The European Union pilot project on transatlantic methods for handling global challenges in the European Union and United States

EU-U.S. Security Strategies
Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations

Executive Summary

This project is funded by the European Union

A project implemented by
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI)
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
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The partnership between the European Union (EU) and the United States is of central importance in addressing a multitude of complex global challenges. Despite recurrent ups and downs, EU-U.S. cooperation remains the most economically significant and integrated relationship in the world. Europe and the United States have long been drivers of global economic prosperity, accounting for half of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), 40 percent of trade, and 80 percent of official development assistance. Yet it has been the political and security arenas that have always provided the crucial test of the partnership’s effectiveness, durability, and solidarity. The capstone of this partnership was the inauguration of the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995, which has emerged as a core element of the transatlantic relationship by promoting and encouraging a transatlantic response to global security challenges and promoting, inter alia, peace and stability.

In the spirit of the New Transatlantic Agenda and within the framework of the European Commission’s pilot project, “Transatlantic Methods for Handling Global Challenges in the European Union and United States,” an effort was undertaken to assess the current state of the EU-U.S. security relationship and offer recommendations on fostering common approaches and enhancing its capacity to deal with emerging challenges. The research, “EU-U.S. Security Strategies: Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations,” was undertaken by a transatlantic team led by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and including scholars from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, the French Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

Generously funded by the European Commission’s Directorate General External Relations (DG RELEX), the main purpose of the “EU-U.S. Security Strategies” project was to provide European and American policymakers with insight, inputs, ideas, and tools to enhance and deepen transatlantic dialogue on four security issues of common concern for the European Union and the United States and to identify potential transatlantic convergences. The four subject areas were identified as follows:

- **The definition of external security and related European and American implementation models.** The research partners examined how Europeans and Americans have defined external security and conducted strategic security reviews. They compared recent American and French national security reviews, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and its subsequent review in 2008, and the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

- **The nexus between internal and external security** and how various threats can be addressed by the EU and the United States. The research team examined the blurring borders between internal and external security and cross-border threats in the areas of cyber security, biosecurity, pandemic preparedness and response, and disaster preparation and response.
Current trends in the defense and security market and related industrial perspectives in Europe and the United States. The research team examined the American and European security and defense industrial bases and determined that both are undergoing a comprehensive restructuring to better respond to contemporary challenges with the security industrial base and market requiring the more dramatic transformation. Both the EU and the United States are struggling to make the security market more efficient, with different methods and with mixed success.

EU-U.S. cooperation for today’s transatlantic security challenges. The research team assessed transatlantic cooperation on four complex security problems, including a nuclear-armed Iran, Afghanistan, the Haiti earthquake and natural disasters, and piracy off the coast of Somalia and suggest that the evolving global security environment requires better organization and enhanced capability within the EU and a stronger, direct EU-U.S. security relationship.
Despite extensive transatlantic security cooperation, the research team identified existing gaps and has put forward specific recommendations to enhance transatlantic dialogue and EU-U.S. cooperation. It is clear that strategies and rhetoric must be put into practice requiring policy makers to place greater emphasis on operational and tactical cooperation on the ground. Moreover, the EU-U.S. partnership must be a driver to boost development of technological and industrial—and thus operational—capabilities. As the EU strengthens into a coherent and cohesive counterpart to the United States (e.g., the nascent European External Action Service will provide such important strengthening), the following overarching project recommendations could provide useful insights to concerned EU and U.S. policymakers into the many rich and diverse opportunities to strengthen the EU-U.S. partnership in the security field:

- **Develop a European strategic security and defense review or White Paper** that would become a foundational element of a comprehensive transatlantic strategic security and defense review.

- **Increase EU-U.S. operational coordination and training**, agree on shared definitions and concepts, and build issue-specific cooperative structures in the areas of cyber security, biosecurity, disaster preparedness and response, and pandemic influenza that foster systematic exchanges of lessons-learned and best practices.

- **Improve governance of the transatlantic security sector** and efficiency of the industrial base to enhance its understanding of emerging requirements, efficiency, and responsiveness; strengthen the regulatory environment; and avoid restrictive and protectionist practices to produce a more open and competitive transatlantic security market.

- **Develop an EU–NATO security agreement** to allow for easy exchange of classified information and enhance operational effectiveness. Undertake routine EU–U.S. security consultations, exchanges of situational awareness reports, and exercises to enhance transatlantic response capabilities, augment EU crisis response capabilities, and integrate them with NATO’s comprehensive approach to complex security and humanitarian operations.

