Since 2002, the African Union (AU) has been making commendable efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the African continent. However, the AU and its newly created structures still suffer huge shortcomings and rely significantly on external support. The Joint Africa-European Union (EU) Strategy and its Action Plan, adopted in December 2007 in Lisbon, established a Peace and Security Partnership. In preparation for the 2010 Africa-EU Summit, this publication brings together African and European views of the progress achieved so far by the AU and the EU in their joint efforts to address African wars and crises, and offers input on emerging priorities and what is still required to make the Partnership work.
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Peace and security in Africa remain unresolved issues. Wars and conflicts still cause considerable loss of life, produce immense destruction of property and negatively impact development. They have contributed to insecurity, aggravated poverty and caused a decline in the human condition in many parts of the African continent. Since 2002, the African Union (AU) has concentrated commendable efforts towards preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in the continent. This has been exemplified by the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and its peace missions.

The Joint Africa-European Union (EU) Strategy and its Action Plan, adopted in December 2007 in Lisbon, included the establishment of a Partnership on Peace and Security. The priorities of the new Partnership have been identified as an increased dialogue on common challenges, the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and predictable funding for enabling the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct peace support operations.

The objective of this publication is to assess the progress achieved so far by the EU and the AU in their joint efforts to promote peace and security in the African continent, with a view to identifying emerging priorities and further needs. The analyses contained in the various chapters produced a number of policy recommendations, which could offer input for the review of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan in 2010 and for further developments in the implementation of the Africa-EU Partnership.

The chapters collected present both African and European views on three main subjects: the developments and shortfalls of the Africa-EU relationship in the field of peace and security; lessons learned and future scenarios of EU and AU operations in Africa; and G8 and EU support to African efforts in developing capacities to maintain stability in the continent. All the papers were presented at the conference on “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the new Africa-EU Partnership and devel-
oping cooperation in de-mining and disarmament”, held at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on 7-9 October 2009.

The conference was organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DG for Sub-Saharan Africa; the European Commission, DG Development; the African Union Commission; and Compagnia di San Paolo. The conference brought together over one hundred participants, mainly from Europe and Africa, notably: officials from the Italian government, EU, AU, and UN, government officials and diplomats from Africa and Europe, research institutions and civil society organisations.

Speakers included Franco Frattini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Romano Prodi, Chair of the AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping; Stefano Manservisi, Director General, DG Development of the European Commission; Mamadou Kamara Dekamo, Ambassador of the Republic of Congo to Italy; Marika Fahlen, Sweden’s Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa; Pierre Michel Joana, Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities, EU Council; Aldo Ajello, former EU Special Representative for Great Lakes Region; Annalisa Giannella, HR Solana’s Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation, EU Council; Mario Raffaelli, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Expert for Peace Initiatives in the Horn of Africa.

The conference was the launching event of a two-year research project, which was conducted by a consortium of European and African institutions with a longstanding experience in security issues, both in the EU and in Africa. The IAI leads the project, in cooperation with the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) and Chatham House. African partners include researchers and practitioners from various African centres, such as the Centre de Recherche et Formation sur l’Etat en Afrique (CREA) in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; the Africa Governance Institute (AGI) in Dakar, Senegal; the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), in Accra, Ghana.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>United States African Military Command</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>APL</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Landmines</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Stand-by Force</td>
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<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU PSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community for Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIPOL</td>
<td>Civil Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoESPU</td>
<td>Centre for Excellence for Stability Police Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CPMRMD</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Department</td>
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<td>CPSOCB</td>
<td>Global Peace Support Operations Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREA</td>
<td>Centre de Recherche et Formation sur l’Etat en Afrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development and Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSI</td>
<td>Détachement Intégré de Sécurité Chadian Joint Police and Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EARN</td>
<td>Europe-Africa Policy Research Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Found</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIFORCES</td>
<td>International School of Security Forces</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU ISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>EU NAVFOR Atalanta</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force in Somalia</td>
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<td>EU SSR Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>European Union Mission in Support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>European Union Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUPOL RD Congo</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU PSC</td>
<td>European Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHQ</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Central Africa Multinational Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8/G20</td>
<td>Group of 8/Group of 20</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICGLR</td>
<td>International Conference for the Great Lakes Region</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRP</td>
<td>Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Mission inter-africaine de suivi des accords de Bangui-African/Mission to Oversee the Bangui Accords</td>
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<td>MIVAC</td>
<td>Common Interactive Watch and Anticipation Mechanism</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
List of Acronyms

PHC Primary Health Care
PoW Panel of the Wise
PSOs Peace Support Operations
RECAMP/AMANI Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix
RECs Regional Economic Communities
RECSA Regional Centre on Small Arms
RMs Regional Mechanisms
SADC Southern Africa Development Community
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SG/HR Secretary General / High Representative
SHIRBRIG Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
SLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SOFA Status of Force Agreement
SPLM Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
SSR Security Sector Reform
TDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement
UK United Kingdom
UMA Union du Maghreb Arabe/Arab Maghreb Union
UN United Nations
UN SRSG United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General
UNAMID United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire
UNREC United Nations Regional Centre for Disarmament
US United States
ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: IMPLEMENTING A NEW AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP
AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Introduction

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit of December 2007 represents a new phase in cooperative relations between Africa and Europe. Under the joint leadership of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), the two continents have committed themselves to forge strong links based on a consensus built around values, interests and strategic objectives. The guiding principles of this cooperative strategy are interdependence between the two continents within a logic of shared responsibilities; a recognition of the legitimate aspirations of African peoples for continental unity; political dialogue involving all stakeholders; participatory approaches at all levels (local, national, regional, continental); and coherence in policies and their instruments for implementation.

Of the eight partnerships comprising the new Strategy, the one on peace and security is perhaps the most difficult to implement in a comprehensive and satisfactory manner. Its key objective is for Africa and Europe to cooperate with a view to strengthening their capacity to react in a timely fashion and adequate manner to threats to peace and security, and to unite their efforts in the face of global challenges. This objective is to be implemented through short-term action plans, the first of which is designed to run between 2008 and 2010, with the following three priority actions:

1) to reinforce dialogue concerning challenges to peace and security, with a view to formulating common positions and implementing common
approaches with respect to peace and security in Africa, Europe and around
the world;
2) to fully operationalise the African peace and security architecture by
ensuring it functions effectively to meet challenges to peace and security in
Africa; and
3) to ensure reliable funding for peacekeeping operations by African coun-
tries by providing the African Union and the regional security mechanisms
with the financial means needed to carry out effective peacekeeping oper-
ations.

How realistic are these objectives and their expected results in the present
political context of the African continent? While there is room for scepti-
cism as to how well the EU can fulfil its commitment, particularly with
respect to the third priority action, my main concern in this paper lies with
the African side. Are African states, regional security mechanisms and the
AU Commission capable of fulfilling their end of the bargain for the suc-
cess of the Africa-EU peace and security agenda? This paper attempts to
answer these and related questions with regard to the respective roles of the
AU, regional security mechanisms and African states. My main argument is
that the objectives outlined above cannot be attained without a political
will by African states to reinforce the AU security architecture and the
regional security mechanisms, on the one hand, and states’ capacity for
human security domestically, on the other. To discuss this argument in a sat-
satisfactory manner, I will analyze the limitations of the African integration
process from a historic perspective, at both the continental and regional lev-
els, and the shortcomings of African states in overcoming poverty, a major
root cause of human insecurity and a threat to peace and security.

I. The Pan-African Project and the AU Security Agenda

One of the major advantages of regional integration is the strengthening of
peace and security in a given region. The more nations interact with each
other in pursuit of common goals, the less likely they are to engage in
armed conflict against each other. Moreover, as regional groupings, they
have more capacity than individual states to deal effectively with internal
conflicts, which are more frequent in Africa than interstate conflicts. Thus,
the current AU security agenda stands to benefit positively from the histori-
ical reconstruction of the pan-African project under the African Union. In 2002, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union. Symbolically, this was a major step forward in the unification project that pan-African thinkers and activists had advocated throughout the twentieth century. Prominent black intellectuals like Alexander Crummell, Edward Wilmot Blyden and Henry McNeal Turner were already formulating pan-African ideas during the nineteenth century. But pan-Africanism as a political movement was born in 1900, when the West Indian barrister Henry Sylvester Williams convened a pan-African conference in London for purposes of promoting unity among all peoples of African descent. From 1919 to 1945, the great African-American scholar William Edward Burghart DuBois, as principal organiser and convener of the first five pan-African congresses, spearheaded the movement.

In this regard, it is worth remembering the historical connection between African unity and world peace. DuBois had planned to hold the First Pan-African Congress at Versailles, to coincide with the Versailles Peace Conference, where the future of the world was to be decided by the victors of World War I. Woodrow Wilson, the American president, then asked the French to ban this meeting, as it was organised by the theoretician of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a U.S. civil rights group established in 1910. The French authorities respectfully declined, pointing out that a member of the French National Assembly, the Honourable Blaise Diagne from Senegal, had reserved the meeting hall at Versailles. Here was a remarkable instance of partnership between Europe and Africa on peace and human rights.¹

While the intellectual pioneers of pan-Africanism had emerged from the African Diaspora of North America and the Caribbean, the realisation of the pan-African dream of “Africa for the Africans” was to be the work of the continental Africans themselves. With representative delegates from all corners of the African continent, the fifth and most important of the pan-African congresses under DuBois was held at the Manchester City Hall in 1945 in the United Kingdom. Participants included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya of Kenya, Nnamdi Azikiwe of

Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Peter Abrahams of South Africa. The call went forth that each delegate should return home and lead the struggle for independence.

Until then, the pan-African project consisted of the vision of Africa as a single federal union. Nkrumah, a major figure at Manchester, remained committed to this idea throughout his political career, during which he worked tirelessly to convince other African leaders of the necessity of a United States of Africa for peace and development in the continent. Another major champion of the project was the Senegalese scholar Cheikh Anta Diop, who envisaged a gradual process of building the political unity of the continent, beginning with Black Africa. He also elaborated a comprehensive plan for the industrialisation of Africa based on the continent’s rich natural resources.

Unfortunately, the pan-African ideal fell victim to both the neo-colonial interests of imperialism, which preferred smaller states to larger entities, and the narrow class interests of the African nationalist leaders, who stood a better chance of gaining presidential and ministerial positions in smaller entities. For example, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, as well as the British territories of East Africa, could have formed a total of 4 states instead of 20!

The fragility of the new states was such that even the Bandung principle of “positive neutralism” or non-alignment would soon become an empty slogan, as the need to retain power required the protection of one or other of the two antagonistic camps in the East-West conflict or the Cold War. In late 1960, the result for Africa was a major split over the Congo crisis, between those who supported genuine independence under the democratically elected Prime Minister, Patrice Emery Lumumba, and those who were prepared to pursue a policy of appeasement with imperialism and the forces of counter-revolution in the Congo. The first group, led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, became known as the “Casablanca Bloc”, following its December 1960 meeting in the Moroccan city under the auspices of King Mohamed V. Led by the pro-West leaders of Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Liberia, the second group was eventually called the “Monrovia Bloc.” Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia succeeded in striking a compromise between the two groups, which met in May 1963 in Addis Ababa to estab-

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lish the OAU. The new, more limited goals were: to fight for the total independence of Africa from colonialism and white settler rule; greater solidarity and economic cooperation among African states; and the peaceful resolution of interstate conflict through negotiation, mediation, and conciliation. Thus, from its very beginning – and in view of its cardinal principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and the preservation of colonially-inherited boundaries in accordance with the 1964 Cairo resolution on borders –, the OAU was no different from other intergovernmental organisations in the world with respect to peace and security. Governments were free to massacre their citizens without any sanctions from OAU member states, let alone a simple public denunciation of heinous crimes against humanity by other governments or the OAU Secretariat. In 1979, when President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania took the courageous decision to pursue invading Ugandan troops all the way back to Kampala and assist Ugandan patriots in overthrowing the murderous regime of Idi Amin Dada, he found very little support among his African colleagues.

Things began changing for the better in the 1990s, particularly with the adoption in 1993 in Cairo of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which gave the Organisation a role to play in internal conflicts. However, the mechanism was too new, untested and non-operational to be activated in the face of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its catastrophic repercussions in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Ironically, Rwanda’s interference in Congolese affairs began in 1996 with a joint effort by a group of states in Eastern and Southern Africa to overthrow the regime of President Mobutu Seso Seko of Zaire, as the DRC was then known. At the time, the overthrow of the Mobutu regime was widely applauded across Africa as a legitimate exercise of the pan-African right of intervention. Here, as in the case of Nyerere’s action against Idi Amin, the idea is that Africa as a whole has a moral duty to liberate Africans from oppression, even if their oppressor happens to be their own state. In spite of its outstanding success in the total liberation of Africa from colonialism through moral and material support to African liberation movements and its role in spearheading the worldwide campaign to ostracise apartheid South Africa in the community of civilized nations, the OAU never recognised African struggles against African tyrants. By sending a peacekeeping force into the Darfur region of Sudan, the AU is clearly putting people’s rights above state rights, and this is a very positive development.
However, the limitations of this intervention with respect to troop levels and logistics is symptomatic of the major shortcomings of the AU security architecture, which have more to do with questions of political will than with questions of limited finances in Africa. Are African states ready to confront the denial of fundamental human rights to large segments of our peoples by corrupt and authoritarian regimes? Countries like Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe showed great commitment in supporting liberation movements in Southern Africa in the face of brutal retaliation by the Portuguese Fascist regime and the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. When the AU member states can replicate those levels of commitment and sacrifice, then the AU security architecture will enhance its capacity to meet the objectives of the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security.

2. Regional Security Mechanisms

The problem of political will is just as relevant for the successful capacity development of regional security mechanisms as it is for the overall African security architecture. Like the AU, the regional economic communities (RECs) are intergovernmental organisations whose viability depends on the level of moral and material support from member states. In the context of the Abuja Treaty on African economic integration, the RECs are the main building blocks for the political and economic integration of Africa. In addition to promoting economic and political integration, some of the RECs have established security mechanisms of their own for conflict prevention, management and resolution. These regional security mechanisms are part and parcel of the African security architecture.

Of all the eight RECs in existence, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has demonstrated the will and ability to respond in an effective manner to threats to peace and security in the region. Through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (or ECOMOG), decisive military actions have been undertaken in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. A very important factor of this relative success is the leadership role of Nigeria, whose economic weight is sufficient to allow for bold initiatives with respect to military intervention. Challenges for ECOWAS and its security mechanism include the decade-long political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire; the chronic instability in Guinea-Bissau, where the traffic in narcotics seems to
exacerbate political conflicts; military involvement in politics in Guinea and Mauritania; and rising tensions in Niger due to the blatant violation of the constitutional process by the incumbent regime. These areas of turbulence will continue to test the capacity of ECOWAS to provide an effective response to challenges to peace and security in West Africa.

Other regions of the continent are still lagging behind West Africa in setting up effective security mechanisms. This is particularly true of North Africa, where the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)\(^4\) has not developed a common strategy for dealing with threats from militant groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. There are also complications for the full insertion of the UMA in the African security architecture because of Morocco’s self-exclusion from the continent’s integration process. The Cherifian Kingdom is not a member of the AU, having left the OAU in 1982 in protest over the admission by the latter of the disputed territory of Western Sahara as a member state, despite its annexation by Rabat in 1976. On the other hand, unlike King Mohamed V, who gave strong support to African independence and liberation movements, his heirs have shown more interest in the Mediterranean region than in Africa south of the Sahara. With Tunisia showing the same orientation, only Algeria, Egypt and Libya are engaged with the rest of Africa in the continental political integration process. As the country that adopted as its own the pan-African intellectual Frantz Fanon from Martinique during the liberation war and gave active support to liberation struggles in Black Africa, Algeria is also one of the initiators of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), along with Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. With the River Nile as its lifeline, Egypt is a major player in the geopolitics of the Nile Basin; it is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), one of Africa’s major economic communities. Under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libya is behind the establishment of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and a major driver of the project to realise Nkrumah’s dream of a United States of Africa.\(^5\)

\(^4\) The acronym is taken from the group’s name in French, *Union du Maghreb Arabe*.

