The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali, in partnership with the German Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung, organized a two-day workshop in Rome to discuss the policy preferences and reform strategies of non-violent Islamic movements in different Arab countries. The workshop, entitled “Democracy and Islamic Movements,” brought together representatives of Islamic movements with Arab, European and American analysts.

Morocco’s Justice and Development Party, Algeria’s Islamic Society for Civilizational Construction, Egypt’s Wasat Party Initiative, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement, Bahrain’s al-Wefaq National Islamic Society and Saudi Islamists close to the Moslem Brotherhood were represented at the meeting. All of them declared they opposed violence and endorsed pluralism.

The discussion highlighted significant differences in the position of legal parties that participate in elections and are represented in parliament and movements that are not legally recognized in their countries and cannot take part in a democratic political process. The legal parties—the Moroccan Justice and Development Party, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, and the Kuwaiti Islamic Constitutional Movement have developed platforms that address issues of broad public concern. Their agendas thus include not only political reform measures but also good governance issues, such as combating corruption, reducing unemployment, and improving public services.

Islamic movements that are kept out of the political sphere, such as the Wasat Party Initiative, al-Wefaq National Islamic Society as well as Algerian and Saudi Islamic movements, are mainly concerned with political reforms that would allow them to participate in the political process and focus less on issues of governance. The difference between legal parties and unrecognized movements is not surprising and shows how participation forces political actors to prioritize the issues that are of concern to their constituencies, rather than those that are of concern to politicians.

Reform strategies adopted by movements not recognized as legal parties are also influenced by the specific conditions in each country. For example, the Egyptian Wasat presses for reform of the party law, so it can become a legal party, but Algerian Islamists, most exiled since the civil war, focus primarily on national reconciliation. Bahrain’s Al-Wefaq, a Shia political society whose members participated in the 2002 municipal election, winning 55 percent of the seats they contested, is nevertheless concerned about the marginalization of Shias in Bahrain and the continuing domination of the Sunni royal family. Saudi Islamists believe that they have no choice but embracing a political agenda centered on gradual reforms and working to build constituencies at the municipal level.

All participants argued forcefully that Western governments and NGOs must accept them as legitimate political actors and stop questioning their democratic credentials. Nevertheless, the discussion highlighted some of the tensions that remain between the generally liberal political platforms of the Islamic movements and their social and cultural preferences. Controversy centered around three major questions:

• What does the reference to Islamic marja’iyya (source or frame of reference), found in the platforms of all Islamist organizations, mean in practice? Is it possible to reconcile an Islamic marja’iyya with the civic values of a liberal political system?
• Where do Islamic movements draw the line between their religious and their political activities? Are they contradictory? Can contradictions be resolved?
• What is the position of Islamic movements on the rights of non-Muslim communities and on religious restrictions on public freedoms?