Towards a Stronger Africa-EU Cooperation on Peace and Security: The Role of African Regional Organizations and Civil Society

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Abstract
The Joint Africa-European Union Strategy, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, was intended to overcome an unequal partnership between the African and European continents by establishing a framework of cooperation based on shared values and common objectives. However, in the first implementation phase it became clear that these conditions were far from being fully realized. In particular, the Partnership on Peace and Security has shown a tendency to institutionalize dialogue and crystallize practices of cooperation along the well-established Brussels-Addis Ababa axis, while efforts to engage with other crucial actors remain to some extent limited. This paper focuses on the sub-optimal involvement of two crucial stakeholders, namely African regional organizations and civil society actors. It presents the main findings and policy recommendations of a study concluded by IAI in September 2012, with the support of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the European Parliament.

Keywords: European Union / African Union / Joint Africa-EU Strategy / African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) / Africa / Regional organizations / Civil society / Crisis management / Mediation / Early warning / Capacity building
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Introduction: Africa-European Union relations five years after Lisbon

The Joint Africa-European Union Strategy (referred to as JAES or Joint Strategy in this paper), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, was intended to overcome an unequal partnership between the African and European continents by establishing a framework of cooperation based on shared values and common objectives. The first Action Plan (2008-2010) identified eight priorities or Partnerships for cooperation, the first of which refers to peace and security,¹ and indicated the concrete initiatives required to operationalize the Joint Strategy. The new approach in Africa-European Union (EU) relations in the field of peace and security was based on a series of assumptions, including the convergence of strategic approaches and shared threat perceptions between the two partners, as well as the gradual development of effective African capabilities to address African crises.

During the first implementation phase it became clear that these conditions were far from being fully realized, and that more time would be needed to achieve them. On the one hand, African and European stances vis-à-vis security challenges in the African continent were often divergent, such as in the cases of the crises in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Libya. Europe is still seen as an external actor that tries to impose its own agenda on African counterparts, and is accused of applying double standards concerning military interventions and the application of international justice. On the other hand, African structures and instruments to prevent and manage crises have evolved at a slow pace, due to a number of factors including, among others, lack of political commitment by African countries, scarce absorption capacity of funds, dependency on external funding and poor transparency in internal management.

As a result, the Partnership on Peace and Security has been hampered by a number of ties that have jeopardized European efforts to promote stability in the African continent. The Tripoli Summit in November 2010 and the second Action Plan (2011-2013) have

¹ The eight Partnerships identified in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy are: 1) Peace and Security; 2) Human Rights and Governance; 3) Trade and Regional Integration; 4) Millennium Developments Goals; 5) Energy; 6) Climate Change; 7) Migration, Mobility and Employment; 8) Science, Information Society and Space.
tried to address some of these problems, but the full implementation of the Joint Strategy is still a work in progress.

In particular, previous assessments of the operationalization of the Joint Strategy and the Partnership on Peace and Security have shown a tendency to institutionalize dialogue and crystallize practices of cooperation along the well-established Brussels-Addis Ababa axis, while efforts to engage with other crucial actors remain to some extent limited. In this contribution, we focus on the sub-optimal involvement of two crucial stakeholders, namely African regional organizations - Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) - and civil society actors - including, among others, non-governmental organizations, academia and think tanks, community and religious organizations, women's groups, and political parties and foundations.

The first part of this paper addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the contribution of African regional organizations to the Joint Strategy. The most significant gaps in the involvement of REC/RMs lie in communication, coordination and harmonization with the African Union institutions, which have only been partially improved by the establishment of liaison mechanisms. Moreover, due to their different degrees of integration and overlapping memberships, African regional organizations themselves face a number of challenges which negatively impact on coordination in terms of mandates, visions and policy priorities. In general, both the existence of competing centres of power and the scarcity of resources are obstacles to an improved engagement of regional organizations in the Africa-EU Partnership, which need to be overcome through political and financial means.

