The EU and the Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Support, Economic Aid and Security Cooperation

by Ramon Pacheco Pardo

ABSTRACT

The EU has a policy of “critical engagement” with North Korea. This implies that Brussels should not discontinue relations with Pyongyang, but should take an approach in which “carrots” and “sticks” are mixed depending on the behaviour of Kim Jong-un’s regime. Considering this policy, what strategy should the EU follow in relation to developments in the Korean Peninsula? This paper argues that Brussels should take a three-pronged approach. It should offer diplomatic support to South Korea’s policy towards its northern neighbour, continue to provide economic aid to North Korea and engage in cooperation with partners seeking to counter Pyongyang’s threats to international security. This strategy will ensure that the EU has its own, independent voice in the Korean Peninsula – thus making Brussels a more relevant player in East Asian affairs. The strategy also implies that the EU should take a more proactive approach towards the region were the Six-Party Talks (SPT), or a similar diplomatic effort, be restored. This would tie in with the EU’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, as well as with High Representative Federica Mogherini’s willingness to make Brussels a more active player in East Asian affairs.
The EU and the Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Support, Economic Aid and Security Cooperation

by Ramon Pacheco Pardo*

1. Background

The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy was launched in June 2016. The strategy sets to establish a framework for the foreign-policy actions of the EU in the short and mid-term. The Korean Peninsula is mentioned in the strategy twice – once to urge the renewal of the EU’s commitment to its partnership with the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK) and again to make clear that Brussels stands for non-proliferation on the peninsula.¹ These are the guiding principles underpinning the EU’s approach to Korean Peninsula affairs. They form the basis of the strategy that the EU will implement over the coming years. This should be a three-pronged strategy focusing on diplomatic support for the ROK, economic aid to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK), and security cooperation with the ROK and other countries in the region.

Indeed, Brussels seems to have followed these policies during the post-Cold War era whenever the political situation in the Korean Peninsula has allowed. Its East Asia Policy Guidelines indicate that diplomacy, targeted economic engagement and security cooperation with partners are the policies of choice of the EU regarding Korean Peninsula affairs.² For the EU’s main goal on the peninsula – to stop and roll back the DPRK’s nuclear programme – needs a combination of “carrots” and “sticks” that matches well its own capabilities, especially in the case of the so-called


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carrots.

This strategy arguably made the EU an important player in Korean Peninsula affairs throughout the 1990s. The EU had a seat at the table in DPRK-related discussions through its participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the organisation in charge of implementing the Agreed Framework signed by the US and the DPRK in 1994, and – towards the end of the decade – developed its own independent policy through the normalization of diplomatic relations between most EU member states and Pyongyang. Brussels itself officially established relations in 2001. The EU’s pro-engagement policy matched President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” and President Bill Clinton’s rapprochement towards the Kim Jong-il regime in the late 1990s. North Korea welcomed this approach, which was implicitly presented as an example to the United States.

The EU, however, became secondary in Korean Peninsula affairs as the second North Korean nuclear crisis began in October 2002, and KEDO subsequently wound up. Brussels was excluded from the Six-Party Talks launched in August 2003, and was reduced to providing diplomatic support to the SPT. An important development, however, was the participation of EU member states, and the EU itself, in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched by the George W. Bush Administration in May 2003, the PSI targeted DPRK proliferation activities through the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear-technology shipments. Member states such as France, Germany, Spain and the UK have been amongst those intercepting these banned items. This showed a new-found assertiveness from the EU, which also translated into support for UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Pyongyang.

Following the interruption of the Six-Party Talks – technically discontinued since 2009 – and an increasing number of missile and nuclear tests by the DPRK, the EU has continued to support deterrence measures such as PSI-led interdictions and further rounds of UNSC sanctions. Nonetheless, Brussels’ Korean Peninsula “toolkit” still has a place for diplomacy – both bilateral and multilateral. It is in this context that almost all EU member states maintain diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the EU is supportive of inter-Korean and multilateral

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3 As of November 2016, Estonia and France are the two only EU member states not to have established diplomatic relations with the DPRK.
4 European External Action Service (EEAS), Fact Sheet: EU-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Relations, 1 June 2016, http://europa.eu/Hq38kF.
initiatives to reduce tensions on the peninsula. These include Park Geun-hye’s Trustpolitik and related Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), launched upon her becoming the President of the ROK in 2013.\(^7\) Crucially, they also include the Six-Party Talks. China, the US and other participants in the talks have, since the SPT’s discontinuation, called for their resumption – a situation which implies that they could be revived in the future.

