Gulf and EU Migration Policies after the Arab Uprisings: Arab and Turkish Youth as a Security Issue

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Abstract
The paper seeks to explore the reasons behind the persistent exclusion of young migrants from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries in their two main areas of destination, the Gulf States and the EU. It focuses on youth from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey, during the key period of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath. The paper covers the period until June 2015. Its aim is two-fold: first, to describe the characteristics and institutional background of the migration policies applied to youth from the six countries, in their two main areas of destination; second, to understand the political motives underlying recent changes to these policies, following the uprisings. In a perspective of political demography informed by Foucault’s theories, migration policies are envisaged as technocratic discursive practices.

Keywords: Gulf countries | European Union | Migration | Youth | Arab Spring | Morocco | Tunisia | Egypt | Palestine | Lebanon | Turkey

INTRODUCTION
The year 2014 was a murderous one for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe: 3,500 migrants, among them many originating from Arab countries, lost their lives. From January to early December 2014, the UNHCR estimated that more than 207,000 people had crossed the Mediterranean, almost three times the previous known high of about 70,000 in 2011.² Political instability at the south and southeast borders of Europe (in Libya, Syria, in Iraq or in Palestine) has been a spur for such massive displacements of refugees from the war-torn countries. However, these dangerous migration routes are also used by “mixed migration” flows: economic migrants comprise a greater share of migrants from Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt (Fargues and Bonfanti 2014). These events illustrate two sets of issues characterizing migration from the South and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The first is the growing scale of the migration pressure from these countries and the level of risk taken by migrants, demonstrating the high stakes involved. The second is the increasing closure of international borders and selectivity driving the migration process. Migrants are typically young adults.³ Discussing migration issues, therefore, equals discussing youth issues,

¹ Françoise De Bel-Air is Part-Time Professor at the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) of the European University Institute (EUI), Florence. The author is very thankful to the participants to the Power2Youth WP2 Conference (Paris, 25 November 2015), to the reviewers of this paper and especially to Iván Martín, for their most valuable remarks and suggestions on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Migration Policy Center.
² UNHCR, UNHCR urges focus on saving lives as 2014 boat people numbers near 350,000, 10 December 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/5486e6b56.html.
³ Most migratory movements take place amongst 20-30 year-olds. In Egypt in the mid-2000s, the average age of the non-migrant Egyptians was 35 years while that of the migrant Egyptians was just under 30 years (Nassar 2005:35).
including patterns of youth inclusion and exclusion.

The paper seeks to explore the reasons behind the persistent exclusion of young migrants from South and East Mediterranean countries in their two main areas of destination, the Gulf States and the EU. It focuses on youth from Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey, during the key period of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath. Its aim is two-fold: first, to describe the characteristics and institutional background of the migration policies applied to youth from the six countries, in the Gulf States and in the EU; second, to understand the political motives underlying recent changes to these policies, following the uprisings. In a perspective of political demography informed by Foucault’s theories, migration policies are envisaged as technocratic discursive practices. By shaping the perception of the phenomenon of migration from the SEM countries, its causes and consequences, migration policies construct the “real” issues to be addressed. This “knowledge” supports a “rationality” of a political nature, which justifies the exercise of power (Kalm 2010). The paper then explores the role of migration policies in the “governmentality” process, or the way migration “management” – and the set of normative assumptions and guidelines for acting upon human mobility it conveys – finally constitute a global process of “population control at the world level” (Geiger and Pécoud 2010:16-17).

The paper first describes the recent dynamics and distribution of young migrants from SEM countries by area of destination, as well as the structural drivers of youth emigration pressure, before and after the uprisings. In the second section, the paper attempts a deconstruction of the managerial policy discourse applied to youth migration in the two areas of destination. The third section confronts the discourses with data and explores the aims underlying policy action.

Restructured around the three poles of security, economy and rights, the migration management discourse appears to mostly serve security aims in the two receiving regions. However, data analysis suggests that the trend towards “securitization” of migration (limiting the numbers), which actually predates the uprisings, coexists with a concern for “economization” of migration (keeping steady inflows of work force). The tension between the two apparently opposite trends is overcome by the growing temporariness of migration and by the selective “subordinate inclusion” of some irregular labourers, hence at the expense of migrants’ rights.

The definition of a migrant used here is that of a person born out of the migration country, as a non-citizen of that country. The migrant may be naturalized in the current host country or elsewhere. Unless stated otherwise, “young” age groups are the 15-34 year-olds.
1. THE CONTEXT OF YOUTH MIGRATION POLICIES, BEFORE AND AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

1.1 Trends of Migration To and From the SEM Countries Until the Late 2000s

At the world level, the proportion of migrants (i.e., persons who reside in a country other than that where they were born, or first-generation emigrants) is low, at just 3.3 percent in the early 2010s. Arab countries (the 22 Arab League member states) at the same period displayed a stock of approximately 22 million migrants, or about 6.1 percent of the total population living in the Arab region (De Bel-Air, forthcoming). Among these, the five Arab countries tackled in the paper, in addition to Turkey, all showed above-world-average proportions of emigrants as of 2011 (Figure 1).

Figure 1 | Distribution of countries by percentage of immigrants and emigrants (2010-2014)

![Figure 1](image)

Table 1 | Number of first-generation emigrants by major destination area and their share in the total resident population of origin countries (c. 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of emigration</th>
<th>Arab countries</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total emigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total emigrants</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total emigrants</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>195,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>209,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>214,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,030,000</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>154,900</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>539,000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>162,600</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,333,000</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>141,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Receiving countries’ statistics. These do not usually include foreign residents in irregular situation.

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4 Sources: unless stated otherwise, estimates are retrieved from receiving countries’ statistics. Europe, North America, Oceania: receiving countries’ statistics (population censuses, population registers, registers of foreigners, etc.) as compiled in OECD-DIOC (2010 revision) and MPC’s migration profiles (http://www.migrationpolicycentre).
Lebanon and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, especially, appeared as major migrant-sending entities with respectively 15.3 and 13 percent of nationals expatriated abroad (Fig. 1 and Table 1).

Around the year 2011, the distribution of migrants displayed a relatively clear pattern. Palestinians and Egyptians favoured other Arab countries and especially the Gulf States, the major pole of attraction in the region. Saudi Arabia boasted most of them, about half a million Palestinians and an estimated 1.5 to 2 million Egyptian workers and family dependents. Until 2011 and the outbreak of the war that followed the ousting of Muammar Gadhafi, Egyptians were also massively present in Libya (an estimated 2 million). By contrast, Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks were mainly geared towards Europe. Lebanese stand out for their worldwide emigration: 38 percent migrated to the Gulf States, 26 percent to North America and 24 percent to Europe (Fig. 2 and Table 1). Lebanese communities are also established in Australia (Tabar et al 2010) and in West Africa.

**Figure 2** | Percentage of emigrants by main area of destination (2010-2014)

For the sake of improved clarity, this paper will therefore examine SEM nationals in the region receiving the bulk of their immigration: Egyptians, Palestinians and Lebanese in the Gulf States; Moroccans, Tunisians and Turks in Europe.

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5 The figure for Palestinians given here signifies those who are holders of travel documents. Figures of migrants may be overestimated due to the total including a large share of foreign nationals settled in Gulf countries for decades, among whom some are non-migrants (i.e., Gulf-born second- and third-generation foreign nationals). In the Gulf States, naturalization of foreign nationals is extremely rare.
In general, emigration flows from the whole of the Arab region have been sustained and the stocks of migrants from these countries have increased over decades. Lebanese, and later Palestinian, massive overseas emigration dates back to the nineteenth century. Oil exploitation in the Gulf was attracting skilled workers from Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon as early as the 1950s, and the flow increased with the 1973 oil boom. Since 2003, a new hike in oil prices has stimulated economic growth and infrastructure development projects in the Gulf region, where young Arab and Middle Eastern migrants have found new employment opportunities alongside Asian and other nationalities.6

Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish migration towards Europe shows a similar upward trend. Since the post-WWII period that spurred labour needs for reconstruction and industrialization in Europe, migration flows from North Africa and from Turkey have increased steadily, with family reunion progressively taking over workers’ migration inflows to Europe since the mid-1970s. Between 2000 and 2011, the total stocks of first-generation emigrants from these countries went up, though at different rates (Fig. 3). The Turkish first migrants nearly trebled over the decade, from 770,000 in 2000 to 2.3 million in 2011. Moroccan emigrants doubled in number, while the figures emigrants from Tunisia only increased by 30 percent between the two dates. As regards young migrants (aged 15 to 34), their absolute numbers also increased. As of 2011, young age groups made up one-third of first-generation Moroccans in Europe, and 21 and 17 percent of Tunisian and Turkish migrants respectively.7 Similar data are unavailable for the Egyptian, Palestinian and Lebanese expatriates in Gulf countries.

**Figure 3** | Stocks of migrants (young and total) from Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey in Europe (2000; 2011)

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6 Most data published by Gulf countries on migration trends are aggregated by nationality (nationals/non-nationals). This is the case in Saudi Arabia, host to the largest community of Arab workers. It is therefore impossible to document trends and dynamics specific to Egyptian, Palestinian, and Lebanese migrants in the Gulf States, where they are most numerous.