The main findings of the research team reconfirmed the critical role that both the EU and the United States play in the international security arena despite a reduction of traditional security threats. Without doubt, an effective and solid EU-U.S. partnership remains the essential link in identifying and addressing current and future emerging threats as well as implementing new security paradigms. Moreover, as European and American security is so mutually intertwined and interdependent, practiced coordination and consistent action is crucial to protect the transatlantic space and project security globally.

The following provides a more detailed summary of the key judgments and findings of each specific security issue that was examined.
In the post–Cold War era, European and North American states as well as international organizations such as the EU and NATO had to deal with a more and more complex and uncertain security environment, where strategic surprises have become more the norm. The need to rethink strategic goals, adjust strategies, and reorganize policies and bureaucracies has increased. As a result, the number and importance of strategic security reviews have increased at both the national and international levels.

The CSIS-led research team examined the evolution of how Europe and the United States have defined external security and how each conduct strategic security reviews. For the purposes of this project, external security was viewed as one country’s national security whereby traditional external threats emanating from outside a national or multinational organization’s borders (e.g., defense) are combined with internal security challenges (e.g., homeland security, resilience). The research team initiated a comprehensive comparison of two national and two multinational security strategic reviews. The two national security strategies that were reviewed were the 2008 French White Paper on Defense and National Security (Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale) and the 2002 and 2010 U.S. National Security Strategies (NSS). The multinational strategies that were analyzed included the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and its subsequent review in 2008 and the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.

Each of the four strategic reviews were placed in their own historical context to better frame the political environment in which they were written, with special attention given to any particular legislative or other mandatory requirements. As described by Camille Grand (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, or FRS) in his contribution, in France there is no legal obligation to produce a strategic security review document. French strategic analysis and policies are mostly derived from presidential and other senior official speeches. The Livre Blanc was only the third such formal strategic review to occur since the 1970s, making the review a significant event. The 2008 paper was developed at the direction of a newly elected president who wished to develop a greater national consensus around France’s defense and security policy.

In contrast, Heather Conley, Manuel Lafont-Rapnouil, and Michael Cass-Anthony (CSIS) highlight that the U.S. NSS is mandated by legislation requiring the Executive Branch to provide a national security strategy to Congress on an annual basis. The NSS represents the first in a series of strategic reviews, closely followed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which provides more direct guidance to the annual defense budget process. Typically, a new American president uses the NSS to frame the global strategic environment and prescribe America’s ability to meet the challenges of this environment while differentiating, repudiating, or justifying past policies and actions.

Multilaterally, as recalled by Stefano Silvestri and Alessandro Marrone (Istituto Affari Internazionali, or IAI), NATO does not
have a formalized time schedule to conduct its strategic reviews; rather, it undertakes them at irregular intervals in response to a particularly complex set of international challenges. For example, NATO’s 1967 Strategic Concept was not changed for 24 years. However, to adapt to the rapid changes in global security following the end of the Cold War, NATO has undertaken three strategic reviews in 1991, 1999, and 2010.

Mark Rhinard and Erik Brattberg (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, or UI) illustrate that although the first formal attempt by the EU to undertake its own strategic review was in 2003, the concept of developing an EU-wide foreign and security policy existed a decade earlier as articulated in the Maastricht Treaty, and later reaffirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. The need to better coordinate EU member states in order to gain more global influence, coupled with the political imperative to shape a European policy independent of American thought in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, led to the development of the strategic review initiated by the then EU high representative Javier Solana.

All four strategic reviews were shaped by their own unique bureaucratic and political processes, which had a dramatic impact on its strategic value and final effect. Prior to the drafting of the Livre Blanc, French president Nicholas Sarkozy appointed a commission chaired by a widely respected and leading official to shape the strategic review. The commission was composed of representatives of government agencies, parliamentarians, academics, and respected individuals and held publicly televised and online hearings as well as a wide range of consultations and visits to the field, including abroad, to discuss key issues and gain valuable input. The American process, however, is much more insular, occurs behind closed doors, and is led by the White House National Security Staff. In 2010, the process was led by the deputy national security advisor for strategic communications with input from various departments (e.g., the State and Defense Departments and intelligence agencies). When the final strategic document is being readied, high-level administration officials brief members of Congress and key allies on its findings before its public release.

Like the French approach, NATO tasked an outside entity, a Group of Experts, led by former U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright, to provide input (in the form of a report, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement) to the NATO secretary general prior to the official drafting of the Strategic Concept. The Group of Experts consulted with senior officials in NATO capitals—and in Russia—and held several seminars that included
European and American think tanks and experts on a select set of critical questions. This inclusive process allowed many stakeholders, even non-NATO members, to provide input into the process. For the EU in 2003, the strategic review process was more exclusive with only a small group of individuals involved in the drafting process. This very streamlined and less bureaucratic approach allowed the strategy draft to be completed in a very short period of time. The draft document was then shared with select European think tanks, and three external workshops were held to elicit comment and feedback. Following the workshops, the draft was made available to member states for comment, where additional issues were added and other more pronounced issues were diluted to ensure consensus on the final document, A Secure Europe in a Better World.