The second part of this article is devoted to the current and potential role of civil society actors in the Africa-EU political dialogue on peace and security and implementation activities, with particular regard to their involvement in conflict analysis and early warning, capacity building and mediation. The JAES was conceived of as a people-centred strategy, at least on paper. However, despite formal commitments, civil society has not yet found adequate room to express itself and to have a real impact on the decision-making process. This situation is exacerbated by significant differences between the two sides, with African civil society organizations lagging behind their European counterparts in terms of human and economic resources and organizational and networking abilities. Therefore, it is crucial to reflect on how civil society could be enabled to provide real added value to the achievement of the Strategy’s objectives.

Finally, the third part of this article identifies some selected policy recommendations to institutional and non-institutional stakeholders, with the aim of putting forward possible ways of engagement of regional organizations and civil society actors and of further improving the existing strategic framework of EU-Africa relations.

2 The African Union officially recognizes eight Regional Economic Communities and two Regional Mechanisms with a mandate on peace and security. These are: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), as well as the East African Stand-by Force Command (EASF) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).
1. African regional organizations and the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security

The changes in the nature of violent conflicts in Africa over the last decades require adaptation and increased capacity by conflict management actors to provide security and political stability to states and their citizens. The contribution of African regional organizations (REC/RMs) to conflict prevention, management and resolution is still an under-researched and mostly overlooked topic, even though regional organizations “are playing an ever more important role in securing peace and security” on the African continent. Often, REC/RMs are considered to have significant comparative advantages in this regard in terms of cultural understanding, geographical closeness and personal links. In addition, as the regional dimension of many violent conflicts has a direct impact on neighbouring countries, REC/RMs have a legitimate and vital interest in being at the forefront of peace and security initiatives. The REC/RMs are one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), created in 2002, particularly in relation to certain of its components, as follows: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), and the African Stand-by Force (ASF). However, their involvement in the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security remains to date sub-optimal and constrained, due to a number of factors.

In the interactions between the AU and the REC/RMs, the continental level is expected to take a leadership role in providing orientations on policy directions and the implementation of programmes. Although the existence of many RECs predates the constitution of the AU in 2002, such a hierarchical division is now generally accepted, albeit sometimes with reluctance. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) governing the relationship between AU and REC/RMs was concluded in January 2008. All REC/RMs have signed the MoU, with the North African Regional Capability (NARC) being the last to do so in September 2011. In the framework of this MoU, the AU and REC/RMs hold regular meetings, joint missions and consultations. Nevertheless, some questions concerning when to act, who goes first and who does what are still open, as demonstrated by the varying or even contradictory positions taken by AU and RECs in cases such as the recent crises in Madagascar and Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, it must be recalled that the AU recognizes ten REC/RMs with a mandate on peace and security, while other regional groupings remain outside this framework.

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5 Ibid., p. 7.


7 These are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
In what follows we assess the interactions between the AU, the EU and REC/RMs within the Partnership, focusing on: 1) political dialogue; 2) the operationalization of APSA and its components; and 3) the issue of consistency of EU support.

1.1. Political dialogue

The involvement of the REC/RMs in the Partnership remains limited as far as political dialogue is concerned. The JAES’s leitmotiv of “treating Africa as one” is difficult to translate into the area of peace and security, as it is heavily influenced by different regional interpretations, despite the continental approach promoted by the Joint Strategy and the central role of the AU. The political dialogue established by the European Union with the REC/RMs in the context of the Cotonou negotiations has not been sufficient to trigger a more comprehensive approach, as it does not provide for a direct link to peace and security. In this respect, the JAES offers a good framework, but its political dialogue needs to be reactivated and improved.

Since the last summit in Tripoli in November 2010, the overall level of dialogue in the framework of the Joint Strategy seems to have decreased, given the lower number and level of interactions during this period, in part as a result of the crisis in North Africa. In the traditional EU narrative of the Partnership on Peace and Security, political dialogue is where progress is made with the AU, but not necessarily with the REC/RMs (some would even go so far as to state that with regard to political processes, the REC/RMs are absent from the Partnership, which seems dominated by Addis Ababa and Brussels-based diplomats). At this stage, experience of the Partnership has demonstrated the limits of the continental dimension of cooperation, and brought about the realization that the REC/RMs have a political role in peace and security.