\(^5\) An Algerian participant at the Rome conference pointed out that his country is less well integrated with Africa than Morocco and Tunisia, whose economic relations with the rest of the continent are more substantial than Algeria’s. Despite its pan-African rhetoric, Libya is notorious for its bad treatment of black African immigrants.
In Eastern and Southern Africa, some states may belong to three or even four separate regional groupings, for this vast region is home to COMESA, the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). Of these four groupings, only IGAD and SADC have attempted to put in place reliable security mechanisms. Much of the activity in conflict prevention, management and resolution has revolved around mediation efforts in both interstate conflicts, the most prominent one being the war that broke out in 1998 between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and internal conflicts, as in the cases of Sudan and Somalia. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum regime and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), is an excellent example of partnership between Africa, Europe, and the USA in the resolution of conflicts on the continent. There is a need to sustain such a partnership in the final resolution of the question of Southern Sudan following the proposed independence referendum in 2011. Likewise, IGAD’s numerous attempts to find a lasting solution to the Somali crisis cannot succeed in the absence of a coordinated effort with the AU and the international community.

Since the end of apartheid in South Africa and of civil wars in Mozambique and Angola, Southern Africa has been virtually free of armed conflicts, both internal and interstate. However, this does not translate into an absence of threats to human security or sustainable livelihoods. Indeed, state-sponsored violence by an incumbent regime clinging to power by undemocratic means in Zimbabwe, and a high incidence of criminal violence in South Africa, have devastated hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent lives. Moreover, a major challenge for the former colonial-settler economic systems, which were built on violence, is how to implement the transition to a more equitable distribution of resources with little or no violence. With respect to the regional security mechanism, the region is even better endowed than West Africa, given the military strength of South Africa and the enormous logistical capacity of the Angolan armed forces. However, discussion is still going on concerning the proper functioning of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, in the wake of the dispute involving the 1998 intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC to counter the invasion of that country by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

Central Africa remains the most turbulent region on the continent, with variable levels of armed conflict in the DRC, the Central African Republic
(CAR) and Chad. It is also an area in which the regional security mechanism seems to exist more on paper than in reality. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in October 1983 within the framework of the Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. Angola joined the ten original members of the former French Equatorial Africa, the former Belgian Africa, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe in 1998, but Rwanda has since withdrawn from this as from most other Central African political groupings. The mostly Anglophone leadership of post-genocide Rwanda is drawn from the Tutsi Diaspora in Uganda, whose social and political ties to East Africa are much stronger than its ties of colonial inheritance to Central Africa. Despite the existence since 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the adoption of a non-aggression treaty in 1995 and the establishment in 1998 of a Higher Council for the Promotion of Peace and the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Political Crises and Armed Conflicts in Central Africa, there are still no viable initiatives for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution in the region.

The most successful experiment in conflict management and resolution in the region so far has been the Inter-African Mission to Oversee the Bangui Accords (MISAB), an ad hoc mechanism established for the CAR through a partnership involving Francophone countries in Central and West Africa, the UN, the OAU and France in the wake of three consecutive mutinies between 18 April 1996 and 25 January 1997. An International Follow-up Committee, with the Malian general and statesman Amadou Toumani Touré as international mediator, worked closely with MISAB to implement the agreement between the government and the mutineers. MISAB had troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo plus French logistical support.

Although the Inter-African mission and the UN peacekeeping force that replaced it did succeed in preventing the outbreak of a full-scale civil war in the CAR, they only managed to establish a temporary peace. Instability continued until General François Bozizé overthrew President Ange-Félix Patassé in 2003, and continues today with several armed groups, including the soldiers without borders of the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda. It is evident that no matter who is running the country, the underlying

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6 Acronym for Mission inter-africaine de suivi des accords de Bangui.
issues of human insecurity and the lack of development which gave rise to the mutinies of 1996-97 have remained the same. With the government unable to pay civil service salaries regularly and provide basic social services in a country with enormous natural wealth, the level of popular discontent can only grow higher.

The CAR is symptomatic of the failure of many states in Africa to ensure regular payment of salaries, scholarships, pensions, and other entitlements. Persons denied these benefits are likely to lose access to basic social services and to experience increased insecurity. For civil servants and law enforcement officers, this can only encourage petty corruption and abusive behaviour towards the public. When this happens on a massive scale, a vicious circle is created. Petty corruption reduces revenue collection, and with diminished state coffers resulting from this and from rampant corruption by senior government officials, the state cannot meet its obligations on time, and this leads to more petty corruption, gross violations of people’s rights, and popular discontent. Thus, however well structured regional security mechanisms might be, they cannot address the fundamental issue of governance in Africa, which is the threat that poverty – and state incapacity to deal with that poverty – poses for peace and security around the continent.

The persistence of poverty remains the major threat to the pan-African project of unity, peace and development in Africa. For it creates insecurity with respect to people’s expectations of a decent livelihood and, indeed, of human survival, and thus undermines respect for diversity, tolerance and solidarity in favour of the politics of identity, intolerance and social exclusion. By reducing people’s ability to lead productive and rewarding lives for themselves and their children, poverty exacerbates identity conflicts along communal, ethnic, religious and regional lines. It therefore becomes insincere to talk of a common African identity, when citizenship rights are daily being denied to fellow nationals on the basis of ethnic or regional origin, and the legendary African hospitality is replaced by violence against immigrants. All this goes to say that regional security mechanisms and the overall African security infrastructure cannot function effectively in the absence of developmental states capable of maintaining state authority throughout their national territory and of ensuring the promotion, respect and fulfilment of the fundamental rights of all citizens, particularly the right to human security.
3. African States and Human Security

Ultimately, the goal of peace and security is compatible with the essential task of nation-building and state-building in Africa. This is: to enhance the capacity of the state not only to establish its authority throughout the national territory, but also to serve the economic, social and cultural needs of all inhabitants: citizens, permanent residents, migrant workers and refugees. According to the British historian C. Northcote Parkinson, if there is one important idea to emerge from the history of political thought, it is “the ideal that government is to be judged by results.”7 And a good government, as Rousseau once suggested, is that which improves the quality of life of its people.8 Its legitimacy and the people’s sense of identification with the political order are likely to be enhanced by good performance with respect to peace and security as well as development. The present crisis of the state in Africa, or its declining capacity for stability and development, is a function of its systemic failure to develop effective state institutions and/or to use them for the purpose of transforming the economy and society to improve people’s lives.

Today, more than half of the people of Africa live on less than one U.S. dollar a day. Over two-thirds of the countries classified by the UN as least developed are African. Obviously, regional integration and development cannot be built on such extreme poverty. The challenge facing the continent today is how to get rid of the political deadwood of the post-independence era. The aim is to renew in deeds, and not simply in words or on paper, the commitment to the pan-African project which has now been strengthened with the decision to establish the African Union Authority.

While building together the institutions of the AU, the best contribution each state can make to the pan-African development and integration process is national reconstruction through poverty eradication and democratic governance. Poverty will not be eradicated through slogans and target dates adopted by multilateral agencies or international conferences. It will be eradicated only through concrete policies and programmes designed to transform the economic, political and social structures that reproduce

poverty in Africa, which are local, national, and international in nature. Of all the poverty eradication strategies, the most important with regard to peace and security are those required at the local level. Here, the low purchasing power of agricultural and pastoral producers with few or no productive assets prevents them from meeting their basic human needs with respect to nutrition, literacy, health and security. Without sufficient income and political structures which are responsive to their needs, people cannot meet their minimum nutritional requirements, pay school fees for their children, and ensure for themselves and their families access to a healthy environment – an environment that includes primary health care (PHC), clean water and decent housing. Failure to meet these needs leads to greater social deprivation and therefore reinforces poverty.

Failure to transform agriculture and other economic activities in rural areas through education, training and agricultural extension and credit programs has meant a relative lack of innovations in production tools, methods and techniques, low productivity and the reproduction of poverty. This is aggravated when peasants are also subjected to exploitative and discriminatory practices by private merchants or state agencies. As Samir Amin has shown throughout his monumental work, sustainable development is not possible without a revolution in agriculture.9 Technological innovations, the manufacture of capital goods for agricultural production, and the transformation of primary products into finished goods are indispensable for the success of such a revolution.

Given the stagnation in agriculture, peasants are forced to migrate to urban areas, where they hope to earn a living wage or to enjoy a more decent standard of living generally. For urban areas are also more likely to provide easier access to social services such as education, health, piped water, electricity and public transportation. Unfortunately, African urban areas are characterised by exploding populations in unexploding economies. The economic stagnation of the last 30 years in a context of structural adjustment has meant growing unemployment, the informalisation of the economy, and the inability of large segments of the population to pay the user fees required under liberal orthodoxy for the social services they need. In some ways, the urban poor are far worse off than their counterparts in the rural areas, who have the advantage of producing their own food.

In urban areas, squatter settlements in or near the central business district allow poor people to avoid high rents and the constant threat of being evicted for non-payment of rent. They also allow people to live closer to their place of work or trade, and thus avoid the need for costly transportation while having easier access to essential services such as piped water, electricity, health centres and schools. Squatters regard these conditions as major social gains, which are worth protecting against anyone, including state authorities. They are therefore ready to use violence as a means of self-defence whenever their settlements are threatened with destruction.

As a form of self-organisation by the poor against social exclusion, squattting is only a partial and at best a temporary solution. A more permanent and useful solution is for the squatters to become gainfully employed and have adequate income to take advantage of settlement programs such as low-cost housing and sites and services. Having gained their right to earn a decent living and easier access to social services, they need to be empowered economically, politically and culturally in order to overcome poverty. Just evicting them from the central business district, green areas and other protected sites to dump them in the peripheral zone as the colonialists used to do, is neither humane nor economically sound. Alternative sites and services can and need to be provided to meet their needs for decent housing and easy access to both social services and their place of employment.

Conclusion

The main focus of this paper is on the initiatives that African states, regional security mechanisms, and the AU must undertake if the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security is to meet its objectives. Since both the AU and the regional economic communities are intergovernmental organisations dependent on the political will of member states, the paper argues that in the long run the success of the AU security architecture, and of the Africa-EU partnership, will depend on the capacity of the African state to maintain its authority throughout the national territory and to transform the economy in order to eradicate poverty, a root cause of violent and armed conflicts.
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Nicoletta Pirozzi
EU AND AU OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE SCENARIOS
AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Kwesi Aning and Kwaku F. Danso

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have emerged as critical contributors to international efforts at supporting African states in the transition from armed violence to sustainable peace. Their role as peacekeepers has become increasingly crucial as the rising number and complexity of crisis situations around the globe continue to exceed the United Nations’ (UN) capacity for prompt and effective interventions. True, the UN’s primacy in the authorisation and conduct of peace support operations (PSOs) continues to enjoy universal legitimacy. Yet the organisation has also come to the realisation that the “complexity of modern peacekeeping means that no single organisation is capable of tackling the challenge on its own”.1 Since the 1990s, therefore, the UN has adopted various resolutions calling for closer and deeper cooperation with regional organisations in general, and the AU in particular, under Chapter VIII provisions of the UN Charter.2

The benefits of co-operative engagement between the AU and the UN became manifest when the AU authorised the deployment of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, and later the African Union

1 UN Doc A/63/666-S/2008/813, para. 10.
2 UN Docs. A/47/227-S/24111; A/60/L.1; S/2008/168; A/63/666-S/2008/813.
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, as precursor operations to enhanced UN deployments. Currently, the Union is engaged in a joint UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Yet, while the AU’s collaboration with the UN has been useful, it is through the EU’s provision of consistent funding through the African Peace Facility (APF) that the AU has managed to sustain its peacekeeping endeavours. Not only does the EU-AU peace and security partnership enjoy the advantage of proximity to the epicentres of conflicts in Africa, it also appears to be inspired by an overlap between sentiments of common humanity as well as the real economic and strategic incentives to be derived therefrom. The UN sometimes finds support for intervention difficult when the national interests of member states are undisturbed by conflicts.

In this paper, we discuss the extent to which critical gaps left by the UN with respect to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa are being filled by joint EU-AU engagements. The paper is also interested in examining how the EU-AU partnership can further be strengthened to maximise mutual security and related benefits arising from it. Ultimately, the paper seeks to explore workable arrangement by which UN, EU and AU peace operations can be harmonised with a view to promoting peace, security and stability in Africa and beyond.

1. Evolving EU-AU Peace and Security Relations

Since the beginning of the 21st century, relations between the EU and the AU have been marked by a deepening partnership of equals with economic and security interests in common. While it cannot be denied that this emerging partnership has a long pedigree dating back to the 1963 Yaoundé Convention, it was the 2000 Africa-EU Summit held in Cairo that set in motion serious political dialogue and collaboration on the crucial issue of peace and security in Africa. The need for broader EU-Africa relations

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beyond the largely economic Yaoundé and Lomé agreements came to be inevitable as Africa became embroiled in violent and internecine conflicts after the end of the Cold War. At the Cairo Summit, the EU and the AU emphasised the nexus between security and development and pledged to work together towards improving Africa’s stability.\(^5\)

However, the strengthening solidarity between Africa and Europe cannot be attributed to the Cairo Summit alone. Institutional transformations taking place on the continent in terms of the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the new African Union rooted in human-centred norms and principles have been significant factors defining the shape of current relations. So too has the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the overarching aim of promoting human security in Africa. Unlike the erstwhile OAU, the AU has a broader legal mandate and authority to intervene in cases of “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.\(^6\)

In spite of the AU’s structural and institutional developments, coupled with a genuine commitment to address existing and budding conflicts, efficient and sustainable responses continue to be impaired by acute financial and logistical incapacities. The AU’s position is made even more precarious by the Union’s dual responsibility of building a peace and security architecture while at the same time responding to crisis situations. Indeed, it is the EU’s commitment to help address the AU’s resource constrains through the APF that has been the defining feature of the EU-AU peace and security partnership.

At the Joint Africa-EU Summit held in Lisbon in 2007, the EU and the AU agreed that the “APF has made a substantial contribution and is a good example to how partnership support can complement and reinforce […] African-led peace support operations”.\(^7\) As a result, the EU indicated its preparedness to provide “continued and increased support for the AU in its efforts to – in cooperation with the relevant African regional organisations – operationalise the APSA”.\(^8\) The Lisbon summit yielded the Joint Africa-EU Strategy to serve

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\(^8\) Ivi, para. 17.
as a strategic roadmap for future cooperation on wide-ranging issues including the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention, management and resolution. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy also formally transformed EU-AU relations from the previous unidirectional pattern of interaction to a purposeful partnership of equals.

But given the obvious asymmetrical power balance, economically and strategically, between the parties, and considering the disproportionate focus on the African side of the scale, is there anything to be gained by Europe in this relationship at all? If we are to adequately comprehend the mutuality of EU-AU partnership, then it is imperative to view EU-AU processes from the wider international context in which they are rooted. Since the fall of communism, and later the 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the realisation has grown within EU circles that “global challenges, such as state failures and regional conflicts, affect Europe and thereby need the EU’s active attention”. This recognition has contributed to a more pronounced definition of EU security in global terms. In other words, if Europe is to adequately protect itself against attacks from terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida, as well as other trans-national criminality such as drug trafficking and money laundering, then Africa’s security concerns can no longer be ignored by European states. Put differently, Africa’s diminishing “unimportance” to Europe is reflected in the fact that the EU needs a “stable Africa in order to protect itself and to address the threats in a better manner”.

Aside from European security concerns, the abundance of natural resources in Africa is another factor explaining the EU’s renewed interest in Africa. In the area of energy security, for instance, “Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and to Europe’s dependency on Russia”. Additionally, the arrival of emerging economic giants such as China and India in Africa has intensified the competition for the continent’s resources, giving rise to the offer of more advantageous packages by the EU. With the benefit of history

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9 Ivi, para. 13.
10 Ivi, para. 9.
12 Ivi, p. 58.
and geography on its side, Europe is determined to maintain its enviable position as Africa’s largest trading partner. Undoubtedly, there is also a moral dimension to European support to Africa. Aside from the EU’s international obligation to contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful and secure world environment, Europe also acknowledges that many of Africa’s “problems can be attributed to colonialism and, more importantly, to the decolonisation of the 1960s.”\(^{15}\) Clearly, Europe feels aggrieved by the sheer scale and intensity of human suffering in Africa, often arising from violent and brutal conflicts, and is genuinely committed to help overcome the continent’s myriad security and developmental challenges. Since the beginning of this century, the EU has actively supported the AU and other international efforts, such as those taking place within the framework of the UN, towards addressing Africa’s peace and security conundrum. EU support in this regard has often come in two major strands: operational and institutional capacity support through the African Peace Facility; and direct military engagements in Africa, the most prominent being the 2003 Operation Artemis. The two dimensions are discussed in turn.

