The European Community Framing of the Mediterranean (1970-1990)

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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the early phase of European construction of the Mediterranean during the 1970s and 1980s. It seeks to analyse how the European Community (EC) discursively constructed itself against the Mediterranean as a neighbouring space, and how it mapped the Mediterranean accordingly. It concludes that early attempts towards European construction of the Mediterranean were mainly triggered by the EC’s economic interests and necessitated by its recurring enlargement processes. The EC did not perceive the Mediterranean as a coherent region, and a clear distinction was made between its various geographical components. The analysis also shows that most of the Community’s initiatives for political cooperation with many Mediterranean countries did not succeed. It demonstrates how most Europeans perceived Middle East politics as a domain of US active diplomacy, even while the EC perceived itself as the most powerful actor capable of constructing the Mediterranean as a zone of economic prosperity.

INTRODUCTION
European construction of the Mediterranean has passed through different phases and has substantially shifted from the early 1970s to current times. Contemporary European perception of and action in the Mediterranean have thus varied politically, economically and strategically from the post-Second World War period, to the détente years, to the post-Cold War new world order, and reaching to the era of globalization.

This paper looks into the early phase of European construction of the Mediterranean during the 1970s and 1980s. Even if the 1960s witnessed the first European initiatives to construct Euro-Mediterranean relations, mainly through French and Italian proposals aiming at inventing a global cooperation approach with Southern Mediterranean countries in the Maghreb area and Libya (Osswald and Wessels 1982: 285-286), as well as in the conclusion of bilateral economic agreements with twelve Mediterranean countries (Tsoukalis 1977: 427), the actual kick-off of the first collective European approach toward the Mediterranean was marked by the European Community’s (EC) so-called “Global Mediterranean Policy” (GMP) and the subsequent launch of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) in the 1970s.

The analysis of these early decades has its significance in displaying not only the shifting patterns in European discourse on the Mediterranean across geographical, political, security...
and economic lines, but also in understanding how European identity was initially constructed and has consequently evolved against its Mediterranean other (Cebeci and Schumacher 2016: 2-3). It also has its significance in underlining the dominant prism through which European interest in the Mediterranean was reflected in different periods. This interest seems to have had a prevailing economic nature in some periods compared to a dominant political nature in others.

This paper therefore adopts a constructivist framework of analysis, complemented by abundant historiographic narrations, that seeks to highlight the interconnection between interests and power structures on the one side and identities, images and ideas on the other (Cebeci and Schumacher 2016: 3). The main research question that this paper seeks to answer is: How did the EC discursively construct the Mediterranean as a neighbouring area during the 1970s and 1980s? This relatively broad question entails further answers to questions like: How did the EC perceive, refer to, and eventually deal with the Mediterranean countries (including both European countries that were at the time non-members of the EC as well as non-European countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean)? How did the EC represent different political, economic and cultural subjects in the Mediterranean area? What are the arguments that were used by the EC to justify these representations? How did such representations feed into collective European practices and policies in those early EC attempts to construct the Mediterranean?

Accordingly, this paper is divided into five sections. The first focuses on the formulation of the GMP and how economics seemed the only factor holding the Mediterranean countries together vis-à-vis the EC. The second brings into focus the EC process of self-construction in the Mediterranean, and poses questions to its rise as a “civilian power”. The third concentrates on EC attempts to reframe its Mediterranean partners in the aftermath of the oil crisis to accentuate the particularity of its Arab Mediterranean partners. The fourth tackles the context of Community enlargement in the 1980s, in which the Mediterranean appeared as a dividing line through an increased European inclination towards sub-regional cooperation. The last section focuses on EC securitization processes in the Mediterranean, distinguishing between securitization practices as evident in the field of energy security and adoption of ordinary measures, as seemed to be the case in the areas of terrorism and migration.

1. THE FORMULATION OF THE GMP: ECONOMICS HOLD THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN TOGETHER vis-à-vis THE EC

By the start of the 1970s the interest of the EC in developing its relations with the Mediterranean was ripe from both political and economic perspectives. Politically, the Cold War had entered the new phase of détente, in which Western European powers ceased to primarily conceive of the Mediterranean Basin as a militarized stage in the tight East-West bipolarity (Bicchi 2007: 68). Economically, the boom that the EC experienced in the 1960s and its first enlargement plans in 1973 paved the way for a reformulation of existing EC-Mediterranean agreements.

Thus, the EC perceived a key economic interest in reforming existing agreements that were signed with twelve out of seventeen “littoral” Mediterranean countries. These agreements were not interlinked through common guidelines with the Community’s economic policy.
Some of the agreements were multi-dimensional, but others were merely non-preferential trade agreements (Tsoukalis 1977: 427). Besides, some agreements were tentative in nature, such as those with Morocco and Tunisia, which were concluded in 1969 with a duration of only five years. On the other hand, the EC enlargement plans in 1973, which expected the inclusion of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, raised the awareness of several European institutions about the urgent need to reform Mediterranean agreements. Specifically, legal reforms to quotas and other aspects of commercial relations between the EC and Third Mediterranean Countries (TMC) had to be introduced (Pierros et al. 1999: 83).

