

EU60: RE-FOUNDING EUROPE

**THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROPOSE**



**POLICE
AND BORDER
CONTROLS
COOPERATION AT
THE EU LEVEL:
DILEMMAS,
OPPORTUNITIES
AND
CHALLENGES OF A
DIFFERENTIATED
APPROACH**

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POLICE AND BORDER CONTROLS COOPERATION AT THE EU LEVEL: DILEMMAS, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF A DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH

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Abstract: The history of the European Union is a history of differentiated integration. Differentiation is a logical corollary of integration insofar as politicization and incentives for further integration differ among member states. Whereas the first opt-outs from Justice and Home Affairs were conceded in order to continue the ratification process of the Treaty creating the European Union, the question today is whether growing differentiation can save or will wreck the Union. In times of Brexit and surging euroscepticism and against the backdrop of the refugee crisis, the Union's resilience to disintegration is at stake. The willingness of member states to make the next steps towards more integration in order to save the Schengen acquis will decide the future of the Union. Further differentiation in the area of freedom, security and justice threatens to reinforce the dividing line between the core and the periphery of Europe.

Keywords: EU integration | Migration | Refugees | Frontex | UK | Denmark

Introduction: A challenging state of affairs

Pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), "The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum,

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immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.”¹

The simple fact that the Treaty of Lisbon puts the basic provisions on the area of freedom, security and justice even before the provisions on the internal market in the EU shows the importance attached to the justice and home affairs policies, designed to ensure free movement, asylum and security.

However, the refugee crisis has revealed a whole list of deficiencies within the remit of the European Union’s area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) policies. The unprecedented influx of people escaping war and destruction, particularly in the summer and autumn of 2015² seems to have become an accelerator for already existing disintegration tendencies within the EU. The UK referendum of June 2016 on membership of the EU and the importance attached by the Brexit campaigners to the control of national borders³ illustrates the explosive potential of the issue. Indeed, xenophobic movements and nationalist parties around Europe, some of them even in government, are ready to capitalize on the daily drama of people searching for a safe haven in Europe. They praise the nation-state as the sole bulwark against chaos caused by open borders. The question of how to square ongoing and unequal migration pressures with the reluctance of individual member states to agree an equal share of responsibility, to protect the right to asylum and to save open internal borders of the Schengen zone is of utmost importance for the perennity of the EU. If a common stance is difficult to attain, the rich tool of differentiation might pave the way for further sectoral integration while allowing reluctant EU member states to stay out. However, this approach poses serious challenges for the unity of the already highly differentiated multi-tier structure of the EU.

Against the backdrop of the experiences of 2015 and 2016, major dysfunctions of the current border and asylum regime can be identified:

- Border authorities of single EU member states were overburdened by the sheer number of people landing on European shores.

¹ European Union, *Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union*, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT>.

² Eurostat, “Record Number of Over 1.2 Million First Time Asylum Seekers Registered in 2015”, in *Eurostat News Releases*, No. 44/2016 (4 March 2016), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-press-releases/-/3-04032016-AP>. For 2016 data, see Eurostat, “Number of First Time Asylum Seekers Up to Almost 360 000 in the Third Quarter of 2016”, in *Eurostat News Releases*, No. 254/2016 (15 December 2016), <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-press-releases/-/3-15122016-BP>.

³ “Eight Reasons Leave Won the UK’s Referendum on the EU”, in *BBC News*, 24 June 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36574526>.

- The current Dublin system puts a disproportionate burden on single EU member states that are at the external borders of the EU. In addition to that, reception conditions are insufficient in many European countries.⁴
- On the other hand, secondary movements of migrants exert disproportionate pressure on favoured destination countries, such as Austria, Germany and Sweden. This has pushed some countries to suspend the principle of open borders and to reinstate border control.⁵
- The relocation of refugees is a source of profound dissent in the EU. The agreed number of refugees to be relocated is disproportionate to their total number.⁶
- Since legal and safe pathways to Europe are insufficient, human traffickers and smugglers bring migrants to European shores, putting the life of thousands of people at risk.⁷
- Police cooperation and the sharing of relevant information have proven to be insufficient. It has not prevented individuals who had claimed asylum in the EU from perpetrating terrorist attacks.⁸

1. Differentiation – a compensatory measure of on-going integration

It is an undisputable fact that the EU is a highly differentiated system,⁹

⁴ See monthly reports on reception conditions by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2015-2016: <http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/overviews>.