2. EU-AU Peace Engagements

2.1 Operational and Institutional Support

While there is a manifest harmony of interest between the EU and the AU in their quest for sustainable peace and security in Africa, the AU’s resource and institutional constraints have often served to deflate its potential as an effective peacekeeper. In 2003, therefore, at the request of African leaders, the EU created the African Peace Facility under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) budget to help address these challenges. The APF, which had a start-up budget of €250M, was intended to serve as a flexible and sustainable funding instrument for African-led PSOs and institutional capacity-building programmes for the nascent APSA as well as the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In general, EU-AU peace support collaborations have been structured around the principle of African ownership and African-led PSOs, with pre-

dictable financial and logistical backing from the EU. Within this framework, the EU has been instrumental in providing support for PSOs undertaken by the AU, including the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB, €25M); the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, €300M); and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, €15.5M). In specific terms, the APF is supposed to finance the following types of peacekeeping expenditures: soldiers’ per diem allowances, communications equipment, medical facilities, wear and tear of civilian equipment, transport and logistics. The APF is, however, not permitted to cover military and arms expenditure. Although the EU has been instrumental in all AU peacekeeping initiatives, it is the AU-EU collaboration in terms of its prosecution of AMIS that provides the best example.

From Rhetoric to Practice: The AU and the EU in Darfur

The Darfur crisis erupted in 2003 against the background of unsavoury Sudanese polity, and the belief on the part of armed groups that a revision of the status quo could best be achieved on the battle field rather than through the ballot box or the courts. In March of 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the two main rebel groups in Darfur, launched a series of attacks on government targets. The attacks were intended to protest against what they called the “systematic […] policies of marginalisation, racial discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and divisiveness [as well as] the brutal oppression, ethnic cleansing, and genocide sponsored by the Khartoum Government”18. The Government and its janjaweed ally responded to the attacks in a “ruthless and disproportionate”19 manner, resulting in extreme violations of fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law.

While the UN adopted an international “Responsibility to Protect” in the midst of the Darfur crisis, and even though the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, clearly stated in 2004 that “genocide has occurred in Darfur

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17 Ibid.
and may still be occurring,” the UN did not know exactly what to do with Darfur. Until 2007, when the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was deployed, much of the effort at stabilising the situation in the region, therefore, came from the AU and the EU. In April 2004, the AU brokered the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the belligerents to end hostilities, release prisoners, and open up humanitarian access to the civilian population. While this agreement produced a temporary lull in fighting, further attempts at extending the truce did not materialise. In May 2006, the AU presided over the signing of another peace deal in the form of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). This time round, the agreement was signed by the Government of Sudan and by only one of the rebel groups, the Mini Minnawi faction of the SLM/A. The congenital difficulties that typified the DPA meant its impact would be correspondingly slight.

Consequently, AU peacekeeping in Darfur became the inevitable option. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was subsequently deployed in 2004 to monitor the combatants’ compliance with the N’djamena ceasefire agreement (and later, the DPA), and to help protect the civilian population from attacks. Nonetheless, given the AU’s capacity weaknesses in terms of finance and logistics, resort to the EU became the only attractive option.

From 2004 to 2007, the EU and its member states joined the AU to execute the AMIS through the provision of a wide range of support to the AU. In April 2005, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, in his capacity of President of the AU Commission, addressed a letter to the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR) of the EU highlighting the seriousness of the situation in Darfur and hoping to be able to count on the EU to enhance the capacity of the AMIS. Responding to this request, the EU pledged to lend all possible support to the AMIS.

While the EU did not engage in intense crisis management operations in Darfur, the organisation, together with its member states, contributed some €500M (€300M from the APF, and €200M from individual EU member states) to the AMIS, from its commencement in 2004 until the mission was

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22 Ivi, para. 12.
transferred to the UNAMID in 2007.\(^2^3\) These funds made it possible to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs; communications equipment; political support to the Darfur peace talks (leading to the DPA); and the Ceasefire Commission. EU support to the AMIS also came in the form of planning and technical assistance to AMIS levels of command, provision of additional military observers, training of African troops, provision of strategic and tactical airlifts and support for the civil police (CIPOL) component of AMIS.\(^2^4\)

**Capacity-Building Support for the APSA and the RECs**

Aside from its operational collaborations with the AU, the EU is also committed to helping build the long-term capacities of both the APSA and the RECs. The RECs are expected to contribute the relevant brigades for the formation and launch of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) by 2010. As a result, the effectiveness of the ASF, the operational arm of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), is contingent upon the viability of the RECs. Between 2004 and 2007, the AU provided 35M for the capacity-building activities of the APSA and the RECs.\(^2^5\) Specifically, the grant was to be directed towards the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the creation of liaison channels between the AU and the RECs, the facilitation of communication links across Africa and the enhancement of RECs initiatives.\(^2^6\) The EU contribution to capacity building is ultimately aimed at supporting the AU and the RECs in developing proactive and comprehensive approaches to peace through operational as well as structural prevention.

\(^2^3\) Council of the EU, EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur - AMIS, (AMIS II/07), Fact sheet, December 2007.
2.2 EU Direct Military Engagement

Operation Artemis

Although the EU’s peace support collaboration with the AU is clearly guided by the principle of African ownership and African-led PSOs with consistent resource backing from the EU and its member states, the EU has not always operated within this frame. While the 2003 EU peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), codenamed Operation Artemis, represented one of the EU’s best peacekeeping endeavours, this mission failed to include the AU.

In May 2003, factional fighting reignited between Hema and Lendu-based militia groups for control over Bunia, a town in the Ituri province of the DRC, after the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Following escalating violence and atrocities, the Secretary-General of the UN requested “the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well equipped multinational force [...] for a limited period until a considerably reinforced United Nations presence could be deployed”.27 France agreed to take up the challenge, and on 30 May 2003 the UN authorised the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) until 1 September 2003, when an enhanced UN mission in the form of the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) could be deployed. The mandate of the mission was “to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situations in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camp in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town”28.

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union decided to deploy Operation Artemis, the EU’s first peacekeeping mission in Africa, with France as the Framework Nation. What was most intriguing about the mission, however, was the total absence of AU input. As a result, even though the mission was a significant success in terms of accomplishing its mandate and highlighting the possibility and necessity of partnerships between the

UN and regional organisations, it also represented a missed opportunity for the EU-AU peace support partnership.

3. Lessons Learned and Future Scenario

There is no doubt that the EU-AU peace support partnership represents an indispensable instrument within a rather limited toolbox of possible remedies to Africa’s peace and security challenges. While Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the contribution of regional organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security, it subordinates them to the pacific settlement of disputes. Regrettably, this tool has, since the end of the Cold War, proved woefully inadequate for addressing Africa’s complex emergencies. Although the primacy of the UN in maintaining global peace and security can hardly be questioned, Africans have since the 1994 Rwandan genocide come to realise the imprudence of depending entirely on the UN for the continent’s peace and security needs.

With the support of the EU, Africa is positioning itself in a manner that allows for a rapid and comprehensive response to conflict situations. In this sense, AU-EU partnership, through the APF, has been critical both in terms of enhancing the long-term capacity of the AU for conflict prevention, management and resolution and of meeting current peacekeeping needs. The critical nature of the AU-EU partnership lies in its ability to launch rapid interventions, as in the case of AMIS, prior to UN deployments. The significance of prompt responses to crisis situations becomes obvious when one considers the fact that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda could be executed in a matter of some hundred days.

Yet the non-involvement of the AU and the RECs in Operation Artemis, even if militarily expedient, completely undermined the EU’s concept of African ownership and African-led PSOs. Indeed, Operation Artemis was a good opportunity for engaging the AU as an “equal” partner in peacekeeping, particularly when the operation was taking place on African soil. Also, the operation could have been used to enhance the AU’s capacity for managing small- to medium-scale conflicts.

This notwithstanding, the EU is generally committed to helping the AU create the necessary conditions for stable peace and security in Africa, conditions which are in turn acknowledged by the EU as necessary for the security of Europe. It is significant, however, to note that the EU sometimes
experiences difficulties in coordinating its member states when it comes to the AU-EU peace partnership. This problem seems to result from a lack of awareness of the potential gains that can be derived from the partnership.\textsuperscript{29} While it is imperative to unravel the necessity of the AU-EU peace and security partnership, it is equally important to stress the need for well coordinated, ordered and predictable interaction between the AU, the EU and the UN in the domain of peace and security. With the increase in the interfaces and synergies between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the AU and the EU, there appears to be a recognition that the role played by these organisations as components of multilateralism is desirable, feasible and necessary. Not only are the AU, the EU and the UN united by a common objective (promoting peace and security), they are also connected by mutual bonds in terms of resource-dependency, legitimacy and the sharing of emerging common values. Closer and deeper interaction between them is therefore needed in order to exploit the comparative advantages of each body, while at the same time enhancing the complementarity of their roles.

**Conclusion**

While the AU has clearly demonstrated its commitment to improving the human security architecture of the continent, the organisation still lacks the necessary capacity for effective structural and operational conflict prevention in Africa. Against this background, the AU-EU peace support partnership, through the APF, has been a prudent and desirable option for addressing Africa’s peace and security challenges. However, closer and deeper collaboration between the AU, the EU and the UN remains a superior strategy for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa and beyond.

Introduction

Since 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been used in Africa in two ways. First, and on an *ad hoc* basis, it has served as an essential tool to respond to immediate crisis management needs – in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, Sudan. Second, in the framework of the 2007 Africa-European Union (EU) strategic partnership, it has contributed to long-term capacity-building efforts. Both approaches are pursued in coordination with a broad range of EU policies and agreements such as, among others, the Cotonou Agreement and the European Development Fund (EDF) with its African Peace Facility (APF).¹

This dual approach is likely to remain a feature of the EU’s engagement in Africa for the foreseeable future. While under pressure to respond to and prevent crises, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is still in the making and thus is not yet ready to fill all security gaps on the continent. Africa-EU security relations are, therefore, still very much in a tran-

sition phase which could well last a decade or more. As long as African states or organisations are not fully willing, equipped and able to prevent or manage their own crises on the continent, they will go on calling for crisis management and peacekeeping interventions from, and partly outsourcing them to, non-African powers or organisations.\(^2\)

This paper mainly looks at EU operations through the framework of the ESDP and its crisis management operations, and looks at AU operations mostly through a peacekeeping lens. This does not mean that long-term prevention and capacity-building efforts should be neglected. On the contrary.\(^3\)

ESDP is still in its early days; the African Union (AU) is an even younger organisation. Created in 2002 on the ashes of the Organisation for African Unity (OUA), it has a strong peace and security focus and was founded on three major principles: “Africa must unite”, “Responsibility to Protect” and “try Africa first”.\(^4\) While continental in nature, the AU has to coordinate with multi-decade-old sub-regional organisations – Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) – which have already developed security and defence cooperation.\(^5\) Through ESDP, the EU therefore has to take the decentralised nature of the African Peace and Security Architecture into account.\(^6\)

The adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and of the Africa-EU strategic partnership in December 2007 marked a turning point in the relationship between the two continents as established by the 2000 Africa-EU Summit in Cairo. The joint strategy is supposed to be based on a more equal footing according to the principles of equality, partnership and ownership. The strategic partnership consists of eight thematic action plans implemented

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along a jointly agreed roadmap leading interlocutors from both the AU and the EU to cooperate at all levels.\textsuperscript{7} Progress achieved should be reviewed by the next AU-EU summit in 2010.\textsuperscript{8} In the field of peace and security, three main priorities were identified: exchanging dialogue on challenges to peace and security, full operationalisation of the APSA and predictable funding for African-led peace support operations.

1. ESDP Operations in Africa: Main Lessons Learned\textsuperscript{9}

In practice, some ESDP initiatives were launched specifically to support AU peace operations in Somalia and Sudan. These contributions, though small in terms of the number of personnel, constituted a valuable test for the EU to assess the viability of practical cooperation with the AU in crisis situations. Significant EU support to troops and equipment for AU missions in Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) have been funded mainly by the African Peace Facility.

EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo. EUSEC started as a very modest mission and has nevertheless managed to foster change at the heart of the DRC security system, by assisting in the reform of troops’ salaries. Implemented in a very competitive donor environment, the mission has managed to keep a high profile within the international community in Kinshasa. After the 2006 elections, the window of opportunity to implement change in the Congolese armed forces started to close and the mission had to cope with a decreasing local leadership to push for Security Sector Reform (SSR). The experience of EUSEC confirmed the importance of local buy-in, not only to ensure committed implementation of reforms but also to favour multilateral donor coordination. This police reform mission has followed the paths of EUSEC and suffered from the same kind of difficulties.

\textsuperscript{7} See: http://africa-eu-partnership.org. The 8 themes are: (1) peace and security; (2) democratic governance and human rights; (3) trade, regional integration and infrastructure; (4) Millennium Development Goals – MDGs; (5) energy; (6) climate change; (7) migration, mobility and employment; (8) science, information society and space.


EU and AU Operations in Africa: A European Perspective

**EUSSR Guinea Bissau.** This tiny SSR mission is, together with EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the most recent ESDP mission in Africa. After 18 months of activity, we can already draw some lessons from this experience.

First, it is absolutely key for ESDP SSR advisers to work in conditions that facilitate close working relationships with their local counterparts while building a genuine ESDP team spirit. Several models exist, like collocating experts within institutions or prioritising team-building processes (EUSEC DRC in its first phase). Beyond collocation, though, more work should be done to operationalise the concept of local ownership and to train ESDP practitioners more thoroughly in its culturally-sensitive implementation in fragile states. Similarly, and with a view to respecting the principle of separation of powers and smooth relations with local counterparts, justice sector reform advisers should enjoy full autonomy in the framework of future SSR missions.

Second, matching ambitions with capabilities and adequate human resources – without even mentioning gender-equality – is a fundamental pre-requisite as well as a constant challenge. EUSSR Guinea Bissau is the latest confirmation of the need to boost EU member states’ efforts to increase the EU’s civilian crisis-management human resources. Ultimately, the availability of adequate staff will also be linked to the strategic interests of European member states and more work should be done on the definition of EU interests and opportunities in this region and in Africa as a whole. Research on this will be carried out in 2010 at the EU Institute for Security Studies.

**ARTEMIS.** Artemis operationalised some new concepts for military ESDP: autonomous action outside the NATO framework, at the request of the United Nations (UN) and with a UN mandate. Plus, Artemis fulfilled some key operational goals: rapid deployment in a very remote area; the capacity to protect the civilian population with a minimum number of casualties; coordination with humanitarian actors and other international organisations.

It also constituted an opportunity to test the functioning of the EU’s politico-military structures – the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) – and it showed that quick decisions could be made by these institutions.¹⁰ Thanks

to its success, Artemis has created a precedent for the ESDP and validated the concept of the “framework nation” which, in this particular case, suited France very well. It has also created a strategic precedent by extending ESDP’s remit to Africa and thus opening a new field of experimentation. However, questions remained and challenges appeared. The mission was so limited in scope that some debates emerged about the difficulty of gauging its success, especially when new massacres erupted in the area shortly after the departure of the force.11 Furthermore, since France was the main initiator, contributor to and leader of this operation, doubts were raised as to the real ability of the EU as such to perform the same role without a French contribution.

At the operational level, the Artemis experience demonstrated the military advantages of leaving considerable flexibility to the Force Commander on the ground in a very violent and volatile context, even though this option may imply less control exerted by the PSC.12 Various shortcomings were noted regarding strategic, political or operational intelligence-gathering and -sharing, the obsolescence of certain equipment and the lack of standard and secured communications tools and channels. Shortfalls in secure communications channels and information technology were addressed in the course of the mission.13

As for UN-EU cooperation, one of the lessons learned by the operation was that both organisations were still “discovering each other”. EU requests to use logistics assets of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (this did not match UN procedures) and to benefit from the legal agreement that the UN mission in DRC (MONUC) had reached with the Congolese (which would have put ESDP troops under UN command)
could not be met. However, Artemis was seen as “a remarkably positive experiment in cooperation between the UN and a regional organisation, in the domain of peace and security.”