The idea of creating a "global" Mediterranean policy is claimed by the European Parliament (EP), which pronounced itself as the first European institution to advocate such an initiative (EP 1973). Indeed, the EP resolution of March 1971 on the trade policy of the Community towards the Mediterranean countries notes the Parliament’s call upon the Commission and the Council to clearly define the objectives and instruments of the Community’s GMP (EP 1971). According to the 1973 resolution, the EP recommended “the improvement of the organization of Mediterranean production and markets”, “joint action by the Six on the basis of a coherent overall approach”, and “the promotion of an active development policy” (EP 1973: 34). The focus of developing EC-Mediterranean relations was therefore overwhelmingly on trade issues, and, how trade issues should be organized between the EC and “all” Mediterranean Countries, without any notable categorization of these countries. According to the EP (1973: 35), by promoting trade and development, “the Community as a multinational unit is in a better position than anyone to make an essential contribution to the establishment of a zone of peaceful co-existence, freedom and progress around the Mediterranean”. The issue of trade was underlined several times in the EP and Commission documents from 1971 to 1973, where the main reference to “all” Mediterranean countries was “contracting Mediterranean countries”.

The analysis of available EP and Commission documents in these years demonstrates that the main reason for the early consideration of a “global” policy was the context of the “Community enlargement”. This appeared mainly in the Commission GMP document, which stated that “A further necessity for a realignment of existing Agreements arises from the enlargement of the Community, as a result of which if nothing were changed existing trade channels, particularly for some specific countries, would be radically altered” (Commission of the EC 1972: 2). Also, in 1973, the EP called upon “the Commission and the Council to complete in good time the legal and technical adjustments necessitated by the enlargement to ensure continuity of the agreements” (EP 1973: 35).

However, in this early stage of constructing the geographical scope of the Mediterranean as a cohesive area towards which the EC could devise a “global” approach, the Mediterranean was composed of vastly diverse countries from political, economic and cultural perspectives. The Mediterranean, hence, at the beginning of the 1970s did represent the absolute different other to the EC:

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2 Yet, the idea of creating common guidelines in EC-TMC agreements was originated in France and strongly supported by Italy, since both countries had concerns about making further concessions in their agricultural policy if they had to negotiate separately with Mediterranean countries (Tsoukalis 1977: 429).
Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey were perceived as close to the Community in different ways. EC documents refer to Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta and Greece as “European Mediterranean Countries” or “Southern European Countries”, which accentuates their European identity. With specific regard to Turkey, the close relation between the EC and Turkey was mainly of a political and strategic nature, since Turkey joined the Western camp and became a NATO member in 1952. This largely explains its demand to sign an association agreement with the Community in 1959 (Ilkin 1990: 35). Besides NATO, and in line with the dominant political orientation of Western Europe’s foreign policy during the Cold War, Turkey was admitted to the Council of Europe and the OECD (Bourguignon 1990: 52). Furthermore, by the start of the 1970s, all “Southern European countries” were either members of the EC or members of institutions that had close ties with the EC (Siotis 1977: 200). For instance, Portugal was a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and Greece, Portugal and Spain were members of the OECD.

This contrasts significantly with the case of the Southern Mediterranean countries, which included Israel and a varying group of Arab states with which the Community shared distinctive political and economic interests. Also, in the Southern Mediterranean, the Community recognized the diversity between Eastern and Western states. This appeared in the EC’s tendency to refer to Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria as the ”Maghreb” (Pace 2002: 197-8), which implied that these countries constituted a distinctive sub-grouping within the Southern Mediterranean.

In the case of Yugoslavia, its particularity as a strategic “littoral state” on the Mediterranean appeared in its status of non-alignment, its strong economic and political links with Eastern Europe, and its growing trade with the EC (Tsoukalis 1977: 433). Therefore, in 1970 and 1973, the EC concluded non-preferential trade agreements with Yugoslavia, which stipulated “most favoured nation” treatment by both sides.

Accordingly, in the Commission’s GMP founding document of 1972, a clear distinction between two types of Mediterranean Basin countries was made. As the document states:

Over and above the common features exhibited by the Mediterranean countries, the Commission draws a distinction, in that basically it keeps open the door to the accession of the European Mediterranean countries to the Community, without in any way weakening the conditions for accession as established in the Rome Treaty, whereas specific relations are to be sought with the other countries of the Mediterranean basin and for those which do not border directly onto the Middle Sea, but are linked together in a way which is significant for relations with the European Communities. (Commission of the EC 1972: 2, emphasis added)

It is hence clear that the GMP mapped the Mediterranean countries in two categories.

First, there were those European countries for which the accession door to the Community was kept open. The stipulations of association agreements with Malta and Cyprus, for instance, were preparing for the establishment of a customs union. Also, association agreements with Greece and Turkey included a view to possible accession. Similarly, the free trade agreement with Portugal was formulated within the framework of EFTA. Indeed, in a few years the sense of a Global Mediterranean approach was significantly undermined when Greece and Spain were
no longer interested in the GMP because they applied for full membership in the Community in 1975 and in 1977 respectively.

Second, there were the non-European Mediterranean countries and those countries which do not directly border the Mediterranean Sea (such as Jordan) but which the Community perceived as significantly "linked" to the EC. For these countries, the Community started to seek a specific transformation of already existing agreements into "a new more global system" (Commission of the EC 1972: 2). Existing agreements in this category included association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia (1969), and preferential trade agreements with Israel (1964), Egypt and Lebanon (1972). In addition, there was a non-preferential trade agreement with Yugoslavia (1970).

In the Commission’s 1972 GMP, the Commission presented its ideas on an "overall" policy towards the Mediterranean countries based on: first, geographical proximity, which renders TMCs as "neighbours linked by a complex network of relations"; second, the Mediterranean as "the bridge between the European Communities and the African countries"; and, third, the shared interests between the EC and Mediterranean countries. On these shared interests, the document notes "mutual interests, in particular in the fields of external security, trade, both in industrial and agricultural products and the provision of energy, and in the labour sector" (Commission of the EC 1972: 2). But notwithstanding the brief mentioning of "external security" as a dimension of mutual interest, the rest of the document deals exclusively with possible cooperation venues in economic issues.

