The EU-Turkey March 2016 Agreement As a Model: New Refugee Regimes and Practices in the Arab Mediterranean and the Case of Libya

by Peter Seeberg

Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, Odense
Taking as its point of departure the EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016 regarding refugees and migrants, this paper analyses the main elements of the agreement and discusses whether the deal (or parts thereof) could be applied to other contexts. It discusses the relevance of the EU-Turkey agreement to the Arab Mediterranean and more specifically in the context of Libya, as and when political and security conditions in that country improve. The author recognizes that despite relevant criticism of the EU-Turkey deal, the agreement may well contain building blocks worth taking into consideration in future migration negotiations between the EU and the Arab Mediterranean.

**Introduction**

The EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016, including the so-called “1:1 mechanism,” has, as mentioned by Ahmet İçduygu and Evin Millet, “begun to accomplish its goal of considerably reducing arrival numbers in Greece.” The agreement constitutes a new and significant element in the international patchwork of regimes and practices that attempt to regulate the movements of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean region and to secure the rights of refugees and migrants. Given that the EU-Turkey agreement has contributed to reducing significantly the flow of refugees and migrants arriving in the EU, it seems relevant to ask whether the model can be replicated in other Arab Mediterranean contexts where migrants and refugees play an important role in the relationship between the EU and partner states. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has indicated that she would like to see similar agreements with Egypt and Tunisia for instance. This paper argues that in a long-term perspective sustainable solutions need to be dealt with on an
international basis.

There are many obvious differences between the situation in Turkey with its relatively high level of economic development and an ongoing accession process with the EU (at least on paper), and the situation in the Arab Mediterranean, with stagnant economies and cooperation with the EU based on association agreements and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) actions plans. Six years after the Arab revolts, the security environment in the region has deteriorated significantly. Furthermore, the political and social conditions in the Arab states south and east of the Mediterranean are becoming increasingly differentiated, in particular in the Levant but also in the Maghreb. However, there are important similarities between Turkey and the Arab Mediterranean states when it comes to these states’ relationships with the EU concerning migrants and refugees, including the common interest in solving the problems related to the significant recent migratory movements. This paper analyses under which conditions the elements of the EU-Turkey agreement could be applicable for dealing with the challenges related to migration and refugees elsewhere in the Mediterranean, especially in the case of Libya.

Despite the highly unstable internal situation, Libya is still a major destination country for migrants and refugees from states from the Sahel-belt and sub-Saharan Africa. The migratory movements towards and within Libya are complex and unpredictable. According to an International Organization for Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix report, in July and August 2016 348,372 internally displaced persons (IDPs), 310,265 returnees, and 276,957 migrants were identified and located in Libya. In addition, based on estimates provided by embassies in and around Libya, large numbers of unregistered migrants from Egypt, Niger, Sudan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Syria and Mali are known to be living in Libya. There is some cooperation between the EU and Libya related to migration, and international organizations working on migration are active in the country. Due to the recent security situation, however, a large part of the work is on hold and the agencies and organizations have moved their offices outside Libya, several of them to Tunisia. An analysis of the EU-Turkey agreement and its possible relevance in the context of cooperation on migration through and/or from Libya will need to take into consideration the current problematic security environment in the region.

1. The EU-Turkey model and its possible relevance in the Arab Mediterranean

1.1 Main elements of the EU-Turkey model

A significant aspect of the EU-Turkey accession talks, as shown by Ahmet İçduyuğ and Aysen Üstübici, is the negotiation related to migration. Following their argument, the EU-Turkey agreement of March 2016 could be considered an instance of migration diplomacy, a mutual trade-off whereby the EU gets fewer irregular migrants crossing its southeastern borders while Turkey receives financial aid, easier access for its citizens to the EU and a re-invigorated accession process. The deal, presented to the European Council by President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker on 15-16 March 2016, contained six central elements which were to be implemented before the end of 2016:

1. returning to Turkey all new irregular migrants (economic migrants and asylum seekers) crossing to the Greek islands;
2. for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, resettling another Syrian from Turkey to the EU;
3. accelerating implementation of the EU-Turkey visa liberalization roadmap;
4. speeding up the disbursement of funds through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and increasing its resources;
5. expediting prepaations for the opening of new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations; and
6. cooperating to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria.