The operation created rather high expectations from the UN about the prospects of ESDP launching more operations in Africa. At the end of the day though, European peacekeeping in Africa has remained limited. The rapid reaction scheme set up for Artemis later inspired the creation of the Battle Group Concept, which came under question in late 2008 when the EU decided not to intervene in the Kivu region.

**EUFOR RD Congo.** This operation proved the capacity of the EU to deploy in Sub-Saharan Africa when needed, although the deployment was not particularly fast. EUFOR was a testing case for EU-UN peacekeeping cooperation in Africa. The operation went well and the troops successfully intervened three times with MONUC to prevent serious incidents. However, some experts considered that the mission benefited from an overall favourable environment and would have been sub-optimal in preventing serious deterioration of the security situation.

**EUFOR Tchad/RCA.** The mandate of EUFOR Tchad/RCA was the result of a compromise between member states pushing a variety of agendas. The rather strong mandate focused on civilian and aid worker protection, with clearly defined rules of engagement, but did not provide the mission with enough guidance and strength to manage initial political ambiguities. From a broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) perspective, to say the least, the EU has not obtained any progress in the internal Chadian political dialogue or on democratisation. Relations between Chad and Sudan have not particularly improved either.

More generally, this raises questions about the political profile of ESDP operations and how EU policy considerations can be more strongly linked to

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ESDP planning and operations. In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, synergies and coherence between the ESDP operation, the French diplomatic representation and the EU Special Representatives could have been optimised, through a more permanent and appropriate EU political presence in Chad.\(^{18}\)

The operation’s added value, however, is probably to have clarified, for European chancelleries and public opinion, the nature of challenges inside Chad (state violence and rebellion, impunity, local ethnic and land-related conflicts) and in the region (the proxy war between Khartoum and N’Djamena and the violence in Darfur). This, in return, should hopefully strengthen European foreign policy in the region.

As for coordination with other international organisations, new modes of coordination were set up at all levels between the EU (mainly DG E VIII of the EU Council Secretariat, OHQ and FHQ, European Commission) and the UN (DPKO, Support office, UN Police, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)). Contradictions between the EU and the UN emerged frequently during the coordination process and affected the mid-term review and the handover process, but they did not hamper joint work, during which, at times, both organisations had to agree to disagree. Beyond certain disagreements, EU-UN coordination has deepened and reached unprecedented levels, and put new procedures in place that will be available for future joint operations.

The whole concept of intervention, as negotiated with Chad, was a hybrid set-up combining EU and UN interventions based on the idea of a bridging operation. It proved difficult to implement efficiently. The EU was expected to provide a military umbrella in the East to civilians, the humanitarian community, UN staff and police as well as the UN-trained Chadian DIS (Détachement Intégré de Sécurité – Chadian joint police and gendarmerie force). On paper, the components of this hybrid set-up were supposed to start their work simultaneously, but this did not happen due to the serious delays mentioned above. This experience raises questions about the mechanisms required for efficient future hybrid EU-UN formulas so as to avoid planning and deployment disconnects. Early definitive commitment of the follow-on force seems key in this respect. As for the bridging function, it

\(^{18}\) Ambassador Torben Brylle, from Denmark, has been EU Special Representative for Sudan and his mandate was broadened to Eastern Chad on 12 February 2008. Ambassador Georg Lennkh, from Austria, was the EU Presidency Special Representative in charge of Chadian internal political dialogue. In practice, France has played a prominent role in supporting the EU rotating presidency locally.
would not have worked in this particular case without the significant (although temporary) re-hatting of EU contingents until the arrival of UN follow-on troops. In April 2009, there were still 817 French, 405 Irish, 316 Polish, 112 Austrian, 65 Finnish and several other European personnel deployed in Eastern Chad under the UN banner.

While strategic airlift capabilities were ensured through internal cooperation between contributors, tactical air assets proved more problematic. It took months to obtain a limited number of additional transport helicopters – thanks to, among other things, a contribution from Russia\(^\text{19}\) – to complement a small and overstretched fleet constantly exposed to harsh climatic conditions.

Lessons learned should also focus on the use of local resources by the operation and the way EU forces should communicate about it. Water scarcity and management, for instance, are certainly challenges to be addressed by using adequate technologies, while remaining aware of the impact on the perceptions of the local population.\(^\text{20}\)

The Eastern Chad experience also required some flexibility and context-sensitive approaches in Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). More dialogue and engagement with the humanitarian community as early as possible during the planning phase and early deployment is crucial in order to establish smooth working relations from day one.

In a context of economic downturn and lack of enthusiasm from other member states, France had to agree to be the main financial (shouldering probably 80% of the total costs) and troop contributor. This predominant French role raises a fundamental question: are ESDP military operations, in Africa and elsewhere, possible without France acting as the main initiator and framework nation?

Given its size, the diversity of troop contributors, the complexity of the challenges, and the degree of cooperation with the UN, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will stand as a milestone in the development of ESDP. It remains to be seen how and when its experience will inspire future missions in Africa and beyond.

\(^\text{19}\) The Russian contribution, delivered after its war against Georgia, was slightly controversial in Brussels but cooperation in theatre proved excellent. Interviews, EUFOR and Council staff, Brussels, 3 June and 20 July 2009.

\(^\text{20}\) In Abéché Stars Camp, the Austrian contingent used a water recycling system and allegedly consumed 4 times less than other troops. The sometimes excessive use of water by troops was also witnessed by Chadian staff, well aware of water scarcity difficulties. Water recycling systems were also used by the Irish in Goz Beida.
EUNAVFOR Atalanta. First, the operation as such was not designed to put an end to piracy in the region on its own. It can tackle symptoms, but not the root causes of the issue. Its mandate does not comprise an end goal expressing a clear foreign policy strategy towards Somalia and the Indian Ocean as a whole.²¹ It is recognised that a comprehensive EU approach towards Somalia and to maritime security more generally, in which Atalanta could play its role, is necessary in the long term.²² Despite the U.S. and UK initiatives in December 2008, there has been no consensus about what measures to adopt to combat Somali piracy on land and to address linkages between piracy and the local political elite in Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia, and at the national level. The operation has engaged Somali authorities who have made anti-piracy statements, but this is not enough. Assisting fragile Somali authorities to improve coastal security may prove a double-edged sword, since in the past expertise and equipment passed on to coast guards has reportedly then been used to upgrade piracy techniques.²³

Thanks to its comprehensive approach involving rule-of-law and Community instruments to support judicial systems in the region, the EU is able to ensure that suspected pirates are prosecuted according to international human rights standards. However, the judicial cooperation started by Atalanta will require long-term engagement from the EU with still rather fragile partner states such as Kenya or possibly the Seychelles. Needs have been identified with a view to enhancing judicial harmonisation and cooperation in the field of piracy in Europe and more generally increasing the profile and capacities of the EU’s representation abroad when, for instance, it comes to negotiate international judicial agreements or Status of Force Agreements (SOFAs). The operation has also highlighted the complexity of operations in a law enforcement environment. At the tactical level, one key issue is the need for standardised secure EU military communications. Finally, one of the innovations of Atalanta lies in the cooperation between the military and the private sector – inter alia through the setting up of the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) –

²¹ Interview with a maritime security expert, Paris, 5 June 2009.
²³ This has been the case with some people trained by private and security companies in Somalia. Interviews with EU military staff, Northwood, 13 August 2009.
and this experience will hopefully inform further reflections on the business and security nexus.

2. EU and AU Operations: AMIB, AMIS, AMISOM

The EU is usually seen as seriously committed to support African peacekeeping and APSA in general. The available literature offers contradictory views about EU motivations to intervene directly or to support peacekeeping in Africa: some underline primarily bilateral agendas for former colonial powers (mainly France)\(^\text{24}\), while others acknowledge the willingness of former colonial powers to Europeanise foreign policy towards Africa. Because EU relations with Africa are in a transition phase, the truth is probably on both sides of the argument. Bilateral agendas vary from one case to another, according to changes in the leadership in Europe and in Africa. However, the long-term trend is there: Europeans will continue to support African leadership in dealing more autonomously with peace and security in Africa. The EU support to African missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia has mainly focused on finance, logistics and planning. EU funding represented a minor part of total costs of these operations. The integration of EU officers and advisers into African chains of command has been a learning process and would deserve to become more formalised in the future. Both AMIS and AMISOM, notwithstanding the dedication of troops on the ground, have struggled against well-known shortcomings: funding, personnel, equipment, air assets.\(^\text{25}\) The suicide bombing which took the life of the deputy Force Commander of AMISOM in September 2009 highlighted anew the need to upgrade the quality of AU self-protection.\(^\text{26}\)

The mission in Burundi, to some extent, may be the exception confirming the rule. Its success so far can be attributed to a combination of constructive factors: an internationally recognised African political mediator (Nelson Mandela), the involvement of a regional hegemon and a leading troop-con-


\(^{26}\) AMISOM Newsletter, Volume 1, Issue 27, 25 September 2009.
tributing nation (South Africa), strong international coordination and high-level UN political leadership (UN SRSG). This example of best practice could perhaps inspire future peacekeeping/peacebuilding initiatives elsewhere on the continent.

The division of labour between foreign funders and troop contributors has raised some questions about unfair treatment, with Africans taking most of the risks by deploying on the ground and outsiders managing the financial and strategic dimension of peacekeeping. For some African militaries though, this division of labour and the idea that Africans are those taking most of the risks does not seem to be problematic.

3. EU-Africa Relations in the Field of Peace and Security: Future Scenarios

Several issues will require future ESDP-AU cooperation in theatre. ESDP staff need to be provided with diplomatic status to overcome basic obstacles when they operate in Africa. Although the negotiation of SOFAs with hosting authorities may be a temporary solution, ad hocery is not enough. The example of difficulties experienced at border crossing-points or delays in visa delivery from the Sudanese administration are cited as examples.

Second, lessons learned from AMIS showed that more clarity regarding the role of EU staff seconded to AU operations will be needed in the future. The EU’s say and place in the chain of command and reporting channels, and the nature of its advisory role, need to be clarified early enough to maximise cooperation in theatre. Third, the EU’s influence as main donor of AU operations will have to be complemented by a high degree of political-military synergy between the two organisations. This is necessary to avoid the recurrence of past cases where changes in the conduct of AMIS recommended by the EU were not implemented.

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28 "Better coordination needs to be undertaken between countries that have launched peacekeeping missions, the ones that finance them and the countries taking the risk in sending troops." Birame Diop, "A review of African Peacekeeping", op. cit., pp. 25-26, p. 30.
30 Ivi, p. 76.
In the absence of a strong African political will it is impossible for the EU to foster more African ownership in the spirit of the new EU-Africa partnership. Without strongly staffed structures enjoying political back-up on the African side, it is also hard to avoid the trap of the donor-recipient relationship that the Lisbon Summit was supposed to consign to the past. The AU must convince RECs/RMs that it is able to give them some added value. For that purpose, RECs/RMs representation to the AU is being developed in Addis Ababa with the support of the EU. A legal framework to regulate AU-RECs/RM relations vis-à-vis the African Standby Force (ASF) is expected to be adopted in 2010. Similarly, given the differing levels of development reached by regional brigades, it is crucial to support the set-up of the ASF in a differentiated and targeted manner. Some have suggested prioritising the most advanced brigades.31

Suggestions were also made to increase cooperation and skills transfer between the AU and the UN in peacekeeping logistics management.32

Finally, in the spirit of the partnerships, dialogue on peace and security would benefit from increased participation from non-state actors, including from the private sector, so as to stimulate progress and accountability.

Beyond the EU-AU partnerships, a myriad of actors have engaged the APSA. International organisations like the UN, NATO, the G8 or the Arab League have developed their own partnerships and support programmes. Brazil, China, India and Japan are also keen to cooperate more closely with Africans on peace and security. More coordination is needed to avoid divide and rule or “aid auction” situations developing from those in Africa who have a long experience of donor competition. The report of the AU-UN Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations has identified solutions to avoid overlapping and limit transaction costs.

It remains to be seen how the EU will support and contribute to new funding mechanisms and in particular the suggested multi-donor trust fund for capacity building.33 Decisions will also be influenced by debates on the definition of Official Development Aid (ODA). So far, according

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31 Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, Options for the EU to Support the African Peace and Security Architecture, op. cit., p. 36.
33 Ibid.
to the criteria established by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), such aid cannot be used to fund military activities. Since the DAC criteria constrain the use of development budgets to fund peace and security efforts, some options should be considered to create or increase resources, matching the hybrid nature of the security-development nexus. As for international coordination, various formats are being developed in the framework of the G8++, the trilateral EU-Africa-China partnership or EU-AU cooperation at the UN.

4. Peacekeeping in Africa: Future Scenarios

Three groups of states are key for the future of peacekeeping in Africa: the UN Security Council members, the funders, and troop contributors. The future of AU operations will depend on the consensus achieved by these three groups. At the level of the UN Security Council, most of the funding has so far been ensured by the USA, Europe and Japan. Russia has contributed less substantially but can always use its veto power to bargain its support to peacekeeping in Africa against other strategic issues more relevant to its domestic interests, such as Central Asia, the Caucasus or the Middle East. China has increasingly contributed to peacekeeping in Africa and has more and more to say. The increasingly important role of main troop contributors like India, Pakistan or Bangladesh, to mention but a few, will also have an impact on the shape of peacekeeping in Africa. More generally, the outcome of the renewed debate on UN peacekeeping generated around the “New Horizon Report” will have a significant impact on AU and EU operations in Africa.

On the funding front, some predict a possible decrease in resources because of successive crises (food, oil prices, financial) in the developed world. It

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is possible that a withdrawal by Western powers because of economic hardships could lead to an increased involvement by China in the field of peacekeeping in Africa. Such a vacuum could also be filled by Russia or even Brazil, if these powers seek more international recognition, more support in global governance fora (like the G20 or the World Trade Organisation) and access to new markets.

As for African troop-contributing countries, they face numerous challenges. First of all, estimates by military experts show that even if the African Standby Force reaches its objectives in 2010, the number of available African troops will be insufficient to replace currently deployed peacekeepers in Africa.\(^{38}\) This means that no matter how African capabilities develop, external troop contributions will be needed. The irony is that African states are caught in an irresolvable dilemma: on the one hand, they are requested to shrink and reform their armed forces so as to build stronger and accountable security systems, according to the new SSR doctrine recommended by developed countries.\(^{39}\) And on the other, regional security challenges and the implementation of the “Africa First” principle require more troops and more expenditure for peacekeeping forces. State building and regionalisation, in that respect, could come to contradict each other.

In the future, however, if current motivations to engage in peacekeeping (extra funds for peacekeeping for poorer states, state legitimisation for contested states with contested borders or controversial/conflict-driving ethnic diversity\(^{40}\)) remain the same, similar strategies are likely to continue being pursued by less repressive, poorer, English-speaking states with “low state legitimacy” and large armed forces.\(^{41}\)

Financially, current peacekeeping costs\(^{42}\) cannot be covered by African budgets only. The key factor here is how the funding structures suggested

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38 Johan Potgieter, *Peacekeeping Forces for Peace Support Operations in Africa*, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2009 (ISS Today). “If Africa wants to provide only 50% of the required forces continuously, it will need a military and police force components of about 154,000”.


41 Ibid.

by the Prodi Panel, for instance a specific trust fund, will take off and whether they will pursue ambitious enough strategies with flexible enough means. The existence of an international framework dedicated to militarily relevant funding would be very useful for the EU and those of its member states who are keen to support AU operations in a sustainable way.

At the operational level, several challenges will have to be faced by African peacekeeping in the future. Corruption in the use of funds supposed to be dedicated to peacekeeping has been a long-standing issue which makes foreign supporters hesitate to blindly fund African peace support operations (PSOs).43 Troops’ efficiency will require efforts to overcome language barriers, cultural diversity and soldiers’ illiteracy and improve their healthcare.44 To what extent French-speaking states have a chance to be integrated into the international (UN or AU peacekeeping) system remains to be seen. Some encourage the UN and the AU to invest in French-speaking human resources with a view to strengthening and improving African capabilities and their effectiveness on the ground (for instance in the DRC).45 In the future as well, more questions will be raised about the role of the private sector in peacekeeping in Africa. It will be an option for logistics, catering (on this precise matter the importance of national cuisine has to be taken into account46) but also for arms and equipment maintenance. The recourse to private operators created serious problem of dependency on donors for AMIS when Nigerian and Rwandan contingents could not ensure their equipment maintenance. By comparison, the South African contingent, which had its own equipment, did not suffer from this situation.