The context of enlargement had thus necessitated that a realignment of previous agreements be performed by January 1974 at the latest, otherwise most Mediterranean countries, especially Spain and Israel, would experience differing commercial difficulties (Commission of the EC 1972: 3-4). The Community’s economic interests were reflected in the arrangements offered in the GMP, which came to focus on energy cooperation and other technical areas. These included free exchange of goods to boost industrial production within the Community, an arrangement regarding agricultural competition both inside and outside the Community, and contractual cooperation in the trade in goods, with coherent measures in the field of capital transactions as well as financial and technical help (Ibid.). Growing European awareness about economic relations unified EC members towards the creation of the GMP, stimulating its description as a "special relationship with the littoral countries based on trade and aid" (La Serre 1981: 379).

EC-TMC agreements concluded in the framework of the GMP reflected the Community’s mapping of it Mediterranean partners. Thus, instead of creating a global policy in the Mediterranean, the EC tailored different agreements for different partners:

- As concerns Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, the EC concluded an agreement with Israel in 1975, the Maghreb countries in 1976 and the Mashreq countries in 1977. These agreements were notably diverse. For instance, the EC did not welcome an Arab proposal to negotiate a Free Trade Area because trade issues were already agreed on in previous agreements (Allen 1977: 334). At the same time, the EC-Israeli agreement was considered the first of its kind between the Community and a South Mediterranean country, as it did not preclude the establishment of customs unions or a free trade area, and stipulated that the abolition of customs duties must be completed by January 1989 (Agreement between the EEC and Israel 1975: 4, 27). During this period the Arabs complained about the content
of their economic agreements, since EC agreements with both the Maghreb and Mashraq countries did not include similar clauses.

- Other agreements were “negotiated individually in the 1960s” and “were renewed in 1972 as part of an overall Community policy” (Commission of the EC 1982a: 2), such as those with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. According to the Commission (1982a: 2), “Turkey, Cyprus and Malta have signed association agreements which will progressively create a customs union with the Community”. This is because the potential for accession to the Community was foreseen for these three countries. To also highlight the particular nature of EC-Turkish relations, the same document mentions that “in Turkey’s case, the agreement ultimately envisages full membership” (Ibid.).

- As for Yugoslavia, negotiations began in 1978 and led to the signing of an interim economic cooperation agreement in April 1980, which was described by the Commission in 1986 as “sui generis”. This is because it has been concluded for an indefinite period of time, and also because the Community removed customs duties and quantitative restrictions on almost all general industrial products of Yugoslavia (Commission of the EC 1986).

- Finally, Greece, Spain and Portugal did not sign any GMP agreements since they soon applied for full membership.

With the two processes of Community enlargement in the 1980s to include Greece, Portugal and Spain, the EC undertook a comprehensive economic revision of its Mediterranean agreements. The GMP revisions were undertaken in two directions: Internally, there was a need to harmonize the apparent economic and social imbalances between new and old members. Externally, the enlargement process necessitated revisions of economic and trade provisions with Mediterranean partners (Commission of the EC 1982a: 1). In fact, in 1985 the Commission notes again that “[t]he Community’s interests are at stake because the Mediterranean non-member countries represent its third most important external outlet and its biggest trade surplus” (Commission of the EC 1985: 2). Out of this conviction, “[a]s the leading power in the Mediterranean, the Community has a direct concern in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries future [economic] development” (Ibid.). Therefore, the aim of GMP revision in 1985 was to come up with guidelines that would constitute the foundation for future negotiations between the EC and TMCs on the content and implementation of cooperation over the next five-year period. The essence of the Commission’s 1980s review proposals are thus best understood in the Community’s need to preserve the flow of trade with Mediterranean countries by offering some assistance funds as a substitute for a further opening of markets (Osswald and Wessels 1982: 303-304).

2. The EC’s Self-Construction in the Mediterranean: A “Civilian Power”?

While constructing the Mediterranean in a specific way in its relations with the countries of the region, the EC had also constructed its own identity. To start with, the EC represented itself in the “unified Six”, even if among these Italy and France were two important Mediterranean powers. Second, Mediterranean partners were composed of all other European and non-European littoral states on the Mediterranean Basin. In this early phase the EC consciously distinguished
between those partners based on their foreseen potential to join the Community. This is how the EC differentiated between “European Mediterranean countries” and “other countries of the Mediterranean basin” (Commission of the EC 1972: 2, emphasis added).

While the Mediterranean Basin still held important political and strategic significance to the EC, as well as to some of its Mediterranean countries (especially France and Italy), the overall focus of the 1972 GMP was overwhelmingly on economic issues. The non-military and low political and security nature of the GMP stimulated some Western European scholars to advocate that the GMP “was conceived to be, along with the Lomé agreement, a central part of [Europe’s] role as a ‘civilian power’” (Osswald and Wessels 1982: 287, see also Duchêne 1972).

The term “civilian power” was widely used at the time as opposite to the traditional military/political power, which dominated the discussion about international politics during most of the Cold War years (Bull 1982: 149). Thus, the novelty of the EC as a civilian power was largely enhanced during the 1970s, especially in the way the Community constructed its external relations with the Mediterranean. This was reflected first in the dimension of cooperation, which focused on “economic development”, and the civilian tools used to construct this cooperation, which focused on trade agreements, economic aid, political dialogue and other non-military instruments (Larsen 2002: 285). According to Duchêne et al. (1984: 15), by stressing economic development as the core of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the Community constructed itself as a “civilian power” capable of separating high and low politics.