There were several common elements across all four strategic reviews regarding strategic content and new strategic vocabulary and thinking. First and foremost was the widening of the scope of national security to combine external and internal security strategies, to acknowledge that the traditional barrier between foreign and domestic security has been removed. There was strong evidence of the introduction of new strategic vocabulary in the wake of September 11, 2001, and the importance of the role of crisis in propelling new strategic thinking. New terms such as the “global war on terrorism,” “preemptive actions,” and “resilience” were introduced into strategic documents. The term “resilience,” meaning to “adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption,” originated in the UK, was adopted in the Livre Blanc, and now has been embraced in the United States. Similarly, the European use of the term “comprehensive approach” to characterize use of all available strategic tools has found its way into recent U.S. security documents as a “whole of government” approach.

For the Livre Blanc, the lasting impact was the establishment of a national security concept for France, which laid the groundwork for its decision to reintegrate into NATO’s military structure and had substantial impact on reorganizing France’s national security structure. For the U.S. 2002 and 2010 NSS, there was also substantial reorganization and creation of new security organizations, such as the Department

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presents the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept to the media.
of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence which was an effort to integrate external and internal security. However, it is difficult to make definitive judgments on the impact of any multilateral strategic review. For NATO, the 2010 Strategic Concept underscores strategic continuity and core capabilities while simultaneously (and slowly) adapting to changes in the security environment, such as cyber security and counterinsurgency operations. For the EU’s first attempt at a strategic review, it is even more difficult as the strategy contained no mechanism for evaluation or review and appears to be more aspirational in approach.

During the Cold War era, most strategic security reviews were classified documents. Today, strategic reviews are more valued for their ability to educate the general public about current and future threats to national security and provide a venue for governments and multilateral organizations to offer their vision of how best to meet these challenges. Moreover, it is an exercise that brings disparate elements of the bureaucracy together to find common ground and strategic understanding; in essence, the process creates an enduring strategic culture that adds value to the day-to-day work of any complex organization. Finally, a strategic review had a profound impact on bureaucratic structures, whether it is creating new, streamlining current, or downsizing old.

There were several areas of concern noted in each strategic review analysis. In particular, strategic reviews can tend to be backward-looking and reactive documents that justify previous actions or budget decisions. A successful strategic review must look boldly into the future; identify new emerging security trends; and make the necessary adjustments to policy and budget lines. This is why it appears to be increasingly important to seek the advice and counsel of outside experts and organizations. An insular review exercise tends to validate previous decisions and lacks political credibility; an open, transparent process that embraces new opinions and challenges long-held precepts ensures a document with strategic durability and buy-in from a broader policy community. However, even the most prescient of strategic documents will not be successful if it is not tethered to budgetary resources to implement stated strategic objectives. National strategies, such as the U.S. NSS and the Livre Blanc, did a much better job at connecting strategic objectives to resource allocation. In fact, the Livre Blanc explicitly states the procurement schedule that will meet its strategic objectives. The U.S. NSS is not explicit in budgetary terms, but subsequent strategic documents like the QDR and the Defense Department’s budget do provide that direct correlation between strategy and resources. For the multilateral organizations, it is much more difficult to ensure that budgets meet objectives. The ESS does not appear to have led to an increased budget or renewed purpose for certain declared actions or missions. NATO appears to have more directly connected budget allocations when new missions are identified, such as missile defense, and the creation of a Center of Excellence on Cyber Security, but national governments decide their resource allocation to a given program.

There was strong consensus that what is absent in the plethora of national and multinational strategic security reviews is a truly transatlantic strategic security and defense review whereby a more structured transatlantic venue is created for discussion of strategic concepts, principles, and priorities. While the NATO Strategic Concept provides a transatlantic collective defense bridge, this document does not adequately capture the transformation of the EU in the external and internal security fields institutionally. Moreover, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept does not address internal security as a NATO core task although it states that terrorism and the disruption of vital communication are threats to NATO. A Transatlantic White Paper could
address internal security threats and cyber security and become the basis for a joint EU–NATO assessment of global threats, risks, and strategic priorities.