One issue of concern is for instance a clash of interests between the AU and REC/RMs over questions of seniority between organizations. The REC/RMs have difficulties in entering into a political dialogue, as the relevant questions for their own agendas might be different from the agenda of the AU, as demonstrated by the example of maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea. While in both cases the issue at stake is piracy, this phenomenon has different causes and requires different responses in the two regions concerned, which underlines the fact that there cannot be a continental blueprint to deal with this issue.

Hence, on this policy issue the AU might be best served by developing a regional policy jointly with the relevant region. Ideally, “[t]he relationship between the AU and the RECs is supposed to be hierarchical but mutually reinforcing: the AU harmonizes and coordinates the activities of the RECs in the peace and security realm”. One of the biggest coordination challenges is to determine what takes priority, especially when national interests trump regional interests, thus raising questions about political will. In

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8 Such as the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).
addition, at both regional and continental levels the same themes are developed, in relation to such issues as security sector reform. In theory, regional and continental strategies should enhance each other, but this is not always the case. For the Partnership to function correctly, instruments for dialogue need to be adapted.

In AU-EU high-level gatherings, such as the Commission-to-Commission (C2C) meetings and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) - Political and Security Committee (COPS) meetings, there is a political void, since they take place once or twice a year without the presence of the REC/RMs. At present, the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) of the African Peace Facility (APF), which is the principal financial instrument of the Partnership, is the only forum where all parties - including the REC/RMs - are involved, but it takes place at the lowest political level. The Akosombo process, that has brought together high-level officials of the AU, EU and REC/RMs in a series of consultative meetings twice a year since November 2010, could be a way to fill this gap.

In addition, all liaison offices of regional organizations to the AU in Addis Ababa are now in place, with the exception of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which is currently on minimal operational capacity. The REC/RMs liaison offices are one of the success stories of the Partnership, but their role depends largely on the efficiency of the relevant officer. Overall, they ensure closer links between the AU and RECs, and contribute to the coordination of activities. The last AU-REC/RMs Memorandum of Understanding meeting also agreed on an extended mandate for the liaison offices besides their original focus on peace and security. However, as those liaison offices are completely funded by the EU through the APF, the question of their sustainability must be raised. The establishment of AU liaison offices to the RECs is also under preparation, and staff positions have been advertised.

1.2. The operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The APSA aims to give the AU and REC/RMs “the necessary instruments to fulfil the tasks of prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa”, as set out in the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is conceived in such a way that, with regard to most of its components, the REC/RMs can be seen as the pillars of the architecture. The challenges in involving the REC/RMs are manifold. Some parts of APSA are functional, but the APSA components are progressing slowly. In this context, the elaboration of an AU-REC/RMs APSA Roadmap, as a result of the triangular consultations with the EU carried out during the Akosombo process, has been an important development. Adopted by the AU and REC/RMs in January 2012, the APSA Roadmap is to guide all


future support by partners, but it still lacks prioritization and benchmarks. It actually overburdens the partners with a wide range of subjects, with the AU and the REC/RMs having difficulties in responding to all the demands coming from international donors. A rationalization of the APSA Roadmap in terms of thematic priorities is therefore absolutely necessary, especially if the AU and REC/RMs are expected to align their strategic plans to it. In our contribution, we focus on the following areas: 1) early warning; 2) peace and security governance; 3) mediation; and 4) crisis management.

