
SOUTHERN
EUROPEAN
SECURITY
in the 1990s
edited by ROBERTO ALIBONI
foreword by WILLIAM WALLACE
TURKEY GREECE
ITALY FRANCE PORTUGAL SPAIN

# Southern European Security in the 1990s

Edited by
**Roberto Aliboni**

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# List of abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AMU | Arab Maghreb Union |
| ATBM | Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile |
| AWACS | Airborne Warning and Control System |
| CFE | Conventional Armed Forces In Europe |
| CIDOB | Centre d'Informació i Documentació Internacionals a Barcelona |
| CINCSOUTH | Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe |
| CSBM | Confidence and Security Building Measures |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| CSCM | Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean |
| DC | Democrazia Cristiana |
| DPC | NATO's Defence Planning Committee |
| EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
| EC | European Community |
| EFTA | European Free Trade Association |
| ELIAMEP | Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy |
| EMS | European Monetary System |
| EP | *El País* |
| EPC | European Political Cooperation |
| EUI | European University Institute |
| FIR | Forza d'Intervento Rapido |
| FRELIMO | Frente de Libertação de Moçambique |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| IAI | Istituto Affari Internazionali |
| IFRI | Institut Français des Relations Internationales |

| | |
|---|---|
| IGC | Intergovernmental Conference(s) |
| IHT | *International Herald Tribune* |
| INF | Intermediate Nuclear Forces |
| IISS | International Institute for Strategic Studies |
| KTM | *Kathimerini* |
| LM | *Le Monde* |
| MPLA | Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola |
| NADGE | NATO Air Defence Ground Environment |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PASOK | Panhellenic Socialist Movement |
| PBL | *Público* |
| PDS | Partito Democratico della Sinistra |
| PKK | Kurdistan Worker's Party |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| R&D | Research & Development |
| RENAMO | Resistência Nacional Moçambicana |
| RIIA | Royal Institute of International Affairs |
| RPR | Rassemblement pour la République |
| SACEUR | Supreme Allied Commander Europe |
| SADCC | Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference |
| SDPP | Social Democratic People's Party |
| SEA | Single European Act |
| SIPRI | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |
| SLOCs | Sea Lanes of Communication |
| TVM | *To Vima* |
| UDF | Union pour la Démocratie Française |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNITA | União Nacional para à Independência Total de Angola |
| US | United States |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WEU | Western European Union |

# Foreword

'European security' has meant primarily *central* European security and insecurity for the past forty years. The division of Germany left two alliances facing each other across the north German plain. The western allies turned their attention to the 'flanks', northern and southern, from time to time. But it was always clear that these were auxiliary: it was the 'central front' which counted. Western European Union, the European caucus within NATO, included Italy and France among its members, but rarely included the Mediterranean among its concerns. As Britain progressively withdrew its forces from the Eastern and Western Mediterranean the security of 'the southern flank' — itself a loose concept — was left very largely to the United States to define. NATO's southern members related bilaterally to the United States, rather than multilaterallyy to each other — as did Spain, outside the alliance structure.

So the security of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean has been neglected by West European governments and commentators in spite of the efforts of a small minority, notable among them the staff of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, to raise the broader issues at stake. Relaxation of tension in Central Europe, and the prospect of progressive American reductions in their European troop deployments, both allow for and necessitate greater concern for security issues to the south. This volume is an extremely useful contribution to the debate, exploring the different perspectives of the Atlantic Alliance's six southern members and the partial and painful emergence of a sense of shared identity.

The 'threat from the south' which several of the chapters which follow discuss is as old a problem for West European security as the 'threat from the East'. Both carry echoes from Europe's past, still there beneath the surface in the debate over 'European identity': Europe versus Asia, Europe as distinct from Africa, Christianity versus Islam, the Mongol, the Turk or the Moor as

the stereotypical outsider. The boundaries of 'Europe' have moved northwards and southwards across the Mediterranean region. Iberia, Sicily and the Balkans have all formed part of empires from outside Europe. The lands around the southern and eastern Mediteranean were all incorporated into European empires in the last decades of the nineteenth century or the first decades of the twentieth; Algeria was even organized into *départements* of metropolitan France.

Both in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean region local tensions and insecurities were overlaid — and to some extent contained — by the disciplines of superpower conflict and the assumptions of the cold war. Both to Europe's east and south the passing of the era of East-West confrontation has allowed old conflicts to re-emerge, and new tensions to develop. Soviet warships no longer contest the Eastern Mediterranean with the US sixth fleet, nor do Soviet objectives in the Middle East transform the Arab-Israeli conflict into an aspect of superpower competition. Balkan conflicts, the Macedonian problem, relations between Turks, Armenians, Christians and Muslims in the Levant, all preoccupied the Chancelleries of Europe before 1914 — as did relations between European states and local rulers in North Africa, from Agadir and Fez to Benghazi and Cairo. The context has changed, the balance of populations altered radically. But the geography remains unaltered; and many of the old mental maps still linger in popular imagination and political rhetoric, conjuring up alternative boundaries and irreconcilable claims to territory, resources and prestige.

Northern Europeans have paid far too little attention to these issues. Southern Europeans have been preoccupied by them, but until recently paid more attention to local conflicts and immediate threats than to the security of Southern Europe as a whole. This book will help to redress this past imbalance, and so makes an important contribution to the developing debate about Europe's security needs in the 1990s.

William Wallace

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# 1
# Southern European Security: perceptions and problems

Roberto Aliboni

### The Southern Rim of the Euro-Atlantic set

The term Southern Europe, as used in this volume, does not coincide with the geographic definition: it includes, from east to west, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. Some objections could be raised to this definition.

Geographically, Turkey lies only partially on the European continent. Yet, the secular choice of Kemalist nationalism brought the country into the Western and European sphere. Turkey is an integral part of NATO and is closely linked to the European Community.

The inclusion of France could also be opposed: the country gravitates mainly towards the Rhine and the English Channel. Yet, unlike Germany and the UK, it also opens onto the Mediterranean, and its policy towards that area, along with its policy towards Africa, has a major influence on its national foreign and security policy. Its Mediterranean policy reflects, even historically (Buheiry, 1989), the interests of southern France. Moreover, it often distinguishes the country's position from those of other allied countries integrated into the NATO military organization.

Finally, although not included in our definition, there is no denying that Malta and Cyprus are Southern European countries.

Thus, the concept of Southern Europe adopted in this volume is geopolitical and is based on two main factors. First, the countries considered all belong to NATO and the European Community. Turkey is not an EC member, but enjoys close association with it. Second, of all EC and NATO countries, the ones in question are those that border on the Mediterranean and the other areas to the south of Europe. It is from this geopolitical point of view that they are considered a set: they form the Southern Rim of the broader Euro-Atlantic set.

### The issues that unite Southern Europe

The fact that these countries can be taken as a set does not mean that they are linked by significant or substantive solidarity. Lying mainly along the shores of the Mediterranean and, therefore, heirs to a glorious past, the countries of Southern Europe share the perception of a common cultural identity. But this perception is not strong enough to be reflected in permanent and structured political solidarity. Southern Europe cannot be considered a subgroup, much less an independent group, in the Atlantic or European frameworks. While interest for the Third World and the Arab Mediterranean is lively in Southern European countries, the poles of attraction lie in Europe and the USA, not in the south.

Yet, it would be wrong to think that nothing links the Southern European countries. They are united by important common concerns within the alliances of which they form the Southern Rim. Even though this does not generate active solidarity, it does create a kind of reactive solidarity. Their international positions are similar in many ways. They have to deal with similar or sometimes even the same problems. They often have similar responses, originating from common cultural and historical matrices. They certainly do not constitute a permanent bloc, but they do have common interests and perceptions and sometimes manage to coalesce on specific issues.

What issues? Several main ones — some from the recent past (Chipman, 1988; Stuart, 1988) and others from the immediate

future — can be identified in the field of security. Those from the recent past will be examined first.

During the period of East-West confrontation, the Warsaw Pact threat was concentrated on the central front and, given the passage of Soviet nuclear-armed submarines, the northern flank. The position of the countries of Southern Europe was marginal. This was a first issue.

A second was that this marginal position was accentuated by the political and geographic fragmentation in the southern flank. Political fragmentation is the result of the varying degrees of openness of Southern European countries to Alliance commitments and integration in the military structure: Turkey, Italy and Portugal are fully integrated into the military structure and have no reservations toward Alliance commitments; France and Spain are not integrated into the military structure, although there are no doubts about their Western allegiance; Greece is integrated into NATO, but its openness is strongly curtailed by its dispute with Turkey.

This dispute is, *per se*, a significant factor in the fragmentation of the southern flank. It should be emphasized, however, that it has affected the openness of Greece towards the Alliance more than that of Turkey: Greece is the 'plaintiff' and has, up to now, tried to trade off greater Greek openness towards the Alliance for Alliance support against Turkey. This political fragmentation has, of course, underscored the geographic discontinuity that distinguishes the southern flank anyway.

Third, unlike the northern flank of the Alliance, of which the East-West border coincides with a regional border, the East-West border of the southern flank is intertwined with the regional North-South divide. No integrated defence has been provided against either threat. Nor is integrated defence provided against threats from the south. Neither the EC, whose competences do not yet include security, nor NATO, which has never wanted to extend its jurisdiction to the Southern European areas, guarantees security along the North-South divide of the Mediterranean. The overlapping of the East-West and North-South dimensions — along with the turbulence in the area to the south — is perhaps the factor that has caused the greatest problems for Southern European countries.

These problems spring, above all, from the large number of actors. Mediterranean security is, in fact, provided by different forces under different circumstances: by single countries with bilateral policies (such as France's military intervention in Chad and Tunisia or Italy's guarantee of Malta's neutrality); by European countries (increasingly participating in UN peace-keeping forces); by multinational coalitions set up on different occasions during the eighties (the interposition forces in Lebanon and the anti-Iraq coalition); and, above all, by the United States.

A source of problems is the so-called 'two-hat policy' of the USA, that is, the overlapping of the two roles of the American (especially naval) forces deployed in Southern Europe: their role within the Alliance in the East-West context and their national role in the North-South context. American decisions to intervene militarily in the south for reasons of national security and global responsibility often have undesired repercussions on European countries, especially the interests and security of the countries of the southern flank.

The absence of a multilateral security context in the Southern European theatres (with the minor exception of that provided by the UN) and the ambiguity between national and allied interests along the southern flank cause tensions in Southern European countries, both in regional relations and domestically. These tensions have emerged on various occasions, especially during the eighties with the activism of the Reagan administration. Emblematic in this regard, was the crisis in US-Italian relations provoked by dissent over the fate of the hijackers of the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship in 1985.

This institutional gap along the Southern Rim of the Alliance produces a kind of security inequality among the various subregions of the Alliance, concealed though it may be, which in turn generates a perception of 'singularization' of varying intensity among Southern European countries.

Perceptions of marginality with respect to the Euro-Atlantic set and singularization with respect to threats from the south tended to bring Southern European countries together before the tumultuous changes in international relations began. What impact do these changes have on those perceptions and what trends will prevail in Southern Europe?

### Changes in security towards the southern areas

Two trends seem to have emerged in relations between the northern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the transformation of the superpowers' international role has done away with the global threat that conditioned the growth of relations across the Mediterranean. Moreover, the relaxation of the East-West constraint has weakened the role of non-aligned countries. Within the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the CSCE (Ghebali, 1989), these countries have constantly tried to stimulate a Mediterranean solidarity aimed at undermining Euro-Atlantic solidarity (Vukadinović, 1987, Ch.6), and these attempts strongly limited trans-Mediterranean cooperation. Consequently, the weakening of non-alignment should also eliminate another important factor that formerly hindered the positive development of relations among the countries and groups gravitating around the Mediterranean. Thus, the first trend seems to be a new impulse in trans-Mediterranean relations and possibly the beginning of a new era of broader and more effective cooperation.

On the other hand, the crumbling of the Soviet threat came at the end of a decade of tough clashes — albeit at very low intensity — and difficult relations between Western countries and Arab-Islamic countries. The subsequent crisis triggered by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait confirmed the impression that threats from the southern Mediterranean region had replaced the Soviet threat. This impression was reinforced by intense rearmament throughout the Third World, but in particular on the southern shores of the Mediterranean (Brzoska and Ohlson, 1987; Karp, 1989; McCain III, 1989; Navias, 1990; Silvestri, 1990b; Spector, 1988). Thus, the second trend is that, in the area to the south of Europe, new threats in the North-South context will alternate with old threats from the East-West one. This trend is in contrast with the first and gives rise to the following ironic situation: at the very time when global changes seem to be opening up possibilities for cooperation, regional developments seem to presage conflicts.

To appreciate these changes, a more detailed analysis of the changes under way on the northern shore is in order.

The signing of the CFE Treaty in Europe (19 November 1990)

was a first substantial step towards establishing a defensive military balance. This new balance should be reinforced by the conclusion of the CFE-1 negotiations on new and lower troop levels. This military evolution intertwined with new political developments such as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and a serious crisis in the USSR, which actually led to a unilateral withdrawal of forces. Despite the waning of the possibility of a rapid Soviet conventional attack, the risk of nuclear attack remains. However, the turn of events after the abortive coup of August 1991 seems to exclude the possibility that the successors to the Soviet leadership could opt for a nuclear choice, though it poses problems of control. On the other hand, the significant progress made in the strategic arms negotiations at the Moscow Summit in July 1991 confirms and strengthens detente and disarmament in the European regional framework.

The disarmament measures in Europe do not directly affect the southern flank. Not only are they quantitatively less in that area, but the territorial redistribution of weapons set down in the CFE Treaty tends to increase and modernize the weapons of Southern European countries. Nevertheless, Southern Europe is wholly involved in European detente. This trend, evidenced by the constant decline of the presence of the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean (Cremasco, 1991; McCormick, 1988), was also confirmed by the Balkan countries' exit from the Warsaw Pact.

Two points regarding the effects of European detente on Southern Europe must be underlined. First, the subregional division of the two Alliances for the territorial balancing of arms reductions agreed upon at the CFE negotiations may start giving these subregions greater autonomy. For the moment, this autonomy is limited to the continuation of the CFE negotiations, but it may take on a more general profile. The extent and significance of such autonomy cannot be imagined today, but it will definitely play an important role in the future of European security. This autonomy also involves Southern Europe and could lead to specific consequences with respect to threats from the south.

Second, although disarmament measures in Europe have not involved naval forces so far, these cannot be ruled out in the future (probably at national level): the modality and levels of the US

naval presence in the Mediterranean have long been the subject of debate (Dismukes, 1984); bilateral relations over air-naval bases continue to be difficult (Veremis and Valinakis, 1989) and to pose financial problems; some analysts have identified possible interests of the USA in future negotiations on naval arms control and disarmament (Eberle, 1990; Haass, 1979; O'Rourke, 1990; Ross, 1989–90). It must be emphasized that the withdrawal of land weapons and troops in Central Europe has not been accompanied by a corresponding naval withdrawal in the Mediterranean. This could have important consequences. First, the national dimension of the US naval presence in the Mediterranean could prevail over its multilateral dimension. Second, the deployment of European naval forces in the Mediterranean could lead to an accentuation of the national profile of 'out-of-area' missions. Third, the very existence of these American and European forces could tend to exaggerate the threat from the south.

What future course is possible in light of the foregoing? Three main hypotheses can be advanced.

The first calls for integration of the threat from the south into NATO strategy. This would have the advantage of avoiding the nationalization of the American presence in the Mediterranean, an important achievement for Southern European countries, which tend to suffer the most from the national dimension of the US presence in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, this hypothesis would also keep the area from slipping into a much-feared marginal position: on the contrary, their role could be enhanced. More generally, this hypothesis would attenuate the risks of fragmentation emanating from the incipient subregionalization of the Alliance and, lastly, it would help maintain a higher American presence in Europe than foreseen by the CFE Treaty and the ongoing reform of the organization of NATO forces.

Nevertheless, including the handling of the threat from the south among NATO competences tends to be viewed negatively by Europeans, today as in the past (Edwards, 1989). Perceptions of the threat from the south were varied during the eighties and still are, causing divisions and contrasts among allied countries. Rather than having an invigorating or innovative effect on the Alliance, such a threat has had a divisive and weakening effect. Then again, European and particularly Southern European

countries wonder whether the developments on the southern shore of the Mediterranean constitute a real threat. The trends under way there suggest (Aliboni, 1991a) that the threat is only partially military: tensions are mainly social and political. Thus, the north is faced with challenges more than with threats from the south.

As a result, inclusion of the threat from the south among NATO competences would not be a fitting policy for Europe and, in particular, Southern Europe: it would provoke conflict within the Alliance and would limit the much hoped for and currently more feasible cooperation with the southern shore.

A second hypothesis is decentralization or perhaps even segmentation of the Alliance. The subregionalization called for in the follow-ups to the European negotiations on arms reductions could lead to such a development. Two possible evolutions in this direction are worth mentioning (Silvestri, 1990b):

> an increase in the weight of the aero-naval components, giving greater importance to the US-Britain-France axis; there are also thoughts of a US-Italy (or US-France-Italy) axis for the Mediterranean [and] the formation of a few 'sub-regional' groups allied with the US: one in the Mediterranean (France-Spain-Italy-Turkey) and one in the North Sea (Britain-Belgium-Netherlands-Norway).

This hypothesis would predictably require the specialization of the southern grouping to deal with the threat from the south. This is already suggested by the NATO reforms that are emerging after intervention against Iraq (Howe, 1991) and in the new structure of NATO's rapid intervention forces, approved by NATO foreign ministers at the end of May 1991. The new structure calls for a southern grouping (presumably an Italo-Turkish division to be stationed between Central and Southern Europe).

Even if formally implemented within the Alliance, this hypothesis could lead to the 'renationalization' of the security (and foreign) policy of the countries concerned. As a consequence, their relationship with the USA would tend to lose its multilateral character and would assume a 'star-like' pattern.

The greater the segmentation within NATO, the worse the

possible political repercussions. The tensions that have characterized relations between Southern European countries and the USA could re-emerge and perhaps even intensify, as has always happened when the national dimension of the American presence in the Mediterranean has prevailed. Furthermore, the reassertion of the national dimension of European countries could result in differences between European and American objectives that would be harder to reconcile through the Alliance's multilateral constraint.

The renascent national dimension would be ushered in by traditional balance-of-power policies, which would weaken the collective European security organization and jeopardize the creation of a similar trans-Mediterranean organization. In this context, the threat from the south could be an excellent pretext for the rebirth of nationalism in Europe.

The hypothesis of NATO decentralization, especially if oriented towards significant segmentation along subregional axes, would lead to risks of instability and conflict not only among the allies, but also across the Mediterranean. This hypothesis, like the previous one, would be detrimental to cooperation in areas south of Europe.

The third hypothesis is centred on the emergence of a distinct Western European foreign and security identity in addition to an economic identity. A more integrated Western Europe should be able to pursue policies toward the south of the Mediterranean that are more in keeping with its views, that is, regional cooperation aimed at dealing with the social and political causes of instability in the Mediterranean, accompanied by military reassurances against the tensions in the area. Note that such a course might be complementary to either the reformulation of the threat facing NATO, or to NATO decentralization, without necessarily excluding them.

Both the strengthening of Europe's security identity and its consistency with the Atlantic context are the subject of debate at the moment (Aliboni, 1990a; Caligaris, 1990; Coker, 1987; Clarke and Hague, 1990; Clesse and Rühl, 1990; Gambles, 1989; Silvestri, 1990b; van Eekelen, 1991). Two main problems stand in the way of a European security policy towards the southern area: first, the problem of establishing a common European

institution that would be able to survive the wide range of objectives and perceptions in Western European countries regarding the crises and situations in the Southern Mediterranean (not to mention the broader 'out-of-area'); second, the problem of making European and American 'out-of-area' policies consistent, on the assumption that European security is to remain associated with Atlantic security.

As for the first, the orientation that seems to be prevailing at the IGC on political union was outlined in a letter written by Kohl and Mitterrand to the acting EC president prior to the European Council in Rome in December 1990. This orientation underlines the priority of a common security policy over a common military policy. Italy's proposal to absorb the WEU into the EC, in order to provide the latter with the security dimension it requires, was considered premature. The institutional structure of the EC would be too cogent, given the differences in European opinions on security, especially with respect to the Third World. Many are, therefore, for a more flexible organization, initially parallel to the European Community. Some feel that the WEU is suited to this purpose, as a bridge towards a more comprehensive and coherent arrangement; others believe that the EC itself could provide the best solution, were the right measures taken to guarantee flexibility.

Opinions on the second point are more conflicting. The USA continues to view a common European security organization positively, but it alternates between expressions of confidence and mistrust — as was the case in the memorandum sent by Under-Secretary Bartholomew to WEU Foreign Ministers in March 1991 (Binnendijk, 1991). France also oscillates between rapprochement with NATO and nationalistic tendencies.

The Bartholomew memorandum, which basically enjoined the Europeans to organize their common security policy within the WEU rather than the EC, was formulated in such awkward diplomatic terms that it gave the impression that the stance of the US administration had changed and that it was now against the emergence of an autonomous European pole in the field of security and defence. Actually, the Americans are concerned, as always, about being excluded from European decision making for fear of finding themselves faced with antagonistic decisions. Such

a situation could be accepted in agriculture, but it would have quite different implications in the field of security. A European 'out-of-area' security policy inconsistent with that of the USA would have the same overwhelming effect on Atlantic solidarity as the integration into NATO of the 'out-of-area' policies of its members. Thus, the problem remains one of interlocking various Western institutions so as to ensure autonomy, consistency and flexibility in inter-Western relations and effectiveness in security policy towards the areas south of Europe, as set down by the Atlantic Council in London in July 1990.

A (non-official) proposal that could satisfy all parties might be that of a NATO organization with a European SACEUR and a WEU command able to wear both hats, thus bringing European forces integrated under WEU into NATO if and when necessary (Heisbourg, 1991a), particularly in case of 'out-of-area' contingencies.

It is difficult to predict what the outcome of the debate will be. In any case, it should be emphasized that a European security policy should make it possible to combine cooperation with military reassurance in the Mediterranean and adjacent areas more effectively. Such a policy should avoid the risk of replacing declining East-West tensions with regional North-South tensions and should prevent nationalistic or specific European interests from re-emerging through the formation of subregional axes.

### Southern European security in perspective

What are the perceptions and policies of Southern European countries with regard to these new and complex security prospects?

These countries continue to fear marginalization and singularization. The cessation of tension in Central and Northern Europe has eliminated the strategic differences that were, as mentioned, behind the perceptions of marginality of Southern Europe. However, this cessation has produced a strong drive towards cooperation with Eastern Europe and the USSR, a drive in which the EC has taken a leading role. More or less openly, the countries of Southern Europe tend to see this trend as a polarization

involving a shift of Europe's centre of gravity towards the north and the marginalization of the south, a polarization privileging the eastern interests of Central European countries and sacrificing the Mediterranean interests of Southern European countries.

Certainly, the growing tension in the areas to the south of the Mediterranean are not only the concern of Southern Europe. France and the UK — not Italy and Spain — were in the forefront during intervention in Kuwait. From a logistical point of view, intervention was supported also by structures in Germany, though facilities situated in Southern Europe played a primary role (Howe, 1991). Nevertheless, the countries of Southern Europe feel particularly vulnerable since they perceive the Iraq-Kuwaiti crisis as a manifestation of much deeper and more complex social, political and economic instability. This instability results in growing demographic (Heisbourg, 1991b), social and economic pressures and tensions on their doorsteps. Once again, the proximity of these pressures, on the one hand, and the shift of the EC and Northern European countries toward the east, on the other, generate perceptions of isolation and singularization.

These perceptions have, of course, produced reactions. One of Italy's reactions is its 'Esagonale' undertaking, bringing it together with Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Another is its proposal to increase the financial aid of the EC member countries to 1 per cent of GNP: one-quarter would go to less developed Mediterranean countries and one-quarter to Eastern countries. Both flows would be regulated by the EC (De Michelis, 1990d). France has promoted the cooperation among the '4 + 5' Western Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) inaugurated at the ministerial meeting in Rome in November 1990. At Palma de Mallorca in September 1990, the governments of Spain and Italy proposed a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), similar in structure and scope to the CSCE (Aliboni, 1991b; Buhigas, 1990).

But these specific undertakings will only be successful if Southern European countries manage to find support for them in the multilateral organizations to which they belong, especially the European Community. These policies must become Community

policies in order to be effective. Above all, only if the problem of Mediterranean security is integrated into the multilateral EC context as a dimension of European security policy can the perceptions of marginality and singularization of Southern European countries be eliminated. Thus, above and beyond the specific policies mentioned here, Southern European countries are particularly interested in the success of the IGC on political union and the development of a common European security policy. The communitarization of Mediterranean security problems would strengthen their national security, clarify their difficult relationship with the USA and usher in a comprehensive security policy reflecting their wishes and evaluations. Therefore, the key to security across the Mediterranean lies in the directions the EC will take.

Solidarity and consensus among Southern European countries on this point does not seem to be sufficiently clear. In principle, all Southern European countries are in favour of deeper EC integration and solidarity and a common security policy. There are, however, diverse and sometimes contrasting specific positions. In particular, opinions differ on the degree of autonomy of the European pillar with respect to Atlantic institutions and this leads to differing views on how and where Western European security and defence policies should be integrated.

Italy supports a federalist approach to EC decision-making in security policy, while other Southern European countries are in favour of a more or less intergovernmental approach. However, the important differences — concealed behind controversies about the institution in which the Western security identity is to be developed — have to do with ties with the USA and NATO. Unlike other Southern European countries, France and Italy are particularly keen on developing this identity in the context of deeper EC integration. With respect to the latter, the hypothesis of developing such an identity within the WEU is seen as an alternative. But the conflict has little to do with the two institutions, which are no more than containers: the problems concern the future contents. And that is why the countries oscillate between the WEU and the European Community.

As for the WEU, there is currently a clear division between those interested in turning it into an effective link with the USA

within NATO and those who want it to be the institutional locus of a European security identity that is decidedly independent of the United States. Thus, France, which supported the WEU in the recent past because it seemed to be a fitting institution in which to develop an autonomous European security policy, has turned to support the EC framework since other WEU members have begun to propose its development as a link with the USA and NATO. In addition, it should be considered that the convergence between France and Italy on the development of a European security identity within the EC is limited by the two countries' fundamentally different assessment of relations with the USA and NATO. This divergence could lead to conflicts sooner or later.

Thus, two distinct questions arise: how to 'reflect' nascent European institutions in the Atlantic institutions; and to what level to integrate European common defence policy? There is no solidarity among Southern European countries on these two questions: the groupings that coalesce around them seem indifferent to geography and include both southern and northern member countries alike.

