The Geopolitics of Climate
A Transatlantic Dialogue

by Luca Bergamaschi and Nicolò Sartori

ABSTRACT

The Paris Agreement is a milestone of international diplomacy and political leadership for global climate action. But what do its global commitments mean in practice, and what are their geopolitical implications for Europe and at transatlantic and global level? Given increasing geopolitical fragmentation, can climate action – driven by stronger European climate diplomacy efforts – become the unifying force for building confidence in rules-based international cooperation?
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Highlights

1. Action within the EU is a fundamental part of Europe’s diplomatic and foreign policy ability to project its interests externally. Europe’s credibility and influence abroad depend on its ability to deliver ambitious climate action at home.

2. As the world deepens the energy transition, the main issues around fossil fuels are not so much scarcity and high prices as how to ensure an orderly transition – including managing the stability of fossil fuel producers and global markets – and how to accelerate decarbonization efforts in order to avoid unmanageable climate risks.

3. Recognizing and addressing the interlinkages between climate change, economic development and security should be a key strategic priority for Europe to help put producers and neighbours on a more stable and sustainable development path as well as unlock new markets and tap into new economic opportunities.

4. Europe’s security will be affected by whether global climate governance mechanisms function properly and by how quickly other countries, notably China and India, transition towards a low-carbon economy. It is in Europe’s core interest to build stronger, strategic low-carbon relations with these countries and non-traditional allies, the more so as established multilateral fora, such as the G7 and the G20, fail to deliver meaningful outcomes.

5. The Paris Agreement was designed to rise above political cycles, through its longevity, ultimate goal and universal participation. In the US, we are witnessing an unprecedented rise of non-state actors that have signalled their continuing – and even deeper – commitment to the Paris Agreement.

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6. Potential for transatlantic cooperation will be low although new forms of cooperation between EU institutions and US sub-national and non-state actors are emerging.

7. If not managed on a shared benefits basis, technological change could spur a competitive and nationalist approach to economic development instead of encouraging cooperation.

8. Falling technology costs, new business models and new consumer choices are driving a global “demand revolution”. In the developed countries energy demand is already falling and the global demand for energy might not reach the level that many conventional forecasters expect, thanks to increased energy efficiency.

9. Change underway in the energy and infrastructure sectors will determine the future level of climate risks as infrastructure use and stock are responsible for the majority of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions. Ensuring that new infrastructure is compatible with the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement and is resilient to climate impacts should become a top security, health and economic priority.

10. Global security depends on maintaining a stable climate, adapting to changes already locked in, and avoiding unmanageable ones. Given the strong mutual interest among major powers in preventing unmanageable climate change, cooperation on climate change can be part of unifying efforts that hold the international rules-based system together.

**Introduction**

Confidence in the capacity of multilateral institutions and regimes to deliver peace, security and prosperity is diminishing. Yet, tackling the critical challenge of climate change requires a functioning global governance regime anchored in rules-based international relations and open markets. The Paris Agreement is the most recent example of how such a global regime looks like in practice as well as the best hope the world has to avoid the worst consequences of global warming. With the United States’ engagement in multilateral governance decreases, Europe will need to make a double effort preserve the foundations for stronger cooperation, rules and solidarity on climate change. What climate strategy should Europe and its partners adopt to ensure the world meet the goal of mitigating global warming while avoiding unintended consequences on economic development?

**1. Europe**

**1.1 EU climate policy: the internal transition**

The European Union is the first mover and global leader in climate change action. In 1997, the EU was successful in supporting binding greenhouse gas mitigation targets within the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and in becoming the major driving
force saving the Protocol after then US President George W. Bush chose not to support it in 2001. After the set-back of the Copenhagen Summit at COP15 in 2009, the EU managed to rebuild confidence in the international climate negotiations and successfully led – together with the US and China – the diplomatic efforts resulting in the adoption of the Paris Agreement at COP21 in 2015.

The leadership model of the EU is based on the principle of “leading by example”. Domestic climate policies, such as the 2020 and 2030 packages and the 2050 Roadmap agreed between 2011 and 2014, and ongoing climate finance support to the most vulnerable countries demonstrate the EU’s resolve to exert leadership on climate action. This action on the domestic front has given the EU enough credibility to lead international negotiations and demonstrate in practice that the energy transition is possible while growing the economy and preserving the competitiveness of the majority of EU businesses. Domestic action is in fact a fundamental part of Europe’s diplomatic and foreign policy ability to project its interests externally. All this helped Europe deliver the Paris Agreement in the run up to COP21 - as a deal shaper, bridge builder and broker between the parties.