7 Eurostat and OECD-DIOC data on migrant stocks in the EU.
Though in much smaller numbers than emigrants, SEM countries also host some immigrants. As geographical crossroads and maritime outlets, the six countries increasingly became transit zones during the 2000s, hence adding to the migration pressure from the South of the EU. Throughout history, SEM countries have never been closed to inflows of population from their immediate vicinity and further afield, let alone during the Ottoman and colonial periods. Some of these countries have become primary destinations for migrants. Lebanon for instance has been attracting regional and Asian work force in the sectors of construction and services since the 1970s. Turkey, likewise, experienced an economic boom over the 2000s that made the country attractive to workers from everywhere, including the ailing ex-Soviet economies. Economic growth also sustained earlier flows of refugees and asylum seekers from several countries including Iraq and Iran (İçduygu and Yükseker 2012). In effect, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt as well as Turkey are signatories of 1951 Refugee Convention.8

However, in the wake of EU expansion, SEM countries' proximity to Europe channelled growing numbers of so-called “transit” migrants to their borders, i.e., migrants fleeing political and economic crises in their origin country, initially bound for Europe but stranded at its borders for lack of entry visa. Increasing numbers of nationals from Sub-Saharan African states, especially from those having passed visa-free agreements with Maghreb countries (Guinea, Senegal, Mali for instance), headed to North Africa on their way to the EU. Estimates of such migrants in Tunisia rarely exceed 10,000 (Natter 2015). In Morocco, figures quoted range between 30,000 and 50,000.9 Before 2011 and the onset of the Arab uprisings, Egypt and Lebanon both hosted Iraqi refugees (respectively, about 17,000 and 50,000 [Fargues et al 2008, Jouini 2009], of which only a small share was effectively registered with UNHCR), and often undocumented migrants and refugees from Sudan10 and the Horn of Africa. A sizeable workforce from Syria, many of them employed without a work permit, also resided in Lebanon. In Turkey, figures of apprehended irregular migrants (66,000 in 2008) suggest that many more resided in the country, the top-five origin countries being Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Bangladesh (İçduygu and Yükseker 2012:444). However, transit migration through the six countries never measured up to the vast numbers of nationals from these countries in the EU and in the Gulf States, as pointed out earlier.

1.2 Youth Emigration Pressure from the South and East Mediterranean Region: Some Structural Explanations

Seen from the origin countries, several youth surveys show that the emigration pressure from SEM countries has remained strong over the years: in Tunisia, the share of the 15-29s willing to emigrate jumped from 22 percent in 1995 to 76 percent in 2005 (Fourati 2008). In Lebanon, a third of young graduates also were willing to leave their country in 2008 (Kasparian 2009). In Morocco, 42 percent of the population between 18 and 50 expressed

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8 Yet, Turkey holds a clause of geographical limitation: it only considers as refugees those coming from Europe. In practice, Turkey also granted asylum to some non-European refugees, such as Iraqi Kurds during the 1990s, but the non-abrogation of the clause gives some political leverage to the government in case of external pressures (Kirişçi 2003).

9 Figures of recent regularizations (February 2015) provide minimal estimates of these migrants (which include some Syrian refugees) as of early 2015: “close to 17,918 one-year residence permits were granted from 27,330 applications registered (almost half of them to Senegalese and Syrians, followed by Nigerians and Ivoirians)” (Martín 2015).

10 Figures of Sudanese migrants in Egypt usually span from 500,000 to 4 million, and cannot be verified.
the intention of migrating, according to a survey conducted by the European Training Fund (ETF) in 2011-2012. Among young people aged 18 to 29 years, 69 percent desired to emigrate, of whom 58 percent had a “strong migratory potential”\(^{11}\) (ETF 2013:36-37).

Besides the factors attracting young people to prospective destination countries (“pull” factors), and especially the prospects of better income than at home, this general upward trend of migration from SEM countries is due to a conjunction of long- and short-term “push” factors, which have sustained migration pressure for youth from the six origin countries.

One long-term factor is demography, namely the coming of age of the generations born in the late 1970s to early 1980s, just before the fall of fertility levels generalized to all the concerned countries (see figure 4). This resulted in a demographic pressure on national labour markets (the “youth bulge”).

**Figure 4** | Share of the 15-24 years-olds in the total population (selected SEM countries, 1950-2015)

This demographic pressure has become all the more acute, and has acted as a spur for migration for two sets of reasons. First, these young generations have benefitted from the generalization of higher education in most of the region: in 2009-2010, UNESCO data indicated that as much as 40 percent of the 18-23 year olds were enrolled in higher education in Tunisia and above 50 percent in Lebanon and in Palestine. Even Morocco recorded an

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\(^{11}\) The real capacities to undertake a successful migration project (in terms of education, family situation, information on opportunities, etc.).
increase of such levels with a (still modest) 13 percent. The proportion of tertiary-educated among the 25-34 year-olds ranged from 11 percent in Morocco to 15 and 19 percent in Tunisia and Turkey respectively, and reached as high as 23 percent in Egypt and Lebanon. Increase in education levels in the region also extended to women: in Egypt for example, female-to-male enrolment ratio at tertiary level in public and private schools was 96 percent in 2012 according to the World Bank. Second, a partial consequence to educational progress of girls in the region, family structures in the concerned countries have also undergone important changes since the 1990s. Age at marriage of females now reaches beyond 25-27 years old, a level comparable to that of Europe. Moreover, while in the past celibacy amongst women was almost non-existent (except in Lebanon), it has become a reality everywhere in the region (De Bel-Air 2008). Demographic factors, therefore, have strengthened the demand for employment, and especially for qualified employment.

However, this clashed with economic factors, which actually decreased the offer of such opportunities. Since the mid-1980s, every SEM country has implemented structural adjustment processes (SAPs). Socio-economic reforms were also conducted within the realm of the WTO accession process, as well as due to the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed during the 2000s by each of the six countries, including Palestine (European Free Trade Agreement). The globalization of the region’s economies and the subsequent massive liberalization and deregulation policies led to a complete reshuffle of the role and patterns of labour in economy. Especially, these measures had specific outcomes on young workers, both men and women. SAPs led to cuts in the provision of education and training as well as, most importantly, in public employment, which used to be the prime outlet for young graduates. In Morocco for instance, the governmental sector used to create about 45,000 jobs a year until 1983, when the country signed its SAP; during the following decade, the provision of public sector employment fell to 10-15,000 jobs yearly (Sadiqi 2007:8). Privatization schemes were implemented, in order to boost productivity but also to strengthen the stability of states faced with financial bankruptcy.

Employers geared their investments towards sectors characterized by relatively low-wage jobs. In Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, where economy was already based massively on small-scale, low-value-added activities, the necessity to develop exports and confront the severe competition with foreign firms, in the West and in Asia, forced the restructuring of such sectors, along upgrading schemes with pre-set objectives. Besides the contraction in public employment, many businesses were obliged to reduce their work force. Moreover, “the work available was invariably at the low-skill, low-
pay end of the spectrum, and [...] economic opportunities were reduced” (Flynn and Kofman 2004:67). Youth unemployment mounted across the 1990s and 2000s, especially among the highly educated. In Morocco, for example, 21 percent of university graduates were without jobs in 2005 as opposed to five percent of the population holding no degree. In the age group 25-34, 40 percent of the university graduates were unemployed, as compared to 6 percent of the Moroccans with no degree.¹⁹ In Tunisia in 2010, 23 percent of graduates were unemployed, as compared to 13 percent for the whole population; the situation worsened to reach 32.6 percent unemployment among graduates in 2013.²⁰ In addition to unemployment and stalling income, youth did not experience better access to socio-political opportunities. Policies of structural adjustment were originally seen as a pre-requisite for political reform,²¹ yet they had in fact the opposite effect. Studies abound that document states’ or regimes’ control over the process of economic liberalization, which hampers the expected dismantling of rentier systems, monopolies of power and accumulation processes, as well as the processes of using international resources and rhetoric on reforms to justify increased political control (Catusse 2006:231-234).²² Given this situation, access to a congested labour market becomes all the more difficult, such that personal connections or wasta (intermediation) are often needed to supplement qualifications and merit.

### Structural reasons to migrate from SEM countries since the 2000s:
A summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-demographic factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth bulge: numerous generations born in the late 1970s access working age in the 2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved education levels; closing of the gender gap in achievements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in family structures and increase in women’s age at first marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased pressure on job creation, which clashes with:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic reforms, decrease in numbers and attractiveness of jobs available:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- cuts in public employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- privatization, international competition and boosting of productivity: most jobs are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- export-led, low-paid and low added-value activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Youth unemployment and especially of the skilled and highly skilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persistence of nepotism and clientelism: employment often relies on personal connections or wasta (intermediation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of security and economic prospects due to political instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Long-term, structural factors such as the contraction of economic opportunities and socio-political lagging in origin countries became strongly felt during the 1990s and later, hence compelling more young citizens of SEM countries to seek avenues for emigrating. As family

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¹⁹ Unemployment rates by age group and education degree, total population (HCP 2007:92).
²¹ The logic was that economic liberalization should lead to a political liberalization, under the assumption that liberal economic reforms, for example, limit the redistributive capacities of patrimonial states or promote the emergence of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie able to convene democratic claims (Anderson 1992, Catusse 2006).
²² On Tunisia especially, see Hibou (2005) and Cassarino (2000).
formation patterns also underwent changes and delays, domestic obstacles to international migration became less.\textsuperscript{23} On the political level, furthermore, the many political unrests and armed conflicts that marked the decade of the 2000s continued to deepen the migration pressure. Long-term conflicts, such as that opposing the Turkish state and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) since 1984, have produced large diasporas of forced migrants and refugees abroad. As a corollary, mandatory conscription may also be a spur to migration: some young Turkish men choose expatriation in order to escape the three-year military service in their country (Sunata 2012). Political events indeed correlate with massive attempts at emigrating, through legal or illegal channels. The Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006 pushed many young Lebanese to emigrate, in addition to deterring them from returning after the conflict ended (Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous 2007). Records of Tunisians attempting to enter the EU illegally shot up in 2008 after the repression of social uprisings that took place in the Gafsa region (Boubakri 2013, Cassarino 2014a).