Considering High Representative Federica Mogherini’s willingness to make the EU a more active player in Asia, and with the DPRK nuclear issue still far from being resolved it becomes necessary to reassess the aforementioned three-pronged strategy based on diplomatic support to the ROK, economic aid to the DPRK and security cooperation with international partners. This strategy can give the EU an independent voice in Korean Peninsula affairs while contributing to bringing stability to Northeast Asia.

2. Diplomatic support for the ROK and multilateral peace efforts

ROK inter-Korean reconciliation initiatives date back decades. President Kim’s Sunshine Policy, however, marked a turning point; it implicitly acknowledged that the ROK is stronger in economic, diplomatic, political and security terms than its northern counterpart. As such, Seoul should be willing to make a greater number of concessions in exchange for rapprochement with Pyongyang. Following a brief interlude in the early years of the Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008-13), this principle seems to have underpinned the ROK’s DPRK policy ever since. The main difference appears to be the extent to which Seoul seeks reciprocity from Pyongyang.

2.1 The EU and President Park’s Trustpolitik and NAPCI

Already outlined in autumn 2011 in an article published in Foreign Affairs, President Park’s Trustpolitik involves a mixture of carrots and sticks.\(^8\) This approach seeks to bring together the positive aspects of the Sunshine Policy – especially economic cooperation – with support for international diplomatic and military pressure when the DPRK becomes uncooperative. The approach matches the EU’s own strategy. It is therefore no surprise that Brussels has publicly supported President Park’s policy.

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This support is underpinned by the EU-South Korea Framework Agreement. Signed in May 2010, the agreement lays out a number of areas for cooperation between both signatories.9 Even though the DPRK is not mentioned by name in the agreement, several of its articles can be easily linked to deterring Pyongyang’s provocations. They include provisions for cooperation on non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, prevention of cybercrime, money laundering or illicit drug trafficking, and protection against human-rights abuses. The DPRK has been accused of these and other illegal activities.

The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative builds on President Park’s Trustpolitik. NAPCI seeks to build trust through cooperation in both non-traditional and traditional security areas. The initiative is designed to supplement inter-Korean trust building, creating an environment in which open dialogue and mutual understanding at the Northeast Asian level make the DPRK more willing to engage in diplomatic exchanges.10 Even though Pyongyang’s recent behaviour has prevented NAPCI from creating the conditions for a diplomatic solution to Korean Peninsula tensions, the EU is nonetheless supportive of this initiative.

This support is twofold. At the official level, Brussels backs NAPCI as one of the regional mechanisms promoting stability in East Asia. Particularly relevant is the EU sharing its experience with multilateralism. As the 2015 ROK-EU Summit joint press statement acknowledges, this is an area in which the EU’s experience is especially useful.11 Certainly, the experience of the EU in developing multilateral integration is one its main sources of “soft” power on the Asian continent. Even though it might not be possible to replicate the EU’s model of integration at the East – or North East – Asian level, the trust-building process initiated with the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 might hold lessons for the region. One such lesson would be the role that a free-trade area, or common market, can play in fostering improved diplomatic relations.

At the track 1.5 diplomacy level, European and ROK researchers have been discussing areas and specific initiatives for cooperation within the context of NAPCI. These range from general trust-building proposals such as education and youth exchanges, to develop good neighbouring relations – with the Erasmus programme cited as an example – to specific suggestions such as addressing cybersecurity through confidence-building measures and the implementation of legislation at the regional level.12

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12 EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA),
is the possibility of discussing and testing ideas that can then be carried on to official exchanges among Northeast Asian countries and with other actors, such as the US and the EU.

