Strengthening the EU’s External Action: The Need for an EU Food Diplomacy?

by Daniele Fattibene

ABSTRACT

Over the last decades, food security has come to the fore as a relevant issue both for scholars and for policy-makers. The so-called “Arab Spring” revealed the strong linkage between food security, political instability and migration. The European Union’s food security policy has set up solid building blocks to deal with the challenge both in terms of development and of humanitarian policies. However, such an approach has proved to be too sectoral, lacking a clear strategic framework where food is embedded into broader security dynamics. An EU food diplomacy under the aegis of the European External Action Service could help to integrate the two souls – development and humanitarian assistance – of the EU’s food security policy, in line with the EU Global Strategy and the international commitments made on climate change and sustainable development.
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by Daniele Fattibene*

1. Food: A new concept of security

In the last decades, the concept of security has gone through an interesting evolution. It has ceased to be exclusively confined to the realm of politics and the military, acquiring a deeper and more human-related dimension. In this context, food security has come to the fore as a relevant issue both for scholars and policymakers. It can be defined either from a macro-level or a micro-level perspective: at the macro-level it refers to a country’s capacity to provide adequate food supplies for its population, either via domestic production, the global market or food aid. At the micro-level, food security describes individual access to food. Against this background, food security has experienced a two-fold change. On the one hand, it has evolved from the definition provided by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) twenty years ago. It has merged with new variables (energy, water, climate change and migration flows), pushing practitioners to introduce many linkages, the most important being the so called water-energy-food (WEF) nexus. On the

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3 A situation “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” FAO, *World Food Summit Plan of Action*, Rome, 13 November 1996, http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm.

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other hand, food has become progressively “securitised,” with many countries including “food security” within their national strategic documents. Interestingly to note, this trend has involved also those countries which do not directly face food security problems, but which are aware of the destabilising effect this could have on domestic as well as global and regional order. The European Union’s (EU) food security policy has gradually changed since the Lisbon Treaty. Nowadays, the EU’s action is three-layered:

- the Commission level, notably through the activities of Directorate-Generals (DGs) DEVCO and ECHO;
- the intergovernmental level in cooperation with the EU Member States; and
- the international level together with other regional or international actors.

The EU’s food security policy has been significantly affected by all the linkages between food and development, but also humanitarian assistance, energy, environment, migration flows and so forth. In this sense, the EU’s policymakers have started to take into account the potential negative externalities that the implementation of some domestic policies may have on global food security. This has been very much apparent with regard to biofuel policy, where a great debate has emerged on the potential implications of biofuel for food prices, indirect land-use change (ILUC), water exploitation and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.


9 According to King and Webber, fuels from irrigated corn or soybeans use 35 litres of water/km whereas electricity from the grid uses 0.56 litres of water/km, while gasoline from petroleum uses 1.5 litres of water/km. And because they are from agricultural products, the biofuels have much larger consumption levels — that is, the water is not returned to the source. See Carey W. King and Michaele Webber, “Water Intensity of Transportation”, in Environmental Science & Technology, Vol. 42, No. 21 (2008), p. 7869, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/es803567m.

10 A study for the European Parliament shows that average net emission estimates range from -42 per cent for sugarcane ethanol to +14 per cent for sunflower biodiesel. See Didier Bourguignon, EU Biofuels Policy: Dealing with Indirect Land Use Change, in EPRS Briefings, January
Nonetheless, the EU food security policy has retained a sectorial approach and still lacks a clear strategic framework which addresses all the security dimensions linked to this topic. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has been working in this direction, by playing a steering function in guiding the EU’s food security projects on the ground, in strong cooperation with the EU delegations. What the EU needs now is a strategic vision, a food diplomacy under the EEAS’s guidance. This would help to increase the level of coordination of all the Union’s actors engaged in food security programmes. A good example may be offered by the role the EEAS is already playing in energy and climate issues, where the Service is facilitating a strong cooperation between DGs ENER and CLIMA. For this reason, an EU food diplomacy that is fully in line with the EU Global Strategy11 as well as with the external commitments the EU has taken in terms of climate change – not to mention the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the UN 2030 Agenda – will help to effectively address the main challenges ahead.