1.3 Youth Emigration Trends Since the Arab Uprisings

The period of the 2000s was indeed one of socioeconomic and political tensions, which boosted mobility from the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea to the two major regions of destination.\textsuperscript{24} A growing share of this mobility became constrained, however, by the closing of borders in Europe as the financial crisis of 2008 was limiting employment opportunities everywhere in the region, but most drastically the very labour-intensive European economies, namely Italy and Spain. The crisis also lowered income from tourism and subcontracting activities in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, thereby reducing both job prospects at home and legal migration opportunities for SEM youth in Europe. Contraction of the migration avenues for Tunisians, in a context of economic downturn and heightened political tensions since the end of the 2000s, probably stands within the array of reasons explaining the outburst of the uprisings in this particular country. Indeed, “the underlying causes of the revolution – rising unemployment, spreading poverty, and political repression – fueled Tunisians’ emigration aspirations” (Natter 2015).

The start of the Arab uprisings in December 2010 did spur an immediate surge in emigration from Tunisia through irregular means, yet of modest scale. Indeed, as stated by Fargues and Fandrich,

Between January and September 2011, 42,807 persons were recorded as entering illegally Italy by sea (most of them disembarked in the Island of Lampedusa whose population is only 4,500 people) compared with less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009, and an annual average of 18,788 in the preceding decade [...]. In order to diagnose the situation, three remarks must be made: first, most illegal crossings took place in Spring 2011, when police forces were disorganised and coastal control was inexistent in Tunisia; second, many non-Tunisians (18,451, i.e. 47% of the total), including more than 17,000 Sub-Saharan Africans (17,342) were smuggled into Italy

\textsuperscript{23} Experience suggests that marriage and children are negatively correlated with intention to migrate. See for instance on Morocco, ETF (2013:5).

\textsuperscript{24} In Tunisia during the 2000s, for example, net outward migration showed a growing negative net balance over the period, reaching the 20,000 a year mark in 2006-2007 (a migration rate of 23 percent of new entrants to the labour market). In Lebanon, it was also estimated that 15,000 to 20,000 people emigrated every year, around the same number as net new entrants to the labour market (Martín 2010:59-60).
together with Tunisians in 2011; and third, illegal entries into Italy peaking in 2011 were concomitant with their decrease in Malta and Spain to such an extent that, if all three countries are considered together, unauthorised entries occurred in larger numbers in 1999, 2006 and 2008 than in 2011 (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012:4).

Moreover, it can be said the migration movements induced by the uprisings and subsequent regime falls primarily affected the countries of the Southern shores of the Mediterranean: “In the spring and summer 2011, an estimated 1,128,985 people fled war-torn Libya to Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan, but also Italy and Malta” (Fargues and Fandrich 2012:4).

However, since 2011, and excepting Turkey to a certain extent, the economic slowdown induced by the post-uprising political transition period was experienced in all SEM countries including Egypt. The tourism and construction sectors are recovering with tremendous difficulties, as projects are at a standstill and foreign investments have dwindled. Levels of economic growth in the region until today remain tepid and youth unemployment is still very high: the IMF estimated it at around 25 percent in 2014 for the Arab region as a whole (Kerr 2014). Moreover, it is estimated that as many as 40 percent of youth aged 15 to 30 in Arab Mediterranean countries are actually “neither in employment nor in education or training” (NEET), while 25 percent are in informal employment (Martín 2013:2). The enduring conflict in Palestine and most recently, violent destruction during the summer 2014 war on Gaza have spurred refugee flows and attempts at irregular entry by sea to the EU. Refugees and conflict-induced migration have thus merged within “mixed migration” flows of Tunisians, Moroccans, and Egyptians to a lesser extent. These are labelled “economic” migrants, which can be questioned in view of the politics-induced economic hardships actually pushing them to emigrate. Moreover, the level of risk taken says a lot about the unabated motivation to emigrate.

2. MIGRATION POLICIES AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS: BETWEEN SECURITIZATION, ECONOMIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Freedom to move is a basic human right, enshrined in Article 13 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his/her own, and to return to his/her country. Yet, it does not include the right to enter and live in any other country, “hence the central importance of immigration policy” (Skeldon 2009:7). Immigration, indeed, has always been a controversial question in the history of nation-states, but also in the context of the emerging global, “post-national citizenships” located outside the confines of the national state, “the European passport [being] perhaps, the most formalized of these” (Sassen 2002:277-278). As a matter of fact, the “apparent de-bordering of the western world under the impulse of economic globalization has been paralleled by a simultaneous process of re-bordering of late-capitalist societies against global

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25 “For the sake of comparison, in the OECD countries the average share of NEET is 15% of youth; in Spain, the country with the most acute youth employment problem in the area, it amounts to 23%. Among youth Arab women, this exclusion from the labour market affects up to 80% of the total population” (Martín 2013:2).

26 And unemployment rates reaching as high as 47 percent after the conflict and 42 percent during the first half of 2015 (World Bank 2015:4).
migrations” (De Giorgi 2010:147). Migration has become one of the most politicized expressions of globalization, and hence construed as a security challenge in the political discourse. In most regions of the world, including the EU, the ensuing process of “securitization” of migration (Huysmans 2006)²⁷ leading to stemming migration flows for security’s sake is the priority driving the design of migration and/or development policies. This process has been progressively speeding up since 9/11 (Içduygu and Yükseker 2012). However, disconnecting the mobility of people from the mobility of capital may seem to contradict the liberal logic of economic globalization which implies free mobility of workers (Favell and Hansen 2002), or “economization” of migration.²⁸ Hence the emergence of the paradigm of migration management, which is meant to combine “the construction of more permissive channels for desirable and actively recruited labor migrants with ever more restrictive approaches towards [...] unsolicited forms of migration, especially through asylum and family reunion” (Menz 2009). Moreover, the concept of management allows for incorporating ethical and human rights concerns in global migration policy-making (Geiger and Pécoud 2010:12), a priority for Europe.

**From migration policy to migration management**

Migration policies are caught between three poles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Securitization of migration</th>
<th>Economization of migration</th>
<th>Issue of migrants’ rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construct migration as a security issue, combat irregulars and stem migration flows</td>
<td>In a liberal logic of economic globalization, implement free mobility of workers and increase their numbers</td>
<td>Enforce labor and residency rights: necessity of control and streamlining of stocks and flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Address citizens’ unemployment</td>
<td>- Meet the manpower needs of employers</td>
<td>« number vs rights tradeoff »</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Address social and cultural fears, etc.</td>
<td>- Correct shortages of young workers in the ageing North.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Migration policy

Migration management

- Construct more permissive channels for desirable and actively recruited migrants
- Restricting unsolicited forms of migration (asylum; family reunion)
- Guarantee respect of ethical and human rights

Focusing on the post-Arab uprisings period, the section now examines migration policies targeting nationals from SEM countries in the Gulf States and in the EU, their two main areas of destination. Policies are taken as discursive practices constructing representations and issues, and designating policy targets. We investigate why and how the construction of migration from the SEM as a security challenge has become a dominant perception and an

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²⁷ A set of measures constructing migration as a security problem (as opposed, for instance, to a humanitarian or economic problem), “a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis of distrust” (Huysmans 2006:xi).
²⁸ The economization of migration also argues in favour of sustaining migration from the youth-rich South to the youth-poor North in order to correct labour and innovation shortages in low-fertility, ageing Europe, for instance. See, for example, Fargues (2009).
essential element of governmentality, both in the Gulf States and in the EU.

2.1 Migration Policies in the Gulf States

Unlike the EU, the Gulf States did not elaborate migration management instruments at the regional level. Nevertheless, the six GCC states obey a common principle that migrants, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, are guest labourers on limited duration contracts. Hence, they should not settle in the receiving country and the length of their stay should not, theoretically, expand beyond that of the employment contract. For this purpose, profession, skills and/or salary level define thresholds permitting the access to family reunion and other basic rights. In general, employers follow recruitment, employment, entry and residency procedures, upon the provisions of the receiving country’s labour laws and administrative regulations. Specific bilateral agreements rule over nationality-specific employment conditions, as well as sector-specific recruitment or seconding of foreign public employees. Nevertheless, until around 2010, private and business actors had the upper hand in the process of private sector labour recruitment. Especially in Saudi Arabia, the biggest employer of Arab (Egyptian) work force, and likewise in the UAE and Kuwait, the involvement of state bodies (Labour, Foreign Affairs and Interior Ministries) in the management (hence, control and restrictions) of foreign worker flows was minimal.

This should not suggest, however, that the Gulf States do not see migration as a security challenge. First, the role of governments was and still is prominent in legally enforcing the economic, ethnic, socio-political and to some extent, spatial separation between nationals and non-nationals among resident populations (Fargues and De Bel-Air 2015). Second, these countries actually have a record of selective hiring and policies of replacing Arabs by Asian workers, for instance after 1980. Quotas capping the numbers of nationals from one single country are said to exist, which theoretically ensure that no single foreign nationality will be able to gain primacy and therefore be in a position to challenge local authorities. Third, the economization of migration pursues the very political aim of securing state-society relations: foreign labour flows were used as a means for redistributing oil wealth. In addition to taking on career opportunities in the expanding public sector, Gulf citizens could also access income from the trade in labour visas. As a consequence, labour recruitment grew disconnected from market needs; pools of informal migrants grew, unaccounted for by authorities, and could be tapped for short-term business needs, especially in Saudi Arabia, the biggest employer in the region.