2.2 The EU and a resumed Six-Party Talks mechanism

The EU was not part of the Six-Party Talks when they were originally established. However, Brussels has become more deeply engaged in Northeast Asian affairs since their launch in 2003 and even following their interruption in 2009. Strategic partnerships with China, Japan and the ROK – the last-named established in 2010 with the aforementioned framework agreement – are the basis of this engagement. Crucially, Brussels has made a point of including dialogues on East Asian affairs as part of these partnerships.

The fact that several countries have openly called for resumption of the Six-Party Talks suggests that they are still seen as a valid multilateral framework. This means that there is a possibility that the talks might be re-established in the same or similar form in which they previously occurred. Considering that the EU now has deeper ties with three of the six parties, through the aforementioned strategic partnerships, there is a distinct possibility that the EU could be more actively involved in implementation of the SPT agreement even if it is not a signatory to it.

The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 2005 lays out a set of commitments by all parties that are considered to be essential for the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the normalization of diplomatic relations between the DPRK on the one hand and the US and Japan on the other. Even though only the six parties to the talks are covered by the commitments, there is no reason why other parties should not support them. In fact, it would be beneficial for the six parties to receive this support. This would show that the six-party process has the support of the international community, thus rendering it more legitimate. EU participation would be particularly relevant in this respect, considering its economic and diplomatic clout.

Following on from its long-standing commitment to support ROK and international community peace efforts, the 2005 joint statement offers scope for Brussels to participate in its implementation. To begin with, normalization of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the US and Japan would probably follow a similar path to the process that led most EU member states to establish diplomatic relations.

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13 It should be noted that an expanded membership of the SPT, potentially including the EU, was discussed prior to the talks being launched.

with Pyongyang in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This is because the starting point of such a process would be relatively similar to its earlier counterpart. In the late 1990s, EU member states had very limited contact with the DPRK and were critical of its political regime. It is the same with the US and Japan today. Any normalization process involving these last-named countries would involve a series of confidence-building measures and diplomatic exchanges leading to the opening of embassies.

As of November 2016, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK have embassies in Pyongyang. The DPRK has diplomatic offices in all these countries plus Austria, Italy and Spain. These countries could share their experience on issues such as the advantages, disadvantages and challenges of establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK, the day-to-day work of their embassies in Pyongyang or the effects of having official DPRK diplomatic representation in their territories – including on issues such as information gathering about domestic affairs in the DPRK and relations with North Korean refugees. Even though at present it might seem inconceivable for Washington or Tokyo to normalize diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, it should not be forgotten that President Clinton seriously entertained this idea. Furthermore, the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of October 2002 explicitly mentioned the normalization of bilateral relations between the two countries.

Another way in which the EU could participate in implementation of Six-Party Talks commitments is through its political and human rights dialogues. Regarding the former, Brussels is one of the few polities that maintains a semi-regular dialogue with the Kim Jong-un regime. This dialogue could be used to discuss progress in the implementation of the SPT Joint Statement – especially its denuclearization steps. Non-proliferation already features in the EU-DPRK dialogue, so it is not inconceivable for denuclearization to be discussed as well. Since most other countries do not have a political dialogue with the DPRK, the EU is in a strong position to represent not only its position but that of other actors more focused on security matters as well.

Finally, the bilateral human-rights dialogue between the EU and the DPRK could be used to address one little-discussed aspect of the Six-Party Talks agreement. This is the commitment from all parties – including Pyongyang – to abide by recognized norms of international relations. Presumably, human-rights protection is one of these. Certainly, the DPRK has a very poor human-rights record. But it should

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16 Ibid.
19 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), *Report of the Commission of Enquiry on*
also be acknowledged that the Kim Jong-un regime has become more willing to discuss this issue over the past few years. The EU would be in a position to take a leading role in discussing human rights in the context of other issues such as non-proliferation, as well as matters of concern to the DPRK.20 As the case of the recently established human-rights dialogue with Myanmar shows, Brussels is adamant on the matter of their protection being part of its external relations – even with countries that would rather discuss economic development instead of their human-rights situations. This confers a legitimacy on the EU that is useful when dealing with Pyongyang.

