Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, But How?

by Philippe Fargues

While peace talks between Syria’s government and opposition bump along in Geneva, battles rage on the ground and the death toll and the refugee wave both rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks, but can it keep its eyes — and borders — closed to the men, women, and children fleeing Syria? How can Europe better respond to the human and political disaster looming on its external border?

The conflict began when, three years ago, a handful of children wrote anti-regime slogans on the board of their classroom in the southern town of Deraa. This event triggered an implacable spiral of repression and protest and the conflict in Syria has now forcibly moved 7 million people from their homes, including 4.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2.5 million refugees who have fled abroad.¹ As in all refugee crises, the vast majority of those who do not get trapped inside the country find themselves stuck just on the other side of the border. Most Syrian refugees are sheltered among four of Syria’s five neighbors:

- Lebanon, the main receiver where more than 900,000 refugees are registered with UNHCR and where many others have not been registered;
- Turkey and Jordan each have close to 600,000 refugees; and
- Iraq with around 220,000 refugees.

Israel, which is at war with Syria, has, to date, kept its border closed.

Other refugees have travelled further away to destinations where they have relatives or friends. Some 135,000 Syrian refugees are currently hosted by Egypt, and tens of thousands find themselves in the Maghreb countries. In contrast, Europe’s response to the refugee crisis has been limited, uneven, and constantly outpaced by events on the ground and riddled with obstacles, as shown by Table 1.

First, Europe has only taken in a small segment (2.9 percent) of the overall Syrian refugee population. Between March 2011 and December 2013, them

¹ Numbers are continuously increasing. Regular updates are provided for IDPs by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at http://www.unocha.org/crisis/syria; for refugees in countries neighbouring on Syria by the UN Refugee Agency at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php; and for refugees in the EU by Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database.
Opinions on the Mediterranean

Op-Med

28 member states of the European Union (EU) received 69,740 asylum claims from Syrian citizens and made 41,695 positive decisions. These numbers are not small in absolute terms, but they represent just a fraction of the 2,301,533 Syrian refugees that Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt sheltered over the same period.

Second, European nations have responded to the refugee crisis in an uneven fashion. Two states took two-thirds of all the asylum seekers accepted by the 28 member states: Sweden and Germany with 23,110 and 20,700 claims received and 11,495 and 16,610 positive decisions, respectively. A third state, Bulgaria, deserves a mention as it has received 4,545 claims since the beginning of the crisis, and 70 percent of them arrived in the four months between August and November 2013 (at the time of writing, data for December 2013 are not available for Bulgaria). Another nine states received between 1,000 and 3,500 claims each and the remaining 16 states fewer than 1,000, including Lithuania and Austria which did not receive any asylum seekers from Syria.

Third, while asylum opportunities offered to Syrians in Europe have grown, these opportunities have not kept up with the war. Before the uprisings, there had always been a regular flow of Syrians seeking asylum in Europe. When the refugee crisis gained momentum in the second half of 2011, pre-existing flows simply amplified so that the EU28 received almost one-third of the Syrian refugees in the first year of the crisis. But Europe did not open the door to refugees in proportion to their flight from Syria and its share of the overall refugee flows fell from 29.4 percent in 2011 to 4.1 percent in 2012, and further to 2.3 percent in 2013.

Fourth, obstacles that Syrian asylum seekers meet on their way to the EU have increased. Indeed, there is a striking discrepancy between two facts. On one hand, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers who are able to lodge a claim in the EU are granted refugee status or temporary protection (86.7 percent had positive decisions in 2011-13), which is a sign of openness. On the other hand, the number of Syrian refugees who turn to smugglers to reach Europe has soared since the beginning of the crisis, which is a sign of closure. The ratio of Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece or Italy, compared to those regularly seeking asylum in the EU28 jumped from 14.7 percent in 2011 to 44.7 percent in 2013.

Put in other terms, 44.7 percent of those who sought asylum in Europe last year were only able to reach the territory of a member state — a legal obligation for claiming asylum — by putting their lives at risk at sea with smugglers. That their number jumped from 947 in 2011 to 8,509 in 2012 and 18,972 in 2013 must be interpreted as a response to obstacles set up by Greece and Bulgaria at their land-border with Turkey, be those obstacles police patrols or wire fences. Greece is a case in point. In the three years since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Greek police and port authorities have arrested 16,211 Syrian refugees smuggled by sea, almost all of them trying to reach another European destination, as Greece has a reputation for not granting asylum to Syrians (25 cases of positive decisions for 1,015 claims received).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination/year</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>03/15/2011-12/31/2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt</td>
<td>15,455</td>
<td>491,651</td>
<td>1,799,882</td>
<td>2,301,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 28 member states</td>
<td>6,450</td>
<td>20,810</td>
<td>42,480</td>
<td>69,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece and Italy</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>8,509</td>
<td>18,972</td>
<td>28,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 28 total</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggled by sea/asylum claims</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. At the time of writing (Feb. 10, 2014), the total number of registered Syrian refugees in the five countries was 2,430,100.
3) Italian Ministry of Interior and Greece Police records.
Europe is currently discussing burden-sharing, or “responsibility-sharing” between those member states that are geographically exposed to irregular entries, and those that are not. While this discussion will be crucial to improve the Common European Asylum System, its results will come too late to address a refugee crisis that risks undermining or even overturning fragile states in the Middle East. The current situation is grim, and the near future promises to see the conflict get worse, if anything.