The Arab uprisings and the shift in policies

The onset of the Arab uprisings, however, spurred a radical turn in Gulf regimes’ involvement in labour and recruitment issues. As a decade of high hydrocarbon prices was ending, mounting youth unemployment and, in some countries in the region, rising poverty levels pushed...
popular demands on regimes. The wave of public Arab discontent reached out to the Gulf and especially, to Oman and Bahrain, the poorest countries of the region. Expectedly, the vast share of foreign workers in all GCC economies became a major focus of popular grievances. In Oman, foreign residents were openly scapegoated by demonstrators, and accused of siding with corrupt local regimes and business classes to keep salaries low and take jobs from locals (Safar 2011). Saudi Arabia did not experience anti-immigrant violence, but there too, protesters targeted high unemployment levels, low salaries and ensuing deterioration of living standards as a sign of growing inequalities in the redistribution process.

All Gulf States revived decades-old policies of work force nationalization (Saudization, Omanization, Kuwaitization etc.) and enacted measures to promote citizens’ employment. Governments put pressure on business people and private sector actors to limit their imports of foreign work force, thus signalling the renewed state involvement in labour issues and work force management. Saudi Arabia launched the most radical of these policies, called “Nitaqat” (ranges) in September 2011. Unlike previous blanket approaches setting general and unreachable quotas of work force nationalization, the Saudi Nitaqat policy defines different nationalization targets, depending on the size and the economic activity sector of companies. Nitaqat also designed and enforces a system of rewards/sanctions for compliant/non-compliant establishments.

Irregularity and the “number vs. rights” tradeoff

In such a context, informality became constructed as irregularity, which itself became an issue in Saudi Arabia and in the other Gulf States. In the Saudi case more acutely than anywhere else, a tension emerged between a politically motivated demand for governmental action in regulating flows of foreign workers (securitization of migration), and the claims of business people, demanding the availability of foreign workers in numbers vast enough to ensure flexibility and downward bargaining of salaries and social packages (economization of migration). This “number vs. rights” tradeoff (Ruhs and Martín 2008) actually relied on the unlimited supply of undocumented workers, more docile to employers’ conditions. GCC countries found themselves faced with two choices: on the one hand, limit the numbers and increase foreign workers’ rights (i.e., engage the “number vs. rights” tradeoff), or, on the other hand, sustain high levels of immigration, but make Gulf societies more permeable to socio-demographic input from non-nationals. “In both cases, the role of migration in the Gulf States’ social contract w[ould] change radically” (Fargues and De Bel-Air 2015:141). However, a third way was eventually taken which allowed for conciliating the economization of migration (sustaining inflows of foreign labourers) and enhancing its securitization by reinforcing state control on labour flows: the criminalization of irregularity, which became constructed (through the press for instance) as a danger for social security and political stability. As a follow-up to the construction of the irregular administrative situation as breaching the law,

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32 Qatar is an exception. Poverty has become a reality over the 2000s in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain.
33 It is a characteristic of the Gulf States that the largest pools of workers usually have the least capacity for claiming rights and entitlements. By contrast, number is an asset in regions where foreign workers and residents enjoy socio-political rights.
34 Available data on labour permits indicate no decrease in foreign recruitment since 2011. See the website of the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM): http://gulfmigration.eu.
35 Foreigners with no residency or work permits, those working for an employer other than their sponsor, and those operating in a trade other than that described on their iqama (residency permit) became suddenly targeted as
widely publicized crackdowns on businesses and areas inhabited by foreign nationals were (and still are) conducted in all GCC countries by state police and Labour Ministry officials. The largest of these operations was conducted in Saudi Arabia in November 2013. It led to more than one million foreign nationals exiting the Kingdom, by force (deportation) or voluntarily.

Figure 5 | Net migration to Saudi Arabia (selected Arab countries, 2006-2013)

Selective deportations
Among these were 300,000 Egyptians. The scale of the operation and the particular focus on Egyptians, as well as Lebanese and Tunisians, is visible in the drop of net migration rates to Saudi Arabia (Fig. 5), emphasizing the comparatively higher surplus of exits over entries of these nationals that year, if compared, for instance, to Moroccan nationals. Interestingly, other, more numerous nationalities were less affected by the deportations than the Egyptians.

It is a fact that Egyptians in Saudi Arabia often occupy some professions that are likely to be increasingly reserved for Saudi nationals. They are often employed in white-collar, skilled and

contravening the law, even though their situation was due, in most cases, to their sponsor’s failure to perform his/her administrative duties. Foreign nationals forced to escape abusive sponsors are also among those categorised as irregulars.

36 Except Qatar.
37 Over the course of a six-month regularization-or-exit campaign, finally crowned by the November 2013 crackdown.
38 Yemenis were also targeted in widely publicized operations.
39 Indians for instance, who are the most numerous expatriates (around 2.8 million) in Saudi Arabia, had only around 130,000 deportations.
semi-skilled technical fields, such as accountancy and marketing. These are fields particularly targeted by Saudi students on state scholarships abroad, who receive incentives to come back to the country (De Bel-Air 2014a). However, in addition to justifications pertaining to the necessity of managing the labour force and opening employment opportunities for jobless Saudis, state communication on the results of the deportation campaign was extremely intense. Especially, figures were published in the press and in the Ministry of Interior’s communications, which emphasized selected nationalities, in a country where statistics are usually concealed on the nationality breakdown of expatriates. This suggests that the reasons behind this deportation campaign were not of a managerial, economic nature (rationalizing the labour market in order to create opportunities for unemployed Saudis). Rather, the aim of criminalizing irregularity may be two-fold:

1. target specific Arab nationalities, i.e., nationals from countries affected by regime change, hence suspect for importing political sedition;
2. address the concerns of Saudi citizens as explained earlier and regain the upper hand on labour management from the business communities.

Migration policies and politics

The first hypothesis is sustained by blunt policies targeting the nationals of Arab Spring countries, such as the restrictions put in place in the United Arab Emirates on the hiring of nationals from Egypt and Tunisia. Some Lebanese expatriates were also expelled from the country under accusation of sympathy with Hezbollah (De Bel-Air 2015). Gulf States actually have a record of large-scale deportation of selected nationalities, in retaliation for their governments’ policies and foreign relations decisions. The expulsion of some 350,000 Palestinian residents of Kuwait in 1990, during the First Gulf War, and the deportation of some 800,000 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia are two examples of Gulf States’ drastic responses to the positions of migrants’ home governments. In the present case, the Saudi deportation campaign did not target all the Egyptians in the country, estimated at 900,000 workers alone, and seems to have followed an upsurge in the numbers of Egyptian nationals in the Kingdom, observed in 2012. Yet, the deportations started after July 2013 when the counter-revolution led to the overthrowing of Mohammed Morsi by the Egyptian Army, with the help of Saudi Arabia. It is thus tempting, although this hypothesis could not be confirmed, to suggest that some supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were among those deported to Egypt.

The second hypothesis is also plausible. The wide publicization of police crackdowns, arrests and deportations following the construction of irregularity as an issue to be combated can be taken as a “border spectacle” (De Genova 2005), a display of sovereignty enforcement addressed to Saudi nationals, as well as to Arabs deemed supporters of post-uprising Arab regimes. Moreover, the “border spectacle” which emphasizes migrant “illegality” and renders it spectacularly visible, and thereby “sets the scene - a scene of ostensible exclusion, in which the purported naturalness and putative necessity of exclusion may be demonstrated and

41 Other, non-Arab nationalities were also heavily targeted, such as the Ethiopians.
42 The expulsions of these nationals were a reaction to the stance of PLO leaders, and Yemeni Presidents in favour of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait after August 1990.
43 “Egyptians represent 40 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s total expatriate workforce”, cit.
verified, validated and legitimated, redundantly” (De Genova 2013:1181). Amidst other, less spectacular measures, the securitization of migration thus justifies and legitimizes in the eyes of the public the capture of control over migration flows by Gulf States’ governments. This may help solve domestic struggles for influence. These opposed powerful business actors, who until around 2010 had the upper hand on labour recruitment, as well as to some extent, on the Saudi economy, and Saudi rulers, eager to regain control over economic policy and assert their political control over influential parties. Yet, the securitisation of migration is most likely aimed at consolidating ailing social contracts, whereby regimes would appear as the sole defenders of Gulf citizens’ interests against insecurity, as well as unemployment and poverty; ultimately, such policies work to deter a spill over of the Arab uprisings to the Gulf States. Hence, the scapegoating of young Arab migrants in the Gulf as potential political threats, as vectors of insecurity, as unlawful workers and as “henchmen” of globalization.

2.2 Migration Policy Discourse and the EU Construction

Most Moroccan, Tunisian and Turkish migrants choose Europe as a major destination (Table 1). However, migrating there has become increasingly difficult for young nationals from these countries, for several reasons.