Finally, harmonised training policies seem unlikely in the short term47 although they will be needed in the long run. More research would be wel-

44 Ibid.
46 In the case of AMIS, a Middle Eastern company was subcontracted and according to the author the food was not adapted to African contingents’ cooking habits, thus undermining their morale. Naveed Bandali, “Lessons from African Peacekeeping”, in Journal of International Peace Operations, Vol. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 2006), No. 2, pp. 11-12.
47 Alex Vines and Roger Middleton, Options for the EU to Support the African Peace and Security Architecture, op. cit.
come to draw lessons from cross-regional training experiences like the RECAMP/AMANI programme. More generally, a political emphasis should be placed on coordination between the various layers in African multilateralism and regional powers, RECs/RMs, and the AU. Policy coordination and coherence between all these actors will be the most crucial factor in the future of AU operations in convincing the EU to continue its support.
G8 AND EU SUPPORT TO AFRICAN EFFORTS IN PEACE AND SECURITY
AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Andebrhan W. Giorgis
Introduction

In Pittsburgh in September 2009, leaders of the Group of 20 nations reached agreement to make the G20 the main international forum for crafting international economic policy – a move that represents a major change in the global financial architecture. This decision ushers in a new economic order that gives re-emerging and emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Korea more say in steering the global economy. This means the G20 will assume the role long played by the smaller club of wealthy countries, made up of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany, Japan and Russia. The transition from G8 to G20 will take place formally in June 2010 in Canada, which as holder of next year’s G8 presidency will now host two consecutive summits – one of them a G20 summit co-hosted with South Korea. France hosts the G8 and G20 in 2011 and President Sarkozy has already indicated that he feels that the

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1 Research for this paper was assisted by Tom Cargill and Markus Weimer of Chatham House’s Africa programme. Chatham House is currently completing a detailed study on the G8 and Africa funded by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation.

2 The G20 emerged in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as it became clear that consultation and coordination needed to be extended to encompass these emerging economic powers. The G7 finance ministers responded by agreeing the establishment of a new grouping bringing Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey, and a little later Indonesia, into a grouping formerly including the European Union as its 20th member.
G8 is no longer relevant and that a broader group, ultimately the G20, needs to replace it.\(^3\)

The South Korean Government has already indicated that the international development architecture will form one of the three pillars of its 2010 agenda (alongside global financial architecture and macro-economic architecture). Yet Korea also seeks not to expand the mandate of the G20 too quickly, although broad commitments to improve fuel, food and finance to the world’s poor are on the agenda.

Africa remains marginalised in the G20: only South Africa is a member and the African Union (AU) remains an invitee at the discretion for the chair (unlike the European Union, which is represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank). The African Union had lobbied for more of its members to be included in addition to the African Union Commission. In the Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2010-2012), “the African side stressed the urgent need to enlarge the G20 and other existing mechanisms for international economy. The Chinese side expressed its full understanding for this request and stressed that existing mechanisms for international economic order must be balanced to ensure the fair representation of Africa.”\(^4\)

At the London G20 Summit in April 2009, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, represented the AU as co-chair with Jean Ping of the AU Commission, at the invitation of UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown. He also attended the Pittsburgh summit in this capacity at the invitation of US President Barrack Obama.

The immediate concern is that low-income countries like those in Africa will not have much of a say. South African President Jacob Zuma lobbied G20 leaders on the needs of such countries. The UN Secretary-General also called on G20 leaders to deliver the $1.1 trillion promised in London last April, especially the $50 billion for poorest countries, and to honour the Gleneagles G8 pledges of 2005 to increase official development assistance (ODA) – with $65 billion for Africa. The G20’s final communiqué did make a couple of commitments that impact Africa:

**Agriculture:** it called on the World Bank to develop a new trust fund, as a way to implement the G8’s food security initiative announced at the L’Aquila Summit in Italy in July;

\(^3\) Discours de M. Le Président de la République, XVII Conference des Ambassadeurs, Palais de L’Elysée, 26 August 2009.

African Development Bank: it also reaffirmed the commitment to ensure that the multilateral development banks have enough finance, especially the World Bank’s soft loan arm, the International Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

As an economic body, the G20 made no reference to climate change or African efforts toward peace and security. Indeed, at the G8 Summit at L’Aquila in 2009, the Italian presidency invited most of the G20 to attend, in addition to a number of African countries – Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Senegal, Egypt and the AU Commission – for a discussion of the global economic crisis on the continent. It may be that the main result of this was bilateral meetings, such as those between the Presidents of India and South Korea with the Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos. And it may be that one of the key lessons from G8 summits on Africa is that bilateral rather than multilateral discussions produce the most tangible results.

It is early days for the G20, and time will tell how the shift toward the new grouping works out. Up to the summit South Africa itself was split on whether a G13 (the G8 with the Outreach Five – China, Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa) might provide them with a stronger voice than the full twenty, which includes Australia, Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey, most of which have only a marginal interest in Africa. South Africa, as the permanent member of the G20, is likely to be inward looking and, with its former Finance Minister and pioneer of the G20, Trevor Manuel, moving out of government, it lacks strategic vision. The result is that the African voice is weak at this crucial moment in the G20’s evolution.

The G20 is likely to deliver far fewer, and broader, economic commitments than the G8, because it has to negotiate consensus amongst a much larger group. This means there are likely to be fewer meaningful commitments related specifically to Africa, whose economic needs are, after all, seen as fairly peripheral to immediate global economic stability.

But then, when it comes to African peace and security, the prime driver for the G8 has been an extension of humanitarian concerns, rather than national interest, although migration and counter-terrorism have featured. In many ways the “responsibility to protect” has found its purest form in G8 engagement with Africa. This position is particularly prevalent amongst EU members of the G8. For the time being the G8, despite its downgrading, will perform the role of annually reviewing progress on key global themes,
such as the development of African efforts in peace and security and the support provided by EU members of the G8: Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

1. Mapping G8 Commitments toward African Peace and Security


1.1 Kananaskis and Evian Summits

At the G8 Summit at Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002, participating nations established an ambitious Africa Action Plan. Stating that Africa had been “undermined or destroyed by conflict and insecurity”, G8 nations pledged that they were “determined to make conflict prevention and resolution a top priority”. This summit built on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and committed G8 members to support goals along with NEPAD, both through individual and collective actions, and through their international membership in international institutions.

The Kananaskis pledges included resolving the principal armed conflicts in Africa at the time. They also envisaged technical and financial assistance to enable African countries and regional/sub-regional groupings to better prevent and resolve conflicts and provide more effective peace-building support to societies emerging from or seeking to prevent armed conflicts. The commitments also covered other aspects of conflict such as better regulation of arms brokers and traffickers; the elimination and removal of anti-personnel mines; addressing the link between armed conflict and natural resource exploitation; and the protection and assistance of war-affected populations.

The following year at Evian, peace operations were given even more emphasis with the follow-up “Implementation Report” to leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan. This report added recommendations calling for African Union consultation and links with the UN, and support for the AU and

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regional organisations to learn more about the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) as a model for the African Standby Force (ASF).  

1.2 Sea Island Summit

The following year at Sea Island, G8 leaders “committed to an Action Plan to expand global capability for peace support operations that is available for any international peace support operation or mission on a timely basis.”

“We commit, consistent with our national laws, to:

– Train and, where appropriate, equip a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010, in line with commitments undertaken at Kananaskis and Evian;
– Coordinate with African partners, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and others to enhance African peace support operations capabilities and set up donor contact groups in African capitals (as foreseen in the Evian plan);
– Work with interested parties to develop a transportation and logistics support arrangement, which will help provide countries with transportation to deploy to peace support operations and logistics support to sustain units in the field;
– Increase the training of carabinieri/gendarmerie-like forces both by continuing to support existing centres dedicated to that purpose, notably those in France and Italy, and those in Africa, and by supporting new initiatives in that respect. In particular, we will support the Italian initiative to establish, on a multinational basis, an international training centre that would serve as a Centre of Excellence to provide training and skills for peace support operations. The centre will build on the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, Gendarmerie and other similar forces “to develop carabinieri/gendarmerie-like units of interested nations, including those in Africa, for peace support operations.”


1.3 Gleneagles Summit

At the 2005 meeting in Scotland, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was high on the agenda. G8 nations agreed to enhance support for the development of Africa’s capacity to resolve conflicts and keep the peace, consistent with their national laws, by:

– Providing co-ordinated technical assistance to the ASF and helping to establish planning elements at the African Union HQ and its regional brigades;
– Supporting the AU in developing its ability to deploy unarmed military observer missions, civilian policing operations and carabinieri/gendarmerie-like forces as part of stabilisation and peace support operations;
– Providing support, including flexible funding, for African peace support operations including transport, logistics and financial management capacity;
– Countering terrorism in Africa, including through cooperation with the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers;
– Supporting efforts from regional and international organisations to reinforce African capacity to promote peace and stability.

Furthermore, it was agreed by the G8 that they would also help Africa prevent conflict and ensure that previous conflicts do not re-emerge, by:

– Working in partnership with the AU and sub-regional organisations, including by providing resources to develop their planned Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and implement the AU Panel of the Wise to address and mediate conflicts before they erupt into violence;
– Enhancing the capabilities of the AU and African sub-regional organisations, building on the existing G8 Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, as well as commitments from the Evian and Kananaskis Summits. To support this, we will work to promote within our respective governments mechanisms for more effective and flexible crisis response and promote faster, more comprehensive and coordinated partner responses engaging ourselves, the UN, key regional organisations and other partners;
– Maximising the contribution of local and multinational companies to peace and stability including through working with the UN Global Compact and developing guidance of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for companies working in zones of weak governance;
– Working to implement UN sanctions regimes more effectively by improved coordination of existing monitoring mechanisms and more efficient use of independent expertise;
– Acting effectively in the UN and in other fora to combat the role played by “conflict resources” such as oil, diamonds and timber, and other scarce natural resources, in starting and fuelling conflicts;
– Improving the effectiveness of transfer controls over small arms and light weapons, including *inter alia* the review conference of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 2006, and taking effective action in Africa to collect and destroy illicit small arms.

Development of international standards in arms transfers, including a common understanding of governments’ responsibilities, would be an important step towards tackling the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms. We agree on the need for further work to build a consensus for action to tackle the undesirable proliferation of conventional arms;
– Working in support of the UN Secretary General’s proposed new Peace Building Commission.

*1.4 St. Petersburg Summit*

At the Russia meeting in 2006 an Action Plan to expand global capability for peace support operations, which is available for any international peace support operation or mission on a timely basis, was outlined.
It was agreed that any nation receiving training and assistance would make its own sovereign decision on whether to deploy its units to a particular peace support operation, and that all peace support operations and other related activities undertaken by G8 members under this initiative would be in accordance with the UN Charter. Moreover, given the fact that most of the peace support operations around the world, particularly those in Africa, are operating under the aegis of the UN and with a UN Security Council mandate, all actions undertaken by the G8 to expand global capability for peace support operations should be implemented in close cooperation with the UN, in accordance with its technical standards, and take into account the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. In Africa, these actions should also be implemented in close cooperation with the African Union and sub-regional organisations, in line with the African ownership principle.
It was also agreed to maintain specific commitments made at Sea Island, such as to equip a total of approximately 75,000 troops worldwide by 2010 and coordinate with African partners, the UN, the EU and others.
1.5 Heiligendamm Summit

The G8 in Germany agreed to continue to support APSA and to identify lasting solutions to sustainable financing and operational support. Examples include:

- assisting African regional organisations and other institutions (AU, SADC, IGAD, ICGLR, MDRP) in crisis prevention and management (including the development of early warning systems both at the continental level and at IGAD headquarters);
- the control of small arms (and illegal trade in such, through cooperation with SADC and EAC);
- the strengthening of African peace-building and peacekeeping structures (continuing support for peacekeeping training institutions, including the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, the École de Maintien de la Paix in Bamako, and the Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi);
- the development of a civil component of the ASF.

The G8 continued to support the creation of the ASF and focused on defining strategies and guidelines for it in areas such as logistics, communication and the civilian components of peace support operations. G8 members also made pledges to the UN Peace Building Fund launched in October 2006 and supported efforts by several African countries to toughen their laws with regard to the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW.

1.6 Hokkaido Summit

Security and peacekeeping in Africa received much less attention at the G8 summit in Japan but there were some commitments relevant to African peace and security. At the Hokkaido Summit Leaders Declaration, the G8 undertook to “promote peace and security through supporting the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in enhancing Africa’s peacekeeping capabilities, in particular the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Stand-by Force (ASF).” They also committed “to fulfil or exceed our Sea Island and subsequent commitments.”

1.7 L’Aquila Summit

At the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy, security and peace in Africa received little attention, but participants reaffirmed their commitment to promote
peace and security. They stressed the importance of and discussed progress in establishing a credible system of regional security, in particular through APSA and the elimination of all factors of instability, including the proliferation of SALW. In this framework, they agreed on continuing collaborative efforts in fighting more effectively all forms of criminality and organised crime, including piracy off the coast of Eastern Africa, drug trafficking in Western Africa, money laundering, and terrorism in all its ramifications. The Italian presidency also produced a report on peacekeeping/peacebuilding to take stock of collective progress in meeting the goals set out and reiterated at successive G8 summits, and most notably in 2004 at Sea Island.8

2. Impact of G8 Initiatives on APSA

2010 is a landmark for the G8 by reason of a number of goals set by its leaders, including for African peace and security. At Sea Island, a headline goal of training 75,000 peacekeeping troops worldwide by 2010 was set. On this, G8 countries appear to be on track. The USA, via its Global Peace Operations Initiative Program (GPOI), has trained more than 69,000 military personnel from 73 countries since 2005, over 48,000 of whom have deployed to 20 operations around the world. In Africa, G8 countries have provided support, with the UK, for instance, having trained 12,000 peacekeepers since 2004-05 via support for centres in 13 countries. France has prepared 3,000 trainees, mostly at African training centres, and 6,800 troops from 27 countries, including 9 peacekeeping battalions in 2008 alone.

G8 countries have also been involved in police training. In Africa, Canada provides financial and technical assistance through its Pearson Peacekeeping Centre to the police services of 15 countries, while the UK, by funding centres in West and East Africa, has supported the training of numerous police peacekeepers, including pre-deployment training to participate in UNAMID. The Italian Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), with US support, has trained nearly 2000 trainer graduates from 29 countries, with over 900 graduates from Africa. Germany also provides training for deployment in Africa, including via funding and trainers for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana. France has supported the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) in Cameroon.

As noted by the G8, peace support operations are often hindered by a lack of transportation and logistical support on the part of regional or UN troop contributors. To fill this gap, G8 countries have supported the AU Missions in Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition, G8 countries and the EU have provided direct bilateral support to UN and AU missions, including provision of military and police experts to AMIS, aircraft and armoured personnel carriers to AMIS and UNAMID, equipment and strategic airlift to the Central African Multinational Force (FOMUC) and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and transportation and other support to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

2.1 Looking ahead

There remains an urgent need for improved coordination to avoid duplication of international efforts toward APSA and ensure the best application of resources. There is also a need for: improvements to the mandate and mission planning process; interoperability and hence doctrine, particularly for police peacekeepers; greater equipping and logistics support; and a balance between quality and quantity.