**Early warning**
RECs form an integral part of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The PSC Protocol states that CEWS shall consist of the “observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room [in Addis Ababa], and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room”\(^\text{12}\). Several RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, SADC, COMESA) have already established their early warning systems to varying degrees.\(^\text{13}\) While in particular ECOWAS and IGAD are quite advanced, ECCAS is lagging behind. Efforts are underway to harmonize methodologies and to coordinate the different elements of the early warning system, despite the varying mandates and legal constraints of the RECs, and their different perceptions of conflict prevention. For example, a CEWS portal for information exchange between RECs and the AU has been set up. However the CEWS indicators are set by Member States, and include red lines not to be crossed in terms of early warning signals. Understandably, no country wants to be on the watch list. Therefore, each REC is developing its early warning system with varying methodologies, and interconnectivity is yet to be realized, operationally but also technically.\(^\text{14}\) Finally, challenges remain regarding the analysis of data and how to transmit them to decision-makers on the regional and continental levels so that early warning can become early action.

**Peace and security governance**
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is at the heart of peace and security governance in Africa. Within the PSC, regional groupings play an important role when it comes to the coordination of issue stances within a region, or when regional clusters take the lead in formulating policies on specific issues.\(^\text{15}\) At PSC meetings on a specific country or region, the REC and the Member State representing the chair of that REC are invited. If a specific conflict is addressed in the PSC, the chair ambassador of the REC concerned briefs the group, while the REC liaison office can attend as an observer. With regard to the relations between the PSC and its regional counterparts, implementation of the provisions in the PSC protocol is lagging behind. For the time being, ECOWAS and SADC are the only RECs with similar PSC bodies at the regional level. Questions that need to be resolved in this regard are how to engage the other RECs in a political process specific to each region, and what format this engagement


\(^\text{15}\) Ibid., p. 7.
should take, for example in the form of bilateral or joint continent-wide meetings. There is also a need for greater coherence in approaches between the different bodies in the AU and the RECs, as demonstrated by the case of Niger, where ECOWAS made a strong pronouncement following the coup d’état in February 2010, while the PSC’s reaction was more timid.

Mediation

Mediation issues in the framework of APSA are mainly referred to the Panel of the Wise (PoW). For quite some time, the only regional body similar to the PoW existed within ECOWAS. This was the ECOWAS Council of the Wise, created in 1999. SADC and COMESA established similar bodies in 2011. For the time being, cooperation between these various panels occurs on an ad hoc basis. However, RECs systematically participate in PoW meetings, where experience and lessons are shared. RECs also participate in PoW missions, as was the case of the good offices deployment of the PoW to Tunisia and Egypt prior to the elections in these countries in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Most recently, at the beginning of June 2012, a retreat took place in Burkina Faso, regrouping the PoW and its regional counterparts, where election-related violence and mediation prospects were discussed. In general terms, the issue around mediation is one of sequencing and the allocation of responsibility between RECs and the AU. This question has been raised as a result of the difficulties encountered by RECs in dealing with the protracted political crises in Madagascar (2009 - 2012) and Côte d’Ivoire (up to the end of 2011), when SADC and ECOWAS activities were taken over by the AU.

Crisis Management

The African Stand-by Force (ASF) has not yet reached full operating capability, and will most likely not do so before 2015. Similarly to other APSA components, the readiness of the five stand-by brigades that should compose the ASF varies greatly. Probably the most advanced is the Eastern African Stand-by Force (EASF), which sent its first deployment of eight staff officers to the AU peace support operation in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011. As for the other regions, “the regional brigades for West Africa and Southern Africa are works in progress. In contrast, the ECCAS Brigade exists only in a rudimentary way and NARC is embryonic at best”.

The recent conflict in Mali illustrates that there is the political will to deploy ECOWAS forces, but the initiative lacks everything from soldiers to equipment. Furthermore, ECCAS is leading a regional peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic. Hence, the ASF is slowly advancing to an African rhythm, and an assessment of the regions will take place this year, starting with SADC.

1.3. Consistency of EU support

For the EU, the AU has been the foremost interlocutor with regard to peace and security issues on the African continent over the last decade, and the EU is the biggest

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16 Ibid., p. 20.
The main challenge in the relationship between the EU and RECs is often expressed in terms of absorption capacity, that is an organization’s ability to use all the funds provided by a donor in a given period for the implementation of its programmes, but the question could also be asked if the entry points identified by the EU are the right ones. There are many types of funding instruments, which are confusing and cumbersome for staff of REC/RMs, which in turn makes access to the funds more difficult. Harmonizing and standardizing various national and European programmes is a central issue of coordination, which the EU so far has not sufficiently addressed.