According to Diez (2005: 613-4), there is a “widespread belief” that the EU relies “on civilian rather than military means” and pursues “the spread of particular norms, rather than geographical expansion or military superiority. In the 1970s, François Duchêne called it a ‘civilian power’; in 2002, Ian Manners argued that the label ‘normative power’ would be better-suited.” Such discourse about the EU as a civilian or normative power has been steadily constructed in Western European literature since the early 1970s, and “establishes a particular identity for the EU through turning third parties into ‘others’ and representing the EU as a positive force in world politics” (Diez 2005: 613). Indeed, the EC took two concrete steps towards this kind of representation during the early 1970s. The first step came with the 1970 inauguration of the European Political Cooperation framework (EPC), through which multilateral coordination of the Community’s external relations would be pursued. The second was the EC’s issuance of the “Declaration on European Identity” in December 1973, which represents its attempt to delineate its identity vis-à-vis the world such that Community members could “achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs” (Bulletin of the EC 1973b: 118). These two steps are thus important in how they represented a coherent attempt on the part of the EC to construct itself as a unitary actor in pursuing external relations with the others. This was applied in relations with the Mediterranean by the Community’s discourses on how the essence of the GMP was “both the liberalization of trade and cooperation in development” (EP 1973: 35). This implied a technocratic/economic approach in shaping the Community’s Mediterranean relations, which was indeed pursued through various civilian instruments. These included negotiating free trade in industrial goods; limited concessions on agricultural goods; technical and industrial cooperation; and the provision of financial aid to some Mediterranean countries (Pierros et al. 1999: 86).
However, while it is not widely debated that the EC was a civilian power in the Mediterranean, Diez (2005) notes that the controversy about "civilian power Europe" lies in inquiring about the reasons behind this representation. These reasons are largely found in: first, the difference in power capabilities between Europe and the two superpowers; and second, the incoherence of European behaviour in the process of applying norms to its external relations. As for the first point, it was indeed the case that the capabilities of the EC (compared to those of the two superpowers) were compelling in limiting the EC’s Mediterranean approach to a technocratic/developmental one. As Duchêne (1973: 19) notes, the competition between superpowers had provided Europe with "much more scope [for] the civilian forms of influence and action". This point becomes even clearer when noting that "obvious political reasons" (rather than merely economic ones) were explicitly evident in European construction of the GMP (EP 1973). As for the second, the EC’s application of its norms in its Mediterranean relations is controversial because in such normative representation the EC was only seeking its economic interests.

It is indeed worth noting that as negotiations of these economic agreements commenced, a gradual dissatisfaction steadily grew in non-EC Mediterranean countries. Some of them (such as Spain and Israel) lamented that trade in agricultural goods with TMCs was too limited, while several TMCs, including Turkey and many Arab states, complained about the Community’s restrictions on their agricultural products as well as their trade deficit with the Community. Even if reducing trade deficits in EC-TMC trade was not officially an objective in the agreements, the GMP substantively intended to make an essential contribution to “the promotion of trade” and “cooperation in development”. This is also why the EP urged in 1973 that agreements “be pursued and developed in the light of the special characteristics of each of these countries” (EP 1973: 35). It is notable that in the Declaration of the Paris summit EC members underlined how they would “respond more than ever before to the expectations of all the developing countries”; and how EC institutions would study the conditions which will permit the achievement of a “substantial growth” target (Bulletin of the EC 1972: 20-21). All these statements indicate that the EC in its normative discourse was depoliticizing its own (often problematic) role in order to favour its economic interests in the partner countries.

Indeed, most EC-Mediterranean agreements were meant to sustain the domestic process of European enlargement through creating common policy guidelines for the Community’s external economic interactions. Accordingly, several protectionist policy practices were devised by the EC in the Mediterranean, mainly in agricultural imports. Such imports were controlled by tariffs, and in several cases by the system of minimum prices established under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to protect domestic producers (Duchêne et al. 1984: 27). So, while the 1972 GMP “provides for the creation of customs unions or industrial free trade zones with the Mediterranean countries” (Commission of the EC 1972: 8), the agreements put restrictions on several important Mediterranean products, such as phosphate fertilisers, textiles and aluminium (Ashoff 1983: 17-8). According to the Commission itself (1982b: 2), Mediterranean problems were “exacerbated by a common agricultural policy skewed against Mediterranean crops”. This is because the CAP led to rising production levels, which generated surplus in certain agricultural goods and forced the Mediterranean countries “hold down their exports and sometimes to sell at a loss” (Commission of the EC 1984: 3).

The imposed EC trade restrictions had positive impact on the Community’s trade with many TMCs, while aggregating trade deficit in these partners’ trade with the EC. For instance, between 1970 and 1975, Community exports to Arab countries rose by 314 percent, while its imports rose
by only 91 percent (Miller 2014: 939). During the 1980s, trade deficits grew from 4,000 million ECU in 1973 to 9,000 in 1980 (Commission of the EC 1982a: 3). Besides, the steadily shrinking employment opportunities within the EC for migrant labour caused a notable decline in the remittance from migrant workers in several North African countries as well as in Turkey and Yugoslavia (Commission of the EC 1982a: 3). However, on its side, the EC attributed the limited success of the agreements (EP 1985: 486), to several factors having to do with its partners’ own internal problems. These include: inadequate regional development, the failure to increase exports of manufactured goods, high population growth, increasing food imports, and debt pressures (Commission of the EC 1984).