Expanded partnerships with the AU and with the RECs to reinforce local capacities in all sectors remain important for enhancing long-term capacity building and finding the appropriate modalities for mission-specific support. The UN Security Council’s recent call for the establishment of a Trust Fund for AMISOM is one such example. The African Union-United Nations Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations is an interesting step forward for an AU-UN relationship and in seeking to secure sustainable, flexible and predictable funding for AU-led peace support operations.9

3. Limitations of the G8

As discussed above, the G8 is yesterday’s international architecture and on economic issues there has been a shift to the G20. 2010 is now not only an impor-

tant year for reflection on past G8 commitments but also marks, under its Canadian presidency, a moment for clear thinking on roles and responsibilities for both bodies. Ultimately, the G8 was always transient and dependent on national or regional implementation of its decisions. The G8 do not possess a secretariat or any other institutional body to perform administrative functions, let alone implementation, monitoring, or evaluation functions. While the G8 can generate the political will, the actual ground-work has to be done by national bodies such as the various ministries and agencies, and regional bodies, such as the EU and its various units. Because of these limitations, the G8’s approach to peace and security in Africa goes hand in hand with multilateralism. Even the heavyweights amongst the G8 are limited in the amounts of resources they can put towards peacekeeping initiatives and support to APSA. Multilateral integration not only has the potential to better focus resource allocation but is also a necessary pre-condition for coordination and harmonisation of efforts. As the summaries show, G8 engagement on African peace and security becomes thinner and thinner from Gleneagles to L’Aquila. This does not mean that the issue is going out of fashion; rather, the theme and the actual implementation have been handed to a multilateral entity to manage – in this case the EU (see below).

Another issue is that some of the G8 countries do have strategic foreign policy interests in Africa (this is all the more true for many G20 members). These countries are likely to remain outside multilateral efforts but may contribute on an ad hoc basis. The G8’s smaller size and clearer focus can still be helpful in addition to allowing key issues of strategic African relevance to be discussed. The G20 is likely in the near future not to prioritise Africa, a situation that is not helped by the lack of strong African advocacy or a clear pan-African vision. For all its flaws, NEPAD provided a common African platform to which G8 nations could respond through their own African Action Plan drawn up in Kananaskis (Canada) in June 2002.

4. EU Coordination in Support of African Peace and Security

A joint Africa-European Union Strategy was adopted by Heads of State and Government in December 2007 in Lisbon. The partnership on peace and security is one of eight adopted, and aims to ensure adequate, coherent and sustainable support for the establishment and functioning of the APSA. It also aims to promote long-term capacity building (including civilian and military crisis management), and coherent and coordinated support for the ASF. The key pil-
lars of cooperation within this partnership are political dialogue, support of APSA, and provision of predictable funding for peace support operations.

The importance for the EU of its relationship with Africa is underlined by the appointment of an EU ambassador to the AU and the Lisbon summit of 2007 (to be repeated in 2010).10

The EU is the most important partner of the African Union when it comes to peace and security on the African continent. The AU structures mirror those of the EU and full-time representatives have been exchanged. The peace and security chapter of the partnership between EU and AU is being implemented and there is continuous political dialogue between the Political and Security Committee in Brussels and the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. An important element of EU support is also to maintain and strengthen the link to the UN and brief them regularly on the peace and security chapter of the EU-AU partnership strategy. This is essential for easing the transfer of operational command from the AU to the UN or vice versa.

The European Commission (EC) funds the CEWS, as well as capacity building for communications, intelligence gathering and information analysis. The AU Situation Room is an example of this. The EU is also engaged in conflict prevention and supports the Panel of the Wise – part of the African security structure.11

Individual EU member states are also engaged in strengthening the APSA and AU. The Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy has developed software that has been used in intelligence assessments and communications. It forms the basis for many projects, such as a German initiative to map all the early warning systems on the continent. In addition, there is a joint French and British proposal to organise cooperation between EU and AU crisis centres (MIVAC – Common Interactive Watch and Anticipation Mechanism), as well as a Finnish initiative to train African mediators.

In the funding of peacekeeping operations, the EU is already providing funds through the African Peace Facility, and Romano Prodi has produced a report for the UN on how AU-led operations should be financed and supported.12

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It is envisioned that the G8 also improve its coordination with the United Nations, and that the United Nations in turn continue to build partnerships with regional organisations and contributing countries. The framework of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management serves as a useful precedent here. Another structure that originally was a French initiative is the EURO-RECAMP/Amani Africa exercise, which links together various regional training and operation centres. EURO-RECAMP aims to make know-how available to the AU in order to verify the ability to implement peacekeeping operations. A European team including UK, Belgian, Finnish, and Italian citizens headquartered in Paris heads the EURO-RECAMP from the EU side. EU member states, as well as other G8 members, will be asked to contribute to the cost of the exercise.

Indications are that Japan, Russia, Canada and the USA will contribute to the EURO-RECAMP exercise at various stages. NATO is also expected to take part in assessing the ASF after the end of the Amani Africa exercise – at the request of the AU. EURO-RECAMP has a history of G8 and other involvement. Over its 10-year existence this initiative has managed to bring together over forty EU, AU and non-EU partners. EURO-RECAMP is an instrument of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for Africa, and is under the control of the Political and Security Committee, which recently designated France as Framework Nation for implementation of the first cycle. It also comes within the framework of the Africa Clearinghouse (G8++), a general coordinating body for the partners’ activities for Africa, and the G8++ Global Peace Support Operations Capacity Building (CPSOCB) Clearinghouse, in which 40 nations and international organisations have participated.13

Aside from financing and technical support, EU troops will continue to play a role in short-term missions, preparing the ground for UN or AU missions to follow, and in providing technical assistance to African missions. This includes the provision of military hardware by individual EU countries on a bilateral basis to African countries engaged in AU peacekeeping missions.

5. The Drivers behind EU Support for APSA

The member states that are most active in the peace and security partnership are France, the UK and Italy. France and Italy together lead APSA

13 Italian G8 Presidency, Draft G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding, cit.
issues. Apart from EURO-RECAMP, France is in charge of military crisis management in general, while Italy specifically takes the lead for civilian crisis management and the police aspect. The UK heads the financing work in collaboration with the Commission.

A point of departure for the Italian engagement in the Peace Support Implementation Team is ex-Prime Minister Prodi’s emphasis on carrying out initiatives through the EU, an emphasis that is still felt in Italy. Despite its multilateral emphasis, Italy also pursues bilateral efforts in the Horn of Africa, for historical and strategic reasons. There is a specific interest in directing extra security efforts to this African region, while Italy is also chair of “Friends of IGAD”.

The UK is seen by some as more active in New York than in Brussels with regard to peace and security issues. It is often argued that the UK feels a stronger affiliation with the UN than the EU, thus seeing a development of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) rather than the peace and security initiatives of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

Lately, President Sarkozy has attempted to transfer some of France’s foreign policy for Africa into EU channels. The Europeanisation of the RECAMP initiative is one example of this. For France, it is perceived as necessary to have the support of other member states in their undertakings, to obtain more legitimacy and also to reduce costs, which for this ambitious military collaboration initiative have been high.


The EU is the best placed regional body to lead on the international effort to support African efforts in peace and security. The EU possesses the administrative and technical capacity as well as the political clout and reputation necessary for the task. In practice, the EU has already taken the leading role through the Lisbon Treaty, which includes the EU-AU partnership on peace and security and the hosting of the G8++ coordination efforts. The EU has in effect taken over the baton from the G8 to implement and coordinate the G8’s initiatives. Nevertheless, challenges remain and the Canadian G8 presidency in 2010 provides an important opportunity to take stock and consider where support for the African Peace and Security Architecture fits into the emerging new global architecture. One key challenge is the AU’s ability to distribute funds within its own structures. Part of the problem is under- and over-funding of particular pro-
grammes by international partners due to lack of coordination. The EU, if accepted as the main interlocutor and administrative centre for fund disbursement, could make a real difference in ensuring the strategic and prudent use of financial support.

The major challenge for the EU is coordination and harmonisation of engagement with the AU and its structures. This starts with the streamlining and standardisation of accounting and reporting requirements amongst donors, which also assists transparency. This may in part be achieved by enabling civil society organisations to be part of a more coherent, coordinated and effective process.

The EU can play a stronger coordinating role for G8 support of the AU and its peace and security institutions, bodies, and centres. This could help strengthen APSA as well as coordinating other, non-military preventative security policy initiatives such as sustainable development, inclusive governance and poverty reduction throughout Africa.

The aim should be to mainstream African peace and security issues into the day-to-day work of European and member state development agencies. Care should, however, be taken to avoid development becoming militarised or military operations becoming development-orientated. The focus should be on policy coherence and on thinking around where and how the military and developmental dimensions overlap. This should be based on consensus and would for instance include analyses of the causes of conflict and instability, as well as impacts.

Apart from the major task of coordinating and targeting engagements and optimising the use of resources, the biggest challenge in the EU taking the lead is to persuade other countries to buy in to taking part in an EU-led effort – particularly some G8 (and now G20) members but also some EU members. When it comes to the peace and security partnership, there may be a perception that engaging on a bilateral basis is more flexible and efficient. Adapting systems to the EU guidelines and project management system, as well as moving bilateral projects over to the Peace Support Partnership Framework, is perceived to be too complicated and bureaucratic. The same goes for the AU – it may be perceived to be a sluggish, inefficient and difficult recipient. This major problem can only be tackled by convincing members with results. The EU must prove that EU initiatives in peace and security with the AU as a partner can be implemented and monitored in an efficient and coordinated manner.
Introduction

The conference on “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the new Africa-EU Partnership and developing cooperation in de-mining and disarmament”, was organised at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on October 7-9, 2009 with the aim to assess the potential and limits of the partnership between the EU and the AU in their joint efforts to promote peace and security in the African continent.

As underlined by Mr. Franco Frattini, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his keynote address, Africa is an asset to the world, especially in terms of its human resources and partnership in the resolution of world problems, and thus cannot be overlooked. He noted that the importance accorded to Africa as a world partner was evident under the Italian Presidency of the G8: at the G8 Summit in L’Aquila, Africa was represented by South Africa, Egypt, Angola and the Chairman of the AU Commission. Additionally, Minister Frattini stated that there is a global will to help Africa in its development and underlined the support provided by the EU through the African Peace Facility (APF). Looking at the Italian contribution, Minister Frattini pointed out that Italy has played a significant role in the struggle against piracy in the Horn of Africa. The Italian government had also worked with 19 African members of the International Contact Group on Somalia in New York to create the strategic document on developing the economic sector and building administrative and security institutions in
that country. Other Italian contributions to peace in Africa have included the Italian African Peace Facility, peacekeeping capacity-building for police units and training for civilian personnel.

Finally, Minister Frattini called for a global pact for a partnership between equals in order to change the current “donor-recipient” model. A “new pact for Africa” would include the UN and recognise Africa’s right to choose its own destiny, define its future and progressively take ownership of solving African problems. In such a pact, Europe would play a primary role and have a moral responsibility to support African choices. The main areas of this new pact would be the following: security and peacekeeping, regional crises and forgotten conflicts, human rights and democracy, new developmental strategies and the Doha agreement. The Minister concluded by stating that “Africa is not a problem, but part of the solution to the world’s problems”.

Mr. Romano Prodi, Chair of the AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping, reinforced this vision, noting that Africa is at the periphery of the world and should be brought to the centre. The main problem in Africa is the lack of unity in the continent. Economically, Africa lacks a common market and commercial exchanges between African countries within the continent are very limited. Politically, inter-African cooperation is characterised by bilateralism rather than multilateralism. Bilateralism also exists in the way Europe, as well as the G8, cooperates with Africa. In addition to these problems, another major African challenge is war. The wars in Africa have caused insecurity, contributed to under-development, aggravated poverty and worsened the human condition in many parts of the continent. As a result of these armed conflicts, about 70% of the UN’s peacekeeping forces are deployed in Africa. Even if progress has been made by establishing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), this structure is up against challenges due to the lack of funding and inadequate human resource capacity for its peace missions. For instance, the African Union Peace Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and African Union Peace Mission in Sudan (AMIS) have shown the limitations of the AU’s capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations. Mr. Prodi underlined that these challenges should be addressed from different perspectives to enable the AU to attain its objectives. He made the following recommendations: a collective African approach; the creation of an international trust fund with contributions from all countries interested in Africa, including Brazil, China and India; the reinforcement of the AU to enable it to achieve its mission; a common approach from all European countries in dealing with Africa; and an effort by the EU to reinforce the relationship between the AU and the UN in the area of peace and security.
Mr. Manservisi, Director General for Development of the European Commission, recalled the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2007 as the first ever joint action between the EU and the AU blocs. Among the common challenges and interests identified during the summit was the need to work for peace and security in Africa. EU support to African peace and security is funded mainly by the African Peace Facility. In this regard, Mr. Manservisi highlighted further areas of EU involvement: good governance; regional and continental integration; and peace and security architecture. This mainly concerns building the APSA and providing support to African peace operations.

The EU also promotes dialogue at the level of regional organisations and mechanisms and is working on a trilateral AU-EU-RECs/RMs Roadmap. This will promote the implementation of the Peace and Security Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs, as well as EU and pan-African coherence. Moreover, EU support is also addressed to areas such as early warning, the fight against drug trafficking and small arms and light weapons (SALW). The EU has launched a triangular dialogue with the UN and the AU in peacekeeping operations. Mr. Manservisi emphasised that the EU provides human, technical and financial assistance to strengthen African capacity to resolve African problems. He expressed the need for more coordination and less fragmentation in order to enhance efforts for peace and security and achieve better and greater development.

From 1993 to 1998, 26 conflicts took place in Africa, affecting about 60 percent of the continent’s population. In order to respond to these challenges, the AU has developed a series of structures and mechanisms. As noted by Mamadou Kamara Dekamo, Ambassador of the Republic of Congo to Italy, the AU established the Peace and Security Council (PSC), whose role is conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as peacekeeping, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. The PSC has been involved in peace missions such as AMISOM and the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), as well as the condemnation and suspension of Madagascar and Guinea due to anti-constitutional changes.

The PSC has the mandate to intervene in internal affairs of Member States in cases where massive violations of human rights, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are taking place. He highlighted the very important cooperation between the EU and the AU, and the EU’s technical, financial and humanitarian support to the African peace efforts. Ambassador Dekamo noted that the AU has a promising peace architecture, but lacks both funding and human capacity. He concluded that reform
of the UN Security Council is essential for a better functioning APSA, and that the “world without Africa is not the world.”

Ambassador Marika Fahlen, Sweden’s Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, pointed out that the EU-AU partnership includes not only political dialogue, but also development, peace and security, democratic governance, human rights, climate change, migration and employment. Further, the EU is the largest contributor to the AU peace missions, as evidenced by the EU support to AMISOM and AMIS. Ambassador Fahlen observed that the AU has shown courage in its deployment of peace missions. However, the reliance on voluntary contribution for peace operations, as in the case of AMISOM, is unsustainable.

The challenges faced by AU peace operations have less to do with funding and more to do with limited human resources. The poor management of funds is due to the lack of capacities, both qualitative and quantitative, rather than bad will. Thus, she stressed that the success of peace and security efforts requires reinforcing AU capacity in fields such as financial management. She pointed out that EU-AU collaboration calls for a broader-based consultation on conflict prevention, resolution and sustainable development. She also recalled the key areas of EU support to the AU, such as support to the Africa Stand-by Force (ASF), and underlined that, for the Swedish EU presidency, strengthening the AU mediation – dialogue and capability through technical and financial support – is a priority. Referring to the current crisis in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ambassador Fahlen emphasised that peace and security cannot be achieved without the existence of human rights and good governance.

1. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership

The new Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit, which was designed to take the Africa-EU relationship to a new strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels, can be considered the capstone doctrine of EU-Africa relations. Nevertheless, the common values, interests and objectives on which this partnership is based are still a work in progress.

African countries have made considerable efforts in consolidating regional integration and developing common mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. This was exemplified in the establishment of the
APSA, which is composed of the ASF, the Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise, as well as a Peace Fund. As noted earlier, the AU put in place a mechanism to intervene in member states in cases of massive violations of human rights, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Although consensus on this has not yet been achieved, African forces offer numerous advantages in peace operations, such as readiness to intervene, rapid deployment, and cost-effective peace operations. In addition to promoting economic and political integration, some Regional Economic Communities (RECs), such as the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), have established regional security mechanisms which are part and parcel of the African security architecture. Despite this progress, challenges continue to linger.

In Africa, state machinery, the main tool responsible for the peace and security of the people, is weak, not only in collecting tax and ensuring peace and security, but also in social and economic transformation. The lack of political will to mobilise resources for African people is one of the major factors behind poverty. The persistence of poverty on the continent remains the greatest threat to the pan-African project of unity, peace and development. Further challenges can be identified at the level of regional groupings. In West Africa, ECOWAS has not resolved the on-going political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, the instability in Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, or the rising tensions in Niger.