Some fear that this lack of solidarity could prevent Southern European countries from solving such common problems as how to decrease their marginality and isolation, how to integrate the Mediterranean dimension into a common security policy and how to implement a security policy that is not only military, but comprehensive. Actually, what is essential is that they maintain the core of interests that they do share: that security towards the south be integrated into a common European security policy. If this occurs, whether it is in the EC or in the WEU, and how either of these, or both, will link with NATO, could be less important for them.

# 2
# The shaping of a subregional identity

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

## Definitions, old and new

The current change in the international system, wrought by the move towards democracy in the East, the decline of the Soviet Union as a military superpower, German unification and the growing pace of European integration — has led to a deepening of the debate in Southern Europe on its identity and its specific role as a subregion in shaping the new European and world order.

The most prominent matters for consultation or action among Southern European countries were certainly issues before this reshaping took place: first, the need for more binding social and economic cohesion; second, the need to keep the gap between the shores of the Mediterranean from widening and to quell the re-emergence of racism and the revival of nationalism in the countries. With the current process of change, however, all these issues have gained new relevance and priority among the actors involved in shaping European policy.

The newer democracies in south-west Europe — Portugal and Spain — which joined the EC in the eighties, have set themselves the task of integrating their traditional relationships with Africa and Latin America into EC external priorities. With regard to security, the ongoing process of change dictates a further

'Europeanization' of defence policies and security relationships with the United States. Italy, for its part, has vested interests in this nascent equilibrium, since its influence in European politics is no longer felt to be commensurate with its economic weight. France is also strongly intent on Europeanization, possibly because it fears that a notable shift towards the centre and the north-east would threaten stability and the key role it has played up to now in the construction of Europe.

Southern Europe is a term often used to define different groups of countries that, from a strategic point of view, were and still are characterized by fragmentation. In the context of the Atlantic Alliance, it is normally used to identify Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and Italy — a group of countries linked by bilateral defence agreements to the United States. It is obvious that issues concerning the southern region cannot be addressed without bringing France, the major European military power in the Mediterranean although not a member of the allied military structure, into the picture. In the past, France and Italy were excluded when it was a question of emphasizing the peripheral nature of the region and of the less developed countries in it, even though southern Italy also has its development problems; but now, a different definition of the region taking into account the element of 'European integration' and comprising Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece, has gained currency. This definition also accounts for the political change in Southern Europe over the last fifteen years, with the return of democratic regimes to Portugal, Spain and Greece, and the entry of these countries into the European Community.

Other definitions emphasizing particular affinities are also used, often to stress the 'Latinity' of four of the Southern European countries and their cultural kinship.

Since the definition of the southern region increasingly emphasizes its European as opposed to its Atlantic character, it tends to exclude Turkey; this is a new phenomenon. Whether or not Turkey is to be included in a 'Europeanized' definition of Southern Europe is an important element in analysis of the Mediterranean question. Other relevant issues are whether or not a more holistic approach will be adopted to include at least the other Mediterranean countries bordering on the Adriatic, and the

relationships between the eastern and western halves of Southern Europe.

### The impact of change on the European order

Change in Eastern Europe was greeted in Southern Europe with an enthusiastic and decidedly supportive attitude. The emerging democratic processes were somehow regarded as a follow-on of the earlier changes in the same direction as Portugal, Spain and Greece. And yet, there was some uneasiness, prompted by fears that the gravitational pull towards the East could hinder the full integration of the newer EC members, and a more basic concern about its expected negative impact on foreign investment and EC development funds for the south of Europe. These concerns were clearly expressed in a joint statement made by the Portuguese and Spanish prime ministers in Seville at the beginning of 1990.

When is the future accession of Turkey to the EC envisaged? Today, it seems highly improbable, if not impossible, not only because Turkey has failed to establish a fully democratic regime, but also because Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to mention Austria and Sweden, have emerged as likelier future candidates. President Mário Soares expressed this feeling of shifting priorities when he wrote that Portugal had 'boarded the EC train at the very last stop'. Be that as it may, as Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986) did become EC members, most of Southern Europe is now inside the Community and directly concerned with the future course it will take.

Membership, integration, absorbing East Germany — all have heavy budgetary implications for each EC country. The Chairman of the European Parliament, Enrique Barón Crespo, has pointed out that these issues should not be allowed to affect the net beneficiaries of EC funds, namely Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland. The impact will, however, be strongly felt by the recipients of EC external aid (EP, 20 July 1990).

Preoccupations, particularly regarding investment flows, tend to be eased by the thought of the privileges anticipated for full members upon completion of the single market. Other concerns, however, over an anticipated drop in the commitment of the

wealthier members to the project of social and economic cohesion among the Twelve, as a result, for instance, of premature enlargements, persist.

These concerns clearly underpin the debate between widening and deepening, between a political Europe versus an economic Europe. Southern European countries, namely France, Italy and Spain, are among the most enthusiastic supporters of a deepening of the EC-Twelve process without totally shutting out new members after 1992. Portugal, for historical, and above all economic and financial reasons, has only hesitantly supported political union, and the escudo, unlike the peseta, is not a part of the EMS. Also for financial reasons, and owing to an economic situation that is a 'serious cause of concern' for the EC, Greece has not yet brought the drachma into the EMS either. It is evident that economic and financial restructuring is by no means complete in that country; however, since the PASOK lost the general elections, Greece seems more supportive of political union.

Southern European countries should not exclude themselves from the important changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. Portugal, Spain and Greece — for which European integration was almost a precondition for their democratic stability — are, in the long run, in no position to oppose an enlargement of the EC to the countries of Central Europe.

## Security in a changing strategic landscape

The southern EC countries share the same major security policy options. They are all members of the Atlantic Alliance, participants in the CSCE and members of the WEU, with the sole exception of Greece, which now seeks to join. Although fundamental security options seem to coincide, this does not reflect, paradoxically, in similar defence positions.

From a strategic point of view, Southern Europe was an area characterized by a distinctive differentiation of national security options, in which the military threat from the East was perceived very differently — far more remotely — than in the other countries of Western Europe, allied and non-allied, with the

notable exceptions of Italy and Turkey. Portugal, a founding member of NATO, had an internal perception of the threat derived from belief in a Communist threat at the domestic level. Even after joining NATO in 1986, Spain has still not entered the military structure and remains concerned with a threat originating in the south; in the same way, the threat posed by Turkey is certainly the prevailing one for Greece. The USA carried out the role of strategic 'federator' of these countries through a variety of agreements on bases and facilities originally dating from the fifties (Vasconcelos, 1988). With the shift in the importance of the USA of the strategic platforms in the region from West–East to West–South, the renegotiation in the eighties of the defence agreements with Portugal, Spain and Greece revealed particular concern on the part of the USA for securing support for 'out-of-area' contingencies, and on the part of the South Europeans for imposing case-by-case clearance provisions.

In the East–West context, EC membership has evidently bound Southern European countries together within allied strategy and brought them closer to the stances of the northern and central countries that had a clearer perception of the Soviet threat. The Spanish linkage between European integration and NATO membership is a clear indication of this. At the same time, EC membership has also meant greater freedom of action in 'out-of-area' contingencies and a safeguard against isolation in supporting US action 'out-of-area', in particular in North Africa and the Middle East, should the case arise. That is certainly a concern in Italy and Portugal, the two countries of Southern Europe most likely to be put in that situation. In Portugal, this syndrome, which could be called the '1973 Yom Kippur trauma', appeared once again during the US raid against Libya. But the European approach can also work in the opposite direction, as was the case during the Gulf crisis. Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece authorized the use of their bases, in the knowledge that condemning Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait, defending Saudi Arabia and supporting the liberation of Kuwait were common European interests.

However, a common approach in Southern Europe to a European defence identify or even to European defence cooperation does not exist. Major trends in Portugal and also in Italy

emphasize that the role of the WEU should be that of a European pillar within NATO or, at least, a bridge between NATO and the European Community. These countries stress — to a greater extent than do Spain, France or Greece — the importance of the US presence on the continent. In this respect, the present positions of Portugal are closer to those of Great Britain and The Netherlands. Portugal and Italy see the US presence in Europe through NATO as a way of reinforcing their own positions in the European context.

As a consequence of the fading perception of a military threat from the East, the NATO factor is also declining and with it one of the factors that made the 'federating' role of the USA politically acceptable. On the other hand, regional conflicts are now generally deemed more likely and the leadership role the USA has sought in containing them has increasingly underlined the 'out-of-area' dimension of those bilateral relations. However, while the relevance of the NATO framework declines, especially in the West–South context, that of the European framework is bound to increase. The EC–WEU *rapprochement* proposed by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis points in the right direction.

In Spain and in Portugal, for instance, old isolationist tendencies still persist. In a poll taken to find out how supportive citizens were of direct military involvement in the Gulf, it was found that the majority of the Spaniards were against it (54 per cent vs. 35 per cent in favour) (EP, 13 Nov. 1990), as were the majority of the Portuguese (55 per cent against vs. 36.5 per cent in favour) (PBL, 24 Aug. 1990). It shoud be noted, however, that a significant sector of the Portuguese elite expressed clear dissatisfaction over the low level of Portuguese military participation, and the media would also have welcomed more active involvement. On the other hand, in both Portugal and Spain, the European framework was clearly preferred for any direct military involvement. The results of the same poll showed that those in Spain who agreed with military involvement almost unanimously felt that it should be in line with the major EC countries. And, in fact, both Portugal and Spain linked military participation in the Gulf to a WEU joint effort.

Both the USA and certain countries in Southern Europe could

be tempted to assign NATO a role in the prevention or resolution of 'out-of-area' conflicts. It seems more likely, however, that the point of view of those who are critical of a south-bound role for NATO will prevail. If it does not, the Alliance would become the theatre of an endless trans-Atlantic battle. Simultaneously, Euro–North American consultations and cooperation in regional issues is bound to increase and possibly extend to some of the EPC committees. In military matters, the dominant trend seems to be towards a reinforcement of WEU–US coordination, as occurred during the recent Gulf crisis and subsequent war.

### The East–South equilibrium

The pattern of relations of the countries in Southern Europe with extra-continental regions has undoubtedly contributed to differentiating it as a subregion with a common approach to the definition of the EC's relations with the south.

One of the many consequences of change in the East has been Southern Europe's increased willingness to step up its initiatives towards the Third World. These efforts, irrespective of their success, are shaping a sub-space of political cooperation in the European context. The issue that Southern Europe raises more strongly than other EC countries is that the Twelve simply cannot be self-centred or 'continentalized', not even with the USA as a partner.

Relations with the Maghreb countries was perhaps the first issue on which a Southern European accord clearly emerged. As a result of an initiative launched by President François Mitterrand in Marrakesh in 1983, a process of political cooperation between France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the five members of the AMU born from the Forum of the Western Mediterranean held in Tangiers in 1989 was initiated within the European framework. The importance the Maghrebis attach to this process is of particular note (Sehimi, 1990). Following a joint meeting of officials from the Foreign Affairs Ministries of the four EC countries in Rome in March 1990, the Four stated that relations with North Africa should command 'a no lesser interest than that

arising from the current developments in Eastern Europe' (Aliboni, 1990b).

Greece is not yet taking an active part in this process, as it is more concerned at present with its own domestic problems and those relating to the Western Mediterranean and the Balkans.

While the countries in Southern Europe seem to agree on the importance of the southern shore of the Mediterranean in their strategy of conflict prevention, they no longer agree so entirely on the best policies to be adopted to promote stability in that area. Their geographic and specific interests tend to influence the priority given to the various existing proposals and initiatives.

Some argue that different approaches should be adopted in the Western and the Eastern Mediterranean, since economic, social and political issues prevail over strategic issues *strictu sensu* in the former, while the latter is more prone to instability and conflict owing to its unavoidable links with the Middle East. France sees the need for an East–South equilibrium. Michel Vauzelle, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Parlilament, puts it very clearly: 'the overriding concern for the East–West balance risks rechannelling to the East all the political attention and economic and financial resources from the West, as if the South were not equally essential to the stability of the whole' (LM, 15 May 1990).

For Italy, a relative stability in the Western Mediterranean 'should not induce policies of exclusion or seclusion in relation to its eastern half' (Aliboni, 1990b). Owing to its geographic location, Italy feels directly affected by instability, both to the east and to the west.

It seems obvious that the external relations of the countries in the southern region are not confined merely to the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Portugal favours Portuguese-speaking Africa and Latin America, the latter also being a priority area in Spanish foreign policy; France has a strong presence in French-speaking Africa and Italy has lately diversified its cooperative relations with Africa and Latin America.

Discussion here will focus on the links between security and development, rather than on which regions should be given priority. It is a complex issue, undoubtedly, and one that seems to be the cause of the difficulties currently encountered by the

Italian–Spanish proposal for a CSCM. Any moves toward a CSCM should not be allowed to conflict with the Euro–Maghrebi initiative currently under way. To prevent the Maghreb from being infected with the virus of instability ravaging the Middle East, the adoption of economic policies designed to keep the potential immigrants home and to face the difficult problems arising from an alarming population growth rate and the mismanagement of resources would appear to be the chief contribution that Europe could make towards promoting stability in the Mediterranean. While a 'fireman's strategy' is needed in the Middle East, in the Western Mediterranean and other areas of the world — spared, as yet, from the spread of fire — a conflict prevention strategy should be adopted to avoid crises similar to the one in the Gulf. That is not to say that the EC should not have a policy for the Middle East. Furthermore, Southern Europe initiatives should not be isolated from broader EPC initiatives, as the main objective is the formulation of a common Europen policy towards these areas.

The Spanish presidency of the EC Council of ministers has highlighted the importance of Latin America ('Ibero–America' is the Spanish term) in Spain's EC policy. The Italian presidency has emphasized the Mediterranean and it is expected that the Portuguese presidency will give priority to Africa. Relations with non-European regions are evidently not exclusive of the Southern European countries; fortunately, they are shared by other EC and non-EC European states.

The areas of preferential interest of the five Southern European countries do not generally coincide, but they do overlap. Another priority, besides the Mediterranean, should be Latin America, made up of countries with European cultural roots and in which a vast re-democratization process is in progress; but this is far from being the case at present.

In the present international environment, initiatives to promote stability in the east and in the south should focus on convergency whenever possible. Support to new democracies in Latin America should match the support lent to the new Eastern European democracies; furthermore, the struggle for human rights and democracy in the Maghreb and the rest of Africa should be encouraged.

One of the difficult questions facing both Eastern Europe and the south is foreign debt. The total debt of Eastern European countries (excluding Yugoslavia) amounts to 148.2 billion dollars; that of North Africa and the Middle East totals 120.3 billion; Latin America and the Caribbean 427.5 billion; and sub-Saharan Africa 139.6 billion. The procedures for the rescheduling and possible cancellation (41 billion dollars of the Polish debt were cancelled) of a part of the debt being undertaken for Eastern Euope should also be offered the south of the world, particularly the newer democracies.

## Meeting new challenges

In the present European reshuffling, a number of issues are emerging that may have a deep effect both on the integration process and on relations with the south: on the one hand, nationalisms are reviving dangerously; on the other, population movements are causing concern that is being vividly expressed, all too frequently with racist and xenophobic overtones.

Nationalistic trends gain weight as the 'federating' cement represented by the Soviet threat crumbles and as the European construction becomes tainted with uncertainty. Conversely, they may also constitute the ultimate attempt to check the current progress towards European Union, nurtured by the fears that German unification has unavoidably aroused in some sectors. These fears have found voice in traditional right-wing circles in Portugal and in Gaullist left-wing circles in France. In some way, the remnants of the Communist parties are not distant from this stance in that they, too, seem to be tempted to define strategic priorities in relation to more powerful European neighbours.

It is obvious that these issues — assessment of the full implications of German unification and security relations with North Africa — can also be approached from an opposite perspective, that of cooperation and integration. But the possibility of redefining national strategies in relation to current neighbouring allies is a possibility that cannot be discarded lightly, and Southern Europe is no exception in this respect. Here, more than elsewhere perhaps, security has in the past been defined

in national terms; security 'à la carte' has been more popular in Southern European countries than elsewhere.

Nationalistic trends are not too popular for the time being and would probably be put to rest by positive steps towards European unity. Xenophobic feelings on the other hand, emerge wherever migrations of North Africans towards the more developed countries of Europe are taking place and are expected to continue in the future. Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco will double their population within the next thirty years, while over 3 million Maghrebis are already at work in Europe. But another question now arises in addition to the old one of dealing with increasing numbers of North African migrants: since the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the populations of Eastern and Central Europe are free to leave (and a large number of them are willing to do so) to escape the vast wave of unemployment that is expected in the short term as economic restructing proceeds. Attracted by higher standards of living, millions of East Europeans are now potential competitors for jobs in EC and EFTA countries, and would probably still settle for less than their Western counterparts, while not being treated as 'aliens', as so often happens with non-European migrants.

Italy, Spain and Portugal — countries with strong emigration only a few years ago — are today host-countries to an increasing number of immigrants. While predominantly hosting natives of Portuguese-speaking Africa, Portugal will probably see the emigration flow of its own citizens pick up again in the nineties. Most of the non-European migrants are illegal, serving a company strategy of hiring cheap labour, while satisfying the needs posed by the poor growth and ageing of the population in most of industrialized Europe.

Disturbingly enough, racism, or xenophobic nationalism, has emerged as a deciding issue in European politics; an election can be won or lost because of it. This is most obvious in France, where Le Pen's National Front claims a 15 per cent share of the ballot, but racist incidents also took place in Florence, Italy, in March 1990. In Portugal and Spain the problem is not as acute, although much has been published to dispel the idea that the Iberian countries, now the chosen illegal residence of significant numbers

of North and Black Africans, would be immune to racist or xenophobic bouts (EP, 2 Nov. 1990; PBL, 14 Aug. 1990).

In the particular case of Arab migrants, the racial question lies in the rejection of the 'Other', perceived as different or alien. The image of the 'Arab terrorist', which the wave of terrorist attacks and hijackings by Arabs in European countries, particularly in Italy and France, helped create, certainly made matters worse. In addition, the Gulf crisis did nothing to facilitate dialogue between the two major civilizations of the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean.

The problems connected with the so-called 'threat from the south' differ greatly from those traditionally posed by a totalitarian military superpower. Essentially, the former can be resolved through a cooperative approach, since they affect both south and north: terrorist victims, to take but one example, are more numerous in the south; the demographic question is closely linked to economic development and is certainly not unrelated to foreign debt, a problem which also affects the lenders; environmental issues are of universal concern and here the industrial societies are perhaps even more deeply afflicted than developing countries. In some of these issues the east is very much like the south.

Were NATO to take up conflict prevention or conflict resolution responsibilities towards the south — an increasingly unlikely event — it would not be able to do so without dangerously and unnecessarily globalizing, in a north-south perspective, tensions and conflicts in which the south-south element is predominant.

## Conclusions

Partly as a consequence of change in the East, the questions of what the role of Southern European countries and especially the newer EC members is in the construction of Europe and of how to balance east and south in the European context have gained urgency and relevance. In fact, this is but one aspect of a new European architecture.

The model of concentric circles proposed by Jacques Delors,

calling for a deepening of integration among the Twelve, generally meets with support in Southern Europe. And the idea of a second common market circle encompassing EFTA is also generally accepted. However, it seems much less probable that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe could form a third circle. None of the countries seems to want to fit into this outer circle, which some maliciously call the Euro–Third World.

In Southern Europe, the idea of creacting additional sub-circles (eccentric as opposed to concentric) of regional cooperation, integrating specific regional interests and preoccupations, is taking shape. The Western Mediterranean initiative (the '4 + 5' group) has already been mentioned. Italy also took a similar initiative, creating an Adriatic sub-circle with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia: the 'Esagonale'. Interestingly, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are discussing the creation of a mini-Comecon and a mini-Western European Union.

An organizing pattern for the Euro-African circle has already been outlined by the Lomé agreements, even if the economic crisis in the sub-Saharan continent calls for a thorough critical review of the course taken till now. However, EC African policy has not yet fully accommodated the impact of the third enlargement nor the new relevance of Italy in international cooperation.

Democratization in Latin America offers new and largely unexplored opportunities for expanded relations between two areas of the world with the same cultural roots. The Community tends to favour group-to-group relations (Regelsberger, 1988). Promoting ongoing processes of regional integration such as the AMU, the SADCC and the Brazil–Uruguay–Argentina project, should, therefore, be an important concern of the European Community.

Regional cooperation and integration will doubtless be dominant elements in shaping an international order at the end of the century. The European model of integration, in particular its aspects of social and economic cohesion, has a very special appeal in areas of the world facing deep inequalities.

# 3
# European Political Cooperation and the pursuit of security: towards a southern position?

Thanos Veremis[1]

This chapter will attempt to examine the standpoint of the southern member states of the EC with regard to cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy. The crucial question posed here is whether a 'southern' position in the framework of EPC can be identified.

In our times of rapid change and fluidity a common southern policy might have a greater impact on the future shape of the EC than isolated national positions. The relevance and timeliness of such a policy are reinforced by the debate on the overall institutional framework of the EC taking place in one of the two ongoing IGCs, and by the fact that, under the Art. 30.12 of the SEA, a review of EPC will be possible in 1992. Moreover, the coincidental succession of southern presidencies of the European and other Councils of the EC and EPC over the last two and a half years have amassed evidence that facilitates the examination of the Southern European question. Indeed, Greece held the six-month presidency in the second half of 1988, Spain and France shared those of 1989, and Italy occupied the post in the second half of 1990. In other words, between July 1988 and December 1990, four out of five were southern presidencies and their records

provide a rich source of information on the positions of these member states.

This chapter is divided into four sections: the first briefly discusses what EPC is (de Schoutheete, 1986; de Vree *et al.*, 1987; Ginsberg, 1989; Hill, 1983; Ifestos, 1987; Pijpers *et al.*, 1988; Valinakis, 1991). The second part looks at the common southern positions on the future of the EC and the Mediterranean Basin. The third highlights the differences that exist between these countries. Special emphasis is given to the recent reactions to the Gulf conflict: although the WEU appeared able to coordinate its members in August 1990, the conflict exposed the EC's weakness in acting out its role as a power in the region. The fourth, and final part, provides a discussion of the desirability of a common 'southern' position, and its possible future evolution in light of current developments in the European Community.

## European Political Cooperation

EPC deals with foreign policy issues but also covers 'the economic and political aspects of security' (Art. 30.6a of the SEA). The institution was born in 1969 when the members of the EC agreed to engage in a process of consultation that would coordinate their foreign policy positions. EPC was intended to deal with aspects of policy which did not fall directly under the competence of the European Community. Although EC member states have refused in principle to relinquish sovereignty, it appears that they have used the EPC framework as an *alter ego* or a testing ground for future political unification.

In the seventies, EPC played an important role in the preparation of the CSCE and tried to introduce the EC into the Middle East political process with its Venice Declaration in 1980. The Genscher-Colombo initiative in 1981 set the foundation for a 'European Act' that would cover the institutions of the EC, the procedures of EPC and the issues of defence. However, the subsequent Stuttgart Declaration of 1983 did nothing to remove the institutional distinctiveness between the EC and EPC, and only broadened the scope of EPC to the political and economic aspects of security. Thus, defence matters were not added to EPC

competences, mainly due to the opposition of Greece, Denmark and Ireland. At the time of the INF deployment in Europe, at least seven members of the EC believed that a European forum on defence policy was necessary: the revival of the WEU was viewed by its original members as a forum that would complement EPC but, more importantly, would leave out the three dissenting EC states (Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986 and the WEU in 1988).

The Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1986 and ratified a year later, was the document that made changes to the EC Treaty and the institutional framework of EPC: the SEA provides for the establishment of a small Secretariat, and calls for the harmonization of the external policies of the EC and those of EPC (Art. 30.5). The most important by-product of this development has been to obscure the distinction between question of 'high politics' (foreign policy and security) and 'low politics' (economics) (Ioakimidis, 1987). However, not all are satisfied with the impact of the SEA on the separation of the EC and EPC frameworks. In fact, it confirms the legal differences between the two: while the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice covers most of the SEA's new rules, it does not extend to Title III which covers EPC (Art. 3.1 and 3.2) (Dehousse and Weiler, 1990).

## A common southern position?

### *The southern EC member states and the Mediterranean*

A brief discussion of the reasons that make a southern position important is in order. The term 'Southern Europe' refers to the less developed part of the European continent (with the exception of France and northern Italy). The obvious common feature appears to be the relative economic underdevelopment which is shared by Portugal, Greece, the south of Italy and, to a lesser degree, Spain. However, because of this common characteristic, these states also tend to be competitors in the economic field (e.g. agricultural products).

All these countries share a traditional tie with the Mediterranean Basin broadly defined, even if Italy and Greece may now be

more sensitive to the impact of a collapsing communist world and the resurgence of nationalism along their eastern and northern borders, respectively. Similarly, an important concern of the EC's southern members is the fear that the Eastern European countries could become formidable competitors in attracting Northern European investment and benefits. The southern states could offer the precedent of their successful transition from authoritarian regimes to parliamentary democracies as a valuable experience to pass on to Eastern European states, but this question falls beyond the scope of this analysis (Pridham, 1991).

The existence of a common 'Mediterranean vocation' is of vital importance for the development of a 'southern' standpoint as the cold war vanishes and new threats emerge: poverty, refugees, religious fundamentalism and overpopulation are often associated with the other side of the Mediterranean. This North-South divide has direct implications for the southern members of the EC, as they would physically be on the 'front line' of any such developments, especially if they were to take on dramatic proportions.

Of the specific initiatives for the Mediterranean taken during the latest southern presidencies, the following is the most recent and comprehensive: Italy and Spain called for a CSCE-type conference on the Mediterranean (CSCM). Portugal and France expressed their support for the concept of a CSCM in February 1991 and Greece backed the idea in September 1990.[2] Moreover, Italy proposed the allocation of 1 per cent of the GNP of the EC countries to development aid, and the setting up of a Mediterranean bank based on the model of the EBRD for Eastern Europe which has just opened in London. Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis pointed out that 25 per cent of the EC countries' development aid should go to the Mediterranean, another 25 per cent to Eastern Europe, and the remaining 50 per cent to the rest of the Third World, thereby clarifying that recent developments in Eastern Europe did not, in his view, justify a letting up of EC support to its Mediterranean neighbours.[3]

*The southern EC member states and the future of European integration*

The southern EC member states share a common view as to what the future structure of the EC should be: they all agree that political union is the ultimate goal, although their views differ slightly as to the rapidity of such a development. Now that Greece has returned to the fold following the election of the New Democracy government in the spring of 1990, and the French government has publicly denounced the 'illusions' of Gaullist opposition to a common foreign policy and a united Europe,[4] it can be said that EPC is viewed as a means to greater integration, rather than the expression of any delaying intergovernmentalism. Thus, it is logical to expect a common southern position within EPC.