Countries of first asylum in the Eastern Mediterranean are under extreme strain due to the massive influx of refugees and the pressure they exert on housing, food, water, schools, hospitals, etc. not to mention security and the social order. It has to be remembered that the Syrian refugee crisis comes just after the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2006-2009, which had displaced around 2 million Iraqi citizens in the very same countries: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt. In addition, the two crises come in countries where the vast majority of the world largest and longest-standing refugee population — the Palestinians — still live.

None of these countries, not even Turkey, regards itself as country of durable settlement for new refugees. Three of them — Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq — are not party to the Geneva Refugee Convention. They do not grant proper refugee status to those fleeing violence in neighboring countries, but instead give refugees an ill-defined denomination as “guests.” These guests are sometimes generously hosted and protected, but most of the time, they are denied all the basic rights that would make settlement an option (work, access to services, etc.), even though history shows that guests may wait a lifetime and never return home. And, indeed, there is a widespread sentiment that many Syrian refugees will not easily return to Syria once security is restored.

Beyond economics, the social equilibrium and political stability of the countries of first asylum are put at risk by the massive influx of Syrian refugees. It has to be kept in mind that national borders are not the only lines demarcating this part of the world. Religious and ethnic communities that span nations are also of paramount importance. Those fleeing Syria, be they Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Christian Arabs, Muslim Kurds, or Syrian Palestinians, naturally find shelter within their community on the other side of the border. With numbers growing, their mere presence can become a trigger fanning dormant tensions. Camps and informal settlements sheltering the refugees might easily become hotbeds for terrorist organizations.

Unless the Geneva peace talks bring a miracle, the situation in Syria will continue to deteriorate. In the coming months, new refugees will cross the border, and those who have left Syria will stay where they have found shelter. It is very likely that tensions will keep growing in the countries of first asylum. Can the world, and in particular Europe, afford any further political deterioration in the Middle East? It is high time for Europe to find a proper response to the current refugee crisis and consider sharing the burden of the crisis more effectively with the countries of first asylum. What burden should be shared — the refugees or their cost — remains to be seen.

Burden-sharing could consist of taking more refugees currently hosted in the Arab countries and Turkey into the EU. Various tools already exist for this, such as resettling more of the refugees currently hosted in countries neighboring on Syria; delivering asylum or humanitarian visas in European embassies in the Middle East to avoid obstacles set up at the EU’s external border; exempting Syrian citizens from visa requirements while the conflict is active; or using the existing channels of family reunification for legal entry into the EU.

While all these solutions must be seriously explored and, as far as possible, implemented, it is important to remember that not all Syrian refugees can be admitted to the EU (they are too numerous); not all of them would want to go to Europe were they offered a place (e.g. families with children who are to be taught in Arabic); and what is good for individuals may do harm to the society of origin (for example, if those admitted to Europe happen to be those most needed to rebuild Syria once the war there ends).

Burden-sharing must also mean solidarity with countries of first asylum so that there is the determination to jointly bear the costs of the refugee crisis. Through which actors should humanitarian aid be channeled in order to best serve the refugees themselves and at the same time prevent their presence generating social and political tensions? In addition to the usual recipients — international organizations, NGOs, and governments — municipalities and local administrations should be targeted, for they are tasked with helping
the daily lives of people and are ideally placed to bridge the gap between refugees and their hosts.

Just as the Syrian peace talks in Geneva take place against the backdrop of Switzerland voting for immigration quotas, the Syrian refugee crisis reaches Europe during the deepest economic crisis since World War II, with citizens’ income plummeting, unemployment soaring, and public opinion lumping asylum seekers and irregular migrants together. However, Europe must open the door wider to Syrian refugees for the sake of its defining values. For the sake of regional security in the Eastern Mediterranean, it must open its cash till wider, too, so as to be able to give humanitarian aid. In both instances, there is a duty to inform EU citizens about the need for asylum and international solidarity, but no politician seems ready to take on that particular task.

About the Author
Philippe Fargues is a sociologist and demographer and the founding Director of the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute in Florence. He held senior positions at the National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris and the American University in Cairo and taught at Harvard and various universities in France, the Middle East and Africa. He has extensively published on migration, population and politics, demography, and development.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About IAI
The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1965, does research in the fields of foreign policy, political economics, and international security. A non-profit organization, the IAI aims to disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences, and publications. To that end, it cooperates with other research institutes, universities, and foundations in Italy and abroad and is a member of various international networks. More specifically, the main research sectors are European institutions and policies, Italian foreign policy, trends in the global economy and internationalization processes in Italy, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, defense economy and policy, and transatlantic relations. The IAI puts out an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (AffarInternazionali), a series of research papers (Quaderni IAI) and an Italian foreign policy yearbook (La Politica Estera dell’Italia).