When it comes to aid, the geographical distribution of EC aid flows demonstrates that the Community’s aid flows to MENA had been constantly decreasing from mid-1960s to the end of the 1980s, especially when compared to other regions like Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) (Grilli and Riess 1992: 204). As concluded by Grilli (1993: 61), the EC’s actual aid flows towards the Arab MENA region fell short of its promises in official documents.

3. Reframing Mediterranean Partners: The Particularity of the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean

The October 1973 war and the subsequent oil crisis triggered a higher European political interest in the stability of the Middle East and a higher degree of securitization of its energy relations with the Arab world. As noted by MEPs, “considering, among other things, the effects of the oil crisis, it was the duty of the Community to find a solution to the pressing problems associated with the Arab Countries” (Bulletin of the EC 1974: 90). The EC Declaration on 6 November 1973 (Bulletin of the EC 1973a: 106), which called on the Israelis to cede occupied territories, was therefore an attempt to conciliate the Arabs (Turner 1974: 409-10). The Arab-Israeli conflict was thus enhanced as a key issue in EC plans for the Mediterranean, and accordingly the GMP was complemented with the EAD in 1974, rather than with a smaller energy forum.

The Community’s energy security also assumed a higher importance, which was manifested in many internal and external EC practices. For instance, in May 1974 the Commission elaborated on “a new energy policy strategy”; and in November 1974 it proposed objectives for the Community’s supply structure by 1985 (Commission of the EC 1974a, 1974b). Externally, energy issues became an integral part of the EC’s relations with the Arab Gulf, as the Commission (1980: 6) saw it was “absolutely essential to normalize trade relations with the producing countries”. Also, the EC referred to the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean in its links to “the petrol-producing region of the Near East” (Commission of the EC 1982a: 1); or as “a major route for fuel and raw material supplies” (Commission of the EC 1982b: 9).

It is thus obvious how the oil crisis led to a further EC reframing of its Mediterranean partners to better accentuate the diversity of its Arab MENA partners. This framing took into consideration “the continuing uncertainties of the energy supply situation, the Community’s failure so far to define unequivocally its Mediterranean policy and the continuing uncertainties over the position of the Arab States vis-à-vis the joint development policy” (Bulletin of the EC 1974: 90).
The particularity of the Arab Mediterranean was stressed again in terms of energy and trade, since the Mediterranean countries were taking more than 10 percent of total Community exports worldwide, progressively offering a greater potential for a "larger market" (Commission of the EC 1982b: 9).

In this respect, two key documents were significant for such reframing to accommodate this distinctive nature of Arab MENA within the Mediterranean space:

First, the Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers on the Situation in the Middle East on 6 November 1973. In this document the EC positioned its stance regarding the war in the Middle East in accordance with relevant UNSCRs 339 and 340. However, the EC also seized the opportunity to stress "the ties of all kinds which have long linked them to the littoral states of the south and east of the Mediterranean" (Bulletin of the EC 1973a: 106, emphasis added).

Second, the Declaration on European Identity makes a clear distinction between EC-Europeans and "others", on the basis of the Community’s plans for a united Europe of the “same ideals and objectives” (Bulletin of the EC 1973b: 119). It states that “the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a united Europe, all give the European Identity its originality […]” (Bulletin of the EC 1973b: 119).

By stressing these elements of political, cultural and social homogeneity, which nurture the dynamic process of European enlargement, the EC situated itself against its partners in the world, whether Mediterranean or non-Mediterranean. Yet, the Declaration came also to specify the particularity of Arab MENA, by noting that “[t]he Nine intend to preserve their historic links with the countries of the Middle East and to cooperate over the establishment and maintenance of peace, stability and progress in the region” (Bulletin of the EC 1973b: 121). The Declaration thus expressed for the first time the political and cultural diversity between the two shores of the Mediterranean in the EC perception, exactly as the GMP had earlier stressed the economic difference.

So, the EC together with its Arab partners started to formulate the EAD, which was thought to add a political dimension to the already existing economic partnership. In this regard, the EAD endeavour reflects, on its part, a further EC attempt to map the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean spaces across political lines by tailoring a specific multi-dimensional dialogue with the Mediterranean Arab partners only. However, the EC attempted to depoliticize the EAD by maintaining an economic focus. As noted by Claude Cheysson (1974: 83), the then European Commissioner for Development, it was the “economic interest” that triggered the institutionalization of Euro-Arab relations. This was mainly due to US and Israeli antagonism to the Dialogue, which caused divisions between EC members on how far they could address Arab-Israeli politics without close coordination with Washington (Allen 1977: 329, Miller 2013, Boutros-Ghali 1974, Khader 1981: 144-5). Besides, the limited capacity of the intergovernmental mechanism of the EPC in dealing with developed divisions among EC members was another factor leading to the EAD’s eventual stagnation. The EC’s choice for the EAD to maintain an economic focus largely implied that the EC was withdrawing itself from controversial Middle East politics (Möckli 2011: 8g).
The centrality of the Palestinian factor in EC-Mediterranean relations acquired higher importance after the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. These events pushed the EC to clarify its stance regarding these key happenings (Persson 2015: 80), which was manifested in the EC’s Venice Declaration in June 1980. While external factors related to the complications of the Palestinian issue and the stagnation of the EAD had their role in pushing for the Declaration, it is also true that the internal intra-EC dynamics had their role in reaching consensus on the Declaration. These were mainly represented in British leadership and lack of German opposition due to a temporary deterioration in German-Israeli relations (Behr 2015). In this Declaration, the Community boldly based its policy on UNSCRs 242 and 338, affirming the PLO’s right to be “associated with the negotiations”, assuring the right of access of all parties to the City of Jerusalem, and condemning Israel’s territorial expansions since 1967, which were referred to as “illegal under international law” (European Council 1980). Even if the Venice Declaration was accompanied by intra-EC debate, and despite its stress on “the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel” (Ibid.), which was disputed by Arab partners, the Declaration is historically regarded as Europe’s first coherent step in formulating a common stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was disdained by Israel and largely ignored by Washington, yet as noted by Hollis (2011: 42), its core principles guided future negotiations in the Middle East conflict, reaching to the Oslo accords of 1993.