Today, in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement, the EU faces new challenges. The efforts needed to implement the commitments and bring climate action in line with the goals of the Agreement differ substantially from the efforts that were needed to build and agree to its architecture. Moving towards deep decarbonization and building resilience to worsening climate change impacts have serious implications for the economy and society, as they require profound transformations in the way we produce, consume, trade and govern energy, food and water. The domestic transition will require strong political leadership and new coalitions to both catch the huge economic opportunities and manage the transition in a socially just way. Shifting priorities and interests will create new power dynamics between the old and the new energy economy actors.

1.2 Connecting internal action to external climate policies

The shift towards a low-carbon economy will have profound external implications, which are at the core of the geopolitics of climate change. The changes in the energy landscape are already visible through a number of indicators. For example, fossil fuel imports have flattened – following a structural decline in European demand – and are expected to further decline as Europe decarbonizes its economy as planned. The New Energy Economy means that we can produce the same, or more, in a smarter, cleaner and cheaper way thanks to energy efficiency, renewable energy, storage systems and smart technologies.

Today, the main issues around fossil fuels do not concern scarcity or high prices. Oil and gas are cheaper and more plentiful than previously thought. The main issue is the ability to ensure an orderly transition - including managing the stability of fossil fuel producers and global markets - and to accelerate global decarbonization in order to avoid unmanageable climate risks. Recent research findings show that the Paris Agreement’s ultimate goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, with efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, would require that 88 per cent of coal reserves, 52 per cent of natural gas reserves and 35 per cent of oil reserves should be left in the ground.

As fossil fuels prices stagnate and European demand declines, Europe’s main suppliers - many of which are in its immediate neighbourhood - will face increasing pressures and domestic needs. These could put them at risk of economic and ultimately political instability, especially in the absence of strong financial buffers that mitigate lower fiscal revenues. That means that Europe will need to carefully manage the transition of its fossil fuels suppliers towards a decarbonized economy.

Recognizing and addressing the interlinkages between climate change, economic development and security is a key strategic priority for Europe to help put producers and neighbours on a more stable and sustainable development path, unlock new markets and tap into new economic opportunities.

In addition to a development model overwhelmingly dependent on fossil fuels revenues, some of the producers are also fragile states ruled by autocratic and often repressive regimes. Europe’s ongoing support for this fossil-dependent development model, for example through the promise of new gas import infrastructure investment that might become stranded or lock in dangerous emissions, could pose a problem to its diplomatic credibility. Key questions for European leaders are: how do they apply the “principled pragmatism” set out by the EU Global Strategy as Europe and the world decarbonize their economies? Will they continue promising import dependency that will gradually decrease, or more realistically manage the consequences of phasing out fossil fuels by supporting a new development model of fossil fuels producing countries?

Other areas of climate and energy diplomacy cooperation between Europe and its main partners include strengthening the EU’s trade and sustainable development chapters in its trade agreements. France has already called for making implementation of the Paris Agreement conditional to any trade agreement with the EU, and the European Commission has suggested new principles to more strongly include climate action in its trade agreements in response to controversial

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TTIP negotiations.\textsuperscript{5}

Finally, even if Europe manages to decarbonize its economy and adapt to climate change, its security and prosperity will still depend on how quickly other countries, notably China and India, transition towards a low-carbon economy. Without a functioning climate governance anchored in rules-based international cooperation, hopes to manage the transformation in an orderly and peaceful manner will vanish. As the United States chose to isolate itself and challenge the existing global order, it is in Europe’s core interest to build stronger, strategic low-carbon relations with emerging powers and other non-traditional allies – the more so as established multilateral fora, such as the G7 and the G20, fail to deliver meaningful outcomes.

2. The United States

2.1 Trump’s U-turn: long-lasting trend or just a pause in US climate leadership?

The arrival of President Donald Trump in the White House marked a significant policy departure on climate change and clean energy from the Obama Administration, culminated in the president’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Under President Obama, the US was pivotal in delivering the Paris Agreement and accelerating the domestic decarbonization of the economy through support for research and innovation in green technologies, power sector reforms such as the Clean Power Act, renewables and incentives for energy efficiency. The US–China joint statement on climate change and clean energy in 2014 paved the way for a new era of multilateral diplomacy that led to an ambitious and long-lasting climate regime.

