China’s Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa

by Anna Katharina Stahl

ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of China’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In addition to outlining the general contours of China’s engagement in SSA, it gives particular attention to China’s relations with SSA in the two policy areas of development and security. Moreover, it examines how China’s leadership change in 2012 has affected the country’s policy in SSA. On the basis of the most recent trends in China’s development and security relations with SSA, the paper formulates a series of policy recommendations for the EU and the US on how to engage China in SSA.
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1. Introduction: China’s renewed diplomatic interest in Africa

Owing to the rise of new international players or emerging countries, the dominance of the European Union (EU) and US in the world is increasingly being challenged. Among these rising powers, China merits particular attention. Because of its size – in terms of geography, population and gross domestic product – it is considerably different from other rising powers.¹ In recent decades, China has witnessed a rapid economic expansion, making the transition from a low-income economy to a middle-income country (MIC). As a consequence of its rapid economic growth it is starting to adopt a more active global posture. In the context of its ambitions to play a more prominent international role, China’s increasing engagement in Africa has attracted particular attention.

Although China’s presence in Africa has increased considerably in the 21st century, it would be wrong to consider it as a completely “new player” there. In fact, modern Sino-African relations developed shortly after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s.² During this period, China’s foreign policy in Africa was influenced by the Cold War environment and mostly driven by ideological motives. Following the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in 1955 (the so-called Bandung Conference), the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, actively supported national independent movements in Africa.³ The Tanzania-
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Zambia Railway, constructed in the 1970s, is considered to be an important symbol of China’s support of African governments emerging from national liberation movements. It connected Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, thereby eliminating Zambia’s economic dependence on the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Notwithstanding the importance of the history of Sino-African relations, China’s current engagement in Africa has to be situated in the context of its own economic development at the beginning of the 1970s. Under the leadership of Deng Xioaping, China started shifting away from a centrally planned economy towards a more market-oriented system (the so-called “open door policy”). In the context of China’s open door policy, the Chinese leadership also increased the scale of the country’s economic activities abroad, particularly in Africa. As China started opening up to the world, it was primarily interested in Africa’s economic prospects in terms of natural resources, trade and investments. Despite the initial focus on economic opportunities, its engagement in Africa has broadened over the past years to include diplomatic, cultural and security cooperation.

China’s foreign policy currently covers almost the whole of the African continent and does not make any distinction between particular regions. With the exception of three states, it maintains diplomatic relations with all 54 recognised states on the African continent. In fact, on the basis of its so-called “One-China policy,” China does not engage in diplomatic relations with countries that have recognised Taiwan. In Africa, only Burkina Faso, São Tomé Príncipe and Swaziland maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In March 2016, Gambia decided to resume diplomatic relations with China at the expense of Taiwan.\(^4\) China’s bilateral cooperation with the other 51 African states is coordinated through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC was established in 2000 to provide an institutional framework for promoting both political dialogue and economic cooperation between China and Africa. It is primarily based on the mechanism of ministerial conferences that bring together Chinese and African foreign affairs and finance ministers every three years.\(^5\) In addition to these ministerial conferences, FOCAC summits with African heads of state and government are held on a regular basis, alternating between China and Africa. The most recent summit took place in December 2015 in South Africa.

In addition to establishing structured diplomatic relations with Africa, the Chinese government has formulated a specific African policy agenda, laid down in several policy documents. Following the initial FOCAC summit held in Beijing in 2006, the Chinese government issued its first white paper on China’s Africa Policy.\(^6\) This


introduces the general principles and objectives guiding Chinese foreign policy towards Africa. At the occasion of the second FOCAC summit in South Africa in 2015, Beijing released a second Africa policy paper that confirms the overall policy framework outlined by the 2006 policy document.  

Overall, the formulation of China’s Africa policy falls under the leadership of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council. However, China’s foreign policy in Africa is not as monolithic as it might seem. With the growing involvement of different actors, China’s engagement in Africa has witnessed a pluralisation in recent years. Under the leadership of the State Council, different ministries are involved in the implementation of China’s Africa policy. Owing to the fact that the FOCAC secretariat is located in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the MFA has a coordination role. The leading role of the MFA in China’s Africa policy is also mirrored in the creation of the position of Chinese Special Envoy for Africa in 2007, who is a senior Chinese diplomat from the MFA exclusively dedicated to African affairs. In addition to the MFA, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages China’s foreign trade, investment and aid relations with Africa. MOFCOM was established in 2003 as the result of a reorganisation of the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation.