The Schengen Agreements and the strengthening of external borders

One reason is the intrinsic process of the construction of the European Union, in the aftermath of the Schengen Agreements (1985) which lifted the Union’s internal borders and created an area of free circulation within the European Union. This raised much anxiety over the national and political sovereignty of the countries concerned. Establishing a common immigration policy proved a great challenge too. Traditionally, indeed, policies on immigration, internal security and national defence are usually considered by scholars as domains where integration is the least likely to occur (Faist and Ette 2007:4). Yet, Europe pursued a growing “Europeanization” of migration policies over the years, which led to reinforcing its external borders. “The European harmonization of immigration policy literally defines the ‘finality of Europe’, its outer borders and how they are controlled” (Faist and Ette 2007:4): the harmonization of immigration policies, or construction of a transnational governance on visas, asylum, immigration and border security, thus played a critical role in the domestic European construction process. More generally, the strengthening of the EU's external borders counterbalanced the creation of an area of free circulation within the Union.

The 2000s: tensions at the Southern borders

The 1999 European Council in Tampere, Finland, laid the foundations of a common EU migration policy, with an agenda balancing humanitarian concerns and economic admissions. However,

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45 Not including the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.

46 Europeanization or “EU-ization” is the “processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms to a European model of governance” (İçduygu and Yükséker 2012:453).

47 It was ‘specifically devoted to the building and consolidation of a common EU asylum and migration policy’ along four fields of action: partnership with third countries; a common European asylum system; the fair treatment of third-country nationals residing within the EU; and the management of migration flows (which includes among
as the management of successive enlargement steps was feeding populist/protectionist discourses, migration from the Arab South, and from Muslim countries especially, became a particular focus for concerns. France had already been the target of several bomb attacks linked to the civil war raging in Algeria during the 1990s (Hollis 2012), but the 9/11 events spurred a growing suspicion towards Muslim and Arab populations, hence enhancing the “securitization” of the migration issue over the 2000s. Besides strengthening migrants’ legal rights, attracting more immigrant labour to “eliminate bottlenecks in the labour market,” and promoting development and democratization in migrants’ sending countries, countering the entry of migrants deemed “illegal” through the Southern and Eastern borders of the European Union gained prominence within the process of the securitization of migration.\footnote{First to the Southern European countries, and then eastwards during the 2000s, until the rejection of Europe’s Constitutional Treaty (Cassarino 2014a). On attitudes towards migrants and immigration in the EU, see for instance Martín et al (2015:58-59).}

\textbf{The three steps of the securitization of migration policies: entry, non-exit and the externalization of EU border control}

The restructuring of EU policy discourse around the issue of security first led to the tightening of existing rules of legal entry and sojourn in the EU space: limitation of the number of visas granted, streamlining of applicants to specific categories of migration (family reunification, asylum, highly skilled for example), longer and more constraining procedures, strengthening of document and profile controls, etc. Second, the sending countries came under pressure to control their borders and the exit of their own nationals, as well as - having become migrant-receiving countries themselves - the exit of nationals from third countries transiting through their territory on their way to Europe. This implied the designation of specific targets and schemes of bilateral (EU-Third Countries) relations with its Southern and South-Eastern neighbours.

In such a context, the notion of irregular migration had to be constructed and disseminated in sending countries’ security apparatuses. As said earlier, the SEM countries had often-lax migration regimes, whereby migrants often enjoyed visa-free entry as well as informal sojourn and labour opportunities. Nationals from a number of Sub-Saharan African countries could easily enter Morocco and Tunisia through land and air borders, and stay legally for the first three months (Natter 2015). Turkey had similar visa-free bilateral agreements with ex-USSR neighbouring countries and with some Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, which made it effectively a transit country towards Europe, but also a stepping stone for asylum seekers, most of them from Iran and Iraq (İçduygu and Yükseker 2012). Informality became increasingly constructed as irregularity, through a process of “policy transfer” from the EU to its external neighbours. Over the years, the EU’s foreign relations related to other measures, the implementation of readmission and the inclusion of mandatory readmission clauses in any future agreements between the EU and third countries) (Cassarino 2005:7).

\footnote{Paragraph 30 of the Conclusions of the European Council on the Stockholm Programme, for example, is clear about the issues of “legitimacy” as a precondition for entering the EU: “Access to Europe for persons recognized as having a legitimate interest to access EU territory has to be made more effective and efficient. At the same time, the Union and its Member States have to guarantee security for its citizens. Integrated border management and visa policies should be construed to serve these goals.” See Conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2009, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111877.pdf.}
immigration control significantly influenced third countries’ migration policy apparatuses, as well as their views on migration. “External effects of European immigration policies take place along a continuum that runs from fully voluntary to more constrained forms of adaptation, and include a variety of modes such as unilateral emulation, adaptation by externality, and policy transfer through conditionality” (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004:417). An example of such policy transfers is the progressive adoption by all SEM countries, since the 2000s, of anti-trafficking laws and measures towards protecting migrants’ rights, alongside projects aiming at managing the emigration of nationals, curbing irregular immigration and emigration, etc.

Similarly, as emphasized by Içduygu and Yükseker on Turkey (2012), within the process of securitization of migration, the concept of “transit” countries became politically constructed to designate those situated along EU external borders and to implicitly label them as producers of “chaotic” and unmanaged movements. These countries’ EU accession processes were thus directly conditioned to their achievements in terms of controlling the flows of emigrants seeking to reach the EU. This “externalization of EU border control” (or outsourcing of EU immigration and asylum policy away from the physical borders of the countries of destination, by subcontracting controls and prevention of irregular migration to migrants’ countries of departure or transit) is a major feature of EU policy transfers to foreign states, and the third array of methods used to limit the avenues of SEM citizens’ migration to Europe. It is achieved through a variety of means, ranging from Frontex patrols near sending countries’ coasts to the signing of readmission agreements or incorporation of readmission provisions within wider partnership between the EU and origin or transit third countries. Readmission agreements require the countries to “take back” their own nationals who have entered or stayed illegally in an EU member state, but also third-country nationals who transited to their country on their way to the EU.

The strengthening of securitization of migration from the SEM after the uprisings

As early as May 2011, the EU reacted to the wave of Arab uprisings by extending to the SEM countries the Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security, which states that: “Relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries on migration-related issues are strategic, aimed at facilitating mobility but discouraging irregular migration.” Under this umbrella, the renewed EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of November 2011 is the “overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy.” It reframes the EU’s approach around “four equally important objectives: (i) better organising legal migration, and fostering well-managed mobility; (ii) preventing and combatting irregular migration, and eradicating trafficking in human beings; (iii) maximising the development impact of migration

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50 Formalized by the EU programme adopted in 2004 at The Hague European Council, confirmed by the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 2008 and reinforced by the 2009 Stockholm programme.

51 On Tunisia for example, see García Andrade et al (2015).

52 The European agency established by EU member states in 2004 to manage, reinforce and streamline cooperation between national border authorities in the EU. Frontex’s maritime interceptions in the Mediterranean Sea aim at preventing would-be migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the Southern European coasts.


54 The first Global Approach to Migration (GAM) was published by the European Commission in December 2005, http://europa.eu/!kP89uj.
and mobility; (iv) promoting international protection, and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.”

This four pillars-approach ultimately revolves around the three poles of securitization of migration, economization of migration, and ethical and humanitarian concerns highlighted in the introduction to this section. Humanitarian concerns are addressed in the designated targets of “trafficking”, “development”, “international protection” and “asylum”. “Better organizing legal migration and fostering well-managed mobility” supports the economic view on migration, yet no mention is made of facilitating or enhancing such mobility as in pre-uprisings documents. Indeed, the security pillar appears overtly prominent, at first sight in the clear dichotomy between “legal” and “irregular” migration, which thus implicitly appears “illegal”. The securitization of the issue is further visible in the addressing of irregular migration and trafficking in the same sentence. In a less straightforward manner, the reference made to development, as well as to “the external dimension of asylum policy” can also be incorporated in the realm of securitization. Indeed, the ultimate aim of the Global Approach to migration is to eventually curb emigration flows, deemed to be spurred by “root causes” such as poverty, unemployment and development gaps between North and South, by enhancing development in migrant-sending countries (De Bel-Air 2011). The emphasis on the security issue also appears in the reference made to the “external” dimension of asylum that runs parallel to the externalization of border control. Emblematic of the post-Arab uprisings migration policy phase is the continuation and reinforcement of the security approach to migration, already prominent since the early 2000s and the aftermath of 9/11. Especially, the intensification of the externalization of the EU migration policy also characterizes the EU Action on migratory pressures - a strategic response, adopted by EU member states in 2012, one year after the beginning of the upheavals in the Arab world (Council of the European Union 2012).

The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement

The new, post-uprisings cooperation schemes established with these countries thus focus on irregularity, on ways of deterring it through externalization of border control, and on readmission by origin and transit countries, of the irregulars captured inside and outside the EU borders. A Readmission Agreement was eventually signed between the EU and Turkey in December 2013, after a tough negotiation process (Kirişçi 2014). In parallel, an EU-Turkey visa

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55 Additionally, “The GAMM is implemented through several political instruments (bilateral and regional policy dialogues and action plans), legal instruments (such as visa facilitation and readmission agreements), operational support and capacity building as well as programme and project support made available to third countries and other stakeholders, e.g. civil society and international organisations.” European Commission website: Migration and Home Affairs: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration.

56 Rather, emphasis is put on the interests of the EU in terms of work force needs (especially highly skilled and specific categories such as artists and cultural workers, researchers and academics). The focus is also on tightening and controlling ever more the process of mobility, through enhancing existing visa regulations and “pre-departure measures focusing on skills matching, skills upgrading and proficiency in EU languages in cooperation with Public Employment Services, EU agencies and other stakeholders.” Also notable is the prominence of public and regional bodies in the process (European Commission 2011:12-15).

liberalization dialogue was initiated, on the basis of the document *Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime with Turkey* (European Commission 2013). The pursuit of Turkey's EU accession process, and eventually the visa-free access to Schengen space for Turkish nationals, is thus made conditional on the management of irregular migration by Turkey.