Before a Transatlantic White Paper can be developed, it will be essential for the European Union, in the post-Lisbon Treaty era, to undertake a European White Paper at the request of the European Council and under the leadership of the EU high representative. There would be a very strong “value of the process” in the development of such a European White Paper by building greater consensus and clarity among EU member states on the growing role of the EU in the security and defense arena and encouraging greater synergy between national security strategies and the EU’s overarching strategy. Moreover, it would be an excellent bureaucratic “team building” exercise for the European External Action Service (EEAS), bringing together commission, council, and member state professionals in a focused, collaborative effort. It is strongly recommended that the EU Council, like the NATO Strategic Concept and the Livre Blanc, establish an expert group or commission that would include current and former European officials (to include select members of the European Parliament) and highly respected business, nongovernmental, and academic officials prior to the official drafting of the European White Paper. It is vital that the process be given an appropriate amount of time (e.g., six months or more) for extended consultations both within Europe and with Europe’s strategic partners, like the United States and Russia, and effective outreach to the European think-tank community. Importantly, consultations should continue throughout the drafting process. Finally, although such a European White Paper must, as its first priority, be strategic in outlook and focus on a few strategic priorities to ensure subsequent adequate resource allocation (rather than an exhaustive, least-common-denominator list of issues), security reviews now perform a much greater public diplomacy role. A European White Paper would educate Europeans on the current and future security and threat environment, articulate how the EU will address these threats, and inform other governments of the EU’s analysis and policy prescriptions.
Europe and North America increasingly face new forms of threats. Whether we speak of global terrorism and regional instability, transcontinental criminal networks, cyber sabotage, or even the effects of climate change and global pandemics, the trend seems evident: modern threats increasingly originate from opaque sources, cross political and sectoral borders with ease, and destabilize the critical infrastructures of our societies. This has caused researchers and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic to reassess the strict separation of external and internal security goals embedded in structures, policies, and practices.

Prioritization of such security threats is now found in the strategic sights of policymakers in both the EU and the United States. For example, the European Security Strategy, as well as the EU’s new Internal Security Strategy, argues for the dissolution of that separation, pleading for a more comprehensive security approach. The U.S. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review has cast cross-border threats into the spotlight, calling for an “integrated” approach to combating threats that cross the foreign/domestic divide. Yet each strategy needs to move from rhetoric to reality via implementation and policy change.

This section explores strategic rhetoric and assesses implementation in both the EU and the United States as well as on a transatlantic level. Each contribution takes up a different security issue (cyber security, biosecurity, pandemics, and natural disasters) in order to outline the latest policy developments, analyze gaps and overlaps on either side of the Atlantic, and assess the prospects for improved transatlantic cooperation.

The overall findings of the studies indicate a higher-than-expected degree to which both the EU and United States are following rhetoric with action on the question of cross-border threats. Having professed the importance of bridging the divide between internal and external security threats, each bloc is taking concrete practical steps toward that end. From “whole-of-government” approaches to international teamwork, both the EU and United States are addressing the internal-external security nexus more rigorously than ever before.

Nevertheless, as the studies make clear, weaknesses remain on both sides of the Atlantic and in the transatlantic relationship. Our findings point to a general need to continue raising awareness on cross-border threats (even as public attention wanes), to pursue common threat assessments across the Atlantic, to identify capacity gaps in both the EU and United States, to engage in joint exercises, and to prioritize efforts to improve cooperation between the EU, United States, and NATO.

The first contribution by Federica Di Camillo and Valérie Miranda (IAI) examines cyber attacks, a growing threat to governments because of the transnational and interconnected nature of critical information infrastructures. Although cyber-related issues have hardly been present in EU strategic rhetoric so far, it is nevertheless possible to identify an increasing awareness of the immediacy of cyber threats as mirrored by the establishment of dedicated agencies and by the commitments
outlined in recent documents endorsed by the European Commission. The authors argue that within the wide realm of cyber security, EU policies follow a four-pronged approach encompassing specific network and information security measures, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP), the fight against cyber crime, and, on the regulatory side, the framework for electronic communications (including data protection and privacy issues).

In the United States, the authors show that cyber security has emerged as a top national security priority. In contrast to the EU, U.S. strategic documents deal quite extensively with cyber issues, adopting similar definitions and advancing very similar expectations. Recent U.S. efforts in the cyber security domain have particularly been directed at bridging the historically separated cyber defense missions with law enforcement, intelligence, and counter-intelligence. The U.S. government has also taken steps toward enhanced cooperation across its agencies and departments as well as with the private sector—namely, with the defense industrial base and critical infrastructures stakeholders—to better identify cyber threats. The authors conclude by noting that while EU and U.S. approaches to cyber security bear much in common, transatlantic cooperation needs to be improved. Suggested routes include:

- achieving a conceptual and semantic harmonization of cyber issues as a preliminary step to attaining legal harmonization;
- devoting higher priority and attention to cyber security on the transatlantic agenda, not least through the creation of a U.S.-EU Cyber Security Council along the lines of the U.S.-EU Energy Council in the transatlantic summit process;
- fostering transatlantic cooperation at the operational level—namely, setting up joint exercises and exchanges between the related U.S. and EU agencies and encouraging the exchange of best practices between the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) on both sides of the Atlantic.