The EU’s main ambition in this agreement – to reduce the inflow of irregular migrants – has been fulfilled to some degree. According to the IOM, the period from 1 January to 7 December 2015 saw a total of 757,278 arrivals by sea to Greece, whereas 172,234 were reported for the same period in 2016. So far, however, it seems that the advantages of the agreement have been reaped primarily by the EU. Visa liberalization remains on hold and there has been very limited progress regarding the opening of new chapters as part of Turkey’s EU accession process. Important reasons for this can no doubt be found in the July coup in Turkey and the subsequent harsh crackdown by the government on suspected coup plotters and other coup sympathizers within the army and public
administration. Scepticism in the US and the EU\(^\text{18}\) about the future of democracy in Turkey was evident already before the coup, not least as a result of Turkey’s revision of its anti-terror law, and the provisions of the EU-Turkey agreement have thus far not been sufficient to overcome these constraints on progress towards visa liberalization and the opening of new accession chapters.

### 1.2 Relevance of the EU-Turkey agreement in the Arab Mediterranean

The main idea of the ENP when it was launched in 2004 was to create an alternative to membership for partners, which, based on the principle of positive conditionality, would contribute to establishing a “ring of friends” around the EU.\(^\text{11}\) In this respect, institutional cooperation between the EU and the Arab Mediterranean countries differs from arrangements between the EU and Turkey, which is not an ENP participant. The need, however, for establishing an institutional framework for migration management, where the EU works together with its Arab partners south and east of the Mediterranean, is in many ways similar.

Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia are transit countries for large numbers of migrants and refugees. At the same time, albeit at different levels, they are also countries of origin of migrants and asylum seekers. Seen from the EU, a future migration diplomacy in the context of the Arab Mediterranean is about creating trade-offs, where the crucial element for the EU is that its partners agree to take back spontaneously as many asylum seekers and economic migrants as possible – both nationals from the partner countries themselves and third country nationals. The incentive for the partner states is to obtain significant advantages similar to those demanded by Turkey in the context of the March 2016 agreement.

This paper sets out to analyse whether the deal (or parts thereof) can be used in EU cooperation with the Arab Mediterranean states. Some differences in the two contexts have already been mentioned. The agreement’s provisions relating to the opening of chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations, for instance, are obviously irrelevant in an Arab Mediterranean context. Perhaps more subtle a difference concerns the motivation for action. The fact, as argued by Elisabeth Collett, that the 28 EU member states were able to reach internal consensus on the agreement, underlines the seriousness with which the situation of late 2015 and early 2016 was perceived in the EU.\(^\text{12}\) In a shifting political landscape, constellations of factors do not always align clearly. Nonetheless, it is worth identifying those elements that may be transferrable to future migration diplomacy situations.

#### Returning irregular migrants

The first item on the list is the question of returning “irregular” migrants. Ideally, such a strategy can mitigate the negative role played by human smugglers and tone down the whole “illegality industry,” as emphasized by Ruben Andersson.\(^\text{13}\) The success of the 1:1 mechanism has been widely acclaimed, but caution is warranted in the interpretation of its results. Spijkerboer asserts that “the decline in numbers precedes the EU-Turkey agreement,” and that indeed “the agreement has no identifiable relation to the decline.”\(^\text{14}\) Even more problematic is that the incentive of the Arab Mediterranean states for accepting binding agreements on return of irregular migrants will understandably be low. In the perspective of migration diplomacy, the southern partners will be reluctant to lose a strong negotiation asset by committing to accepting the return of all irregular migrants. They will furthermore fear that if their neighbouring states do not simultaneously accept similar agreements, they will stand in a weakened position regionally. These issues may well turn out to be the major factors compromising attempts at replicating the EU-Turkey agreement in an Arab Mediterranean context. But it should be emphasized that it is problematic to analyse any of the items in the EU-Turkey agreement as an isolated issue. In reality, any agreement will be part of larger complexes of agreements, which more or less explicitly constitute the negotiated reality.

#### Resettling of readmitted refugees

The EU-Turkey agreement includes several discriminatory practices, as underlined by Gloria Fernández Arribas, which will be important to avoid in the Arab Mediterranean. One such problem is that the agreement on resettlement excludes non-Syrian refugees – a practice which obviously is not in accordance with the principle of granting protection based on need rather than nationality.\(^\text{15}\) The Arab Mediterranean context cautions against such discriminatory practices – in the Libyan case, some of the refugees from countries like Eritrea and Sudan will meet the requirements for refugee status under the Convention, while those from other sub-Saharan countries will not. Furthermore, under the EU-Turkey agreement refugees who have attempted to enter Greece irregularly are barred