To that effect, Turkey underwent a major overhaul of its legal and institutional framework pertaining to migration and asylum. Turkey had to repeal its free visa policy with some of its neighbours (Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, etc.) which had caused serious concerns in the EU with respect to border management, especially since the crisis in Syria (Elitok 2013:3). The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, ratified in April 2013 and implemented in April 2014, is intended as a significant step toward managing both legal and irregular migration to Turkey, including humanitarian migration that was not addressed previously in any Turkish legal provision (Açıkgöz and Ariner 2014:6). Additionally, migration policy-making is now centralized within a newly created General Directorate for Migration Management (GDMM). Prior to the GDMM's creation, most migration issues were addressed via secondary legislation and regulations. The GDMM's responsibilities include developing new legislation and strategies, coordinating and managing multiagency efforts to combat irregular migration, standardizing practices, registering and determining status of potential refugees, and ensuring protection for victims of human trafficking, stateless persons, and those who receive temporary protection (Kilberg 2014).

**The Mobility Partnerships**

The readmission issue was at the core of the Mobility Partnerships that the EU (and nine member states) signed with Morocco in June 2013, and with Tunisia in March 2014, after a previous Agreement was *de facto* cancelled by the fall of the Ben Ali regime. Signed and implemented within the Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security, Mobility Partnerships take the form of non-legally binding Joint Declarations negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Their stated objectives, similar to those displayed by the GAMM, are to “ensure that: (i) Mobility and legal migration between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries is well managed, for instance better information on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU; (ii) Cooperation is increased to prevent irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; (iii) The impact of migration on development is maximized, for example through assistance for returned migrants who want to help build up their home country; (iv) The capacity of Southern Mediterranean countries in the field of asylum and international protection is increased.” In return, “the implementation of the mobility partnerships will include opening negotiations on an agreement for facilitating the issuing of Schengen visas for certain groups of people, particularly students, researchers and business professionals. Sufficient safeguards must be in place for the lifting of mobility restrictions to work. Partners must ensure that they take every possible measure to prevent irregular migration and to this end, agree to conclude a readmission agreement allowing for the return of citizens who do not have the right to stay in Europe.”

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58 As well as Jordan in October 2014.
Coercive EU policy enforcement and the reactions from the South

It is worth noting here that South countries did not readily accept the signing of such conditional agreements, which are in their view too constraining in terms of conditionality imposed and too imbalanced in favour of EU security agendas. Starting in 2011, Egypt was approached for negotiations towards a Mobility Partnership but eventually declined the EU offer. Negotiations with other countries were tough and lengthy. As with Turkey, the discussions between Morocco and the EU had been under way for more than a decade.\(^{60}\) The Kingdom adamantly rejected the readmission clause as a precondition for visa liberalization, and demanded more commitment to provide economic opportunities and mobility avenues for potential migrants. Tunisia, a priority target of the EU since the start of the Arab Spring and the collapse of Ben Ali’s and Gadhafi’s regimes, had laid down some of its priorities for starting negotiating its Mobility Partnership. These included labour migration, fundamental rights protection for migrants, wide visa facilitation and development,\(^ {61}\) in an attempt to break with the proactive securitization of migration performed under former President Ben Ali. Yet, these arguments were discarded.

Indeed, it is rather fascinating that the signing of such Agreements, whereby “the EU is in fact encouraging [SEM states] to exercise greater control over [their] citizens and those of other states, seen as ‘undesirable’ in Europe,” happened precisely during a post-uprisings climate prone to political expression and to popular pressure on political leaders, in the SEM countries. Yet, pressure is exercised by the EU “through financial and other incentives” (EMHRN 2014:5), namely, the visa facilitations promised in return for the implementation of the readmission condition. In spite of the growing globalization of migration movements, migration remains highly selective and the policies run by destination countries have a great impact (Di Bartolomeo and Fargues 2015). Moreover, because of individual/familial strategies and constraints or opportunities met throughout the migration process, most SEM citizens (with the exception of Lebanese as seen earlier) are geared towards one single main destination (Egyptians to the GCC; North Africans and Turks to Europe); this creates dependency and uneven bargaining power between sending and destination sides.

In addition, the enactment of measures contained within the agreements are negotiated all the more strongly on “partners” in the South, to the degree that they bear very high political stakes at the domestic, intra-EU political level, similar to what is observed in the Gulf States. Readmission provisions and more generally, operations against irregulars such as that conducted by Frontex, may well be considered as “border spectacles”, even if they are much less publicized than the ones conducted in the Gulf States. Indeed, as stated by Cassarino (2014b:137-138), readmission is a coercive measure, and “its public manifestation reinforces the credibility of law-enforcement agencies, and by the same token reifies the managerial centrality of the state with regard to its constituencies. Border controls, the forecasting of yearly expulsion quotas and the proliferation of detention centres in the territory of EU member states contribute to making the presence of the sovereign more visible and powerful in the public eye, above all in times of economic crisis, social discontent and the retrenchment


of the welfare state.”

Migration policies are indeed purpose-driven and the interests and demands of migrants or potential migrants are not at the core of the management process. When asked, the prospective young migrants from SEM countries do not convey positive perceptions of migration to Europe or to the Gulf (ETF 2013). The asymmetry of migration rights between the North and the South, for example regarding the visa policy, has always been a contentious issue, and one often raised by young Moroccans since the uprisings (Chattou et al 2012). In Morocco, in Turkey and in Tunisia the agreements passed with the EU have also been fiercely criticized by the media and civil society organizations.62

3. YOUTH, MIGRATION AND POLITICS

At first sight, there is indeed an obvious contradiction “between strict border control, the effort to enforce readmissions and introduce visa facilitations for TCNs [Third Country Nationals],” or conditioning visa delivery and mobility facilitation to security objectives (Maroukis and Triandafyllidou 2013:2). Against the backdrop of policies and measures stigmatizing young SEM citizens as potential criminals and a challenge to law, order and sound management, we now move to exploring how these measures influence the size, structure and dynamics of young migrants’ flows in destination areas. We also explore the likely political purposes of such a “demographic engineering” (Bookman 1997). This section mostly focuses on the EU. As noted earlier, data available on Arab national communities in the Gulf States are inexistent, or too scarce to allow a credible analysis.

3.1 Number: Limitation of Flows, Depoliticization of Migration’s Drivers

The measures enshrined in the new Partnerships significantly reinforced the trend towards restraining avenues for legal migration, which has been observed since the early 2000s as highlighted earlier in this paper. Figures of residency permits granted to Turkish, Moroccan and Tunisian citizens in the EU dropped between 2008 and 2014, by 11 and 12 percent respectively for Tunisia and Turkey, and by a sharp 53 percent for Morocco, from 203,670 permits granted in 2008 to 96,197 in 2014 (Fig. 6). Germany is the only EU country that, over the six years, increased the number of residencies granted to Turks, as well as to Moroccans and to Tunisians, yet by a few thousand only and on a much smaller scale than the opportunities previously offered in the Southern European countries. The drop also contradicts the stated objectives of the Partnerships and Agreements, i.e., to enhance possibilities of legal migration from the signatory countries to the EU.63 This may be due to the effects of the financial crisis on these countries’ economies since 2008, which dried out employment opportunities in Moroccans

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62 According to a petition signed by a number of Tunisian and international human rights organizations, “the provisions included in this ‘Mobility Partnership’ do not provide Tunisian citizens with real opportunities to enter and live in the European Union. It limits itself to facilitating the issuance of visas to the most privileged and/or qualified persons, while the employment possibilities evoked are remote and are void of any concrete prospects. These commitments are insufficient when compared to the obligations imposed on Tunisia within the framework of the partnership, including tighter border controls, cooperation with Frontex, and the signature of a readmission agreement.” See “EU-Tunisia Mobility Partnership: Externalisation policy in disguise”, in MigrEurop, 3 December 2013, http://www.migreurop.org/article2319.html.

63 It should be noted that some provisions for liberalizing visas were to be enforced at a later stage (see supra).
and Tunisians’ main immigration countries Spain and Italy, and in France to a minor extent. Yet, the securitization of migration is also part of the explanation: the relative share of young permit holders (aged 20-34 years) among all new permit holders has decreased since 2010.\(^64\)

**Figure 6** | Evolution of the total number of first permits by nationality and proportion of youth among permit holders (EU, 2008-2014)

The possible socio-political consequences of the continuous contraction of legal avenues for migration are many. In part I we suggested that among the many drivers of migration were the nepotism and clientelism that plague all Arab societies; but also consequently block the process of political change. However, by emigrating – hence choosing the “exit” instead of the “voice”\(^65\) – emigrants paradoxically contribute to reproducing the socio-political conditions of their exclusion.\(^66\) It has been suggested in part I and by several authors that the progressive closure of Europe’s gates to migrants from the SEM countries since the 2000s could have played a role in the outburst of the uprisings after 2010, for example in Tunisia. In Morocco and in Tunisia, Constitutional and institutional amendments seem to have incorporated some of youth’s concerns. Yet, in Egypt and Turkey where young prospective migrants also suffer from the restrictions on emigration opportunities (to the Gulf States and to Europe, respectively), regimes restrict political expression. Since the Arab uprisings, too, most SEM countries have amended their Constitutions to include provisions protecting nationals abroad

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\(^{64}\) Eurostat provides permit data disaggregated by age group and sex only for the period 2010-2014.

