervousness in Moscow, as was demonstrated by the report of the Foreign Intelligence Service released in September 1994. In the

recent past, this has occurred even with respect to the most general and unspecified allegations about a possible Western role in the Caucasus, as well as about an eventual "diversification" of Ukraine's foreign policy. The idea of "geopolitical pluralism" in the post-Soviet space is vigorously rejected as undermining the vital interests of Russia. In the unexpectedly animated debate on the Partnership for Peace initiative, one of the most sensitive issues was the participation of the other newly-independent states. According to some interpretations, Russia's demand for a "special status" in this program would have given Moscow an implicit *droit de regard* with respect to its CIS partners, or at least the right to operate as their full-fledged representative.

In this respect, even the Baltic states might be perceived as being part of Russia's zone of vital interests. They are certainly not regarded as possible candidates for a Russian-dominated confederation (commonwealth, association, Euro-Asian union etc.). But the most implacable opposition, fraught with the potential for a serious international crisis, can be expected from Moscow if the westward drift of the Baltic states were to bring to the fore the issue of their membership in NATO.

Moscow, however, seems excessively optimistic in the wake of its evident recent policy successes within the FSU. Operating as the Eurasian pacifier would entail much more than mandating its military capabilities, and even these capabilities are limited in view of the formidable task of conflict management in the numerous areas of instability. Still more challenging are the economic costs of leadership in Russia's relations with the CIS partners. The overall international image of "a new Russia" will also be dependent, to a large extent, on its behavior in the "near abroad." In all these respects, Russia's specific interests in the post-Soviet space might be better served by a broader Euro-Atlantic cooperative pattern, rather than in the absence of the latter, not to mention the alternative of confrontation.

Such an approach, however, requires a much stronger "liberal internationalist" attitude than currently existing in Russia. Nor are domestic instabilities conducive to an appropriate assessment of long-term foreign policy interests. Indeed, increasing activism in the "near abroad" became to compensate for the spectacular failures within the country and is used by the ruling elite as an argument against allegations of weakness and accusations of submission to the West.

3. The Third Circle: FSU Vicinities

Russia's vehement opposition to the prospect of the East-Central European countries' participation in NATO clearly revealed two important elements in its thinking on foreign and security policy.

Firstly, NATO is perceived as an alliance which continues to challenge Russia's security interests. Whatever the previous rhetoric on an emerging strategic partnership with the US or with the West in general, Russia in this case threatened to reconsider its post-Cold War military planning and its compliance with the CFE treaty.

Interestingly, Western countries did not dramatize Russia's reaction. One reason for their restraint seems to be that Moscow had played directly into their hands by providing a pretext for rejecting the problematic NATO membership applications of the Central Europeans. Another explanation seems obvious as well: they suspected that Russia's new enthusiasm for a cooperative partnership with the Western alliance preserved some of the instincts of the past – a suspicion which was confirmed by Moscow's over-reaction.

Secondly, Moscow considers East-Central Europe, even if not under its direct control, to be at least a "no-man's land" where it will try to prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition. It would be an exaggeration to claim that Moscow is seeking to re-establish a hegemony over East-Central Europe similar to that of the COMECON/Warsaw Pact era. Even the most backward-looking politicians in Russia understand that such a scheme is unrealistic. But Moscow's suggestion of joint Russian-Western guarantees to East-Central Europeans as a substitute for their participation in NATO demonstrated that it still claims political responsibility over an area from which it had to withdraw militarily. Moscow did so, true to Soviet tradition, without considering the preferences of the East-Central Europeans themselves.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP), for that matter, was considered by Moscow only as a second-best solution. But since it clearly removed the issue of immediate East-Central European participation in NATO from the political agenda, the program was initially welcomed as a "great victory of Russian diplomacy." This enthusiasm later gave way to hesitation, accompanied by long and confusing discussions, but this was primarily due to considerations going beyond the problem of East-Central Europe.

It is noteworthy that Russia so far has remained indifferent to the prospect of the East-Central European countries eventually joining the EU. Even more surprisingly, there was no Russian reaction to these countries gaining associate membership in the WEU. There are two possible explanations: either the principal target of Moscow's campaign was NATO, which is the most plausible proposition, or the issue may be highlighted at a later stage, when security cooperation within the EU extending to East-Central Europe becomes a matter of practical policy.

Moscow's reaction to such a development will be a significant test of its political thinking and political behavior with respect to its European neighbors. It is clear that the expanding security dimension of the EU will result in the gradual

involvement of the East-Central European countries in the Western security zone, thus showing that Moscow's recent schizophrenia about NATO was either irrelevant or ill-focused. As it stands now, developing less irritating forms of East-Central European "westernization" (i.e., ties to EU/WEU and not to NATO) appears more important for Russia than the security re-orientation of its former allies *per se*. In view of this, there is reason to doubt whether the security implications are really the focal point of Russia's concern about NATO's possible expansion eastwards.

A similar question is raised by the absence of any strong reaction from Moscow to Finland's accession to the EU as the resulting changes might be interpreted as being even more dramatic. They will not only affect the status of an immediate neighbor with a 40-year record of loyalty but will also bring the EU into direct territorial contact with Russia. Moscow, however, seems to refrain from articulating its possible concern, for reasons similar to those in the case of East Central Europe.

4. The Fourth Circle: The Pan-European Dimension

For a country of the size, the potential and the geopolitical position of Russia, it was only natural that after some initial frustration, caused by the loss of its super-power status, Moscow would start once more to aim at consolidating and increasing its overall role in the international system. In many respects, Russia's interactions with multilateral institutions (UN, OSCE, NATO, EU etc.) seem to be a function of this important foreign policy ambitions.

This consideration was evident in Russia's nervous reaction to the anticipated eastward expansion of Western institutions. It also explains some of the apparent inconsistencies in the recent political behavior of Moscow. When it became clear to political elites that this expansion would take place without the participation of Russia, they pointed to the danger of the country becoming isolated from European developments. Even if their initial concern about a possible isolation was sincere however, Moscow came also up with the somewhat contradicting argument, put forward later, that Russia may not and should not be treated as "any other country."

Moscow's demand for special consideration – raised in response to the Partnership for Peace program – was formulated with less logic than straightforwardness: Having effectively blocked the expansion of NATO as unacceptable if carried out without the participation of Russia, Moscow objected to the alternative program on quite the opposite grounds, i.e., because Russia had received the same offer as the other countries. In other words, being equal turned out to be as unacceptable to Russia as being isolated.

It is interesting, however, that Russian pretensions to "special status" within the Partnership for Peace were satisfied by a meaningless protocol ("memorandum of understanding"). This document, in very general terms, calls for an exchange of information, for consultations and cooperation between NATO and Russia, but refers to the latter as "a major European, world, and nuclear power," recognizing its "size, importance and potential." Thus, the result of Russia's campaign turned out to have only a symbolic character. Moscow's concern about the wording of the memorandum seems quite remarkable, whatever the future of the program might be.

But it would be too simple to conclude that only symbolism matters to Russia. In Bosnia, its insistence on being consulted by NATO if the alliance prepared combat operations was certainly based on some ability to influence the course of events. In February 1994, when NATO failed to inform the Russian government before issuing its ultimatum regarding Sarajevo, Moscow's subsequent moves opened a non-military way out of the deadlock, thus substantiating its claims to be an important actor in the area. The establishment of the "contact group," with Russia's full-fledged participation alongside four major Western countries, marked a turning point when Russia finally could feel that it was being treated as a great power.

Russia's search for recognition as the predominant figure in the CIS area also reflects Moscow's understanding of great power status. For Russia it presumably means the recognized ability of the leader to operate on behalf of its clients. Hence, preventing outsiders (including NATO and other Western institutions) from entering the CIS/FSU zone is only a kind of "negative control" over the area; it would have to be supplemented by a "positive program" aimed at raising the status of the multilateral structures emerging under the patronage of Russia in the post-Soviet space, be it the CIS itself or its possible future substitute(s). For that matter, they should become organic elements of pan-European structures.

Indeed, promoting the CIS has become one of the major themes of Russian diplomacy. Special emphasis is placed on the point that the CIS should operate at the same level as NATO and other Western institutions and become their equal partner. Apparently, this approach is designed to pursue two of Moscow's goals at the same time: to provide Russia with additional legitimacy in the FSU, and to prevent the "pan-Europeanization" of existing Western institutions.

An ideal pan-European structure, as viewed by Moscow, could be only provided by the CSCE. Compared with the other institutions, it certainly deserves preferential treatment. Here, Russia does not have to beg for membership or partnership. On the contrary, as a full-fledged participant and one of the founders, Moscow can promote further development and upgrading of the CSCE, ascribing any success to its own efforts. Furthermore, any allegations about the "insufficiently European

character" of Russia would be irrelevant with respect to the CSCE whose membership extends to North America and Central Asia.

The ambitious program of strengthening the CSCE, initiated by Russia in the context of preparations for the December 1994 CSCE summit meeting in Budapest, envisaged, among other measures, its upgrading to "an efficient all-European political organization" entitled to coordinate the activities of major regional institutions, i.e. the CIS, NACC, EU, the Council of Europe, NATO and WEU. Indeed, it seems clear that such a program could effectively meet the principal Russian concerns about the organization of the European political space. It would give a prominent position to the Moscow-led CIS and place it on an equal footing with Western institutions. It would also prevent those institutions from acquiring a pan-continental character, forestall Russia's isolation, and weaken arguments about a "security vacuum" emerging in East Central Europe. Coupled with the idea of establishing a European (mini-) Security Council, in which the states "responsible for the general situation in Europe" would presumably have a permanent place, the scheme looked even more than attractive to Moscow.

Ironically, or predictably, it is here that the plan was vulnerable to criticism and therefore proved to be unrealistic. It is doubtful that members of existing institutions might be enthusiastic about proposals to subordinate them to the CSCE/OSCE. Against the background of the CSCE's rather poor performance in recent years, any plans for a radical re-organization would be doomed to be dismissed as too ambitious. Furthermore, the very fact that such proposals are being submitted by Moscow could make some of the European actors cautious, if not suspicious.

In fact, to avoid suspicion and to make any plan more feasible, it should have been initiated by some CSCE participants other than Russia. However, it would be regrettable if the idea of making the CSCE/OSCE more effective were to be discredited only because it was actively endorsed by Moscow. Russia may be willing to dissolve the "transatlantic identity" within a kind of "Euro-Atlantic" super-pattern. Though assuming that the idea of establishing a hierarchy between the existing institutions has to be abandoned as unrealistic, the CSCE/OSCE might still address not only Russia's concerns but concerns of others about Russia as well.

VI. Conclusion

To state that Europe is splitting again into a two-bloc system might be considered a risky proposition. The "classic" Cold War pattern has certainly become a thing of the past and is unlikely to re-emerge. But whether the post-Cold War period is over or approaching its end is not an idle question. It remains to be seen if a

historic, perhaps unique, opportunity of creating a viable pan-European non-confrontational system has been irretrievably missed, or whether there still are chances to prevent the estrangement of Russia (or "Russia plus") from the rest of the continent.

But even if the notion of "confrontation" is in many respects inadequate, there are quite a few worrisome indications that Europe seems about to repeat its own history. Moscow's perception of, and its attitude toward, Western institutions is reminiscent of what took place in previous decades. However, along with the similarities one may also detect new patterns.

The ideological component of confrontation has disappeared, but the Russian feeling of being opposed to and by Western institutions remains strong. Unlike in the past, the Russian political establishment considers these institutions to be legitimate actors in the international arena, which makes cooperative interaction possible. A competitive pattern certainly prevails, however, which could become even stronger unless Russia is actively and equitably involved in the cooperative management of international affairs.

In the absence of such an involvement, Russia is becoming more assertive, and more arrogant towards the outsiders, in those areas which it considers to be more promising in terms of restoring its self-confidence. Seeking to consolidate its own zone of influence, Russia tries to deny access to Western institutions, as was true for COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in the Soviet era. Similarly, and in an even more straightforward manner, Moscow is pressuring Western institutions to recognize Russia's special interests, and eventually special rights, in the FSU.

Moscow, as in Soviet times, is willing to deal with Western institutions on behalf of its clients. The institutional structures created within Moscow's zone of influence are actively promoted with the aim of putting them on an equal footing with Western institutions, just as the Soviet Union insisted on equal relations between the EC and COMECON, and later, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Russia's perception of its vital interests within the post-Soviet geopolitical space may hardly be characterized as a transitional phenomenon. But the practical implications might be different from the Soviet past, depending not least on the character of Russia's interaction with Western institutions and the West in general. In this respect, the biggest challenge is to prevent the acceleration of centrifugal tendencies which is only possible by developing – together with, and not against Russia – some kind of safeguards in order to make the CIS area an integral part of the international system, rather than keeping it apart.

The "grey zone" between the two parts of Europe is a matter of special concern for Moscow. It is trying to prevent NATO from expanding into East-Central Europe, as it successfully did in the past with respect to Austria, Sweden and Finland. Today, however, the "grey zone" has become much larger, whereas the

ability of Moscow to impose its will has become much more modest. The result is that Moscow is attempting to veto only the expansion of NATO, whereas in the past the above-mentioned countries did not dare join the EC either. Another difference, and the most substantial one, is the relative marginalization of security concerns, all the official declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.