⁵ Cf. Elspeth Guild et al., *Internal Border Controls in the Schengen Area: Is Schengen Crisis-Proof?*, Brussels, European Parliament, June 2016, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU\(2016\)571356](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2016)571356).

⁶ "EU Refugee Relocation Scheme Must Be Bigger, Quicker", in *Reuters*, 24 August 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-un-greece-idUSKCN10Z18U>.

⁷ According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 5,098 people have died in 2016, compared to 3,777 deaths registered in 2015. See the *Missing Migrants Project website: Recorded deaths in the Mediterranean Sea by month, 2014-2017*, <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean>. See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Dead and Missing at Sea in Mediterranean: 2016*, 9 February 2017, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/53632>. For 2017 data, see IOM, *Mediterranean Update*, 7 March 2017, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-update-7-march-2017>.

⁸ Manasi Gopalakrishnan, "Islamic State Reportedly Training Terrorists to Enter Europe as Asylum Seekers", in *Deutsche Welle*, 14 November 2016, <http://dw.com/p/2SgXd>.

⁹ Cf. Nicole Koenig, "A Differentiated View of Differentiated Integration", in *Jacques Delors Institute Policy Papers*, No. 140 (23 July 2015), <http://www.delorsinstitute.eu/011-21785>; Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leufen and Berthold Rittberger, "The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation", in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 6 (2015), p.764-782; Steven Blockmans

defined commonly as “a polity that displays variance across policy areas and across space, while maintaining an institutional core”.¹⁰ The concept of a multi-speed Europe adds to these modes of differentiation the aspect of time, but implies that integration laggards will follow later. Differentiation has to be considered as the corollary of deeper integration encroaching upon the sovereignty of its component member states and of the successive enlargement rounds.

As the history of the European integration process shows, justice and home affairs play an important role in the emergence of an increasing differentiated polity.

In order to avoid gridlock after the rejection of the Treaty creating the European Union in 1992 by the Danes, Denmark was granted a series of opt-outs from the economic and monetary Union (EMU), the common security and defence policy (CSDP), European citizenship and justice and home affairs (JHA) as it then was, today subsumed under the heading of AFSJ. In fact, two of these opt-outs are security-related and touch the core of state sovereignty, with external and internal security belonging to the “high policies” of the nation-state. Despite the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty, which confined JHA to intergovernmental co-operation instead of supranational decision-making methods, and therefore provided safeguards against the potential dynamics of “creeping competencies”,¹¹ the Danish electorate endorsed Maastricht only after the opt-outs had been granted. This shows the “intense tensions between sovereignty and integration”.¹²

In the aftermath of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, differentiation has gradually emerged as a strategy to allow willing member states to make further integration steps without being held back by others, unwilling or unable to follow the pace of integration. As a consequence of the integration of Schengen provisions within the legal framework of the Amsterdam Treaty, the UK and Ireland were granted flexible opt-out arrangements regarding AFSJ measures. In addition to that, the Amsterdam Treaty provided for the first time for the possibility of “enhanced cooperation”, allowing a limited number of member states to co-operate within the structures of the EU and

(ed.), *Differentiated Integration in the EU. From the Inside Looking Out*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2014, <https://www.ceps.eu/node/8851>.

¹⁰ Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leufen and Berthold Rittberger, “The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration...”, cit., p. 770.

¹¹ Tanja A. Börzel, “Mind the Gap! European Integration Between Level and Scope”, in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005), p. 226.

¹² Ibid.

allowing others to refrain from participation. Although the current Lisbon Treaty provisions allow for enhanced cooperation in criminal (Article 20 TEU, Articles 82, 83 TFEU) and police matters (Article 87 TFEU), this mechanism has so far not been triggered in security related policies.

2. Sources and modes of differentiation

Schimmelfennig et al. identify two main factors determining the often bumpy path to integration: "interdependence" and "politicization".¹³

Interdependencies exist between the various levels of the European multi-layer system, and between its component member states, as well as across policy areas. Further integration creates spillover effects and gives incentives for even further integration. An eloquent example of these integration mechanisms are the Schengen rules, which are born out of the freedom of movement within the common market. In order to achieve the common market, internal borders were abolished. This called for close cooperation between police and border control authorities of the member states and common rules and practices to be established by the EU.