During the EC presidency of Italy in 1990, Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis suggested the absorption of the WEU into the EC, and backed the Delors Plan which calls for a merger of the EPC Conference of Foreign Ministers and the EC Council of Foreign Ministers. Although De Michelis' WEU initiative was criticized at the time, it has contributed to relaunching the debate on European security within the IGC on political union (Gambles, 1989). The same applies for the Italian proposal, made without prior debate, to reform the UN Security Council by replacing the UK and France with the European Community.

Greece presented its proposals on the EPC, which were less far-reaching than the Italian initiatives, on 16 May 1990. In a memorandum presented by its Permanent Representation in Brussels (ELIAMEP pp. 350–1), the Greek government asked for the removal of the division between EC and EPC institutions. In order to safeguard its own territorial integrity from regional threats, Athens also favours a clear definition of EC boundaries. The above proposals are part of a broader plan to integrate the EC even further, thus reinforcing the view that all southern members agree on the future political unification of Europe. However, such an obvious common interest in the Mediterranean and common vision of the EC's future do not necessarily mean commonality of all views, or even commonality of priorities.

## Southern divisions

*General considerations*

First, mention must be made of the 'division of labour' which appears to follow from the geographical position of the southern member states and their different historical pasts: while Spain tends to concentrate on north-western Africa (Western Sahara, Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla), Italy's main focus is Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean; the attention of France is divided between the west and the east of the Southern Mediterranean (Algeria, Lebanon); and the main preoccupation of Greece is Cyprus and Turkey.

This diversity of attention does not necessarily mean that no cohesive position may emerge, but it signifies competition for the EC's scarce economic and financial resources and, similarly, competition for the priorities of an already heavily burdened EPC agenda.

Second, at the UN General Assembly in 1987, only an 80 per cent common position among the five southern countries could be achieved. Although that figure is slightly higher than the overall EPC figure of 75 per cent for the Twelve members, it declines to 56 per cent if the resolutions which were adopted without a vote (i.e. by consensus) are not taken into consideration. Finally, there were 12 three-way splits among the five EC southern states in the resolutions that required a vote (7.5 per cent), but there were only 19 such splits among all EC members.[5] Although more research needs to be undertaken on the matter, these results tend to confirm that a common southern position at the UN does not yet exist.

Despite all the joint southern initiatives described above, a third factor that inhibits the emergence of a common southern standpoint is national recourse to bilateral alliances, such as the Franco-German axis, and Italo-German cooperation. The 1981 Genscher-Colombo plan automatically comes to mind, but the more recent joint Italian-German Declaration is also a case in point. In April 1991, following the French suggestion of greater powers for the European Council, the two Foreign Ministers (Genscher and De Michelis) issued a declaration on the need to

strengthen the powers of the European Parliament. The intricacies of that debate fall beyond the scope of this discussion; however, the instance once again illustrates the absence of a common southern position. Italy's 'Hexagonal Initiative' may also be seen as detracting from a common southern standpoint on international affairs, but is not examined here since non-EC Europe is not the object of this analysis. The picture, in terms of practical cooperation in the field of foreign policy between southern EC states, is multi-faceted: although Franco-Spanish seminars bringing together diplomats from both sides of the Pyrenees are an annual occurrence, and similar meetings of Spanish diplomats with their Portuguese, German and Italian counterparts take place, there has yet to be an exchange of diplomats between Madrid, Paris, Rome, Lisbon and Athens on the model of the Paris-Bonn, Paris-London and London-Bonn Foreign Ministry exchanges.

### *The Gulf conflict*

Last but by no means least, the varying degrees of commitment to the UN-led war effort during the Gulf conflict have reduced the credibility of a southern viewpoint on such emergencies. At the same time, the absence of a military pillar deprived the EC of its power projection capacity and minimized the effectiveness of its mediation offer. Thus, no common EC position was translated into fact, with NATO and, to a lesser extent, the WEU being preferred as fora. The choice of the former can be explained by the presence of the Americans, the leading force of the allies in the conflict; however, the WEU experiment did not facilitate the emergence of a European stance, if only because three EC member states do not belong to that organization yet (even if representatives from these countries — plus Turkey — attended the WEU meeting as observers).

At the national level, France sent troops, planes and ships and participated actively in the war. Italy was involved in air and naval operations. Spain and Greece sent ships to back up the economic sanctions and the embargo on Iraq. Under the aegis of NATO, Italy also sent six F-104 fighters and 8 military planes

(together with another 36 fighters from Germany and Belgium) to Turkey at the request of the government in Ankara. Although all governments supported the UN action, there were differences among the southern EC members' attitudes towards the conflict: there was opposition to military action in Greece (government-opposition split), some opposition in Italy, divergence in the Socialist government in Paris which led to the resignation of its Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement (a co-founder of the French-Iraqi Friendship Society) and a clear-cut break between the Spanish government's support of military action and Spanish public opposition to the war. The use of Spanish bases to carry out (B-52) bombing raids on Iraq sparked internal controversy, as was publicly admitted a week after the raids began.

Perhaps more significantly, the Mitterrand peace plan of early January 1991 was not endorsed by the EC, even though it was clear that all EC states were in favour of a conference on the Middle East. Although Italy and Spain (together with Germany, the Soviet Union and Sweden) later supported a revised last-minute French plan, this did not materialize because the Iraqis failed to respond and Britain would not consider an alternative to the American ultimatum.[6]

## Conclusions

Southern Europe has often been referred to as a 'poor' bloc, but the inclusion of France, Italy and the Barcelona area of Spain (the fastest-growing region in the EC) renders such a description questionable. Be that as it may, it is still unclear whether there is a southern bloc at all. This chapter has attempted to point out the limits and advantages of such a classification and has advanced the desirability of a southern stance.

The recent disappearance of a serious discrepancy of the '80s — the non-recognition of Israel — may augur well for a future common southern stance: Spain decided to reverse its traditional position on the eve of its accession to the EC; Greece, on the other hand, resisted such a move until 1990, despite having held the presidency of the EC Council and EPC Conference twice between 1983 and 1988.

Developments in Eastern Europe could also spur southern members into action: Italy's revived regional vocation in south-eastern Europe with its effort to create an area of influence in the Danube and the Adriatic and its special concern for Yugoslavia (Dassù, 1990, pp. 300–3, 309–11) could be complemented by Greece which, by virtue of its geographical location, could extend this role into southern Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. The predominant Christian Orthodox religion of these populations constitutes another important factor enhancing the potential role of Greece as an agent of the EC in the Balkans.

Moreover, Germany seems to be increasingly absorbed by its own reunification. Should the pace of European integration be slackened, should the three major European powers (Germany, the UK, France) drift apart, should the Germans find it opportune to pursue 'their own Ostpolitik' (Thies, 1991, p. 10) then a common southern 'front' could be required to reilluminate the road towards EC integration.

The Gulf conflict may prove to be the catalyst. Although its impact on the EC in general and on its southern members in particular may not yet be clear, there is (at least at the rhetorical level), a commitment to a revamping of EC policy towards both that region and the Mediterranean. This may prove to be an opportunity that the southern members cannot afford to pass up. The EPC Declaration on the Gulf conflict of 17 January 1991 could not have been more explicit: because of the traditional links of friendship between the EC and the Arab countries, the Twelve 'will develop a global approach towards the region through a renewed Mediterranean policy, a relaunched Euro-Arab dialogue and a reinforced collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Maghreb Union and all concerned countries in the region.[7]

Two important questions affecting the future of the EC will have implications in the emergence and continuation of a southern bloc: enlargement and political union. Cyprus and Malta have both applied for membership and their applications might yet receive a positive response once the difficult transition towards '1992' is completed. The real problem, however, remains the Turkish application. In December 1989, the Commission delivered its opinion (endorsed by the Council) according to

which Turkey was not considered ready for full membership in the European Community. In 1990, however, it was decided that Turkey's association agreement would be extended to other areas such as industrial cooperation, culture, the environment, an open political dialogue and consultations with the EPC. Other arrangements short of full membership are being considered to bring Turkey closer to EC institutions.

There is a little doubt that the future of European security cooperation depends on the 'prior political cohesion of Western Europe' (Gambles, 1989, p. 67) and vice versa: if the members of the EC decide to adopt a system that promotes their common security, the prospects of political unification will be greatly enhanced. Mention has already been made of the problems between Germany, France and Britain, but the Gulf crisis caused rifts even among the smaller members of the European Community. At the 4 January 1991 meeting of Foreign Ministers in Brussels, the Dutch Foreign Minister opposed a French peace plan for the Gulf while Belgium and Spain maintained a distant attitude towards the war effort. The division between active supporters of the alliance in the Gulf and the somewhat lukewarm Europeans might also bring a new perspective to the debate on a system of European security other than NATO. It seems that the American role in the Gulf and the weak performance of the EC caused confusion among the latter's member states. During the 4 February 1991 IGC on political union in Brussels, The Netherlands refused to accept a Franco-German plan for the integration of the WEU into the EC and a transfer of security competences to the European Council (KTM, 28 Feb. 1991, p. 13). If this was an indication of decline in political cohesion, it could lead to a 're-nationalization' (Gambles, 1989, p. 69) of security policy-making and a return to bilateral regional arrangements between states with similar predicaments. Southern European states could, as a result, be induced to seek closer security cooperation. But it is also becoming clear that at least Portugal has, in the current controversy over the future of European defence, opted for its traditional Atlantic vocation. The Secretary General of the WEU has voiced his concern for the re-nationalization of defence, both for the emerging security environment and for the future of European

unity. 'It is difficult to imagine a Union without a security dimension, for it would result either in a vacuum or in a dichotomy between common economic and foreign policies on the one hand, dispersed security and defense positions on the other' (van Eekelen, 1990, p. 9).

However, indications for the future of European Union are not negative. The constitutional debate in the EC entered a new phase with the IGCs in December 1990 and February 1991. Negotiations involving economic and monetary union imply a readiness to agree on common policy goals and on the transformation of the policy-making powers of the European Community. But what is even more important for the EC's political future is the IGC on political union and constitutional issues. A positive indication of developments in the IGC is that Denmark has agreed that reforms on EC powers are necessary, Ireland has intimated interest in common security and Greece has once again returned to the fold. Most members agree that the issue of 'deepening' should take priority over that of 'widening' (Wallace, 1991).

An important item on the agenda of the political IGC is the revision of certain provisions of the SEA in order to enhance the foreign and security policy competences of the EPC. However, the IGC on political union 'is more likely to focus on solid and practical issues rather than a rebalancing of political powers or institutional relationships' (Wallace, 1991, p. 3).

Yet another view, in line with the prospect of rapid movement towards a European Union with a full-fledged security policy, is currently being aired. According to this line of thinking, the EPC has been overtaken by events, while the WEU is in a position to assume a more active role in European security. Thus, it could, for the time being, implement decisions by the EC (Political Union on security matters until the eventual drafting of a common defence policy. The operational role of the WEU could then develop in two complementary directions: as the defence component of the Union and as a reinforcement of the European pillar in NATO (Ioakimidis, 1991).

## Notes

1. The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable contribution of Stelios Stavridis, in terms both of guidance and the injection of well researched ideas (see Stelios Stavridis, 1991, *Foreign policy and democratic principles. The case of the EPCD*, Ph. D. dissertation). The author is grateful to Dr Ioakimidis for his valuable advice on various points of this chapter.
2. See the declaration to the UN of the Greek Foreign Minister Samaras on 27 September 1990 (ELIAMEP, p. 298).
3. See LM, 12 March 1991, p. 25; furthermore, a Mediterranean Financial Club which groups forty banking institutions from both sides of the Mediterranean Sea was launched in Paris on 19 April 1991 (*Liberation*, 23 Apr. 1991, p. 12).
4. See the statements of the French Foreign Minister Dumas to LM, 12 March 1991, and more generally the joint Mitterrand-Kohl letter of 19 April 1990 on the need for political union in Europe by 1993.
5. Information based on the data provided in *European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin*, 4 (2), 1988: 335, 365–74.
6. IHT, 3 Jan. 1991, 8 Jan. 1991, 16 Jan. 1991, 6 Feb. 1991.
7. *Declaration on the Gulf conflict*, EPC press release No. 17/91, Brussels, 17 Jan. 1991.

# 4
# France, the Mediterranean and Southern European security

Christophe Carle

The rethinking of France's security policy after the sweeping changes of the last few years is proving to be an arduous task with as yet uncertain results. The issues raised pertain to the future of the respective roles and interrelationships of the major institutions which make up the new European landscape: the EC, NATO, the CSCE, and the Western European Union (WEU). In parallel with this, current debate in France also concerns the future structure of the nuclear deterrent force, levels of military expenditure, power projection capacities in the wake of the Gulf war, and the desirability or otherwise of maintaining the conscription system in its present form. The entire set of these questions is beyond the scope of this chapter, which does, however, address some of them through the prism of the Southern European and Mediterranean dimension of French security policy.

For a start, it would be a mistake to argue that France is not a Southern European country, although it is fairly common to list the 'southern' EC members as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. It is, in fact, a consequence of inescapable geographical, historical, and cultural realities that France is, has been and will remain a continental European, an Atlantic and a Mediterranean power. De Gaulle thus described France as 'seul pays de l'Europe qui soit

ouvert à la fois sur les mers du Nord, l'Atlantique et la Méditerranée' (De Gaulle, 1970, p. 98). No doubt, this Mediterranean orientation is more keenly felt in Marseilles or Toulon than in Normandy or Brittany. But this trait is by no means unique to France, and is similar in many respects to the division which exists, for example, between northern and southern Italy. But above all, the history of France's relations with the Maghreb countries, its colonial past and economic and linguistic ties and the place of North African immigrants in the French community and economy have made Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia partners whose 'special relationships' with Paris require permanent and close attention (Grimaud, 1990, pp. 323–40). The Mediterranean and Southern Europe are an integral part of the French national identity; no overall assessment of the evolution of France's security perceptions and policies would be complete without bearing that factor in mind.

## An historical overview

French security policy in the Mediterranean has undergone several successive phases since the advent of the Fifth Republic. Before that, the Second World War has already lit a long fuse to the French colonial edifice in North Africa. The crumbling of that edifice and its after effects remain sensitive issues to this day in the French mind set towards the Mediterranean and Southern European security.

Having seen its main Mediterranean maritime routes to the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa threatened first by the German navy and then by the rise of Fascism in Italy and Spain, France embarked on the construction of the naval base of Mers El Kebir. The triangle of Toulon, Mers El Kebir and Bizerte symbolized the concentration of France's interests and defensive network in the Western Mediterranean, leaving Britain the predominant role in the Eastern Mediterranean. The corner-stone of the French presence was, of course, Algeria. With 340,000 North Africans mobilized in 1940, the role of colonial troops in the war was expected to be a crucial back-up for France. Following the armistice and the destruction of the French fleet at Mers El Kebir,

North Africa became an issue of contention between the Free French and the Vichy regime. But De Gaulle's arrival in Algeria in 1943 bore the seeds of the difficult relationship between the liberation of France and the future status of Algeria and of the Tunisian and Moroccan protectorates (de la Gorce, 1988).

In parallel, the end of the war ushered in the dominant position of the United States in the Mediterranean. From 1947, with the Truman doctrine, 1948 with the arrival of the US Sixth Fleet and 1949 with the birth of the Atlantic Alliance, France became confined to a secondary role in the Mediterranean. Attempts to preserve some measure of the old influence failed. The Franco-British crisis over Syria in 1946, the disastrous Suez expedition of 1956 and the running sore of the Algerian war until 1962 drove the point home. The most that France could do was to continue to base its Mediterranean naval presence in the Toulon, Bizerte, Mers El Kebir triangle in the West within the new NATO structure until the withdrawal of its Mediterranean fleet from the Alliance's integrated command in 1959.

Thus, from the late 1950s, with the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the task of rebuilding Franco-German relations, France's attention shifted northwards, away from the Mediterranean and Southern Europe. The traumatic evacuation of Bizerte in 1963, after the end of the Algerian war, was symptomatic of this evolution and was linked, according to De Gaulle, to the acquisition of a nuclear capacity at the very time when France's empire was relinquished.[1] Even then, however, France still retained the Mers El Kebir naval base, pursued nuclear testing in Algeria until 1966 and secured preferential access to Algerian oil resources in accordance with the Evian accords. Only after the signing of new economic cooperation accords with Algeria, the Six Day war of 1967 and the withdrawal from Mers El Kebir in 1968 (announced in 1966) could De Gaulle's post-colonial design for France in the Mediterranean region begin to take shape.

But instead, under Pompidou, the Yom Kippur war and the oil crisis illustrated how difficult it is to promote peaceful and fruitful economic relations in a dangerously conflict-prone region. After the election of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 the Gaullist traits of France's Mediterranean policy dwindled substantially. The country moved into closer alignment with the United States

and NATO, and took on a more active role within the EC in pursuit of Community ties with the southern riparian countries. Thus, Giscard d'Estaing presided over a substantial strengthening of French naval forces in the Mediterranean, including the basing of two aircraft carriers — the Clemenceau and the Foch — at Toulon in 1975 and 1976 and nuclear attack submarines after 1979. In parallel, from 1974 onwards, the cooperation of the French naval squadron in the Mediterranean with CINCSOUTH was tightened through exchanges of liaison officers, participation in joint exercises and joint reconnaissance in the area.[2]

At the same time, and in concert with Germany, France endeavoured to play a leading role in a new 'Euro-Arab dialogue', epitomized by the Venice Declaration of June 1980.

Most apparent, however, was France's increasingly mercantile orientation in the Mediterranean basin and towards the Arab world after 1974. This applied to French civilian and military contractors, primarily in the Gulf states. The predominance of the latter as trading partners led to a reduction of French oil and natural gas purchases from Algeria and the emergence of Morocco as France's favoured partner in the Maghreb. In this spirit, Paris drew closer to Rabat over the Western Sahara issue: in 1977, the two countries cooperated in the military intervention in Zaïre.

In the early period of Mitterrand's first seven-year term in office (1981–8), there was a noticeable effort to repair relations with Algeria, though not at the expense of privileged ties with Morocco. It was in Rabat, in January 1983, that the French president mooted the proposal of a Western Mediterranean conference, gathering six countries: Italy, Spain and France, with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It was initially suggested that Greece and Portugal might join in; but Algerian reluctance scuttled the initiative in any case (LM, 27 Jan., 2 Feb. 1983). As a result, French relations with the Maghreb states remained essentially bilateral. Seen from Paris, the Eastern Mediterranean hardly seemed ready for ambitious cooperative diplomatic ventures. The dispatch of French naval units to Lebanon in 1983-4, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and the supply of military resources to Saddam Hussein, the rise of tensions between the USA and Libya and the outbreak of terrorist bombings in France all combined, even before the end of the cold war, to generate

perceptions of new risks arising from the Mediterranean area and the Middle East.

In this context, France took unilateral moves such as the creation, in the mid-80s, of the 'Force d'Action Rapide' for operations both in Central Europe and overseas. On a multilateral level, in the late 1980s, military cooperation and various R&D agreements between France, Italy and Spain paved the way notably to the participation of the latter two in the 'Helios' military observation satellite project, as well as to shared access to reconnaissance data from the AWACS which France was then about to acquire.

### After the cold war

During the course of Mitterrand's second term, France has found itself having to plan for its future security in a drastically new international environment. For France, as for other Western powers, the question is one of adapting existing assumptions, postures, structures and politics to a situation in which the relatively simple East-West guidelines of the past are no longer operative.

The multiplicity of factors which converge on the notion of security in the Mediterranean makes it a complex policy area to tackle. In the past, that complexity tended to be shrouded by the implications for Southern Europe of the East-West confrontation. If any semblance of strategic unity could be found in the Mediterranean, it was a subset of Western security, as a 'flank' in the Atlantic Alliance, and as an area of competitive naval presence between the US Sixth Fleet and the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean. With the democratization of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the introversion of the USSR into its tormented self, volumes of strategic analysis of the Mediterranean as an area of East-West confrontation and of its relationship with the 'central front' have been made obsolete.

A full discussion of French policy in the revision of Europe's security is not the object of this chapter. However, several indications of current and foreseeable trends can help to identify French orientations towards Southern European security. From

the French point of view, the prospects for Southern European security are inextricably linked to broader developments, above all in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, but also in the WEU and the CSCE.

In France, European integration is the subject of ongoing internal debate broadly speaking between Gaullists and federalists. Rather than a controversy organized along party lines, it tends to cut across political affiliations, as epitomised by the 'left-wing Gaullist' tendency of former Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, and similar cleavages within right and centre-right parties such as the RPR and UDF. True to a predisposition to manoeuvre rather than setting and holding a course, President Mitterrand's advocacy of a European-wide 'confederation' has had some appeal for those who cherish the Gaullist vision of Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals'. Simultaneously, however, its supporters argue that 'the confederation cannot be conceived of without the Community . . . and that the two are complementary: the Confederation starts where the Community stops. It prolongs, as far eastwards as possible, the endeavour undertaken in Western Europe' (Védrine and Musitelli, 1991, p. 176). The need to preserve the trans-Atlantic link through the Atlantic Alliance is emphasized time and time again.

Of these elements, the notion of confederation is the most vague. After the Prague meeting of June 1991, its future, if any, is very much open to question. The apparent reluctance of East Europeans to settle for anything resembling second-class status in Europe and their increasingly clear longing for NATO security guarantees in some form bring the debate back to a more pragmatic terrain; i.e., how to design and manage a greater Europe which for better or for worse does not fit into a single overarching organization, but includes several functionally different but overlapping structures.

The prospect of an institutionalized and operative CSCE as a collective security instrument for Europe is generally accepted as a distant prospect at best. If any broad convergence can be detected across the French political spectrum, it is for a strengthening of European cooperation in security and defence matters in the framework of the political union, with the admixture of the WEU in an as yet undefined formula. This

preference for Europeanization explains France's reluctance to endorse, let alone participate in multinational NATO forces as they are currently envisaged. France's continued rejection of the notion of integration in the Allied command structure and of 'out-of-area' NATO operations remains a potent influence. The Gulf war has all too clearly illustrated the need for close cooperation and reliance on the United States for mustering power projection capabilities beyond Europe's reach. However, in the French view, the clear prospect of further American military disengagement from Europe raises the medium to long-term need for a stronger Western European security identity and relative defence capacities. This applies to the long-term need to counterbalance Russia/the Soviet Union, whatever its future form. More broadly, it is seen as a *sine qua non* for ensuring that Europe's voice is heard where its security interests are at stake, notably in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean area. The applause which initially greeted the EC troika's recent mission to Yugoslavia was significant in this respect.

A key challenge in seeking a European defence identity is avoiding subregional splits within the European Community. France's central position within Western Europe makes this an important issue for the country. France is inevitably drawn for different reasons to cooperation with Great Britain, the other European nuclear power, as well as with Germany and its fellow EC Mediterranean riparians. Thus, for example, in the wake of the shortcomings highlighted by the Gulf war, France is proposing that the 'Helios' satellite reconnaissance project should be placed under the aegis of the Western European Union.

### 'Threats', risks, and confidence-building

In France as elsewhere, a still largely unresolved debate concerns the types of security contingencies that face Western Europe as a whole and Southern Europe in particular. Many of those risks are expected to be non-military, pertaining to demographic and immigration, as well as environmental issues. The socio-cultural, political and developmental factors in the Mediterranean of particular concern to France are perceived most acutely in the

Maghreb. France's traditional ties and its interests in that region will continue to elicit close attention, as does the tormented evolution of Algeria's internal political situation.

Military risks are also sometimes perceived as having increased in the last few years. Weapons proliferation on the Southern Rim of the Mediterranean, and particularly in the Middle East, is sometimes seen as heralding a new era of south-north threats. The very notion of a 'threat from the south' is very recent. Yet, it is sometimes mentioned in France as a factor with which future national, European and Allied security arrangements will have to deal. Indirect threats to Western interests were epitomized by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars. In both cases, the WEU's coordination of naval units constituted Europe's most tangible contribution. The Gulf war, however, is generally seen as having highlighted Europe's incapacity to react in any significant way either during the build-up of the crisis or throughout the war itself.

The perception of direct threats from the south, mainly from the Middle East, is also increasing in France as a result of the growing spread of long-range delivery vehicles, including aircraft and ballistic missiles, in the area. A frequently encountered line of analysis maintains that France's nuclear deterrent is ineffective against the use by Middle Eastern leaders prone to 'irrationality' of long-range weapons of mass destruction. Thus, it is sometimes advocated that France should endow itself with a potent ATBM force along its Mediterranean coast.[3] In this context, it is significant that Spain has recently joined the Franco-Italian programme to develop the 'Future surface-to-air family of missiles' (FSAF), and that talks to that effect are also under way with Germany. 'Aster' missiles and associated radars and fire control computers could provide the European hardware to deal with the contingency of 'southern' ballistic missiles around the turn of the century.

The risks that might arise from weapons proliferation around the Mediterranean cannot, however, be compared with the erstwhile East-West antagonism. It is worth recalling that arms races in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the Third World, are motivated by intra-regional concerns and rivalries, rather than by any systematic enmity towards the north, in general, or Europe, let alone Southern Europe, in particular. Thus, it would be

politically self-defeating to use the military threat from the south as a new justification for Western and European security arrangements. Moreover, it could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy by fostering hasty perceptions of a new North-South divide, just as the East-West rift is being bridged. Southern Europe — including France — would be most acutely affected by such a new North-South 'front line', running as it would somewhere in the middle of Mediterranean.

For these reasons, French, Southern European and European security policies must attempt to defuse indirect and less plausible direct military risks originating in the Mediterranean's Southern Rim. In this spirit, the recent French global arms control plan[4] prepared for the July 1991 meeting of the five major arms exporters in Paris, emphasizes that proliferation control hinges not only on export restrictions in the north, but also on regional confidence-building and arms control in the south — notably but not exclusively in the Middle East.

More broadly, the debate on confidence-building in the Mediterranean has elicited growing interest in France over the last few years. In order to forestall the risk that non-military issues in the Mediterranean region might degenerate into security issues, and to maximize the role of the EC as a pole of stability in the region, France has joined the 'Group of 4 + 5' (Italy, Spain, Portugal and France, plus the five states of the AMU). This initiative, similar to the one proposed by President Mitterrand in Morocco in 1983, is being actively pursued by France; and along with Italy, Spain and Portugal, efforts are being made to ensure that Mediterranean cooperation is on the agenda of the Twelve as a whole, rather than an exclusive subregional concern of the Southern European countries. The role of French dialogue with Germany could become particularly important in this respect.

France continues to disagree with Spain and Italy on the need for a CSCM, tailored along the lines of the CSCE, and encompassing the entire littoral of the Mediterranean. Supported by the countries of the AMU, France considers this widening of Mediterranean cooperation 'premature', and difficult to combine with a deepening of cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. Since it took fifteen years for the CSCE to become operative, a similar endeavour in such a conflict-ridden area as the Eastern

Mediterranean should be viewed as a long-term prospect. It may, of course, be objected that the CSCE was launched at a time when the withering of the East-West divide was hardly a short-term prospect. Although there is merit in both arguments, the sheer practical diplomatic difficulty of bringing all Mediterranean riparians around a single table militates in favour of not making Western Mediterranean cooperation dependent on the resolution of all riparian issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neither the Middle East, nor the Adriatic-Balkans subregions of the Mediterranean offer the near-term scope for institutionalized cooperation with Europe which has been offered by the creation of the AMU in 1989.