2. The link between food security, political instability and migration flows

In the last years an interesting debate has emerged on the linkage between food security, political instability and migration flows. It is not coincidence that food (in)security is higher in those countries coping with internal political instability or conflicts,12 with a proportion of undernourished people that is almost three times as high as in other developing countries.13 Additionally, the FAO has pointed out that post-conflict countries with high food insecurity are 40 per cent more likely to relapse into conflict.

The Arab Spring have epitomised the interesting linkage between food security, social unrest and migration flows. “Food riots”14 blew up in many countries in the region especially as a result of food price spikes as well as the removal of food and fuel

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14 Barbet-Gros and Cuesta calculated that 55 such riots exploded in 38 countries between 2007 and 2014. The authors divide them between those “directed against the Government” (mostly driven from food policy failures like food price inflation) and those “not directed against the Government” (where the targets were food suppliers like trucks, shops or even refugee camps). See Julie Barbet-Gros and Jose Cuesta, Food Riots: From Definition to Operationalization (Introduction Guide for the Food Riot Radar), September 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/food-price-crisis-observatory#4.
subsidies. Such a dangerous mix decreased citizens’ purchasing power, fuelling the level of frustration towards national governments. Moreover, in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region the aforementioned distinction between macro-level and micro-level food security is essential to effectively analyse the level of food (in)security. The following graphs highlight two important indicators of both macro- and micro-level food security. Figure 1 shows the amount of foreign exchange reserves that MENA countries need in order to pay for food imports.

**Figure 1** | Value of food imports in total merchandise exports, 2011-2013

![Figure 1](image)


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17 In this paper MENA refers to the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
Between 2011 and 2013 several States (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen) spent more than 35 per cent of foreign exchange reserves to pay for food imports, with a peak of 46 per cent for Syria. This makes them more vulnerable to external shocks like sudden food price spikes. In these contexts, food insecurity may become the channel through which other sources of resentment (i.e., poverty, unemployment, political marginalisation) can be expressed.

Figure 2 shows instead two sub-indicators of micro-food security: the prevalence of wasting and stunting among children under five years of age, with the most critical situations being found in countries like Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Morocco.

**Figure 2 |** Prevalence of wasting and stunting in children under five years in MENA region

Source: Global Hunger Index Data, http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JL16EW.

Notes: Wasting=low weight for height; Stunting=low height for age. The figure does not contain data for Israel and the UAE as these countries were not measured by the GHI, whereas Syria did not provide any data.

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The Syrian case is probably the one which best epitomises the role of food insecurity as a trigger of political instability and ultimately migration flows. While not suggesting adherence to those neo-malthusian theories which interpret the Syrian war merely as a consequence of natural and environmental factors, it does seem plausible that food insecurity was one of the factors that caused mounting social unrest which then burst into fierce anti-government protests. Thus, when food insecurity is coupled with other structural weaknesses like unstable institutions, demographic stress and an already deteriorated socio-economic environment, social unrest is more likely to occur.

The EU has been very much exposed to such turbulences in the MENA region, especially in terms of migration flows, with a 226 per cent increase of asylum seeker’s applications between 2014 and 2015. Asylum statistics interestingly show that there is, if not a correlation, at least a link between food (in)security and the countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU. These data, combined with the main indexes of food security such as the Global Hunger Index, underline that for the top-10 countries of origin of asylum seekers in the EU the “severity of hunger” is “alarming” in one (Afghanistan), “serious” in three (Iraq, Nigeria and Pakistan), “moderate” in one (Albania) and “low” in Iran and Ukraine.

Food (in)security in the MENA region risks becoming even more acute as a consequence of rising competition (as well as mismanagement) over water resources. The International Displacement Monitoring Centre warns that water shortages, water pollution and natural hazards could cause a higher level of climate-change-induced displacement. In the MENA region, the level of renewable fresh water per capita is on average around 12 per cent of the EU level, with dramatic levels registered in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Qatar. The EU has acknowledged the role that food security plays in terms of political instability, security and migration flows. For this reason, in 2015 an 1.9 billion euro trust fund was launched to address the “root causes of migration.”