The Paris Agreement was designed to rise above political cycles – through its longevity, ultimate goal and universal participation. Trump’s announcement to pull out of the agreement met widespread opposition, including from big emitters as China and India as well as cities, states, businesses and institutions in the US.\textsuperscript{6} Since 2017, the G7 and G20 Summits, as well as the 2017 EU–China Summit, released statements clearly showing the US isolation and declaring the Agreement “irreversible” and “non-renegotiable”.

\textsuperscript{5} European Commission, \textit{Commissioner Malmström unveils 15-point plan to make EU trade and sustainable development chapters more effective}, 27 February 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1803. Joint actions that the parties could commit to could include: promoting business opportunities for clean tech industry with special attention to SMEs; facilitating trade and investment for climate change mitigation such as in renewable energy and energy efficient goods and services; promotion of International standards for climate-friendly goods, services and technologies; and cooperating on trade-related aspects of the international climate change regime.

\textsuperscript{6} See American’s Pledge website: https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com.
The international community is thus confident that it is not impossible to deliver on the Paris Agreement commitments. The international and US domestic climate community has already operated without full engagement by a US Administration, such as during the George W. Bush era. In fact, we are witnessing an unprecedented rise of non-state actors, including in the US, that have signalled their continuing – and even deeper – commitment to the Paris Agreement, as a new way of shaping power relations and public engagement. They are expected to release a new “America’s Pledge” report that aggregates and quantifies the full range of potential non-federal actions to meet the 2025 emissions reduction target and have organized a major Global Climate Action Summit to be held in California in September this year.

Despite the new US federal policy, and rhetoric, in favour of expanding clean coal, onshore and offshore natural gas and oil, and the nuclear industry, it is clear that US low-carbon action – at the state, city, university and corporate level – will continue. States, such as California and New York, and businesses, such as Apple, Google and Unilever, have signalled their intentions to carry on. Also, at present there are no signals in the real economy that point to a possible resurgence of coal. However, if US federal policy does not change after 2020, it will be much harder to deliver the Paris goals.

In terms of geopolitics and geo-economics, international players such as Europe and China are expected to fill the leadership vacuum left by President Trump in the global race to the low-carbon economy. Trump’s decision could have serious consequences for the US economy and society as well as its global leadership. The cost of worsening climate impacts will be borne by vulnerable Americans, who will be more exposed to extreme weather events (as it happened recently in Puerto Rico and Texas) and will miss out on the economic opportunities and increased air quality that come from the fast growing sectors of clean energy and green-tech. The decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement could also run against public opinion – polls show that the majority of US citizens want the US to stay in the Agreement and support more solar and wind farms - in this crucial year of mid-term elections.\footnote{Brian Kennedy, “Most Americans Say Climate Change Affects Their Local Community, Including Two-Thirds Living Near Coast”, in \textit{PEW Fact Tank}, 16 May 2018, \url{http://www.pewresearch.org/?p=302596}; Cary Funk et al., “Majorities See Government Efforts to Protect the Environment as Insufficient”, in \textit{PEW Reports}, 14 May 2018, \url{http://www.pewinternet.org/?p=20248}.}

\subsection*{2.2 Climate change in transatlantic relations: is there space for meaningful cooperation?}

The new climate and energy priorities of the US Administration will make it harder to find common ground with European partners. It is difficult to envisage how European countries, except a few exceptions, and the European Commission will want to engage meaningfully on fossil fuel cooperation while promoting
decarbonization at the domestic and international level.

A narrow focus on energy security, including cybersecurity, might dominate transatlantic energy relations for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, there are important venues that could favour a sustained dialogue on clean technology innovation and energy transition. The G7 and G20, the EU–US Energy Council, the annual Clean Energy Ministerial meeting and the Mission Innovation initiative can be successful venues for discussing diverging issues, finding solutions and agreeing common practices.

One area of potential climate cooperation is in the Arctic, as demonstrated by the 2017 Fairbanks Declaration, climate security and climate-resilient development.