More than at any time since its withdrawal from the NATO military command structure, France is confronted with the problem of the interaction between integration, security and defence. According to Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, 'security is the concern of all, and defence is the concern of each'.[5] In other words, progress towards common European foreign and security policies does not necessarily entail integration of military means of defence.

The concern is raised particularly by two factors: one is France's widespread interests and its network of security assistance accords overseas, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. The other is, of course, its nuclear deterrent. With regard to the former, France must maintain its capacity to appraise independently and to act upon situations which may involve French, but not necessarily broader European, concerns. As for the nuclear element, its role as the ultimate guarantor of France's vital interests and its reliance on the exclusive prerogative of the president put it outside the scope of future European military planning or decision-making. Yet, with the diminishing area of relevance of nuclear weapons in a post-cold war world, the nuclear status of France — and Britain — is of decreasing significance. Moreover, further progress in European security integration would tend to Europeanize *de facto* the increasingly existential French and British nuclear deterrents. In this connection, it has been suggested that European consultation on the political and doctrinal aspects of nuclear deterrence be brought

within the WEU in the context of the widening security role of the European Union (Paolini, 1991, p. 254).

For the present, however, a good deal of creative diplomacy is required in view of France's peculiarly isolated position in the proposed reorganization of NATO. To duplicate existing NATO structures with hypothetical European ones would clearly be as futile as it would be onerous. The Europeanization of the Alliance and the emergence of a genuine strategic European entity are thus seen as objectives in Paris. The fact that the American soldiers sent from Germany to the Gulf returned to the USA rather than to their former bases has not gone unnoticed and is commonly interpreted as confirming that the preservation of the trans-Atlantic link will require more European security cohesiveness than ever. Cooperation in a European framework in matters of defence, in the strict military sense, on a systematic basis in the form of coordination, exercices, and procurement, and on an *ad hoc* basis pending common political decisions for possible future interventions east or south, is clearly a favoured French option. Existing cooperation with European states can thus be expected to intensify as the political union progresses. How far this process can go will largely depend on fellow Community members' readiness to perceive such European arrangements as not necessarily contradictory to membership in the Atlantic Alliance. It will also depend on how far France is willing to proceed on the road to European defence cooperation before giving priority to national prerogatives.

For the foreseeable future as in the past, the southern dimension of French security will remain an important one. The role of supply routes through the Mediterranean constitutes a permanent factor in French defence policy. But with the dwindling of East-West tensions, it is increasingly apparent that potential instability and risks in the Mediterranean have essentially economic, political and socio-demographic origins. The historical and geographical proximity of North Africa and its links with France through trade and immigration will continue to make it an area of foremost importance in French foreign policy. Yet, neither France nor Southern Europe can, alone, foster the economic or political conditions for effective cooperative neighbourliness between the north and the south of the Mediterranean.

Politico-economic strategies to deal with non-military issues in the Mediterranean can only be worked out at the Community level: in this respect, France has both special imperatives and special assets in seeking to ensure the emergence of cohesive European policies designed to address pressing developmental issues and to avoid any economic — let alone militaristic — confrontation between Western Europe and its southern neighbours.

## Notes

1. On Bizerte, De Gaulle explained in 1961 to President Bourguiba of Tunisia: 'nous sommes, comme vous le savez, en train de nous doter d'un armement atomique. Dès que nous aurons des bombes, les conditions de notre sécurité changeront du tout au tout. En particulier, nous aurons de quoi nous garantir de ce qui pourrait éventuellement se passer à Bizerte quand nous en serons partis'.
2. Naval cooperation with the USA and NATO, has of course always been facilitated in the French view by the fact that the very notion of 'integration' has wholly different operational meanings on land and at sea.
3. See for example F. de Rose, 'La dissuasion du fort au faible', LM, 9 Nov. 1990.
4. *Plan de Maitrise des Armements et de Désarmement* (Paris, Présidence de la République, 3 June 1991); text in LM, 4 June 1991.
5. 'il ne s'agit pas de substituer une approche collective aux responsabilités nationales actuelles. La sécurité est l'affaire de tous, la défense est l'affaire de chacun. L'Union politique oeuvrera la jonction entre sécurité et défense', in *Bulletin d'Information* (Paris, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères), 11 Oct. 1990.

# 5
# Southern Europe between detente and new threats: the view from Greece

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## Introduction

Since the threat perceptions and defence perspective of Greece stem from past and more recent experiences, it is reasonable to assume that the dramatic developments in Eastern and south-eastern Europe in 1989-90 and the Gulf crisis in 1990–1 will dominate them in the next decade. Most notable will be the security vacuum created in Eastern Europe and the realignment patterns shaped throughout the Middle East and Mediterranean area by the war with Iraq. In addition, the EC member countries have embarked on an ambitious scheme to strengthen and further enlarge their political cooperation and security coordination. The interaction of these fundamental trends will probably create a new European architecture, whose exact ramifications are now open to intense diplomatic debate. By virtue of geopolitics and history, Southern Europe's place in this process could be important.

Significant change has also occurred in internal developments in Greece. The new conservative-liberal government is proceeding towards a re-examination of the country's regional and interna-

tional roles and towards a fundamental review of some bilateral relationships. After a dramatic decade of PASOK-dominated governments that culminated in an unprecedented political crisis with two inconclusive parliamentary elections in less than six months, Greece is trying to regain the ground lost during the 1980s and to redress its credibility and overall status within the EC (Couloumbis and Valinakis, 1990).

These particular developments may or may not continue to influence the Greek security orientation as the dramatic first years of the new decade unfold. Setting unforeseen fundamental change aside, other less sensational and more gradual changes may be perceived, as is indeed the case of Greece's evolving position in the European security architecture.

### The 1974 turning-point

Two major factors have traditionally influenced the Greek perception of security. The first is the country's geographic position and maritime vocation. Situated at the southern end of the Balkan peninsula, with the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean as its maritime frontiers, Greece constitutes the geostrategic link between two very important areas — Europe and the Middle East. Its dependence on the seas is particularly striking: its merchant fleet is one of the largest in the world, and its ratio of coastal length to total area is comparable to that of Japan or the United Kingdom (Lucchini and Voelckel, 1978, pp. 58–60, 205–7). Throughout history the Aegean and the Mediterranean have been regarded as Greece's lifelines. One third of the total Greek population lives on the Aegean coast and of this sea's 300 major islands only two do not belong to Greece.

The second factor is the revived antagonism with Turkey. In recent years, especially since the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, this antagonism has taken on greater significance as a security issue and has directly affected the positions of Greece on international issues, including its attitude toward East-West relations and European security structures.

Over the last decades, Greek security perceptions have indeed undergone an important shift. In the immediate post-war period

they were predominantly influenced by 'the threat from the north' (i.e. the Warsaw Pact) which was seen as acute. Greece had emerged from the Second World War with a ravaged economy, and in the immediate aftermath of the war, its efforts to rebuild a democratic order were severely hindered by the civil war (1946–9), in which the Greek Communists were supported by the country's northern neighbours. This prompted the Greek government to seek closer cooperation with the USA and NATO, which it joined (together with Turkey) in 1952 (Veremis, 1988). Progressively, however, the perception of this threat from the north has waned. At the same time, relations between Greece and Turkey have deteriorated as a result of the crises in Cyprus and in the Aegean.

The year 1974 can be regarded as a turning-point in Greek security orientations. In the light of the traumatic experience of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the perception of a Warsaw Pact threat automatically receded into the background and a long period of acute tension with Turkey began. Ankara put forth a series of new claims that sparked disputes over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, the width of Greek territorial waters, the limits of Greek airspace and command and control responsibilities within NATO (Alford, 1984; Axt and Kramer, 1989; Meinardus, 1985; Veremis, 1982; Wilson 1979/80). With Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus, many Greeks saw their fears confirmed, and were afraid that Turkey would not hesitate to use military means to 'solve' the Aegean 'issues' plaguing relations between the two countries.[1]

Official declarations in Ankara[2] and the creation of a Turkish 'Aegean Army' confronting the Greek islands[3] intensified these fears. The perception of a Turkish 'grand design' on Greece's Eastern Aegean islands has dominated much of Greek security thinking and planning ever since. Seen to be both real and imminent, this threat became a highly important subject of Greek expert and public debate in the 1970s and '80s (Alexandris *et al.*, 1988; Constas and Tsardanides, 1989; Sazanides 1980), thereby retarding an in-depth analysis of broader European security issues.

### The perception of the Warsaw Pact threat

The restructuring of Greek security considerations in the aftermath of the 1974 crisis led to an instinctive indolence and at times indifference towards developments within the Warsaw Pact. Greek concern over the Pact's designs and military capabilities was of a different magnitude after 1974 (Veremis, 1988, p. 268). There is little evidence that Greek public opinion was concerned about any danger of direct attack by the Pact's forces and most Greeks automatically ruled out the possibility of a Bulgarian attack on Greece's narrow and difficult-to-defend land strip in Thrace and Macedonia.[4] Relations with Sofia improved significantly in the '70s and '80s, even though both countries continued to fulfil their obligations to their respective alliances.

The Greek position *vis-à-vis* the Warsaw Pact threat was also a by-product of the peculiarities of the Balkan theatre. Soviet troops or armoured forces had not been deployed forward, i.e. in Bulgaria or Romania. Thus, the Pact's ability to carry out a surprise attack and a large-scale offensive against Greece or Turkey was somewhat limited (Sekeris, 1989, pp. 19–133). Moreover, as pointed out by strategic analysts, in the southern region there is no focus of vulnerability comparable to that which existed in NATO's Central region (Lesser, 1990, p. 114; Ruiz-Palmer and Grant Whitley, 1988, pp. 28–9).

### Relations with the United States and NATO

The Greek-US defence relationship, complemented by common participation in NATO, has traditionally constituted the cornerstone of Greek security policy. As elsewhere in the southern region, the US presence has had a distinctive role: in an area that comprises three separate land sub-theatres, the US forces, and particularly the Sixth Fleet, have lent cohesion to the defence of the whole southern region, have contributed to its linkage with the central region and have bridged NATO and 'out-of-area' considerations (Snyder, 1987, pp. 16–18).

Because of the preponderance of American forces in the southern region, NATO has, since the early '50s, been perceived

in Greece as synonymous with the United States. Both were associated with practical benefits in terms of equipment and infrastructure support, aid and training. Initially, participation in NATO was also considered a 'hallmark of membership in the Western democratic club' (Lesser, 1990, pp. 114–15). However, the close US and NATO association with the Greek military regime (1967–74) left them discredited among public opinion after the fall of the junta. The mistrust towards NATO contributed to the strengthening and acceleration of Greek efforts to join the EC, which was seen as likely to develop a political and, in the longer term, even a security dimension.

Since 1974, Greece has also made an effort to reduce its reliance on the USA and to broaden the basis of its security policy, particularly in the direction of West European defence cooperation schemes. This process began in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus crisis with large defence equipment purchases from France; it was intensified under all subsequent administrations, which have consciously sought to expand what is seen to be Greece's freedom of manoeuvre and relative autonomy in regional crises. In what has been termed 'the purchase of the century', Greece purchased 40 F-16G and 40 Mirage 2000 C fighters for the Hellenic Air Force in the late 1980s.[5] However, even though diversification of defence equipment has been actively pursued, the USA continues to occupy a prominent place, mainly through its Foreign Military Sales credits, used to finance purchases from the USA[6] (Laipson, 1989).

During the 1980s, Andreas Papandreou repeatedly argued that relations with the USA should be restructured to reflect Greek national interests more genuinely. This attitude frequently led to markedly different assessments of international and bilateral questions, with Athens reluctant to take the actions which the USA expected of it.[7] In most of these cases the Greek position was not strikingly different from the overall European response to international developments. However, Papandreou's sometimes vitriolic anti-USA rhetoric (particularly when addressing mass audiences and party gatherings) had an adverse effect on the position of Greece among its Western allies.[8]

### From PASOK to New Democracy

Following two inconclusive elections (June and November 1989), the conservative-liberal party (New Democracy) returned to power after the elections of 8 April 1990. Between the two elections, Greece was briefly governed by an uneasy grand coalition of New Democracy, PASOK and the Communist Party (Synaspismos). The whole spectrum of the Greek Parliament minus the Ecologist deputy and two regional party MPs supported the government headed by a respected octogenarian banker, Xenophon Zolotas.

Throughout this period, which coincided with deep changes in Eastern Europe, matters of foreign and security policy were 'frozen'. The sensitive issue of the negotiations for US-Greek base renewal was suspended (Veremis and Valinakis, 1989, pp. 20–2). The only use of this interregnum was that it facilitated the smooth transfer of power from the socialists to the conservatives and effected the acceptance and support by the full range of Greek political forces for the fundamental orientation of Greece as an active member state of the European Community.

Since April 1990, New Democracy, under the leadership of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, has moved swiftly to apply its programme despite a paper-thin (152 out of 300) majority in Parliament. Internally, its main concern has been to take the necessary measures (stabilization and austerity) designed to reduce a staggering public debt, improve the balance of payments and manage a rapidly escalating trend toward heavy foreign borrowing.

Ever since his electoral victory in April 1990, Mitsotakis has tried, not without difficulties, to create a foreign policy profile of confidence and reliability among Greece's main allies and particularly the United States. His government signed a new eight-year agreement regulating the presence of US bases and installations in Greece. Upon US initiative, two major installations in the vicinity of Athens are being closed but the bilateral climate is positive as never before since 1974. Mitsotakis was also the first Greek prime minister to visit Washington since 1964 (TVM, 20 June 1990).

This new atmosphere, as well as active Greek support for the

anti-Iraq coalition, is likely to facilitate closer links with the USA in the field of defence cooperation, even though the ultimate test of this relationship will remain (for Greece) the continuation of the 7:10 ratio (sustained by Congress) on US aid to Greece and Turkey. However, the Gulf crisis has unleashed forces that are likely to disturb the delicate balance which was reached in the summer of 1990 (TVM, KTM, 10 Mar. 1991).

Successive Greek governments have relied on the US Congress and the influential Greek-American lobby in Washington to perpetuate this ratio in military aid to the two countries, seen by Greeks as crucial to maintaining the balance of power in the Aegean (Laipson, 1989). This ratio symbolically reminds American decision-makers that US-supplied arms were used in Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

### Greek-Turkish relations

The fledgling Greek administration embarked on new dialogue with Turkey but relations between the two countries have shown little improvement. Prime Minister Mitsotakis met with his Turkish counterpart Yildirim Akbulut during the NATO summit in London in June 1990, the first such high-level contact in two years. The talks were inconclusive, and it appeared unlikely that the 1988 Davos *rapprochement* would be resumed. However, it was agreed to start a low-level dialogue later in 1990 with regular contacts between foreign ministry officials.

In June 1990, the EC Dublin summit officially stated that the Cyprus problem 'affects EC-Turkey relations', a move perceived as an important expression of support for the Greek position. However, Western and particularly US perceptions of Turkey's role following the Gulf crisis could equally strengthen Turkey's position.

The Gulf war has left Greece with a feeling of disappointment about the application of double standards. Both conservatives and socialists were prompt in their support (although at different levels of intensity) of the international coalition's effort to implement UN resolutions; they stressed however (again with differing tones) that the same spirit and interest in applying UN

decisions should be addressed to the case of Cyprus (KTM, 26 Aug. 1990). The parallel between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus has, in fact, dominated the Greek attitude ever since the war. However, Turkey's enhanced post-crisis status is likely to temper hopes for equal treatment of the Cypriot case (KTM, 15 Mar. 1991).

### The treatment of Balkan instability

The profound changes that have taken place — and that are continuing to take place on an almost daily basis — in the Communist Balkans and in the overall European security situation, have already had revolutionary consequences in the northern neighbourhood of Greece.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Communist regimes in the East European region radically transformed inter-state relationships in the Balkans. Age-old ethnic issues, particularly those involving national minorities and rapidly growing Muslim populations, are likely to disturb the delicate post-Second World War Balkan balance.[9] The tendency manifested by some minority leaderships to identify themselves with neighbouring countries — thus unleashing secessionist and irredentist threats — could lead to uncontrollable external involvement and serious complications. Human rights issues will then automatically be transformed into diplomatic and even military confrontations.

Moreover, the disintegration of the Communist system has created a large vacuum in political, economic and security terms. No major and mass political parties have appeared on the Balkan political scene yet and reform-Communists have scored impressively in parliamentary elections. The economies of all four countries (Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria) are in a desperate state.

A major trouble-spot is a disintegrating Yugoslavia.[10] Greece has strongly supported the maintenance of a unitary and strong Yugoslavia as a factor of stability in the area. In recent years, however, tension has risen between Yugoslavia's Republic of Macedonia and Greece. Skopje-based demonstrators closed the border with Greece on several occasions in 1990 and Greece

threatened to use its veto within the EC to block EC aid to Yugoslavia (KTM, 20 Oct. 1990).

The threatened secession of Slovenia and Croatia would pose delicate problems for the security of the whole area, particularly if accompanied by bloodshed and border change. Moreover, violent conflicts between Serbs and Croats or Serbs and Albanian-speaking Kosovars are equally probable. The latter conflict, should it materialize, would be exacerbated by upheaval in Albania itself.[11]

Some by-products of Balkan tension have already had an impact on neighbouring Greece; the most outstanding of these is refugees. The flow of ethnic Greeks living in southern Albania has increased steadily in 1990 and an influx of thousands of refugees crossing the Greek-Albanian border alarmed the Greek authorities in early 1991 (TVM, KTM, 13 Jan. 1991). Prime Minister Mitsotakis was the first foreign statesman to visit the last Stalinist bastion in Europe. He promised economic aid and investments in an effort to deter a massive flow of fugitives across the border.

## Economic crisis and defence spending

Since 1974 the main political parties in the country have agreed on the need for high defence spending. Both the New Democracy (1974–81) and the PASOK (1981–9) administrations allocated large sums to upgrading Greece's defence capability.

In recent years Greece has ranked first among NATO countries in military expenditures in relation to GDP (6.6 per cent in constant prices compared to a 5.6 per cent figure for the US).[12] As noted by a DPC report, 'the defence effort of Greece in terms of inputs is one of the best in the Alliance'. Furthermore, it pays 'a high social cost for defence in that its average conscription period of 22 months is the longest in NATO'.[13]

An unusually large percentage of the public supported these high levels of defence spending until the late 1980s. This is rather unusual, considering the traditional aversion of most socialist parties to high defence outlays. Papandreou justified his policy by arguing that 'schools and hospitals are of much greater impor-

tance in the long run; but we are in a period when neither schools nor hospitals will mean much if we cannot defend our territorial integrity'.[14]

The deterioration of the economic situation did not, however, leave Greek defence policy unaffected, as the continued delays over a large order of fighter aircrafts and frigates underlined. Moreover, during the tripartite government (November 1989-March 1990) the main political forces agreed in principle on defence spending cuts that could affect the country's freedom of manoeuvre in the post-cold war Balkan environment. These developments might also have an impact on the necessary purchase of equipment abroad, which would constitute a serious drain on foreign currency holdings.

The economic crisis has also seriously disturbed the development of a modern national defence industry. Since the mid-1970s, Greece has been trying to develop an advanced defence industrial base, capable of satisfying the needs of the Greek armed forces and of securing export markets for surplus production, thereby improving the country's balance of trade, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and limiting the drain on currency reserves caused by arms imports. However, according to government figures, in the late 1980s Greece was able to produce no more than 20 per cent of its armaments.[15] By 1990 it became evident that flagrant management shortcomings and labour unrest had seriously affected the future of state-controlled defence industry in Greece; by 1991 large privatization and merger plans were announced in an effort to restructure the whole sector.[16]

The economic crisis will, undoubtedly, affect Greece's international behaviour across the board. EC Commission specialists have helped the Greek government with the drafting of its 1991 budget, which includes tough austerity measures aimed at curbing the country's budget deficit. Prime Minister Mitsotakis, who personally took up the national economy portfolio, will have to tackle the country's economic malaise with determination; in order to do so, he has asked for a sizeable loan from the EC (in the order of approximately two billion ECUs) to support the Greek balance of payments.[17] The Greek economic efforts were successful in February 1991, but the EC Commission wants to be sure that reform will be far-reaching. The EC-imposed austerity

measures may, however, be a tall order for a government with only a two-seat majority in Parliament, especially as its plans to privatize state enterprises and other modernization schemes have been met with strikes and mass protests.

## European security cooperation: Greece's psychological background

Accession to the EC undoubtedly constitutes the greatest post-war achievement in Greek international relations. Under the leadership of Caramanlis, Greece capitalized on a particularly favourable international climate and became the tenth member of the EC in January 1981. The accession was not only a net benefit in economic terms and an added assurance for the country's democratic institutions, above all, it enhanced Greece's feeling of security and independence (Kazakos and Stephanou, 1987, pp. 311–28)

The lessening of Greek political and even defence ties with the USA and the development of new politico-military linkages (e.g., with France for some time) were eloquent signs of this independence. Even though no single country appeared willing or able to counterbalance American influence in the region, the EC as a whole represented a very promising ally. Indeed, the EC provides Greece with a more agreeable political forum than NATO, as Turkey is not one of the Twelve.

However, in the area of EPC and security, there has always been a temptation among the bigger European countries to promote informal and intimate groupings of the 'more committed' governments (Ifestos, 1987; Wallace, 1985). Even at the margins of EPC gatherings, more restricted groups are occasionally convened, although in very informal and discreet ways. The revitalization of the WEU framework was indeed, *inter alia*, a response to the need felt during the INF crisis to coordinate a unitary West European attitude without the three EC 'dissidents' (Greece, Denmark, Ireland) (Regelsberger, 1985a, p. 114; 1985b, p. 15). Thus, whatever the real motives behind the move to revive the Western European Union in 1984, those Greeks who favoured an increasingly 'Europeanized European defence' largely inter-

preted this shift away from the EPC framework as a way of excluding Greece (as well as the other non-WEU members) from European security consultations.

A growing concern that a twelve-member EPC may not be a sufficiently effective or credible forum for security deliberations was indeed noticeable among some EC member states in the early 1980s. Indirectly, Irish neutrality, Danish reluctance and Papandreou's anti-nuclear rhetoric accelerated and reinvigorated a trend toward finding more effective ways of organizing a Western European approach to East-West relations and the Old Continent's security. Thus, the revival of the WEU was largely interpreted in Greece as an effort to achieve a more intimate and more productive dialogue for some governments, which would not be hampered by the requirement of incorporating all minority interests (Regelsberger, 1985a, p. 114).

### The preference for the EC framework

In keeping with its somewhat more pragmatic and flexible approach, and as a part of its effort to broaden the basis of its security, Greece has, since 1985, supported the role of an independent and globally assertive European Community. A strong and unitary EC voice in world affairs is now seen by Athens as an important contribution to the consolidation of stability in Europe. Moreover, in a spectacular policy reversal, the Papandreou government expressed support for efforts aimed at enhancing Europe's ability to provide for its own defence.[18]

The efforts to keep the essence of security consultations within the EPC failed throughout the negotiations leading to the SEA. Even worse, at least from the Greek point of view, the final SEA text seems to recognize formally a European security Community '*à geometrie variable*' (since it provides for the possibility of increased cooperation within the WEU and NATO frameworks — Art. 30.6 of the SEA) (Kazakos and Stephanou, 1987, pp. 325–6). For Greece this was an important blow, but it did force the country to approach the WEU — albeit reluctantly under PASOK — and declare its readiness to engage in negotiations in view of WEU membership.[19]

This goal was actively pursued by the New Democracy government which stressed its unconditional devotion to the basic principles of WEU (including nuclear deterrence) and its eagerness to join the security component of EC integration. From the earliest days of the Gulf crisis, Greece announced its active support for the anti-Iraq multinational force and proposed putting its task-assigned naval units under WEU coordination (Axt, 1990). As a result, Greece was invited to participate as an observer at the political level in WEU meetings; hopefully, the experience will serve to strengthen its membership request (KTM, 22 Aug. 1990; TVM, 10 Feb. 1991).

In this respect, the idea put forward by the Italian EC presidency to 'absorb' the WEU into the EC as its security component is fully in keeping with Greek needs and preferences. It is expected that as the IGC on political union proceeds, Greece will increasingly align itself with the most ardent supporters of enlargement of EPC consultations and activities to incorporate the security dimension.[20] This includes supporting such ideas as the creation of a coordination mechanism for national 'Rapid Deployment Forces' to serve as 'peace-keeping forces' at the request of threatened EC allies in the Third World (or even in Eastern Europe). Greece would also feel attracted to such ideas as an EC 'Mediterranean Coast Guard' to patrol the Mediterranean. Common EC border guarding is indeed becoming increasingly necessary (in view of 1992) and could be used to cover land, maritime and air borders of EC territory in the fight against terrorism, narcotics trafficking, etc. The development and practical implementation of such ideas would be particularly interesting and comforting for a geographically exposed member country like Greece.

Even though strong reservations might be voiced by some EC members, these ideas could be retained for more limited zones of application (such as the Mediterranean). Another area of immediate regional concern for both Italy and Greece is the Balkans. The expected increase in immigrants and refugees from the ex-communist countries in this area could be a source of problems in the future. A coordinated attitude on the part of the two countries with traditional ties with this part of Europe could constitute the backbone of a new and comprehensive EC Balkan

policy that would include a substantive aid package, development projects and political dialogue.

### Towards a new security architecture in Europe

The dramatic developments of 1989–90, the Gulf crisis and the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, have brought a new dimension to the future of Europe's security architecture. New schemes are being worked out by EC and NATO members and various regional groups are being formed.

Two elements will define the Greek attitude. First, Greece's geographic position as the south-easternmost EC member country, in the midst of a region of rapidly increasing instability. Sharing a common 1,000 km frontier with three profoundly unstable and still reform-Communist countries (Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria), Greece feels vulnerable to the regional effects of the rapidly and chaotically disintegrating old order. Coupled with real or alleged minority issues, the potential for a return to the powder-keg tradition in the Balkans is real. No Greek government can draw up plans for a viable European architecture without taking these risks into serious consideration.

Unfortunately, the area of instability extends, from the Greek point of view, in two additional directions: on the one hand, towards the Black Sea region, where a disintegrating Soviet state will face increasing and simultaneous challenges from autonomist movements (e.g., Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan); and on the other hand, towards the explosive Middle East-Eastern Mediterranean area. The 'arc of crisis' is seen by analysts in Athens to extend from the Adriatic, clockwise to the Balkans, to Turkey's border with the Caucasus and Iraq, and to Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean; the instability potential of these regions will probably dominate Greece's security perceptions and planning in the coming years.