In contrast with previous experience, limited and *ad hoc* partnership with NATO is becoming possible both with regard to specific matters of mutual interest, such as Bosnia, and on a broader, though still inchoate, basis, as in the Partnership for Peace. The latter certainly has great potential for turning into a cooperative pattern of relations between Russia and NATO which might substantially minimize the negative consequences of Europe's new divide. But this prospect seems highly dependent on the overall status of the new East-West relations, rather than *vice versa*.

Russia's sensitivity towards the nuances of transatlantic relations remains low. In the past Moscow attempted time and again to loosen US-West European cohesion, which it does not do today. However, Russia's quite different reactions to the expansion of NATO, on the one hand, and to that of the EU on the other, might well have something to do with Moscow's competitive perception of the United States, even if on the subconscious level, revealing the persistence of the old instincts.

Moscow has preserved its taste for "great designs" and its enthusiasm for pan-Europeanism. Its suggestions to upgrade the CSCE over all the existing multilateral structures, including those under Russian control, also recalls the Soviet idea of simultaneously disbanding NATO and the Warsaw Pact and replacing them by a system of collective security. Within the Cold War pattern the possibilities for the implementation of such an approach were actually non-existent, since the West's imperative was to "keep the Soviets out." Today, the imperative should be to "keep the Russians in."

By and large, excessive comparisons between past and present are likely to lead to pessimistic forecasts. They do have their place in the above analysis. So far, the record does not seem too disappointing. Some elements of positive interaction between Russia and Western institutions are developing. There is hope for the future, provided that both sides continue to be mutually receptive and co-operatively oriented.

12. An American Perspective on Future European Security Arrangements

Stanley R. Sloan[1]

"... when you are up to your ass in alligators, it is difficult to remind yourself that your initial objective was to drain the swamp."
(Colloquial American saying)

I. US Interests and European Security

During the Cold War, US leaders and public alike accepted that the United States had a vital interest in the defense of Western Europe against the threat of a Soviet-led attack or the imposition of communist regimes on European nations. The communist element of this national interest became prominent only after World War II. But even before the emergence of the Soviet threat it was generally accepted that US interests would be jeopardized if any hegemonic power controlled the European continent. This assessment played a major role in US decisions to enter both World Wars I and II.

Today, in the view of many Americans, without the Soviet or any other hegemonic threat to Europe and given the abject failure of communist systems on the Old Continent, there is no obvious reason to justify continuing substantial US involvement in European security arrangements. Political leaders still include European security issues in the realm of high policy declarations, but the political salience of those declarations has diminished.

This diminished domestic support for US involvement in European security could be seen as an opportunity for Europe finally to assume responsibility for its own security. On the other hand, it could be seen as heralding a substantial decline in the international community's ability to develop effective multinational responses to international security problems if the Europeans are not able to substitute effectively for US leadership.

Future US policy toward European security is at the core of the larger issue for the United States about its role in the world. Perhaps for the first time in its history, the United States enjoys circumstances in which no other power poses credible military threats to its vital national interests. The sudden emergence of this benign international setting at the end of the Cold War came as a welcome surprise. But it could be a less pleasant one when Americans begin to realize that

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1 The author is the Senior Specialist in International Security Policy for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of CRS or the Library of Congress.

the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of the international community's need for US leadership and commitment.

For the time being, the United States appears neither ready, willing nor able to provide international leadership that rises to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Suffering from what might be called "international leadership fatigue" and unwilling to pay any substantial price in lives or money for international goals, the United States has adopted a posture toward international involvement that could be described as "self-deterrence."[2] The costs to US interests of continued US self-restraint may be minimal in the near term. But longer term penalties of an inadequately policed international system could be much more severe for both the United States and the international community. When such costs are recognized and assessed, the United States may well seek to reassert an international leadership role commensurate with its superpower status and capabilities.

In the meanwhile, however, there are more questions than answers about the future US role in the world. The Clinton administration has made US domestic prosperity a key "pillar" of its foreign policy. This approach recognizes the importance for any government of improving the economic fortunes of its citizens. But the consequent impulse to justify all foreign commitments in terms of their contribution to domestic prosperity may be undermining the traditional value base for US foreign policy – a base that the administration has claimed to embrace. Thus interaction between economic interests and foreign policy values may have made it more difficult for the administration to justify to Congress and to the American people commitments that cannot be demonstrated to improve US short-term economic interests.

In spite of numerous post-Cold War US government pronouncements about the US commitment to European security, therefore, the basic directions of US policy toward future European security arrangements have not yet been tested and confirmed in US political decision making and public opinion. The consequent uncertainty about American preferences, combined with other variables including, most importantly, the future of Russia, leave the way toward a future European security system clouded and contentious.

The importance of creating an effective post-Cold War security system in Europe should, however, not be underestimated. Jonathan Dean, in his comprehensive 1994 analysis of European security, has got it right. Dean argues that Europe is the "test case" for the future of the international security system after the Cold War. Dean concludes that "failures of the European system of multilateral security institutions would probably mean the failure of the UN-linked

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2 Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?*, CRS Report for the Congress, 94-581 S, 20 July 1994.

system of multilateral security as well."[3] The same countries that will determine whether or not a European system will work (including France, Britain, Germany, the United States and Russia) will play key roles in the shaping of the future international security system. If they cannot succeed in Europe, how could they be expected to succeed beyond Europe?

So far, the record is none too good. Blame for the disaster in Bosnia can be shared by many, but the bottom line is a catastrophe for the people of Bosnia and could be seen as a significant debacle for the Atlantic Alliance as well. The United States pursued a principled position aimed at identifying an aggressor (the Bosnian Serbs) but was completely unwilling to make the commitment necessary to stop and reverse the consequences of that aggression. The European allies were willing to make a commitment in the form of humanitarian aid and peace-keeping troops, but were unwilling to acknowledge that Bosnia presented a case of aggression, not just of civil conflict in which they could afford to remain neutral.

The combination of the US position, strong on principle but weak on commitment, and the European position, strong on commitment but weak on principle, resulted in the most serious split that the Atlantic Alliance has ever experienced. The development of a successful European security system will require the United States and the European nations to decide what values and interests they wish to defend and then to demonstrate their willingness to pay a price on behalf of those values and interests.

This analysis seeks to identify the interests that the United States could be said to have in a post-Cold War European security system. It is set against the backdrop of the Cold War rationale for US involvement in European security. It concludes by outlining some of the possible directions in which European security relations could evolve, asks which direction best serves US interests, and what policies the United States would be required to pursue to encourage the outcome most favorable to its interests.

II. The NATO Bias in US Policy

1. The US, NATO and European Security

Before examining current US policy toward future European security arrangements, it might be instructive to survey the development of a well-founded prejudice in US policy for NATO's place at the center of European security affairs. Professor Lawrence Kaplan, NATO's leading historian, has called NATO "the

3 Jonathan Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994, p. 387.

enduring alliance."[4] Indeed, the alliance has endured far longer than many of its critics predicted or even than its founding fathers expected. Why has NATO enjoyed such staying power?

Until the 1990s, the easiest, historically most potent answer was: the Soviet threat. The perceived need to counter the power and expansionist designs of the Soviet Union provided common ground for a very diverse grouping of nations to remain more or less united under the NATO banner until the Cold War ended, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, and the Soviet Union disintegrated.

From the US perspective, surely this was the most important reason for the alliance. Had NATO not been established, Soviet power might have carried communist ideology and control into Western Europe. At the very least, the Soviet sphere of influence would have grown to the long-term detriment of US political, economic and security interests. At the worst, Soviet expansionism unchecked in Europe could have led eventually to US-Soviet nuclear war.

In spite of the overwhelming importance of the Soviet threat, one suspects that NATO was more to the United States than just a way of countering Soviet power. It could be argued that simple inertia has kept NATO from closing down at the end of the Cold War. But the fact that the alliance has continued into the mid-1990s suggests that there are some reasons beyond inertia for NATO's refusal to join the Warsaw Pact in the dust-bin of history.

Beyond the Soviet threat, another major factor giving NATO a special place in US foreign policy has been the goal of promoting internal European stability. For over forty years US leaders have generally accepted that the US presence in Europe has played a constructive stabilizing role within Western Europe as well as between East and West. Just as the United States sought to block Soviet domination of Western Europe, it hoped to prevent a revival of internal West European conflicts that already had led to World Wars I and II. The US presence in NATO provided a secure framework for former adversaries to begin to build new patterns of cooperation. As those patterns developed in the form of European unification, the importance of the US stabilizing factor diminished but did not entirely disappear.

NATO also provided a vehicle for US leadership in the world. The alliance's heavy reliance on US conventional forces and nuclear weapons gave the United States a decisive voice in decisions about European security. Within Europe, the United States exercised extraordinary influence. The war in Vietnam and other issues demonstrated that this influence did not automatically carry over to foreign and defense policy issues outside Europe. But Washington's leading position in NATO was the foundation for the US claim to leadership of the Western world.

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4 Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States. The Enduring Alliance*, Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1988.

In recent years, the domestic US debate has tended to emphasize the financial *costs* of this US leadership role, though the US has come along with economic benefits as well. European reliance on the United States sold more than a few weapons systems to allied nations, often in competition against indigenously-developed products. More importantly, the United States benefited from the trade and investment opportunities that existed in part because of the security envelope that US military forces provided for the process of European economic unification.

NATO also created a direct link between the military power of the United States and the ideals that underlay the US role in the world. A pure balance of power approach to international politics views ideals or morality as unwelcome intrusions into the foreign policy making process. But the nature of US democracy, including the substantial constitutional role played by the US Congress in shaping foreign and defense policies, ensures that those policies cannot be carried out successfully without reference to goals that are broader and more complex than those implied with reference to balance of power considerations alone. The American people want to believe that their foreign commitments draw on and support the "American way of life." This democratic link to foreign policy imposes a set of conditions on any American presidency that can be ignored only at an administration's peril.

The Treaty of Washington gave voice to US ideals and a view of a world that would be compatible with those ideals, as did the UN Charter. Because NATO included a much narrower, more like-minded, mostly democratic set of nations than did the United Nations, it was possible to see the relationship as some sort of community of common values as well as shared interests – more than just an alliance. As Kaplan has noted, "... what distinguishes the alliance from others is not just longevity, or even the military balance, but the promise of a genuine community as outlined in the treaty's preamble."[5] For the United States, then, NATO has been an affirmation of its values as well as an instrument of diplomacy, leadership, and defense against threats both military and ideological. How much of this remains relevant at the end of the Cold War?

2. NATO at the End of the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War, Americans have increasingly asked of NATO, "What have you done for us lately?" By mid-1994, neither Washington nor Brussels had answered the question with complete success. The emphasis on defense burdensharing that tended to dominate intra-alliance discussions in the waning years of the Cold War left a strong residue in the US Congress and among the American people. NATO became seen as a way that the Europeans managed to

5 *Ibid.*, p. 184.

extract a free ride on defense from their sucker cousins across the big lake. (To many in the United States, NATO means "those Europeans," just as to many Europeans "NATO" translates into "those Americans.")

The Bush administration worked diligently to attempt to justify the alliance in terms of future "risks" to US security. It began the process of adapting NATO to the emerging post-Cold War world, but the task was barely underway when it left office, discredited for paying insufficient attention to mounting social and economic problems at home.

The results of the 1992 elections, which brought Democrat Bill Clinton to the presidency, were widely interpreted as a message that the electorate wanted its political leaders to concentrate on getting the domestic house in order. But did it at the same time reject all the assumptions that have motivated the US role in the world over the last four-plus decades? The rhetoric of candidate Clinton tended to support most of the goals that traditionally have motivated US foreign and defense policies, and the promotion of human rights received increased emphasis. Clinton argued for a broader sharing of global security burdens, but did not deny a special responsibility for the United States in the international community as the sole surviving superpower and a force for global stability. When President Clinton took office, however, it became clearer that his domestic agenda and the lower priority devoted to foreign policy would produce some fundamental changes in the US role in the world. By mid-1993, moreover, the process of change had created the image of an administration that had failed to establish a clear foreign policy strategy.

III. NATO's Place in the Clinton Foreign Policy

In September 1993, the Clinton administration reacted to growing criticism that it had no foreign policy. President Clinton's National Security Adviser Anthony Lake proposed a strategy that would seek to enlarge the area of democracy abroad to replace the policy of containing Communism, making it clear that the administration would resist "isolationist" temptations. But Lake cautioned that a policy seeking to engage the United States in support of democracy world-wide would not mean that the United States would become involved in every conflict or source of instability around the globe. Lake said that the United States would attempt to bring diplomacy to bear "always," but that "...there will be relatively few intranational ethnic conflicts that justify our military intervention."[6]

With regard to the balance between unilateralism and multilateralism, Lake said that the administration believes that "We should act multilaterally where

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6 Anthony Lake, *From Containment to Enlargement*. Speech at Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 21 September 1993. The text is reprinted in: *The Congressional Record*, Extension of Remarks, 29 September 1993, pp. E2293-E2296.

doing so advances our interests – and we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose."[7]

This comment may have reflected the fact that when the administration began translating a more multilateral approach into operational decisions, it ran into complications. The crises in Somalia and former Yugoslavia had raised concern in the Congress and in the country at large about any open-ended commitment to participate in internationally-organized multilateral military operations, particularly if the United States would not be able to shape and control such operations.

Responding to such concerns, US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright in September 1993 backed away from earlier administration enthusiasm about multilateral operations.[8] While still supporting increased multilateralism, Ambassador Albright said that the United States would want several questions answered before deciding whether to support UN peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations. The questions include: Does the mission have clear definable objectives? Is a cease-fire in place, and have the parties agreed to a UN presence? Are the necessary financial and human resources available? Can an "end point" to the operations be identified?