Through the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), managed by the EU Delegations, the EU has invested considerably in a wide range of REC/RMs (for instance, the ECOWAS RIP allocates EUR 120 million for political integration, including peace and security activities). In most cases, the RIPs are prepared in silos and therefore the question of how they interlink and are linked up to the continental level is rarely addressed. In this regard, some of our interlocutors pointed out that the REC/RMs do not necessarily understand the EU system and how the EU programming cycle works, as there appears to be a lack of a consistent picture across the EU between Headquarters, the Delegation to the AU and the regional Delegations. This is further complicated by the fact that EU Headquarters has to clear all programmes with Member States, the latter also often having their own programmes in the African regions.

The interaction between the EU and REC/RMs is improving thanks to the African Peace Facility (APF), which is the main financial instrument for the APSA, and its ongoing programmes that are channelled through the AU. There are regular exchanges and missions as well as consultations in the framework of the AU-REC/RMs MoU. Increasingly, requests for the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) (an innovative tool within the APF that funds the first stages of African-led mediation initiatives) are prepared jointly by the AUC and a REC/RM, which includes a division of labour between the continental and regional levels of the mediation initiatives in question. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is trying to bring some coherence by working hand-in-hand with the European Commission, especially on how the APF is used, and by providing a political reading of the various financial instruments to better shape EU support. Still, competencies on the EU side are in the process of being established and defined more clearly.

2. The role of civil society

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy was meant to be a people-centred partnership, and pledged to create the conditions for civil society to play a more active role in formal and

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informal dialogue between the two continents, as well as in its implementation process. Five years after its adoption, however, it seems that despite good intentions it has not lived up to expectations. It is common opinion that in terms of objectives achieved the Partnership on Peace and Security is the most successful of the eight priority areas identified in the JAES. But to what extent is civil society actually involved in the implementation of the Partnership? What added value could civil society organizations (CSOs) bring to peace and security activities in relations between the EU and Africa? How could the JAES take advantage of them?

As far as peace and security issues are concerned, civil society can provide a significant contribution in at least four broad areas, namely dialogue, early warning, capacity building and mediation, which ultimately support the achievement of two priority objectives of the Partnership on Peace and Security, i.e. political dialogue and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The contribution of CSOs to the Africa-EU dialogue on issues related to peace and security is organized through both formal and informal channels. According to the Livingston formula, adopted by the PSC in December 2008, the PSC may call upon CSOs to organize and undertake activities in the areas of conflict prevention (early warning, reporting and situation analysis), peacemaking and mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian support and post conflict reconstruction, provision of technical support, training, monitoring and impact assessment of peace agreements, etc. The results of such activities are supposed to feed information into the decision-making process of the PSC. Unfortunately, there is still a gap between commitments on paper and reality, and the proposed initiatives are yet to be implemented on a regular basis. On the EU side, the Peacebuilding Partnership has been working as a channel of dialogue between EU bodies dealing with security issues and civil society. In a way similar to that foreseen by the AU Livingstone Formula, the EU Political and Security Committee (COPS) invites to its meetings experts from CSOs in order to have opinions from the ground on specific countries and regions on an ad hoc basis.

As regards the operationalization of the APSA, civil society from both Europe and Africa has direct engagement with many of its components. By taking advantage of its well-established presence on the ground and expertise in analysing and assessing the root causes and drivers of conflict, for instance, CSOs support early warning activities and directly feed into one of the pillars of the APSA, namely the continental and regional early warning systems. For instance, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) signed an agreement with Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2002 for the implementation of a regional early warning and response system (ECOWARN) as an observation and monitoring tool for conflict.