The second contribution, by Elisande Nexon and Jean-François Daguzan (FRS), focuses on biosecurity threats. The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States exposed the threat of biological weapons and revealed vulnerabilities. The authors note that in the EU, strategic rhetoric on biosecurity has increased over the past decade and is taken into account in the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD of 2003 and the adoption of New Lines for Action in 2008, aimed at further improving the implementation of the strategy. The EU has also produced a Green Paper on Bio-Preparedness and, in 2009, an EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Action Plan (CBRN). In the United States, which has a number of strategies, directives, and orders that deal with biosecurity, the key strategic document is the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, released in 2009, which sets out strategic guidance for federal entities in charge of implementation of biosecurity policies. The United States also has a number of structures explicitly dealing with bio security, including the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), the

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), Center for Disease Control (CDC), and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH).

The authors’ analysis reveals that the EU and the United States hold similar threat perceptions and display compatible security apparatuses for biosecurity. Both view biopreparedness as a priority, and an “all-hazards” approach is favored, taking into account the full spectrum of biological risks, from natural outbreaks to accidental contaminations and release and misuse. Nevertheless, the United States and the EU should seek to

- adopt common definitions and terms of reference in order to improve communication and avoid misunderstanding;
- carry out oversight of all CBRN outreach, cooperative initiatives, and activities in order to improve coordination and enhance transatlantic dialogue;
- recognize the importance of engaging industrial and scientific communities in transatlantic initiatives and dialogues.

The third chapter, written by Mark Rihard and Erik Brattberg (UI), examines whether the EU and United States are turning words into action on the issue of pandemic threats. Following recent pandemic outbreaks, European policymakers have taken steps toward enhancing European cooperation on pandemic preparedness and response, including strengthening surveillance and early alert and early response capacities. Nevertheless, a tension remains in the relationship between national and EU level responses to pandemics. In particular, legally binding measures were viewed with scepticism by some EU member states. In the United States, steps have been taken to enhance preparedness and response, focusing on surveillance, shared standards, decisionmaking structures, and early alert and early response capacities. Although the U.S. government has taken a strategic approach to pandemic preparation, several shortcomings remain, especially when it comes to vaccine production.

In brief, the findings indicate that EU and U.S. strategic rhetoric on pandemic influenza is fairly consistent and closely aligned. Most EU and U.S. cooperation takes place through the World Health Organization (WHO), where both sides have taken a leading role in new initiatives and seek to encourage cooperation among recalcitrant countries. However, there is little direct U.S.-EU cooperation in the area of common policies or operational capacity sharing beyond an occasional exchange of experts. Key recommendations therefore include the following:

- build relationships between EU health agencies, such as the nascent European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), and U.S. agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control (CDC);
- establish U.S.-EU expert working groups and task forces for tackling specific pandemic threats;
- operate as a constructive transatlantic leadership team within other international...
organizations. This cooperative relationship should be enshrined in regular caucuses of EU and U.S. officials before and during WHO events, for example, and nurtured through partnerships with officials from international organizations.

Finally, Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian (CSIS) examine how the EU and United States have approached disaster preparation and response. The authors note that in the last several years an important evolution has occurred in the treatment of natural disasters in EU security policy, with disaster preparation and relief having assumed greater importance in high-level official documents and public declarations. With these changes, EU institutions have looked to take a stronger role in ensuring collective security on the continent. In this context, the Solidarity Clause might serve an important role in fostering unity of effort in the face of a major natural disaster in Europe, requiring assistance from other member states. Like their counterparts in the EU, policymakers in the United States have increasingly highlighted the threat that natural disasters pose to national and global security. High-level strategic documents have moved to frame disaster preparation and response as part an “all-hazards” and “whole-of-government” approach to security. This is an ambitious framework; it requires heightening coordination and cooperation between the myriad constituencies in charge of countering disasters and other threats. Finally, transatlantic cooperation on natural disaster response is discussed both in the context of disasters occurring “at home” in Europe and North America as well as disasters taking place overseas, such as the 2004 Tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and how transatlantic cooperation can be strengthened there. Key recommendations include the following:

- strengthen coordination among foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and host nation officials;
- increase efforts to identify, in conjunction with the UN, EU, and United States, the capacities, specialties, and limitations of various response stakeholders before disasters strike—this will help minimize redundancies and ensure that no vital needs or requirements go unaddressed;
- integrate local officials into the disaster response effort, especially in cases where disasters occur in developing or poor countries.