Second, in view of the magnitude of the challenges ahead, Greece's preference will lie solidly in the EC-WEU framework. This choice is not seen as being inconsistent with membership in NATO. Since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the Atlantic Alliance has been striving to shape a clear and viable orientation

and purpose. Its solid structure is, however, still considered the only reliable and credible defence mechanism in place, particularly essential in times of transition and crisis such as these. It is thus realistic to expect that Greece will continue to honour its NATO commitment, not least because of its stabilizing role in south-eastern Europe.

In short, Greece's proximity to both traditional and new hot spots and centres of instability (Balkans, Black Sea, eastern Mediterranean and North Africa) and the significance of trans-Mediterranean communications to vitally important regions, confer on the country a geostrategic position that transcends the NATO-Warsaw Pact antagonism. Yet, changes in these regions must not be seen solely in narrow military terms. More attention should be paid to underlying political, social and economic trends, and the EC has a particular role to play in this respect.

After a decade of largely catastrophic experiments in economic and international affairs the April 1990 parliamentary elections could represent a watershed in Greek orientations. A more cautious, balanced and realistic contribution to the direction of European political affairs can be reasonably expected from Greece. However, the country's threat perceptions and security policies will continue to be affected in the foreseeable future by the perceived crucial need to preserve an overall balance with Turkey and stability in the Balkans, so as to safeguard Greek vital interests and more immediate security requirements in this area.

## Notes

1. See in particular the statement by the then Prime Minister Caramanlis quoted by Wilson, 1979/80, p. 3.
2. The Turkish Prime Minister stated in 1975 that 'half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so . . . We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked', and a few days later the Turkish Foreign Minister said 'Today's Turkey is not the Turkey of 1923, after the Lausanne Treaty. It is a growing Turkey' (Wilson, 1979/80, p. 39). And the country's Deputy Premier went so far as to

say: 'The group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast . . . should belong to Turkey' (for a detailed list of Turkish statements see Mavros, 1978).

3. This 120,000 man army has, according to Greek sources, 180 landing craft at its disposal. See, e.g., the Greek Prime Minister's interview to *The Financial Times*, 24 Feb. 1982.
4. See the statements of the Greek Defence Minister under the conservative administration in TVM, 5 Oct. 1979. At the peak of the anti-INF demonstrations, an opinion poll (Dimitras, 1983, p. 15) showed that twice as many Greeks had a favourable opinion of the USSR than of the USA (36 per cent vs. 18 per cent).
5. Defence technology for Hellenic forces', *Military Technology*, 6 (10), 1988: special suppl.
6. *Ibid.*
7. See the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, 30 Nov. 1982, and *The Economist*, 27 Nov. 1982.
8. See, e.g., his address to armed forces officers at Thessaloniki in *FBIS, Western Europe Daily Report*, 16 Aug. 1982, p. S1; TVM, 3 Jan. 1982; 4 Dec. 1982.
9. See, for instance, 'Back to the Balkans', *The Economist*, 2–8 Mar. 1991, pp. 29–34.
10. See 'A case of Serb-atomic particles', *The Economist*, 16–22 Mar. 1991, p. 21.
11. 'Too late for tactics', *The Economist*, 2–8 Mar. 1991, p. 31.
12. See *Enhancing Alliance collective security; shared roles, risks and responsibilities in the Alliance. A report by NATO's Defence Planning Committee*, Brussels, Dec. 1988, p. 13.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
14. Addressing armed forces officers; see *FBIS, Daily Report Western Europe*, S2.
15. See 'Defence technology for Hellenic Forces', *Military Technology*, 6 (10), 1988, special suppl.
16. According to a special agreement with the Greek state, the management of the EAV (Hellenic Airspace Industry) was taken over by Lockheed (TVM, 13 Mar. 1991).
17. The *Wall Street Journal*, 9 Oct. 1990.
18. *Ta Nea*, 7 July 1985 and EP, 30 Dec. 1985 (interview with A. Papandreou).
19. See the interview with A. Papandreou in *The Financial Times*, 6 Apr. 1987.
20. Opinion poll findings show a clear and steadily growing

trend in favour of Greece's participation in the European Community. This favourable attitude (among the highest within the Twelve) also applies to political and security cooperation within the EC and cuts across party lines (with the possible exception of a tiny Communist minority opposing the idea of a European 'military bloc'). See Eurobarometer poll findings and Dimitras, 1990.

# 6
# Continuity and change in Italy's security policy

Ettore Greco and Laura Guazzone

## Introduction

Italy's security policy has shown remarkable continuity in maintaining a high level of loyalty to its international commitments. This attitude has basically resulted from the awareness of the Italian leadership that, given the country's geopolitical position and the limited power, its national interests can only be pursued successfully in a stable framework of Western cooperation.

The main security policy decisions have thus always been presented by the governments as 'natural' choices deriving from obligations towards allies and partners. Indeed, they have rarely been the subject of concrete domestic debate. The 'agnosticism' of Italy's public towards security policy issues revealed by opinion polls is merely the other side of the same coin (Silvestri, 1990a).

Although the divisions between government and opposition re-emerge periodically on the occasion of some fundamental decision — among the most recent are the deployment at Crotone of the F-16 formerly deployed at Torrejón and participation in the military action against Iraq — there has been a growing convergence between major political parties since the mid-seventies on the basic elements of Italy's international collocation.

This trend, which began during the period of so-called 'national solidarity' between governmental forces and the Communist opposition (1976–78), has made new and significant progress since the end of the cold war. The option for an increasingly integrated Europe, in particular, enjoys very large consensus, including that of the main opposition party, the PDS — the former Communist Party. The recurrent divergences over NATO's role have also lost much of their former ideological profile. This constitutes an unprecedented condition for more pragmatic debate on the single decisions regarding national security. Attention tends, in fact, to focus less on 'fundamental choices' than on specific governmental action in the various frameworks of international policy.

In the last few years the growth of Italy's international prestige — marked by events such as the country's inclusion in the summits of the Seven and its adhesion to the EMS — has been accompanied by greater assertiveness in the field of security policy. Of particular importance is the readiness shown by Italy to take over significant responsibilities in collective military actions aimed at managing crisis contingencies — such as the peace-keeping missions in the Sinai and in Lebanon and the mine-clearing operations in the Red Sea and during the Iran-Iraq war — or at imposing the respect of international law — such as the intervention to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Furthermore, new interest has been emerging in the construction of a stable institutional framework for Western European security cooperation, not only as a part of the general goal of European integration, but also as a result of the specific perception that, in the new security environment, Western Europe has a decisive role to play in preserving the stability on the continent. Italy has indeed adopted an increasingly assertive approach in the debate regarding the institutional arrangements for a European defence.

Finally, Italy's defence policy has paid growing attention to the security dimension of regional North-South relations. The main source of concern here is represented by the endemic political and economic instability in the Mediterranean area. Beginning in 1980 with the decision to guarantee Malta's neutrality, Rome has tried to develop an active role in the surrounding Mediterranean

area at both the bilateral and multilateral levels; a role that is now in the process of being transformed into a fully fledged regional policy.

Italy's search for more room for action on the international scene has been made more urgent by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the persisting conflictuality in the countries along the southern coast of the Mediterranean. According to the view of Foreign Minister De Michelis, Italy now has the opportunity, for the first time since 1945, to add a Central-European and a Mediterranean dimension to its foreign policy, which was fundamentally centred on the Euro-Atlantic dimension during the cold war: 'we have simply been offered the possibility to implement an international policy that is more effective, more balanced and more complete' (Lazar, 1989/90). In the security sphere, this ambition is being pursued through attempts to promote regional cooperation frameworks which can contribute, in parallel with NATO, the EC and the CSCE, to the stability of the areas of major concern for national security.

## The Euro-Atlantic dimension of Italy's security policy

The political upheaval in Eastern Europe and the progressive dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have raised some major problems for Italy's security policy. The sweeping change in the political and strategic environment in Europe has in fact confronted the Italian government with the need to secure an active role in the construction of the new European order. This role has two main priorities after the fall of the communist regimes and the Berlin Wall: (i) to achieve the widest and closest consultation with its allies and partners, thus avoiding the strongly perceived risk of marginalization in the diplomatic process; (ii) to promote both an acceleration of EC integration and a strengthening of the pan-European process centred on the CSCE as necessary conditions for the preservation of stability on the continent.

Rome thus emphasizes the enhancement of the European institutional framework at its different levels, supporting Delors' idea of a European architecture based on three concentric circles

with decreasing degrees of integration and homogeneity: the EC, the Atlantic-Western system and the CSCE. Indeed, this flexible formula is an attempt to harmonize three strategic objectives: the deepening of West European integration, the gradual enlargement of the Western system to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of a collective security system (De Michelis, 1990b, p. 45; Aliboni *et al.* 1991, p. 27; Dassù, 1990, p. 304).

The search for a more integrated EC, able to play an active political role on the international scene, has been a traditional goal of Italy's foreign policy since the early eighties.

Backed by the unanimous, albeit somewhat rhetorical, Europeanism of the political parties and by several resolutions of Parliament, the Italian government has, in principle, favoured the transformation of the Community into a political union. In June 1989, a referendum on this subject and on the granting of constituent powers to the European Parliament was supported by 88.1 per cent of those who voted. At the IGC on political union, Italy has been among the countries which have most consistently stressed the need for an acceleration of political integration and the democratization of EC institutions (Agostini, 1990). Furthermore, like other Western European countries, it sees the further development of EC integration as the natural and most effective response to German reunification and the potentially destabilizing effect of a growing gravitation of the newly united German state towards the East.

A complementary goal of Italy's foreign policy is the acquisition of a specific and, to some extent, autonomous role in the strengthening of cooperation with the Eastern countries. While ruling out the accession of the latter to the EC in the short term, for fear that this enlargement could slow the Western European integration process, Rome has insisted on establishing regional agreements as a suitable bridging solution bringing the Eastern countries closer to the European Community. The ambition declared by Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De Michelis, is to give a Central European dimension to Italy's foreign policy by contributing to the emergence of a stable cooperation framework in the region. In particular, the Italian government has been the most ardent promoter of the 'Esagonale' (Hexagonal) including

Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The main objectives of this arrangement are the creation of partnership structures, cooperation on specific matters (such as environmental protection, transport, migration and culture), the consolidation of democratic institutions and economic development. Italians feel that it can offer a useful political instrument to manage possibly growing instability or specific crises in Central Europe and the Balkans. Of particular concern for Italy are the disintegrating drives in Yugoslavia. The 'Esagonale' has been presented by Rome as a way of facing the Yugoslav problem in a wider multinational context.

However, the evolution of the Yugoslav crisis has clearly shown that the regional cooperative effort undertaken in that context can by no means substitute the increasingly essential political role of the EC on the European scene and must necessarily be regarded as complementary to it. Concerned about the stability of the area, Italy's government has placed the highest priority on the goal of preserving Yugoslavian political unity. The subsequent sharpening of the crisis with the gloomy threat of civil war on its eastern borders has prompted it to assume a more positive attitude towards the Republics' claims for independence. Italy has hence convincingly supported the mediating and stabilizing action of the EC which, of all the European institutions, has proved the most credible and effective interlocutor for the conflicting parties.

The intensification of economic cooperation with the new democracies of Eastern Europe is considered an indirect aid to the Soviet Union. Moscow could, in fact, suffer negative repercussions from failure of the economic reforms in East European countries. Finally, in Italy's view, the 'Esagonale' represents a counterbalance to the inevitably increasing weight of united Germany (De Michelis, 1990a; 1990b; 1990c).

The Italian government has consistently pointed out that regional agreements like the 'Esagonale' constitute only one component of the broader European architecture. Italy was among the most active supporters of the pan-European process and the institutionalization of the CSCE. Nevertheless, it rejected the idea of making the CSCE the corner-stone of the new European order. This view stems from the concern that a

strengthening of pan-European structures, coupled with a lack of progress in intra-Western cooperation and integration, could lead to a shift in the political balance towards Central Europe with the resulting marginalization of the Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the problem of North-South relations, which constitutes a major source of concern for Rome, is only marginally considered in the CSCE context. Finally, the growth of the political role of the EC favoured by Italy is unlikely to take shape in the CSCE, where the United States and the Soviet Union have decisive influence.

Italy's strong interest in maintaining a solid framework of Western cooperation is confirmed by its attitude towards NATO. It has traditionally acted as one of the most loyal allies of the United States, with which it has constantly sought to maintain a special relationship. While being ready to take over important political responsibilities in the implementation of major NATO decisions, Italy has often tried to play a mediating role when the Alliance has had to face internal disputes. This attitude emerged clearly in 1989 during the row over the modernization of short-range nuclear forces in Europe. The position worked out by the Italian government on that occasion was essentially a compromise solution which was eventually agreed upon (IAI, 1990b, pp. 185–98). Generally speaking, Italy has shown an evident tendency to take an intermediate stance on nuclear matters, trying to facilitate the Alliance's decision-making process.

The guidelines for the reform of the Alliance outlined at the London Summit (July 1990) were supported by Italy without reservations. In particular, the decision to reduce reliance on nuclear forces was welcomed by the Italian government, which had already encouraged this development during the eighties. The prospect of a more equal sharing of responsibilities and burdens between the United States and the European allies is also accepted, in principle, by Rome, but there is strong reluctance to accept any option which would require an increase in national resources devoted to defence. The opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority of the public is, instead, in favor of reducing military expenditures (Silvestri, 1990a). For this reason, Italy supports the proposals for modification of the Alliance's

military structure, such as multinationalization of forces, which would provide a savings.

Italy regards the Atlantic Alliance as an indispensable pole of stability for Europe, especially in view of the new risks and possible sources of crisis emerging in the post-cold war situation. The hypothesis of an extension of NATO's competences to 'out-of-area' contingencies, on the other hand, finds little consensus. The main concern is that the inclusion of the threat from the south in NATO's strategy could accentuate the risk of tensions along the North-South axis and weaken the prospect of more intense dialogue and cooperation with the non-European countries of the Mediterranean.

In Italy, the debate on the prospect of a European defence is still rather confused. It must be stressed that Italy's security policy has traditionally been based on the reaffirmation of the Atlantic commitment, rather than on an effort to promote innovative solutions. In the past, two main concerns induced Italy to consider, however reluctanctly, the idea of an autonomous security policy of the West European countries: the possible loss of the advantages deriving from the special relationship with the USA and the risk of falling under the hegemony of the strongest European allies. The rather passive way in which the Italian government accepted the actions aimed at the so-called revitalization of the WEU fundamentally stemmed from these two major concerns.

Nevertheless, during the eighties a new interest in the idea of a European defence has gradually gained ground among the political parties belonging to the governmental coalition. A contrast clearly emerged between a more conservative and cautious position represented especially by the then Foreign Minister Andreotti and a more innovative one held by other leaders of the DC (the Christian Democrat party) such as De Mita and Colombo and the 'lay' parties. This contrast came to the fore on the occasion of the debate on the WEU Hague 'Platform on European security interests' and the bilateral actions promoted by France: while the Goria government tried to water down the content of the Hague Platform and expressed serious reservations about the Franco-German undertakings in the autumn of 1987, the subsequent De Mita government reversed this stance and in

spring 1989 declared its readiness to work on the strengthening of European cooperation in the field of defence through both bilateral and multilateral actions (IAI, 1990a, pp. 128–40).

This new approach has been gaining currency in the last few years together with a new activism aimed at achievement of political union in the European Community. During its EC presidency (second half of 1990), Italy put forward the idea of absorbing the WEU into the European Community. Although too ambitious to have real possibilities of being accepted, such a proposal had the unquestionable merit of stimulating debate on the institutional arrangements possible for European defence in view of the IGC on political union which began in November 1990. At the conference, Italy presented a plan which calls for further development of the role and the institutional structure of the WEU as a transitional solution. The EC should eventually absorb the competences of the WEU through a gradual process involving, among other things, the strengthening of institutional ties between the two institutions.

Italy's preference for the EC as the most appropriate context for building an autonomous European security and defence policy is based on three fundamental factors. First, Rome has repeatedly stressed the need for a security policy integrating military with political and economic aspects. Such a multidimensional security policy can evidently be achieved only in an integrated institutional framework like the one provided by the European Community. In general, Italy remains sceptical about cooperation of a purely military nature and, hence, tends to emphasize a more comprehensive and political profile for European institutions. Secondly, unlike the WEU, the EC appears to offer a solid and proven institutional structure for multilateral cooperation, in which the formation of restricted directorates — such as a Franco-German or a Franco-British one — is less likely to occur. Preventing the other European partners from assuming hegemonic positions is a crucial goal for Rome, which has to this end traditionally relied on the equalizing effect of the US military presence on the continent. Thirdly, given its solely military character, the WEU, in its current configuration, does not provide a credible framework for the effective treatment of security problems in the

Mediterranean area, the roots of which are perceived by Italy as being more economic than military.

## The southern dimension in Italy's security policy

Official definitions of Italy's southern security environment identify a 'Mediterranean region', that does not, however, constitute a regional system but only a scarcely integrated ensemble of subregions: namely North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and the NATO countries (Ministero della Difesa, 1985, p. 7).

Since the late 1970s, this Mediterranean region has experienced a transformation of its strategic conditions as a result of the combination of three main factors: political instability and socio-economic dislocation (mainly, but not only, in the Arab countries); diffusion of power, most visibly represented by arms proliferation; linkage with the so-called southern 'arc of crisis' stretching from Afghanistan to Morocco.

This transformation of the strategic conditions in the Mediterranean region has resulted in a heightened perception of risks for Western security emanating from the area south of Western Europe.

In the same decade, Italy sustained some direct security threats from the Mediterranean area, deriving from crises in the south and Western responses to them: a stream of terrorist attacks linked to Middle Eastern conflicts were carried out on Italian territory in the 1980s; Italian armed forces took part in all multinational operations in the Mediterranean region after 1981, suffering attack on several occasions (Beirut in 1983; the Gulf in 1987–8; Iraq in 1991); Italy came under direct military attack in 1986, when, after the US bombing of Tripoli, two Libyan Scuds were fired against the island of Lampedusa (aimed at the Loran Long-Range Aid Navigation Station manned by the USA).

These events took place against a background of growing Italian activism in foreign policy, interlaced with the (re)-emergence of the 'out-of-area' question as an issue in Euro-American and intra-European relations, and represented Italy's

first direct involvement in the management of military aspects of security since the Second World War.

Nevertheless, military considerations are not prominent in the Italian response to the perception of increased security risks from the south. Indeed, Italy has responded by trying to develop a full-fledged 'Mediterranean policy'. Many facets of this policy have still to be coherently articulated and implemented; nevertheless, it appears to be based on a concept of comprehensive security whose manifesto can be considered the *Italian-Spanish Non Paper on CSCM*. In it, it is argued that: 'In this area of the world, economic imbalances, together with social and cultural conflicts, are at the root of an instability that also breeds military confrontation. Such a situation is fundamentally different from the one that prevailed in Europe' (Ministero degli Esteri, 1990, p. 3).

This concept of comprehensive security underlies the proposal for a CSCM and all of Italy's Mediterranean policies (Aliboni, 1991a; 1991b); it is believed that integrating economic, political and military means in a global cooperative strategy towards the region will be able to defuse the security risks arising from Mediterranean instability in a much more lasting manner than *ad hoc* 'containment' actions.

In fact, the perception is that what is at stake in the Mediterranean is a cultural and social balance that is far more complex than the military one. From an Italian or, indeed, a Southern European point of view, security challenges such as (mass) migration, terrorism and intercultural confrontation are often as frightening as conventional and unconventional arms proliferation in the region.

This view explains the already mentioned Italian hostility to extending NATO competences to the South: NATO is and remains a military alliance and is therefore unable to deal with the non-military aspects of Mediterranean security.

On the other hand, the concept of comprehensive security applied to the Mediterranean region reinforces the Italian preference for the EC as the main locus of European security. With the adoption of a common security and defence policy in the framework of the future European Political Union, the EC could in fact become the only European institution able to implement

an integrated cooperative strategy towards its Mediterranean neighbours.

During the recent Gulf crisis, this conviction was behind the Italian effort to coordinate European responses through the EPC, and to promote the adoption of a common security and defence policy at the IGC on political union (Guazzone, 1992).

### *Which risks from the south?*

As far as the security risks coming from the Mediterranean-Middle East area are concerned, Italy shares with the other Southern European countries a marked vulnerability that originates in the territorial proximity, the intensity of politico-economic relations and the special sensitivity to the political tensions arising in intra-Western relations when facing crises in the south.

In this context, Italy feels particularly vulnerable to some specific forms of crisis in the south. Any acute political, economic or military crisis in the Maghreb would expose Italy to multiple risks, given the combination of territorial proximity (the Sicilian Channel dividing Italian territory from Tunisia is only about 150 km across) and relatively intense politico-economic relations (North Africa's share in Italy's total energy imports rose from 25 to 46 per cent between 1983 and 1989).

Damage to local economic interests, danger to Italian expatriates (over 10,000 in the five AMU countries) and the possibility of a mass exodus towards Europe, are the direct non-military risks that could emanate from a crisis in the Maghreb. Crisis in the Middle East could have similar effects on Italian economic security, given its dependence on the region for energy supplies (the Middle Eastern share still represents 27 per cent of the total, although it has decreased in recent years) and maritime commercial traffic.

Italy also feels particularly exposed to crisis connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict: not only is this issue felt to be at the core of Middle Eastern conflictuality, but there is also the perception that every exacerbation of this conflict since the early 1970s has been accompanied by an intensification of terrorism of Middle Eastern

origin in Italy. Furthermore, the empathy for the Palestinian cause that has developed among the Italian public since the late sixties has traditionally produced pressure for government action in support of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinians.

In addition to these direct risks, Italy is particularly aware of indirect risks, namely the further deterioration of the economic conditions in the Mediterranean (aggravating the political instability and leading to migration), and the political isolation of Israel and some Arab countries, namely Libya and Syria, which could further radicalize their attitudes towards their respective regional environments (the Maghreb and the Arab-Israeli conflict).

It is evident from this review that military threats do not rank high among the security risks perceived from the south. However, their occurrence is not discounted either, and the need to develop military instruments suited to facing regional conflictuality of an increasingly technological nature is apparent in the military reform under way in Italy (see below).

### *Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the Mediterranean*

As argued previously, the development of a prominent and relatively consistent Mediterranean segment of Italy's foreign policy is as much the effect of the global enhancement of Italy's foreign policy and of regional conditions, as it is the manifestation of an historical vocation inherent in Italy's geopolitical position (Santoro, 1990). In fact, the existence of a distinct Mediterranean dimension in Italy's foreign policy is a recent phenomenon dating back no further than the mid-1970s (Donini, 1988; 1989). Therefore, the perception of increased security risks from the south came at a relatively early stage in the formulation of the Italian Mediterranean policy and influenced it significantly.

The Mediterranean policy that has emerged consists of a series of micro and macro policies in the fields of foreign and defence affairs: economic policy remains less integrated, apart from the state-controlled areas of energy imports and development aid.

In the diplomatic sphere, Italy concentrates its bilateral action on three groups of countries that can be classified as 'key actors', 'old friends' and 'problem countries'.

The first category is made up of the countries that play a central role in their respective subregional environments: Morocco and Algeria in the Maghreb; Egypt, Israel and Jordan in the Mashreq. Only two countries — Tunisia and Egypt — fall into the second category. Finally, the third group comprises Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.

In its bilateral relations with the 'key players', Italy generally implements policies decided at the pan-Western or EC level (e.g. aid priority, associate status, special support or sanctions connected with distinct situations).

In contrast, more specifically Italian policies are involved in relations with 'old friends' and 'problem countries'.

Italy's special attention for Tunisia reflects ties born of territorial proximity, but also expresses support for the country's efforts to act as a mediator in regional integration in the Maghreb. It also answers Tunisia's traditional search for alternatives to French influence.

Relations with Egypt are built on a mutual interest in strengthening the role of regional countries in ensuring regional stability. Egyptian-Italian cooperation in security-related fields like anti-terrorism (a bilateral accord in that field signed in 1986 was the first to be stipulated by Italy with a non-EC Mediterranean country) is generally complementary to pan-Western and particularly US policy in the region, but it can, at times, diverge.

An example of this was the 1985 *Achille Lauro* affair, where the Italian and Egyptian interests in defusing the crisis with and within the PLO coincided and were in contrast to the US insistence on immediately bringing the PLO-linked hijackers to trial in the United States.

Italy maintains relatively good relations with Libya, Syria, Lebanon and, to a lesser degree, with Iran. These are based on two main factors, other than special economic interests (as in the case of Libya): one is the desire, already mentioned, to prevent politico-economic isolation from contributing to the further radicalization of the regimes of these countries, the other is the

attempt to design a specific political role for Italy as the mediator between these 'problem countries' and the West.

To conclude this overview of bilateral diplomacy in the Mediterranean as one facet of Italy's security policy, it must be pointed out that Italian relations with the Gulf countries are globally weak and mostly confined to the commercial sphere. This is due to the absence of any traditional cultural or political ties, as well as to the Gulf countries' perception of Italy as being marginal in the two fields most vital to them: oil and regional security.

In fact, security cooperation, in the form of direct or indirect military assistance and arms sales, is the least developed facet of Italy's security policy in the Mediterranean-Middle East area.

Formal military cooperation agreements exist only with Malta and Morocco, while memoranda of understanding are in force with Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt; however, the profile of Italian military cooperation is globally low if compared to that of other Western powers. Arms sales and post-sale assistance contracts extended to Iraq and Libya by private defence industries were halted — at least officially — by the embargo on arms trade imposed on these countries in 1985 and 1986, respectively.

Another aspect of Italy's diplomacy in the Mediterranean remains to be stressed: the 'multi-bilateral' and subregional level of action. Attempts have been made to set up a loose intermediate network for coordination among regional states, able to compensate for the shortcomings of purely national or pan-Western security policies in the region. To this end, Italy has more or less formally coordinated its action with the other Southern European countries — namely France and Spain — to contain the security risks coming from the South.

In the economic sphere, this has taken the form of a sort of 'southern lobby' in the EC, supporting, among other things, the enhancement of aid policies in the framework of the EC's Mediterranean policy.

In the military sphere, the western wing of the Southern European network (France, Italy and Spain) has materialized in multi-bilateral naval, intelligence and R&D cooperation (Greco, 1991).

In the political sphere, the Southern European network is

manifested in the attention paid to the political perceptions of the Mediterranean countries and, more concretely, in the efforts promoted throughout the eighties to create some sort of Mediterranean 'monitoring group' in support of regional security. These efforts finally materialized in 1990 — thanks to French initiative — in the setting up of a 'Group of 4 + 5' (comprising the four south-western members of the EC, and the five countries of the AMU), which, in addition to its own cooperation programme, pledged to work for the calling of a CSCM.