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prevention and decision-making. On the EU side, CSOs’ potential contribution to early warning activities is similar to that on the African side. Information and analysis collected through civil society actors can for instance feed into EU open-source intelligence platforms, such as Tariqa. Civil society also provides the African Stand-by Force, the Panel of the Wise and other AU organs with capacity building and training on specific security issues or on mediation techniques. In addition to national governments and regional organizations, civil society can also have an important role in conflict resolution, as is the case for instance of the Community of Sant’Egidio in Mozambique, or a number of women’s associations in the Mano River Basin. The engagement of civil society actors at both the Track I and Track II levels has proved crucial in providing a voice to marginalized groups, such as women, in official peace processes. At the same time, civil society actors can also prove key in local conflicts, as in the case of the District Peace Committees (DPCs) in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence.

However, despite some positive examples and formal commitments, the Partnership on Peace and Security is still monopolized by institutional stakeholders, with civil society playing a marginal role. Opinions collected throughout the study revealed that most of the remarks made on the first Action Plan still apply today, as no major shift has occurred in the second Action Plan. The strategic framework of the JAES is perceived as too bureaucratic, and both African and European CSOs feel they are hardly having an impact on the institutions’ agenda through a bottom-up and structured approach. A common remark from CSOs is that, although they acknowledge being consulted (especially on the European side), they feel this happens only to allow officials to tick the CSOs box. They maintain that consultations take place only on ad hoc basis, and their opinions are not really taken into account in shaping policy. In this regard, however, it is fair to underline the different perceptions existing between CSOs and

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22 Originally developed by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations, Tariqa is now managed by the EEAS. Tariqa is an open source intelligence platform supported by a multimedia content database with the ultimate aim of providing real-time support for early warning and response. See for further information http://joinup.ec.europa.eu/software/tariqa/description.


24 Such as in the case of the African Union Mediation Support Capacity project, jointly implemented by the AU’s Conflict Management Division (CMD), Accord, and a European NGO, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

25 Interview with senior expert, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and with FES, Addis Ababa, 23 February 2012.


27 Track I diplomacy refers to official initiatives led by institutional and governmental actors. Contrariwise, Track II diplomacy is conducted by non-governmental actors (including for instance academics, NGOs and public figures), with the aim of confidence-building and providing support to conflict resolution.
in institutional stakeholders. EU institutional actors indeed observe that CSOs tend to intervene and to actively participate in dialogue only when specific issues, especially funding, are at stake.

The main causes of the limited achievements in CSOs’ participation in the JAES and in its Peace and Security Partnership can be divided into three categories: i) CSOs’ capacity; ii) mechanisms of participation; and iii) funding.

2.1. CSOs’ capacity

Effective dialogue and joint initiatives are first hampered by the uneven engagement of civil society in the JAES, with African actors still lagging behind. Though the degree of involvement of European CSOs varies somewhat, they can rely on long-established structures and dialogue with EU institutions. This is not the case on the African side, where local human resources and expertise (and funds) are sometimes lacking or, where present, are not sufficient to ensure regular dialogue with institutional actors and active participation in the JAES structured framework. The result is that direct engagement is often limited to “multinational” NGOs to the detriment of local ones. What is more, the high personnel turnover makes it difficult to keep the momentum going, to maintain the flow of knowledge or the expertise already acquired, and to ensure continuity and consistency in joint activities, including those on peace and security, as well as engagement with institutional stakeholders. Additionally, according to some of its representatives, African civil society’s access to and direct involvement in the JAES are limited by the role played by the African Union’s Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOCC) which acts, in a nutshell, as the only channel through which African CSOs can be involved in the Strategy. Whereas in principle the establishment of a body overseeing and working for civil society’s engagement towards the AU institutions and the JAES is positive, many African CSOs and their European counterparts complain about the excessive bureaucratization and slow procedures, as well as a lack of transparency in the selection of local organizations represented within ECOSOCC, with the result that the smaller and more independent organizations are often underrepresented. Again, different perceptions exist. ECOSOCC indeed maintains that difficulties in engaging civil society derive mainly from poor cooperation among local CSOs, which hampers direct dialogue with them. Besides, with regards to joint Africa-EU initiatives, it is the different formal setup, namely the limited institutionalization of European CSOs, that prevents the two partners from “speaking the same language” and from fully understanding and recognizing each other.