Apart from China’s ministries, policy banks constitute key players in China’s involvement in Africa. The two most important Chinese policy banks are the China Export-Import (Exim) Bank and the China Development Bank (CDB). Whereas the CDB plays an important role in funding large infrastructure projects in China and abroad, it is China’s Exim Bank that plays a predominant role in supporting China’s foreign trade and economic cooperation with Africa. It administers concessional loans according to diplomatic and business objectives, and it plays a “policy-oriented ‘development financing’ role” in Africa. In this context, China’s policy banks support the activities of Chinese companies in Africa. Similar to other rising powers, the private sector plays a key role in China’s engagement with Africa. Most of the Chinese firms operating in Africa are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than private-sector firms. Since SOEs do not have to face pressures from stockholders as private companies do, they are better suited specifically to

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9 China has three institutional or so-called “policy” banks that were established in 1994 with government-directed spending functions. They implement state policies to promote China’s trade, investment and industrial activities. Rohini Kamal and Kevin P Gallagher, “China Goes Global with Development Banks”, in *Bretton Woods Project Briefings*, April 2016, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/04/20508/.
advancing the government’s broader geopolitical objectives.\textsuperscript{11}

Alongside the national institutions, Chinese subnational governments are also key actors in Africa. Over the years, Chinese provincial and municipal governments have set up extensive overseas programmes and have thereby become important players in international development cooperation with Africa.

In sum, over recent years, China’s relations with Africa have become ever more complex, involving a variety of different actors and covering a growing range of issues. This paper focuses primarily on China’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). As an analysis of China’s overall engagement in SSA would go beyond the scope of this paper, the following sections concentrate on two specific policy areas – namely, development, and peace and security. On the basis of the analysis provided by sections 2 and 3, Section 4 draws conclusions about the main opportunities and challenges of China’s engagement in SSA, and it formulates a list of policy recommendation for the EU and the US.

\section*{2. China’s role as a development actor in SSA}

China’s growing engagement in Africa has been most visible in the economic area, including development cooperation. In fact, unlike the US and the EU, China does not make a clear distinction between development aid and economic/commercial arrangements.\textsuperscript{12} Figure 1 shows that China has become Africa’s second largest trading partner, having surpassed the US in 2009. In parallel with growing Sino-African trade relations, there has been an important increase in Chinese aid to Africa over the last 10 years, as indicated by Figure 2.


As a consequence of China’s own economic progress and its status as a MIC, it has become one of the world’s largest suppliers of finance to developing countries, progressing from a net recipient to a net donor. According to the most recent estimates by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), China’s total concessional finance for development amounted to 3 billion dollars in 2013 and 3.4 billion dollars in 2014. Among the group of emerging donors, China is therefore one of the most important providers of development assistance. Yet Figure 3 shows that in comparison to traditional donors – members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), i.e. the EU and the US – Chinese aid to Africa is still rather marginal.

Source: Brookings 2014.

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Figure 2 | Chinese aid to Africa, 2001-2009

Source: Author’s compilation based on Bräutigam 2011, Appendix 6.\textsuperscript{16}

Figure 3 | ODA of major donors to Africa, 2000-2011

Source: Author’s compilation based on Bräutigam 2011\textsuperscript{17} and OECD statistics.


China’s role as an emerging donor has also been reflected in the publication of specific policy papers. In April 2011, China published its first white paper on its foreign aid. The document was published by the State Council in order to respond to the criticism of the international community regarding Chinese development assistance to Africa and to send a signal of increased transparency of Chinese aid to Africa. Unlike China’s white paper on Africa from 2006, which was primarily drafted by the MFA, the 2011 white paper on China’s foreign aid was prepared by MOFCOM and refers to China’s foreign aid policy more broadly.

Three years later, in April 2014, MOFCOM drafted another important policy document related to China’s development assistance, the so-called draft “Measures for the Administration of Foreign Aid.” These measures are the first comprehensive legal document with the character of a law to regulate the Chinese government’s foreign aid. The policy document provides a list of 51 articles highlighting the principles guiding Chinese development cooperation. On the basis of MOFCOM’s draft measures, the State Council released a second white paper on foreign aid in July 2014, which provides an update on Chinese development assistance for the period 2010-2012.