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14 Thomas Spijkerboer, “Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of Migrants and of Border Deaths?”, cit.

from the 1:1 mechanism, such that returnees to Turkey are denied international protection in Europe – or, as it is phrased in the EU Commission’s press release, “[p]riority is given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly.” A precondition for a well-functioning relocation and resettlement system in the Mediterranean is that the EU member states agree on allowing significant numbers of refugees to arrive in Europe and become resettled. This procedure has not, despite the relatively positive wording in the European Commission’s statements, been very successful in the EU-Turkey context. The systems for relocation and resettlement have in various ways proven unworkable, in particular when it comes to internal solidarity between the EU member states. In addition, the relocation and resettlement efforts might again result in potentially discriminatory practices, where the EU ignores the wishes of the refugees themselves, who might prefer to utilize different types of networks in connection with arriving in the EU, such as drawing on family already living in a given EU member state.

Visa liberalization
The reason underlying inclusion of the dialogue on visa liberalization in the EU-Turkey deal can be found in the many years of migration diplomacy related to EU accession for Turkey. A parallel process is found in the framework of the readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU, signed in 2013 and containing the Roadmap towards the visa-free regime with Turkey. However, the recent turmoil in Turkey combined with the continued scepticism in the EU towards Turkey’s accession has placed any such process on hold. It likewise seems unrealistic to foresee visa liberalization being included in negotiations between the EU and the Arab Mediterranean states. Instead, solutions might be developed within the framework of specific ENP programmes, projects related to the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with a labour market dimension, or agreements like the mobility partnerships which the EU has already signed with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan – and has had initial talks about with Lebanon and Egypt.

Increased financial aid
In the context of the agreement with Turkey – and in addition to already-disbursed financial aid for education, health care, etc. – the EU has promised 3 billion euros specifically for improving the living conditions of Syrian nationals under international protection. A further 3 billion euros has been promised to Turkey for the same purpose. If a “Turkey model” is to be replicated in the Arab Mediterranean, significant financial packages from the EU covering broader areas will be necessary – not only to persuade the Arab states to agree to receiving irregular migrants, but also to contribute to improving the legal apparatus in said states, to secure possibilities for enhancing their public sector in general (education, health, etc.), and to stabilize the political realities in third countries involved in the programmes.

Cooperation on improving humanitarian conditions in Syria and other homelands
The EU-Turkey agreement focuses on Syria and mandates that the EU should cooperate with Turkey on improving humanitarian conditions there. This element would also be appropriate in the context of similar agreements with Arab Mediterranean partners. Contributing to solving the many problems related to the tragic situation in Syria is relevant in the Arab Mediterranean, not least because the EU-Turkey agreement has resulted in the transfer of large numbers of refugees from the Aegean to the Mediterranean routes. Equally relevant will be working together to improve humanitarian conditions in several of the very diverse homelands of the refugees and migrants: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, etc.

2. The case of Libya
Mattia Toaldo notes that “long before Europe was hit by its worst-ever ‘refugee crisis’ […] Libya was already one of the main gateways into Europe for refugees and other migrants.” Complex routes through Libya, often locally organized and facilitated by Libyan state corruption, have, as mentioned by Derek Lutterbeck, for years brought African and Middle Eastern refugees and migrants to Libya’s long coastline positioned for departure towards Malta, Lampedusa and Sicily. The post-Qadhafi leadership initially declared its resolve to address the migration issue, but internal developments in Libya, in particular after the elections in 2014, have since made it difficult to proceed with such ambitions and have also

22 Ibid., p. 162.
made external intervention problematic. Any discussion of applying elements of the EU-Turkey agreement in Libya must presuppose a level of stability and well-functioning governance by the Libyan people, which in recent days has not been a reality. On 4 August 2016, the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM), originally under a two-year mandate to aid the Libyan authorities in strengthening border security, has had its term extended to 21 August 2017, with a budget of 17 million euros.

The September 2016 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix report for Libya underlines the centrality of that country with respect to larger migration flows in the region, in particular as “a transit country for migrants from West Africa and the Middle East who continue along the Central Mediterranean route to Europe.” Furthermore the Horn of Africa, as identified in the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) report, is also producing large numbers of refugees and migrants. In the foreseeable future it seems unrealistic that Libya can maintain large numbers of refugees and migrants in safe conditions, especially when it comes to providing possibilities for work (as we have seen in Lebanon and Jordan), and Libya will hardly be able to receive irregular migrants returned from Europe – in casu primarily Italy. To make such undertakings possible the EU will either have to accept resettling of readmitted refugees on a larger scale in the EU member states or, alternatively, allocate the necessary financial aid for well-functioning and safe protection in third countries close to the homelands of the refugees and migrants.