"Politicization" tends to produce opposite effects to integration. It is defined as an "increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU."¹⁴ As AFSJ policies interfere with traditional core-competencies of the nation-state, politicization is high. Examples of this politicization are numerous. Most specifically, we refer to the issues of border control and security decisive for the outcome of the Brexit referendum, the Danish refusal to relinquish sovereignty in the realm of justice and home affairs¹⁵ and the Polish reluctance concerning the creation of the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency,¹⁶ extending the competence of the previous Frontex Agency.

¹³ Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leufen and Berthold Rittberger, "The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration...", cit., p. 765.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 771; Pieter de Wilde, "No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration", in *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2011), p. 560.

¹⁵ Tamás Ibolya, "A Vote of No Confidence: Explaining the Danish EU Referendum", in *OpenDemocracy*, 17 December 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/node/98662>.

¹⁶ Elżbieta Kaca, "The European Border and Coast Guard: Potentials and Risks", in *Bulletin PISM*, No. 116/848 (16 December 2015), <https://www.pism.pl/Publications/Bulletin-PISM/116-848>.

Differentiated integration appears thus as a possible solution for uneven degrees of politicization amongst member states due to diverging attitudes, often produced by mass media and politicians. Both vertical and horizontal patterns of integration¹⁷ co-exist within the EU. Both are coupled with modes of differentiation.

The terminology of vertical integration refers to the different levels of integration.¹⁸ In the realm of JHA, with the creation of the Trevi Group in the mid-1970s the EU pursued the path of vertical integration from intergovernmental coordination outside the treaty provisions to joint decision-making by the Council and the European Parliament.

The terminology of horizontal integration refers to the territorial scope of integration. AFSJ is characterized by internal differentiation insofar as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have *inter alia* obtained opt-outs from the Schengen provisions and secondary legislation linked to it. Moreover, Schengen policies are characterized by external differentiation through the membership of Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

3. Dilemmas of differentiated integration

The basic problem of differentiated patterns of integration and cooperation is incremental fragmentation and the loss of unity. Koenig identifies three core dilemmas.¹⁹ Politically, the EU has to weigh the loss of unity against being incapable of taking action. From a legal point of view, differentiated legal provisions challenge the homogeneity of EU law and its application across the EU. Finally, institutional differentiation compromises the unity of the institutional framework of the EU. One major question of differentiated integration is the problem of supplementary tailor-made instances of decision-making parallel to the already complex institutional set-up of the Union. One example of an informal body born out of the deeper integration of a sub-group of member states sharing the common European currency is the Eurogroup.

¹⁷ Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leufen and Berthold Rittberger, "The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration...", cit.; Nicole Koenig, "A Differentiated View of Differentiated Integration", cit.

¹⁸ Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leufen and Berthold Rittberger, "The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration...", cit., p. 765.

¹⁹ Nicole Koenig, "A Differentiated View of Differentiated Integration", cit., p. 6-7.

On the other hand, within the remit of AFSJ, there are serious concerns over the legitimacy of the Council and the European Parliament, when discussing and legislating on issues of “Schengen” despite the fact that some member states do not participate and others, external to the EU, do participate in the common area without internal border controls.

Considering the existing complexity of the multi-layer structure of the EU, the prospect of further bodies of decision-making does not contribute to the transparency of the EU. Of course, from the ordinary European citizen’s point of view, the legitimacy of the EU also results from the traceability and comprehensibility of its institutions and its modes of decision-making.

4. Opportunities to break deadlocks in the AFSJ? Three cases for differentiation

4.1 An intricate legal arrangement for Denmark in the AFSJ

In a referendum held in Denmark in December 2015, the Danish voters rejected a proposal to replace the country’s opt-out from the European justice and home affairs system with an opt-in model, as applied by the UK and Ireland. This would have given the Danish *Folketing* the choice to accept or to reject European legislation on a case-by-case basis and to ensure continued participation in the European policy agency.