2.2. Mechanisms of participation

In principle, the two main channels allowing CSOs to actively participate in the Strategy and make their voices heard are the Implementation Teams (ITs) in Brussels and the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) in Europe and Africa. For each Partnership, the former bring together representatives from the European Commission, the EEAS and Member States, as well as the civil society’s contact point, and monitor, as their name suggests, the implementation of the Joint Strategy. JEGs are informal and open-ended groups composed of African, European and international actors, CSOs included, with an expertise on the issues they address and a willingness to work on the priority action concerned. Both have proved somewhat ineffective. For instance, EU IT meetings tend
to work more as a vague information sharing platform without setting common objectives for action. On their side, JEGs, despite their name, in most cases do not bring together real experts, being composed of political officers from national embassies in Brussels and Addis Ababa who may not necessarily have an expertise in the specific partnership area to which they are called to contribute. Such problems apply to representatives from both sides, but are particularly true of the African side due either to limited local expertise or to difficulties in swiftly identifying existing expertise. Moreover, civil society representatives are not regularly invited to JEGs or to other meetings, such as those of the AU-EU Joint Task Force (made up of representatives from the African Union Commission, the European Commission and the EEAS and meeting twice a year). Delays in informing CSOs and in involving them are quite frequent. In the specific case of the Partnership on Peace and Security, CSOs maintain that dialogue with institutional stakeholders has also been slowed due to internal reorganization on the European side after the establishment of the EEAS.

2.3. Funding

As of 2009, after the endorsement of the First Action Plan, CSOs have been asking institutional stakeholders to ensure better organization of meetings and that adequate resources be allocated to allow their participation in the Strategy. The issue at stake, however, does not only concern the availability of funds, but also the capacity of CSOs, especially African CSOs, to access them. This is particularly true for the smaller organizations that are not familiar with EU mechanisms and do not have the adequate human resources to deal with “civil society unfriendly” procedures.

3. How to better engage African regional organizations and civil society?

The analysis above has shown the need for a more effective involvement of African regional organizations and civil society actors in the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security. This increased engagement can result from the implementation of targeted actions in crucial sectors such as dialogue, coordination and outreach, capacity building and funding.

Promoting dialogue between the continental institutions and African regional organizations during the strategic elaboration and programming phase of peace and security actions would significantly facilitate their operationalization. For example, joint assessment missions conducted by the AU and the EU in post-conflict countries should include the participation of concerned REC/RMs on a regular basis, as they are closer to the particular conflict and could offer a better understanding of the relevant dynamics. At the same time, the promotion of a systematic dialogue between AU and EU institutions on one side, and civil society on the other, could trigger the latter’s contribution to the design and implementation of official policies. Such opportunities already exist outside the Partnership’s framework - i.e. the Peacebuilding Partnership on the European side. It would therefore be useful, for the sake of consistency between EU policies, to establish formal links and synergies between on-going initiatives so that they benefit from each other. In this perspective, both the REC/RMs and civil society have precise duties in terms of proactive engagement in the Partnership, such as
inquiring about progress made and informing the institutions of the activities they carry out in relation to the implementation of the Action Plans.

A solid political dialogue requires **closer links between institutional representatives and stakeholders in REC/RMs and civil society**, which remain high-level and selective in nature. Cooperation at expert level should be encouraged, and there should be more context- or theme- specific interactions. This would help avoid the “talk shop effect” that is common in political meetings, and would improve the outcome of existing gatherings, such as the Joint Expert Groups in Europe and Africa, the Implementation Teams in Brussels or the African Union Partners Group in Addis Ababa. As an alternative, a Peace and Security Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) could be created to replace all existing technical meetings and act as an inclusive forum for participation. In addition, different gathering formats “à géométrie variable” could be promoted, such as seminars with politicians, experts and civil society representatives in the context of meetings between the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the Political and Security Committee of the EU; regional meetings between the AU, the EU and REC/RMs or meetings with a geographical or thematic focus involving all interested actors, including the relevant REC/RMs and local civil society organizations.