Although the two white papers provide important information on Chinese development assistance, controversy over the lack of transparency of Chinese aid and doubts regarding the reliability of the data remain. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the instruments, geographic distribution, sectors and development principles of China’s development assistance to SSA, it is therefore important to cross-check the Chinese data with other sources. The research by Deborah Bräutigam and the China Aid Dataset constitute two important sources regarding the figures of Chinese development assistance.

23 Deborah Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift, cit.
24 China Aid Dataset is a collaborative online platform that tracks project-level Chinese development finance to Africa through open source data-collection methods. See the AidData website: http://china.aiddata.org/content/about_the_project. See also Austin Strange et al., “China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection”, in Center for Global
2.1 Instruments and geographical coverage

China’s aid system is in flux, and in recent years new instruments have emerged. According to the white paper on foreign aid, China offers the following three types of financial support to developing countries: grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans.\(^{25}\) Other sources confirm that Chinese foreign assistance to SSA also takes the form of debt relief, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as in-kind aid.\(^{26}\)

**Figure 4** | China’s foreign aid by region, 2010-2012

![Graph showing China's foreign aid by region, 2010-2012](image)


According to official Chinese sources, in the period 2010-2012, China provided assistance to 121 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Oceania and Europe.\(^{27}\) As Figure 4 shows, in the period 2010-2012, aid to Africa accounted for over half of Chinese aid, while Asia accounted for nearly one-third of the total. Chinese aid to Africa mostly concentrates on countries in SSA. According to the 2014 white paper on Chinese foreign aid, nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Togo, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia) have

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\(^{25}\) These loans, also referred to as “preferential” or “soft” loans, are granted by the Chinese government on terms substantially more generous than those for market loans.


\(^{27}\) Chinese State Council, *China’s Foreign Aid*, July 2014, cit.
been the primary beneficiaries of China’s debt relief.\textsuperscript{28}

The importance attributed by China to Africa is also reflected in the establishment of an instrument specifically targeted at the continent’s development. Under former President Hu Jintao, a specific China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) was established.\textsuperscript{29} The objective of this is to promote Chinese business activities in Africa by providing equity funds that assist Chinese companies investing there. The fund was established in June 2007 with 1 billion dollars of initial funding by the CDB, which was later increased to 5 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{30} Experts have noted a lack of transparency of the CADF since no list of the projects that it funds is available.\textsuperscript{31}

\section*{2.2 Sectoral priorities}

China’s intervention as a development actor in SSA is reflected in a variety of areas. Different sources confirm that Chinese finance to Africa covers the areas of infrastructure, natural resources, industry, health and agricultural sectors.\textsuperscript{32} As outlined in Figure 5, China’s 2014 white paper on foreign aid lists the following five main sectors of Chinese intervention: (1) infrastructure; (2) goods and material; (3) human resources development (education); (4) industry; (5) agriculture.

Figure 5 shows that Chinese support for infrastructure development accounts for the bulk of Chinese aid in volume. This explains why China is emerging as a major funder of infrastructure projects in Africa. According to a study by the World Bank, China has signed infrastructure finance agreements with more than 30 African countries, some of those in SSA, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan, being the biggest recipients.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, the study highlights that “most Chinese government-funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed
at securing a flow of Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources for export to China.”

Experts have referred to this Chinese practice as so-called “infrastructure-for-resources deals.”

**Figure 5 | China’s foreign aid by sector, 2010-2012**

![China’s foreign aid by sector, 2010-2012](image)


In addition to infrastructure, another important share of China’s aid projects concerns the sectors of human resources development, agriculture and industry. In the 2014 white paper on China’s foreign aid, the term “human resources development cooperation” refers to capacity-building measures, education and vocational training projects. Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has offered scholarships for students from SSA to study in China. Moreover, China is holding training sessions for public officials and technical personnel from African countries with close political relations to the Chinese Communist Party (e.g. Ethiopia). China’s contribution to human resources development in Africa is particularly visible in the area of agriculture. On the basis of its own experience, China is active in the area of agricultural development with the aim of enhancing recipient countries’ productive capacities. Since 2006, the Chinese government has established more than ten Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) in SSA, including in Mozambique, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda.