The referendum was initiated ahead of the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol),²⁰ adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure by the European Parliament and the Council (cf. Article 88 TFEU) in order to align the previous legal framework with the requirements of the Treaty of Lisbon. In fact, European police cooperation was started originally by an intergovernmental agreement outside EU law. Europol was then officially established by a Convention endorsed by the Council in 1995 and only gained the status of an EU agency funded by the EU budget under Council Decision 2009/371/JHA.²¹ Europol thus evolved from a body of intergovernmental cooperation into an EU agency. Denmark’s participation

²⁰ Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)..., 11 May 2016, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32016R0794>.

²¹ Council of the European Union, *Council Decision (2009/371/JHA) of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol)*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32009D0371>.

in Europol was unhindered whilst it was an intergovernmental body, but it must leave the agency by 2017 under the new legal provisions. This leaves the Danish government in an embarrassing situation. The government's proposal was rejected by the Danish electorate, despite the fact that the opt-outs from JHA/AFSJ have proven to be "increasingly detrimental to Danish interests",²² including with regard to asylum and migration policy and to judicial cooperation. Support for the opt-in model from a large majority of Danish MPs, trade unions and industry organizations could not prevent a negative outcome.

Politicization seems to have outweighed interdependence, pushing for a limited loss of sovereign rights in a policy area traditionally considered as a core competence of the nation-state. As Ibolya states, "the fierce insistence to sustain full sovereignty in immigration policy and policies concerning third country citizens has been and remains the key issue in Denmark's opt-out from justice and home rules."²³

After a meeting between the Danish Prime Minister with the Commission President and the president of the European Council in December 2016, a second best solution for Denmark and the EU has become a possibility. It would prevent Denmark's full participation in Europol but ensure a "sufficient level of operational cooperation including exchange of relevant data."²⁴ However, this solution is conditional upon membership of the Schengen area and full application of Directive 2016/680/EU on data protection in police matters.²⁵

With regard to police cooperation, Denmark's status is reduced to that of a third country, depriving its government of any decision-making rights in the governing bodies of Europol. This case of differentiated integration in one of the Union's core policies is definitely detrimental to European and Danish security. It is clearly not a real alternative to pooling competences

²² Tamás Ibolya, "A Vote of No Confidence: Explaining the Danish EU Referendum", cit.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of Denmark to minimise the negative effects of the Danish departure from Europol, following the referendum in Denmark on 3 December 2015, 15 December 2016, <http://europa.eu/!gD78Yj>.

²⁵ Directive (EU) 2016/680 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data..., <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016L0680>.

for the efficient fight against serious and organized crime, such as human trafficking, and against terrorism. However, the EU cannot prevent Denmark from cutting itself off from existing arrangements.

4.2 *The new European Border and Coast Guard*

On a second highly topical issue, the reform of Frontex, the Parliament and the Council came to an agreement in September 2016 under the pressure of on-going migratory flows. As the United Kingdom and Ireland do not participate in the Schengen area, the Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 on the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG)²⁶ is not binding for them, but allows the two countries to attend meetings of the management board to participate in specific activities (para. 68). As with Denmark, both countries can decide within a period of six months whether they will implement the provisions of the Regulation in national law. In fact, Denmark is bound to Schengen provisions by intergovernmental agreement, similar to the non-EU countries of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. This shows how highly differentiated the provisions on the common management of external borders, the removal of internal borders and the policies linked to it are – both vertically and horizontally. For the time being, further cherry-picking could be avoided. Nevertheless, the new regulation provides for more integration, allowing the EU as a last resort to intervene in a member state that has failed to take appropriate measures to safeguard its borders. This is highly controversial because it interferes with the sovereign rights of the member state concerned.²⁷ In the case of Poland, the host country of the European Border and Coast Guard agency, the current national conservative government even refuses for the time being to sign a headquarters agreement that lays out the status of the agency and its staff.²⁸ It is hardly conceivable that the EU will ever send rapid reaction forces into a country without prior consent. This attitude suggests that there will be either more intergovernmental arrangements outside the framework of EU law or willing member states will have to resort to “enhanced cooperation”.

²⁶ Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard..., <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32016R1624>.

²⁷ Elżbieta Kaca, “The European Border and Coast Guard: Potentials and Risks”, cit.

²⁸ Henry Foy and Duncan Robinson, “EU Border Guard HQ Provokes Squabble with Poland”, in *Financial Times*, 16 December 2015.