*Impact on defence policy*

The influence of the perception of increased security risks from the south on the formulation of Italy's defence policy has become increasingly evident in the eighties. Socialist Defence Minister Lagorio (1980–3) was the first to advocate a reconsideration of the structure and missions of the Italian armed forces on the basis of the increasing strategic importance and complexity of their role in the defence of NATO's southern flank.

This opened a lively but confused debate over the need for a new 'model of defence' in Italy, which was further stimulated by the country's participation in the multinational force in Lebanon and was reflected in the Ministry of Defence's 1985 White Paper (Ministero della Difesa, 1985).

For the first time since the Second World War, the 1985 White Paper acknowledged the existence of specific threats to national security interests distinct from those associated with Italian commitments to NATO, namely, the defence of the southern part of the territory and of the free flow of strategic supplies such as oil, and the protection of nationals abroad.

The 'new thinking' outlined in the 1985 document failed however to be translated into new defence planning. The sluggish debate over the 'model of defence' was once again revamped by the 1990–1 crisis over Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

In spring 1991, the Italian Parliament began to discuss the requirements of the 'model of defence' anew:

— the definition of two missions for the armed forces: defence

of national territory and contribution to international stability;
— the revamping of the FIR (the Italian rapid intervention force) and the strengthening of the air-naval and air forces;
— the enhancement of the role and relative weight of professional soldiers in the Army (that would deeply cut its effectiveness and possibly evolve towards an all-volunteers force);
— the formulation of multi-year appropriation and budgeting procedures;
— the streamlining of the top chain of command.

If and when implemented, this new model of defence should equip Italy with a military instrument more suited to the requirements of the ongoing reform of the NATO military structure, and more capable of performing multinational missions of peace-keeping, peace-enforcing and intervention in 'out-of-area' conflicts.

## Conclusions

The dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the new related risks of crisis and instability in Eastern Europe, the ensuing changes in international leadership, the expectations of a higher international profile for the EC and the accentuated tensions along the North-South axis are the main factors that have led Italy to adopt an increasingly active attitude towards its security problems. The new assertiveness in this field, which gradually emerged in the eighties, has received a significant boost after the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Italy has been developing its action in two main ways: (i) by actively contributing to the process of restructuring of the Western institutions responsible for security policy; (ii) by promoting or favouring new forms of regional cooperation in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean. The most relevant development with regard to the former is the full support for the extension of EC political integration to security policy. As for the latter, a basic model has seemingly emerged based on the

revitalization of common regional interests suffocated during the cold war and a multinational cooperative approach covering cultural, political, economic and military aspects.

The web of cooperative undertakings among Southern European countries — especially Italy, France and Spain — is to date the most advanced example of this model. However, the persistent differences in the approach of Southern European countries to fundamental issues such as the development of a European identity — namely a common security and defence policy, military participation in 'out-of-area' crisis management, or the launching of a CSCM — make the limits of these subregional solidarities evident.

This is one of the reasons why the regional actions undertaken by Italy have not fundamentally changed the basic orientation of the country's security policy. It continues to assign the highest priority to the strengthening of broader European cooperation frameworks. Regional actions are, in fact, regarded as complementary to the action of the three central pillars of European security represented by NATO, the EC and the CSCE. The most worrisome scenario for Italy would be the resurgence of a 'balance-of-power' situation in Europe generated by a series of crises in the East and by the parallel failure of the integration processes at various levels. Thus, the success of both the Euro-Atlantic and the Mediterranean dimension of Italy's security policy seems to depend to a decisive degree on the consolidation of West-European and Pan-European cooperation.

# 7
# The Portuguese national security policy

Herminio Santos

## Introduction

This chapter takes into consideration the main aspects of Portugal's national security policy: foreign relations and their implications for military policy.

After years of international isolation, European integration became Portugal's number one priority as a European perspective took over in its relations with the USA, the Portuguese-speaking African countries and Brazil.

The key aims of Portuguese foreign policy are definitely to abandon its peripherical position in major European decisions, to achieve the development levels of other Western European countries, to maintain its Atlantic relationship with the USA and Canada and to keep and build on the privileged ties with the African continent and Brazil (Pinheiro, 1990).

However, if Portugal wants to take a stand outside its borders, it is generally thought that it must start in Europe, that 'melting pot of nations, where each contribution is measurable by its diversity and, without losing its identity, enriches the whole'.[1] The Atlantic dimension is seen as a part of the Portuguese identity and a means of strengthening its position within Europe.

Within Europe, bilateral relations with Spain are of particular

importance for Portugal. Broadly speaking, in spite of changes in Eastern Europe and the Gulf events, it is felt in Portugal that a large part of the world strategic balance will continue to involve Western Europe and particularly the Mediterranean.

In view of these basic lines in Portuguese foreign and security policy, this chapter examines Portugal's relations with Africa and Brazil, with the USA, with Spain and, lastly, with Europe. Some considerations on the Portuguese military instrument conclude the chapter.

## Africa and Latin America

Sixteen years after the '25 April' revolution and the end of the colonial war, the return to Africa is seen positively. With the help of the positive evolution in most former Portuguese colonies, which had pro-Marxist governments in the 1970s and 1980s, Africa has become a foreign policy priority. At present, free elections have been held in Cape Verde and S. Tomé e Principe (the opposition won both), a peace settlement was reached in Angola and Guinea-Bissau is undergoing a process of internal debate over democratization.

In 1990 and 1991, Portugal mde a considerable and most successful diplomatic effort as mediator in the Angola peace negotiations between the UNITA and the MPLA. After the negotiations were successfully concluded, Portugal has continued to assist the former contenders in the difficult business of actually bringing peace to Angolan society: merging the MPLA and UNITA armies, preparing the general elections, democratizing the public administration, etc. As for Mozambique, it is now thought that the Portuguese government will at some point be asked to act as mediator between the FRELIMO government and the armed rebel group, RENAMO, which have unsuccessfully been trying for some time to put an end to the civil war through negotiations in Rome promoted by a Catholic group — the Comunità di S. Egidio — and the Italian government.

Cavaco Silva's government is determined to establish and take on the leadership of a Luso-African Portuguese-speaking community, with common stances in a number of areas where

interests are shared. This was the substance of the statements the Prime Minister made during an official visit to Bissau in November 1990, when he addressed the first meeting of foreign ministers of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, S. Tomé e Principe and Portugal. Terms like 'history in the making' and 'putting to rest the ambiguities and misunderstandings of the past' were not scarce in the Prime Minister's address.

Portuguese diplomacy expects important dividends from its effort to regain influence in Africa. As a 'First World' country, a member of the EC and NATO, Portugal can use whatever influence it may have with its European partners to protect the interests of the Portuguese-speaking and the African countries in general. The lusophone countries can reciprocate by using their influence with other African countries to advance the Portuguese point of view (Carvalho, 1990).

At the Bissau meeting, the six countries decided to intensify political and economic cooperation, and to convene a summit meeting of heads of state and government every year.

Brazil was the only Portuguese-speaking country not present at the Bissau meeting. Asked about the significant absence, João de Deus Pinheiro, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, admitted that if Brazil had been present 'consensus would have been more difficult' (PBL, 25 Nov. 1990, p. 8). There is the feeling in Portugal, however, that a 'circle' of international cooperation among Portuguese-speaking countries makes no sense and lacks coherence if the largest of the seven, Brazil, does not participate.

Historical, cultural, strategic and political factors justify a close relationship between Portugal and Brazil. Since its entry into the EC and after Brazil's return to democracy, the relationship between the two countries has gained new momentum. The present Brazilian leadership feels that a greater Brazilian presence in Europe is essential, especially in view of the 1992 single market. In 1990, Brazil became the fourth foreign direct investor in Portugal, and there are at present approximately 25,000 Brazilians working in Portugal.

### The relationship with the United States

Security relations between Portugal and the USA are based essentially on the 1951 Defence Agreement as subsequently revised. The negotiations which led to the most recent revision of this agreement (known as the 'Lajes Agreement') in 1983 were conducted with the main objective, on the part of Portugal, of achieving the much needed re-equipping of its armed forces.

The major re-equipment programmes of the Portuguese armed forces have always been strongly dependent on US aid. As the amount of aid has decreased substantially, some of these programmes have been delayed or postponed. Looking at the Military Programme Law of 1987–91, the dependence on US military aid for re-equipment programmes becomes glaringly evident. Major items such as the replacement of the armaments and equipment of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade, and the purchase of frigates, new equipment for some Army units and F-16 aircraft rely predominantly on US aid (both in credits and in resources).

As a consequence some friction has arisen over procurement. The decision to purchase helicopters for the *Vasco da Gama* frigates (three MEKO 2,000 frigates to be delivered to the Portuguese Navy through 1991) is an example. The USA wanted Portugal to buy Seasprite helicopters, which were not considered the most suitable by some military circles. After much debate and following Mrs Thatcher's personal intervention, a British firm finally obtained the contract.

In 1990, American military and economic aid under the Lajes airbase agreement totalled 127 million dollars. In 1989, this amount came to 163 million dollars and the previous year had reached the highest level in the last ten years, about 207 million dollars. The amount was similar in 1985, when changes in Eastern Europe were still far away. In 1979, US economic and military aid totalled 29 million dollars.

The facilities granted at the Lajes airbase are an essential factor in the relationship between the two nations. According to Calvet de Magalhães, in order to assess correctly Portuguese and American relations, 'determinant factors of a permanent character', that is, geostrategic, ideological and constitutional factors,

must be borne in mind. For Calvet de Magalhães, 'the geostrategic is surely the most important and the one that, through several reverses, is always the result of the evolution of the international political situation and the positive factor *par excellence*' (Calvet de Magalhães, 1987).

In December of 1983, after long talks between the two countries on the use by the US Rapid Intervention Force of the Lajes airbase and possibly the use of other airports on continental Portuguese territory in times of crisis, Jaime Gama and George Shultz signed a new agreement which expired on 4 February 1991. Under the provisions of the agreement, it automatically remains in force for one year after the expiry date, provided negotiations for its review have begun, as is the case. The technical and operative agreements regulating the functioning of the airbase have been revised and the installation of a satellite control station on Portuguese territory is being negotiated. In 1988, after a gradual reduction of US financial and military aid to Portugal, long negotiations were started for new compensation from Washington.

In 1991, Portugal began renegotiation of the agreement. During the Gulf crisis the airbase was, once more, of extreme importance in moving and supporting American troops. From August 1990 until the beginning of the Desert Storm Operation, more than 800 missions for refuelling of fighters and bombers flying over the Azores were carried out from Lajes. During the Gulf crisis, Portugal made it clear that the granting of facilities in the Azores and, for the first time, on mainland Portugal, was its principal contribution to the US-led coalition effort.

Considering these efforts, some think that Portuguese authorities should put new demands on the USA, namely, for the supply of more modern and sophisticated material to re-equip the armed forces. Others think that relations between the USA and Portugal should go beyond the defence and military equipment levels. There are many areas in which cooperation would be feasible, such as the economy, science and technology. Portugal's accession to the EC should extend relations between the two countries beyond the sheer strategic importance of Portuguese territory, particularly the Azores. Portugal should not be seen as a mere strategical platform. The growth of Portugal's international role

— as sustained by its membership in the EC and its dialogue with Africa — is not compatible with such relations with the US (Calvet de Magalhães *et al*, 1990, p. 67).

This point of view is shared by the present government. In one of his public appearances, the Secretary of State for Defence, Eugénio Ramos, claimed that it is time to take advantage of the quality change in relations between the USA and Europe to achieve 'greater maturity' in Portugal's relationship with its 'big neighbour' to whom it is tied by the North Atlantic. With such an upgrading, Portugal is bound to develop a privileged relationship with the United States.

### The relationship with Spain

During the period of dictatorship in both countries, Portugal and Spain ignored each other. Democracy and especially EC membership altered the relationship between the two peninsular countries. Trade has increased enormously: from 5 per cent of Portuguese foreign trade in 1985, to roughly 15 per cent in 1990.

At the annual summit meetings between the prime ministers of both countries — now a rule — a number of relevant issues are discussed and common stances worked out. However, a different approach to European matters still prevails, in particular concerning security. When Cavaco Silva and Felipe González met in the Algarve for the 1990 Iberian summit, Portugal stressed the importance of NATO and the trans-Atlantic linkage, while Spain stressed the importance of moving towards a common foreign and security policy in the European Community. The Portuguese Foreign Minister thinks that these different approaches derive from the fact that 'Portugal has a more Atlantic position and Spain, as always, a more continental one' (PBL, 6 Dec. 1990, p. 6).

Within NATO, the two countries have not always seen eye to eye on the definition of their respective strategic areas. Since Spain's entry into NATO, Portugal has expressed its unwillingness to have its forces under Spanish command and has opposed the idea of a single command for the Iberian region. Portuguese authorities opposed the guidelines originally proposed for Spain's

contribution to NATO in the Eastern Atlantic, which included the defence of the airspace over the Azores and Madeira. More recently, Spanish authorities agreed to limit their responsibilities to areas of vital strategic importance, i.e. the Straits-Canary Islands line in the Eastern Atlantic. It was decided that Portugal would choose in which cases, if any, Portuguese troops would come under Spanish military command within NATO. According to Virgílio de Carvalho 'Portugal is not against, nor is that its role, the Spanish projection into the Atlantic within NATO. What Portugal is strongly against is the possibility of that happening on its territory' (Carvalho, 1983, p. 44).

In spite of these controversies, it seems that the authorities of both countries have come to the conclusion that it is time to discuss thoroughly the problem of the strategic interests of each country and to find a way to cooperate. According to Admiral Fuzeda da Ponte (Portugal's former Military Representative to NATO and currently Navy Chief of Staff) cooperation between Portugal and Spain could be a reality if 'instead of supporting the differences, one tried to adjust the national diversity and, by taking advantage of it, drew mutual benefit. In other words, the interests of each peninsular country could be strengthened by the territorial strategic complementarity' (Fuzeda da Ponte, 1987, p. 190).

In the regional context, Portugal has become more aware of the importance of its relationship with North Africa, Morocco in particular. Since the security dimension is not absent, the major concern is evidently the potential for crisis. Portugal has consistently been trying to strengthen its relations with Maghreb countries, not only through participation in the Western Mediterranean multilateral solidarity (the '4 + 5' group), but also through development of bilateral relations with Morocco (some military cooperation already exists) and with Algeria.

## Portugal and the new European architecture

The main Portuguese aim in establishing a new European order is maintaining the prominent position of the trans-Atlantic and

overseas space. It is within this space that Portugal expects to be able to assert itself.

Thus, the Portuguese agree with the statement made by NATO's Secretary General during his visit to Portugal in November 1990. He said that 'the trans-Atlantic link, supported by the Alliance, is irreplaceable' and stressed the Portuguese role in reinforcing the link between North America and Western Europe.

The Portuguese diplomacy opposes any security policy intended to set up a European bloc relegating ties with the USA to a secondary position. NATO, EC, WEU and CSCE are seen as complementary, not mutually exclusive organizations.

Given these premisses, how does Portugal envisage the European pillar? Portugal does not reject the integration of WEU into the EC in the long term, but for the moment the integration of European security and defence policies should take place within the Western European Union. In other words, if the organization of European security is seen in concentric circles, the first circle of the European security system within the greater circle of the CSCE would be NATO, with the WEU acting as its European pillar. According to the Prime Minister, Portugal defends 'the WEU activity towards a strengthening of European defensive cohesion'.[2]

One thing is certain and that is, except for the Communists, Portuguese politicians are reluctant to accept a European security policy that would mean the end of NATO. On the one hand, WEU reinforcement is defended; on the other hand, so is the Alliance. The position is close to that of Britain and the United States. The WEU is considered to be of value for 'out-of-area' operations which NATO cannot perform.

Before the December 1990 European Council in Rome, the Foreign Minister, Mr Pinheiro, met with members of the opposition parties to explain the government's proposals. Only the Communists were strongly against them. Their remarks were based on the principle that European Union may result in a loss of sovereignty for Portugal and the continuation of a Europe of blocs. The other parties basically agreed with the government (PBL, 16 Dec. 1990, p. 6). The Socialist Party produced a document in which gradual progress toward European Political

Union is defended in a more decisive way than by the government. The stances of the Socialist Party in this respect are closer to those of the President of the Republic: stronger support of European Union and full integration of Portugal in all EC mechanisms, including joining the EMS at an early stage.

This cautious position of the Portuguese government is justified by the fear that Europe may turn to the East and forget the peripheral countries and the interchange with Africa and Latin America. This brings us to the Portuguese view of German unification and changes in Eastern European countries and the USSR.

Portugal backs the presence of a united Germany within NATO, but points out that the European support for Eastern countries, in which Germany has a keen interest, must not damage Community cohesion, nor overshadow the solidarity owed to Africa and Latin America.[3]

Portugal has a cautious position on the prospects of the Eastern crisis, the turmoil in the Soviet Union and the disintegrative fury in some states of Eastern Europe. In both the European Council in Rome and the CSCE meeting in Paris at the end of 1990, it became clear that Lisbon intended to remind Europe once again that the ties with Africa and Latin America cannot be forgotten.

At the press conference at the end of the Paris CSCE meeting in November 1990, Cavaco Silva stressed the need for a North-South dialogue and wished that 'this spirit of European relationship could spread to other parts of the globe: to Africa, Latin America and, obviously, to the Middle East' (*Diario de Noticias*, 22 Nov. 1990, p. 13).

However, Portugal, which is trying to enhance its role in the EPC, is now devoting greater attention to Central and Eastern European affairs, currently at the top of the agenda for Europe.

## The Portuguese armed forces and their modernization

Portuguese national security policy is a blend of old and new objectives: the expanding European dimension tends to prevail, but the country's trans-Atlantic and extra-continental ties

remain. Development of the Portuguese military instrument is an important element of this transformation.

Portugal is undertaking a thorough redefinition of its security priorities, which fall under three main categories: the strategic concept of national defence and its major options are currently being fully revised; the Defence Ministry and the structure of the armed forces are being reformed; guidelines for modernization and re-equipping (which should result in the Military Programme Law for 1991–5) are being established.

The revision of the strategic options drawn up in 1985 was the object of a public debate launched by the Defence Minister in the second half of 1990. The 1985 documents were the result of a compromise between the Euro-Atlantic stances of the political parties and the more nationalistic attitude of the armed forces themselves. In order to understand how this was possible, one must bear in mind that political-military relations were far from being normalized at the time, thus the Defence Ministry had no real grip on defence policy-making. Of course, the integration of Portugal into European institutions and subsequently the profound change in the European and international security landscape also made a full review of the 1985 concepts essential.

In order to achieve full normalization of politico-military relations and the restructuring of military forces, the so-called 3R policy has been proposed by the government: the three Rs stand for Restructuring, Redimensioning and Re-equipment.

The structuring of the Defence Ministry is almost complete. As for the restructuring of the armed forces, a model must be found for a military institution geared to today's needs, the reality of the Portuguese presence in Europe and new 'out-of-area' responsibilities. In this way, a structure built for the purpose of fighting wars in Africa in the 1970s and essentially unchanged since then would be eliminated once and for all.

The shortcomings of the Portuguese military apparatus are well known. No radical reform of staff and resources has been carried out since the colonial war. Today's scenario is not very encouraging: overstaffing, the financial burden of reservists and obsolete material. The Portuguese armed forces are the most expensive, in terms of staff, of NATO forces. For instance, in 1985, over 85 billion escudos of the 140 billion escudos attributed

to the three armed forces branches, that is, 61 per cent of the military budget, was spent on staff. From 1980 to 1990, the Defence Ministry general spending on staff rose from 22 to 109 billion escudos.

Portugal, a country of ten million inhabitants, has approximately 6,000 officers and almost 11,000 sergeants in the permanent ranks of its services. In 1990, about 34,000 men completed compulsory military service. Last year, about 23,000 men were recruited to the Army — which had the highest level of personnel — and the rest were distributed through the Navy and the Air Force. In 1989, the Army recruited close to 30,000 men.

A major objective of the current restructuring is to cut back on the numbers of the three services, especially the Army. In the Army, the troops should be concentrated into two main mobile brigades, instead of being kept in a territorial army, as at present, and the level of operational skill and technological capability significantly increased.

The Defence Minister, Fernando Nogueira, has already announced his intention to reduce the compulsory military service from twelve (recently down from eighteen) to four months (with the possibility of a four-month extension in case of particular need on the part of the services). This points to semi-professional armed forces, with the active or operational forces structure essentially composed of volunteers and professional servicemen.

The Gulf war has shown that the most likely scenario for the involvement of Portuguese armed forces is regional conflict, either as a result of European commitments or bilateral commitments with African countries (Portugal is already contributing military advisors, training and logistic support to varying degrees in Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and S. Tomé e Principe). Participation in UN peace-keeping missions is also being envisaged for the first time.

Former Foreign Minister and then Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, Jaime Gama (Socialist MP), expressed the need for 'a broad consensus, when one is dealing with a matter of such extreme importance as military service and national defence' (PBL, 9 Nov. 1990, p. 8).

The concepts up for review concern the enhancement of the air-naval component of Portugal's military contribution to NATO:

the modernization programme for the years 1987–91 concentrated on the Navy and the Air Force. The major acquisitions of this period were the three *Vasco da Gama* class frigates with anti-submarine capabilities and 20 F-16 interceptor aircraft for the Air Force.

The modernization of the Army was not considered a major priority, even though the 1st Mixed Brigade, earmarked for the north of Italy before the current review of NATO's force structure, has been modernized in terms of equipment, in particular with a new air defence system. The Alliance provided most of the funding for the Portuguese Integrated Air Control and Command System, which will be one of the most sophisticated in Europe.

The modernization and re-equipment programme now being discussed will take into consideration the need for greater mobility and professionalization of the Army. The Navy and the Air Force should see their capabilities for patrolling the 200-mile Economic Zone improved. The sea-patrol fleet should be enlarged, with the purchase of four out of six newly planned units. Portugal should also take part, with Belgium and The Netherlands, in the development of a small minesweeper (at present, Portugal has none).

Considering the Army's needs to be able to project power and take part in peace-making and peace-keeping missions, the current priorities are to concentrate all the special forces presently individually located in the Navy, the Air Force and the Army (marines, paratroopers and the 'Comandos' regiment, respectively) in one highly operational unit.

Under the CFE agreement, Portugal will not have to make any cuts since the accepted rule was quantity. On the contrary, it expects to receive armaments and equipment withdrawn from other European countries in substitution for obsolete equipment. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, combat helicopters and aircraft will be available to replace existing resources which fall short of the minimum operational requirements. As of 1993, the Army may be able to replace its old tanks and armoured vehicles with newer M-13s and receive comparatively modern artillery pieces. The Air Force is counting on Alpha-Jet training aircraft.

In conclusion, Portugal's security concerns and consequently its major strategic options are being thoroughly reviewed. Quite uncharacteristically, this process has involved some degree of public discussion and should be completed, that is, the major guidelines drafted, before the end of 1991. These should fundamentally be in line with major NATO options. A slight shift is predicted towards the European and regional contexts, in keeping with the greater attention that European developments in the field of defence and security and the regional framework are receiving.

## Notes

1. Communication by Eugénio Ramos, *Os vectores estratégicos da conjuntura euro-atlântica de Portugal*, at the Conference on *As mudanças na Europa de Leste a na URSS e a conjuntura euro-atlântica de Portugal*, University of Azores, July 1990.
2. Speech at the National Defence Institute, Lisbon, 31 May 1990, in *Nação e Defesa*, 1990, (3): 19–27.
3. *Ibid.*

# 8
# The end of the reluctant partner: Spain and Western security in the 1990s

Fernando Rodrigo

### The Gulf crisis

The Persian Gulf crisis has been an important test revealing the level of development reached in Spanish security policy since the permanence of Spain within the Atlantic Alliance was decided by referendum in March 1986. The crisis has also made it obvious that Spain is no longer 'the reluctant partner' (Snyder, G.H., 1988) in Western security.

From the beginning, Spain condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and fully supported the UN Security Council resolutions, thus participating in the international embargo against Iraq. It still remained to see, however, whether Spain would be able to pass from political declarations to political actions.

The first sign of the Spanish will really to support its Western partners was the decision taken by the government of Mr González, authorizing US use of the military facilities on Spanish territory in support of deployment in Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that this authorization, in accordance with the 1 December 1988 Agreement on Defence Cooperation between the two countries, was given as early as 7 August 1990.

This decision meant a radical change in traditional Spanish foreign policy: even during the Franco era (Marquina, 1986, p. 860), American use of military facilities on Spanish soil for purposes within the scope of the bilateral Agreement or the Atlantic Alliance did not allow for military actions 'out-of-area'.

In the weeks following the invasion, the heavy air traffic caused by the American deployment at the Torrejón base near Madrid was a daily news item and the initial source of criticism against the government. This criticism came from the Left, which felt that the authorization given to the USA constituted a possible violation of the conditions accepted by the Spaniards in the referendum on Spain's permanence in NATO (i.e.: (1) the participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its incorporation into the integrated military structure; (2) the ban to install, store or introduce nuclear weapons in the Spanish territory will be maintained; (3) the US military presence in Spain will be progressively reduced).

In the days thereafter, the Spanish government verbally committed itself to the solution of the crisis by ratifying the final communiqué of the Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 10 August. In that session, the member countries of the Alliance supported the deployment of American, British and French military units in the Gulf region, while reminding Iraq that they would consider any aggression against Turkey as *casus belli*.

However, definitive proof of Spain's actual will to participate in the solution of the crisis would be its decision to send military units to the conflict area. As such a decision was unprecedented in twentieth-century Spanish history, the government could not foresee the reactions of political parties, the media, or the public[1] when watching on television the departure of warships carrying reserve forces towards the Gulf area.

A good example of the atmosphere in those days in some strata of Spanish society sharing the government's international inclination was an editorial article that appeared in the Madrid daily *El País* on 15 August:

> For the first time, Spain, as a new member of the European Community and NATO, has to assume its responsibility regarding a very serious international conflict. The decisions

taken by the Government until now, and approved by almost all political parties, have placed our country among the nations from Europe and all over the world that have taken positions against Saddam Hussein's aggression and in favour of the re-establishment of Kuwait's independence and sovereignty. Spain, as a member of the United Nations Organization, has fulfilled its obligations and has adopted the necessary measures to keep the embargo imposed by the Security Council.

It has also fulfilled its obligation as a member of NATO, assuming the commitment of defending Turkey in the event of its being attacked. Upon the request of the United States, the Spanish government has given its consent to the Americans' use of the bases in operations defending Saudi Arabia from possible Iraqi aggressions. This consent — based on a very flexible interpretation of the bilateral treaty — is very precise. We have proven our solidarity to the United States in a very delicate task, giving the necessary importance to the need for military support to a threatened Saudi Arabia.