Building on China’s history of promoting agricultural development in Africa in the 1970s, the ATDCs are a new tool of Chinese agricultural aid to Africa to foster...

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34 Ibid., p. 84.
Alongside infrastructure and agriculture, Chinese finance also contributes to the development of the industrial sector of countries in SSA. China is playing a key role in Africa’s industrialisation by establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These are based on China’s own development model. To attract foreign direct investment in the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese leadership set up industrial and technological development zones for a specific industry in different Chinese coastal cities. Following this model, China’s overseas SEZs in SSA are intended to create economies of scale for Chinese overseas investment, and to assist less experienced small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises to venture overseas “in groups.” So far, Chinese SEZs have been established in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia.

2.3 Guiding principles

China’s recent policy documents provide an overview of the core principles guiding its development engagement in SSA. Considering China’s history as an aid donor, its current role as a development actor in Africa is based on principles that were formulated during the 1950s. Overall, two sets of principles can be distinguished: the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence from 1954 and the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid from 1963. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formulated by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in light of the Bandung Conference. They present guiding principles for China’s relations with other countries and are enshrined in the constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Among these five, Chinese leaders have put particular emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and of non-interference.

Whereas the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence guide China’s foreign relations with all countries, the Chinese leadership also formulated a set of specific guidelines to govern its assistance to developing countries, known as the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance. These were put forward by then Premier Zhou Enlai during his visit to several Asian and African countries in 1964.

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39 See footnote 3.
The two sets of principles have important implications for China’s policy regarding SSA. They serve as a justification for the Chinese leadership to oppose the common practice aid conditionality.\(^4\) China defends the lack of conditionality in its development cooperation with Africa by invoking the principle of non-interference, claiming that interference in domestic affairs is illegitimate, and that Chinese aid should instead focus on the real needs of the recipient countries.

### Box 1 | Guiding principles of China’s foreign policy

**China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence** (1954)
1. mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. mutual non-aggression;
3. mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
4. equality and cooperation for mutual benefit;
5. peaceful co-existence.

**China’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance** (1963)
1. respect the principle of equality and mutual benefits;
2. respect the sovereignty of recipient countries and never attach any conditions or ask for any privileges;
3. provide economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extend the time limit for the repayment when necessary;
4. help recipient countries embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development;
5. help recipient countries to complete projects which require less investment but yield quick results;
6. provide the best-quality equipment and materials manufactured by China at international market prices;
7. ensure that the personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology being transferred;
8. ensure that Chinese experts have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country.

### 2.4 China’s South-South cooperation with Africa

China’s role as a development actor in SSA differs significantly from that of the EU and the US. Most importantly, China refers to its development relations with African countries as “South-South Cooperation” (SSC) between two developing countries. The notion of SSC stands in opposition to the traditional North-South Cooperation between the EU/US and developing countries. Unlike traditional

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40 Aid conditionality refers to the practice of traditional/DAC donors of setting development cooperation objectives (e.g. political norms, such as human rights and good governance) that the recipient country needs to fulfil.
development cooperation, China’s SSC with Africa is not based on the notion of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as defined by the OECD’s DAC.\textsuperscript{41} In contrast to the DAC definition of ODA, which excludes commercial arrangements by private actors, the Chinese approach to development is characterised by a mutually beneficial business-oriented cooperation.\textsuperscript{42} Hence, unlike the traditional development approach of the EU and the US, which is aimed at poverty reduction through the disbursement of grants, grant-based aid represents only a small part of China’s foreign aid to SSA.\textsuperscript{43} Because China’s SSC with Africa is driven by the idea of a win-win partnership, Chinese leaders argue that the Chinese development approach is less paternalistic than that of the EU and the US.\textsuperscript{44}

3. China’s growing contribution to African peace and security

Besides development, China’s growing presence in Africa is also reflected in the area of security. This comes as no surprise considering that Africa represents the region with the greatest number of armed conflicts in the world.\textsuperscript{45} Although China’s engagement in Africa is driven by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, “Beijing has become increasingly entangled in African domestic affairs and conflicts as its economic involvement deepens.”\textsuperscript{46} In recent years there has been a growing number of examples of China’s exposure to security challenges in Africa. In Nigeria and Sudan, Chinese oil facilities are regularly attacked, and Chinese workers kidnapped by rebels and militia groups.\textsuperscript{47} Chinese SOEs have also been exposed to security risks in other parts of Africa, such as Angola and Eastern Congo.