3. The EU’s approach towards food security

The EU has made an impressive effort to develop a food security policy that is as comprehensive as possible. Drawing on the aforementioned linkages, the Union’s approach towards food security is three-layered:

- the Commission level, notably through the activities of DGs DEVCO and ECHO;
- the intergovernmental level in cooperation with the EU Member States; and
- the international level together with other international actors.

The Council Conclusions on the EU Policy Framework for Food Security are the political basis of its food security policy. The document has been the result of a joint effort taken by two DGs, DEVCO and ECHO, which represent the “two souls” of the EU’s approach: the development and the humanitarian assistance.

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dimensions. These two souls stem from two different rationales (ensuring sustainable development and saving lives) and operate with different perspectives (long-term and short-term respectively).

Against this background, what is still lacking is a strategic framework whereby food is embedded with other security dynamics, such as political instability and migration flows, and which brings together efforts made by development and humanitarian assistance into a coherent whole. The EEAS through the work of the EU delegations on the ground has already been playing a crucial steering role, by ensuring coherence among all EU actions with food security objectives. However, so far this has not produced a clear vision or scheme which, drawing on the aforementioned several linkages, provides a truly holistic approach to food security. Launching a “food diplomacy” under the EEAS’s guidance would thus represent a clear qualitative leap which may definitely increase the role of the Service in this issue.

3.1 The two souls of the EU’s food security policy

The Lisbon Treaty confirmed the predominant role of DG DEVCO in food security issues. It inherited the EuropeAid structure, with thematic and geographic programmes undertaken under a common presidency. Nowadays, food security projects are mainly addressed under the Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic programme (around 1.5 billion euros allocated for “Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture” projects between 2014-2020), as well as bilaterally. Around 60 countries have chosen to concentrate their bilateral relations with the EU on food security projects. Therefore, between 2014 and 2020 around 8/9 billion euros overall has been allocated for food security programmes. Additionally, during the 2008 food crisis, the EU launched a 1 billion euro Food Facility instrument, which allowed it to address one of the most critical moments of the last decades and which reached out to 150 million people in 49 countries.

The GPGC programme for 2014-2020 clearly reflects how the different linkages had an impact on the EU policy-makers. Moreover, an important tool to boost

32 Food security programmes are indeed presented together with environment and climate change, sustainable energy, human development and migration and asylum.
synergies across development- and non-development-related activities is the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). The PCD is not an exclusive tool of the development cooperation policy, since DEVCO works more as a “user” of impact analyses undertaken by other DGs. The PCD is thus functional to analyse the coherence or incoherence of the EU policies with food security objectives, together with their impact at the individual country level. Furthermore, it raises the accountability of all DGs on the effects that the implementation of their policies can have on other EU objectives as well as on recipient countries. It has become even more important now with the 2030 UN Agenda, which explicitly mentions the risk of negative externalities linked to the implementation of domestic policies. For the EU this need has very much come to the fore with the latest ambitious commitments taken at the Conference of Parties 21 (COP21) in Paris, as well as the Energy Union package.

DG ECHO is the second key actor in the EU’s food security policy, which it mostly addresses from the perspective of humanitarian assistance. With 349 million euros provided for food assistance, as well as 130 million euros allocated to addressing under-nutrition in 2014, the EU is one of the biggest donors in the world. Drawing on the Food Assistance Convention, DG ECHO adopted an innovative approach towards humanitarian assistance, by creating a “toolbox” to provide food assistance at every stage of emergency. Against this background, a cornerstone of the EU’s food humanitarian assistance is the concept of “resilience.” It is not a coincidence that in 2015, 16 per cent of ECHO’s humanitarian funding (around 107 million euros) went to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) activities, whereas more than 43 per cent of all ECHO-funded projects include DRR activities within two

36 It set the compulsory goal of at least 40 per cent domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and of 27 per cent of renewable energies in its energy mix by 2030. Furthermore, the EU Members contributed 14 billion euros to climate finance in 2014.
37 Among them 20 per cent reduction in GHG emissions, 20 per cent renewable energy, 20 per cent improvement in energy efficiency.
Regional Resilience Programmes.\textsuperscript{40}