When President Clinton went before the UN General Assembly later in the month, he confirmed a more circumspect administration attitude toward the role of the United Nations in international security operations, observing that "[t]he United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts."[9]

This policy approach appeared to mollify domestic critics of multilateralism, but it raised new questions about the willingness of the United States to act at all unless vital US interests were directly threatened. Criteria intended to produce financial and time limits on US military commitments may seem quite reasonable, but they are difficult or impossible to meet with strong certitude for many situations. Using them as a set of criteria for affirming US support therefore might result in false projections, policy paralysis, or protracted decisionmaking while a crisis worsens or is resolved unfavorably in terms of US interests.

The statements by the administration could have been seen as creating a possible opening for NATO. The President and his top advisers had called on traditional American values, attempted to translate them into a policy designed for the post-Cold War world, and acknowledged the continuing need to bring power to bear in a way that deters potential aggressors. At the same time, the administration was backing away from the reliance on the United Nations as the venue of choice

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7 *Ibid.*

8 John M. Goshko, "US Lists Stiff Conditions for Troop Role in UN Peace Keeping," in: *Washington Post* (WP), 24 September 1993, p. A19.

9 Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Seeks Limits on Peace Keeping," in: *WP*, 28 September 1993, pp. A1, 14.

for multilateral military operations. The speeches affirmed the importance of NATO, but failed to identify what new role the alliance would play in the "enlargement" strategy.

1. US Tilt away from Europe?[10]

Late in 1993, as preparations for the NATO summit were approaching a critical juncture, statements by Clinton administration officials appeared to tilt US policy away from the traditional close partnership with Western Europe. This policy tilt created the impression that the administration was taking a "zero-sum" approach to relations with Asia and Europe, requiring that US policy shift its focus away from Europe in order to construct a more profitable relationship with Asia. The tilt was seen in:

- President Clinton's renewed recriminations aimed at France and the U.K. for opposing the administration's proposal for a "lift (the arms embargo) and strike (Serbian targets)" policy toward Bosnia;
- Secretary of State Christopher's assertion that "Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world" and that Washington had been too "Eurocentric" for too long;
- the publicity hype preceding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting that included unnamed "senior administration diplomats and trade officials" implying that APEC relationships were becoming more important to the United States than those with Europe.

European diplomats in Washington, who had been reassured that the United States could pursue an activist Asian policy without sacrificing good relations with Europe, asked what had changed. Some sought to dismiss the appearance of a tilt toward Asia as a tactic to win concessions in the end game of the global General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. They hoped that the United States had not turned away from a unifying, global approach toward a new, divisive, region-versus-region tack.

2. A Successful Summit

Fortunately for transatlantic relations, the GATT negotiations reached a compromise solution, removing one apparent stimulus for administration charges aimed at Europe and eliminating one possible obstacle to a successful transatlantic summit meeting. The episode nonetheless raised warning flags about the

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10 The following discussion is based on analysis originally developed in Stanley R. Sloan, "Transatlantic Relations in the Wake of the Brussels Summit," in: *NATO Review*, April 1994, pp. 27-31.

potentially detrimental effect of the administration's emphasis on domestic economic prosperity on US alliance relations.

The NATO leaders faced considerable challenge of "renewing" the alliance, and a variety of conflicting views on most issues. They responded with decisions that solved few problems, but did provide coping mechanisms that could help adjust NATO to the evolving European and international security scene. The Partnership for Peace program provided an artful compromise allowing all European states that wish to move closer to the alliance to do so at their own pace. The program postponed decisions that, sooner or later, will be required to respond to the strong desires of several new democracies to become full NATO members. It promised to buy time that could be used to prepare countries for eventual membership and to convince Russia that its interests were not being threatened in the process.

The summit declaration's support for the process of European security and defense cooperation helped move the allies toward compromising a Franco-American debate that had unnecessarily handicapped transatlantic cooperation. The agreement to restructure NATO forces to facilitate the formation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) would allow a more versatile application of NATO forces to military requirements in and outside of Europe. At least on paper, the leaders strengthened NATO's threat to use force in Bosnia to stem the brutality being inflicted on innocent civilians.

Most importantly, the summit represented some rapprochement in US-French security relationships. The French government had taken a more pragmatic attitude toward military cooperation with NATO, becoming directly involved in NATO preparations for peace missions, and also in regard of NATO's response to the Bosnian conflict. The Clinton administration did its part by confirming its rejection of the Bush administration's scepticism about European security and defense cooperation. This hallmark of the administration's policy toward Europe yielded multiple references in the summit declaration to the importance of such cooperation and the constructive role played by the Western European Union. The declaration included no fewer than eight favorable references to WEU, seven each to the European Security and Defense Identity and European Union, and two each to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy goal.

The summit therefore not only avoided open acrimony but also helped ameliorate some bad feelings raised by the administration's seemingly anti-European strategy. In spite of this progress, difficult challenges remained.

3. Gap between Rhetoric and Reality

The constructive trends in US-French relations, in and of themselves, did not guarantee that Europe would be more capable of assuming security burdens than it was before. All the summit references to European unity were essentially bouquets presented by the United States rather than new accomplishments or goals offered by the European Union members. In fact, the post-Cold War cuts in defense spending of most European allies (except France) were rapidly eroding military capabilities available for cooperative European or NATO missions.

In addition, it was clear NATO would not benefit if the Clinton administration's greater tolerance for European security and defense cooperation became simply a way for the United States to reduce its role in Europe at a time when the alliance still does not work particularly well without US leadership.

Perhaps the summit's main shortcoming was in not giving clear public affirmation to NATO's new role as an essential vehicle for multilateral political/military cooperation in dealing with non-European as well as European security problems. The importance of NATO in this regard had already been established by the experiences with multilateral military operations in the Gulf War, though NATO's military organization was not directly involved in the conduct of the Gulf War. Forces of NATO countries that fought in the war were there under a United Nations mandate in an ad-hoc coalition led by the United States. But if NATO country forces had not had the benefit of the common experience, training, practices and procedures developed through NATO, the operation would have been much more difficult, costly, and dangerous.

The summit meeting created the impression that, in the long run, the EU/WEU would assume greater responsibility for organizing responses to security challenges. But neither President Clinton nor his colleagues in allied nations made it clear to their legislative bodies and to public opinion that military force would still be required to maintain international order and that, for the foreseeable future, cooperation in NATO was the best available way to sustain the ability to mount multilateral military operations in and beyond Europe.

IV. US Strategy and Interests

1. Clinton's Strategy toward Europe

By the summer of 1994, the Clinton administration had set the broad policy context for its strategy toward Europe, reflecting the new priorities that it brought to US foreign policy. The administration's *National Security Strategy Report for 1994* reiterates earlier declarations that its foreign policy rests on three pillars, or "basic

objectives": security, economics and democracy.[11] The report describes the strategy to implement the policy as a combination of "engagement and enlargement." The description of these terms and concepts in the document makes it clear, as have Clinton administration policies and performance, that the administration is pursuing a substantially reduced and modified US role on its watch in the post-Cold War world, with a pervasive emphasis on the importance of US domestic prosperity.

"Enhancing our security," the first pillar of the Clinton policy, articulates the goal of developing a military capability "appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy," "taking account of the realities of the post-Cold War era and the new threats." The explicit goal is to sustain the ability, "in concert with regional allies," to win two "nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."[12] The rhetoric that adorns this pillar pledges the administration's determination to respond to threats to the security interests of the United States. But at the same time the report details the many tests that must be met before the United States will deploy its military forces. The report observes that "the need to husband scarce resources suggests that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations."[13]

The fact that "economics" has become a pillar of foreign policy has been reflected in Clinton administration priorities and proclamations from day one. The 1994 strategy document confirms the elevation of what has always been considered primarily a domestic policy goal to the status of a basic objective of foreign policy as well. "Promoting prosperity at home" for the Clinton administration became a critical requirement of administration foreign policy.

The third pillar, promoting democracy, was inspired in large part by the democratic revolution in Europe and has been the inspiration for some of the Clinton administration's most distinctive foreign policy initiatives. Believing that democracies tend not to war against one another, the administration has set out to enlarge the area of democratic nations to help reduce the threats to US security interests.[14] The report makes it clear that these three pillars frame US strategy toward Europe. The Europe-focused section of the document begins by noting that, with regard to the first pillar, "enhancing US security," European stability is "vital to our own security, a lesson that we learned twice at great cost this century."[15] Regarding the second pillar of "promoting prosperity at home," the strategy review observes that "vibrant European economies mean more jobs for Americans at

11 William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," *National Security Strategy Report for 1994*, The White House, July 1994, 47 p.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

14 The policy of enlargement was first articulated by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake in September 1993. See Lake, *From Containment to Enlargement*.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 36.

home and investment opportunities abroad."[16] And with regard to the third pillar of "promoting democracy," the review notes that the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of new democracies leads toward the US goal of an "integrated democratic Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the peace and promote prosperity."[17]

The administration gives itself high marks for leadership in Europe, but the report's strongest impression is made by its conscious effort to link virtually every policy objective or accomplishment to US economic interests. The second of the three pillars appears to provide the report's most pervasive theme. In fact, a preface attributed to President Clinton acknowledges that the administration's security strategy is "premised on a belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies has increasingly disappeared – that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people."[18]

The report's section on Europe addresses directly the need to adapt European security organizations to be able to deal more effectively with conflicts like the one in Yugoslavia and to "advance Europe's integration." It acknowledges that many institutions will play a role in future European security arrangements, including the European Union and Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, re-named in December 1994 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations. But the strategy report takes a quite traditional US stance in endorsing NATO as the central player in future European security arrangements.

It is interesting that the report's support for European integration comes in the context of the second pillar (advancing US domestic prosperity) rather than in the security context. Explaining US support for "the process of European integration embodied in the European Union," the report proclaims that the United States seeks to "deepen our partnership with the EU in support of our economic goals...."[19] This approach could be seen as raising questions about the depth of Clinton administration support for European integration. But it probably should be interpreted simply as a logical consequence of the insertion of economic self-interest as a "pillar" of US foreign policy. In fact, the way in which so many aspects of US foreign strategy and commitments are justified in terms of US economic well-being suggests that the document was prepared with one eye on the

16 *Ibid.*
17 *Ibid.*
18 *Ibid.*, p. ii.
19 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

President's 1992 campaign promises and the other on plans for the 1996 re-election campaign.

2. US Interests

This most recent statement of US security strategy does not include a clear list of US interests. In some cases directly, in others by inference, however, the report does suggest a contemporary definition of US interests in future European security arrangements. If the report had included a list, it might have declared that US interests are to seek:

- security arrangements that promote stable (non-conflictual) relationships in the European area;
- a security system that sustains US influence and leverage on issues (through NATO) while at the same time devolving some defense responsibilities on European allies (through EU);
- transatlantic and European security cooperation sufficient to yield effective European assistance in dealing with global security challenges;
- a system that supports and promotes the development of democracy and free market economic systems in Eastern and Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union;
- a system that advances US economic and financial interests by reducing US defense burdens, keeping existing European markets open to US defense and non-defense trade and developing markets for US products in the new democracies.

Whether or not US policy has been pursuing these interests effectively is a separate issue. But such a list may provide a useful frame of reference for assessing the development of future US policies.

V. Alternative Future European Security Systems

At least in theory, there are several directions that an evolving European security system could take in the next five to ten years. This section describes five potential directions for the evolution of European security arrangements. Listing five possible directions is simply an analytic device to help describe the range of possible developments. The hope is that examining this range in combination with an interpretation of US interests may help create a framework within which the question of future US policy might be examined. The range of possibilities discussed below

includes what I will refer to as European security systems that are: NATO dominant; EU/Maastricht dominant[20]; OSCE dominant; fractured; and integrated.

1. NATO Dominant

This tendency is characterized by a NATO that is successfully reinvigorated with new sense of purpose as well as additional members from among the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. Its most important characteristic, however, is a continued strong leading role for the United States that ensures transatlantic management of European security affairs. In this direction, a greater degree of defense cooperation among the members of the European Union is likely but the European Security and Defense Identity remains insufficiently developed to truly "Europeanize" NATO or for the WEU to take over NATO's responsibilities. The OSCE remains handicapped by its unwieldy membership, limited operational mandate, and negligible resources. The United Nations continues to lack the full support of the United States that would be required to transform it into an effective manager of military operations that go beyond traditional peacekeeping activities. NATO therefore remains the only effective organizer of multilateral military forces and operations. Russia would have the choice of cooperating with NATO or remaining on the outside of the main framework for European security decisionmaking.

2. EU/Maastricht Dominant

The Maastricht direction assumes a successful process of implementing the foreign and security policy goals articulated in the treaty of that name establishing the European Union. As the members of EU progressively coordinate their foreign and defense policies and merge their military forces, the EU takes on principal responsibility for managing security in Europe. The EU also develops the capacity to intervene internationally on behalf of European interests and policy goals. NATO soldiers on, but is relegated to a role of trying to sustain minimal transatlantic military cooperation. The United States withdraws all substantial military units from deployment in Europe. The OSCE and the United Nations remain handicapped by the factors discussed above in the NATO-dominant model. The new democracies increasingly cast their fates with their European neighbors to the West, but Russia is not a member of EU and must exercise its influence through the OSCE and the United Nations.