In view of Saddam Hussein's persistent aggressive attitude and his disdain for international law, now is the time to examine whether Spain must take further measures to support the international action imposed by the UN. In this sense, it would be meaningless to make a show of Spanish solidarity with the Western world by sending a warship to the Gulf, since this solidarity has already been fully proven.

Therefore, before taking any decision committing Spain militarily in the Gulf area, the government should have ensured the support of the opposition in Parliament, locating the framework within which to provide Spanish action with the maximum legitimacy. Given the existence of anti-American feelings in some sectors of public opinion (Rodrigo, 1989) and the general support for the process of European integration, this framework could only have been the Western European Union.

In the Atlantic Council session of 10 August mentioned previously, Spain, along with some other European countries such as France, proposed the WEU as the most suitable framework in which to coordinate any military action to be undertaken by European NATO members, while NATO had to remain within

the limits set out by the Treaty of Washington for military actions in the 'out-of-area'.[2] In this session, Spain stated its willingness to send sea units to participate in the embargo imposed by the UN Security Council[3] if the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of the member countries of the WEU would decide to do so in the meeting that was going to be held in Paris on 21 August.

On 14 August, following the resolutions of the UN and the WEU, the Minister of Foreign Affairs took up contacts with the leaders of the parliamentary opposition[4] to inform them of the decisions taken by the government up to that time. The decisions were supported by all political groups with the exception of Izquierda Unida.[5]

The new attitude of the political forces with respect to the commitments taken on by Spain, including those of a military nature in case of crisis, was reflected in the declarations of Javier Rupérez, speaker of the major opposition party,[6] before the Congress Defence Committee:

> The Popular Party is ready to support the decisions taken by the Government regarding the Gulf conflict, as well as to back up the sending of Spanish ships to the zone. For the first time, we have to confirm that the crisis is affecting us. It is essential to show our allies that our solidarity is real, not just mere rhetoric. (EP, 14 Aug. 1990)

Once it had obtained the support of the majority of the political parties, on 21 August the Spanish government announced to its allies in the WEU its willingness to send one frigate and two corvettes beyond the Suez Canal to participate in the embargo imposed by the UN on Iraq. This made Spanish alignment with its Western allies a reality and shattered the image of Spain as 'a semi-aligned country' (Snyder G.H., 1988, p. 145). In a declaration released in Rabat, the Spanish Prime Minister emphasized the significance of the Spanish decision: 'We are not going to follow the traditional policy of not participating in the destiny of Europe or not sharing the international unanimity about the conflict. I am not for an isolated Spain. We are going to remain firm in our new role' (EP, 20 Aug. 1989).

### Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance

The Persian Gulf crisis has definitively brought about Spain's alignment with its Western allies; at the same time, it has confirmed its heterodox insertion into Western security. The Atlantic Alliance was set up several decades ago — without the participation of Spain — to face and resolve problems springing from the East-West confrontation that is now waning.

What would the reactions of the Spanish government and public opinion have been had the crisis presented a more 'traditional' scenario, one that needed to be solved within the more 'traditional' framework of the Atlantic Alliance? There is no convincing answer to this question; however it may quite safely be affirmed that the Spanish government would probably have had more internal difficulties in materializing its solidarity towards its allies.

Such difficulties could stem from the lack of definition of Spain's position within NATO. Since the referendum on the permanence of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance in March 1986 (Viñas, 1988) Spain has been involved in a long process of negotiation with its allies to define its contribution to the common defence outside of the military structure.

In May 1986, the Spanish Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers presented a memorandum to the Atlantic Council and the DPC; nine general points in accordance with the conditions established by the referendum constituted the basis for the development of Spanish participation in NATO.

The debate with the allies on these points went on from 1986 to January 1988, when Spain was ready to formulate its proposal for its contribution to the common defence. The Spanish ambassador to NATO addressed a letter to the General Secretary listing the possible tasks the Spanish armed forces could be entrusted with for the common defence: (1) prevention of the occupation of Spanish territory (if necessary, all Spanish forces could be used for this task, which includes all kind of military operations); (2) sea and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic; (3) control of the Strait of Gibraltar and its accesses; (4) sea and air operations in the Western Mediterranean (the last three tasks include control and protection of sea traffic, surveillance, and

tactical air support to naval operations and anti-mine measures); (5) the control of airspace and air defence of the area under Spanish responsibility and cooperation in nearby zones (this would include air surveillance and all kinds of air defence operations); (6) the use of Spanish territory for transit, support and rearward logistics. Each of these six tasks, individually considered, will be coordinated jointly by the Spanish forces and their allies.

The ambassador's letter pointed out that the Spanish contribution to the common defence, would 'preferably' take place within the bounds of the strategic zone of national interest. The letter gave specifications for the Agreements mentioned previously:

> In sum, the proposed Agreements will define the individual contribution of both forces, Spanish and allied, the tasks to accomplish, the understandings on command and control, the relationship between command and missions, the geographic zone of application, the instructions to put the Agreements into practice, and the conditions on the time and circumstances under which the forces would be used to perform their tasks.[7]

The elaboration of these Agreements required prior consensus on the general guidelines to be followed by negotiators. It took almost a year to work out these guidelines, as they were not approved by the DPC until 1 December 1988. Finally, in May 1989, after a year and a half of difficult negotiations (the main objections came from France and Portugal) the first two Agreements on the coordination of the Spanish forces and the allied command were signed.[8] These Agreements refer to sea and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic and air defence on Spanish territory.

In order to coordinate the activities of the Spanish armed forces with those of the other allied countries of the integrated command structure (Ojeda, 1989), Spain has distinguished between 'operative command' and 'operative control' of the forces (a distinction originally made by France), so that the Spanish armed forces will always be under national command.[9] However, when these forces participate in combined operations, they will be able to pass under the operative control of an allied

command, if the military circumstances require it. Likewise, allied forces could temporarily come under the operative control of a Spanish command.[10]

The Coordination Agreement on air and sea operations in the Western Atlantic establishes that Spanish units can carry out various missions in the area located between the Cape of Brest (France), Cape Blanco (Sahara) and the Azores Islands. There may, however, be some zones of Spanish special interest inside this strategic triangle, such as the maritime route connecting the Andalusian ports with the Canary Islands and the Cantabric and Galician coastlines. The Agreement on air defence establishes an interconnection for real-time data transmissions between the Spanish system of alert and control and that of the Atlantic Alliance (NADGE).

While presenting these Agreements to the press, the Spanish Defence Minister announced that two new Agreements related to sea operations in the Western Mediterranean and defence of Spanish territory would be signed shortly, as the negotiations were in a very advanced stage. According to the Spanish minister, the Agreements related to the utilization of Spanish territory as a base for logistic and rearward support and for surveillance of the Strait of Gibraltar, had been left to the end because of their complexity and political interest.[11]

Spain's participation in the Alliance has involved a long search for new forms of cooperation in the defence of the Western world. These new forms must combine solidarity with the Allies with attention to the new realities in Europe and the world. Spain feels that, far from being an exception, not integrating into the allied command structure will be the normal mode of membership in the near future.

From this point of view it is easy to understand why Spain was the allied country that received the DPC's decision to revise the Alliance's military strategy most enthusiastically (EP, 24 May 1990). In fact, Mr González was one of the strongest supporters of the European dimension in security at NATO's special summit held in London on 5–6 July 1990. The Spanish Premier made the following statement:

The reduction of US and Canadian troops in Europe and our

> own European vocation make it imperative that the Europeans fortify the pillar of a renovated Alliance on this side of the Atlantic. In this scenario, the EC has a decisive role to play in building up a common foreign and security policy and becoming a privileged interlocutor of its North American allies. (EP, 6 July 1990)

### New perspectives in the relations between the USA and Spain

The declarations of Mr González reaffirmed some of the main points of Spanish security policy which, since the spring of 1986, when *perestrojka* was merely 'wishful thinking', had initiated the revision of the role of the USA in European defence and the incorporation of the security dimension in the building of the new Europe.

For Spain, the revision of the US role in European defence called for the adaptation of the 1982–8 Defence Agreement between the two countries to the new facts that had taken place in the international arena and to the new role played by Spain in international relations.

Nobody in Spain or outside the country denied the necessity of adapting the rules set down in 1953. Reaching an agreement on the scope and limits of this adaptation was nevertheless difficult. Spanish political forces included defenders of continuity, content to make only a few changes, as well as people who wanted the end of any bilateral defence relations.

The Spanish government was guided by the conditions approved in the referendum on Spain's continued membership in the Atlantic Alliance, in particular that it had 'to proceed toward the progressive reduction of the military presence of the USA in Spain'.

In July 1986, upon request from the Spanish government, new talks were begun between the USA and Spain. The objective was to find a new frame for the bilateral relations and to proceed toward a reduction in the American military presence — a reduction which Spain felt should be substantial but not detrimental to the common security (Zaldivar, 1989).

After a year and a half of difficult negotiations — negotiations

that brought US-Spanish relations to an historical low point — a common declaration was made on 15 January 1988:

> The governments of Spain and the United States have reached an understanding on the new frame which substitutes the Cooperation, Defence and Friendship Agreement of 1982.
> 1. Following signature of this new Defence Agreement, the USA will continue to use the support installations in Spain as well as to use the Spanish territory, the sea and the airspace in times of crisis or war, backing NATO's reinforcement plans.
> 2. The initial term of the new Agreement will be eight years which can be extended for successive annual periods.
> 3. Observing the Spanish government's sovereign decision, the United States shall withdraw the 401st Tactical Combat Wing within three years as of the coming into effect of the new Agreement.
> 4. No commitments by the parties involved regarding military or economic help in the form of credit or donation will appear in the Agreement or will be related to it.
> 5. Future cooperation in education, culture or science and technology will be based on new and fair formulas. This cooperation will be separate from the new Defence Agreement.

With the new Agreement, Spain renounced any form of military or economic help in order to stress that the Spanish contribution to allied defence consists of the facilities provided for the American troops and, as a consequence, requires no compensation. It is worth noting that Spain's refusal to receive any economic or military assistance kept the outcome of the negotiations from setting a bad example for governments of other countries wishing to change their defence relations with the United States.

The Spanish request to move the 401st Wing to an airbase closer to its zone of combat — on the border between Italy and Austria or between Turkey, Bulgaria and the USSR — made clear the will of Spain to define itself as a rearward zone for Alliance strategy, thus maintaining the position in the southern flank

traditionally assigned to it by US strategy. This new strategic definition of Spain had important consequences for its military contribution to the Alliance.

However the difficulties between Spain and the USA did not end with this understanding. The negotiations undertaken for the new Agreement were the cause of further problems and debate.[12] The toughest problem was, without a doubt, the ban on introducing nuclear weapons into Spanish territory.

After passage in October 1981 of the bill authorizing Spain's accession to the Atlantic Alliance, the 'storage' and 'installation' of nuclear weapons in national territory was banned (Remiro, 1988). Observance of this policy, plus a ban on the 'introduction' of nuclear weapons in Spanish territory, was one of the conditions for the permanence of Spain in NATO.

Upon the insistence of the Spanish government to include these bans in the Agreement, the American government requested the definition of the term 'introduction', fearing it would be used in the future to ban the arrival of US warships in Spanish ports or the overflight of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.[13] Finally, in the midst of heated debate with the media, the Spanish government agreed to include a clause in the Agreement which regulated the stopping of ships: 'Both Governments will grant the authorizations regulated in the present annex without requesting any information on the type of weapons carried on board the ships'.[14]

## The European option

In 1988 Spain not only elaborated the general guidelines for the Coordination Agreements between Spanish and allied forces, it also negotiated its accession to the Western European Union.

In October 1984, Felipe González proposed in Congress the entry of Spain into the WEU, the only European organization with defence competences. The government has, however, never denied its preference for an EC with full competences in security matters. As the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister stated before the European Parliament when presenting the Spanish programme for the presidency of the EC:

> The adhesion of Spain to the WEU is the consequence of a dichotomy that exists in the Single European Act and that my country would like to overcome. When the time comes to consider revising section III of the Single European Act, the convenience of doing away with the limits imposed on our coordination in security matters by Article 30 should be evaluated.[15]

From this point of view, the reactivation of the WEU in the context of the European Union, as asserted in the 'Platform on European security interests' approved in The Hague on October 1987 (Cahen, 1989), was enthusiastically welcomed by the Spanish government: 'We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.'

Nevertheless, when Spain and Portugal were invited by the Council of Ministers of WEU to initiate talks in The Hague and the negotiations for the accession to the Brussels Treaty started on May 1988, Spain's decision to ban the installation of nuclear weapons in its territory and its claim to carry out its military contribution to the Alliance 'preferably' within the area of national strategic interest, were very controversial among WEU members. It was felt that Spanish security policy did not conform very well with the Hague Platform, which committed member countries:

— to carry out our share of the common defence in both the conventional and the nuclear field, in accordance with the principles of risk and burden-sharing which are fundamental to allied cohesion;
— to ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements.

The Spanish government's explicit acceptance of the Hague Platform, the Rome Declaration and the Brussels Treaty (Mangas

Martín, 1989), as well as its willingness 'to participate fully in their implementation', allowed for the Spanish accession to the WEU together with Portugal on 14 November 1988.[16] On that day, the member countries of the WEU also signed a Political Declaration committing them to re-examine and update the Brussels Treaty (Cahen, 1989):

> During the consultations which were held with a view to the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain, taking into consideration the spirit in which their security cooperation has recently developed, found that a number of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in which they intend to pursue and strengthen that cooperation, on the basis of the Rome declaration on 27 October 1984 and of the Platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 27 October 1987.
>
> Consequently, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain consider that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols, will be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard for the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their cooperation in security matters.

Nevertheless, Spain's hopes for a revision of the Brussels Treaty as a means of creating a Western security organization soon vanished in the day-to-day routine of the Western European Union. At the same time, the unexpected events in Central and Eastern Europe rechannelled Spanish hopes of building a common European security back to the European Community.

Since its accession to the EC, the Spanish experience with the EPC has been very positive (Barbé, 1989): Spain has become the best student of the EPC and not the *enfant terrible* that some countries feared it would be (Regelsberger, 1989). The Spanish position includes incorporation of all aspects of security into the EPC. As the Secretary of the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs wrote (Perpiñá-Robert, 1989): 'The EPC means the will to create a common foreign policy . . . The heart of the problem is that we cannot build a common foreign policy for Europe — an aim

accepted in the Single European Act — while excluding defence and security matters'.

The inability of the Twelve to provide a common answer in military terms to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reaffirmed this position after the Gulf crisis. As a consequence, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernández Ordoñez, supported the idea of transferring the structure and the experience of the WEU to the EC at an informal meeting of EC Foreign Affairs ministers in Asolo, Italy (EP, 9 Oct. 1990).

Although Spain supports the idea that the EC must be the keystone of a new European architecture, it also feels that the CSCE could play an important role in a larger Europe. In fact, Spain is among the countries that approve of institutionalizing the CSCE to some degree. However, given the importance of the USSR and the USA in the CSCE, Spain feels that it should not play the central role in European affairs. The Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister expressed this position very graphically before the Congress Foreign Affairs Committee: 'I think it is quite clear, at least from the Spanish point of view, that we should not look towards a CSCE which absorbs, eats up, or squashes EC integration'.[17]

### The Mediterranean concern

In addition to its concern about the future role of the CSCE, Spain also feels that the North-South dimension — in its opinion a very fundamental one — has not been dealt with adequately in the Helsinki process. Felipe González made a very clear statement to this effect in Congress:

> In preparing the CSCE we have expressed something that we consider very important: the CSCE is not capable of taking care of the security and cooperation problems in the whole of Europe; therefore, for us it is extremely important to look to the south of the Mediterranean and to complement the East-West security arrangements with something similar oriented to the south.[18]

To answer this challenge, Spain together with Italy has proposed the idea of organizing an international conference for the application of the CSCE procedures to the promotion of security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries, a kind of Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). This idea was first introduced in February 1990 by the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister at the 'Open Skies' conference in Ottawa. Later, it was officially presented during the opening of the CSCE meeting in Palma de Mallorca on 24 September 1990.

The point of departure of the analysis made by Francisco Fernández Ordoñez, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his inaugural speech in Palma, is that:

> The basic problem in the Mediterranean is the growing divorce between the two shores in terms of economy, demography and values . . . This situation can only give rise to tensions now as well as cause instability in the future . . . In order to face up to the emerging challenges, bilateral action will no longer be sufficient: an overall approach to the problems is needed. Our concern must be to avoid a possible collision course between Islam and the West, and to set up a system of good-neighbourly relations between both shores.

Although the situation in the Mediterranean is very different from the one in Europe, in the opinion of Fernández Ordoñez, the CSCE experience could be very useful for the stabilization of the Mediterranean:

> The CSCM must be based on a Mediterranean Act, with a catalogue of principles codifying the common values on both shores, thereby constituting a code of conduct among the participating States and an initial definition of its three dimensions or baskets: security, cooperation and the human dimension.
>
> Just as the focal point in East-West relations was security, in North-South relations the focal point is the economy. Therefore the CSCM's main priority must be cooperation.[19]

Traditionally, Spanish foreign and defence policy has been

concerned with developments in the south, but that has almost exclusively meant the Maghreb, mainly Morocco. Nevertheless, since Spain's entry into the EC and its decision to remain in NATO — both in 1986 — Spain has played a more global and active role in the region, giving more attention to cooperation and security in its broader sense and less to purely military matters.

In recent years, Spain has signed defence and cooperation agreements with Tunisia (Dec. 1987), Mauritania (Feb. 1989) and Morocco (Sep. 1989), in an attempt to establish a new kind of relationship with these countries. The Spanish government is conscious, however, that Spain cannot effectively deal with the many problems in the area alone. Therefore, Spain has tried to build up bilateral and multilateral networks in the fields of economy and security capable of handling at least the problems in the Western Mediterranean. Spain has established a strategic group with France and another with Italy for debate of Mediterranean issues. It participates in the group of the '4 + 5' countries of the Western Mediterranean (Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia) established in Rome in November 1990.

From the Spanish point of view, the EC plays a crucial role in this strategy. Consequently, the priority given to Eastern Europe by the Community after the autumn of 1989 has been cause for concern in the Spanish government. Felipe González expressed the Spanish perception very clearly in December 1989, in his first speech to Congress after winning the general elections: 'I cannot deny that the priority accorded by the EC to Eastern Europe raises problems for our foreign policy, as well as for our economic development'.[20]

From this perspective, the importance given by the Spanish government to the launching of the CSCM initiative can be more easily understood. Spain did not take part directly in the war against Iraq, although it did provide logistic support to the multinational force within the framework of the Western European Union. However, Spain believes that after the end of the war the need for a CSCM that includes the Gulf countries is more acute than ever. To that end, in a resolution supporting the government policy in the Gulf approved by a 296 to 17 vote, the Congress expressed its desire for 'the establishment, after the

crisis, of a system of peace, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. The national interest demands that Spain participate in the elaboration of these proposals' (EP, 19 Jan. 1991).

In the Spanish view, other conferences are essential in solving the Palestinian problem or reducing the current level of conventional and non-conventional weapons in the Middle East, but a regional framework for dialogue and cooperation and for creating confidence between neighbouring countries is of no less crucial importance.

## Notes

1. A public opinion poll showed that 48 per cent of the Spaniards was in favour and 34 per cent was against the sending of the Spanish warships to the Gulf to participate in the UN blockade against Iraq (EP, 13 Sep. 1990).
2. Reservations about any NATO intervention in this crisis explains Spain's position one month later in the Atlantic Council, which took place after the Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Helsinki, rejecting the suggestion made by the US Secretary of State, James Baker, of giving logistic support to the Western military units deployed in the Gulf region and coordinating the humanitarian help to the zone through the NATO Emergency Planning Committee (EP, 11 and 28 Sep. 1990).
3. At the beginning of the crisis, Spain showed its preferences by deploying its naval units in the Eastern Mediterranean in missions normally carried out by the American units moved to the Persian Gulf; it did not, however, deny the possibility of sending Spanish units to the conflict zone (EP, 12 Aug. 1990).
4. Congress was adjourned at the time for summer vacation and its president rejected a request presented by Izquierda Unida for an extraordinary meeting of the Congress Standing Committee to demand a government report on the Persian Gulf crisis and the utilization of Spanish bases. The Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers did not appear before the Congress Foreign Affairs Committee until the beginning of the new session on 28 August. Felipe González did not

appear before Congress until the first plenary session held on 11 September. Almost all parliamentary groups criticized the Prime Minister for his delay.

5. A coalition of left-wing parties led by the Communist Party, with 18 seats in a Congress of 350.
6. The Popular Party, centre-right, has 103 seats in the Congress.
7. 'Texto de la comunicación del Gobierno español al Secretario General de la OTAN' in *Actividades, Textos y Documentos de la Política Exterior Española, 1988* (Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1989, p. 761).
8. An unofficial version of the Coordination Agreements is reported by the *Revista Española de Defensa*, June 1990.
9. According to Jaime de Ojeda (Spanish ambassador to NATO in 1983–9) 'operative control is the delegation to a command of the authority to lead the assigned forces to accomplish specific tasks limited by function, time or geographic location; unlike operative command, operative control does not have the power to change the mission of the assigned forces or to use components of those forces separately' (Ojeda, 1989).
10. In order to obtain Portugal's full agreement on the coordination of sea and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic, the governments of Spain and Portugal reached a gentlemen's agreement by which Spain renounced taking Portuguese naval units under 'operative control', accepting however the opposite situation: EP, 22 May 1990.
11. The Spanish refusal to admit the existence of a British allied sub-command on the Rock complicated these last negotiations.
12. To illustrate the divergences between the two negotiating parties, it can be pointed out that the Spanish government initially presented more than 80 changes to the original text and the USA only ten.
13. The memorandum regulating this problem in the previous Agreement was maintained in the new one: 'Spanish government policy allows no aircraft carrying nuclear material or weapons to overfly Spain; any change in this policy will require the consent of the Spanish government'.
14. The Agreement contained other important changes. For example, the authorized level of forces was reduced from 12,545 soldiers and 1,699 civilians to 8,078 soldiers and

1,030 civilians, a reduction of 35.9 per cent. The text of the Agreement on defence cooperation between the USA and the Kingdom of Spain can be found in the *Boletin Oficial de las Cortes Generales* (Madrid, Congreso de los Diputados, serie C, No. 238–1, 1989).

15. See *Actividades, Textos y Documentos de la Política Exterior Española, 1989* (Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1990) pp. 209 ff.
16. Spain did not became a full member of the organization until March 1990, when all member countries finished the parliamentary ratification process, even though the Spanish representatives participated in all the organization activities following the signing of the Accession Protocol.
17. See *Diario de Sesiones de la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Senado*, 30 May 1990.
18. See the report by Felipe González on the European Council held in Dublin in *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 27 June 1990.
19. Both texts are from the letter that Fernández Ordoñez addressed to De Michelis as president of the EC Council of Ministers on 12 Sep. 1990.
20. See *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 4 Dec. 1989.

# 9
# Prospects for Southern European security: a Turkish perspective

Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer

### A new world in the making

The end of the cold war, heralded by the successes of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, tore down, suddenly and almost completely, the political and military balance that had been established in Europe in the post-war period. A change of such sweeping scope was bound to affect the relationships and roles that had prevailed previously. And, needless to say, it was bound to affect the institutions within which such relationships and roles had been structured.

Accordingly, the USA, Europe and the Soviet Union have undertaken a process of sorting out their new roles in the evolving international system and redefininig their mutual relationships. They are also readjusting those international institutions that had helped them to steer and regulate their roles and relationships.

As all key power relationships, roles and institutions that bear heavily on Turkey's external goals and orientations are being overhauled, reviewed or even discarded, it is only logical to assume that Turkish views of the world, or parts of it, will not remain static.

As early as 1945, Turkey chose to be on the Western side in the emerging bipolar power structure. Its sense of direction and

purpose were unequivocal, unmarred for several decades by any reservation. Its choice of and focus on the West were guided essentially by two goals: military and ideological security against the Soviet Union and socio-economic development. Turkey was also willing to pay the price of belonging. Hence, as of 1946, the domestic political and economic system began to be liberalized and, upon admission into NATO in 1952, military risks and burdens began to be shared with the Allies.

With the unfolding in the second half of the 1980s of the post-cold war era and the release of new political forces and debate in the USA, the Soviet Union and Europe, the forty-odd-year old position and role of Turkey within the West have come under scrutiny both within and outside the country.

As the 1980s drew to a close, one of the widely held convictions among informed Turks was that, given the decline in East-West military confrontation, Turkey's security relationship with the West would suffer as a result of the diminishing value of its strategic location.

As normalization in Europe became more and more entrenched in concomitance with the implementation of the Soviet 'new thinking', East-West arms control negotiations, negotiations on CSBM and, finally, the success of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, many realized that Turkey's contribution as a flank country to the defence of the West in Europe was no longer needed. And, if its contributions no longer seemed to make a major difference for the security of Western Europe, the argument went, then the whole gamut of its relationships with the West would be vulnerable to a new, critical examination by its erstwhile allies.

For decades it had been widely acknowledged both in Turkey and outside that the bond of security institutionalized within the Atlantic Alliance's military structure was the primary, if not the exclusive, domain in which Turkey found almost universal acceptance in the West. Political and economic relations lagged far behind.

The reasons for the asymmetry in military and political relations between Turkey and its allies vary and range from socio-cultural differences and historical stereotypes to economic disparities. From the very beginning, there have been fundamental

divisions and incompatibilities between the social and cultural fabric, level of socio-economic development and political regimes in Turkey and the majority of the Atlantic Allies. Against the background of a military coup every ten years since 1961, in particular, and a deteriorating human rights record in the wake of each new blow to democracy, political relations with Western Europe reached a new low in the 1980s. Many in Turkey recognized the asymmetry between Turkey's military and political relations and its influence in the West, and warned that a cessation for one reason or another in the security link would have adverse repercussions on its already tenuous political relationships, possibly undoing them to a large extent. Accordingly, the meaning of the fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989, heralding the end of the division of Europe and of the cold war, was more complex for Turkey. Ironically, it seemed to convey a hidden message or forewarning of swift marginalization for Turkey in the eyes and chambers of the West in the emerging political conjuncture created by a reunited and militarily secure Europe.

In short, the most important effect of the passing of the cold war on Turkish perceptions of the outside world was the powerful sense of having been marginalized in the security equation in Europe where the military dimension had lost urgency, and of having been isolated politically and economically from the mainstream visions, ethos and dynamism that the Community of the Twelve seemed to be generating in European developments.

With hindsight, Turkey's relatively agreeable position within the Western fold during the cold war, firmly institutionalized within NATO, the OECD and the Council of Europe, seems to have been largely the result of the suppression of historical images and emotions in order to maximize the struggle against the East. Now that an anti-Soviet coalition is no longer needed for the security of Europe, national and historical stereotypes seem to be resurfacing among the West Europeans with considerable intensity. And these, when combined with legitimate concerns over high rates of population growth, high rates of unemployment, Islamic fundamentalism, etc., may culminate in the definite exclusion of Turkey from the key European institutions that will

capture and guide the hearts and minds of the Europe of the future.