As a consequence of its growing presence in Africa, China has also been increasingly involved in African conflicts. Concerns have been raised that China’s presence in Africa exacerbates the proliferation of arms.\textsuperscript{48} Because the Chinese arms industry

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\textsuperscript{41} According to the OECD DAC, financial flows qualify as ODA (1) if they are undertaken by official agencies; (2) with the aim of promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries; and (3) if they have a concessional character.

\textsuperscript{42} Deborah Bräutigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa”, cit.

\textsuperscript{43} Helmut Asche and Margot Schüller, \textit{China’s Engagement in Africa}, cit.; Deborah Bräutigam, \textit{The Dragon’s Gift}, cit.


is expanding, the Chinese government has made deals with African states, such as Angola, Botswana, Eritrea, Namibia and Sierra Leone, to supply military equipment, often in exchange for natural resources. These Chinese arms trades tend to be characterised by poor transparency and they frequently bypass United Nations (UN) arms embargos. Some experts have argued that China is explicitly supporting so-called pariah states that are boycotted by the West on human rights grounds, such as Sudan or Zimbabwe.

Initially being rather unprepared, the Chinese leadership has started to realise that in order to have the capacity to develop a long-term relationship with Africa and protect China’s economic interests, it needs to deal with Africa’s precarious security situation. It has started to go through a learning process, acknowledging that Africa’s intrastate and regional armed conflicts have produced wider security threats, such as terrorism, piracy and international organised crime. As part of its learning process, China has gradually shifted from a policy of non-interference to selective engagement or so-called “constructive involvement” in African security. Three important developments can serve as an indication of China’s changing security approach in Africa.

First, China increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and has become the largest contributor to these of all permanent members of the UN Security Council. It currently has around 1,500 peacekeepers participating in UN PKOs, which is more than 15 times as many as about 10 years ago. Typically, China has limited its contribution to non-combat forces. However, there are a few examples where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was deployed on African soil. As part of China’s involvement in the peacekeeping mission of the UN in Mali, it sent an infantry unit in 2013. According to official Chinese sources, the Chinese


50 Mark Curtis and Claire Hickson, “Arming and Alarming?”, cit., p. 37.


54 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

troops in Mali are a “guard team that will mainly be responsible for the security of the MINUSMA headquarters and the living areas of peacekeeping forces.”

Second, China is starting to join multilateral security initiatives and to formulate a more outward-looking military strategy. In particular, it wants to increase its global maritime presence. China’s contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia is considered to be a landmark in this process. In 2009, China started to deploy a counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, which was the first expeditionary deployment of the PLA’s navy. China’s anti-piracy efforts there suggest that the Chinese leadership is more open to a deployment of the PLA in other parts of the world.

Finally, China is supporting African security initiatives. In particular, the Chinese leadership is collaborating with the African Union (AU) to foster the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). China’s growing support for the AU has been symbolised by the building of the new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in December 2011, representing the largest Chinese foreign aid project in Africa. Furthermore, the Chinese government decided in October 2011 to give to the AU Commission the status of full member of the FOCAC. During the FOCAC meeting in 2012, President Hu Jintao officially launched the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security. As part of this new policy initiative, the Chinese government has started providing financial and technical support to the AU’s activities in the field of peace and security, as well as to institutionalise a strategic dialogue with the AU on peace and security matters. Last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced at the UN General Assembly that China would provide 100 million dollars in military assistance to the AU in the next five years to support the establishment of an African standby force and to boost its capacity for crisis response.

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60 Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, “China’s Xi Says to Commit 8,000 Troops for UN Peacekeeping Force”, in Reuters, 28 September 2015, http://reut.rs/1MCKugq.
4. Conclusion: The broader context of China’s engagement in SSA

In sum, this paper has highlighted that China’s relations with SSA have expanded substantially over the past decade. China’s engagement in Africa reflects the broader trend of the rise of MICs and therefore needs to be analysed against the background of China’s own economic development and its domestic policies. At the same time, the expansion of Sino-Africa relations shows that emerging countries increasingly challenge the dominance of Western powers. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, a continent regarded as the so-called “backyard” of the EU and the US. Thus this last section will situate China’s engagement in SSA in a more general context, focusing specifically on China’s domestic policy priorities and the implications of China’s rise in SSA for the EU and the US.