\subsection*{3.2 The role of the EEAS: Time is ripe for an EU food diplomacy?}

The previous sections have highlighted the high level of maturity that the EU has reached at the technical level. In the last years the Union has managed to set up very solid building blocks in terms of both development and humanitarian assistance activities. Moreover, the EU has worked hard in order to create other tools such as the PCD to ensure a stronger degree of coordination of all the stakeholders involved, with the aim of avoiding overlapping. Additionally, the events in the MENA region as well as the sometimes harsh debate which has emerged on the implications of the use of biofuels have raised the awareness of the relations that food has with several other topics, such as political instability, migration flows and energy security. Yet, in order to address these challenges properly, the EU needs to go beyond this sometimes excessively technical approach. It needs to elaborate a clear strategic framework towards food security which identifies all these dimensions and guides the Union’s action in an effective way. The actor that is best suited to fulfil this task is obviously the EEAS. The Service has already been working on the ground with the EU delegations in order to avoid a situation where the cross-cutting nature of food security generates overlap among the activities of DEVCO, ECHO or other DGs.\textsuperscript{41} Such a steering function has proved to be effective in some cases like Ethiopia\textsuperscript{42} or Somalia.\textsuperscript{43} Launching a clear, holistic and comprehensive food diplomacy would definitely increase the role of the EEAS in food security in the future. First, a stronger empowerment of the Service will be essential to effectively coordinate all projects with food security implications. In this sense, a positive example may be offered by the role the EEAS has played in other policies like Energy or Climate. Second, a stronger strategic coordination under the aegis of the EEAS would help to put food security projects in line with other important external commitments the EU has taken in terms of energy and climate change policies. This is even more important in light of the EU Global Strategy but also the UN 2030 Agenda. The latter pays significant attention to food security, presenting it in a very comprehensive way in strong linkage with other non-food-security related activities. Therefore, the EU needs a food diplomacy which is fully aware of the linkages food security has not only with development and humanitarian-assistance-related activities but also with political stability, security and migration flows.

\textsuperscript{40} The two EU programmes are the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR), launched in 2012 to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable across 9 countries in the Sahel region of West Africa; and the Supporting the Horn of Africa’s Resilience (SHARE) initiative – launched in 2011 as a consequence of the Horn of Africa food crisis – aiming to boost resilience in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia.

\textsuperscript{41} This occurs either formally, through the so-called “inter-service consultation,” or informally.

\textsuperscript{42} In 2013 the EU and 20 Member States plus Norway endorse the EU+ Joint Cooperation Strategy, to ensure that all interventions aimed at addressing Ethiopia’s development challenges would be fulfilled without overlapping.

\textsuperscript{43} Where there was a serious risk that investments in “hard security” might overlap with those dealing with food security.
3.3 Relations with the Member States in implementing food security objectives

The EU has also made strong efforts to coordinate its food security policy with the Member States. In this sense, drawing on the 2013 Implementation Plan for Food and Nutrition Security, the Commission and the Member States have jointly issued two biennial progress reports on the implementation of the six priority areas identified. These reports have been very important, as they have helped to ensure improvements in the coherence, complementarity and coordination (the so-called “3 Cs”) of EU-Member States cooperation and to assess “the performance of EU donors in working together to deliver agreed EU policy priorities regarding food and nutrition security.” According to the second report, EU donors invested almost 3.7 billion euros in food and nutrition security in 2014 (around 8 per cent of their total official development assistance, or ODA), with interventions split among 3,300 programmes in more than 100 countries. Furthermore, they provided approximately 1.1 billion euros for emergency and humanitarian aid related to food and nutrition security in over 80 countries. As the table below shows, the majority of interventions (45 per cent) were done in Africa, whereas 25 per cent of the activities were global.

Table 1 | Geographical distribution of aid disbursement in 2012 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million euros</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (Sub-Saharan)</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood countries</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,366</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: * “Other” covers programmes in the Middle East, Pacific or more than one region or continent.

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45 1) Improving smallholder resilience and rural livelihoods; 2) supporting effective governance; 3) supporting regional agriculture and food and nutrition security policies; 4) strengthening social protection mechanisms for food and nutrition security, particularly for vulnerable population groups; 5) enhancing nutrition in particular for mothers, infants and children; and 6) enhancing coordination between development and humanitarian actors to build resilience and promote sustainable food and nutrition security. Ibid., p. 4.