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20 Throughout this discussion, references to the European Union should be read to include the Western European Union. The WEU will be mentioned specifically and separately from EU only as required for clarity.

3. OSCE Dominant

In the OSCE dominant direction, the United States and the European states would accede to Russian desires for a European security system constructed on a pan-European foundation. NATO remains a viable framework for coordinating military cooperation and EU defense cooperation continues to develop, but all with the understanding that ultimate political decisionmaking on European security issues resides in the OSCE. The United States is increasingly distanced from the system, remaining involved largely to balance Russian influence. The Russian desire to give the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) equal status with NATO under the OSCE umbrella is largely realized.

4. Fragmented

In a fragmented European security system, all the existing organizations would have failed to attract sufficient political support and cohesion to provide the operational center for the system. Competition among nations preferring different directions has undermined the effectiveness of all the key institutions. NATO has faded toward total irrelevance and the United States has withdrawn most forces from Europe. The EU has failed to develop sufficient consensus on foreign and defense policies to substitute for NATO even though cutbacks in defense spending throughout Europe have stimulated a variety of defense cooperation projects. Defense has not been thoroughly "re-nationalized" because no country wants to devote sufficient resources to become militarily self-sufficient. The OSCE remains weak and racked by divisions among the members and Russian influence has increased in part because of the general incoherence in NATO and the EU.

5. Integrated

In an integrated system, all the building blocks of a European security system have been effectively brought together and linked to each other and to the United Nations system. In such an approach, each level of institutionalized cooperation would ideally be consistent with and supportive of the next level – a building block, instead of a bloc-to-bloc, approach to European security. In such an approach, nation states remain the basic building blocks, but regional cooperation in the EU has progressed, NATO has effectively combined US leadership with a stronger European pillar, the OSCE provides the "rules of the road" for relations among states in Europe and, operationally, is playing an effective role in pre-conflict resolution and mediation efforts. An increasingly-democratic Russia is playing a constructive role in a cooperative European security system. Good working relations have been established between the integrated European system and

the global UN system. Military cooperation in NATO makes it possible for the transatlantic allies to make combined joint task forces available for OSCE and UN-authorized missions and NATO's autonomous ability to act contributes to deterrence of aggressive international behavior.

VI. Current Preferences and Tendencies

The final two directions are offered as extreme outcomes. The vision of a fragmented European security system is the nightmare scenario for most governments and experts, but it was the one in which developments appeared to head late in 1994. Such a system would be highly unstable and the potential for political and even military conflict among European states would be greater than in case of any other direction suggested above. The integrated system suggests a kind of ideal direction (at least from this author's perspective) in which the competing interests of all the states and organizations involved are successfully resolved in a highly cooperative and stable set of relationships. Even though these two directions are extreme, they nonetheless may be helpful to policymakers. The fragmented scenario may provide some guidance concerning what to avoid; the integrated scenario may help define useful goals and desirable tendencies, even if portrayed in an ideal form here.

The NATO-dominant direction remains the default position for the United States. As long as an integrated system remains a long-term vision but a short-term impossibility, the USA is likely to continue to prefer preservation of NATO's preeminent role in European security affairs as in its best interest. This does not preclude support for greater European cohesion on defense and security issues and in fact presupposes more substantial sharing of international security burdens by European allies. Even the Clinton administration, wishing to shed some international security burdens and willing to envision a stronger European security pillar, has stuck by the admonition that such a pillar should be constructed inside, not outside, the alliance. In November 1994, when long-standing differences over Bosnia policy were widely perceived as threatening the future of NATO, the Clinton administration moved quickly to attempt to close the gap with its European allies, abandoning a principled hard line against the Bosnian Serbs in an attempt to save the alliance from going down in defeat along with the Bosnian Muslims.[21]

France, of course, is the most ardent advocate for the EU/Maastricht direction. France has accepted, and even embraced, a continuing role for the transatlantic relationship and NATO in the post-Cold War world. But the strongest strain in French policy today is the promotion of a European defense identity. The decision to expand the EU to include virtually all West European states and the growing

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21 Michael R. Gordon, "US, in Shift, Gives up Its Talk of Tough Action against Serbs," *The New York Times*, 29 November 1994, p. 1.

pressure to facilitate membership for a number of Central and East European states has led some French and German officials to propose a "two-tier" Europe. In such a system, France, Germany and the Benelux countries would move rapidly toward a more federal Europe and a cohesive foreign and defense policy while others would be allowed to pursue a more evolutionary pace around the periphery.

During the November 1994 NATO unity crisis over Bosnia, French officials seized on the transatlantic divisions to argue that they had been right all along in arguing that the United States could not be counted on as a pillar of future European security arrangements. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé commented that "[t]he conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to move beyond NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European defense that could back up our common foreign policy interests. This crisis has revealed the doubts we had all along that Europe's interests are not necessarily those of America."[22]

The OSCE-dominant direction for European security was a popular vision for many European experts and officials in the early days of the post-Cold War era. That popularity faded quickly, partly because President Bush's administration made it clear that the United States was not prepared to see the OSCE take the lead away from NATO and, in part, because the OSCE became seen increasingly as an unwieldy operational instrument for defense cooperation. Nonetheless, the Russian Republic in 1994, after deciding to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program, began lobbying for the OSCE as the dominant European security organization. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has subsequently embraced the vision of a European security system in which NATO and other organizations are subordinated to the OSCE. It seems unlikely that Russian advocacy for a OSCE-dominant system will bring a dramatic resurgence of enthusiasm for the OSCE from other quarters in Europe. But it probably does ensure that the OSCE will, at a minimum, remain the over-arching framework for European arms control talks, crisis prevention measures, and for setting the rules of the road for relations among member states.

Furthermore, the Clinton administration has decided that at least some modest strengthening of the OSCE could help ensure the Russians that their interests will be considered in important decisions on European security issues. President Clinton's commitment to NATO enlargement has increased the pressure to find ways to move toward enlargement while responding constructively to Russia's desire not to be excluded. This double-track approach has been embraced and promoted by Richard Holbrooke, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs. Consistent with this approach, some administration officials reportedly are considering how to create an "inner group" within the OSCE. The

22 William Drozdiak, "US and Europe in Serious Rift over Bosnia War," in: *WP*, 27 November 1994, pp. 1, 44.

purpose of such a group would be to give the OSCE a greater sense of direction and purpose while at the same time enhancing Russia's role in European security arrangements. US Secretary of Defense William Perry, taking a slightly different approach, has proposed that NATO set up a "standing consultative commission" with Russia "to provide formal structure for our NATO-Russia relationship."[23]

VII. Implications for US Policy

If the United States should decide to reassert a leading international role commensurate with its power and potential influence, it would be required to formulate clearly US desires for the evolution of European security relations as well as of for the development of a post-Cold War international security system. Against the Bosnia backdrop, the United States cannot afford to articulate its opposition to aggression if it is not willing to back its words with deeds. By the same token, the United States, in its own interest, probably cannot afford to leave European security to the Europeans. European professions of desire for a common foreign and security policy should not hide the unfortunate reality that, in many instances, there is no such thing as a clear definition of "European" interests on which they could be counted to act when necessary. In cases where the Europeans are able to develop common positions, the United States presumably would want to be able to influence the outcome when US interests would be affected. Based on these conclusions and the list of US interests outlined above, US policy would presumably seek several goals.

First, such a policy definition would identify as a long-term objective the development of a European security system that features an effective synthesis of existing organizations (most importantly the OSCE, NATO, EU/WEU) and that is coordinated efficiently with activities at the global UN level.

Second, for the immediate future, it would re-affirm the central importance for the United States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a unique forum for military cooperation and political-military consultation and coordination. US policy would articulate the desire for allied and partner nations to carry a share of international security burdens and support efforts to develop more cohesive European defense as long as this: First, results in increased contributions than would otherwise be available and second, does not undermine transatlantic cooperation through NATO. This presumably allows room for the development of a progressively "binary" relationship between the United States and a more cohesive European defense pillar in the alliance.

The US desire to support the democratization efforts of the Central and East European states in such an approach would likely include support for membership

23 Michael Shields, "US Calls for NATO-Russian Security Forum," *Reuters Wire*, 5 February 1995.

in NATO for several of these states, some within the next five years and others within a ten-year time period. US policy would seek to accomplish this expansion while assuring Russia that its interests are not at risk and while adapting NATO procedures and structures to ensure that a larger membership would not prevent individual allies or ad hoc coalitions of allies from acting when it is not possible to engage the participation or support of all NATO members.[24]

Third, a new challenge has been added to the list as the result of European initiatives early in February 1995. There is apparently growing recognition in Western Europe that the challenges faced by the NATO allies cannot be completely resolved within the narrow confines of the alliance, or even in a treaty between the United States and the members of the European Union. The diverse nature of post-Cold War issues affecting allied interests suggests the need for a new initiative designed to broaden the context of the transatlantic relationship. The point of doing so would be to give form and substance to the apparent belief of all allied governments that, even in the absence of a Soviet threat, they continue to share many values, goals and interests.

At the annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, Germany in early February 1995, foreign and defense ministers from Britain, France and Germany separately proposed a new European-American pact. German Defense Minister Volker Rühe called for a "new, wider trans-Atlantic contract" designed to emphasize the importance of military, political and economic cooperation on behalf of Western economic interests and democratic values.[25] The approach was supported by British Minister of Defense Malcolm Rifkind who said that "defense issues alone do not offer a broad enough foundation for the edifice we need." French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, along the same lines, called for "a new trans-Atlantic charter to consolidate the common desire of North America and Europe to contribute to international stability in all its dimensions."[26] The concept is one that might be attractive not only to the Clinton administration but also to centrist Republicans and Democrats in the Congress.

Creation of a Transatlantic Cooperation Community, as suggested by these officials, could provide the new foundation for cooperation that is required for the post-Cold War world. Such a community would encompass, not replace, NATO, which would remain the framework for transatlantic defense cooperation. It would symbolize and provide a vehicle for consultation and cooperation between the United States and the members of the European Union. It would also help

24 For a summary of the debate on US policy toward Russia's place in European security arrangements see: Stanley R. Sloan, *US Policy toward Russia and NATO*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 94-871 S, 9 November 1994.

25 Joseph Fitchett, "Western Europe Proposes New Trans-Atlantic Pact," in: *International Herald Tribune*, 7 February 1995, p. 1.

26 *Ibid.*

mitigate problems caused by the fact that some European NATO members are not currently members of the European Union, and therefore would not be included in a US-EU bilateral treaty.

Perhaps most importantly, creation of a Transatlantic Cooperation Community might help generate the political energy in the United States and the European countries needed to deal with the challenges of moving beyond the Cold War, strengthening the international economic system, and dealing with new security challenges. This may be the vision needed to carry the international system beyond the immediate confusion of the post-Cold War world toward a new era of democratic growth, economic well-being, and enhanced security for all.

The good news is that the rhetoric of current US policy is, in many ways, headed in these directions. The bad news is that the United States currently appears to lack the political energy to convincingly follow through with such policies. If the United States remains unable to provide the necessary leadership, and the European effort remains inadequate for the task, the consequences could be far reaching. As Jonathan Dean argues, failure to establish a functioning cooperative security system in Europe could lead to "a more dangerous, nuclearized multipolar world system rather than one based on increasing resort to multinational cooperative security..."[27]

The key weakness in the US approach is revealed by the strong emphasis on policies that promote US domestic prosperity. It is an obvious requirement, indeed a responsibility, for the US government to seek a better way of life for its citizens. But it seems unlikely that long-term foreign policy requirements can be effectively based on short-term economic requirements. In fact, the administration's apparent perception that every overseas commitment must be justified in terms of short-term economic considerations tends to make its expressions of support for long-term strategic and value-based goals look like empty rhetoric. It raises the question of whether or not the administration would be willing to stand by international commitments if it were not able to make a case for their benefit to US economic interests.

A mismatch between US words and deeds therefore may continue until the nation feels that it has the material resources and the vigor to resume a leading international role. Economic recovery may restore a greater sense of self-confidence to the nation, but that self-confidence will also have to be reflected in effective national leadership. Until such confident leadership emerges, the forces leading toward a more chaotic international system and a fragmented European system may well dominate those that would lead toward more stable, peaceful, and cooperative European and international security systems.

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27 Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars*, p. 388.

PART THREE
EU-NATO Interaction

13. Security Links in the Making

G. Bonvicini, M. Cremasco, R. Rummel, P. Schmidt

I. Organizing the New Power Structures in Europe

We are experiencing a reshuffling of the international system: some old security institutions have gone (Warsaw Pact), others – NATO, EU, WEU – have taken over new tasks, are about to enlarge membership and are trying to cope with new challenges, respectively. In this situation, old power centers, especially the US and Russia but also Western Europe, are trying to find new places and roles within the international system. But there are considerable differences as to how these power centers can and should find these new positions. Many feel that the European Union (EU) should fill the power gap in Europe, aiming at providing the major center of gravity in Europe and (perhaps) beyond. The EU, however, is not a traditional nation state embracing all the necessary competences in a coherent and powerful decision-making structure. Thus there are substantial doubts whether it will be able to satisfy the requirements of a traditional superpower.[1]

This assessment stems from several observations:

- Since the EU has represented a civilian power to date, and since the complex relationship between Brussels and the national capitals serves as the legitimating basis of EU policy, given the lack of a democratic and public European structure there are good reasons to believe that the EU will not be able to develop a coherent, well-founded foreign and security policy supported by the people in the short term.[2]
- The demise of the bipolar order has given rise to new attempts at deeper integration within the EU. This process has, however, strengthened the role of the nation state, i.e. the European Council as an inter-governmental body of the EU. The current debate on the further development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is, therefore, characterized by a rather strong inter-governmental tendency limiting the reach and scope of a future common defense policy or even a common defense.[3]

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1 Some political forces in Europe would like to avoid this anyway; see, e.g., for Germany the position paper of Heidemarie Wiezcorek-Zeul (SPD MP and speaker on European policy and deputy party head), "Die Reform der Europäischen Union – eine Aufgabe der Sozialdemokratie," Bonn, 6 June 1995, especially p. 3.