4.1 China’s domestic priorities

China’s engagement in SSA is largely influenced by the country’s specific political structures. It is commonly described as a “one-party system”, centred on the CCP. In 2012, on the occasion of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, China witnessed a change in leadership.

Under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (FYP) was adopted. The 13th FYP presents the roadmap for the new Chinese leadership for the period 2016-2020. As China’s FYPs constitute blueprints for China’s domestic socioeconomic development, they generally do not explicitly refer to issues of Chinese foreign policy. Yet several elements of the 13th FYP indicate that China’s new leadership remains committed to supporting the country’s diplomatic relations with Africa. This has also been symbolised by the fact that the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, Wang Yi, decided to pay his first official visit in 2016 to four African countries.61

Several reforms outlined in the 13th FYP implicitly relate to China’s engagement in Africa. China’s 13th FYP foresees an organisational reform of the PLA and reflects efforts of the current Chinese leadership to modernise its military and play a more important role in African security. This trend has been confirmed by the recent establishment of a Chinese diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa.62 China has thereby followed the example of the EU and the US. While the US opened the United States Mission to the African Union in 2006,63 the EU established an EU

61 Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique and Namibia.
delegation to the AU in 2008.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, the Chinese government signed a 10-year leasing agreement with Djibouti to set up its first military base in Africa. This shows that the current Chinese leadership is ready to protect its economic interests in the Horn of Africa by fostering its security engagement on the continent.

Alongside the security reforms, the 13th FYP shows that the new Chinese leadership has recognised that, in order to maintain a rapidly growing economy, it needs to change in China’s current economic model. In this context, the government has attempted to adapt the Chinese economy to a so-called “New Normal”\textsuperscript{65} of slower, but more stable and sustainable, economic growth. According to the 13th FYP, China will have an annual growth rate of 6.5-7 per cent until 2020. China’s slower growth will have repercussions on its relations with Africa. There are initial signs showing that China’s trade and investments in Africa are declining as a consequence of its economic slowdown. Moreover, as China needs fewer natural resources, the price of commodities is declining, which negatively impacts on natural resources exporting states in Africa.

Yet, in order to proactively respond to China’s “New Normal,” the 13th FYP puts forward a series of measures to implement China’s new One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR). This new development strategy, also known as the New Silk Road Initiative, was announced by President Jinping in September 2013 and consists of two main components: the Economic Land Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. OBOR aims to redirect China’s domestic overcapacity and capital for infrastructure development to improve China’s connectivity with countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. In order to foster investments in countries along China’s New Silk Road, a specific Silk Road Fund of 40 billion dollars was established by the Chinese government. Through the Silk Road Fund, African countries belonging to the Maritime Silk Road could benefit from Chinese financing for major infrastructure projects.\textsuperscript{66}

In addition to the formulation of new development strategies, the current Chinese leadership is supporting the creation of new financial institutions. The most notable example is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which could rival the World Bank in providing infrastructure finance to Asian developing countries. In terms of China’s development relations with Africa, the New Development Bank – also known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) Development Bank – is likely to play an important role. As the headquarters of the New Development Bank are in Shanghai, and it will also open a regional office in South Africa, an important instrument to foster Sino-African development relations is presented.

\textsuperscript{64} See the EEAS website: \textit{EU & the EU. Chronology of bilateral relations}, http://europa.eu/!QC88cW.

\textsuperscript{65} This expression is used by the Chinese government to anticipate a more stable growth rate and to express the need for a rebalancing of the Chinese economy from export-driven growth to a model based on domestic consumption.

4.2 Implications for the EU and the US

To respond to China’s growing international role, both the US and the EU have institutionalised their diplomatic relations with China. The US established a “Strategic and Economic Dialogue” with China, which contributes to the wider objective of building a cooperative and comprehensive relationship with the country.67 Along the same lines, the EU decided in 2003 that China would be the first among the emerging countries – the BRICS – to be lifted to the status of a bilateral strategic partner. In the same year, the Chinese government issued a specific EU policy paper, thereby formalising for the first time its diplomatic relations with an international partner.68 On this basis, European and Chinese policy-makers adopted the Strategic Agenda 2020 to foster their collaboration.69 While China adopted a second policy paper on the EU in 2014,70 the EU recently released a new strategy to guide its relations with China for the next five years.71

China’s growing presence in SSA represents a major challenge for the EU and the US. Thus EU and US policy-makers have started to address Africa within the framework of their bilateral relations with China.72 Whereas as EU-China and US-China exchanges on Africa are still at an early stage, several areas for potential cooperation have been identified.