Looking across the studies for this research team, common findings emerge that point toward areas for enhanced transatlantic attention in the years ahead. Those findings can be summarized as follows:

- Agree on shared definitions and concepts. The EU and United States should work
toward shared definitions of threats and shared methodologies for managing them in a comprehensive way. Shared definitions would alleviate, for example, differing problem definitions (e.g., cyber) and transatlantic miscommunication and misunderstandings (e.g., biosecurity) that currently impair efficient transatlantic cooperation. If possible, shared definitions should lead to common threat assessments for the threats examined by the research team.

- **Build issue-specific cooperative structures.** Historically, the EU and United States have found success when focusing their joint efforts on specific challenges. An EU-U.S. Cyber Security Council would bring necessary priority and attention to that issue, for instance, while improved relations between EU and U.S. disaster management communities would enhance readiness across the Atlantic. Cooperation need not be permanent or wide-ranging; ad hoc cooperative structures (e.g., task forces) have worked well in the area of pandemic control.

- **Increase operational coordination and training.** The research team agreed on the importance of regular exercises to improve operational coordination. This includes training directed toward building capacity in concerned agencies in the EU and United States so that cooperation in times of crisis is more familiar and seamless. This includes training for disaster management preparation, cyber response teams, pandemic control procedures, and biosecurity breach situations. Such training should take place bilaterally, between EU institutions and the United States and between the EU and NATO. A key part of the training should include the sharing of lessons learned and “best practices” from a transatlantic perspective.
The wave of terrorist attacks that started in September 2001 provoked a rethinking of the concepts of internal and external security. The two policy areas, often separated in the past, are increasingly seen as overlapping. This change has far-reaching implications for the security and defense industrial bases: both are restructuring to better respond to the security challenges in Western societies. The security industrial base and market, in particular, will be subject to the more dramatic rebuilding, as its structure is far less developed than that of the defense market. Both the EU and the United States are working to make the security market more mature and efficient, with different approaches and mixed success. However, the transatlantic community needs a thriving security industrial base if it wants to successfully overcome the challenges it faces.

This is the scenario that the IAI-led research team developed in order to provide as complete a picture as possible of the evolution of the security industry and market, identify the main obstacles to its development on both sides of the Atlantic, and provide ideas and recommendations to overcome these obstacles. The research team focused on different aspects of the market’s evolution to ensure a comprehensive assessment. An introductory paper describes the security sector, and three additional contributions deal, respectively, with public-private partnerships in the sector, the regulatory environment, and the development of industrial policies in the security sector.

The first paper, *The Security Market in the EU and the U.S.*, produced by Hélène Masson and Lucia Marta (FRS), provides a complete picture of the current security market both from the demand and supply sides, based on the most recently available data. The authors provide an in-depth analysis of the main industrial actors and of the main procurement agencies, devoting particular attention to the transatlantic dimension of the market. The analysis describes a very fragmented market in terms of both customer base and industry on both sides of the Atlantic. The paper also underscores the uncertainty regarding the actual size of the market, which hampers efforts toward market restructuring.

The second paper, *Challenges to Agenda-Setting Priorities: Toward Effective Public-Private Partnerships for Security in the EU and United States*, by Jan Joel Andersson and Erik Brattberg (UI), focuses on the relationship between governments and the security industry. Their research attempts to evaluate whether this relationship is sufficiently structured to allow a fruitful exchange of ideas between the two stakeholders. The paper, in fact, posits the assumption that transparent and fruitful communications between demand and supply are essential if the industrial base is to provide governments with needed capabilities. Customer-supplier relations in the defense field are used as a point of comparison. After reviewing the emerging security industry-government relationship, the authors conclude that the diversity of buyer profiles and consequent lack of predictability of the security demand represent a significant challenge for the industry, which should itself be more involved in agenda-
setting activities as well as in the formulation of requirements.

The third paper, *The Regulatory and Acquisition Environment for Security in the EU and United States*, by David Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, and Priscilla Hermann (CSIS) and Sandra Mezzadri (IAI), provides an assessment of the regulatory environments for the security industry in the United States and the EU. Government regulations have a direct impact on the industrial base and its ability to develop and field security-related capabilities. The paper identifies various regulatory shortcomings on both sides of the Atlantic: insufficient acquisition oversight and cost estimation capabilities as well as overreliance on external contractors in the United States; and an inadequate level of standardization and liability protection as well as poor transparency on public procurement practices and procedures in the EU. The paper also highlights some regulatory weaknesses common to both the EU and the United States; these include unclear definitions of security versus defense goods, bureaucratic barriers to entry, and an insufficient public-private dialogue. The paper advocates for collaborative EU-U.S. efforts to develop common solutions in these areas.