2 For a balanced assessment, see Erhard Forndran, "Rahmenbedingungen, Probleme und Möglichkeiten einer künftigen europäischen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik," in: Erhard Forndran and Hans D. Lemke (eds.), *Sicherheitspolitik für Europa zwischen Konsens und Konflikt. Analysen und Optionen*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995, pp. 11-59.

3 This is true not only for the British position but also for current French thinking.

- Looking at Northern and Central Europe, the already confusing picture becomes even more so. Three former EFTA countries (Finland, Sweden, and Austria) have entered the EU, who have, while they were ready to become a part of the current EU system, by tradition deeply rooted foreign and security policy attitudes that create difficulties in accepting the development of a common defense policy and common defense as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty.[4] The Central and Eastern European (CEEC) candidate states are desperately seeking membership in both NATO *and* the EU, but suffer from a political contradiction: on the one hand, they are proud of their newly gained sovereignty and independence, on the other, they feel obliged (for security reasons, among others) to pursue a policy of transfer of that sovereignty to multilateral or supranational organizations such as NATO and the EU. It is rather evident that these contradictory policies will cause some problems in a future enlarged EU.
- Outside factors are also causing problems for a coherent CFSP of a further enlarged EU. In November 1990, the CSCE Charter of Paris triggered hopes of an era of cooperation and peace. Yet the December 1994 CSCE summit was already marked by competition between two security models: the Russian model of merging NATO into the CSCE[5] and the Western model of a network of interlocking and mutually reinforcing security institutions guaranteeing the survival and maintenance of – certainly reformed – Western set-ups. The outcome was a moderate transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE.

The enlargement of NATO has become the prime topic of debate on future security structures in Europe. Two further problems ensue from this debate: Russia's reluctance to regard an expansion of NATO as a positive element of the European security architecture and the inability of Atlantic nations to render NATO's enlargement compatible with that of the EU. This difficult situation adds to the EU's internal problems and generates intra-Western divergences.

It is obvious that the Atlantic Alliance is only capable of providing rather limited answers to the new non-military security challenges in Europe and beyond – all the more reason for the policies and strategies of NATO and the EU to be blended into a common approach to cope with the new challenges. There is a need for a common view of an (at least rough) division of labor and for an understanding of how both institutions can develop into a really cooperative

4 To become WEU members, the countries should, according to the WEU's Petersberg Declaration, accept all WEU declarations since 1984. This includes the acceptance of a nuclear component which is especially difficult to agree on in Sweden and Finland.

5 Another favorable solution for Moscow discussed sometimes is Russian membership in NATO, which would transform the Alliance into a collective security system.

framework of institutions. The development of EU-NATO interaction has begun, but it remains unfinished.

II. Developing EU-NATO Interaction: An Unfinished Business

The development of a system of interaction between EU and NATO is not an end in itself. To clarify its purpose and scope, a four-part analysis will be carried out in the following sections. The first part will assess the security challenges that will have to be tackled by the evolving new cooperation between EU and NATO. The second compares the nature and scope of these challenges with the current status of interaction between the two institutions, evaluating the advantages and drawbacks of the current arrangement. This automatically leads to the question of the aims of a future reshaping of the relationship between the EU and NATO – the subject of part three. The fourth and final part lays out the options and strategic demands with regard to future EU-NATO collaboration.

1. Security Challenges in Europe

States in Europe are primarily confronted with three types of security challenges: first, the establishment after of a post-Cold War security order for all of Europe with a special focus on the role of the EU and NATO; second, the handling of dissolving states and political fragmentation; and third, the taming of intrastate conflict to prevent interstate violence. The main aggravating factor in all three categories continues to be the poor understanding of the nature of these challenges. Even after five years of post-Cold War experience, policy makers and the public all over the OSCE area either misread the dangers or draw insufficient conclusions from perceived threats. In the West, the damage which appeasement and a lack of resolve can cause to the normative goal of peaceful conflict resolution is underestimated. In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the rush into Western institutions prevents a sober assessment of their security concerns, while Russia – unable to join international cooperation fully – seems to be attracted once more by traditional power politics. By addressing the major security challenges successfully these this aggravating factor is likely to be reduced as well.

(1) The European Security Architecture as a Challenge for Central and East European Countries

Historically, the Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries have been treated as a region of both German and Russian expansionism. Therefore, although the CEEC do not perceive the danger of an actual threat, they share a

common feeling of being somewhat squeezed between Russia – intent on regaining the status of major power through a foreign and military policy of higher profile and greater reach – and the West – not indifferent to their expectations and requirements, but not yet fully committed to their security, the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and the structured relationship with the EU notwithstanding.

Confronted with this "architectural challenge" and given the potential instabilities and conflicts in the region, the Central and Eastern European countries could have been tempted to revert to the old game of power politics and to adopt hegemonic foreign policies aimed at establishing or re-establishing their own spheres of influence. But none of those countries is in a position to play such a demanding role: they are too weak politically, economically and militarily. The attractiveness of the West and the lack of experience and stimuli for regional cooperation in the East have kept these countries from forging a regional security system as an alternative to their rush westwards.[6]

They soon realized that the only way out of the impasse was to be accepted in the fold of the Atlantic Alliance and the EU: NATO would provide the security guarantee needed to lessen their historical risk perception, while EU membership would mean participation in Western Europe's stable and functioning institutions and the prospect of positive economic development. Within this common view, each country nevertheless has its specifics.

Poland, for example, feels a more direct risk than other countries. In its general perception it has become a "frontier" country. Therefore, Warsaw pays special attention to Russia's intricate developments and to the potential risks which would originate if Moscow undertook some sort of power politics, looking upon the territory of the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, upon Central Europe, as Russia's "natural" sphere of influence – as more Russian voices begin strongly began to suggest." As a result, it has been Poland's main architectural conclusion to repeadedly demand NATO membership, even before participation in the EU.[7] In this context, Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement and its political fiddling *vis-à-vis* its participation in the Alliance's PfP are seen by Warsaw as two reasons for scepticism with regard to the developments in Russia. In addition, Poland is also concerned with the political and economic stability and military developments of Belarus and its capability to maintain an adequate degree of independence within the framework of the CIS.

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6 See Christoph Royen, "Ausblick auf ein neues Europa in einer 'transkontinentalen Staatengemeinschaft'," in: Jürgen Nötzold (ed.), *Europa im Wandel. Entwicklungstendenzen nach einer Ära des Ost-West-Konflikts*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995, pp. 165-186.

7 See: Security Dilemmas of Central Europe. Public lecture delivered by His Excellency Mr. Lech Walesa, President of the Republic of Poland on Thursday, 30 March 1995 at Berwaldhallen, Stockholm.

Hungary, on the other hand, seems less concerned about the uncertain developments in Russia, despite its 1956 experience.[8] A far more acute problem is its border with an expansionist Serbia and a Romania not fully stable and still ambiguous on minority issues.

The main sources of instability, however, are the slaughters taking place on former Yugoslav soil. Most of the Southeastern European countries are concerned about the risks of a possible spillover of the Bosnian conflict and the repercussions on their economies of the UN embargo on the new Republic of Yugoslavia – an embargo which they are nevertheless helping to enforce. Bulgaria, for example, had suffered an economic loss of almost $5 billion by mid-1994 and is particularly worried that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) could become involved in the Bosnian conflict, opening the Pandora's box of an enlarged Balkan war. Sofia is apprehensive about the activities of the Turkish Party (the MRF) and the prospect of a destabilization of the regions in southern and southwestern Bulgaria eventually choosing the path of separatism – a move which would tend to refocus Bulgarian fears on the "Turkish threat." Finally, Bulgaria considers the still unresolved issues between Greece and Turkey a source of potential disturbance with direct implications for its security.

Romania, although also worried about the negative effects on its economy of the UN sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro,[9] seems less concerned about the developments in the former Yugoslavia – short of a regional war whose repercussions it would not be able to escape – than about political and military developments in Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The following developments are being carefully observed in Bucharest: (i) the military posture and role of Russian troops in Moldova; (ii) the outcome of the process toward greater democratization of Russian political life and a true market economy; (iii) the evolution of Moscow's foreign policy toward the "near abroad" and the new impulse given to the combat readiness of Russian armed forces; (iv) the repercussions of the military intervention in Chechnya on the Russian domestic political situation; and (v) Ukraine's ability to steer an independent course and to limit Russian influence on its internal and external affairs.

One of the most outstanding problems is Ukraine. The independence of Ukraine is crucial from a Western point of view. The country's fragile stability, however, has led to a shift from a more Western to a more Russian orientation since President Kutshura took office in June 1994. The question is, how far will Kiev and Moscow go in their *rapprochement*. The Draft Agreement on Friendship,

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8 See István Szönyi's contribution in this volume, "Hungary as a Security Risk: No Major Concerns," chapter 4.

9 See Roxana Iorga's contribution in this volume for data, "Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks," chapter 5.

Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia indicates rather far-reaching goals in matters of security and economy. Aside from the extent to which Ukraine will be related to Russia, the crucial point is dependence. A total loss of Kiev's independence would greatly influence other countries' perceptions of Russian foreign policy.

In this regard, evolving traditional elements in Russia's foreign and security policy[10] have caused some alarm in Central and East European countries. The Russian opposition to NATO's enlargement can be interpreted as an attempt to push the Americans out of Europe and to try to establish a bipolar West European-Russian structure, a situation which Central European countries would regard as both a Western betrayal and an establishment of a West European-Russian condominium over Central Europe. Nevertheless, Western policy currently seems to aim at a convergent enlargement of EU and NATO[11] and at partial fulfilment of Moscow's need to establish some sort of special NATO relationship. It is an open question, however, in how far this approach will satisfy Russian demands and will overcome Moscow's oppostion.

(2) Security Implications of Dissolving States and Political Fragmentation

Another important feature of the drastic changes in Europe is the dissolution of states, the management of which represents a major challenge. Experience has been not only negative, as in the violent split in the former Yugoslavia, but also positive as in the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia into two independent republics, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Yet, in terms of a security challenges, the division of Czechoslovakia has weakened rather than enhanced the security of both new states. This is not so much a matter of threat perceptions in terms of a balance of military power, as of political and economic weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Being smaller than before and being less capable of safeguarding their own security, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are more urgently in need of joining existing and functioning security clubs. Certainly, there can be only a general assessment of the new risks engendered by the resurgence of old national and ethnic issues (much more pressing than a specific military threat – no Eastern European country seriously considers the possibility of being attacked by a former ally), but in conjunction with the relative smallness of these countries, participation in Western institutions becomes a must.

In this respect, the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are a stark reminder of the

10 See the contributions in this volume by Valdimir Baranovksy, "A Russian Perspective on Future European Security Arrangements," chapter 11, and Sergei Medvedev, "Security Risks in Russia and the CIS: A Case Study," chapter 2.

11 Even this aim is not shared by all the allies.

instability of the situation, including the weight of nationalistic and ethnic factors in fuelling conflicts and the inability of collective security institutions to guarantee the safety of an internationally recognized state. Such examples contribute to the resolve of most Eastern and Southeastern European countries to join the relatively stable institutions of the West.

Ukraine's dilemma is that it may not have a Western option. Only if the country should fall apart, which would not come as a surprise, some parts of the country are likely to become part of neighboring states and thus maybe of Western institutions.[12]

Russia's security perceptions are not shaped by any actual or potential external threat.[13] It knows it remains the major nuclear and conventional power in Europe and is aware that none of its neighbors has sufficient military capabilities to constitute a real threat to its territory or to confront the Russian military machine, however low its military potential and operation readiness may be.

Moscow is concerned by two somewhat related scenarios. On the one hand, it fears the implosion and disintegration of the Russian Federation, which could result from the uncontrollable spread of armed secessionist movements. Moscow has demonstrated through its military intervention that it cannot and will not accept such an internal development. On the other hand, it is worried – and irritated – by what it interprets as Western attempts to belittle its international role, marginalizing its participation in building a European security system and isolating it by establishing a new dividing line on the continent. Moscow has demonstrated through its opposition to NATO's enlargement and its ambiguous role in the crisis of the former Yugoslavia that it intends to oppose such an external development. These two developments are linked in a kind of a vicious circle: the more assertive Russian foreign policy becomes, the more it worries former allies and adversaries alike possibly stimulating a response which could, in turn, fuel Russian concerns about a Western encirclement.