\(^{65}\) Hirschman (1970) distinguishes between alternative ways of reacting to deterioration in business firms and, in general, to dissatisfaction with organizations: one, “exit”, is for the member to quit the organization or for the customer to switch to the competing product, while the other, “voice”, is for members or customers to agitate and exert influence for change “from within”; “loyalty” against all odds is the third response.

\(^{66}\) This is especially true for highly skilled migrants. An open door to emigration practiced by every Arab regime allows for exporting looming discontent over political, economic and social blockages. Therefore, emigration contributes to maintaining socio-political stability, or stagnation. Consequently, as ambitious young Arab graduates find outlets in emigration, they stop seeking responsibilities, political participation and innovation at home. Expatriation of Arab elites thus gives leeway to regimes for controlling the process of elites’ and institutions’ reproduction, especially patronage networks, at the expense of economic, social and political reforms. Highly skilled migration, in a way, thus sustains exclusion in Arab societies (De Bel-Air 2014b).
and giving them avenues for political participation in the home country, especially by voting from abroad.\textsuperscript{67} These measures are in tune with the recommendations of the GAMM (third pillar) and the Partnerships, which work at involving expatriates in the development of their origin country. However, such initiatives cannot bear fruit if the institutional setup of the origin country is not prone to socio-political change,\textsuperscript{68} at the national or at the local level. Therefore, it is difficult to forecast whether restrictions to emigration from SEM countries can have a role in further political changes in the region, and the direction these changes would take.

In the same vein, at the level of EU-SEM countries’ bilateral relations, restrictions to emigration signal the persistence of a depoliticizing approach to migration as essentially driven by attraction (“pull”) factors, of an economic nature. Preventing migration from the South is a non-acknowledgement of socio-political contexts and conditions that act as “push” factors from SEM countries. Mandatory readmission provisions similarly ignore, or undermine, the local constraints to readmitting refugee populations and irregulars, as well as young citizens with unfinished projects. This representation reminds us of pre-uprising Ben Ali’s Tunisia, where captured irregular migrants from the country “were often depicted by Tunisian officials as persons full of illusion, attracted by the ‘dream of European Eldorado’. The rationale behind this patronizing rhetoric […] consisted in deflecting policy attention (in both Tunisia and abroad) from the severe and impoverished living conditions faced by a growing segment of the population and the youth in depressed areas. In other words, to account for the resilience of illegal migration, the explanation of the GoT compassionately referred to externalities (i.e., European pull factors) that concealed domestic push factors (poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, repression and political violence)” (Cassarino 2014a:107). Restraining legal migration opportunities may well, just as before the uprisings, commit the EU to privileging regimes that efficiently control their nationals, but display anti-democratic tendencies.

Last but not least, the lack of legal migration channels, the failure to make existing ones work, and the strengthened focus of policies on deterring “irregularity” overlooks the well-documented fact that this combination of policy measures actually produces irregular migration (for example see Düvell 2009). Such political choices are therefore counterproductive. Indeed, Eurostats statistics show that, in spite of the tremendous efforts displayed to counter young SEM nationals attempting to cross over to the EU, irregularity has increased. Figures of “third country nationals found to be illegally present” in EU countries actually went up between 2008 and 2014 for young Moroccans and Tunisians.\textsuperscript{69}


\textsuperscript{68} Hence, the debate on the agency of migrants vs. structural contexts, as drivers and obstacles to the development of origin countries (De Haas and Vezzoli 2010, Skeldon 2008).

\textsuperscript{69} Young irregular resident Moroccans (aged 18-34 years) numbered 18,230 in 2008 and 21,160 in 2014. Young Tunisians in the same situation numbered 14,045 and 16,055. Eurostats, third country nationals found to be illegally present, annual data (rounded) [migr_eipre]. Turkey does not display a similar trend: figures dropped from 14,000 to 8,300 apprehensions between 2008 and 2014. This could support the hypothesis that young Turks migrated less during the 2000s, because of strong improvements in the country’s economic performance during the period (ESI 2012).
3.2 Structure: Stigmatization of Unmarried, Low-Skilled Economically Active Young Men

Migration policies enacted in the Gulf States as well as in the EU towards young SEM citizens also aim at changing the structure of migration flows from that region. In the case of the Gulf, we have supplied some evidence that nationals from Tunisia and Egypt were stigmatized for their roles in the change of old regimes, and political allies of Gulf rulers in the case of Egypt. Lebanese Shiites also suffered sporadic deportations. This is in line with Gulf States’ migration policies, where security concerns dictate limiting the numbers of certain nationalities, such as Palestinians after the First Gulf War in 1990-1991.

As for Europe, no nationality quotas were applied but the securitization of migration since 9/11 also seeks to amend the structure of flows. First, the policy objective of “better management of legal migration” implies that categories of potential migrants preferred for visa approval become fewer: the “students, researchers and business professionals” as described earlier. Indeed, as pointed out in the statistics on first-residence permits categorized by motive, among the holders of permits pertaining to remunerated activities the number of highly skilled workers, researchers and Blue Card holders is the only one to go up over the period. The relative share of such permits, indeed, increased notably for the Turks (8 to 22 percent of the total) and for the Tunisians (2 to 16 percent) between 2008 and 2014.71 Attracting the highly skilled among the workers is actually the result of a policy. In the case of Morocco for example, the examination of the specific policy interventions – pre-, during and post-migration – aimed at improving the labour market integration of migrant workers or the matching of their skills72 emphasized the exclusive focussing of such measures on the most qualified. These are now more demanded especially in the Gulf States, in North America and, within the EU, in Germany (Bensaid et al 2015:9). The less skilled are actually left to themselves, although unemployment is too high in Morocco to provide for their economic incorporation. Since 2008, additionally, opportunities offered in the labour-intensive economic sectors (construction and agriculture for instance) in Spain, the largest provider of employment for (mostly low-skilled) Moroccan workers, and in Italy have dried up. This leaves the low-skilled Moroccans, and other nationalities including those who prefer to work in the Gulf, with little or no possibility to emigrate legally in search for a better income.

All the more so, work is no longer the main avenue of migration to the EU. As witnessed in the evolution of the distribution of permits by categories of migration purpose, the three countries have experienced a sizeable drop in the number of young citizens entering the EU for a “remunerated activity”, both in relative share and in numbers. The numbers were halved for all Turks and Tunisians over the period 2008-2014 and divided by 4.5 for Moroccans, a result of the fall of employment opportunities in Spain and Italy. As of 2014 most Moroccans, for instance, entered the EU as family dependents (67 percent of the total), whereas the share was only a third (35 percent) in 2008 (Figs. 7 and 8).73 In fairness, it must be acknowledged

70 Available since 2008 in Eurostats statistics, as of mid-2015.
71 Figures for highly skilled workers, researchers and Blue Card holders are much lower for Moroccans, from 0.4 to 1.8 percent of all first permits granted for remunerated activities.
72 Otherwise designated as “migrant support measures from an employment and skills perspective”. See MISMES website: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/mismes.
73 The figures used are the ones for all first permits (all ages). Figures of first permits by age group and sex are not
that the economic downturn following the 2008 financial crisis played some role in this evolution of SEM citizens’ migration patterns to the EU.

**Figures 7-8** | Distribution of first permits granted, by purpose and date (2008, 2014)

Most of the “family reasons” permit holders stated that they were joining a spouse or partner in the EU (around half of Moroccans, up to 74 percent of Tunisians). Marriage or engagement, therefore, has become a comparative advantage for would-be immigrants. This is the case for young migrants too: among Moroccans and Tunisians aged 18-34 years, 53 and 56 percent entered as family dependents. Among young Turks, education stands higher than family reasons.

In general, the evolution of the structure of young SEM migrants’ flows to Europe is more “favourable” to women than to men. The number of young males granted first residency permits has not only decreased in number, but also in relative share, as compared to the young females. This suggests that young females are either favoured over young males for immigration to the EU, or that the avenues they choose for applying to immigration to Europe are comparatively less restrained than the labour-related ones used by most young males. Indeed, among young women alone, the share of family dependents is higher (63 and 71 percent among young Moroccans and Tunisians) than among young males (38 and 52 percent), whose purposes to migrate are more diverse (family reasons, education, remunerated activities).

The prominence of family reunion, which presupposes installation, as a way to enter the EU apparently contradicts the policy trend to prevent long-term or permanent settlement. However, constraining circulation may be the only way to keep borders sealed, especially to new individual migrants. Indeed, in view of the policy and permit data exploited so far, our hypothesis is that the security-oriented EU policy actions implemented since the 2000s particularly focus on unmarried, low-skilled economically active young men. Moreover, as available for every EU country and data are missing certain years, which does not allow for drawing conclusions. Using “corridor” data (one nationality in one immigration country) also does not permit generalizations to be inferred, because of the selection of migrants by the destination country’s context and policies.
most SEM migrants are not in a position to apply for a higher education permit in order to enter the EU, the streamlining of accepted migrants to existing family units (through the family reunion schemes) thus leaves young SEM citizens with a constrained choice, either forced installation through family reunion schemes, or precarious, short-term employment mobility schemes.

3.3 Dynamics: Temporariness, Irregularity and “Subordinate Inclusion”

In general, data on first permits by categories of duration indicate that short stays have indeed become more frequent. Between 2008 and 2014, the share of short-term (less than one year) residency permits increased from 16 to 20 percent, from 17 to 23 percent and from 22 to 40 percent of all first permits granted respectively to Tunisians, Moroccans and Turks in the EU (Fig. 9).