Finally the fourth paper, *Transatlantic Industrial Policies in the Security Sector*, by Valerio Briani and Nicolò Sartori (IAI), outlines how the U.S. government and EU institutions approach the development of a more mature security market. The paper begins by analyzing the distinct characteristics of the defense and security markets—as in the UI paper, the defense sector is considered the point of reference. The document then outlines how the United States and the EU are developing their respective markets by adopting two very different approaches. While the EU is slowly but surely developing a security industrial policy as a part of the more encompassing European industrial policy, the U.S. government favors a more institution-centered approach, largely recoiling from intervening in the sector. However, in both cases the chosen approach has resulted in a security sector that is more closely modeled in structure to the defense sector.

Each of the above-mentioned contributions includes a number of policy suggestions and ideas on how to improve the governance of the security sector and the efficiency of the industrial base. Most of the policy recommendations are applicable both to the United States and the EU and can be summarized as follows:
- *Improve industry’s engagement in the governance of the security sector.* Enhance communication so that the security industry is more conscious of the capability requirements, more efficient thanks to predictable and stable demand, and more responsive to the market.

- *Enhance the regulatory environment.* Business leaders need a sound regulatory environment, with clear and simple regulations, in order to be able to make the right investments. Industry would also benefit from less fragmented demand, which can also be reached through proper regulatory action.

- *Avoid competitive and/or protectionist practices.* European and American security needs are similar. Both can benefit from a more open and competitive transatlantic security market. Any attempt to introduce protectionist elements (such as prohibitive export regulations or “buy domestic” acquisition practices) will be counterproductive.
The disappearance of the existential threat that led to the establishment of NATO and spurred the development of the EU has meant that political consensus between the two sides of the Atlantic can no longer be guaranteed when confronting new international challenges. The evolving global security environment requires better organization within the EU and increased European investment in strategic civil and military capacities as well as a stronger EU-U.S. relationship. Such a pragmatic approach to the transatlantic relationship would have a profound effect on Europe’s profile in the world and the EU’s ability to make a positive contribution to the maintenance of international stability alongside the United States.

To better analyze the emerging security dynamics, the FRS-led research team undertook four detailed case studies that examined transatlantic cooperation with respect to complex security problems of widely differing character and magnitude. The cases assessed contributions by the European Union and its member states and the United States to international efforts to stabilize and develop Afghanistan since 2001, dissuade Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons over the past five years, provide humanitarian relief to Haiti in the aftermath of the devastating January 2010 earthquake, and combat piracy off the coast of Somalia since 2008. Each case examines the stakes, interests, and levels of commitment of EU members and the United States and assesses the degree of convergence of these commitments. Moreover, the four cases considered key variables, proposed plausible scenarios of evolution, and outlined several implications for the transatlantic partnership.

In his analysis *The Nuclear Standoff with Iran and the Future of Transatlantic Security Responsibility-Sharing*, Riccardo Alcaro (IAI) suggests that transatlantic divergence does matter: “The initial fractiousness of the transatlantic front made it easier for Iran to advance its nuclear expertise.” The second lesson he draws is that “even when the United States and the European Union are able to agree upon a common line, this is of little help if their strategic objectives remain distant.” Moreover, the “EU/European political and economic assets represent a critical, if not fundamental, crisis management resource, in particular when the United States is short of options.” And finally, there are real limits to transatlantic security cooperation in the sense that “several EU member states are unlikely to buy the argument that the failure of the European years-long effort to persuade Iran to come clean on its nuclear ambitions has rendered an attack unavoidable . . . . So, an attack against Iran is likely to undo, or at least jeopardise, whatever benefit may have accrued to the transatlantic partnership from the E3/EU+3 process.”