The EC was unable to develop further on the Venice Declaration during the entire decade of the 1980s, as internal divisions put the brakes on any further collective coordination. This was mainly due to France’s continuous attempts to lead an independent European policy in the Middle East, which contrasted with the stance of Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, which preferred closer coordination on these strategic issues with Washington (Behr 2015: 31).

4. The Context of Community Enlargement in the 1980s: The Mediterranean as a Dividing Line and European Inclination towards Sub-Regional Cooperation

The two enlargement processes that the EC experienced during the 1980s contributed to reshaping how the Community perceived the Mediterranean in two ways.

First, the Community’s comprehensive perception of the Mediterranean as a whole, as the EC realized that its trade with the Mediterranean countries – especially in agricultural goods – could be significantly influenced. It is telling to see how in 1982 the Commission commented on “the importance of the Mediterranean area as a whole” solely in terms of “market access” (Commission of the EC 1982b: 8). According to the exact wording of the Commission, “Since 1972 the area has grown steadily more important to the Community in economic terms” (Ibid.: 9). “The Community must take care to see that loss of market access does not irreparably destroy the fragile balance of relations with the Mediterranean countries. […] Ousted from Community markets, they could only turn elsewhere” (Ibid.: 8).
This explains why the EC undertook comprehensive revisions during the 1980s of its Mediterranean agreements, which mainly focused on trade in agricultural goods. At the time, most non-EC Mediterranean countries were anxious that the upcoming inclusion of Spain and Portugal would further decrease their exports to the EC and exacerbate their economic problems (Commission of the EC 1984: 5). The Community was thus convinced that “the relative importance of agriculture to the Mediterranean economy, coupled with the need to improve competitiveness in advance of Spanish and Portuguese accession, means that agriculture will play a major role in the new programmes” (Commission of the EC 1982a: 4).

Second, European partition of the Mediterranean into different areas, as the processes of Community enlargement indicated that TMCs were increasingly composed of those lacking the prospect of EC membership. According to the EC, the accession of new members from Southern Europe made “the centre of balance of the European Community shifts to the south and increasing importance is attached to the [... Community Mediterranean Policy” (Commission of the EC 1982a: 1). Accordingly, the start of the 1980s marked a growing European perception of the Mediterranean in terms of its different sub-areas. There were southern European countries, both those on the verge of accession as well as those which could apply for accession. There were southern Mediterranean countries, which were also increasingly perceived in two groupings: the Maghreb countries and the controversial Middle East/Mashreq countries. Besides, the Mediterranean still linked the EC with other important regions, such as the Balkans and oil-rich Gulf, with which the Community shared important economic and political links.

The Community’s distinction between its Mediterranean partners during the 1980s was further evident when Morocco’s application to join the EC was rejected twice, in 1984 and in 1987, by the Council (responses remain classified), since it was not a European state (Mommen 1998: 218). Later, the President of the Council “emphasized the various factors which make Morocco a special partner” (Bulletin of the EC 1987: 64). Yet, scholarly production links the rejection of Morocco’s application to the question of European identity; where Europe starts and ends; and which Mediterranean partners could have the prospect of joining the Community while others would remain only “special partners”.

This debate on European self-construction and identity was further stimulated by the fact that no other application to the Community’s membership had been met with such definite denial, including the one from Turkey. As Rumelili (2004: 40) notes, “all other applications have led to different institutional arrangements that left the possibility of full membership open”. In the case of Turkey, when the Turkish government applied for EC membership in April 1987, the issue was essentially discussed from a technical perspective in light of the EC’s busyness with the accommodation of the third enlargement as well as Turkey’s own geographical, demographical and developmental characteristics. According to the Commission (1989: 4) Turkey “will eventually have a bigger population than any Community Member State – and its general level of development is substantially lower than the European average”. The technical assessment conducted by the EC in the late 1980s indicates that the prospects for Turkey’s accession to the Community were not utterly excluded on either a geographical or an identity basis. Rather, as the Commission (1989: 6) states, “As long as these [demographic and economic] disparities continue to exit, there will be reason to fear that Turkey would experience serious difficulties in taking on the obligations resulting from the Community’s economic and social policies”. Besides these technical issues, the EC noted that Turkey’s political context
and practice has "not yet reached the level required in a democracy" (Ibid.: 7). This meant that Turkey could only start accession negotiations once it fulfilled the EC’s developmental and democratic standards (Rumelili 2004: 44).