In assessing its security *vis-à-vis* the former Soviet Union, Western Europe is confronted with a situation that does not offer easy solutions and choices. Until 1994, Europe still hoped that Russia would continue as a democratic, market-oriented and non-interventionist country, willing and ready to be a constructive partner in international diplomacy. In one year, this hope was shaken by: (i) President Yeltsin's reference to a potential situation of "Cold Peace" in his speech to the Budapest OSCE summit in December 1994; (ii) Moscow's intention to

12 See Oleg Strekal's chapter 3 on "Independent Ukraine: The Search for Security."

13 There were many in Europe and the United States who saw Russian military intervention in Chechnya as a clear case in favor of NATO enlargement. See, for example, the article by Otto Graf Lambsdorff, a member of the Bundestag and European chairman of the Trilateral Commission, "NATO after Chechnya: The Case for Expansion Becomes Obvious," in: *The International Herald Tribune*, 20 January 1995, p. 8.

reassert its influence and reintegrate the former Soviet republics under a restored CIS; (iii) Russia's decision to suspend the implementation of the Individual Partnership Program and to delay the approval of the document on a more intense dialogue between NATO and Russia; (iv) the uncertain path of economic reforms which has cast doubts on Russia's willingness and ability to change the old system; (v) the deepening of the domestic political struggle, complicated by two additional factors: the uncertainties about Yeltsin's political tenure and physical health, and the unrelenting expansion of organized crime; (vi) the pro-Serbian attitude in the conflict in Bosnia; and (vii) the military intervention in Chechnya which reduced President Yeltsin's support base to an all-time low and appeared as a sharp reminder of what Russian policy towards the "near abroad" could mean.

In fact, the war in Chechnya has called into question the intentions and direction of the Russian leadership itself and raised questions about what kind of state Russia is going be in the next century. European countries did not question President Yeltsin's right to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, thus implicitly regarding Chechnya as a Russian internal affair. They strongly objected, however, to the way in which the Kremlin conducted its military intervention and explicitly declared that Russia had an obligation to observe international standards and follow the code of conduct endorsed by President Yeltsin himself at the 1994 Budapest OSCE Summit.

On the one hand, Europe is fully aware that the fate of democracy and market economy in Russia will be a major factor in determining the fate of reforms in the "near abroad" and in shaping the future of European security. Thus, Europe is still willing to bet on Yeltsin and to try to influence the course of events in Russia in a way consistent with Western interests and values. This means continuing to support the present regime politically and economically along the basic lines established by the Russian-EU partnership agreement signed in Corfu in June 1994 and including Russia as a member of the G-7 (G-8), as was done at the Naples summit in July 1994.

On the other hand, the widespread feeling in Europe today is that it will take a long time for Russia to become a fully democratic and reliable partner – if it ever succeeds at all. Expectations may have been too high and it would be wise to start planning for an outcome different from that hoped for, without, however, turning it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, the West should be ready to face the more important challenge of integrating Russia "into the European and Western family of nations, in a realistic but also sensitive manner."[14]

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14 Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, British Defense Secretary, in a speech to the Belgian Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels, 30 January 1995.

(3) Intrastate Conflict as an Interstate Security Problem (the Minority Issue)

Apart from the violent fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia and Russia, latent ethnic and intrastate conflicts with high potential to involve other states are widespread among Central and East European countries, including the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Bulgaria. All are different and must be treated with individual approaches. The differences derive mainly from historical factors and experiences with the impact of particular ethnic problems. Confrontations may stem from the aspirations for greater autonomy or outright independence of an ethnic minority directly or indirectly supported by the government or nationalistic forces of the minority's country of origin. Examples of such minority groups are the Hungarian minority in Transylvania (approximately two million); the 600,000 Hungarians (more than 10 per cent of the population) living in the southern part of Slovakia; the minorities of Moravians, Silesians and Sudeten Germans in the Czech Republic; the approximately 350,000 Hungarians living in the Serb-dominated province of Vojvodina; the Romanian ethnic minority in Moldova; and the Russians in Estonia (over 30 per cent of the population) and Latvia (around 34 per cent).

But the aspirations and the degree of integration of these minorities in the respective countries differ. Some aim only at maintaining or improving their cultural situation.[15] Others strive for greater autonomy or total independence with the ultimate aim of rejoining their ethnic home country. The latter represent political factors capable of dramatically influencing the domestic situation of Eastern countries intensifying their perceptions of threat. Demands by domestic groups receiving outside support thus constitute dangerous elements of potential tension in interstate relationships in Eastern Europe. All countries with Russian minorities are highly sensitive to Moscow's attitude regarding ethnic Russians living in the "near abroad." Hungary is directly affected by and concerned about the war in Bosnia due to Hungarian minorities in the Vojvadina and the resumption of the fighting between Croats and Serbs in Croatia since this precedent would likely shape attitudes and expectations regarding similar ethnic affairs with Romania and Serbia – issues which are an important part of its security picture. As a result, Budapest's security picture is likely to be affected if the war in Bosnia ends with a Greater Serbia and/or a Greater Croatia.

Against this background, most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe share the view of the Polish president: "Expanding the European structures will promote democratic and market economy reforms, not only in the states which will

15 For a comprehensive reference book with regard of minorities in Europe and their basic policies see Jürgen Nowak, *Europas Krisenherde. Nationalitätenkonflikte vom Atlantik bis zum Ural – Ein Handbuch*, Hamburg, Oktober 1994.

acquire full membership but also in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole."[16] The prospect of membership in Western institutions as a factor dampening possible conflicts provides a healthy framework for the development of these countries.

The West should recognize that the threat perception and security requirements of the Central and Southeastern European countries are real and not confined to issues of a military nature. In today's European environment, the Central and Eastern European countries see security as much more than just being able to defend their borders. Their quest to become NATO and EU members should be interpreted as a sign of their willingness to be a part of and to contribute to the construction of a European political and economic system open to the world, but capable of providing for its own security. Nevertheless, these Eastern requests underline the need for a joint EU/NATO strategy.

2. The State of Development of EU/WEU/NATO Interaction

The nature of the new security challenges in Europe, their military as well as non-military causes, and their growing scope, require a wider range of resources for and commitments to conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-making and closer cooperation among existing security institutions. In this context, the development of the EU/WEU/NATO relationship is crucial and decision makers are faced with two basic problems: the first is to establish a functioning link between the organizations; the second is to enlarge arrangements eastward almost simultaneously or at least in a coordinated way.

(1) Towards an Interlocking Security System: Problems and State of the Art

There is no lack of institutions concerned with European security; on the contrary, NATO, EU and WEU, OSCE and even the UN have become actors in search of solutions to crises or conflicts. Nevertheless none of them has the capacity to deal with the broad and diversified nature of the new security challenges alone. In addition, there even is a widespread feeling that a real system of coordination has not yet emerged. The case of Bosnia has revealed rather an unclear and complicated structure; a certain distinction has evolved between negotiating and legitimizing multilateral institutions and organizations and actors implementing certain measures.

16 Lech Walesa, "Security Dilemmas of Central Europe," p. 5.

Institutions negotiating/legitimizing political settlements:

- states on a unilateral level, primarily the US,[17] and *de facto* Russia in a last resort role,
- the UN in cooperation with the EU (Stoltenberg, Owen), and the EU on a unilateral basis,[18] the OSCE,
- *ad hoc* structures, (the London Contact Group, International Conference on Former Yugoslavia).

Institutions for implementation and control of certain measures:

- the UN: peace-keeping and possibly peace-enforcement, humanitarian and economic aid, arms control,
- the OSCE: monitoring, conflict prevention in areas adjacent to a war zone,
- the EU: monitoring, conflict prevention, economic sanctions and incentives, humanitarian aid,
- the WEU: embargo control, peace-keeping, enforcement on a limited scale,
- NATO: monitoring, embargo control, peace-keeping, enforcement.

This mix of actors, competences and activities emerged as the result of at least two problematic developments:

- Theoretically, each organization or state should bring its specific capacity to bear. In reality, however, it is difficult even to assess the specific potential of existing institutions as they are all undergoing continuous adaptation and change and all organizations depend on the political will of the member states.
- At the same time, a drastic simplification of the complex European institutional security structure is not feasible. It is just too great a task for governments to dismantle the old institutions and start over from scratch. For example, it would be a very difficult task to develop the EU into some sort of a third power between the US and Russia serving as a pole of attraction and an international problem solver; the EU has inherited too many contradictions and differences in interest, and lacks legitimation, which limits its role.[19] Moreover, the concentration of diplomatic, economic and military power in a "single Western European hand" may create new problems in terms of competition between this new entity and Russia and the US, thereby hindering the resolution of the architectural security problems.

There seems to be no alternative to a system of "interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions." The Europeans have taken a number of practical steps in this direction:

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17 See the Croatian-Muslim agreements under the sponsorship of the US.

18 See, for example, EU's action plan of November 1993.

19 One would have a good point in stating: "Cohesion requires flexibility." The question is, however, how much flexibility is necessary?

- by locating all major security organizations in Brussels, moving the WEU's secretariat general to Brussels, where communication and coordination between EU/WEU/NATO is regarded to be easier;
- by making some countries' WEU ambassadors at the same time representatives to NATO;
- by establishing contacts between the WEU general secretariat and the respective body at NATO. What is still missing, however, is some sort of an established division of labor between WEU and NATO. The often used formula that WEU should act where NATO is not ready to act merely leads to the duplication of structures and assets. While the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are meant to establish a formal link between the two organizations through possible use by the WEU of NATO command structures and assets, unfortunately, this concept is blocked by French opposition.

Problems of a similar magnitude but of a different kind exist in the internal coperation between EU and WEU on the one hand and in the embryonic collaboration of EU/WEU and NATO an the other hand. The emergence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a security tool of the EU seems to have complicated rather than smoothed the inter-institutional relationship. The EU has surely moved ahead through both the launching of the CFSP and its efforts to reinforce the WEU, which the Maastricht Treaty considers "an integral part of the EU." The new security dimension introduced by the Maastricht Treaty represents an initial attempt to fulfil the principle of "comprehensiveness": it has tried, in fact, to create new instruments complementing the Union's already well developed external economic policy. Until recently, the latter constituted the only real instrument of security projection of the Fifteen, which they used both preventively (association agreements) and punitively (economic sanctions).[20]

The problem for the Union today is whether the whole of its external policy, including the CFSP, can become a credible external security instrument providing stability at the Union's borders and beyond. In particular, what has to be discussed is whether the Union's recent move toward a new defense and security posture will help the search for security in Europe by creating a better division of labor between the Union and NATO. How will the institutional and political evolution started with Maastricht increase the effectiveness of both institutions in the coordinated management of crises and conflicts in Europe?

The need to put more emphasis on the role of the CFSP and to reinforce the WEU is clearly a result of the new post-1989 geopolitical scenario in Europe. But the actual contribution of CFSP and the WEU to crisis management operations in these last years has been far from satisfactory. This is one of the reasons why a

20 See Roxana Iorga's contribution to this volume, "Romanian Perspectives on Security Risks," chapter 5.

debate on revision of the Maastricht Treaty has already begun. The main issues are:

- the rebalancing of the process of European integration in the direction of defense by putting less emphasis on economic integration; politics should be brought into the forefront once again;
- the strengthening in operational terms of the trend towards progressive communitarization of the institutional procedures in the defense field, through joint actions by majority voting, a greater role for the European Parliament, common budgetary procedures, etc.

It seems that the EU (including its diplomacy-based CFSP and its military-based WEU) will have to undergo substantial adaptation before it can be successfully linked with NATO to master the new security challenges in Europe.

(2) Stretching the Western Network Further East

Soon after the meltdown of the Communist system, the Atlantic Alliance stretched out its hands in friendship to the former Warsaw Pact (WP) countries. The NACC principle of non-selectivity with regard to the new partner states greatly helped to further compliance with the CFE Treaty which had become questioned by the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Since this great success, more practical day-to-day consultations and seminars have dominated NACC activities. There is no doubt that the NACC's dialogue is a useful instrument to support change in Central and Eastern Europe, but these activities and the PfP have turned out to be insufficient:

- Those countries seeking NATO membership have shown dissatisfaction with the seminar-type activities and have asked for more practical steps in the direction of membership.
- Conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement have become the new tasks for the military. Therefore more practical arrangements will have to be found to improve military inter-operability in its broad sense. In addition, the NACC has not been able to prevent the renationalization of the military in Central and Eastern European countries. NATO has tried to provide an answer to these demands and risks with the PfP. Thus, the PfP has to a large extent taken over NACC tasks: overlaps and duplication have become unavoidable.[21]
- There is no doubt that the NACC and the PfP address a serious problem of the new political systems in the CEEC: the role and function of the military. But this is only one of the problems. Weak economies, ethnic, nationalist, religious and cultural tensions contribute to the instability of this region. NATO's

21 This is partly due to the fact, that non-NATO countries in Europe like Finland, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland has been given the opportunity to take part in PfP.

programs cannot resolve these troubles, and the Alliance is fully aware of this limitation.

Additional problems are interrent in the PfP's structure, the principle that NATO establishes individual programs with each state (the 16 + 1 principle). On the one hand, this idea of establishing individual programs in the broader framework of the standard agreement makes it possible to treat all partners on an equal basis, gives NATO a clear steering function with regard to the individual programs, and avoids the possible negative interference of certain countries. On the other hand, given the unwillingness to undertake rapid enlargement and the rather limited scope of the programs, the PfP can prevent neither the renationalization of the partner states' defense structures, regarded as a major desire of the Alliance, nor the re-emergence of Russia as an important military actor.[22]

Another problem is the reach of these new arrangements. As already stated, the Alliance started out with the principle of non-selectivity. The PfP, however, has a broader and at the same time narrower approach: broader in the sense that (former) EFTA countries were given a chance to participate, narrower however, in the sense that foreseeably not all countries invited have been able to provide NATO with the demanded individual PfP program proposals. According to this fact, an even smaller number of countries seems to be eligible for membership.