In Northern Africa, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) does not have a common strategy to deal with terrorism. While some Maghreb countries are major players in the continental integration process, others show more interest in the Mediterranean region and partnerships, paying less attention to Sub-Saharan Africa.

In Eastern and Southern Africa, home to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), regional capabilities are hampered by states’ overlapping membership of separate regional groupings. Indeed, some countries are members of three or more such groupings. Of the above-mentioned four groupings, only IGAD and SADC have attempted to put in place reliable security mechanisms. The East African region also has to address the on-going conflict in Somalia and Sudan.

The Central African region, home to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), remains the most turbulent, with variable levels of armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central
African Republic (CAR) and Chad. Additionally, the CEMAC does not have any viable security mechanism. All this illustrates that regional security mechanisms and overall African security infrastructure cannot function effectively in the absence of states capable of ensuring citizens’ security. Further, civil society involvement in the implementation of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and in peace and security has been rather poor. This is due to civil society’s lack of know-how and funding and to the reluctance of some parties to create fully transparent and inclusive policy-making processes. One explanation for their reluctance could be institutional actors’ lack of awareness of the relevance of civil society’s involvement in partnerships. The full operationalisation of APSA, which is at the centre of the new African role on peace and security, faces political, financial and socio-economic difficulties. Additionally, the EU’s approach to Africa is not univocal. The lack of coordination and complementarity in the framework of the EU’s African policy is partly due to diversified national interests. These are evident in the maintenance of privileged trading partnerships, development cooperation, and a military presence in some African countries. The AU and the EU represent two worlds that still need to be reconciled, despite their historical and geographical relations. The inadequacy of AU capabilities and resources in addressing peace and security issues, and the need for material support from the EU, risks compromising the view of the EU and Africa as equal partners. Thus, to ensure a partnership of equals it is necessary to move away from the language of support and create a partnership founded on mutual interests rather than funding alone. Support should therefore be seen as an entry, and not an exit, strategy. In spite of its new prominence on the international stage, Africa’s presence in international fora has remained limited, and for global powers and international donors the elaboration of policies for its development has been simply an appendage. For example, the G8 does not envisage any structured or permanent involvement for Africa. Thus, it should be a priority for the EU to promote Africa’s role in international fora so that the continent can become a credible partner at the international level. However, there are concerns that elevating the relationship to a higher level would strip some African leaders of control over resources. Given that the AU and regional groupings are inter-governmental organisations, the main intervention lies in the hands of the state. The EU welcomes the reinforcement of states’ capacity to achieve their aims. Admittedly, the various challenges in the partnership can be overcome by a mutual understanding of partners’ specificities. In this regard, carrying out a joint conflict
analysis is a necessity. Additional measures include security sector reform (SSR) – army, police and judicial system – and the fight against corruption. Promoting peace and security requires addressing the internal causes of conflicts, such as poor governance and poverty, and the external causes, including geopolitical interests. It would also be beneficial to repatriate funds in Europe from illicit accounts held by African people. To make this possible, African states should improve security and create conditions for investment, while the EU must maintain similar standards in applying the law on repatriation of foreign funds.

Although ostensibly controversial, many argue in favour of “local ownership”. Taken from the perspective of development aid, local ownership is a major principle for sustainable development. However, opponents are of the view that the concept of “ownership” must be replaced by one of “partnership”. This is partly because the concept of “African solutions to African problems” was conceived by developed countries to let Africa deal with its own problems without asking for western countries’ intervention or help. Certainly, adequate capacity-building was not ensured by external partners when Africa was asked to take on more responsibilities in peace and security. In the case of peacekeeping operations, partnership and the creation of conditions for private sector development – rather than local ownership – have the potential to promote true development. Whatever the view, the notion of African ownership should not be construed or used as a cover for inaction in situations where action is required. African problems of peace and security require establishing a global, joint security partnership engaged in joint efforts.

2. EU and AU Missions in the African Continent: Lessons Learned and Future Scenarios

The partnership between the EU and the AU has greatly evolved over the years. The structure of cooperation between the two blocs already exists and must be used and further improved. Collaboration between the two partners is not an option but an imperative based on common interests. Areas of collaboration in peace and security are operational collaboration, institutional capacity support to the AU and direct EU military engagement in Africa. The EU has committed resources to build the capacity of APSA, RECs and ASF. In practice, the EU has launched a number of initiatives to support AU peace operations, particularly AMIS, AMISOM, and the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The EU support for the Darfur peace operation
was a response to its responsibility to protect. This support also highlights the partnership in peace operations between the UN, the AU and the EU. Other EU operations in Africa are the now concluded Artemis operation in Bunia and EUFOR in DRC, EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic, the ongoing EUSSR in Guinea Bissau, and EUNAVFOR Atalanta, to name a few.

The Artemis operation is considered a success because it stopped the massacre in Bunia, prevented armed group leaders from derailing the peace process and allowed the re-deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the region. However, it is argued that Artemis was a missed opportunity for the EU to work with the AU. Arguably, this was due to the nature of the operation. Artemis was a quick and short mission at the request of the UN and the operation was not initiated by the EU, but rather by France, which then received EU support.

For the AU, two major factors influence its deployments of peace operations: moral obligations and international pressure. The experience of AMIB, used as an example of the AU’s prompt action, shows that the AU deployed troops because the UN was not prepared to send peacekeeping troops to the country. The AU cannot object to a request for assistance from a member state in crisis. Thus, this deployment was based not on readiness, but on the principle of moral obligation.

In the case of Sudan and Somalia, while the AU was not ready to intervene, it was subjected to international pressure to do so. The AU mission was stalled by numerous challenges, such as lack of transport, logistics issues, and inadequate human and financial resources. Also, the mission was slowed due to the lack of necessary capacity to manage peace operations, given the inherent bottlenecks in the equipment-acquiring process, recruitment, and even the payment of peacekeepers. One of the lessons worth mentioning is the “Burundi concept” that emerged from AMIB. This simply means that countries contributing troops are responsible for funding the logistical support, while the AU handles peacekeepers’ salaries. With this set-up, two concerns emerge: the AU risks losing operational control and there may be double payments to peacekeepers due to the lack of budget control capacity.

The future of the current AU operations will depend on the consensus achieved by the UN Security Council members, the funders, and troop contributors. On the funding front, some predict a possible decrease in resources because of the financial crisis in the developed world. A specific trust fund is essential to support AU efforts. As for African troop contributors, they face numerous challenges. For example, ASF is unlikely to reach full operability by 2010 and, even if it does, external troop contributions
will be necessary. Additionally, current peacekeeping operation costs cannot be covered by African budgets alone.

At the operational level, African peacekeeping faces several challenges, such as language barriers between Francophone and Anglophone personnel. Troops’ efficiency will thus require efforts to overcome cultural diversity and focus capacity-building in peacekeeping more on policing and civilian component. Finally, the 30 percent quota for women in peace operations has not been reached, mainly because states have difficulties in recruiting the required number of women. This problem, however, is not unique to Africa.

EU-AU cooperation requires enhanced engagement in political dialogue that includes both state and civil society actors. Both the EU and AU should be at the centre of the dialogue and Africa should define its priorities. This primarily requires the good will of governments, as the change of state leadership often means a change in relationships. Such changes make it difficult to formulate the common vision which is imperative to explore common dangers and common interests, and to make efforts more sustainable.

Furthermore, to make efforts more effective, duplications must be avoided through policy coordination and coherence between all actors. Consideration must also be given to reinforcing education and training in Africa. The EU needs to increase AU human resources in civilian crisis management. The EU should also assist the AU when it is not able to change the institutional order and when it is subjected to international pressure. With regard to Somalia, it must be born in mind that the international community has a great responsibility for this country. Capacity on the ground, in addition to the military, is needed to analyse the Somali conflict. Roles and responsibilities should be shared and the conflict should be approached in a joint manner by the AU, EU and UN. Dialogue will enable the partners to answer the outstanding questions about the leadership of peace operations and peacekeeping troops on the ground.

Equally, Sudan should be given more attention with regard to preventing potential future conflicts. Despite indicators of a probable escalation of conflict in the run-up to the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum, nothing is being done to prevent the outbreak of violence.

3. In the Aftermath of the G8: EU Coordination with other International Donors to Support African Efforts in Peace and Security

Two questions are at the heart of the discussion in this section. The first concerns the aftermath of the G8 as it tilts towards G20: what can the role
of the G8 be in this new international political landscape? The second crucial question is whether the African problem will increase in importance. In the framework of the Italian Presidency of the G8, a group of experts headed by Mr. Mario Raffaelli, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Expert for Peace Initiatives in the Horn of Africa, drafted a report on strengthening Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping and supporting peace operations. Since the G8 Summits at Kananaskis (Canada) and Sea Island (United States), G8 leaders have been rethinking and repeating the same commitments. The real achievements were the creation of specific and concrete targets: the creation of 75,000 peacekeeping troops, training of trainers for police units and Carabinieri/Gendarmerie-like personnel, support for the improvement of training centres in Africa. However, this success is hindered by the fact that the G8 does not possess a Secretariat or any other institutional body to perform administrative functions, let alone implementation, monitoring, or evaluation functions.

The G8 has provided support to the APSA: France, Italy and the United Kingdom have trained peacekeeping troops. At the 2009 G8 Summit in L’Aquila (Italy), leaders stressed the importance of APSA and the elimination of SALW. Participants agreed to continue with collaborative efforts to effectively fight all forms of organised crime, such as piracy off the coast of Eastern Africa, drug trafficking in Western Africa and terrorism. Currently, G8 countries coordinate efforts via the Africa Clearinghouse and work closely with the AU, UN, EU and other international donors to help develop the APSA and operationalise the ASF, the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System.

In Pittsburgh in September 2009, leaders of the Group of 20 reached an agreement to make the G20 the main international forum for crafting international economic policy. In June 2010 in Canada the G20 will assume the role long played by the G8. However, the G8 will not become irrelevant. At the London G20 Summit in April 2009, the G20 called on the G8 to honour the commitments it had made in London concerning Africa, specifically its commitments to agriculture and to financing the Multilateral Development Banks, including the African Development Bank, and alleviating poverty.

In the G20, South Africa is the only member from Africa. The AU remains an invitee only, at the discretion of the G20 Presidency, and thus does not enjoy the privileges of the EU in this international forum. The immediate concern over the G20 is that low income countries, including the African ones, will remain marginalised. There is no guarantee that Africa will have more of a voice or that its problems will receive greater attention than before.
Other challenges include the lack of strong African advocacy. African leaders have missed out on opportunities to lobby for the continent on international platforms such as the 2009 UN General Assembly in New York. Lobbying has, in some cases, been conducted through bilateral cooperation by African countries with their international partners rather than used to serve continental interests. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which triggered the G8 process and the Africa Partnership Forum, is in crisis, as indeed is the G8 response to NEPAD. Among other reasons, the NEPAD was based on the leadership of African heads of state, some of whom are no longer in power.

Despite the current position of the NEPAD, however, the G8 still offers a platform for African problems to be addressed, since some countries of the G8, namely Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the US, have interests in Africa. It is thus important to explore how the G8 under the leadership of Canada, which will also co-host the G20 together with South Korea, will continue the work initiated by the Italian G8 Presidency on the issues of peace and security in Africa. It is also of paramount importance to consider the role of emerging countries like China, India and Mexico in this process. The multiplicity of actors, the magnitude of resources needed and the enormity of the challenges to be tackled make it necessary to enhance coordination. Enhanced coordination would facilitate coherence of policies, convergence of interests and effective allocation of donors’ support. Furthermore, it would avoid wasteful duplication of efforts and resources and ensure coordination in the operationalisation of the APSA. Under this multilateral approach, a single entry point is necessary. The EU is well positioned to play this role. A more prominent EU coordination role in international support to peace and security efforts in Africa would, however, depend largely on the emergence of more coherent EU and AU common foreign and security policies, respectively.

Notwithstanding the African position, for peace operations to be effective it is important to set clear priorities. Firstly, quality versus quantity of peace operations must be emphasised. Quality can be improved by conducting analysis on the ground before deciding to deploy peacekeeping forces. Subsequently, the quality should be reflected in the mandate stemming from the analysis and should be consistent with the reality on the ground. The mandate must have two major components: SSR and good governance. It is equally important to strengthen African capacity, at both the regional and continental levels. Secondly, coordination must be improved to resolve the issue of shared responsibility – who is doing what – without which,
quality in peace operations cannot be achieved. This coherence is required from both the European and the African sides. In addition, a number of other necessary measures include: enhancing the quality of dialogue to ensure adequate consultation; shifting the focus from response to prevention so as to build long-term conflict prevention measures; overcoming fragmentation of aid and achieving policy coherence between the EU, AU, G8 and UN and other countries with an interest in Africa; and promoting African decision-making autonomy and ownership, which is indispensable to sustain the APSA. To reap the benefits, African states will have to embrace democratic governance and diminished sovereignty, muster the necessary political will and resolve to establish reciprocal trust and confidence, invest in collective security, promote pan-African solidarity and involve civil society.


An Expert Seminar within the conference looked at de-mining and disarmament issues. The following points summarise the main topics presented and discussed.

4.1 International Frameworks and State Cooperation: AU and EU Policies in the Areas of SALW, ERW and APL. State of Play

Europe and Africa have a long history of cooperation on disarmament and de-mining even before the EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000, which set in motion a structured political dialogue between the two partners. Reference can indeed be made to bilateral cooperation between European and African states before 2000. From the outset, the EU and the AU have been working on issues related to SALW, and instruments and good practices are already in place. A number of strategies to deal with disarmament at the continental level are connected to regional and national mechanisms. The African peace and security architecture does not only have tools, it also has policies. There are policies on post-conflict reconstruction and development, SSR, disarmament and non-proliferation of arms, border control, and organised crime. The question of SALW continues to be a major challenge to peace and security in Africa. The main challenge derives from the easy availability and accessibility of SALW, especially to non-state actors who use them to attack
government forces, civilians and even peace missions, as was the case with AMIS, AMISOM and the United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC). Although arms are not produced in Africa, except in a few rare cases, weapons continue to circulate from one country to another in the continent. For example, there are claims that some weapons found in Somalia come from Eritrea. These claims should be assessed. Weapons, for the most part, are acquired legally by states, but are poorly managed and frequently end up in the hands of non-state actors. Research reveals that there are more arms in the hands of civilians and non-state actors than in the hands of government forces.

To deal with the threat they pose, the AU has put in place a continental Steering Committee on SALW and is developing a continental strategy to coordinate activities in this area. Both the UN and civil society organisations (CSOs) are involved in this Committee. With regard to de-mining, in 2004 an African Common Position on De-mining was adopted. However, more still needs to be done. The work has been limited by the lack of communication between member states and of coordination of their efforts. It is expected that once in place, the continental strategy will address these problems.

One example of RECs addressing the problem of SALW comes from ECOWAS, a community that enjoys a unique relationship with the EU. The ECOWAS and the EU have worked together in the conception of regional instruments, particularly the Treaty on the Circulation of SALW. The EU provided support, from the elaboration to the adoption of the regional policy on SALW. It also supported the exchange of information which allowed ECOWAS to produce a moratorium on SALW in the region. The moratorium, which prohibits the import and export of SALW except in cases of legitimate security needs, was adopted by member states in 1998 and subsequently extended for a further three years. Most importantly, the mechanism allows for control of SALW in the West African region, whose experience also reinforces the importance of civil society. The relationship between ECOWAS and CSOs has been institutionalised and CSOs have played a very important role in the control of SALW in the region.

To strengthen the control of SALW, both the supply and the demand of these weapons need to be addressed. On the supply side, attention must focus not only on guns, but also on ammunition, mostly imported from Western countries and also illegally produced in Africa. To do this, research must be conducted on the illegal production of weapons on the continent. Interestingly, the EU has been open to dealing with both the supply and the demand side of weapons produced in Europe. All EU member states have
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committed themselves to transparency and to the legal trade of weapons. But it is also necessary to keep track of where the legal trade of weapons becomes illegal. Once again, financial control is important in addressing the issue of SALW. In this regard, the Africa-EU partnership can be instrumental in influencing how companies behave.