Also, it could be argued that the Community distinguished between all Mediterranean sub-areas according to evident geo-political factors. This was emphasized by the then Vice-President Lorenzo Natali, European Commissioner for Mediterranean Affairs, when he noted:

Geopolitical reasons in themselves make an impressive case for the necessity of a coherent European Community policy on the Mediterranean. A glance at the map proves it. Look first at the Balkans and then at the mouth of the Atlantic. Take in the Dardanelles and the petrol-producing region of the Near East; remember too that the Mediterranean is the inescapable north-south axis for links between Europe and Africa. We must question whether the Community could survive a serious disturbance in the Mediterranean region. (Commission of the EC 1982a: 1)

This formulation of the geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean contributes to further understanding of how additional lines of delineation were introduced to EC mapping of the Mediterranean. Importantly, it reflects how the EC by the mid-1980s looked at the “southern and eastern Mediterranean countries” as unstable and conflictual areas. According to the Commission (1985: 2), the Community’s “interests and security are at stake and any further upsets in a region already torn by tensions and conflicts [...] could have dangerous consequences”. The employment of the terms “serious disturbance” or “dangerous conflicts” demonstrates that the EC/Europeans had a securitizing understanding of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, they were increasingly convinced that the Mediterranean is politically, economically and culturally diverse; that it is politically unstable and conflict-ridden; and that it could be destabilized by adverse conditions (Duchêne et al. 1984: 21). This was particularly the case in the Mashreq/ Middle East area, where the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 1982) stimulated wide European disinterest in discussing overall Euro-Mediterranean relations (Bicchi 2007: 127).

The context of the 1980s thus pressured the EC for innovative ideas in revisiting its construction of the Mediterranean and its mapping of Mediterranean partners. This happened through an increasing European inclination towards sub-regional cooperation and a powerful emphasis on economics. In this respect, and in a way to compensate for the stagnation in the EAD, in 1983 France elaborated on a Western Mediterranean Cooperation initiative (WMCI). The purpose of such an endeavour, which was launched in July 1990 as the "5+5 Initiative", was to strengthen political and economic cooperation in areas of common interest between the European and Arab countries of the Western Mediterranean (Romeo Núñez 2012). The WMCI reflected further European frustration with the possibility of effectively pursuing a global Mediterranean policy or even a broad Euro-Arab Dialogue. Also, the fact that the WMCI was a French-born initiative, reflects the French fatigue with devising further proposals within EC institutions to reinvigorate the EC’s Middle East policy. Therefore, The WMCI marked the partition of the Arab Mediterranean in European perception into two sub-regions, each of which enjoys a relative coherence in politics, economics, and cultural and social development. The initiative also reflected a reformed European understanding of possible political partnerships in the Mediterranean. Such understanding worked also to highlight the distinctive intensity of Community members’ political interest in the Mediterranean, since only four European members
(later joined by Malta) chose to embark on the WMCI. Similarly, the EC – triggered mainly by French proposals – worked to re-invent its relations with the Arab Gulf region. Particularly, the importance of the Arab Gulf region increased with outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran and the formation of the GCC in May 1981, which worked to renew the Community’s energy fears.

5. EC Securitization and De-Securitization Processes in the Mediterranean: Between Security Practices and Adoption of Ordinary Measures

As mentioned earlier, the EC securitized energy issues in its relations with Arab Mediterranean partners, as well as with Arab oil-producing countries in the Gulf area. Also, the EC depoliticized the EAD by maintaining an economic focus for the dialogue in order to escape Washington’s antagonism and divisions within the Community. However, two more issues deserve attention in EC securitization/de-securitization practices in the Mediterranean during the 1970s and 1980s.

The first is economic migration, which started to appear at the time as a growing socio-political problem necessitating a boundary-drawing effort on the part of the Community. The Commission notes in 1982b (p.15),

Cooperation on social matters also need a boost. The virtual closing of the door to further immigration and the problem of integrating immigrants into the society of the host countries, above all in the regions with concentration of them, could lead to social unrest with grave political consequences.

In its reference to possible social unrest and grave political consequences of the increasing flows of migrant workers, the EC appeared to deal with economic migration as a socio-political problem rather than a security one. In fact, the EC (and also member states) adopted ordinary political measures to deal with the problem in terms of drawing boundaries on migration flows from the Mediterranean into the Community. This process of drawing boundaries was done by both member states and collective EC institutions. According to the same Commission document (p. 15-16),

Most member states are already implementing bilateral schemes for on-the-spot training in the host country of workers who are needed for the development of their country of origin. The Community should encourage and assist with this type of cooperation by providing suitable aid for these schemes.

Besides, by the mid-1970s several member states had started to impose national restrictions on migration (Hammar 1985), which some scholars attribute in part to the lack of labour shortages in many EC countries (Pierros et al. 1999: 101). On the EC level, the Commission included “economic migration” in its agreements with some TMCs, especially the Maghreb countries and Turkey. This is because, according to the Commission (1982b: 6), “the Mediterranean countries from which there has traditionally been considerable emigration to the Community are the Maghreb countries, Turkey and Yugoslavia”. Thus, the EC Association Agreement with
Morocco, for example, came to organize social-security and economic issues of Moroccan workers in the Community, such as insurance, pension and family allowances (Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and Morocco 1978: 20). Also, the EC attempted to organize the status of Turkish workers in the Community, since West Germany and other members were opposed to granting free access to Turkish nationals into the EC (Bourguignon 1990: 58). At the EC-Turkey Council in December 1976, the status of Turkish workers was slightly improved when the concept of "a second priority for Turkish workers" was introduced to give priority to Turkish workers if vacancies could not be filled by Community (Ibid.: 57).