A part of the practical work of the PfP is related to possible peace-keeping operations between NATO and an (unknown) number of PfP partner states. This would involve efforts to deal with crises before they become violent and gives rise to difficult decisions for the Alliance concerning its future tasks and roles and calls for an especially careful analysis of the relationship between Article 5 (collective defense) and Article 4 (consultation, aspects of collective security) of the Washington Treaty.

Another important problem is the future WEU/NATO relationship. There is currently much overlapping and duplication of the two organizations' activities: WEU offers higher level consultation, NATO much more substantial cooperation with the CEEC, but in principle both institutions aim to do the same job and to extend stability to the east of Europe. No clear-cut division of labor is discernible. But how would this complex consultative structure influence policy development in the event of a real crisis? Who will do the necessary planning and preparation in case a peace-keeping mission is required: NATO or WEU or both?

An expression of the current competition is the parallel action of NATO and the WEU in the Adriatic: NATO and WEU ships control the embargo in parallel actions under a common command and the – conceptually very doubtful – joint

22 See William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, "NATO Expansion and Partnership for Peace: Assessing the Facts," in: *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 139, December 1994, pp. 47-53.

political control of the NATO and the WEU Councils.[23] Enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia has been enforced by NATO but complementary control actions on the Danube have been undertaken in a WEU framework. In addition, a number of military activities, especially on former Yugoslav soil, have been undertaken outside of both frameworks – under the auspices of the UN or outside of the European or Atlantic frameworks, as in the case of the European reaction force in Croatia and Bosnia, consisting of British, French and Dutch forces.

3. How to Develop EU-NATO Interaction in the Future?

In order to shape the interaction of the EU and NATO, decision makers will first have to agree not to focus on their respective organizations but to look at the system as a whole. The need for such a holistic approach is the subject of the following section. It leads once again to the matter of a division of labor between the organizations as the efficiency and stability of their interaction depends substantially on a common understanding of respective tasks.

(1) What Kind of Link Between NATO and the WEU?

An (at least rough) division of labor and an understanding of how the two institutions can develop into a really cooperative institutional arrangement is required. This would include a substantial consultation process between the WEU and NATO for each military action. Given that crises can escalate, the WEU should be fully backed by NATO. This is also a necessity in case of actions aiming to prevent the spillover of certain conflicts. Bringing the political and military weight of the whole Alliance to bear will always have a greater effect than relying solely on WEU's potential. This should be taken into consideration during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: the French approach to the upcoming conference aims at defining the future function of the EU's military arm, the WEU, in relation to the EU only, neglecting the essential link to NATO. This must be avoided.

Despite talk of an independent West European capability for regional actions beyond NATO, there is no doubt that West European countries will not be able to mobilize the necessary resources for larger operations (including peace-keeping). The reason is the lack of central force multiplier categories in such sectors as

23 See Assembly of the Western European Union, *An operational organisation for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation*, Document 1415, 10 May 1994, Fortieth Ordinary Session (First Part), Report submitted on behalf on the Defence Committee by Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur, p. 6.

command, control and communication, and strategic transport. Progress towards greater independence will be rather slow, as money is needed elsewhere.[24]

What is needed, instead of the rather competitive relationship of the two institutions in recent years,[25] is a parallel debate on a new Euro-Atlantic relationship. This new "transatlantic bargain" should embrace not only security affairs but also a broader range of policies. Given the scarce resources in relation to the great tasks to be performed, a new form of solidarity (within the Alliance and between Nato and WEU) has to be found. Required are (1) guidelines to structure resource sharing; (2) a statement of commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to act to resolve crises; and (3) the establishment of organizing principles for new approaches to conflict prevention and crisis management. The traditional transatlantic concept of burden-sharing needs to be widened to include all relevant contributions to conflict prevention on the basis of the concept of responsibility sharing.

In order to establish some division of labor it is essential to achieve a proper understanding of peace-keeping, which is still lacking today. At least four kinds of peace-keeping operations can be identified: preventive peace-keeping; interpositioning of forces; maintaining civil order; and denial of certain aggressive actions. The high level of confusion among allies with regard to these four types of peace-keeping and the varying levels of risk-taking that they imply has to be reduced.

The enlargement of the WEU and NATO continues to pose a problem for their interaction. Current policy aims at a parallel enlargement of NATO and the EU/WEU, and indeed, many countries in Central Europe are inclined to join EU/WEU as well as NATO. However, given the current structure of EU policies in the field of agriculture and regional affairs (structural and cohesion funds), the EU does not seem to be able to invite new full members. According to a serious assessment, the membership of the Visegrad countries would call for an increase in the EU budget of 60 billion ECUs or a dramatic change in major policies.[26]

Can the WEU be expanded independently of the EU? Theoretically yes. Even in practical terms, this hypothesis is not totally unfeasible as the current state of incongruency between EU and WEU memberships demonstrates. But even membership in the WEU calls for some clarifications in relation to both EU and NATO: Can the EU Council draw on such a WEU member state? Does this

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24 Only France plans to increase slightly its military expenditures in the years to come. All other European states experience substantial cuts in defense expenditures.

25 See Peter Schmidt, "Partners or Rivals: NATO, WEU, EC and the Reorganization of European Security Policy – Taking Stock," in: Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defense Cooperation,* Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992, pp. 187-228.

26 See Richard E. Baldwin, *Towards an Integrated Europe* (Centre for Economic Policy Research), London 1994, p. 170.

member state has to assign its forces to NATO or will it be represented at least in the political bodies of the Alliance? If the West is really committed to the goal of avoiding the renationalization of the defense sector and believes in the stabilizing function of membership, its policy should be to speed up the extension of NATO to provide a more stable framework for the politics of CEEC and to contribute thereby to conflict prevention.

(2) What Kind of Division of Labor between NATO and EU?

The main field of cooperation/competition between NATO and the EU is the eastern part of the European continent, to which both organizations are addressing their attention and from which both are receiving the main stimuli for institutional and political adaptation. Thus two key questions are:

- whether the security actions of the two organizations towards the East are sufficiently coordinated, and
- whether the reform process, induced by the requests coming from the East, is being implemented with the aim of reaching an effective division of labor and responsibility.

The answer to both questions is largely negative. Only *ex-post*, after institutional adaptation, will the two organizations try in practice to coordinate the new instruments and to enhance the process of consultation. But this effort cannot be seen as satisfactory as an *a priori* coordination, aimed at creating institutional consistency between the two reform dynamics. In fact, there are two risks:

- The first is that of creating a situation of dangerous competition between the two structures in order to reach an advantageous position in the rush to accommodate the requests of Eastern countries.
- The second is that of not shouldering the responsibility of a leading role in the stabilization of Eastern Europe. The protracted failure of Western institutions to meet challenges and risks in Eastern Europe and to project stability and security eastward can rapidly lead to a complete loss of credibility, which would definitely undermine the potential for innovation of both NATO and the EU.

The main objective of both organizations should be to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the process of enlargement towards the east. In order to achieve this goal, they should start from consideration of the deep differences in security perceptions in Russia and the CEEC. Of the several case studies conducted in our research program, it is obvious that in the case of Russia the search for security essentially means a new international status, whereas in the case of the CEEC it principally means a new kind of cover and guarantee. This represents an additional argument in favor of a better division of labor and functions between NATO and

the EU. All institutional reforms should follow this basic requirement; as a result the processes of enlargement of NATO and the EU need to be closely coordinated.

The aim to enlarge EU has not yet been impeded by the overlapping of Russia's domestic and foreign policy. Many among Moscow's political elite think that the most powerful opponent is not the EU but NATO. But the current critique of a possible enlargement of NATO is not based on an analysis of the political power situation in Europe and reflects historical and outdated assessments. In the long term, when Russia finds out that it is not NATO which will represent the real competitor for power and influence in Europe, but a possibly strengthened and expanded EU, Russia's rather positive view of EU policy could change rather rapidly. NATO addresses only one political aspect – security – whereas the EU is almost an all-embracing organization and will therefore be much more of a competitor than the security-centred Alliance.[27] Once the EU/WEU starts to develop a real defense dimension separable from the US and the Alliance, there is therefore reason to believe that Russian policy will change.

Thus a common EU/NATO approach with regard to the question of how to make enlargement palatable for Moscow must be worked out. The current approach of establishing a special bilateral NATO-Russia relationship or of courting Moscow in special frameworks such as the Contact Group on Bosnia does not fully exploit Euro-Atlantic levers. Nevertheless it should represent the crux and priority commitment of a long lasting Western strategy towards Russia.

This strategy has several positive objectives:

- to prevent the syndrome of singularisation and isolationism in Russia;
- to reverse the process of division and fragmentation in Central and Eastern Europe;
- to oblige the EU to shoulder its burden and responsibility but also to define a new and reasonable task for the (enlarged) Alliance;
- to provide a security net for the small states of Central and Eastern Europe which satisfies their interest in belonging to the West.

4. Strategic Demands and Institutional Options

In the initial phase following the end of the Cold War (1990-95), transatlantic partners were preoccupied with reassuring each other that the close European-American relationship would continue, albeit in a different fashion. In the second

27 One might even argue that Moscow should be interested in the establishment of an enlarged NATO providing the necessary reassurance for Central European states which would be the prerequisite for mutually advantageous political and economic relations between these countries and Russia.

half of this decade, they will have to focus on identifying common concerns and working out how transatlantic cooperation can help to ease common security problems most efficiently. A division of labor between the EU and NATO for a comprehensive security approach toward the CEEC and CIS countries remains a theoretical exercise as long as it lacks major preconditons for its implementation. Europeans and Americans will have to support such a strategy substantially: on the European side this presupposes a common commitment and significantly advanced cooperation in security matters; on the American side it involves a clear commitment to remain a "European power." The best way to combine intra-European security cooperation with a continuing American role in the security of Europe is to identify common challenges of the EU and the United States and to draw respective conclusions for the future institutional arrangement.

(1) Defining the Transatlantic Agenda on the Security of Europe

The definition of future transatlantic interests in the security of the CEEC and CIS must be placed in the wider international context within which transatlantic nations will have to operate in the future. Compared to the situation in 1990 the context for transatlantic cooperation has changed significantly; while not antagonistic, the future international context is likely to be less cooperative and more competitive than expected in the early nineties, with new struggles for influence between China, Russia, Japan, the US and the European Union. The Europeans have pushed ahead with their process of unification and cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe and have started to develop some structural ties with Russia and Ukraine. In the United States, the Clinton administration has worked on a domestic reform program and cleared some items on the external agenda, such as relations with Japan, conclusion of NAFTA and APEC. Jointly the EU and the US have found solutions to multilateral trade issues (Uruguay Round, foundation of the WTO) and to a new set of security challenges (NATO adaptation, CSCE institutionalization). Washington and European capitals have cooperated in international crisis management during the Gulf war, the Somalia mission, and the Bosnia conflict.

All these experiences in the short timespan after the Cold War demonstrate that there are new difficulties as well as new responsibilities in Euro-American cooperation.[28] They also prove, more importantly, that the potential for action emanating from this relationship is significantly higher than that of other actors in world politics, including other major powers (Japan, Russia, China) or inter-

28 European Parliament, Report of the Committee on the institutional affairs on the future relations between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, Brussels, 27 January 1994 (Rapporteur Karel De Grucht).

national organizations (UN, OECD, OSCE). Joint Euro-American approaches are relatively efficient in all those areas in which the degree of international interdependence has increased. Tokyo still has problems with going beyond competitive goals in trade relations; Moscow continues to be unpredictable in its external behavior and could be a cooperation partner as well as an aggressive challenger; Beijing is hard to pin down to Western standards.

Multilateral organizations, conferences, and regimes seem to have much less power of initiative and implementation than does Euro-American bilateralism. More often than not, they depend on the Atlantic stimulant, on conceptional ideas, and paradigmatic implementation. Solutions to such issues as global arms control, organized international crime, and problems of overpopulation would lack a driving force if the EU and the US did not take a pioneering role. The same applies to security in Europe. Since the world has been relieved of the constraints of East-West antagonism, cooperative solutions to worldwide as well as regional challenges have a more realistic chance. Yet they call for a more extensive sharing of responsibility among states, and not just the US and EU member states, though not that many viable actors are able and willing to take on the burden of leadership.[29]

In the second half of the nineties, the US and EU are confronted with a number of international challenges that demand joint action. This list includes the further liberalization in world trade to enhance global economic growth and reduce unemployment, a renewed approach to arms control and non-proliferation, the promotion of worldwide environmental protection and the management of overpopulation, which involves uncontrolled migration, malnutrition, epidemics, lack of education, socio-political aggression and systemic instability. A matter of comparable scope is the stabilization of the post-communist states in Europe and the building of a reliable security order in the OSCE area. In this regard, it seems that five years after the end of the Cold War the task of enlarging the area of democracy, market economy, and the rule of law is by no means completed. In many of the Central and East European states as well as in those of the CIS, old communist elites have come back into power. States like Ukraine and the Russian Federation are threatened by secessionist movements. The scarcity of resources in all OSCE countries demands better orchestration of multilateral institutions and a more comprehensive (civilian and military) approach to dealing with violent conflict.