The US security and defence community has been traditionally ahead of most nations in analyzing and translating assessments of climate security risks into strategic, operational and procurement decisions. Although this space is closing down inside the US federal agencies, there might be space to leverage the US expertise and experience on climate security by non-governmental organizations and private actors through transatlantic dialogues. This would also help close the gap between the US and Europe on climate security.

There is a lack of sophisticated understanding or discussion about climate-related security risks in Europe, with the danger that European policy-makers and politicians will underestimate and consequently mismanage such risks. Climate-resilient development is also an area of traditional US leadership through the work of USAID, the US aid agency, especially in developing strategies for climate risk management in fragile states. This work could be carried forward as part of the G7 Working Group on Climate and Fragility, which since 2015 has been an important technical venue for advancing analyses and discussing integrated solutions for climate-resilient development.

New cooperation should also be established at the sub-national level. European cities, regions and member states could collaborate more closely on an ambitious agenda with US states and cities and on a range of issues that might not be viable at the federal level – for example, exploring cooperation through the exchange of experiences on delivering a socially just transition away from coal. The US states of California, Oregon and Washington have already joined the “Powering Past Coal Alliance”, the first global coalition in support of phasing out coal, thereby signalling their intention to work with other partners on accelerating clean growth and climate protection through the rapid phase-out of traditional coal power. Other areas of cooperation could be the development of electricity infrastructure, power market reforms, including how to set up functioning carbon price mechanisms and unlock flexibility resources, such as demand-response and through smart

management systems.

3. Global

3.1 The emergence of new climate actors: opportunities of cooperation or drivers of competition

The changing way in which we produce and consume energy is creating new political and economic interests, empowering new actors and challenging existing structures. New, clean technologies and markets are increasingly shaping international relations and the economy. China is by far the largest investor in green technologies. Clean energy investment in China is twice as much as in the EU in absolute terms and roughly the same if measured per capita, with plans to deploy renewable energies and electric vehicles at a much faster pace. This trend is particularly concerning for the G7 countries, which fear they might be left behind in the development of cutting-edge technologies. As Europe’s clean investments are falling, European powers risk losing low-carbon competitive advantage, market share and geopolitical influence, especially in those regions that are entering the low-carbon transition. A more complicated challenge almost every country faces is how to provide credible answers to the social impact of the energy transition, especially in regions economically driven by coal production.

On the one hand, technological change could encourage closer cooperation in order to share the benefits from increasing opportunities. The EU–China statement on climate change and clean energy, agreed last year at the EU–China Summit but not yet formally adopted due to disagreements over China’s status as market economy in the World Trade Organization, point in this direction. On the other hand, the spectrum of trade wars and China’s relatively closed markets to foreign direct investments and lack of compliance with international standards point to a more competitive and nationalist approach to economic development.

Global low-carbon markets are becoming the battleground for increasing competitiveness, growth and employment. Technology costs are falling rapidly and consumers are adopting new technologies at a quick pace. This is driving a global “demand revolution”. Energy demand is falling in the developed countries and global future need for energy might not reach the level that many conventional energy forecasters expect, thanks to increased energy efficiency. According to the International Energy Agency, energy efficiency improved globally by 13 per cent between 2000 and 2016, with natural gas accounting for the biggest share of

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energy savings (one-third) and substantially reducing European gas imports.\textsuperscript{10}

Today, a full set of basic electric devices, such as lightbulbs, TVs, radios, ceiling fans and refrigerators, use less than one-third of the daily electricity they used two decades ago. This fundamentally questions how much electricity is really needed to provide services to billions of people, and suggests that meeting their demand will require significantly less energy than in 1990s. This trend poses critical challenges to the business model of traditional power utilities as well as oil and gas companies.

The Paris Agreement has opened up new and significant market opportunities. The Nationally Determined Contributions submitted at COP21 point to a combined investment in renewables of at least 2 trillion dollars over the next 15 years.\textsuperscript{11} In addition, 90 trillion dollars in infrastructure investment is needed globally by 2030 to achieve global growth expectations.\textsuperscript{12} China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) is a strategic initiative that places China at the heart of the global infrastructure politics and one main vehicle of Chinese foreign policy interests. In response, Japan is ramping up international partnerships and investment to offer an alternative to OBOR with the promise to deliver “quality” infrastructure investment in order to build a competitive advantage vis-à-vis China. This includes a strengthened partnership with India and other South-East Asian countries, as a means to protect Japan’s interests in the South China Sea.