Against the background, the following policy recommendations can be put forward:

**The EU and the US should collaborate with China to foster the AU and the APSA.** The recent establishment of China’s diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa represents an opportunity for collaboration between China, the EU and the US to support the AU and its role in fostering African peace and security. Moreover,

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China’s first overseas deployment of combat forces in Mali reaffirms China’s growing involvement in PKOs in Africa and could open the door for collaboration with the EU and the US to support the APSA. While China is a newcomer in the field, it could learn from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which has seen its most important missions deployed in Africa. In recent years, the EU has started welcoming the contribution of partner countries in CSDP missions. The EU and the US signed a Framework Participation Agreement in March 2011 to provide a legal framework for US contributions of civilian personnel to CSDP missions. A similar type of collaboration could be envisaged with China. This could provide a starting point for overall China-EU-US security cooperation in Africa.

**The EU and the US should specifically reach out to China in the area of maritime security in the Horn of Africa.** China, the EU and the US are major trading partners. As most of their trade is transported by sea, they share a common interest in secure maritime routes. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has undermined the safety of one of the most important maritime routes. Both the EU and the US have engaged in efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, namely through the US-led Combined Task Force 151 of the Combined Maritime Force and the EU Naval Force Atalanta. Moreover, China launched a counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden in 2009, which has been its first long-distance naval deployment. In this context, initial collaboration in terms of information-sharing and the coordination of navies took place between China, the EU and the US. For instance, the PLA navy has responded to the distress calls of non-Chinese vessels under pirate attack in the Gulf of Aden, and has also provided an escort for several non-Chinese ships. This initial collaboration should be further expanded. For instance, China should increase its participation in the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction mechanism, which is a monthly planning conference that allows for the coordination of all counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

**The EU and the US should specifically reach out to China in the area of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa.** China’s new military facility in Djibouti will have major implications for the EU and the US. Following the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US has been increasingly involved in counterterrorism in Africa. Through its Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, the US has been involved in fighting terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. At the same time, Djibouti hosts a military camp for France that has been pushing for a more proactive European response to counterterrorism in the Sahel region. While EU-US cooperation on counterterrorism has expanded significantly since

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the 9/11 terrorist attacks and more recent attacks in Europe, counterterrorism also officially features on the agenda of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership. Thus, although there have been some concerns about China establishing a land facility in Djibouti close to that of the US and France, it could represent an opportunity for joint efforts between China, the EU and the US to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

**The EU and the US should enhance China’s contribution to global governance, namely through the Group of 20 (G-20) and the AIIB.** China currently holds the presidency of the G-20 and will be followed by Germany in 2017. This presents an opportunity for collaboration between the EU and China to foster the role of the G-20 in global economic governance. In particular, the EU could support China’s efforts in opening the G-20 to African developing countries. Together they could support South Africa’s leadership of the G-20 Development Working Group. At the same time, the EU and the US should engage in a coordinated approach regarding China’s efforts to play a more prominent role in global governance through institutions such as the New Development Bank and the AIIB. The case of the AIIB shows the risks of a divided transatlantic partnership. While the US opposed the creation of the AIIB, several EU member states have followed the Chinese lead and become founding members of the New Development Bank.

**The EU, the US and China should contribute to Africa’s development and support African countries in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).** As members of the UN, all three partners have contributed to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs. Through triangular development cooperation the EU, the US and China could support the implementation of the SDGs in SSA. Although only a few examples of triangular cooperation have emerged so far, this new type of development cooperation could present several advantages. First, triangular development cooperation would allow the combination of the comparative advantages of China’s model of SSC with the traditional donor-recipient relationship between the EU/US and SSA. While as China’s SSC encompasses mostly infrastructure projects, traditional development cooperation of the EU/US puts particular emphasis on aspects of sustainable development and good governance. Second, triangular development cooperation might be better suited to tackle regional and global challenges, as compared with traditional bilateral frameworks.

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