Turks should be able to keep their feeling of betrayal in perspective simply by assuming a more self-critical attitude than they tend to do, for Turkey has not been a consistent modernizer in the true tradition of Atatürk. It has made too many concessions, deliberately or otherwise, with respect to Kemalist reforms. And those domestic political forces that have been the claimants and beneficiaries of these concessions are busy promoting their own world-view, which is, basically, Middle Eastern.

These feelings and perceptions of marginalization and isolation do have policy implications. As the balance of forces in Europe and among the superpowers has undergone change, forcing the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact and the fundamental reassessment of NATO's *raison d'être*, the political and military foundation of Turkish security policy has also become uncertain. For Turkey, this uncertainty is especially painful because it derives from scepticism not only over the continuing military and political viability of NATO but also over the possibility of America's withdrawal from Europe. Turkey has argued that a viable NATO and a powerful American role in it are essential to peace and stability in Europe in this era of transition and fluidity. With this frame of mind, it has watched the acceleration of the drive for a European defence pillar with equanimity, not because it has reservations or objections in principle to this hypothetical entity (so long as it is not conceived of as an alternative to NATO), but because it fears being further isolated. Its appeals to be invited to join the WEU have failed to elicit the desired response from this body which is apparently the most plausible candidate to assume the security responsibilities of the European pillar.

Turkey's role in the collective enterprise devoted to building the future architecture of Europe is, therefore, one which is full of serious challenges, vicissitudes and imponderables, more so than that of any other country. Because of its exclusion from the EC for at least the foreseeable future, the CSCE might seem the only evolving institution through which it can be loosely rooted in the Europe of the future.

The disappearance of the dampening effect of the cold war has

been accompanied by the revival of nationalism, ethnocentricism and minority issues especially in the former Soviet Union, the Balkans and to some degree among the Slovaks in Central Europe. The course of future political developments in the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, where such issues abound, is of particular importance for Turkey and the other countries in the region. Instability and conflict within and across national borders in the Balkans could swiftly draw into their orbit of interaction the Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and Greece, possibly mobilizing new waves of immigration to Turkey, as well as tensions in bilateral relations. A further deterioration in the already unstable situation in the Transcaucasus might also raise a host of problems ranging from population movements to increased political tensions with the Republic of Armenia and possibly with some Western powers that have already declared their broad support for Armenia.

Similar observations can be made for the former Soviet Union. The deep economic and political crisis in the country, especially the continuing inability to implement sweeping economic reforms, might further exacerbate nationalistic options and ethnic strife, raising the spectre of civil war and massive migratory flows of people. The bulk of these movements are likely to be in a westwardly direction, but Turkey might also be a major destination for the secular-minded Turkic population contemplating immigration in the face of serious economic deprivation and social unrest.

The Gulf crisis, which erupted with President Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait on 2 August 1990, provided, or better still imposed, an opportunity for all concerned to explore the question of Turkey's place in the West from a perspective broader than the one offered by the East-West prism. Among other things, it provided Turkey with the opportunity to collaborate with the West at a time when the passing of the cold war had almost made it irrelevant to Western security. President Turgut Özal, who prides himself on being an engineer and therefore a rational man, did not simply respond affirmatively to Saddam's challenge; he went one step further: he used the occasion to elevate Ankara-Washington bilateral relations to higher, more intimate levels in order to break out of the malaise

from which they had been suffering since the mid-eighties and, thus, hopefully, to create a counterweight to the chasm that was simultaneously opening in Turkish-West European relations.

### The Gulf crisis and the war

The Gulf crisis and the war have exposed the continuing value of Turkey as a strategic asset to the defence of Western interests in this turbulent but economically vital region of the world. President Özal's decision to abide firmly and swiftly by the UN Security Council decisions and to extend full and active support to the US administration in leading the struggle to liberate Kuwait was motivated by a combination of intentions: to reaffirm Turkey's choice of the West in its general world orientation, to reinvigorate the US-Turkish bilateral relationship, to contribute to checking the power and aspirations of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, perceived as an expansionist and aggressive regional hegemon, and to assume an activist posture, hence a position of influence in the region. Turkey was the second regional country after Saudi Arabia which allowed the USA to use its territory for the conduct of the war. And it came close to being a second front.

The Gulf war has also exposed the country's serious vulnerability to developments in the region. Until recently, Turkish vulnerability had been viewed largely in hypothetical terms and rather through indirect linkages. The Arab-Israeli conflict, viewed through the East-West prism, was the major cause of concern, argued Turkish conventional wisdom. But the Arab-Israeli conflict did not have an immediate connection with or impact on Turkish interests. Syria, a Soviet client, seemed important because of its alliance with the Soviet Union, and the latter's restraint in matters concerning Turkey, a NATO ally, was counted on to keep Syria's grievances against Turkey under control. A long honeymoon with Iraq that lasted through the 1980s was brought to an end in 1990 when Turkey's South-East Anatolia Project was seen by Iraq as a major threat to Iraq's water security. With his occupation of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein inadvertently contributed to the release of latent forces which have, in turn, pushed

Turkey directly into the Middle Eastern abyss. Whatever the ultimate fate of Iraq politically and economically, Turkish interests will be closely affected by it from now on. The powerful sense of an inescapable link between the future course of Iraqi and Turkish developments stems from the realization that Iraq is moving headlong towards fragmentation. Together with the damage inflicted by the war and the UN boycott, this fragmentation would further uproot the regional balance of power to the advantage of Syria and Iran, Turkey's neighbours. The most radical change would come about if and when currently negotiated Kurdish autonomy in Iraq evolves into independence. Autonomy is usually the first step in that direction. This eventuality is likely to imply more than the creation of the first independent Kurdish national state in history (they have traditionally lived a nomadic life-style organized around the tribe); it appears highly plausible that it will offer Turkish Kurds, some of whom are already engaged in political terrorism under the wing of the Marxist-separatist PKK, an attractive example or option to emulate and eventually to join.

In short, the US decision in the wake of the liberation of Kuwait in late February 1991 to leave the ouster of the Iraqi regime to the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, and, when the rebellion failed, to intervene jointly with the British and the French in order to carve out a security zone in northern Iraq for the Kurds under Western protection, has dragged Turkey directly into the redrawing of the political map of the northern Middle East. The war that started off as an effort to reduce Iraq to the status of a marginal power in the region for the foreseeable future has drawn Turkey in by assigning the Kurdish ethnic element an autonomous political role in defining the new order in the Middle East. This is by its very logic threatening and destabilizing to Turkey, simply because it offers legitimization to the aspirations of Kurdish separatists in Turkey. The presence of allied forces in Turkey, ostensibly to protect Iraqi Kurds against possible future attacks by Baghdad, is construed by the Turkish opposition as a Western scheme to interfere in Turkey's Kurdish problem on the side of the Kurds.

Given this Kurdish dimension, the balance of Turkey's Gulf policy is uncertain, to say the least. More questions and problems

have been raised in Turkey's relations with Europe, for example, than have been satisfactorily answered. The EC has not been particularly impressed by the political, economic and military contributions resulting from the Turkish policy of full cooperation with the Western-led coalition and the costs and risks thus incurred. This has been so, despite US efforts to convince the EC of the wisdom of a more benign attitude towards Turkey. The annual US security assistance package was increased from $553.4 million to $635.4 million, effectively circumventing the 7 to 10 ratio set by Congress as a guideline in allocating aid to Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, the $2.2 billion foreign assistance package scheduled for Turkey in partial compensation for the losses it has incurred, falls far short of covering the estimated $10 billion in revenue lost from the Yumurtalìk-Kerkük pipeline and trade with Iraq. This amount is indeed meagre, especially when compared with the monumental reward extended to Cairo by the cancellation of the $7 billion Egyptian debt.

Germany's reluctance to participate in NATO's Allied Mobile Forces, a symbolic unit dispatched to south-eastern Turkey in January 1991 as a sign of Allied solidarity, and the heated debate in the German government as well as among the public against invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in case of Iraqi attack of Turkey, have exposed the extent of the fragility of Turkey's NATO relations. Charges in some Allied capitals to the effect that Turkey had provoked an Iraqi attack by permitting the USA to use Turkish territory for air attacks on Iraq were not very heartening for either Turkey or the future of NATO. This episode is probably a harbinger of the divisive issues that NATO is likely to face as it tries to gear itself to the future challenges of regional conflicts in those parts of the world that fall outside the treaty area.

The exodus of over half a million Iraqi Kurds from northern Iraq was the unpredictable political, economic and security burden that Turkey has had to shoulder since the Kurdish rebellion against the central government failed in late March 1991. With a Kurdish problem of its own and an economy that yields a $1,500 per capita annual income, Turkey was caught in an extremely difficult predicament when hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings ran to its borders. Turkey's initial

refusal to allow them to cross the border produced a very bad public image in the West; under pressure, it yielded, letting through close to half a million people, as well as a Western military rescue force.

No country, no matter how developed, efficient and well-intentioned, can handle a mass exodus of this size and suddenness without hurting anyone and without making mistakes. Every country in the world, large or small, takes stringent measures to protect itself against mass population movements across its borders, especially if such movements seem to carry the potential to disrupt the economy, alter the socio-cultural fabric and foster political tension in the host country. It is these considerations that have alerted the think-tanks in Western and Southern Europe to ponder the question of possible future population movements from the east of Europe and from North Africa. It is these considerations that condemned the Vietnamese boat people, the Afghan refugees and more recently the Albanian refugees (most of whom were refused entry into Italy) to seek the mercy of the countries in the immediate vicinity of the disaster from which they were fleeing. The human tragedy that the Iraqi Kurds lived through while fleeing Baghdad's forces called for massive humanitarian assistance from Turkey and other countries. What it did not call for was the emotional and highly prejudicial accusations against Turkey and Turks that the relief operations provided for the refugees were not as efficient as they could have been.

The urge to recriminate against Turkey and Turks in relation to the Kurdish refugees, and Turkish sensitivities to it, have deep political and historical roots. That Turkey has been challenged into a guerrilla war in the south-east of the country by the PKK is a secret to no one. That the great powers have an historical fondness for a 'divide and rule' policy in the Middle East that goes back to the reign of the Ottomans is also public knowledge. There is the widespread belief in broad sectors of Turkish public opinion that Western humanitarian concerns for the Iraqi Kurds, refugees or not, have been heavily influenced by geopolitical considerations in this eternally unstable but richly endowed region of the world.

In conclusion, Saddam Hussein's recklessness has established

an altogether new balance in the region, the exact contours of which are only gradually emerging. From several angles, Iran, Syria and the Kurds have come out as the biggest winners. The USA, Great Britain and France are back in the Middle East in roles reminiscent of those they played in the 'Eastern Question'. Theoretically speaking, the only major positive feedback of the Gulf crisis for Turkey has been the reaffirmation of Turkey's continuing strategic significance, though more in the Middle Eastern than in the European context. This reaffirmation could lead to new bilateralism between Turkey and the USA; however, that hypothesis is also rather tenuous, considering the many semi-hidden obstacles. The special relationship between President Bush and President Özal is seen as a weakness by the Turkish public, which did not support Özal's personalistic, pro-American Gulf policy.

## Domestic opinion

Turkish public opinion generally viewed the world through conservative lenses, expressing broad agreement with official policy, until the mid-1960s when the Marxist Left entered the Turkish parliament for the first time in republican history and launched an effective public debate on Turkey's alliance with the West, in particular with the USA, the leading capitalist country.

The foreign policy debate in the 1970s was dominated by the ideological views and premisses of the Left and the Right, reflecting the general ideological polarization among the populace, the political parties, the press, universities, security forces and key branches of the national bureaucracy. The Left represented the most powerful opposition to the official ideology of Westernization when this meant alliance with and integration into the bourgeois West. The liberal Right and the conservative Right, both strongly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, defended Turkey's Western orientation, although the latter had a radical nationalistic slant.

The 1970s witnessed the consolidation of another world-view within the political culture, namely that of the religious fundamentalists. Competitive politics encouraged politicians to

exploit Islamic themes in a country where the great majority are Muslims, but the vote-getting potential of the National Salvation Party, outspokenly anti-Western, anti-Israel and pro-Arab and the voice of the fundamentalists, rarely received more than 10 per cent of the votes cast in the general elections. The electoral system encouraged coalition governments: hence the disproportionate power possessed by the small National Salvation (fundamentalist) and the National Action (nationalist) Parties and the consequent political instability throughout most of the 1970s following the 1973 elections.

The military regime that seized power in 1980 deliberately tried to reconstruct the ideological balance in the country. It used an iron hand in suppressing and penalizing the Left, as it held Marxist ideologues and militants primarily responsible for the large-scale terror and instability of the 1978–80 period. In an effort to present an alternative to the appeal of Marxist-Leninist thought, the military regime turned to religion as a source of spiritual growth, maturity and stability: it instituted compulsory religion courses at secondary schools; it increased the number of secondary public schools called ÿmam-Hatip Okulu, for the training of the clergy to be employed by the state in the mosques. Eventually these schools began to produce more clerical candidates than there were positions to fill. Thus, the military government granted these graduates eligibility for the centrally-administered entrance examinations to the university, the diploma of which is a critical requirement for upward mobility within the ranks of the state. Similarly, neighbourhood centres for the religious training of young girls were allowed to mushroom in crowded, semi-urban settlements populated by newcomers from the countryside. Naturally, the number of mosques has been on the rise, as has the number of female university students who defy the Kemalist dress-code and don the traditional Islamic attire.

The military's manipulation of religion as a potential instrument of social stability and cohesion represented a radical departure from the official ideology of uncompromising state secularism, a cardinal principle of modern Turkey instituted by Atatürk in a predominantly Muslim country. Concessions had already begun, however, following the introduction of the multi-

party system in 1946; each successive government offered some seemingly minor concession until the insideous emergence of two parallel cultures in public education and the bureaucracy became noticeable in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The civilian government of Prime Minister Özal, elected to power in November 1983, extended the limits of the leniency towards the religious Right introduced by the military government. Several prominent former fundamentalists made their way into Mr Özal's party and government, and Mr Özal also took great care to improve relations with the Islamic world. He paid much publicised visits to many an Islamic country, inspiring significant Arab business in banking, real estate and tourism, and the revival of Arab culture in Istanbul, the country's financial and industrial heart and cultural trend-setter.

The victory of Mesut Yîlmaz at the party congress in June 1991 has not only brought him, a liberal, to the office of prime minister, but has generally been interpreted as a retreat for the conservative wing of the ruling Motherland Party. President Özal, reportedly with a family background of distinct sectarian affiliations, namely, the outlawed Nakshebandi's,[1] backed the bid of Mr. Yîlmaz for the leadership of the party in return for the latter's support of Mrs Özal's candidacy for the leadership of the party's local organization in Istanbul. Evidently, therefore, President Özal, and Mrs Özal have joined forces for a liberal political cause.

The growing religious tolerance exercised by the state in the 1980s encouraged the public to take advantage of it for its own purposes. Public display of individual religiosity is no longer feared, as it was in the early decades of secularism; mosque attendance has increased. It is safe to conclude that the fundamentalists, that is, those who wish to restore Islam to its rightful place as the organizing principle of the Turkish society, and the profit-seekers, that is, those who see an opportunity to make economic gains in re-Islamizing society, have, by now, achieved important organized power. While the increase in the display of individual religiosity might not, alone, pose a threat to Turkey's official secular, Westernizing ideology, the combined force of organized groups has the potential to challenge it seriously, as they now have their own richly endowed banks,

schools, hospitals, cultural centres, foundations, business firms, publishing houses, press, etc., providing them with a broad social base on which to build and expand their political power.

The headway that fundamentalism and religion have made in the Turkish political system where they occupy several key positions of power has generated a new awareness among those brought up in the Kemalist tradition that their world-view is threatened. People are getting together in awareness-raising groups for the protection of the Kemalist reforms that form the basis of modern Turkey. An alliance has also developed between secularists and feminists.

In short, society has polarized considerably along secularist-modernist and fundamentalist-conservative lines. This insidious process has been taking place under the dark clouds of terror cast by militant Islamic groups. Several prominent Kemalist intellectuals, both men and women, have been murdered over the last two years.

It is important to note that not all the Westernized, modernist segments of the society are categorically Kemalists. Starting from the premiss that religion performs an important spiritual, moral and cultural function in society, they are critical of the excessively restrictive secularism imposed by Kemalism, a secularism that, in their opinion, bordered on aetheism. This type of thinking is generally known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and is embraced by prominent intellectuals and politicians.

The SDPP, in essence the continuation of the oldest political party in the republic but reconstituted by the military regime after 1980, represents the only voice of dissent against the slip back to fundamentalism. But even this party's voice is moderate on questions other than secularism.

For our purposes, the important question is to determine how much power, if any, the fundamentalists have been able to exert on Turkish foreign policy.

So far, their influence has not overpowered the pro-Western orientation of Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, even though they have made several important advances. In the 1970s and '80s, Turkey made serious overtures to the Arab world under the combined impulse of political and economic pressures. Turkey's dependence on Arab oil and the latter's growing power in the

1970s combined with growing Turkish fundamentalism to force Turkey to take a closer look at the level and nature of its relations with the Middle East. It became publicly supportive of the Palestinians; it joined the Islamic Conference, albeit with the reservation that it is a secular state. In his early years as prime minister, Mr Özal went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, the first Turkish head of state and government to do so while in or out of office. Exchanges of official visits with the Gulf states, again early in his career, and the liberalization of the regime on foreign capital removed the political and legal barriers to the introduction of Arab banking into Turkey, and resulted in the spreading of its ripple effects in social and cultural life.

Yet, these trends have not turned the balance of forces either within the population at large or among the foreign policy elite against the pro-Western forces within their ranks. Opinion-makers in the society, i.e. the press, universities, professional and business organizations and national trade unions, continue to be enticed by the official ideology of a modernizing Turkey committed to a Western life-style. This, however, does not hide the fact that religious conservatives fill important positions within the government. Yet, given Mr Özal's unquestioned leadership of the party, their power has fluctuated according to Mr Özal's shifting political emphasis and visions. As in domestic politics, his choices and predispositions have prevailed almost unchallenged in foreign policy, too.

Not even during the Gulf crisis was there more than a small number of pro-Saddam demonstrations after Friday prayers at the mosques. Furthermore, the impact of the Gulf war on the believers in Turkey was to moderate their enthusiasm for the concept of community of the Arab-led Muslim world: the Gulf crisis exposed the ineffectiveness of using religion as an instrument of political unity among the Muslim and Arab worlds and of turning that unity into a struggle against the West. More importantly, perhaps, the Gulf crisis exposed the weaknesses and divisions in the Arab world, thus throwing a dark shadow on the legitimacy of Saddam Hussein's claim to be the only spiritual leader in the Islamic world. In fact, he attracted the scorn of many well-known columnists writing in the religiously conservative, anti-Western press.

The opposition faced by Mr Özal during the Gulf crisis to his unrestrained pro-American and anti-Saddam policies came largely from the main opposition parties, the SDPP and the True Path Party. It is important to note that opposition did not rest on religious rationales, but rather on what they regarded as total submission to President Bush's policy. The opposition charged President Özal with usurping unconstitutional powers, while the man on the street was opposed to Özal on the question of Turkey's possible entanglement in the war. Opposition within his own party was also largely motivated by constitutional, rather than fundamentalist considerations, a point frequently misinterpreted in Western analysis.

The foregoing illustrates that the role of the state, or more specifically, of the head of the government in the current constitutional system, is extremely important in either encouraging or discouraging the pursuit of an Islamized society in Turkey. Ever since his rise to the leadership of the country in late 1983, Mr Özal has been performing a balancing act between the liberals and conservatives — consisting of both notorious nationalists and notorious fundamentalists — in his party. After many years of vacillation between these two power blocs, he and his wife seem to have settled on the liberal course, but continue to pay the utmost care to avoid irreparably alienating and antagonizing the conservatives.

In summary, then, while a clear picture of the distribution of power in the country between the religious fundamentalists and secular, modernizing Kemalists has not yet emerged, one can conclude that the former have made a forceful come-back and are demanding, as part of their democratic prerogatives, the right to take part in every important institution in society. Relying on their overwhelming financial means, believed to originate at least partly in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and with their mushrooming cultural organizations, educational and medical institutions and press, they challenge the liberals and modernists to be consistent in their commitment to Western-style democracy and to abolish any remaining state taboos, which they consider official discrimination against true believers.

### Southern European security

With all the momentous changes in Europe and the world discussed above, Southern Europe is no longer immediately associated with the southern flank of NATO, as was the case until recently. Nobody seems to be concerned about the Soviet threat to this flank.

The Soviet Eskadra in the Mediterranean no longer seems to threaten any of the southern flank countries. Yugoslavia's disintegration does not raise fears of inviting Soviet intervention. Rather, it is the military, socio-economic and cultural threats emanating from regions in the vicinity of Southern Europe, namely, North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf and the Balkans that are perceived as potential challenges to Southern European security and stability. Some threats of a strictly military nature, such as the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait have a long history as vital 'out-of-area' issues for the Atlantic Alliance. In a sense, military threats were simpler to manage because they were strictly defined and required a specific, narrow focus. Currently evolving sources of threat are less easily discernable in character and intensity, but they exist nevertheless in the form of social, economic, political and demographic trends in the countries in adjoining regions. These trends predict ideological confrontations between Islamic fundamentalists and secularists in North Africa, nationalistic and ethnic confrontations in the Balkans, and economic frustrations in both, all of which threaten to trigger international terrorism and massive population movements in Southern European countries. This would, in turn, jeopardize the social fabric and social peace there. Southern Europe is not, however, under any direct threat of a military nature.

Turkey's situation as a Southern European country differs from that of all the others. Yugoslavia and Albania are also special cases. While none of the others have direct territorial contact with the areas that breed potential threats to peace, Turkey does. Iran and Syria have long been known to use international terrorism as an instrument of state policy. The Gulf war and its aftermath, producing an influx of millions of Kurdish refugees, are excellent evidence of how mutual borders accentuate

vulnerability. Differences of a political nature, namely, Turkey's exclusion from the EC and the Greek-Turkish conflict, also help to draw a wedge between Turkey and the rest of the countries in the region. Turkey's particular social and economic problems, more specifically, its relative underdevelopment, the revival of Islam and its adverse record in human rights, are features that are more commonly found in the south than in the north. In other words, in many ways Turkey is south, whereas the rest of Southern Europe is north; this means that it presents them with the types of challenges that they fear might come, for example, from North Africa.

Turkey entertains several broad political objectives in the broader Mediterranean-southern flank region: to remain outside of the sphere of political terrorism originating in the Middle East and North Africa; to have secure access to the SLOCs; and, to see that the political *status quo* in Yugoslavia and Albania are not radically upset.

Turkey is heavily dependent on the SLOC's for external trade. Accordingly, the Sixth Fleet's presence in the Mediterranean continues to be seen as vital not particularly with respect to the Soviets, but rather with respect to regional crisis and instability.

The balance in the Yugoslavian and Albanian region is a very important element in Turkish thinking about European and Turkish security, primarily because of the fear that the complex national and ethnic mosaic in that part of Europe might trigger a major conflagration if Yugoslavia's probable disintegration prompts the neighbouring countries to intervene for one reason or another. The likelihood of such conflagration would be more ominous if and when its influence were to spread to the rest of the Balkans, also a mosaic of intermeshing national and ethnic groups.

All these perceptions notwithstanding, there is one major obstacle to contemplating tightly organized forms of cooperation between Turkey and the other Southern European countries: Turkey is the only country, besides Yugoslavia and Albania, that is not a member of the EC, the fundamental legitimizing framework and point of reference for the various cooperative transactions among these countries.

Above and beyond the effects of exclusion from the EC, this

difference could also have repercussions in terms of the urgent and possibly massive nature of security challenges that Turkey will be facing; it could jeopardize efforts at collective crisis prevention and resolution, for Turkey is a front-line country bordering on the south. For example, could Southern Europe not have fulfilled a meaningful role in alleviating the pressure on Turkey, either before or after the Kurdish refugee problem erupted? Indeed, a relief operation coordinated by Southern European countries might have been received with greater sympathy in Turkey than the relief operation carried out by the big powers. But the political will needed for such schemes is absent. Europe's reluctance to take part in the NATO Allied Mobile Force dispatched to south-eastern Turkey in January 1991 provided a valuable lesson for future cooperative security schemes.

Yet, schemes inspired by the European example, such as the proposed CSCM, pose serious questions and are worth taking seriously simply because this expansive stretch of land from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf does not possess a single institutionalized or formalized mechanism designed mainly to foster confidence. Unlike its European antecedent, a CSCM might deal with the question of international terrorism. Greater cooperation on terrorism and illicit arms and drug trafficking could proceed among the Southern Europeans, even without waiting for a broader framework to become reality. These are international activities that may not require EC solidarity and support.

In view of these obstacles, the Turkish view of security in Southern Europe seems to rely heavily on the American factor. US-Turkish bilateralism has been growing as Turkey is distanced from mainstream European developments. The US naval presence in the Mediterranean might still be seen as a counterweight to the preponderance of Soviet naval power in the Black Sea, especially because naval arms control is not predictable in the foreseeable future. But the world to the East appears to offer Turkey new opportunities as well as constraints. Nationalism and Sovietism are continuing to force change in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Bonds of common race and culture provide a means for the Turks of Turkey and the Azeris, Uzbeks, Tartars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Uygurs, etc., to rediscover each other. In other words, while Turkey's relations are faltering in Europe, including

the south, where the Greek-Turkish conflict is obstinately evading resolution, a new set of relationships might be evolving to the East. But the world to the East is an uncertain world, unknown and unconnected to Turkey for a long, long time. Turkey has always walked to the West and looked to the West . . . but ultimately has stayed behind.

## Note

1. The Nakshebandi's are a religious sect outlawed under the Kemalist reforms as were all such sects. However, religious resurgence and state tolerance have led them to re-emerge in defiance of the law.

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# Index

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, with debates still raging about the so-called 'New World Order', little attention has been given to the countries of Southern Europe.

In the Current East-West climate of cooperation rather than confrontation, the focus of international security concerns will inevitably shift to other spheres. One major focus of concern will be to North-South circles, and the countries of Southern Europe which are located in the midst of one of the most troubled North-South frontiers.

This timely volume brings together experts from all the countries concerned, to assess the issues facing the region in the 1990s. One scenario presented is that the West's current preoccupation with Eastern Europe will lead to the marginalisation of the Southern European region. From a Western viewpoint, this perspective cannot be ignored; firstly, because the Gulf War and continuing repercussions of crisis in the Middle East have led to renewed strategic concerns about the Eastern Mediterranean, but secondly and most crucially, because the security of the Southern European region is vital to the cohesion of the European Community as a whole.

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