Change underway in the energy and infrastructure sectors will determine the future level of climate risks. Existing infrastructure use and stock are responsible for more that 60 per cent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.\textsuperscript{13} Ensuring that the new infrastructure is compatible with the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement and that it is resilient to climate impacts already locked in, should become a top priority. From this perspective, greening the huge infrastructure pipeline of the OBOR initiative is a key challenge for global security and prosperity. This, running in parallel with a shift in public and private finance from high- to low-carbon assets, could kick off a virtuous race-to-the-top cycle in which major powers battle to position themselves as China’s leading green partner.

3.2 Climate security: global risks and opportunities for increasing stability

Today, climate change is one of the most widespread concern around the world and is considered a critical global threat by many foreign policy professionals and by an increasing number of governments. In 2015, G7 countries recognized


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 23.
climate change as a “threat multiplier” that fundamentally undermines the stability of countries, especially the most fragile and vulnerable ones. The UN has recognized the destabilizing impact of climate change in many regions of the world, in particular in the Sahel region and Sub-Saharan Africa. The situation in the Lake Chad Basin is particularly critical and an example of the climate–resource security nexus. Following years of underdevelopment, extreme poverty and severe drought, over 10 million people are now in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Many fishers and farmers have lost their jobs, which is increasing the willingness, especially among young people, to migrate or join terrorist and non-state armed groups, such as Boko Haram. The impact of climate change will exacerbate existing pressures and create new risks.

For the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Risks Report, climate change is once again in the top three drivers of global risks over the next 10 years, alongside rising income and wealth disparity, and rising cyber dependency. Environmental risks dominate the 2018 risk landscape in terms of both likelihood and impact – particularly the risks of extreme weather events, natural disaster and the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation – all interlinked with the societal risks of water crises and large-scale forced migration. There are increasing concerns about the potential impact on the number of displaced people, with worst case scenarios projecting up to 1 billion people displaced by 2050 from climate-related impacts.

Extreme weather events around the world, from Puerto Rico and Texas to the Arctic region and Europe, are increasing in frequency and intensity, as expected by scientific community. Climate impacts are becoming more visible, material and costly. Climate-related disasters have cost the United States alone as much as 300 billion dollars in 2017 while Europe has seen an increase in extreme weather events of 60 per cent over the past three decades, with dire consequences for human health, water supplies, agriculture, infrastructure and tourism.


One hotspot of climate change is the Middle East and North Africa, a region torn apart by decades of wars, terrorism, massive displacement of people, chronic underdevelopment and systematic violation of human right and basic freedoms. Twenty per cent of the total population in the Mediterranean region live under permanent water-stress conditions and the situation is deteriorating quickly. In Egypt, water supply per capita has dropped 60 per cent since 1970 and by 2025 the UN expects Egypt to face absolute water scarcity, with 80 to 100 million people exposed in the region. The unprecedented drought that struck Syria between 2006 and 2010, together with unsustainable agricultural practices and decades of groundwater over-extraction, undermined the livelihood of local farmers who were forced to move to the cities where the civil war began, eventually displacing millions of people to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Europe.

Despite increasing evidence and worrying projections by the scientific community, policy-makers and political narratives are failing to recognize the need for urgent climate mitigation and adaptation action commensurate to the threat posed by climate change. The level of future impacts is uncertain and depends on climate-sensitive ecosystems, how much temperatures rise and how quickly countries limit emissions and adapt to a changing climate. But future analyses, especially worst-case scenarios, clearly show that unless we accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement, climate change will undermine the ecological and political pillars of peaceful human coexistence as we know it today. The foundations of global security increasingly depend on maintaining a stable climate, adapting to changes already locked in, and avoiding unmanageable ones.

**Conclusion**

Major powers share an interest in preventing unmanageable climate change and should strengthen cooperation to hold the rules-based international climate regime together. Especially at a time in which the United States refrains from re-engaging in climate politics, Europe bears the special responsibility for demonstrating and advocating ambitious climate action through stronger domestic and climate diplomacy efforts. Win-win cooperation on energy transition and resilient development with big emitters such as China and India, with a particular focus on COP21-compatible infrastructure and shifting finance from high carbon to carbon-neutral investment, becomes highly strategic in nature. It is also critical to avoid

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tensions that might slow down the widespread deployment of clean technologies, and ultimately increase the risk of failing to deliver on the Paris Agreement goals.

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