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29 "In the trade sphere, the GATT agreement showed that no multilateral accord was possible until the EU and US had come to an agreement. Indeed, it was embarrassing in view of the ostensibly multilateral nature of the GATT to see the degree to which everything eventually turned on an understanding between the US and the EU. Clearly neither was in a position to form alternative coalitions or to bypass the need to reach an accommodation with the other." Michael Smith/Stephen Woolcock, "Learning to Cooperate: The Clinton Administration and the European Union," in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1994, p. 474.

The EU and the US are centrally involved in the efforts to stabilize Europe and to build up structures of cooperative security throughout the continent. Yet, a number of conceptual questions are perennially unresolved and remain on the agenda. Almost all of them are somehow related to the future development of Russia:

- In the short and medium term, Russia will remain unstable and leadership in Moscow will remain weak – meaning difficult choices for Atlantic leaders. Yeltsin's government is neither sufficiently democratic nor particularly reformist, but because of lack of alternatives, Western leaders support it. They have not been harsh on Russian policy in Chechnya so as not to weaken Yeltsin's domestic position further. But the West must find a balance between two objectives: the evolution of democracy and a market economy on the one hand and the respect of human rights and minority rights on the other hand.
- The West has to reconsider how to condition its support for the economic and political restructuring of former communist countries. Assistance can either be conditional on the fact that reforms have already been carried out or that merely first preparatory steps have been taken to achieve market economy. In the first approach, which is favored by the United States, Western help may not be granted for a long time as reform has not come about. In the second approach, there is a risk that foreign assistance may be lost when internal reform efforts in the end turn out to have failed. Western countries have to determine in each case how to deal with a given country.
- Atlantic nations will have to decide how to intensify trans-European cooperation while containing potential Russian aggression. This decision involves the distribution of scarce resources: how much should be allocated to fostering the Russian transformation process and how much to preparing NATO's military reconstitution? This question is particularly pertinent in this ongoing period of uncertainty in Russia. If the West emphasizes reconstitution, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, if the West puts all its eggs into the basket of transformation, that, too, could turn out to be a miscalculation.
- The West has to decide on the cooperative economic, political and security structures needed in Europe. Should they be all-European, regional or both? There is little regional cooperation in the east of the continent and the trans-European link consists basically of an OSCE that is very limited in its reach. Should the cooperative vacuum in the east be filled by further all-European cooperation: a deepening of the OSCE and/or a widening of the Council of Europe? In this case, the transatlantic community will have to be upgraded. Or should it rather be filled by regional integration, that is, within the CIS? Will

this be interpreted by Moscow as an invitation to return to hegemonic power politics? It would, in any case, lead to the danger of regionalization.

- The West cannot disregard that Russia and the other CIS states cover a geographically and geostrategically vast Euro-Asian area. Is the West, implicitly or explicitly, favoring two spheres of influence within this area (which will most likely mean two different ways of ensuring security) or do Western countries regard it as one common space in which to share responsibility among all OSCE nations?[30]
- Europe is affected by a number of ongoing local wars, some of them raging within states. There are also cases on the continent in which conflicts have a potential to grow violent – with unavoidable repercussions on Atlantic nations. Should Western nations put more emphasis on the prevention of military conflict or should they improve crisis management and enhance means of military intervention and defense?

All these conceptual alternatives with which the West has to grapple lead to the question of how to shape the new fault line between East and West emerging in Europe. Transatlantic nations will have to consider not only the pros and cons of alternative solutions to reducing the continental divide, as in the Cold War days, they will also have to take into account the effects which divergent approaches might have on the future Western community, its degree of solidarity, and its cooperative infrastructure.

(2) Options of EU-NATO Interconnection

Some observers have compared present transatlantic relations to those between North America and Western Europe at the end of the 1940s and have concluded that the same amount of restructuring is needed today as was carried out after World War II. Indeed, the first five post-Cold War years have already witnessed substantial institutional change which, however, has involved the adaptation of existing institutions, rather than the creation of new ones, as occurred after the Second World War. While keeping most of their previous objectives, NATO, WEU, EU and the EU-US Dialogue have extended their missions and altered their external appearance and internal fabric. This transformation process continues and is characterized by new features of economics, foreign policy, and security. Economic relations across the Atlantic are those least in need of institutional innovation as they have long been dealt with effectively in multilateral fora such as OECD, GATT, the Western Economic Summit and EC-US talks. Foreign policy seems to be the real late-comer in transatlantic relations and is now

30 F. Stephen Larrabee, Allen Lynch, *Russia, Ukraine and European Security – Implications for Western Policy*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation 1994.

being dealt with in the intensified EU-US Dialogue. Security, which was covered entirely by NATO for more than forty years, has become a more complex task, demanding a broader contractual and institutional basis.

The future transatlantic security link will have to provide two essential things:
- a combination of collective defense and collective security,
- a combination of military and non-military security measures.

What are the West's institutional options for assuring these requirements? In order to combine the responsibilities of collective defense and collective security, transatlantic nations basically have no alternative but to continuing to optimize existing structures. Starting over from scratch is out of the question. For politico-military reasons, collective defense and collective security cannot be separated in any case. Consequently, both NATO and WEU have extended their traditional mission beyond collective defense to providing a contribution to collective security organizations (UN, OSCE) by making political declarations concerning their preparedness for new missions. They have, in fact, also begun to act accordingly, particularly in the former Yugoslavia.

Further adjustments in this direction are on the way but may progress along alternative routes, depending on parameters which are partly outside the realm of security. Transatlantic structures may be altered either by unilateral shifts of one side or by joint efforts. On the US side, a lowering of Washington's commitments has been discussed and has even occurred to some extent through the reduction of the American presence in Europe since the early 1990s. Further Republican dominance in US policy will hardly allow for any changes in the opposite direction. On the European side, WEU members are strengthening the so-called second pillar of NATO. WEU is developing initiatives to create some military infrastructure of its own and may give this approach priority over further modernization of NATO. Once WEU has established its common defense policy and moved on to common defense, it could become the fourth pillar of EU and a true second pillar of NATO. For the foreseeable future, however, it remains extremely limited militarily in its range of action – quite independently of any further developing link with the EU. In sum, neither side is likely to reshape NATO in a relevant way. Neither a complete US withdrawal from Europe nor the development of a self-sufficient common European defense is in the cards. In other words, as in collective defense, the collective security tasks of the Alliance will continue to be characterized by a disproportion between the American and the European side, at least as far as available military capability is concerned.

A joint approach to both collective defense and collective security became operational when West Europeans endorsed a 1994 US proposal to allow WEU members to draw on American assets and to create Combined Joint Task Forces

(CJTF). This innovation allows for more flexibility in Euro-American security policy but also has important limits: Washington may be less generous in practice than it sounds in theory and Paris may be less willing to take up the American offer than is expected by its fellow Europeans. Moreover, the *ad hoc* coalitions which the new transatlantic arrangements allow for will strain relationships and solidarity between those allies that act and those that do not.

III. The Transatlantic Community Renewed

There has been talk of renewing and extending the Washington Treaty to improve the political acceptance and strengthen the contractual basis among the allies. The emphasis of this renewal would be on collective security commitments and regulations. But who will be the partners to such a revised treaty, the present sixteen nations or an enlarged membership of NATO? What will be the range of commitments covered by a revised treaty? Will security guarantees for CEEC be included? Such a revision of the Washington Treaty would raise the question of whether the Alliance is to remain basically a defense pact or whether it is to become an organization of collective security – and eventually merge with the OSCE, in which case transatlantic relations would lose most of their distinctiveness.

The institutional options for future transatlantic security relations are also determined by the need to combine military and non-military measures. Successful security policy in terms of prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict will have to include instruments of political and economic stability that are not available to the military organizations of NATO and WEU. They are held by other actors – the US, the EU and its member states – and cannot be commanded by military organizations. Atlantic nations will have to look for other frameworks to coordinate their respective programs of stabilization and systemic change in CEEC and CIS countries. Concerted and joint action by Western states can either be channelled through multilateral organizations such as the OSCE and the EBRD or be addressed directly to countries in the East. In both cases, transatlantic cooperation will have to be organized within the group of individual Western nations and with the support of the EU-US Dialogue.

Thus it is the EU-US Dialogue which has a relatively high potential for innovation, even compared to NATO. All official documents confirm the Alliance as the "essential forum" of consultation in transatlantic security and defense policy. Yet NATO is likely to share an increasing part of security tasks with the two main actors, the EU and the US. Indeed, the bulk of responsibility for stabilization and conflict prevention falls to the EU. These are areas in which NATO can offer political and diplomatic links (see NACC and PfP) but hardly any economic or

political instruments to develop security structures. In addition, for reasons of burden sharing, Washington has transferred most of the responsibility of stabilization in Eastern Europe to the EU, diminishing NATO's role in the process.[31] With respect to conflict prevention and systemic transformation (democracy, market economy, rule of law) NATO's contribution is inferior to that of EU-US collaboration. In the framework of their bilateral relationship, the European Union and the United States are managing a large part of today's security order in Europe.

Still, however, both the EU and the US lack the adequate means to carry out their tasks and roles.[32] Moreover, most of the items on the new list of common challenges of the EU and the US lack political acceptance by public opinion. Politicians have not yet made convincing cases in this regard. Political barriers continue to limit joint action in the traditionally sensitive area of security policy. That is why the initial euphoria about new opportunities for cooperation after the end of the Cold War has turned into disillusionment. It is important to realize now that both sides of the Atlantic are under the same kind of domestic pressures to reduce expenditure for security. [33] Atlantic nations will therefore have to find new methods of burden sharing which go beyond military contributions and include investments in stabilization policy.

Proposals have been made to identify this new and broader version of solidarity and set it down in a new transatlantic treaty. Former Secretary of State James Baker was the first to make the proposal in 1990; others have repeated it since then in vaguer terms. Early in 1995, the British and the German defense ministers asked for the establishment of an Atlantic Community; in February 1995, the German foreign minister advanced the idea of an Atlantic free trade zone. The options for an institutional readjustment of transatlantic security policy should not be blurred, however. The weakness of cooperation among Atlantic nations in non-military security measures remains an unsolved problem while their importance for international peace is growing.

If the issue of non-military security has not yet become an area of strategic Euro-American cooperation, interaction between military and non-military security policies has been addressed even less. In this regard, no transatlantic

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31 After the end of the Cold War Washington's policy of containment was replaced by a concept of enlargement concerning Western market economy and democracy. The most recent approach of the Clinton Administration puts the notion of the "integration of Europe" on to the foreground and thus refers to the EU as the prime actor.

32 The situation is also characterized by the unfulfilled hope for a peace dividend after the end of the Cold War. A significant shift from military to civilian means did not materialize.

33 See for one of the most recent examples the "jobs-summit" of the G-7 in March 1994. David Goodhart, "US and Europe Discover Unusual Consensus," in: *Financial Times*, 14 March 1994, p. 4.

forum seems suited to taking on this bridging role. NATO lacks expertise and credibility in non-military questions of security, the EU-US Dialogue covers only the non-military issues, and the EU lacks competence in military matters – at least as long as it has not developed its common defense as postulated in the Maastricht Treaty. Theoretically there are three options to deal with the problem of underdeveloped Atlantic security structures. Either the EU-US-Dialogue or NATO could be made the lead coordinator of the new more comprehensive security policy of Atlantic nations or a steering group could be established which coordinates both institutions – conceptionally and operationally. Such a "transatlantic security coordination group" could be based on a reinvigorated Washington Treaty as well as an enhanced Transatlantic Declaration. The embryonic links between EU and NATO would take on a more elaborate shape.

All this leads to the conclusion that the new European security system will have to be built on modernized transatlantic relations. Security will remain a prime field within these relations as the new security challenges in the CEEC and CIS countries have to be met and a number of worldwide issues such as non-proliferation and military terrorism dealt with. Other issue areas such as environmental devastation, uncontrolled mass migration and organized international crime will rival with security for positions at the top of the transatlantic agenda, but they may all be dwarfed by the need for economic growth. One suggestion to enhance economic growth at both sides of the Atlantic is implied in the recent proposition for a Euro-American free trade zone. New transatlantic arrangements for security are likely to be influenced as much by dynamics in the economic sphere as by specific and generic dangers to Western security in CEEC and CIS countries. In this case EU-NATO interaction will have been transcended and a more comprehensive Atlantic Community will loom on the horizon.

ACE	Allied Command Europe
AFD	Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary)
APEC	Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AYD	Alliance of Young Democrats (Hungary)
BSF	Black Sea Fleet
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDPP	Christian Democratic People's Party (Hungary)
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMECON	see CMEA
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives (EU)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DOR	Democratic Convention of Romania
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation (OSCE)
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNP	Gross National Product
GRP	Greater Romanian Party
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities

HDFR	Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania
HSP	Hungarian Socialist Party
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDSR	Social Democratic Party of Romania
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	Pologne, Hongrie: Assistance pour la restructuration économique
PUNR	Party of Romanian National Unity
PSD	Party of Social Democracy (Romania)
R & D	Research and Development
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCP	Romanian Communist Party
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe
SLP	Socialist Labor Party (Romania)
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WP	Warsaw Pact
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

AFP	Agence France Press
AP	Associated Press
CN	Currierul National
FJ	Financial Izvestiya
FT	Financial Times
GU	Golas Ukrainy
IHT	International Herald Tribune
Ng	Népszabadság
NYT	New York Times
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
USJS	United States Informations Service
WP	Washington Post
WSJ	Wall Street Journal

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