3. Economic engagement with the DPRK

The EU has a policy of critical engagement with the DPRK. This means that Brussels is willing to engage with Pyongyang, even if this engagement is subject to restrictions imposed by UN, and the EU’s own, sanctions.21 The fact that Brussels officially supports engagement with the DPRK is, however, relevant. Engagement allows for regular interactions with a regime that often portrays itself as isolated and persecuted by third parties. In the case of relations with the EU, this is not the case. In addition to diplomatic and political exchanges, as described in the previous section, there is also economic engagement in the form of aid, assistance and EU-funded projects.22 Considering that economic engagement is one of the tenets of President Park’s Trustpolitik policy, there is scope for Seoul and Brussels to work together in this area.

3.1 Aid and assistance

The EU is a significant provider of humanitarian and food-aid assistance to the DPRK. This support dates back to 1995 and, as of November 2016, continues in spite of the Kim Jong-un regime’s nuclear and missile tests. This aid is crucial for a population that has experienced high rates of malnourishment for over 20 years. President Park’s Trustpolitik has a food-aid component as well. Hence, the EU’s economic engagement through aid and assistance is aligned with ROK policy – for Seoul has not discontinued its aid and assistance towards the DPRK in spite of the latter’s five nuclear tests.23 In the case of the EU, continuing provision of

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21 European External Action Service (EEAS), Fact Sheet: EU-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Relations, cit.

22 Ibid.

humanitarian aid also allows it to strengthen relations with the DPRK Government. Other countries have been quick to discontinue aid following Pyongyang’s misbehaviour – but not the EU, which, in this respect, is probably regarded as a more reliable partner.

A different type of assistance was included in the SPT Joint Statement – energy. Indeed, energy assistance in the form of the construction of two nuclear-proliferation-resistant light-water reactors was part of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, signed in October 1994, which put an end to the first North Korean nuclear crisis. The nuclear reactors would have served as compensation for the DPRK’s loss of energy-generating capacity derived from closing down its nuclear reactors. The Bush Administration also agreed to build the reactors following signature of the joint statement.

Were the Six-Party Talks to be resumed and the joint statement to inform third-party policy towards the DPRK again, the EU could be involved in energy assistance through light-water reactor construction. After all, Brussels already has been a party in the development of this key element of the agreed framework through its participation in KEDO. The engineering capabilities of several EU member states, and the EU’s uninterrupted engagement with the DPRK, would put Brussels in a good position to be involved in this type of energy assistance. Furthermore, Brussels’ lack of strategic goals in the Korean Peninsula would probably make Pyongyang more willing to accept the presence of European (as opposed to South Korean, US or Japanese) engineers and other workers.

### 3.2 EU-funded development projects

Another element of the EU’s economic engagement with the DPRK is implementation of EU-funded development projects. These projects are closely linked to the humanitarian goals behind Brussels’ aid and assistance. Quite often, they involve participation in multilateral initiatives. Current projects focus on areas such as the provision of clean water, sanitation and health services; disaster preparedness; and agriculture risk reduction. Since the DPRK has no access to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, these development projects are essential for the country to improve its infrastructure. From the perspective of Brussels, these projects allow for a semi-regular presence of European officials and experts in the DPRK. This is beneficial to get a glimpse of the situation on the ground, which can in turn inform EU policy

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27 See the European Commission website: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection - North Korea (DPRK), http://europa.eu/!Ph93wX.
towards the country.