When it became obvious in 2011 that the Qadhafi regime would fall, the EU launched a number of activities to support the establishing of a new, democratic regime. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war the EU discussed plans for prospective ENP membership, participation in UfM projects and potentially also the development of a mobility partnership agreement similar to the ones signed with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. Potentially – in an optimistic (or perhaps naïve) scenario – agreements regarding refugees and migrants between the EU and a stable, democratic Libya would be more than relevant. There are obvious commonalities of interest between the EU and Libya related to migration, not least in a security perspective. Libya has for decades been one of the most important migration countries in Northern Africa, and there is no reason to believe that this will change.

Conclusions and recommendations

As shown, the EU-Turkey agreement attempted to alleviate a difficult situation, in which the tragic developments in Syria significantly contributed to creating what the international media dubbed “the EU’s migration crisis.” Apparently the agreement worked, in that the migration pressure in 2016 was significantly reduced with respect to 2015. In a long-term perspective, more durable solutions must deal with the complex and multi-faceted migration phenomenon on several different political and institutional levels.

The first and perhaps most important way forward is to recognize that migration has become one of the most significant challenges of contemporary international politics and that the phenomenon correspondingly needs to be dealt with on an international basis. The rare consensus between the 28 EU member states underpinning the EU-Turkey agreement may be seen to indicate movement towards realizing this reality. Still, given that the overall costs related to the activities suggested below will be very significant, it seems unlikely that the EU member states will agree to such undertakings for the Arab Mediterranean and the relevant African states within a short- or medium-term perspective. Is it then possible or practical to replicate the EU–Turkey agreement in other contexts? A few preliminary conclusions and recommendations follow.

Firstly, as stated by Andersson, “a strategy will need to be global and systemic rather than ad hoc and national or narrowly regional; pragmatically, it must focus on rights and opportunities rather than security and threat scenarios, since the latter have proven counterproductive and abusive.” This reflects the main effort of this paper, to analyse possible pragmatic solutions for the Mediterranean context – knowing that particularly in the context of Libya the recent problematic internal realities might prohibit progress in dealing with migrants and refugees.

29 The IOM has published a plan for relevant activities dealing with IDPs from Libya as well as refugees and migrants from countries in Africa and Asia, who are living in Libya. See IOM, Libya Plan of Action August 2016-December 2017, cit.
30 Ruben Andersson, “Europe’s Failed ‘Fight’ against Irregular Migration”, cit., p. 1069.
Secondly, the EU-Turkey agreement can ideally minimize the negative aspects of migration processes like human smuggling and in general deter the “illegality industry.” It is very important to keep sight of this, because it is an element that emphasizes the common interests in dealing with the phenomenon. Pragmatically, solid funding from the EU can lay the foundation for making the states in the south most affected by the influx of refugees and migrants realize the importance of taking part in activities leading to sustainable solutions for all parties involved. Funding will correspondingly be essential in motivating the Arab Mediterranean partners to agree to taking back refugees and migrants. As part of a workable model based on the EU-Turkey agreement, the EU would need to help those states to improve their protection standards to satisfy international expectations.

Thirdly, the complex realities of migration in the Arab Mediterranean would in some cases necessitate the active involvement of third states willing to receive refugees and migrants as part of agreements with the EU. This would be of the utmost importance in any future agreement with Libya, due to the many different nationalities of the migrants and refugees arriving in that country. One possible avenue would be to establish more permanent cooperative structures involving the EU, Libya and international organizations of relevance in the given context.

Fourthly, in connection with attempts to replicate the EU-Turkey agreement in the Arab Mediterranean region, promises from the EU of various sorts of institutional cooperation will be essential. As mentioned above, the ENP, the UfM or bilateral agreements like the mobility partnerships could provide institutional frameworks for collaboration. The need to improve humanitarian conditions for refugees and migrants in several of the sending countries and their overburdened neighbour states will pose an urgent challenge for years to come.

Fifthly, the EU must work on developing the conditions for resettling the readmitted refugees and mixed migrants accepted within the EU member states, in particular if and when arrangements like the EU-Turkey agreement are being implemented in other contexts. There is a need for a much stronger solidarity within the EU on agreeing to share the responsibility for refugees and migrants – and on assimilating the newcomers in ways that make their integration in European states sustainable.

References


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