4.3 The difficult relocation of refugees

The EU has encountered even more resistance in the case of the relocation scheme for 160,000 refugees, forced through under the Luxembourg Presidency in September 2015²⁹ despite resistance from Eastern European member states. The plan was meant to ease the burden on frontline countries like Greece and Italy and to save Schengen and the Dublin III Regulation, which determines which EU member state is responsible for examining an application for asylum. However, in view of the sluggish implementation³⁰ of the Council decision establishing the relocation scheme and the decision of Hungary³¹ and Slovakia³² to file actions for annulment in the Court of Justice, the likelihood of coming to common viable solutions in the area of asylum while pursuing the idea of equal burden sharing seems unlikely.

5. Outlook

The opt-out arrangements in the realm of JHA/AFSJ for Denmark, the UK and Ireland were born out of the necessity of not stalling the ratification process of the Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam. As another round of a major treaty revision looks unlikely any time soon, this mode of differentiation is currently not on the agenda.

Opt-out concessions made to single countries in order to avoid withdrawal from the EU will put the whole Union at risk. The example of Britain shows that stepping back from existing commitments could not salvage Britain's membership. Ex post concessions therefore do not appear to be a viable mode of differentiation.

The case of Denmark and its participation in the Schengen zone shows that intergovernmental arrangements may be a possible solution if reluctance

²⁹ Council of the European Union, *Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32015D1601>.

³⁰ European Commission, *Ninth report on relocation and resettlement (COM/2017/74)*, 8 February 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52017DC0074>.

³¹ Court of Justice of the European Union, *Hungary v Council of the European Union (Case C-647/15)*, 3 December 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:62015CN0647>.

³² Court of Justice of the European Union, *Slovakia v Council of the European Union (Case C-643/15)*, 2 December 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:62015CN0643>.

is great to acquiesce in supranational decision-making. But, as the problem of police cooperation reveals, intergovernmental arrangements outside the treaty framework cannot be more than a tool for limiting damage. Against this backdrop, “enhanced cooperation” under article 20 TEU seems to be the most viable path for further integration in the area of freedom, security and justice if politicization impedes a uniform stance.

The next leap forward in AFSJ threatens to create new fissures and will provoke calls for more differentiation. Member states should go beyond the current level of cooperation between national law enforcement forces. The competences of a European Public Prosecutor, so far limited to offences against the Union’s financial interests (article 86 TEU), should be extended to other cross-border related offences such as migrant-smuggling and human-trafficking, two of the top priorities of Europol under the 2013-2017 EU policy cycle.³³ The right to initiate the investigation of crime with a cross-border dimension should be given to Europol. However, for the time being, the more systematic sharing of information in any of the relevant European databases, such as Eurodac, the Europol and the Schengen Information System, and the implementation of existing secondary law, is more urgent than further integration, according to a personal communication by a staff member of the Luxembourgish representation to the EU in Brussels.³⁴

With regard to the current Dublin system, discontent in member states with external borders is steadily growing. Persistent migration pressure will bring a Europe with open internal borders to an end if member states don’t recognize and support the nexus between the common management of the external borders by a real European Border and Coast Guard and an agreement on a functioning relocation scheme for migrants, the implementation of which would represent a qualitative step towards a more efficient and united EU. Those countries that opt out of this will remain at the periphery of the concentric circles of the Union, whatever it becomes in these times of growing euroscepticism. The most salient case of differentiation within the EU will thus take place in the AFSJ.

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³³ See the Europol website: *EU Policy Cycle – EMPACT*, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/eu-policy-cycle-empact>.

³⁴ Personal interview given on 25 November 2016.

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Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)..., 11 May 2016, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32016R0794>

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2017 is set to be a crucial year for the European Union (EU) and its Member States. Multiple crises, key electoral appointments and the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome are among the most important events in the EU agenda. Against this backdrop, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI), in cooperation with the Centro Studi sul Federalismo (CSF) and in the framework of IAI's strategic partnership with the Compagnia di San Paolo, have launched a new research project: EU60: Re-founding Europe. The Responsibility to Propose. The initiative seeks to re-launch the EU's integration process, and will involve researchers from leading European think tanks who will contribute policy papers analysing specific political or institutional dimensions of the EU.



*Ministero degli Affari Esteri
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