In their analysis *Afghanistan: A Stress Test for Transatlantic Security Cooperation*, Stephen Flanagan, T.J. Cipoletti, and Amanda Tuninetti (CSIS) develop the idea that the “Afghan engagement has highlighted the limits of the EU as an actor in semi-permissive environments and exposed its lack of doctrine and capacity in security sector reform.” The authors argue that “at the same time, NATO has consistently
underperformed in this field as well, and the lack of civilian capacity in NATO is well known.” Still they note that “there is growing U.S.-European convergence in political engagement with the Afghan government and civilian assistance efforts, but shortcomings in the integration of military and civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts persist.” They conclude that “while NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan has not provided a template for future engagements, it has proved valuable in advancing the transformation of European armed forces.” In a sense, Afghanistan “has highlighted a number of difficulties in transatlantic security cooperation in dealing with emerging global challenges. Differences in conceptual understanding of the conflict and the nature of engagement have led to asymmetrical and incompatible human and financial contributions, threatening not only the goal of stabilizing Afghanistan, but also the future of EU-U.S. security cooperation. Without agreement on goals and strategy, future transatlantic missions will likely encounter some of the same challenges that have hampered the engagement in Afghanistan.” Therefore, the authors make several recommendations:

- The EU countries should expand their commitment to training the Afghan national security forces, particularly the police, and supporting the development of the rule of law, in order to ensure the success of the transition plan agreed to at the Lisbon ISAF-Afghanistan Summit.

- Funding and staffing for the EU’s crisis response capabilities, including the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, should be augmented and better integrated with the development of NATO’s comprehensive approach and new civilian planning capability.

- An EU-NATO security agreement should be concluded to allow for easy exchange of classified information and overcome other operational limitations that are diminishing the security and effectiveness of EU personnel in the field and the success of combined EU-NATO missions.

In the case study *EU-U.S. Response to the Haiti Earthquake: A Comparative Analysis*, Erik Brattberg and Bengt Sundelius (UI) argue that policies to prevent and manage a complex humanitarian crisis require taking into account the objectives of state security, societal security, and human safety at the domestic and international levels and at the “intermes- tic” level as societies become increasingly inte-
The EU and the United States should “consider developing more pre-established agreements built around a ‘lead partner’ criteria for different parts of the world.”

“The continental Operation Centers in Washington and in Brussels” should be linked “through regular exchanges of situation awareness reports and through interactive training workshops and joint training exercises.”

The United States and the EU Commission should establish “protocols directly rather than with individual EU member states to signal U.S. support for EU-wide coordination.”

“The strategic dialogue between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Director General for the European Commission’s Office of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) should be expanded to include other relevant institutions for emergency relief and preparedness.”

Finally, in The Fight against Piracy off Somalia: A Consensual but Asymmetric Engagement, Philippe Gros (FRS) argues that “the transatlantic partnership is necessary for the present fight against piracy off Somalia, not only for naval anti-piracy operations, but also for the broader comprehensive approach to tackle such problems.” But it is an asymmetric partnership as the “EU as an institution clearly co-leads the effort and, in relative terms, its members commit more resources than the U.S.” Indeed, the United States does not consider piracy as a critical security threat. Beyond the defense of direct economic interests, Europe’s level of commitment in this area is due to the type of engagement, “primarily a law enforcement operation with a very limited use of force, undertaken under the umbrella of the consensus of nearly the entire international community.” Therefore, the anti-piracy mission “fits perfectly with the enduring common denominator between strategic cultures of EU partners,” may not represent a new durable step of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and does not require a rebalancing of the transatlantic security agenda. However, the relative stalemate of the current “comprehensive” strategy, which combines naval containment and engagement with Somalia’s weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG)—although satisfying for many—may lead over time to other options that would stress this asymmetric but consensual partnership.
Both the Iran and Afghanistan cases illustrate the importance of shared strategic assessments and agreement on goals in dealing with various security challenges. It may not always be possible to reach common assessments and develop common goals, but the differences that have at times limited transatlantic cooperation can be narrowed by undertaking more common EU-U.S. strategic assessments and consultations between NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) on emerging security challenges. It should also be recognized that, when agreement on goals cannot be reached, Europe and the United States should refrain from public recrimination that would otherwise undermine its cohesion. It is imperative that transatlantic policymakers devote more energy to better understanding and limiting negative effects from a lack of transatlantic convergence.

The Somali piracy, Afghan, and Haiti cases all highlight the need for better integration of civil and military capabilities to address complex security and humanitarian contingencies. As NATO moves forward with the development of its “comprehensive approach,” it is recommended that a parallel EU-U.S. effort be undertaken to take stock of how civilian crisis response and management capabilities can be better integrated.

In summary, when the four research areas are examined together, it is clear that the partnership between the EU and the United States is absolutely essential in addressing the challenges of a complex, multipolar security environment. Therefore, it is equally essential that the EU-U.S. partnership receive the necessary political priority and attention that a relationship of this magnitude deserves.

Hopelessly surrounded and outgunned, Somalian pirates surrender to HMS Cumberland’s Royal Marines boarding team in the Gulf of Aden, February 2009.

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Center for Strategic and International Studies
Executive Summary

EU-U.S. Security Strategies
COMPARATIVE SCENARIOS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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