Resumption of the Six-Party Talks and implementation of the joint statement would widen the scope of economic-cooperation activities with the DPRK. Trade, investment and energy are specifically named in the document.\(^{28}\) In fact, Pyongyang has been pursuing stop-go economic reforms since at least July 2002. Concurrently, there has been a marketization of its domestic economy – private markets have a growing influence in the country.\(^{29}\) Any meaningful economic reform, however, would necessitate opening up to third countries and receiving external funding and advice. This is the Chinese and Vietnamese model, which the DPRK could one day implement. The example of tourism is telling: in order to boost its tourism industry, the DPRK is seeking to work with the World Tourism Organization and foreign operators.\(^{30}\)

The EU would be an attractive partner for the Kim Jong-un regime if the number of economic cooperation activities is increased as a result. The reason is twofold. To begin with, as already mentioned, the EU does not have any strategic interest in the Korean Peninsula. This makes it an appealing partner to a DPRK Government always suspicious of the intentions of other countries. In addition, European companies and governments offer a combination of capital and expertise. The DPRK needs both.

4. Security cooperation with the ROK and other partners

The EU’s security role in East Asia is limited. In contrast to the US, it does not have a military presence or an alliance system in the region. Nonetheless, Brussels’ East Asia Policy Guidelines and the EU-South Korea Framework Agreement indicate that the EU can cooperate with East Asian partners in general, and the ROK in particular, in order to curtail Pyongyang’s proliferation of WMD and nuclear and missile tests.

4.1 Non-proliferation of WMD and DPRK denuclearization

The EU is one of the most active players at the global level in the area of non-proliferation of WMD, engaging in a wide range of activities.\(^{31}\) This contribution is logical when considering both its capabilities and the potential threat of WMD

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\(^{28}\) Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, cit.


falling in the hands of rogue regimes or terrorist networks. In the particular case of the DPRK, Brussels’ contribution to the Proliferation Security Initiative is supplemented by participation in the UN sanctions regime that – starting from 2006 – has sought to prevent proliferation as a means to punish Pyongyang for the development of its nuclear and missile programme. Non-proliferation is one of the key goals of the EU in its Korean Peninsula policy, due to the fear that DPRK WMD and nuclear technology might be used by countries such as Iran or might fall in the hands of terrorist groups.

The main raison d’être of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, however, was denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.32 This is also one of NAPCI’s goals.33 Thus, this is one of the main areas in which the ROK, the US and other countries would seek cooperation from the EU were the joint statement to be reactivated. Brussels has been collaborating on denuclearization efforts through the implementation of UNSC sanctions, since many of their provisions seek to starve the DPRK of the technology and funds required to develop its nuclear programme. From the perspective of Brussels, this collaboration sends a message to Pyongyang – its engagement via dialogues and aid does not preclude the imposition of sanctions. Concurrently, the EU’s partners also receive the message that Brussels is ready to stand by them.

Reactivation of the SPT Joint Statement would, however, necessitate a different type of cooperation. Similarly to the provision of energy through the construction of the two aforementioned light-water reactors, it would involve EU member states with the appropriate technological capabilities in dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear facilities. The experience of the EU in the post-Soviet Union space would prove very useful in this regard. Brussels has recent experience in the denuclearization of third countries of a type that few others have. This makes it an ideal partner for nuclear facility and materials decommissioning.

Policy Recommendations

The EU has an important role to play in Korean Peninsula affairs. It should continue its diplomatic support for the ROK and multilateral peace efforts, maintain economic engagement with the DPRK and preserve security cooperation with the ROK and other partners. Yet, qualitative changes should be implemented in order to increase the effectiveness of its DPRK-related activities. The following recommendations would be helpful in this respect, were the Six-Party Talks to be reconvened and the September 2005 joint statement become the basis of international engagement with Pyongyang.

32 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, cit.
The EU should:

1. Share its experience and that of most EU member states that have normalized diplomatic relations with the DPRK, both in relation to the normalization process itself and to the diplomatic exchanges concomitant with normalized relations.
2. Use its existing bilateral political dialogue with the DPRK to discuss denuclearization in the context of a wider range of issues.
3. Use its existing bilateral human-rights dialogue with the DPRK to discuss human rights in the context of other issues, including denuclearization and matters of concern to Pyongyang.
4. Expand its assistance to the area of energy, particularly through support for the building of proliferation-resistant light-water reactors.
5. Widen the scope of EU-funded projects to address other areas – especially trade and investment, and energy.
6. Become more deeply involved in DPRK denuclearization activities, including by building on its own experience in the post-Soviet space.

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