On the demand side, factors contributing to the demand for weapons must be addressed, as well as the view of guns as a source of necessary protection. Governments must provide adequate security for their people to prevent the need for them to acquire guns for self-protection. Fighting corruption and promoting good governance, political reconstruction, and law and order are some of the ways to address the root causes of the demand of SALW. Equally important is to carry out effective SSR, as well as marking arms and improving stockpile management. Sharing of information and a coordinated policy on the management of SALW will be necessary to manage countries’ stockpiles.

Regional disarmament processes require a common agenda that allows a coordinated approach at the continental level. An African policy will be essential to enable AU member states to harmonise their responses on issues of SALW proliferation. Attention must also be given to de-mining, which is often overshadowed by the focus on arms. A Sanction Committee developed on a UN model, to be established by the AU to monitor weapons, impose sanctions, and examine money trails, will be an important tool in dealing with this problem.

4.2 Joint Initiatives and Implementation

Examples of joint initiatives and implementations came from the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), COMESA, the UN Regional Centre for Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), and the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA).

IANSA’s aims are cross-cutting with the issues of peace, security and good governance and it works to bring government and civil society together. Through its joint initiatives, IANSA has contributed to the ratification of the UN firearms protocol and to strengthening national gun law, as it did in Zambia. It has also conducted a mobilisation campaign in Mozambique, where citizens took the initiative to hand in illegal weapons. IANSA’s work also includes reducing domestic violence.

COMESA’s efforts are directed at harmonizing the policies and programmes of three regional groupings, namely EAC, COMESA and SADC. A joint conflict-management strategy was developed in which the fight against war
economies is led by COMESA, SALW is managed by EAC and IGAD is responsible for conflict prevention. Additionally, there is an Accreditation Process which aims at formalising COMESA’s engagement with civil society. UNREC collaborates with the AU to coordinate the implementation of activities aimed at peace, arms control and disarmament. Although currently most of its work takes place in West Africa, UNREC has focal points in each sub-region in Africa and intends to extend its activities into other regions as well. UNREC works mainly to regulate small arms brokering in East Africa. However, its activities also include: the development of legal instruments for the control of SALW in Central Africa; African security sector reform programmes; the harmonisation of reforms on small arms in West Africa; and the establishment of a database of suppliers of SALW in Southern Africa. Outcomes of its activities include the drafting of guidelines on stockpile management and weapons marking, workshops on technical aspects of marking and the development of international mining standards. The Nairobi-based RECSA has 13 member states. It has conducted training initiatives in the EAC partner states and marking is currently taking place in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. RECSA is also destroying some stockpiles, with the DRC leading in the destruction of SALW.

From the above-mentioned experiences, a number of challenges have been identified: the slow implementation of SSR, partly as a result of governments’ lack of capacity in this area; national and regional conflicts and mistrust among governments in the different regions; corruption; and a lack of transparency and cooperation from manufacturers and traders. In addition, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) activities are not designed in accordance with needs on the ground, particularly those of local communities. Moreover, efforts are hampered by the lack of coherence since priorities set up at the pan-African level are not the same as at regional levels. As a way forward, DDR design must become more flexible and take into account the needs of local communities, and it must also have a long-term plan. In promoting joint initiatives, it is important to build the capacity of civil society. Civil society should participate in briefing the PSC, as well as in the AU Small Arms Strategy. Ownership, meaning that Africa must define its own priorities and requirements, is critical. However, this must be done along with a coherence of engagement. Further, it is essential for SSR processes to be accompanied by good governance and accountability. Combating the illicit trade in weapons must be tackled at a deeper level, cover various areas including management of stockpiles and arms marking, and take into account the ever-changing variables in its analysis.
4.3 The Contribution of Disarmament and Arms Control to Building Peace and Security

The great availability of SALW is one of the biggest global threats to the security of our societies. Today, it is estimated that there are approximately nine hundred million arms and weapons worldwide. This is equal to one weapon for every 8 persons in the world, a staggering figure. Trafficking of SALW is an element of destabilisation. It fuels organised crime, interferes with economic, education and peacebuilding efforts, and contributes to many violations of human rights. Most importantly, the highest cost paid for the inability to eliminate the illicit trade of arms and ammunition, as well as its uncontrolled distribution, is the human lives that are lost in the process.

The five key challenges for international peace and security are: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organised crime. The illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of SALW, as well as their excessive accumulation, are central to these challenges. That is why in 2005 the EU adopted an Export Control Policy applicable at both the exporter and end-user level to combat the illegal and excessive accumulation of arms. This strategy is guided by three principles: 1) prevention: it is more beneficial to take action before the problem becomes acute, to deal with stockpiles, destroy surpluses and conduct training; 2) cooperation with local authorities; and 3) multilateralism: it is important to have a broader consensus on objectives and policies.

The Programme of Action to Prevent and Combat the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons is the only universal instrument of its kind. Therefore, it is an indispensable tool and a reference point for any conflict scenario and even for peaceful ones. Once it enters into force, another useful tool will be the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). States are therefore encouraged to support and commit themselves to the ATT. This pending treaty is based on the principle of shared responsibility between producers, exporters, importers and users. Despite its failure to spell out the “import, export and transfer of arms”, which would have made it a much stronger treaty, the ATT will establish mechanisms to prevent irresponsible arms transfers and their diversion to the illicit market. This instrument can be used in the partnership between the AU and the EU in controlling the illegal trade of SALW. In addition, it is critical to add the ammunition component to provisions on illicit trafficking of SALW, to have specific criteria on the control of national and private exchanges in documents pertaining to transfers of armaments, and to regulate responsible possession of arms by civilians.
Carriers’ safety regulations and transport standards also contribute to peace and security. Experience shows a correlation between arms trafficking and carriers’ compliance with safety standards. Blacklisting carriers which do not conform to such standards protects passengers and helps to limit the transport of illegal arms. Of the 172 air cargo companies named in the EU Air Safety Ban blacklist, 80 are mentioned in the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee report. The deregulation and privatisation of security have contributed to some failures in controlling and stopping the transport of illegal arms by certain private companies. Thus, targeting non-state actors for the illicit transportation of illegal arms is fundamental, as it improves air safety and possibly even saves lives. Another method of controlling the transport of illicit weapons is building infrastructure. A system of surveillance and monitoring not only improves security, but also facilitates regional cooperation, development, trade and investment.

Peace cannot be achieved without addressing the underlying causes of conflict. Experience from EU projects in Albania, Cambodia, Latin America, and the Caribbean show that removing weapons from civilians’ hands, training police to manage arms stocks, and assisting government in policy formulation to control the flow of weapons, contributes to the seizure of illegal arms and decreases crime rates and the number of bullet-wound cases reported by hospitals.

For example, the projects implemented by member states of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the disarmament of rebels and civilians have reduced the incidence of criminal activities, dismantled networks for the illegal exploitation of natural resources and enhanced cross-border security. But sexual and gender-based violence has continued and citizens still resort to arms for protection. The question remains of what type of peace can be created if communities cannot meet basic human needs. Achieving an arms-free society, and subsequently peace, requires an effort to improve people’s livelihoods and ensure human security.

General Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The final remarks recalled the roles played by the EU, G8 and Italy in supporting African efforts for peace and security. The AU’s efforts to address conflicts in the African continent and reduce other forms of instability, such as undemocratic changes of government, were acknowledged. However, numer-
ous challenges were highlighted, such as the lack of funding, qualitative and quantitative human resources, the continent’s lack of unity, and the existence of bilateral cooperation within Africa and between Africa and Europe.

The summary consisted of a number of points and ways forward. First, experts agreed to move away from the concept of the EU’s donor relationship with Africa to the concept of a real Africa-EU partnership. Second, they expressed a need for a coherent approach to be achieved through a triangular relationship between the AU, EU and the RECs, a deepened dialogue between the AU and the UN, and the active engagement of emerging countries such as Brazil, China and India.

It was noted that in the Africa-EU partnership, African problems should not simply be left to Africa. The EU should continue its capacity-building initiatives and strengthen human relations, among other things. Italy should make sure that Africa remains important within the G8 when Canada takes over the presidency. Moreover, multilateral approaches should be promoted, not simply because they are politically correct, but because they are effective in dealing with peace and security challenges. In this regard, the unity of Africa is essential. This is best achieved through political and economic integration.

Additionally, experts pointed to the need to harmonise the various RECs and to optimise relationships between the RECs and the EU. They stressed the importance of the participation of civil society in the Africa-EU partnership. Thus, it is necessary to define the role of civil society and build its capacity in peace and security. It was admitted that Africa remains marginal in international affairs. Therefore, raising the continent’s representation in international institutions and decision-making positions is essential.

An integrated approach is required for SALW, taking into account the demining aspect. Such an approach should be linked to the development of the APSA and the ASF. It should also include capacity-building, for example in stockpile management and DDR, and should be linked to other areas of EU-AU work, such as SSR, border programmes and civilian aviation. Moreover, capacity building is required in the areas of transport, infrastructure and energy. Parallel to this, it is critical to address the broader need to promote good governance and strengthen African states’ capability in the areas of peace and security.

In order to strengthen the efforts to promote peace and security in the African continent, a number of policy recommendations were proposed based on the issues highlighted in the above sections.
– Efforts that deal with peace and security in Africa should focus more on building mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts and strengthening early warning systems.

– In view of the increasing demands for peace operations in Africa, efforts should be devoted to trying to operationalise the Africa Stand-by Force (ASF) as planned.

– Efforts to promote local ownership in Africa should be aimed at building civilian capacity for peacekeeping; promoting civil-military cooperation in peace operations; building capacity in financial management of the APSA; and promoting gender equality in peace operations. Meanwhile, continued efforts to build capacity for the military and police should be maintained.

– States have the primary responsibility for the peace, security and development of their citizens. Therefore, steps should be taken to promote good governance and security sector reforms in post-conflict states in Africa.

– In the run-up to elections in Sudan, Burundi and the DRC, steps should be taken to prevent probable recurrences of conflict by ensuring that elections are indeed held and are free and fair.

– In view of the need for coherence and coordination, a forum should be organised to build a global partnership for peace and security in Africa and establish close coordination between the EU, AU and UN, and G8 and G20 support to APSA. Other countries, such as Brazil, China, India and Mexico should be invited to be part of the new partnership. The international forum should aim at creating a “Global Fund for Peace and Security in Africa” and achieving coordination to support the APSA.

– The EU should conduct an assessment of bilateral relations in the collaboration between Europe and Africa and efforts should be made to promote close coordination in providing support to Africa.

– In view of the need for coherence, a forum should be organised to create and define a triangular relationship between the AU-RECs, EU-RECs and EU-AU.

– Civil society is an important player in the African continent. Its role in the African Peace and Security Architecture should be clearly defined and efforts to build its capacity (including in SALW and conflict prevention) should be maintained and enhanced.

– More efforts should be devoted to increasing Africa’s representation in international institutions and decision-making positions.

– SALW are acknowledged to be major challenges to peace and security in the African continent. The AU should consider including weapon col-
lection (including illegal weapons from civilians) and destruction as part of the peace operation mandate as well as in peace agreements.

– A conference should be organised in Africa to build a coherent approach at the continental level to deal with SALW. The conference should address the implementation of the 2000 Bamako Declaration on SALW.

– The EU-AU should commission research on the illegal production of guns in Africa and its role in arms trafficking and conflicts in the continent.

– Efforts should be made to establish closer coordination of arms marking and stockpile management at the regional level, and regional disarmament programmes should be set up.

– States in Africa and Europe should be encouraged to support the proposed UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a legally binding instrument to regulate the global trade of conventional arms.
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### PROGRAMME OF THE CONFERENCE

**WEDNESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 2009**

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<td>14.45 – 15.45</td>
<td>Registration</td>
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</table>
| 15.45 – 17.00 | AU-EU relations, political dialogue and inter-institutional cooperation  
  *Chair:* Gianni Bonvicini, Executive Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome  
  *Speakers:* Franco Frattini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rome  
  Romano Prodi, Chair, AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping  
  Stefano Manservisi, Director General, DG Development, European Commission, Brussels  
  Mamadou Kamara Dekamo, Ambassador of the Republic of Congo to Italy, Rome  
  Marika Fahlen, Sweden’s Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm |
| 17.00 – 17.30 | Coffee break                                                         |
| 17.30 – 19.00 | SESSION I: Ensuring peace and security in Africa: implementing the new Africa-EU partnership  
  *Chair:* Pierre Michel Joana, Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities, Council of the European Union, Brussels  
  *Speakers:* Nicoletta Pirozzi, Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome  
  Georges Nzongola, Centre de Recherche et Formation sur l’État en Afrique (CREA), Abidjan, and Institut Africain de la Gouvernance (IAG), Dakar  
  *Discussant:* Aldo Ajello, former EU Special Representative for Great Lakes Region, Rome |
| 20.30         | Dinner                                                               |
### Thursday, 8 October 2009

<table>
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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<td>9.30 – 11.00</td>
<td><strong>Session II: EU and AU missions in the African continent: lessons learned and future scenarios</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maurizio Moreno</strong>, President, International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), Sanremo</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Damien Helly</strong>, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), Paris</td>
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<td><strong>Ferdinand Kwaku Danso</strong>, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Discussant:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jaotody Jean de Matha</strong>, Head of the Operations and Support Unit, Peace Support Operations Division of the AU, Addis Ababa</td>
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<td>11.00 – 11.30</td>
<td><strong>Coffee Break</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11.30 – 13.00</td>
<td><strong>Session III: In the aftermath of the G8: EU coordination with other international donors to support African efforts in peace and security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chair:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mario Raffaelli</strong>, Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Expert for Peace Initiatives in the Horn of Africa, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speakers:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Alex Vines</strong>, Research Director, Regional and Security Studies; and Head, Africa Programme, Chatham House, London</td>
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<td><strong>Andebrhan W. Giorgis</strong>, Consultant, Revival Africa Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discussant:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gerrard Quille</strong>, DG for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, European Parliament, Brussels</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.00 – 14.30</td>
<td><strong>Buffet Lunch</strong></td>
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EXPERT SEMINAR:

A SPECIAL FIELD OF COOPERATION:
AU-EU SECURITY DIALOGUE ON A COMMON AGENDA
FOR DE-MINING AND DISARMAMENT

14.30 – 17.00 ROUND TABLE 1:
International frameworks and state of co-operation: AU and EU policies in the areas of SALW, ERW, APL State of play

Co-Chairs: Fiona Lortan, AU Commission, Addis Ababa
           Daniela Dicorrado, DG DEV, European Commission, Brussels

Speakers: Peter O. Otim, AU Commission, Addis Ababa
           Member of AU PSC
           Cyriaque Agnekethom, Representative of ECOWAS, Abuja

17.00 – 17.30 Coffee break

17.30 – 18.30 Panel-Audience Discussion

20.00 Dinner

FRIDAY, 9 OCTOBER 2009

09.00 – 11.00 ROUND TABLE 2:
Joint initiatives. Implementation.

Chair: Damien Helly, Research Fellow, EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), Paris

Speakers: Joseph Dube, Africa Coordinator, IANSA, Johannesburg
          Elizabeth Mutunga, Representative of COMESA, Lusaka
          Jacqueline Seck, Representative of UNREC, Lome
Programme of the Conference

Daniela Dicorrado, DG DEV, European Commission, Brussels
Francis Wairagu, Representative of RECSA, Nairobi

11.00 – 11.30 Coffee break
11.30 – 12.30 Panel-Audience Discussion
12.30 – 14.00 Buffet lunch
14.00 – 16.00 Round Table 3:
The contribution of disarmament and arms control to building Peace and Security

Chair: Francis Wairagu, Representative of RECSA, Nairobi

Speakers:
Marlen Gomez-Villasenor, Director for Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Mexico City
Federico Grandini, SESAR Joint Undertaking, Brussels
Singo Stephen Mwachofi, Representative of ICGLR, Bujumbura
Hugh Griffiths, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Annalisa Giannella, HR Solana’s Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation, EU Council, Brussels

16.00 – 16.30 Panel-Audience Discussion
16.30 – 17.00 Conclusions and Wrap up
Gianni Bonvicini, Executive Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
Daniela Dicorrado, DG DEV, European Commission, Brussels
Fiona Lortan, AU Commission, Addis Ababa
Giuseppe Morabito, Director General, DGAS, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
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