The second is terrorism, as the start of the 1970s marked the height of political terrorism, which – notwithstanding its various types and motives – mounted dramatically from the side of Palestinian resistance groups to hit targets in Western Europe (Crenshaw and Pimlott 1997). As a result, several EC members underwent a securitization process of the terrorism threat. This happened by introducing small-scale security measures, including the formation of specialized forces and the introduction of specific laws (Bicchi 2007: 70). According to Lodge (1989: 28), such measures included "a combination of economic, legal and political measures designed to deter state-sponsored terrorism and to advance the possibilities for a political settlement to problems in the Middle East". It is important therefore to note that such measures were adopted by the member states rather than the Community, and that the threat of terrorism was perceived to be emanating mainly from the Middle East rather than a formidable threat emanating from the southern Mediterranean area as a whole (Lodge 1989: 28). This is explained by the fact that the overwhelming majority of non-indigenous terrorist activities were associated with Palestinian resistance movements, including activities that occurred in the 1980s, such as the Achille Lauro incident. This factor led EC members and institutions to pay specific attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than securitizing the issue of terrorism in its relations with all Arab Mediterranean partners. In fact, several Arab states sympathized with the Palestinian cause and consequently with armed Palestinian resistance. This is why the twelve member states listed some Arab Mediterranean countries as "providing 'homes' but not direct support to terrorist bases" (Lodge 1989: 29), which reflects how EC members understood at the time the limited magnitude of the phenomenon. Apart from these member state actions, terrorism as a security threat was discussed collectively within the EPC framework with the aim of initiating an intra-European intelligence coordination (Bicchi 2007: 73). In this respect, the EC attempted to define terrorism by categorizing various terrorist attacks, and as for Middle East terrorism, member states eventually agreed to the "legal remedy" by applying existing international anti-terrorist provisions (Lodge 1989: 29-36). These provisions were agreed on in the "European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism", which was issued by the Council of Europe in 1977 and adopted by the Community in 1980 (Bulletin of the EC 1979: 90-91). There were similar EP resolutions on terrorism during the 1980s (EP 1980, EP 1986), which denote the necessity of closer member state cooperation in information-sharing, protection of external frontiers and creation of a common legal area in the field of terrorism. In these resolutions, terrorism was not confined to Palestinian terrorism, but encompassed other shapes of indigenous terrorist activities in Europe. For instance, in one EP resolution on terrorism (EP 1980: 92), the Parliament urged that European "legislators and the competent authorities should devote particular attention to the danger of a resurgence of fascism, racism, xenophobia and antisemitism".
CONCLUSION

The analysis shows that the EC in its early attempt to construct the Mediterranean in the framework of the GMP, which was mainly necessitated by the first enlargement, did not consider the Mediterranean as a coherent space. Rather, it made a conscious distinction between two types of Mediterranean Basin countries. First, there were those European countries to which the accession door to the Community was kept open. Second, there were the non-European Mediterranean countries, for which the Community sought a transformation of its economic agreements to harmonize its overall Mediterranean policy along common policy guidelines. Such distinction was further legitimized in the Declaration on European Identity of 1973, which came to further accentuate the dynamics of European unification in relation to the Community’s external relations. Accordingly, European Mediterranean countries were referred to according to their European Identity, while Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries were grouped with other developing countries. Later, following the 1973 war and the oil crisis, the Arab Mediterranean started to constitute a distinctive grouping within the Mediterranean space due to the Community’s increasing securitization of energy issues.

Besides, with the stagnation of the EAD and the complications of Arab-Israeli politics, the EC depicted the Mediterranean at the start of the 1980s as a space torn by tensions and conflicts. This image, coupled with the EC’s own recurring enlargement processes in 1981 and 1986, was key in the Community’s reference to the Mediterranean area as a whole in terms of market access. Yet, the Community drew further lines of distinction in dealing with its Mediterranean partners, where southern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Western Mediterranean appeared as operational groupings composed of rather coherent sets of Mediterranean countries.

Such perceptions fed into the Community’s policy practices and three of these are perhaps key to highlight for MEDRESET’s next stages of research.

First, the Community’s economic advancement vis-à-vis its Mediterranean neighbours paved the way towards the Community’s aspirations of constructing the Mediterranean as a zone of economic prosperity. Accordingly, the EC repeatedly reformed its agreements with contracting Mediterranean countries solely in order to accommodate its recurring enlargement and enhance its economic leverage in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, the EC imposed several protectionist measures on Mediterranean products that could compete with the products of new members from southern Europe. In the final analysis, it is evident that the EC thoroughly advanced its economic interests in the Mediterranean, which seemed during these decades to be a fertile soil for expanding European economic power. The sole pursuit of collective economic gains thus contributed to consolidating the dynamic process of European integration as well as to establishing the Mediterranean as a zone for European economic influence rather than a zone for economic prosperity. Mediterranean political and economic problems were hence either depoliticized, securitized or treated as inherent internal problems related to Mediterranean partners’ own domestic structures.

Secondly, with the increasing securitization of energy issues with the Arab world, the EC complemented the GMP with a more comprehensive EAD in 1974 after failing to create a smaller energy forum with the Arab oil-producing countries. It is indeed one reason why, by the early 1980s, the EC’s attention started to be directed to devising a separate economic
cooperation venue with the GCC in order to secure the stability of energy supplies. Besides, an implicit European withdrawal from Middle Eastern politics was marked in the 1980s, as no practical policies were adopted to interpret the 1980 Venice Declaration into actions, while in 1983 the Western Mediterranean Initiative was introduced. However, the previous analysis also shows that this withdrawal was also a result of member state divisions as well as the lack of European autonomy and leverage in the Middle East.

Finally, "economic migration" had started to appear by the 1970s as a growing socio-political problem that necessitated a boundary-drawing effort by both the Community and its member states. This was translated into the adoption of several unilateral and collective measures to restrict migration to the EC, especially from the Maghreb countries and Turkey. Similarly, the rise of terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was met by several securitization measures. Yet, the bulk of such measures were adopted by member states, and the threat of terrorism was perceived to be emanating mainly from the Middle East and Palestinian resistance movements rather than a formidable threat emanating from the Southern Mediterranean area as a whole.
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