Beyond political dialogue and institutional coordination, it is crucial to **reinforce the outreach capacity** of the Partnership, ensuring adequate information about the results achieved and publicizing the opportunities offered in its framework. The JAES cannot be confined to Brussels and Addis Ababa, but needs to be owned by all the key interlocutors, including REC/RMs, AU and EU Member States, and African and European civil society actors. In short, the Partnership needs a communication plan. In addition, internal EU communication between the Delegations, the EEAS and the European Commission needs to be improved.

Another major issue hindering the active participation of African regional organizations and civil society is the uneven and sometimes limited capacity of REC/RMs and CSOs, or their difficulties in accessing formal and structured mechanisms of cooperation with continental institutions. On the one hand, **coordinated efforts between international actors** to enhance African capacities are strongly recommended. A key partner for the EU could be the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), especially its Governance and Public Administration Division, which is extremely active in this field, and benefits from a well-established presence on the ground. At the same time, the EU should take into greater account the alternative solutions coming from the African side, with a crucial role to be played by regional organizations.

The effectiveness of **capacity building efforts** can be guaranteed only if a realistic timeframe is established and the actions to be implemented are targeted to specific priorities. For instance, the three-year political commitment foreseen for capacity building programmes within the Action Plans is not sufficient and should be expanded. When cooperating with REC/RMs, the EU should direct capacity building to some selected areas in a differentiated manner, instead of covering the full list of the Partnership with each of them. Moreover, this engagement should be deepened beyond the peacekeeping and financial aspects.
As far as civil society is concerned, the main challenge is to make capacity building programmes sustainable in the long run. It is worth recalling that stronger participation of CSOs entails better and more structured organization in most cases. Networks could prove useful to this end, with the bigger and longer-established organizations being the driving force behind the others. The networking process among CSOs is still at an early stage in Africa, but some relevant examples already exist - in West Africa for instance - with a focus on early warning and mediation issues. Networks are also a valuable means of accessing REC/RMs in an easier, but formal, way. The WANEP or the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) and their structured cooperation with ECOWAS are cases in point.

The ineffectiveness of instruments and mechanisms within the JAES is often attributed to a lack of funds. This may indeed be an important obstacle, but it is also crucial to see beyond the financial issue and to avoid using it as an excuse for an absence of political will. Work is therefore needed in both directions.

The African Peace Facility, as the main financing instrument of the Partnership on Peace and Security, and the political integration components of the Regional Indicative Programmes ensure the significant availability of funding for strengthening REC/RMs involvement in the Partnership. While well-known challenges persist in terms of human resources and management expertise on the African side, and in terms of internal coordination and the slow pace of the disbursement of funds on the European side, it is unlikely that procedures will become any easier, more flexible, faster or better. The EU, therefore, should promote stronger synergies among the different financial resources and rationalize the JAES with clearer objectives in terms of its financial engagement with both the AU and the REC/RMs. These actions, in turn would help the African side to prioritize its objectives. This kind of reflection on the prudent application of limited resources should take place in both the EEAS and DG DEVCO at the European Commission.

Local CSOs need to be supported in order to acquire expertise on how to obtain access to funding, which is perceived as one of the main obstacles to their effective participation in the JAES. The recently-created Support Mechanism could be used to enhance CSOs' capacity to contribute to the Strategy. At first sight and in accordance with what has already been committed to on paper, the Support Mechanism could facilitate the organization of joint meetings and initiatives, as well as the provision of real technical expertise in JEGs or other venues, making up for the lack of funds that has been identified as one of the main causes of the failure of the people-centred approach and the successful implementation of civil society’s entry points into the JAES.

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