Figure 9 | Share of short term residency permits (one year and less) in all first permits (2008, 2014)

This is in line with the prevention of the settlement of new SEM citizens in Europe. This evolution in residency patterns also goes hand in hand with the control of non-highly skilled workers’ migration, as emphasised in the Mobility Partnership and in the legal provisions regulating movements between EU member states and the SEM countries, which promote controlled and short-term circular migration schemes for temporary workers. Mobility Partnerships and more generally, readmission provisions can thus be described as “a new generation of temporary labour migration schemes,” that serve “regulatory” aims (Cassarino 2009:41). Within the Agreements and Partnerships, the readmission provision supports short stay and high turnover of foreign migrants: it “is one of the various mechanisms geared towards controlling people’s mobility,” as well as “the technical instrument for deterring regular migrant workers from overstaying their temporary job contracts” (Cassarino 2014b:138). More generally, EU legal provisions governing immigration for the purpose of employment all set maximum durations of stay for the permit holder, not only the Directive on seasonal workers but also the Directive for intra-corporate transfer of non-EU skilled workers adopted in 2014 and the EU Blue Card Directive, both directed at skilled and highly skilled (Blue Card)

And suspicion of fake marriage as is often the case.
non-EU professionals. Interestingly, this emphasis of EU policies on workers' temporariness is reminiscent of the similar label of “temporary” applied to migration from Egypt to the Gulf States.

Furthermore, despite the apparent prime focus of EU and Gulf policies on security and limitation of numbers, some authors suggest that readmission (and temporary stay) are in fact intertwined with the economization of migration (i.e., increase of numbers) (İçduygu and Yükseker 2012), which tends to confine the migrants in a subordinate status, in conditions of “structural marginality” or “less eligibility” (De Giorgi 2010). As asserted by Kitty Calavita (2007) on Spain and Italy, for instance, European policy aims is not to seal borders and forbid the entry of migrants. It is to perform a “subordinate inclusion” of migrants, whereby these “useful invaders” are economically included, but at the same time prevented from social and cultural inclusion in host societies.

Immigrants are useful as ‘Others’ who are willing to work, or are compelled to work, under conditions and for wages that locals largely shun. The advantage of immigrants for these economies resides precisely in their Otherness or difference. At the same time, Otherness is the pivot on which anti-immigrant backlashes turn. Because, if marginalized immigrant workers are useful in part because they are marked by illegality, poverty, racialization and exclusion, this very marking, this highlighting of their difference, contributes to their distinction as a suspect population, and fuels backlash. So, immigration law simultaneously preserves Otherness, and must combat its political, social, and fiscal fallout. In concrete terms, it both constructs illegality and difference, and spends millions on doomed projects of integration (Calavita 2007:97).

The “subordinate inclusion” of migrants is not only enforced by temporariness of stay. The criminalization of irregular migration, too, takes place in parallel with a partial opening of EU economies to workers in irregular situation. As we have noted earlier in this section, irregularity is produced by the limitation of legal avenues to migration; additionally, data pointed at a stability, if not increase, of figures of irregulars in the EU. In the context of the global neoliberal drive for labour market flexibility and deregulation,

the new borders constitute a functional complement to economic deregulation [...]. As has already been the case in history, the mobility of capital can fully express its profitability only in conjunction with a limited and controlled mobility of labor. [...] The processes of criminalization and illegalization [...] converge toward an emerging European model of punitive regulation of migrations, in which restrictive immigration laws, [...] arrests and deportations work symbiotically to reproduce immigrants' vulnerability and exploitability (De Giorgi 2010:152 and 158; also on Spain: Calavita 2003).

76 As opposed to the label of “permanent”, which qualifies migration from Egypt to non-Arab, mostly Western states. The labels of “temporary” and “permanent” are used by Egyptian authorities.
As a matter of fact, the EU’s economies were “able to absorb thousands of irregular migrants” (Içduygu and Yükseker 2012:450), as were Gulf States’ economies. In such a context, the spectacular display of border control operations, of round-ups and captures of irregulars, of massive deportations like the ones organized in the Gulf States, are “border spectacles”. As such, they hold the function of displaying migrants’ “illegality”, hence permanent condition of “detainability and deportability” (De Genova 2005). As further emphasized by De Genova, what is at stake is “a larger sociopolitical (and legal) process of inclusion through exclusion,” a paradoxical “scene of exclusion” of migrants, yet as irregulars, or “obscene of inclusion” (De Genova 2013:1180). Our suggestion is, therefore, that post-Arab uprisings migration policies in the EU, as in the Gulf States, are driven by two intertwined processes of securitization and economization of migration. Yet, the ethical and human rights concerns enshrined in the global migration policy-making discourse on migration “management” seem to have been lost, in view of the increasing “structural marginality” of migrants engineered by this very combination of securitization and economization of migration.

CONCLUSION

In summer 2015, the so-called “migrant crisis” erupted. The influx of refugees from Syria registered in the EU-28, especially, reached half a million in the month of November 2015. After initially resisting acceptance of the inflow, much in tune with the securitization of migration, on August 25 Germany decided to stop sending the migrants back to their country of first entry to the EU.\(^{77}\) Soon after, in early September, quotas of resettlement in all European countries were discussed. Does this mean that EU migration policies underwent a major upheaval, and would become motivated, from now on, by a combination of economic and rights-led concerns? In view of our interpretation of the post-Arab uprisings drivers of EU policies towards migrants from the South and East Mediterranean region (i.e., securitization and economization leading to the “subordinate inclusion” of certain categories of migrants kept in irregular and precarious situations), making sense of the recent move is indeed very difficult. However, the initial period of openness of EU gates to all did not last long. Very soon, \(\text{prima facie}\) granting of the status of refugee became limited to three nationalities only: the Syrians, the Iraqis and the Eritreans. All other nationalities became stigmatized as “economic migrants” trying to infiltrate the EU, hence having to undergo very thorough screening processes for their asylum claims (Sudanese for example). Others were simply turned away, as were the nationals of countries labelled as “secure”,\(^{78}\) even if suffering from very high unemployment rates (Kosovo and Montenegro for instance), or from significant political downturn, like Turkey. Our hypothesis is that the opening of EU borders to refugees from the three countries does not, in fact, mark a change in EU policies since it is accompanied by a parallel stigmatization of certain nationalities as suspect, and by a closure of avenues of legal entry for these nationals. Part of these will have to resort to irregularity. The intertwining of securitization, economization and probably “structural marginalization” of some categories of migrants may thus still accurately describe EU migration policies as of autumn 2015.

\(^{77}\) According to the Dublin regulation, the asylum-seeker is forced to claim asylum in the country he/she first entered the EU.

However, two supplementary levels of categorization/discrimination now apply to SEM citizens: first, that separating the refugees from the migrants, characterized as economic and hence criminals in the European public discourse. Also disturbing is a new, nationality-based gap implicitly emerging, which separates legitimate refugees of Syrian, Iraqi and Eritrean nationalities from illegitimate economic migrants from other SEM countries.

In a perspective of political demography, and focusing on the key period of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath, the paper first aimed at describing the characteristics and institutional background of the migration policies applied to youth from six South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries, in their two main areas of destination, the Gulf States and the EU. Second, it sought to understand the political motives underlying recent changes to these policies, following the Arab uprisings. The paper first described the recent dynamics and distribution of young migrants from SEM countries by area of destination, as well as the structural drivers of youth’s emigration pressure (demography, economic globalization, political instability). It also emphasized the fact that migration pressure from these countries is strong, but not a direct outcome of the uprisings. In the second section, the paper attempted to deconstruct the managerial policy discourse applied to youth migration in the two areas of destination. Restructured around the three poles of security, economy and rights, the discourse’s function appears to mostly serve security aims. In the Gulf, the emergence of irregularity as a policy concern helps to reaffirm ruling regimes’ sovereign power over socio-political and geographic borders, as well as their control over the redistribution process. Additionally, the criminalization of irregulars supports the selective deportation of some nationalities (namely, a vast portion of the Egyptian expatriates) in the context of post-uprisings regime change in the SEM region. In Europe, the policy discourse supports the strengthening of the EU’s external borders, which counterbalanced the creation of an area of free circulation within the European Union. The securitization of migration applies particularly to the Southern borders since 9/11. The signing of so-called Mobility Partnerships (Morocco and Tunisia) and Readmission Agreement (Turkey) constraining youth migration from the South and securing their readmission by their origin country de facto externalizes EU border control. The third section of the paper confronted the discourses with data and interpreted the aims behind policy action: depoliticization of the motivations to migrate from SEM countries; stigmatization of unmarried, low-skilled young economic migrants; and sustaining of work force inflows albeit “securitized” by the growing temporariness of migration and by the selective “subordinate inclusion” of some irregular labourers.
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POWER2YOUTH is a research project aimed at offering a critical understanding of youth in the South East Mediterranean (SEM) region through a comprehensive interdisciplinary, multi-level and gender sensitive approach. By combining the economic, political and socio-cultural spheres and a macro (policy/institutional), meso (organizational) and micro (individual) level analysis, POWER2YOUTH explores the root causes and complex dynamics of the processes of youth exclusion and inclusion in the labour market and civic/political life, while investigating the potentially transformative effect of youth collective and individual agency. The project has a cross-national comparative design with the case studies of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territories and Turkey. POWER2YOUTH’s participants are 13 research and academic institutions based in the EU member states, Norway, Switzerland and South East Mediterranean (SEM) countries. The project is mainly funded under the European Union’s 7th Framework Programme.