3.4 Relations with other international actors

Finally, an important part of the EU’s food security is undertaken in strong cooperation with other international actors. In the last decades, the number of entities dealing with food security (with different degrees of institutionalisation) has significantly expanded. Among them, the EU has very strong ties not only with international or regional organisations (i.e., FAO, but also the African Union, ECOWAS, etc.), but also with banks (World Bank, IFAD), NGOs and even with international research organisations (International Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI). The most important of these, in terms of contribution and number of programmes in which the EU is involved, are the FAO, the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Committee on World Food Security.

The Union cooperates very intensively with these organisations, working both on global as well as country-level programmes dealing with topics ranging from forestry (i.e., the FLEGT programme), livestock (i.e., the FIRST programme), land tenure, resilience or fisheries. Although DG DEVCO is the main reference point for the FAO, DG ECHO also does significant work with the FAO on projects aimed to boost countries’ resilience and more generally whenever the collapse of the agricultural system makes it necessary to intervene.

The WPF is another crucial actor for the EU as it works strongly with DG ECHO in a series of humanitarian activities aimed to strengthen food security at all stages. Very important among such activities are for instance the “cash and vouchers” projects which are very effective to empower people and make local markets work, as well as programmes on “school feeding” or women’s empowerment.

The IFAD is another important partner for the EU’s food security policy. Because the IFAD is essentially a bank, the EU cannot finance it directly. However, the two entities do a lot of work together in several projects, mainly at the country-level.

Finally, an important partner for the EU’s food security policy is the Committee on World Food Security. The EU is one of the main financial supporters of this body but also one of the strongest advocates of the so-called Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests.  

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48 For more information, see the EU FLEGT Facility website: http://www.euflegt.efi.int.
4. Why does the EU need a food diplomacy?

In the last years the EU has proved capable of setting up a very comprehensive food security policy. At the theoretical level, the EU has reached an impressive stage of maturity, not only on projects strictly related to food security but also on those activities whose implementation may cause negative externalities. However, the EU’s approach to food security has shown itself to be sometimes overly sectorial, lacking a clear strategic vision of the several security dimensions linked to food security. In this context, an EU food diplomacy with a strong role for the EEAS could help to integrate the two souls of the EU’s food security policy within a holistic framework to address the main challenges ahead. As elements of such a framework both practitioners and policy-makers mention the following points.

First, concerning research and development (R&D) activities, an EU food diplomacy could help to build stronger synergies between those industrial and technological stakeholders which are R&D enablers and local communities in Africa, with the aim of transferring technological capacities to the continent. This would also make it possible to boost relations between European small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and those in developing countries.

Second, drawing on the linkage between food security, political instability and migration flows, the EU food diplomacy could pave the way for including food security within future EU conflict prevention strategies. Since food is not mentioned in the 2015 Action Plan, such a step would mean promoting the issue of food security from being exclusively considered in relation to the spheres of development or humanitarian assistance. Instead food security may become a key ex-ante strategy which is essential to increase the level of resilience of developing countries. Including food security within future EU conflict-prevention strategies would allow the latter to address the “root causes” of crises more effectively.

Third, an EU food diplomacy could allow the Union to lead a global effort to produce a true re-thinking of models of farming, with the aim of making food more nutritious as well as more sustainably produced. These projects at the moment clash with the very different views of the Member States. A food diplomacy endorsed by all Member States could facilitate the emergence of a stronger political consensus, for instance by aligning to the goals set in the UN 2030 Agenda.

Finally and most importantly, a food diplomacy would gradually change the way EU food-security-related projects are implemented. The Union’s approach risks being overly vague, as many times the logical frameworks guiding EU projects are not tailored to the different countries. This obviously impedes identification of concrete results which should guide the EU’s action. Setting an EU food diplomacy

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could thus help movement towards an implementation phase guided by clear and flexible results which can be easily adapted according to the different contexts in which the EU is intervening. An EU food diplomacy would need to devote greater attention not only to the activities to be carried out but also to the transformation that it wants to produce. In other words, it would allow the EU to overcome its current sectorial approach and to develop a truly holistic and country-tailored food security policy.

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